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.. ' .•. 8702260257 PDR ADOCK p ; BOREG-0737 SDPPLEllEHT 1 EMERGEHC!' RESP<IllSE CAPABILITY Prepared for: Public Service Electric • Gas . Salem Nuclear Generating Station units 1 • 2 870220 ------ -----., 05000272 PDR . . GP-R-212207 January 1987 Prepared by: General Physics Corporation 10650 Hickory Ridge Road Columbia r MD .21044

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Page 1: NUREG-0737,Suppl 1 Emergency Response Capability ... · Operating Procedure (EOP) Upgrade, Regulatory Guide 1.97 implementation for Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, systematic

.. '

.•. 8702260257 PDR ADOCK p ;

BOREG-0737 SDPPLEllEHT 1

EMERGEHC!' RESP<IllSE CAPABILITY

Prepared for:

Public Service Electric • Gas . Salem Nuclear Generating Station

units 1 • 2

870220 ------ -----., 05000272 PDR . .

GP-R-212207

January 1987

Prepared by:

General Physics Corporation 10650 Hickory Ridge Road

Columbia r MD .21044

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..

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SECT I ON 1 PURPOSE .•.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.. • ••. • •••••••• 1-1

SECTION 2 DEFINITIONS •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••••••••••••• • 2-1

SECTION 3 REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS •••••••••• ~ ••••••• -••••••••••••••••• 3-1

SECTION 4 SALEM BACKGROUND ON ERC INTEGRATION ••••••••••••••••••••••• 4-1

SECTION 5 ERC TASK ACTIVITIES AND PSE&G RESPONSIBILITIES •••••••••••• 5-1 5.1 ERC Task Activities and PSE&G Responsibilities ••••••• 5-1 5.2 Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) •••••••••• 5-1

5.2.1 DCRDR Program Plan and Team Staffing •••••••••• 5-1 5.2.2 Develop Salem-specific Human Factors

5.2.3 5.2.4 5.2.5 5.2.6 5.2.7 5.2.8

Guidelines . .........•..•............. ." ....... 5-3 Prepare for NRC Briefing and NRC Audit •••••••• 5-4 Perform Operating Experience Review ••••••••••• 5-5 Per form Control Room Survey ••• · •••••••••••••••• 5-6 Perform DCRDR Verification •••••••••••••••••••• 5-7 Assess Human Engineering Discrepancies ••••••• ~5-8 Perform HED.Reconunendation and

Resolution ...........•.....•...... · .......... 5-9 5.2.9 Schedule Control Room Modifications •••••••••• ~-10 5.2.10 Prepare DCRDR Summary Report ••••••••••••••••• 5-11

5.3 Emergency Operating Precedure (EOP) Upgrade ••••••••• 5-12 5.3.1 Prepare and Submit EOP Procedures ·

Generation Package (PGP) ••••••••••••••••••• 5-12 5.3.2 Develop Plant Specific Technical

5. 3.'. 3 5.3.4 5.3.5 5.3.6

Guidelines (PSTG) ••••••••• _ •••• ~ •••••••••••• 5-13 Perform PSTG-Verification •••••••••••••••••••• 5-14 Develop Draft EOPs ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 5-15 Perform EOP Verification ••••••• ~·············5-16 Perform System Functions Review and

Task Analysis . ...••....•..•..... · ......•...•. 5-1 7 5.3.7 Perform DCRDR/EOP Validation ••••••••••••••••• 5-18 5.3.8 Perform EOP Modifications •••••••••••••.••••••• 5-19 5. 3. 9 Implement EOPs ••• · ••• • ••••••••••••••••••••• , •• 5-20

5.4 Regulatory Guide (R.G.) l.97 •••••••••••••• ~·········5-20 5.4.1 Prepare R.G 1.97 (Rev 2) Compliance/

Position Report •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 5-29 5.4.2 Perform R.G. 1.97 Control Room ·

Interface ••••••••••••••••••• ~ ••••••••••••• ~5~22 5.4.3 Prepare for R.G. 1.97 NRC

. Comment/Audit ................................ s-23 .

