On Geopolitics: Spaces and Places1

Harvey Starr

University of South Carolina

The study of international relations sits at the convergence of human inquiry that crosses both time and space. The aimhere is to elaborate on the spatial context of international relations, to contrast it to the temporal context, and toindicate broadly the continuing importance of the geopolitical spatial context to the study of international relations. Ibriefly demonstrate how this relationship is based not on an earlier approach based on geographic determinism, butrather possibilism—the possibilities presented by the spatial, geographic, and geopolitical context. In elaborating on spaceand place, I return to the central research focus of my career: the dynamism and importance of the spatial context forunderstanding international relations, along with the need to take both time and space into account, the need to appre-ciate both a locational view and the perceptual/symbolic/constructed view of space and place, and to do so within anincreasingly globalized, interdependent, and transnational world system.

The study of international relations (or international poli-tics or world politics) sits at the convergence of humaninquiry that crosses both time and space. Much of myscholarly career has been devoted to the study of space,as reflected in both the theme of the 2014 annual meet-ing of the ISA, “Spaces and Places: Geopolitics in an Eraof Globalization,” and my recent book, On Geopolitics:Space, Place, and International Relations. In a much morecursory overview, I want here to touch on themes centralnot only to my book, but to a set of issues that form acentral research focus of my career: the dynamism andimportance of the spatial context for understanding inter-national relations, along with the need to take both timeand space into account, the need to appreciate both alocational view and the perceptual/symbolic/constructedview of space and place (and to do so within an increas-ingly globalized, interdependent, and transnational worldsystem); and to demonstrate how the relationshipbetween geopolitics and international relations coversstate and nonstate actors alike.

Why be concerned with space and spatiality? Whetherattributed to Confucius, to Buddhist precepts, to Bucka-roo Banzai, or to generations of geographers, we have allbeen reminded: “no matter where you go, there you are.”Much of my research has been devoted to what thismeans. What does it mean— “there you are”? Location?Absolute? Relative? Related to what? Space? Distance?What is the meaning of distance? Of space? Of place?

In distinction from a number of scholars of geopolitics(usually “realists” studying national security policy insome form) who see the geopolitical context at least asenduring—if not immutable or deterministic—I havebeen concerned with the dynamism of that context.

Foucault once commented that scholars saw space as “thedead, fixed … immobile” (Agnew and Duncan 1989:1). Ihave, however, argued that space or the spatial dimensionwas dynamic and changing. The realist Colin Gray(1977:1) once asserted that “Geography is the most fun-damental factor in the foreign policy of states because itis the most permanent.” I argue that Gray’s assertion tellsonly part of the story. Geography is important not justbecause of its relative stability, but also because of its rolein shaping the dynamics of opportunities and risks. Geog-raphy affects changing perceptions of the possibilitiesand probabilities provided by the geographic environ-ment. Although geography—in terms of topography orthe absolute distance between two points, for example—is relatively stable, technological change or politicalchange (such as those brought about by the creation ordissolution of alliances) alters the meaning and impact ofgeography on interaction opportunity and the structureof incentives and risks.

Context: Time, Space, and Determinism

Time and space are two of the primary ways in which wecontextualize social behavior and interactions. But, inmuch of our work, time—the temporal dimension—seems to be privileged. Abler, Adams, and Gould(1971:10), in the classic geography text Spatial Organiza-tion: The Geographer’s View of the World, succinctly indicatethe importance of these two dimensions: “Time andspace are obvious and immediate aspects of human exis-tence…. Time and space are the fundamental contexts ofall experience…. Experience must be located in time andspace before we can begin to process it further…. Locat-ing an event in the spatio-temporal continuum is our firststep in ordering our experience of it.” Although this israther obvious, it is key to understanding that analysesstructured solely (or almost entirely) around time are only tellingus half of the story. So we have the question: Why is it thatsocial scientists have been primarily concerned with timeand only more recently turned to consider space?

There are some powerful differences in the ways inwhich time and space have been perceived and under-stood. These differences have enormous effects on how

1 This article is based on the Presidential Address delivered at the AnnualMeeting of the International Studies Association, April 4, 2013, San Francisco.Much of the paper draws upon my book, On Geopolitics: Space, Place, and Inter-

national Relations (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers, 2013). I would like tothank Jennifer Knerr of Paradigm for all of her help and advice on this book.A great number of colleagues have influenced my work on geopolitics overthe years, but for this specific piece I would particularly like to thank ZaryabIqbal and Paul Diehl for their assistance in thinking about the contours anddirection of my Presidential Address. Paul deserves a special mention for sug-gesting “spaces and places” as part of the title and focus.