i

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• ·u

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

5.4.4 Prepare Design Modifications for R.G. l.97••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••··5-24

5.4.5 Procure Equipment for Instrumentation Modification .....................••......... S-24

5.4.6 Implement R. G. 1.97 Modifications •••••••• ~ •• 5-25 5.5 Emergency Response Capability Training •••••••••••••• 5-25

5.5.1 Establish Systematic Training

5.6

Requirements ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 5-25 5.5.2 Develop ERC Integrated Training Plan ••••••••• 5-27 5.5.3 Develop SPDS Simulator Hardware/

5.5.4 5.5.5 Safety 5.6.l 5.6.2 5.6.3

5.6.4

5~6.5 5.6.6

Software ...••..•..•..••••••••••••...•••.•.•.. S-28 Perform.EOP Training •••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••• 5-28 Perform SPDS Operator Training ••••••••••••••• 5-29 Parameter Display System (SPDS) •••••••••••••• 5-30 Perform SPDS Functional Analysis ••••••••••••• 5-30 Perform SPDS Parameter Set Selection ••••••••• 5-31 Perpare and Submit SPDS Safety Analysis -

. Report and Implementation Plan ••••• : ••••••• 5-32 Prepare Functional Requirement

Document ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • ••••• 5-34 Develop Static SPDS Displays ••••••••••••••••• 5-35_ Prepare SPDS Human Factors Program and

Per~orm Review .•..••...•....•..•........... S-3.6 5.6.7 Determine Process for Signal

5.6.8 5.6.9

Validation •••••••••••••••••••.•••••••••.••• 5-37 Develop Software Design Specification •••••••• 5-38 Determine Parameter Use and ·

Proce~sing ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 5-38 5.6.10 Develop Dypamic Display Software ••••••••••••• 5-39 5.6.11 Perform SPDS Hardware Installation ••••••••••• 5-40 5.6.12 Perform SPDS Verification/Validation

(V&V) •• -•• · •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• • ·.S-41 S.6.13 Perform Man/Machine Validation of

SPDS Displays ••••••••••••••••••••••••••.••• 5-42 5. 6 .14 Prepare for NRC Audit •••••••••••.••••••••••••• 5-43

SECTION 6 EMERGENCY RESPONCE CAPABILITY TASK INTEGRATION •••••••••••• 6-1 . .

6.1 Task Integration Step No 11 PSTG Development for Task Integration ••.•••••••••••••••.•••••••••••••••• 6-1

6.2 Task Integration Step No 21 ERG/PSTG Functi~nal Analysis Development .......... ·_ ........•. ~ .... ~ ..... 6-3

ii

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SECTION 7.0

TABLE OF CONTENTS (continued)

6.3 Task Integration Ste~ No 3i SPDS Parameter Set Selectioo .......................... · .......... •. 6-4

6.4 Task Integration Step No 4i control Room ijuman Factors Guideline Development ••••• · ••••••••••••••••• 6-6

6.5 Task Integration Step No Si Performing DCRDR · · and EOP Validation ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 6-7

6.6 Task Integration Step No 6i R.G. 1.97/Control Room Interface ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 6-a·

6.7 Task Integration Step No 7i SPDS Verification and-Validation •.•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• ~···6-10

6.8 - Task Integration Step No Si Salem ERC Integrated

7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5

Trainirig Plan ...............•.....•............... i-11

ERC PROJECT MANAGEMENT/ORGANIZATI~ •••••••••••••••••• 7-1

ERC Project Division of Responsibility ••••••••••••••• 7-1 ERC Project Co_ordina tor ••• · ••••••• ~ ••••••••••••••••••• 7~ 2 Project Overview/Management •••••••••••••••••••••••••• 7-3 ERC Project Documentation and Reporting •••••••••••••• 7-4 E:Rc Action Tracking ..•••...••....••••.•••••• ~········7-5

iii

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SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of this plan is to establish an effective means for the

integratiai of tasks necessary to meet NRC Generic Letter 82-33 (NUREG-0737

supplement 1) and to enhance control room operations for Salem Nuclear

Generating Station (Salem) Units 1 & 2. The Emergency Response Capability

(ERC) task integration will involve the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS)

implementation, Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR), Emergency

Operating Procedure (EOP) Upgrade, Regulatory Guide 1.97 implementation for

Accident Monitoring Instrumentation, systematic operating training, and the

Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) implementation only as they relate to the

other task activities •

~l

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SECTION 2. DEFINITIONS

2.1 Definitions

CSF Critical Safety Function

.DCRDR Detailed Control Room Design Review

EOF Emergency Operations Facility

EbPs Emergency Operating Procedures

EPP Emergency Plan Procedures

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute

Emergency Response Capability

Emergency Response Facilities

Emergency Response Facility Information

ERC

ERFs

ERFIS

ERG Emergency Respons~ Guidelines

HED Human Engineering Discrepancy

I&C Instrumentation and Coritrol.