Starr, Harvey. (2013) On Geopolitics: Spaces and Places. International Studies Quarterly, doi: 10.1111/isqu.12090© 2013 International Studies Association

International Studies Quarterly (2013) 57, 433–439

we think about phenomena and how we design ourresearch to study international relations. The quotationfrom Foucault starkly outlines some of these differences—space as dead, fixed, immobile, whereas time was seenas rich and dialectic. Abler et al. provide one way of con-trasting time and space, and how humans have consid-ered them. Their argument allows us to turn Foucault’sobservation on its head. That is, in addition to the per-ceptual and analytical reasons found in discussing relativespace, there are deeper reasons to argue that it is spacethat is richer and more complex and thus deserves farmore attention. Time is simply “easier” to deal with.Abler et al. observe:

Because we cannot control our movement throughtime and because it is divided into formal units likedays, lunar periods, years, we are more aware of time thanspace. Our consciousness of existing in time producesthree regions along the temporal dimension: the past,the present, and the future…. At each moment weoccupy a point in time. At that point, experience isvery intense and immediate. Intensity and immediacydiminish as experience moves further into the past oras events we probably will experience move into anincreasingly distant future. (Abler et al. 1971:8)

I think this is a powerful statement of why we are moreaware of time. However, the “Western” linear temporalordering of the past, the present, and the future—mea-sured by standard units of time such as days or years—echoes the character and advantages geographers give toabsolute space or absolute distance when compared torelative space or distance: an ease of measurement andsimplicity of conception. In contrast to this view of time,Abler et al. point out how we occupy space:

Spatially, we also occupy a nodal (central) position,although we have no widely used categorization of spaceanalogous to the division of time into past, present, andfuture. Individuals and groups have spatial ranges of var-ious sizes, but these have not been formalized in anygenerally accepted way…. All of us have territories andranges and crudely formed conceptions thereof…. Per-haps our insensitivity to space is related to the fact thatmovement in space is voluntary whereas movement intime is wholly involuntary…. (Abler et al. 1971:9;emphasis added.)

What this means is that even absolute space with itsstandard units (miles, kilometers, latitude and longitude)has no equivalent to the universal human experiencewith past, present, and future. All humans must belocated physically somewhere (as noted, “no matter whereyou go, there you are”), but there are no commonreference points. All location is somehow relative and non-formalized. The notion of movement through space beingvoluntary whereas movement through time is involuntaryand crucial (if stunningly simple). Being more universal,more linear, and invariant (in the sense of it being invol-untary), the temporal context is easier to understand andwork into our research designs. Just because it is voluntary,the spatial context should be more important to manyaspects of our research designs. However, there is nodoubt that for other parts of research design, it makesour tasks much more difficult.

This discussion points to the dynamism I have thoughtabout and studied over my career. It stands in stark con-trast to geographic or geopolitical determinism. It would

not be unfair to characterize a major thrust of the workof Harold and Margaret Sprout (for example, Sprout andSprout 1965) as an attempt to counter previous determin-istic views and uses of geography. Although not the onlyperspective on geopolitics, nor the only scholars to pres-ent that perspective, the Sprouts’ version of possibilismhas held a central place in the study of international rela-tions. William T. R. Fox (1985:27), in elaborating on theSprouts’ possibilism, once noted that “Harold and Marga-ret Sprout are the American political scientists with themost sustained interest in and influence on geopoliticalthinking from the 1930s to the 1970s.”

The Sproutian “ecological triad” is the mechanism bywhich we join politics and geography. This triad is com-posed of an entity, its environment, and the entity–environment relationship. The advantages of this frame-work derive from its applicability to any number of levelsof analysis, thus assisting the analyst to cross levels ofanalysis. That is, whether the focus is on a single decisionmaker, a small group of decision makers, a foreign policyorganization, a government as a whole, or the state as aninternational actor, the concept of the ecological triadargues that we need to look at the ongoing policy/choiceprocesses within that entity, its context or environment,and then the interaction between the entity and the envi-ronment. Determinism is only one form of the entity–environment relationship that could be hypothesized.However, it is a form in which the full causal force flowsfrom the geographic environment to the human or insti-tutional environed entities. In response to this model ofthe entity–environment relationship, the Sprouts arguedthe existence of alternatives where decision makers wouldbe capable of making choices. One alternative was theirconstruct of environmental possibilism, the central tenet ofwhich:

is that the initiative lies with man, not with the milieuwhich encompasses him. Possibilism rejects the idea ofcontrols, or influences, pressing man along a road setby Nature or any other environing conditions. Themilieu, in the possibilist doctrine, does not compel ordirect man to do anything. The milieu is simplythere…. In the possibilist doctrine, the milieu is con-ceived as a set of opportunities and limitations. (Sproutand Sprout 1965:83)

In this view, the environment is seen as a number offactors that limit human opportunities, constraining thetypes of action that can be taken as well as the conse-quences of that action. Although the limits set by theenvironment may be wide or narrow, it is assumed thatthe limitations are discoverable. Once these limitationsare known to some degree, another form of entity–environment relationship comes into play: environmentalprobabilism. As the humans in the decision units of anyentity view their environment, the characteristics of thatenvironment provide cues as to the probability of certainoutcomes. The environment presents the entity not onlywith what is possible, but with what choices would bemore or less likely under those particular circumstances.

If possibilism rests on the most basic notions of choice,elaborated by probabilism, in that some choices will bemade more or less likely, then there is one more compo-nent that is essential to the Sproutian alternative to deter-minism: cognitive behaviorism. This is “the simple andfamiliar principle that a person reacts to his milieu as heapperceives it—that is, as he perceives and interprets it in

434 On Geopolitics: Spaces and Places

light of past experience” (Sprout and Sprout 1969:45).This “psychological milieu” is about how humans see theenvironment and their images of the environmental con-text. Thus, the entity–environment relationship dependson the perceptions of the entity—a conception of theentity–environment relationship as far removed fromdeterminism as possible (and quite congenial with recent“constructivist” approaches). The “real” world has animpact only after choices are made and an implementa-tion attempt is sent out into that real world. Note, how-ever, that even the “feedback” from the real worldsomehow must be perceived in order to be learned andto affect future choices.

It should now be clear how the set of entity–environ-ment relationships proposed by the Sprouts provided thebasis of my own agent-structure framework of opportunityand willingness (see Starr 1978; Most and Starr 1989). Ihave argued that both opportunity (possibilism) and will-ingness (probabilism and cognitive behaviorism) are nec-essary for understanding behavior: The environment mustbe permissive, and the acting unit must choose. Theopportunity–willingness framework forces an analyst totake all three components of the ecological triad intoaccount. The spatial and geographic components of theenvironment of any international actor are thus essentialto understanding choice in foreign policy and interna-tional relations. The geopolitical environment includesthe effects of space, topography, position, and climate(Osterud 1988). Harold Sprout (1963) asserted that geo-political hypotheses deal with the configuration and lay-out of lands and seas, climate, and the distribution ofnatural resources, as well as those dealing with the distri-bution of people, social institutions, or behavioral pat-terns. Thus, all international actors or entities may belocated spatially—in some geopolitical arrangement oftypography and/or some distribution of people, behavior,and resources.

Geopolitical factors in the environment thus provide astructure of opportunities and constraints. The geopoliticalstructure, including the geographic structure, is “alwaysboth enabling and constraining,” as Giddens (1984:169)has observed about structure in general. Opportunitythus consists of both the possibilities that exist in theinternational system at any point in history (for example,technology, ideology, religion, and social inventions suchas new forms of government) and how those possibilitiesare distributed in the system. Thus, there are two dimen-sions to my version of possibilism. First, the phenomenonmust already exist somewhere in the world system. Thephenomenon—be it nuclear weapons, telecommunica-tions satellites, Protestantism, Marxism, railroads, orfinancial markets—must have been “invented” so that it isavailable as a possibility to at least some actors in the sys-tem. The second dimension centers on this possibility’sdistribution in the system. For example, nuclear weaponsdo exist; however, most states cannot “take advantage” ofthem, because they have neither the wealth nor theexpertise to produce their own. Though a possibility mayexist, limits on resources and choice affect the ability tomake use of it.

This second dimension is analogous to Harold Sprout’sconcern for the distribution of resources, people, orbehavior and also derives from the Sprouts’ discussion of“capability analysis” (for example, 1969:53). The possibili-ties or opportunities that exist and their distribution helpus understand both how costly, or risky, certain optionsappear to decision makers and how they might calculate

the expected utility of those actions. That is, thegeographic/geopolitical structure of opportunities andconstraints (possibilism) are translated through environ-mental probabilism into the incentive structures ofhuman beings who have to make choices. The geopoliti-cal environment, then, has an impact on both oppor-tunity and willingness, as people perceive theenvironmental opportunities and constraints, plug theminto a structure of incentives that make choices more orless likely, and, through some form of utility calculations,have them affect the willingness to behave.

The geopolitical approach of the Sprouts can, then, besummarized in terms of the existence of interactionopportunities and their effects on choice. Geopoliticalfactors or environments can affect interaction, processessuch as diffusion, or the occurrence of various types ofevents based on the interdependent choices of states. Aninteraction opportunity approach also directs our atten-tion to those phenomena or mechanisms that can changethe ease of interaction or the importance of spatial rela-tions. For example, technology has been studied for theways in which it has been used to overcome the spatialand temporal constraints of topography. Technology oranything else in the environment that affects ease ofinteraction (and thus also the salience or importance ofspace) is able to change the meaning of the geographic/geopolitical context of environment. New technology per-mits humans to overcome physical barriers to the move-ment of ideas or things (especially military things) or toovercome the spatial distribution of resources throughthe creation of man-made synthetic alternatives.