INPO Institute of Nuclear Power· Operations

ITP Integrated Training Program

M/M Man/Machine

NLS Nuclear Licensing and Safety

NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NSAC Nuclear Safety Analysis Center

NUTAC Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee

PDA Preliminary Design Assessment

PGP Procedures Generation Package

PLS Plant Staff

. PSTGs Plant Specific Technical Guidelines * PWR Pressurized Water Reactor

Salem Salem Nuclear Generating Station

SPDS safety Parametr Display System

SRO Senior Reactor Operator

TSC Technical Support Center

V&V verification arid Validation

WOG Westinghouse Owners Group

2-1

System

* Guidelines for the EOP' s ·are WOG ERG' s with a -conrparisofi. · Record developed for Salem procedures

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SECTION 3. REGULATORY ~QUIREMENTS

3.1 Regulatory Requirements

The specific regulatory requirements for performing the ERC tasks

including integration are contained in Generic Letter 82-33, which issued

NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 entitled, "Requirements for Emergency Response

Capability." ·All other previously issued NUREGs and Regulatory Guides are

only to be used as sources of guidance for providing acceptable means of

meeting the requirements of Generic Letter 82-33.

The requirements contained in NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 replace the

qorresponding requirements in the following sections of·NUREG-0737:

I.C. l Guidance for the Evaluation and Development of Procedures for

Transients and Accidents

I.D.l Control Room Design Reviews

I.D.2 Plant Safety Parameter Display Console

iII .A. l. 2 Meteorolbgi.cal oat.a

The requirements of NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 are referenced for each of

the Salem specific requirements discussed in Section 5 of this document. In

addition, pertinent support provided byNRCand industry guidance documents is

also referenced.

Since the integration of the ERC task activities require plant specific ·

effort coordination, task completion dates could not be dictated uniformly for

all plants. Instead, Generic Letter. 82-33 allowed for scheduie negotiations

between the NRC and the licensee based on the plant specific needs of each

utility •

3-1

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••

The schedule requirements for Salem Nuclear Generating Station are as

follows:

Task

SPDS Safety Analysis

SPDS Operability

EOP Procedures Generation Package

EOP Implementation

DCRDR Program Plan

DCRDR Summary Report

R.G. 1. 97 Position. Report

R.G. 1.97 Implementation

ERF Completion

3-2

Schedule

Complete (submitted 1/30/84)

6/30/87

Complete (submitted 5/20/83)

· -:No'~later·~i:h.~{i_· 6. -mopt'h!s -of NRC

··:approval of·w~i-t~r~~ -i~ide Complete (submitted 2/14/83)

Complete (submitted 12/31/S3)

Complete .;. NRC SER 6/17/85

Complete - NRC SER 6/17/85

TSC Complete 12/85

OSC Complete 12/85

EOF 12/86

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••

SECTION 4. SALEM NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION BACKGROUND ON ERC INTEGRATION

4 .1 Salem Background on ERC Integration

The initial ERC task integration philosophy was reflected in t~e NRC's

SECY-82-111, developed in early 1982. Based on this NRC Commission docwnent,

Salem deferred implementati6n of several activities (including SPDS

implementation and. R.G. 1.97 position report) until the final NRC integration

plan was developed. On December 17, 1982 Generic Letter 82.;..33 was issued,

which extracted the information in SECY-82-111 to develop NUREG-0737-

Supplement 1.