Alliances have a similar ability to change the impactand meaning of time and space, by “leapfrogging” physi-cal barriers, such as mountains, oceans, or simply dis-tance (see Starr and Siverson 1990). These ideas areimportant in that they support the view that the geopo-litical environment is dynamic in nature. The meaning ofthe geopolitical context can be changed rapidly throughsuch mechanisms as technological innovation, the forma-tion or dissolution of alliances, or the integration or thedisintegration of states. Far from a determinist view ofthe immutability of the earth’s physical environment, theconstraints of the environmental context (which would“determine” human choice and behavior) are being over-come by human technological invention or politicalinnovation—thus changing what the physical environ-ment means to decision makers in terms of the opportu-nities it presents and the probabilities of behavioralchoices.

As noted, an important component of cognitive behav-iorism is the set of geographic/geopolitical images thatdecision makers hold and how those affect their otherimages and calculations of choice. Decision makers’“mental maps” derive from geographic maps to formimages of global and regional environments and the risks,threats, and opportunities in those environments (seeNijman 1991). Again, this follows on earlier work ofSprout and Sprout (1971:248), who note that “maps aregeographic models” and, as such, are simplifications thataffect our images of the geographic/geopolitical environ-ment (on the nature of cartography and maps, see Mon-monier 1991; Akerman 2009).

Context: Space and Spatiality

But what is space? As with all important concepts, space ismultidimensional. As made explicit in the Sprouts’ idea

Harvey Starr 435

of “cognitive behaviorism,” space is also a concept thattakes on meaning only as it is perceived by individuals orgroups of individuals. We must now introduce the idea of“place.” Agnew and Duncan provide three approaches tothe idea of place. They note that geographers usuallylook at these separately, but that all three meanings are“complementary dimensions” of place. By looking atthese three approaches, we can begin to highlight themeaning of space or spatiality:

Approaches to defining a geographical concept ofplace have tended to stress one or another of threeelements rather than their complementarity. Firstly,economics and economic geographers have empha-sized location, or space sui generis, the spatial distribu-tion of social and economic activities resulting frombetween-place factor cost and market price differen-tials. Secondly, microsociologists and humanistic geog-raphers have concerned themselves with locale, thesettings for everyday routine social interaction providedin a place.2 Thirdly, anthropologists and cultural geog-raphers have shown interest in the sense of place oridentification with a place engendered by living in it(Agnew and Duncan 1989:2).

It should be noted that the first two approaches toplace are clearly related to “opportunity.” The thirdapproach is related to “willingness,” as part of identityand self-identification, of how people locate themselves inthe universe, as well as how they value things.3 The firstapproach—location or space—is the one with which I thinkstudents of international relations are most familiar,emphasizing the location of things in relationship toother things and how things are distributed. This idea ofspatial contingency is picked up in Kirby and Ward’s(1987:3) definition of “spatiality” as “a contingent factorwithin the operation of any social formation,” in whichsociety’s “components are themselves dependent upontheir spatial setting.”4

This view of place-as-location matches the two basicways to think about location, as presented by Abler et al.(1971:59): “absolute location” and “relative location.”According to Abler et al., “Absolute location is position inrelation to a conventional grid system designed solely forlocative purposes.” In this view, location is provided bysuch things as latitude and longitude or a street address.The concept becomes much richer, but also much trick-ier, in the second way to think about location: “Relativelocation is position with respect to other locations.” Thiscan be expressed in terms of a variety of factors, such asdistance or travel times from other locations, or the costof such travel. We have noted above how technologychanges “relative location”—places that were once weeksapart in time, are now only hours apart—and othermechanisms, such as alliances, can do likewise. As Abler

et al. (1971:82) note, “Any activity we undertake whichmakes it easier or more difficult for people, ideas, orobjects to move through space has significant effects on spa-tial processes and the structures they produce” (emphasisadded).

Abler et al. (1971:72) note that prior to 1950, geogra-phers generally dealt with space (and distance) in the“absolute” mode. Since then, however, in most research“relative location and relative distance has been used todefine new kinds of stretchable, shrinkable spaces.”Contrasting the two views, they note: “There are a largenumber of ways of describing distance and location in arelative context, but in the absolute context we arerestricted to customary and unchanging units such asmiles, kilometers, or degrees of latitude or longitude tomeasure distance” (1971:59). In a view similar to the oneI have expressed in my work, they note (in a way thatwould be at least congenial to Foucault) that “humandecisions constantly alter and restructure relative spaces.It has taken geographers a long time to challenge thepervasive tyranny of absolute space” (1971:82).

Not only do human decisions “alter” relative spaces,but various types of relative space explicitly take time intoaccount, so that relative space and relative distance, andthe meaning of relative space or distance, are heavilydependent on perceptions: “The spaces in which peoplelive are much more psychological than absolute. If we areconcerned, as we often are, with explaining spatial inter-action, what is important is not how far two interactingplaces are from each other in absolute space, but ratherhow far the people at the two places think they are apart”(Abler et al. 1971:75). This view captures the Sprouts’cognitive behaviorism, along with the extant set of “con-structivist” approaches and models (see also Snyder,Bruck, and Sapin’s [1954] “definition of the situation”).In my own work, this involves how perception of space ordistance affects willingness.

Although in recent decades the overwhelming focushas been on relative location and distance, geographershave not abandoned the traditional questions of geogra-phy: “‘Where?’ and ‘What is where?’” These questions—especially the latter—become more complex and interest-ing when dealing with relative distance. For example, inabsolute space, using unchanging measures such as milesor kilometers—conceived of as Euclidian space—theshortest distance between two points is a straight line.Geographers, looking at relative space, have providedother ways to think about distances between two points;for example, a road that winds its way around a moun-tain. Similarly, cities where streets and avenues form gridsthat channel or constrain movement between the cornersgenerated by the grid can be viewed as “Manhattanspace.” Manhattan space is “a variant of Euclidian space,in which the shortest distance between two points is apath consisting of line segments which meet at rightangles” (Abler et al. 1971:73). Thus, a straight line as theshortest distance between two points, or “as the crowflies” distance, loses its meaning in a setting where astraight line is impossible. Manhattan space is a usefulexample of how any number of constraints can, and do,change the meaning of relative location or relative dis-tance.

Relative Spaces

Earlier we introduced place as dependent on perception,identity, and values. We can now elaborate on that, using

2 O’Loughlin and Anselin (1992:16) note that “Giddens prefers the termlocale over place because place suggests a spatial container while locale is thesetting of interaction and the contextuality of social life.” In earlier work, Ihave also used Giddens in this way, preferring the broader idea of contextover more narrow meanings such as “container.”

3 See, for instance, the work of John Agnew or that of David Newman (forexample, 1991, 1996, 1999).

4 A good example of the function of space and spatiality in the “operationof any social organization” is found in the fascinating “Sugarscape” simulationpresented in Epstein and Axtell (1996). The “agent-based” computer model-ing methodology presented by Epstein and Axtell puts spatial distribution atthe heart of a multidisciplinary model of how societies develop, grow, becomemore complex, and die.

436 On Geopolitics: Spaces and Places

additional ways to look at relative location or relative dis-tance. In Figure 1, we can see four additional differentways in which space can be presented and thus contrastrelative locations in relative spaces to the “reality” of abso-lute space. The figure indicates how five separate pointscan change in their distances/location to each other basedon absolute space, time-space, cost-space, and social-space. Using absolute space, each location—from A to E—is located six kilometers from its next neighbor. Loca-tion A is situated in absolute space six kilometers fromlocation B, which is located six kilometers from locationC, and so on, based on “a conventional grid systemdesigned solely for locative purposes.”

The other three types of space are relative spaces.“Time-space” is based on the amount of time it takes togo from one location to another (or move some objectfrom one location to another). Whereas deterministicgeopolitics is based on absolute location/distance, mostof the questions we study in international relationsregarding security, conflict, international political econ-omy, or cooperation are based on time-space (and, as weshall see, cost-space). This is where technology has animportant impact on how the meaning of space canchange. In Figure 1, note that location C is now substan-tially closer to location A than location B. Such locationsmay flip for a number of reasons; for example, A may becloser to C in time-space because they are linked by anexpressway, which shortens the time to drive betweenthem, in contrast to the other locations, which are con-nected by winding, two-lane roads (or no roads at all!).

Time-space is reflected in international relations’ dis-cussions of a “shrinking world.” For example, we cantrack the pace of civilian intercontinental travel since theearly nineteenth century. Around 1820, the earlieststeamships traveled about 5 miles per hour. However, thetransoceanic liner RMS Lusitania (which figured so prom-inently in the US entry into World War I), which waslaunched in 1907, could travel approximately 30 milesper hour. The DC-3 airliner, introduced in 1936, had amaximum speed of approximately 230 miles per hour.But, only forty years later, following continually faster jet

airliners, the Concorde supersonic airliner began flyingcommercially in 1976 with a speed just over Mach 2, oraround 1,350 miles per hour! If we graphed these speeds,we would see a sharply accelerating exponential curve.Although the absolute location and distance betweenNew York and London, for example, remained the same,the time-distance between them fell from about 2 monthsfor the early trans-Atlantic steamships to about three anda half hours for the Concorde.5 In the national securityarena, we can find a parallel reduction of time-space withthe development of intercontinental bombers and thesubsequent development of ICBMs. In any of these typesof examples, it is the meaning of distance that has chan-ged in regard to human perception and choice.