Generic Letter 82-33 required that by April 15, 1983, the utility's plans

and proposed schedule be submitted to the NRC for review and schedule

negotiations. On April 15, 1983 PSE&G submitted the ERC plans and proposed·

schedule for Salem Nuclear Generating Station. In addition, a complete

discussion on the background and status of each ERC task ·effqrts and the

integration process was discussed. Subsequently, the final schedule was

negotiated with the_ NRC and documented as previously discussed in Section 3 •

4-1

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SECTION 5. ERC TASK ACTIVITIES AND PSE&G· RESPONSIBILITIES

5.1 ERC Task Activities and PSE&G Responsibilities

The primary task and PSE&G Division of Responsibility involved in

implementing the ERC project tasks are discussed below. The overall

responsibility for each of the ERC projects .are discussed in section 7.1.

The requirements for performing the ERC tasks are defined by NUREG-0737

Supplement 1 and are referenced under "Requirements" in each of the following

task acti"vities. The ERC tasks activities for the emergency response

facilities (ERF's) are not discussed in this report.

5.2 Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR)

5.2.1 · DCRDR Program Plan and Team Staffing - The DCRDR Program Plan

will be prepared for NRC review on the Proposed PSE&G planning·

phase, review phase, and assessment and implementation phase for

DCRDR implementation. The program will include staffing and

qualification of th.e review team, DCRDR task analysis, operating

experience review, the verification and validatfon processes, the

_control room survey", and the methodology for assessing and

resolving human engineering discrepancies. This program plan was

submitted to the NRC on 2/14/83 for review as discribed in

Confirmatory Order dated.6/12/84 and 7/26/84.

A DCRDR Review Team will be established to work together to

perform all of the required DCRDR related activities. This team

will be used throughout the review and assessment phase of the

DCRDR program. The typical review team consists of a systems

engineer, a senior reactor operator (SRO), and I&C/Electrical

engineer and a human factors specialist.

5-1

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·}

5.2.1.1 Requirements - N~G-0737 Supplement 1 Section 5.2.a

states that all licensees shall submit a program plan

within two months of the start of the control room

review that describes the CRDR process.

NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 5.1.b.i requires that a

qualified multidisciplinary review team and review

program be established.

5.2.1.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Assure Plan development and contract of DCRDR human

factors expertise. Manage and provide the team

leapership for the DCRDR efforts •

Secondary Responsibilities:

• Aid in program scoping and development and provide a

DCRDR team member as necessary.

• Operations - Provide necessary team support (SRO's)

and review DCRDR Program Plan.

• Training - Provide DCRDR team support as necessary.

5.2.1.3 Guidance

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Sept. 1981

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.1, NRC SRP on DCRDR, Sept.

1984 •

5-2

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• s.2.2

• NUREG-0801, Evaluation Creiteria for DCRDR, Oct.

1981.

Develop Salem Specific Human Factors Guidelines - Human Factors

Criteria will be developed to document the human engineering

criteria and conventions specifically applicable to the Salem

Nuclear Generating Station Control Room. All applicable

requirements will be identified in a manner that permits easy

r.eference for convenient project use. After the DCRDR, the Human

Factors Guideline will be adapted for ongoing reviews and docu­

mentation of future changes to the Salem Control Rooms. This

criteria will also be applied for SPDS development on CRT

displays as discussed in Section 6.4 of this plan.

s.2.2.1 Requirements - No NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 requirements

specified.

5.2.2.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Develop or assure development of Human Factors

Guidelines

Secondary Responsibility:

• None identified

5.2.2.3 Guidance

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Sept. 1981

5-3

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• 5.2.3

Prepare for NRC Briefing and NRC Audit - An NRC briefing will be ·

required by the NRC upon their review of the DCRDR Program

Plan. The briefing will respond to their specifc comments on the

Program Plan.

An NRC audit or results review will be conducted by the NRC upon

submittal of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station DCRDR Summary

Report. This audit/review will analyze the results and

documentation to assure adequate resolution of identified Human

Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs).

5.2.3.l Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Sections

5.1.a,c,d, and e state that the NRC review of the DCRDR

Program Plan and Summary Report will result in either an

inprogress audit, preimplementation audit, or a HED

implementation review.

5.2.3.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility

• Coordinate NRC audit or question responses with

plant engineering.

Secondary Responsibility

• Provide technical support for NRC audit or

responses.

5.2.3.3 Guidance

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Sept. 1981 •

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.1 SRP on CRDR, Sept. 1984.