Similarly, the cost of moving across distance has chan-ged as well. Whereas time-space captures much of whatBoulding (1962) meant by the “loss-of-strength gradient,”cost-space captures the rest. Simply put, cost-space dealswith the costs of moving objects from one location toanother. Cost-space is critical to what Agnew and Duncanmeant when they stressed economics in discussing “loca-tion,” dealing with “economic activities resulting frombetween-place factor cost.” In Figure 1, cost-space is rep-resented by the bus fare between locations. In the figure,each location is equidistant from its neighbors—the busride costs $0.50 from location A to location B, and $0.50from location B to location C, and so on. However, wealso know that some public transportation systems arebased on fare-stages, where the cost per absolute distancedoes not stay the same, so that fares are not proportionateto absolute distance: for example, the British bus system.Taxicab fares are based on cost-space, but also includethe time it takes to get from location A to location B aswell as the distance traveled (and sometimes within broadfare areas), so that, again, price is not based on the abso-lute distance traveled.

Just as changes in technology reduce the time it takesto move from one point to another, they also affect thecosts of moving people and things. Not only must rail-roads be invented to become part of the menu of oppor-tunities, but they must be available to any specific area ifthey are to reduce time and cost (consider the cost ofrenting an apartment, or buying a house, near a com-muter train station compared with one that is a thirty-minute drive away). Although closer in terms oftime-space if moved by plane, some types of goods arecloser (that is “cheaper”) in cost-space if they move byrail, truck, or ship, owing to size or the amount that mustbe shipped to be economically worthwhile. AlthoughBoulding’s loss-of-strength gradient focuses on the timerequired to move military capabilities, cost-distance alsohighlights the economic and human costs of moving mili-tary capabilities. The cost of moving large numbers oftroops has historically been high in terms of money andlives, with armies often losing more lives to disease, acci-dents, and hunger in long marches or sieges than in

FIG 1. Relative Locations in Relative Spaces

5 Regarding time-space, Abler et al. (1971:83) note, “A peculiarity of time-space convergence is that distant places converge on each other at a greaterrate than close places.” This reflects the impact that transportation technologyhas on spanning large distances more quickly and the much more marginalimprovements in moving across a city than across a continent or an ocean.One example they present is looking at the time distance between Edinburghand London in 1776 and then in 1966. The change that they found was basedon the comparison of stage coach (5,760 minutes) to airplane (180 minutes).This yields a time-space convergence of 29.4 minutes per year. That is, foreach year between 1776 and 1966, the two cities became closer by an averageof almost half an hour.

Harvey Starr 437

actual combat. The “projection of force,” especially bymajor powers using blue water navies, aircraft carriers, orlong-distance bombers, has often been much less costlythan the movement of massive numbers of troops. Theuse of US air power in the first Gulf War is an example.Again, a nuclear-armed ICBM also illustrates how technol-ogy can alter cost-space.

To indicate the variety of other possible relative dimen-sions, Figure 1 also includes “social-space,” measured interms of interactions: here, the number of social contactsper week. Although locations might be close in terms ofabsolute space/distance, people may not interact propor-tionately with those who are closest. This is contrary toone of the basic tenets of geography, or Zipf’s “principleof least effort,” which argues that there will be moreinteraction between entities that are close than those far-ther apart (Zipf 1949).

Social-space might reflect the different ethnic makeupof groups at specific locations or major class differences(which could be reflected not only in local prices but thetypes of stores in the different areas). At such a micro-level of analysis, we see this view of social-distance in thestudy of protracted social conflicts. As developed in thework of Edward Azar (for example, Azar 1984), pro-tracted social conflict was a special form of social conflictthat was long term, ongoing, and permeated all aspectsof the two societies involved. It was seen as highly intrac-table and apparently unresolvable to normal conflict reso-lution mechanisms because of the extensive linkagesbetween development, violence, and identity that perme-ated the two actors. Classic cases of protracted conflict,the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and the conflict in North-ern Ireland, also indicate that a key feature was conflictbetween the government of a state and at least one non-state actor on that state’s territory. Gil Friedman(2002:11) has noted that the typical protracted conflictsituation finds the “geodemographic integration of rivalnations,” that is, the intermingling of peoples from differ-ent ethnic-national groups on the same territory. Thus,this constant opportunity for conflict is also embeddedwithin a context of constant willingness. At the sametime, individuals and groups that literally share the sameterritory have very low levels of interaction: Althoughabsolute distance is low, social-distance is quite high interms of locale—”the settings for everyday routine socialinteraction provided in a place.”

Social-space distances can also be found when lookingat the international system in terms of a “feudal,” or hier-archical, model. Studies of former colonial areas in the1960s and 1970s revealed that they continued patterns ofinteraction that found former colonies interacting mostwith the former imperial power, next with other formercolonies of that same imperial power, and far less withother states, including their neighbors and near regions.In the 1960s and 1970s, for many Francophone Africanstates, the quickest way to fly from one to another wouldbe through Paris. The same relationships applied to for-mer British colonies in Africa, where the quickest way totravel from one to another would be through London(for example, see Gleditsch 1969). International relationsscholars have also used social-space in looking for “dis-tances” between states or groups based on any number ofsocio-political-economic factors. For example in BruceRussett’s (1967) study of regions, his analyses revealedhomogeneous groupings of states that were “close”—thatis, were similar and clustered together—in terms ofvoting in the UN General Assembly, their networks of

memberships in international organizations, trade inter-dependence, and sociocultural similarity. Looking acrossthese analyses, we clearly find evidence that countries thatwere similar on one or more of these dimensions didinteract more (see also Quincy Wright’s [1942] version ofsocial-space in his different approaches to “distance”).