5-4

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• 5.2.4

Perform Operating Experience Review

The operating experience review will identify factors or

conditions that could cause and/or have previously caused human

performance problems and could be alleviated by improved human

engineering. This review will provide information on potential

problem areas by studying documented occurrences of human

engineering related problems that have occurred at Salem and at

similar plants. This will consist of a historical review (i.e.

LERs) and operator interviews.

5.2.4.1 Requirements - Even though no requirement to perform

this review is stated in NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, the

NRC has required this review in all DCRDR program plans

per NUREG-0700 •

5.2.4.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Conduct or direct the operating experience review

with human factors consultant support.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Operations - To participate in the operator surveys.

5.2.4.3 Guidance

e NUREG-0800, Section 18.1, SRP on CRDR, Sept. 1984.

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Oct. 1981 •

5...:5

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• 5.2.5

Perform Control Room Survey

The purpose of the Control Room ·survey is to identify

characteristics of I&C, equipment, physical layout, and environ­

mental conditions that do not conform to precepts of good human

engineering practice, regardless of the particular system or

specific task requirements. This survey is accomplished by

conducting a systematic comparison of existing Control Room

design features with documented human engineering guidelines.

5.2.S.l Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 5.1.b.iv

states that a control room survey will be conducted to

identify deviations from accepted human factors

principles.

5.2.S.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Assure proper conduct of control room survey along

with providing appropriate PSE&G and human factors

exper~lse~

Secondary Responsibility:

• Provide historical preliminary design assessment

input and integration coordination •.

5.2.5.3 Guidance

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.i \

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Sept. 1981

5-6

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5.2.6

-- -- ----------~-:------------------

Perform DCRDR Verification

The DCRDR Verification is to systematically verify that the I&C

identified in the Task Analysis as being required by the operator

are present in the Control Room and effectively designed to

support correct task performance.

5. 2. 6.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement l Section 5. Lb. iii

states that the display and control requirements will be

compared with the inventory to identify missing displays -

and controls. Para. 5.Ld requires that selected design

improvements be verified to assure that no new HEDs are

created.

5.2.6.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility

• Conduct DCRDR Verification along with human factors

consultant support.

_Secondary Responsibility

• None identified.

s. 2. 6. 3, Guidance'

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.l

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Sept~ 1981

5-7

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s.2.1

••

'}

Assess Human Engineering Discrepancies

Upon identification of the Human Engineering Discrepancies

(HEDs), they will be assessed for their relative importance to

plant safety and operation. This assessment is accomplished by

analyzing and eval ua t;ing the problems that~ could arise from the.

failure to correct the discrepancy. Each HED must be categorized

for later consideration for resolution.

S.2.7.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 5.1.c

states that assessment of HEDs based on significance

must be performed.

5.2.7.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Repsonsibility:

• Assure (and participate in) HED assessment with

human factors consultant support.

Secondary Responsibility:

e Training/Operations Participate in HED assessment

process.

S.2.7.3 Guidance

e NUREG-0801.

e - NUREG-0700 •

5-8

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5.2.8

Perform HED Recommendation and Resolution

Upon final assessment of all HED~, the recoinmended resolutions,

if.any, .must be determined. Resolution or the extent of

corrective action is dependent on the level of safety

significance and overall control room modification difficulty.

In addition, the recommended HED resolutions must be evaluted to

assure that no new deviations will result from the improvement.

5.2.8.l Requirements - NURE_G-0737 Supplement 1 Section 5.1.c

states that design improvements will be selected to.

correct analyzed discrepancies, Section 5.1.d states

that recommended improvements will not create new

discrepancies on unreviewed safety questions and that

they should be coordinated with other control room

improvements (i.e. 1 R.G. 1:97 and NUREG-0737).

5.2.8.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Assure and participate in the HED resolution process

with support from a human factors specialist.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Training/Operations

process.

S.2.8.3 Guidance

e NUREG-0801.

e NUREG-0700.

5-9

Participate in HED resolution.

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• 5.2.9 Schedule Control Room Modifications._ During.implementation

scheduling, approved modifications to resolve HEDs will be

integrated with other enhancement programs. These changes will

be scheduled consitent with PSE&G existing work scheduling

program, with consideration given the possible HED safety

consequence, plant operating status, procurement time, and plant

outages. Modifications that can be performed by simple

enhancements will be performed expeditiously.