As we can see, the various forms of relative space areways of viewing space, place, and distance that help makethe argument that geography and spatial approaches aredynamic and complex. One way this happens is because“Individuals and groups of people live at intersections ofnumerous relative spaces” (Abler et al. 1971:82; emphasisadded). By noting the types and number of such intersec-tions, we can see the different ways space is dynamic:“The number of dimensions we use and the way we mea-sure distance along them determine the nature of anyspace we construct. By choosing different distance mea-sures, we can change space” (Abler et al. 1971:73).

Briefly returning to my own work, this task of develop-ing “different distance measures” in order to reconceptual-ize space is exactly the aim of my research using GIS toremeasure and reoperationalize opportunity and willing-ness in regard to contiguous borders (for example, Starr2002). In an absolute distance sense, contiguity indicatesthat two states touch. This is an on/off measure of conti-guity that is relatively static unless the border is altered bywar or diplomacy (for example, integration, decolo-nization). By using GIS to develop indexes of ease ofinteraction (opportunity) and salience (willingness) thatcharacterize any single border or any area along eachborder, variance has been added—variance that changesthe nature and meaning of the border.6 The elementsfrom the ARC/INFO GIS used to develop these indexesidentified the location of key aspects of a state’s transpor-tation, communication, energy production, industrial,agricultural, and security infrastructures. This approachdemonstrates how human activity and its creations canchange borders and the meanings of borders beyond on/off touching—and might do so relatively quickly.

To Conclude

We see, then, why relative location/distance is so stronglyfocused on time-space; why it is so oriented to how loca-tion and space relate to time, and vice-versa. And this iswhy technology and the range of other human inventionare so important—they change the meaning of space, loca-tion, and distance. Time-space and cost-space are abouthow long it takes to move objects across some distance,from some location to another, and the costs of doing so.They are crucial in our study of security, of militaryaffairs, and thus to realist models of international politics.They are crucial in our study of economic, social, andpolitical transactions: to our study of trade, diplomacy,and integration, and thus to liberal, neoliberal, and plu-ralist models of international politics. And, social-spacecaptures much of the social construction of meaning andidentity central to a broad set of constructivistapproaches.

The opening sentence of this article argued that spaceand time are the central components of the context ofinternational relations. Thus, space and geography are

6 The new dataset also permitted new analyses and findings concerningthe relationships between borders and both conflict and cooperation. SeeStarr and Thomas (2002, 2005), and Starr (2013: chapters 6, 7, 8).

438 On Geopolitics: Spaces and Places

inextricably intertwined with the study of internationalrelations. Very simply, all humans live (in permanentabodes) on the territory of some state. As with MarkTwain, the reports of the death of the territorial statehave been greatly exaggerated. Territory and the bordersthat separate states from each other provide key elementsin the structure of the global system—mapping the num-ber and arrangement of the territorial units upon whichall humans live. Territory and borders permit a spatialapproach to international or global politics by setting outthe location of states and their absolute and relative dis-tances from each other. Borders represent importantlegal boundaries between states. Such boundaries are justas important (or perhaps even more so) between democ-racies at peace with one another, who rely on a multitudeof economic and social transactions, as they are to adver-saries who “securitize” their borders with fortificationsand military capabilities.

Borders continue to act as factors of constraint onhuman interaction, as well as factors that facilitate humaninteraction. Territory and borders have significant effectson international relations because of their meaning tohumans (scholars, policymakers, or peoples). There is adeep connection between individuals and groups to theterritory on which they live and the territory that theirancestors lived on. What is so important to the identityand cohesion of groups, thus, also can become one ofthe major obstacles in managing and resolving conflictbetween those groups. I have argued that geography is“dynamic” in that the meaning of space, distance, territory,and borders can change in the perceptions of peoplesand foreign policy-making elites. This can be donethrough technology or through alliances. Both the inter-nal and external politics of peoples, substate organiza-tions, and states affect the creation, dissolution, andmeaning of borders.

In sum, even in the world of growing interdependenceand globalization, geography, territory, and borders haveimportant roles to play in the reality of, and study ofinternational relations. I hope I have helped us under-stand a bit better the importance of geography, border,space, and place—even in the contemporary globalizedand “borderless” world, and the attendant claim of de-ter-ritorialization. It is important to stress that despite livingin the interdependent, transnational, and globalizedworld of the twenty-first century, geographic factors suchas territory and borders are still integral and meaningfulelements of world politics.