5.2.9.l Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement l Section 5.1.c

states that improvements that can be accomplished with

an enhancement program should be done promptly. Section

5.1.d. states that improvements should be coordinated

with other changes resulting from other improvement

programs such as SPDS, R.G. 1.97, operator training,

etc.

5.2.9.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Determine initial schedule for approved HED

modification and prepare or assure preparation of

necessary design change packages.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Coordinate modification scheduling with other

improvement programs and negotiate final schedule

with the. NRC.

• Assure modification scheduling is consistent with

available manpower, budget and outages.

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5.-2. 9. 3 Guidance

• NUREG-0700

5.2.10 Prepare DCRDR sununary Report - At the completion of the DCRDR, a

Final Summary Report will be prepared for submittal to the.NRC

for review and comment. This report will document in summary

form the processes and activities utilized in the DCRDR. Any

departures from the methodologies described in .the Program Plan

will be noted and justified.

The Final Summary Report will also describe the results of the

DCRDR Review Phase. All HEDs identified during the DCRDR will be

included, along with the determinations for correction and/or

resolution for each HED. A proposed implementation schedule will

be provided.

5.2.10.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement l Section 5~2.b

states that all licensees shall submit a summary report

of the completed review outlining proposed control room

changes including their schedule for implementation.

Additionally, summa~y justification for HEDs with no or

only partial correction will be provided.

5.2.10.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare Final Summary Report for submittal to the

NRC.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Licensing - Review and submit report to NRC for

review.

.5-11

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5.2.10.3 Guidance

e NUREG-0700

·• NUREG-0801

5.3 Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP} Upgrade

5.3.1 Prepare and Submit EOPProcedures Generation Package (PGP) - This

document includes the Salem Nuclear Generating Station EOP plant

specific technical guidelines, writers guide, EOP validation

program and EOP trainning program description. The PGP must be

transmitted to the NRC for review.

5.3.1.1

5.3.1.2

Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.2.b

states that each licensee shall submit to the NRC a

Procedures Generation Package at least three months

prior to the date it plans to begin formal operator

training on the EOPs.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare or assure preparation of the technical

content of EOP PGP.

• Assure package development and timely submittal to

the NRC.

Secondary Responsibility:

e Operations - Provide operations input and package

review as necessary.

5-12

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5.3.1.3 Guidance

• EOP Generation Package Guideline (INPO EOPIA)

Feb. 1983.

• NUREG-0899, Guidelines for Preparation of EOPs,

August 1982.

• Review Criteria for Evaluation of PGPs (Batelle)

Nov. 1983.

5.3.2 Develop Plant Specific Technical Guidelines - The development of

the plant specific .technical guidelines (PSTGs) will consist of

converting the WOG ERGs into Salem specific guidance for develop­

ment of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station EOPs in accordance

with the PGP. This will involve providing .Salem systems data

(including informational and control requirements) along with any

Salem specific non-ERG information. Any deviations from the ERGs

must be described and justified.

5.3.2.1

5.3.2.2

Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.2.b.i

requir.es that the method for developing plant specific

EOPs from the generic technical guidelines including

plant specific information· be developed.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare or assure preparation of the PSTGs based on

the WOG ERGs including the calculational

methodology.

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5.3.2.3

·)

Secondary Responsibility:

• Operations - Provide operations expertise arid

support as necessary. Review draft PSTGs.

Guidance

e NUREG-0899.

5.3.3 Perform PSTG Verification - The PSTG verification process will

evaluate the correctness and technical accuracy of the PSTGs.

Static aspects of the PSTGs, such as plant specific functions and

setpoints, will be confirmed to be in accordance with the WOG ERGs

and Salems PSTG Peparation Guide. The existence of adequate

documentation for the PSTG and EOP verification will be

confirmed. This will be performed by individuals not involved in

the initial PSTG preparation.

5.3.3.l

5.3.3.2

Requirements ~ NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.2.b.iii

states that a program for EOP (PSTG~ verification must

identify operator- tasks: a_nd information and control

requirements .during emergency operations.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

· Primary Responsibility:

• Assure proper verification of the PSTGs is

performed.