References

Abler, Ronald, John S. Adams, and Peter Gould. (1971) SpatialOrganization: The Geographer’s View of the World. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:Prentice-Hall.

Agnew, John A., and James S. Duncan. (1989) Introduction. In ThePower of Place, edited by John A. Agnew and James S. Duncan.Boston: Unwin Hyman.

Akerman, James R. (Ed.) (2009) The Imperial Map. Chicago: University ofChicago Press.

Azar, Edward E. (1984) The Theory of Protracted Social Conflict andthe Challenge of Transforming Conflict Situations. In ConflictProcesses and the Breakdown of Social Systems, edited by Dina A.Zinnes. Denver: Monograph Series in World Affairs, University ofDenver.

Boulding, Kenneth E. (1962) Conflict and Defense. New York: Harperand Row.

Epstein, Joshua M., and Robert Axtell. (1996) Growing ArtificialSocieties. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Fox, William T. R. (1985) Geopolitics and International Relations. InOn Geopolitics: Classical and Nuclear, edited by C. E. Zoppo and C.Zorgbibe. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff.

Friedman, Gil. (2002) Toward a Spatial Model of Protracted ConflictManagement: The Palestinian Case. University of South Carolina:Unpublished doctoral dissertation.

Giddens, Anthony. (1984) The Constitution of Society. Berkeley: Universityof California Press.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter. (1969) The International Airline Network: ATest of the Zipf and Stouffer Hypotheses. Peace Research Society:Papers 11: 123–153.

Gray, Colin. (1977) The Geopolitics of the Nuclear Era. New York: CraneRussak.

Kirby, Andrew, and Michael D. Ward. (1987) Space, Spatiality,Geography, Territoriality, Context, Locale—And Conflict. Paperpresented at the annual meeting of the American Political ScienceAssociation, Chicago, September.

Monmonier, Mark. (1991) How to Lie with Maps. Chicago: University ofChicago Press.

Most, Benjamin A., and Harvey Starr. (1989) Inquiry, Logic andInternational Politics. Columbia, SC: University of South CarolinaPress.

Newman, David. (1991) On Writing “Involved” Political Geography.Political Geography Quarterly 10: 195–199.

Newman, David. (1996) Writing Together Separately: Critical Discourseand the Problems of Cross-Ethnic Co-Authorship. Area 28: 1–12.

Newman, David. (1999) Real Spaces, Symbolic Spaces: InterrelatedNotions of Territory in the Arab-Israeli Conflict. In A Road Map toWar, edited by Paul Diehl. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt UniversityPress.

Nijman, Jan. (1991) The Dynamics of Superpower Spheres of Influence:U.S. and Soviet Military Activities, 1948–1978. InternationalInteractions 17: 63–91.

O’Loughlin, John, and Luc Anselin. (1992) Geography ofInternational Conflict and Cooperation: Theory and Methods. InThe New Geopolitics edited by Michael D. Ward. Philadelphia:Gordon and Breach.

Osterud, Oyvind. (1988) The Uses and Abuses of Geopolitics. Journalof Peace Research 25: 191–199.

Russett, Bruce M. (1967) International Regions and the InternationalSystem. Chicago: Rand McNally.

Snyder, Richard C., H. W. Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1954) Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics. PrincetonUniversity: Foreign Policy Analysis Project.

Sprout, Harold. (1963) Geopolitical Hypotheses in TechnologicalPerspective. World Politics 15: 187–212.

Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. (1965) The EcologicalPerspective on Human Affairs. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. (1969) Environmental Factorsin the Study of International Politics. In International Politics andForeign Policy, edited by James N. Rosenau. New York: Free Press.

Sprout, Harold, and Margaret Sprout. (1971) Towards a Politics of thePlanet Earth. New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold.

Starr, Harvey. (1978) “Opportunity” and “Willingness” as OrderingConcepts in the Study of War. International Interactions 4: 363–387.

Starr, Harvey. (2002) Opportunity, Willingness and GeographicInformation Systems: Reconceptualizing Borders in InternationalRelations. Political Geography 21: 243–261.

Starr, Harvey. (2013) On Geopolitics: Space, Place, and InternationalRelations. Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers.

Starr, Harvey, and Randolph M. Siverson. (1990) Alliances andGeopolitics. Political Geography Quarterly 9: 232–248.

Starr, Harvey, and G. Dale Thomas. (2002) The “Nature” ofContiguous Borders: Ease of Interaction, Salience, and the Analysisof Crisis. International Interactions 28: 213–235.

Starr, Harvey, and G. Dale Thomas. (2005) The Nature of Bordersand Conflict: Revisiting Hypotheses on Territory and War.International Studies Quarterly 49: 123–139.

Wright, Quincy. (1942) A Study of War. Chicago: University of ChicagoPress.

Zipf, G. K. (1949) Human Behavior and the Principle of Least Effort.Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Harvey Starr 439