Secondary Resi;x>nsi_bili ty

• Operat_ions - Revise PSTG verification process and

results for adequacy.

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5.3.3.3 Guidance

• INPO NUTAC EOP Verification (INPO 83-004).

• NUREG-0899

5.3.4 Develop Draft EOPs

After preparation of the PSTGs and their verificqtion, the draft

Saiem Nuclear Generating Station EOPs will be developed. The

draft EOPs will use the information contained in the PSTGs for

functional requirements. The EOP development process must be -

consistent with the Salem Nuclear Generatin~ Station PGP Writers

Guide.

5~3.4.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.1.c

states that upgraded EOPs must be consistent with the

PSTGs and an appropriate writers guide.

5.3.4.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare draft EOPs in accordance with Salem EOP

Writers Guide.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Operations - Review draft EOPs for acceptability.

S.3.4.3 Guidance

e NUREG-0899.

• Salem EOP Writers Guide. ·

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• NUREG/CR-875, Evalµation of EOPs, April 1981.

• NUREG/CR-2005, Checklist for Evaluating EOPs, April

1983.

5.3.5 Perform EOP Verification - The EOP verification process will

evaluate the correctness, technical accuracy and proper conversion

of the Salem PSTGs for EOP d~velopment. s·~attusi aspects of the

EOPs such as plant-specific valve numbers, setpoints, footnotes,

and format will be confirmed to be in accordance with the

PSTGS and the Salem EOP Writer's Guide. Supporting procedures

that are referenced or utilized will be verified and evaluated to

ensure that the intended fllllctions referenced by an EOP can be

accomplished. In addition, the EOPs will be partially-evaluated

for usability and compatibility with the minimum number,

qualifications, training, and experience of the Salem Nuclear

Generating Statioo operating staf_f. Finally, the existence of

adequate .documentation for the EOP verification will be confirmed.

5.3.5.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7. 2. b. iii

states that a program for EOP verification must be

prepared.

5.3.5.2 · PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Assure proper verification of the EOPs are

performed.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Operations - Review PSE&G verification process and

results for adequacy.

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5.3.5.3 Guidance

• INPO NUTAC EOP Verification, (INPO 83-004).

• NUREG-0899.

5.3.6 Perform System Functions Review and Task Analysis - The system

functions review and task. analysis process of the DCRDR and EOP

upgrade is to determine the input and output requirements of the

Control Room crew for emergency operation and to ensure that

required systems can be efficiently and reliably operated during

emergency operations by available personnel. This will be

accomplished by performing an analysis of tasks contained in the

Salem draft EOPs.

5.3.6.l

5.3.6.2

Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement l Section 5.1.b.ii

states that a system function and task analysis be

conducted to identify control room op~rator tasks and

·information and control requirements during ·emergency

operations.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Assure proper conduct of task analysis including

training needs and human factors expertise.

Secondary Reponsibility:

• Operations .... Provide operator support and input to

the task analysis.

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5.3.6.3 Guidance

e NUREG-0800.

• CRDR.Task Analysis Guideline (INPO NUTAC) Dec. 1983.

• NUREG-0700, Guidelines for CRDR, Sept. 1981.

• NUREG/CR-3371, Task Analysis of Control Room Crews,

Vol .• 1 and 2, Sept. 1983.

• NRC Memorandum of May 14,_1984.

5.3.7 Perform DCRDR/EOP Validation - the DCRDR/EOP Validation is to

. determine whether the functions allocated to. the Control Room

operating crew can be accomplished effectively within (1) the

structure of the Salem EOPs and (2) .the design of the Control Room

as it exists. Ad~itionally, this step provides ari opportunity to

identify HEDs that may not have becom·e evident in the static

processes of the DCRDR, and the EOP development. The DCRDR/EOP

validation process will use predefined accident scenarios to drive

the walkthroughs or simulator exercises. This process will

require a Salem operating crew.

5.3.7.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.2.b.iii

states that a program for validation of the EOPs be

prepared.

5.3.7.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Participate iri and assure proper conduct of the

DCRDR/EOP validation.

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• I

I

Secondary Responsibility:

• Operations - Provide an operating crew for

performing DCRDR/EOP Validation.

• Training - Provide simualtor time and expertise as

required.

5.3.7.3 ·Guidance

• INPO 83-006, EOP Validation Guidelines I July 1983.

e NUREG-0899.

e NUREG-0700.

5.3.8 Perform EOP Modifications - EOP discrepancies discovered during

the DCRDR/EOP Validation' phase will be evaluated and resolutions

will be incorporated into the draft EOPs. This feedback process

will better assure that the EOPs are usable. The· EOP modifica­

ti6ns resulting at this time will create the human factored EOPs

required.

5.3.8.1

. 5.3.8.2

Requirements - No specific NUREG-0,737 Supplement 1

requirements identifed.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility .·

Primary Responsibility:

• Ensure EOP modifications as determined necessary are

performed.

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-.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Operations - Input and review EOP modifications.

5.3.9 Implement EOPs

Upon completion of the EOPs and EOP operator training (see Section

5.5.4) the EOPs will be implemented.

5.3.9.l

5.3.9.2

5.3.9.3

Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.1.e

states that upgraded EOPs will be implemented.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Operations - Implement upgraded Salem Nuclear

Generating Station EOPs.

Secondary Responsibility:

• No secondary responsibilities identified.

Guidance

• . INPO 82-013, EDP Implementation Ass~stance Program,

April 19825.

5.4 Regulatory Guide (R.G.) 1.97

5.4.1. Prepare R.G. 1.97 (Rev 2) Compliance/Position Report - This report

will consist of 1) a compliance summary on how Salem presently

meets the post accident monitoring instrumentation requirements of

R.G. 1.97 (Rev. 2) including instrument rangesi qualification,

power supply, redundancy, _etc., 2) the PSE&G position to -further

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meet the requirements of R.G. 1.97 and justification for deviation

from the requirements, and 3) i-ts application to emergency

response facilities. This report will ~e developed using the

existing Salem instrumentation design and the EOP/EP require- .

ments. The R.G •. 1.97 Position Report was sumitted to the NRC in

accordance with.the O.L. Condition on 4/2/81.

5.4.1.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737, Supplement 1, Section 6.2

states that the licensee shall submit a report

describing how it meets the R.G. 1.97 requirements.

5.4.1.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Determine appropriate R.G. 1.97 instrumentation and

prepare basis for the R.G. 1.97 Position Report.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Input into R.G. 1.97 instrumentation rieeds and

develop final position report for NRC submittal.

5.4.1.3 Guidance

e R.G. 1.97 (Rev. 3).

• Recommendations for Changes to R.G. 1. 97 (INEL)

(Sept. 1982) •

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5.4.2 Perform R.G. 1.97 Control Room Interface - Accident monitoring

instrumentation which are required for specific operator action

(primarily Type A/Technical Specification variables) will be

identified and given special consideration during other emergency

response capability task activities. This will include preferred

instrumentation selection on the SPDS, recognition of operator

usage during the DCRDR/EOP Validation, and the control panel

instrumentation identification for usage during an accident.

5.4.2.1

5.4.2.2

Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 5.1.d

states that .DCRDR improvements should be coordinated

with other improvement programs including R.G. 1.97.

PSE&G Divisions of Responsibility

Primary.Responsibiiity:

• Review and input into R.G. 1.97 instrumentation

identification philosophy.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Establish ERC philosophy for instrumentation

identification on the control panels.

• Review and input into instrumentation identification

philosophy and evaluate review results of DCRDR

validation.

• SPDS Project Manager - Evaluated R.G. 1.97

instrumentation list for use on SPDS displays •

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5.4.2.3 Guidance

e NUREG-0700.

• R.G. 1.97 (Rev. 2) Section 1.4.6.

5.4.3. Prepare for R.G. 1.97 NRC Commen.t/Audit - The NRC will perform a

review of the Salem Nuclear Generating Station R.G •. 1.97 Position

Report and will either accept or request additional information on

each of the exceptions taken to the Regulatory Guide by PSE&G.

PSE&G will be required to prepare and submit anyadditional

information as required to support the Salem Nuclear Generating

Station positions. The NRC may also perform an audit to verify

implementation of the R.G. 1.97 instrumentation modifications.

5.4.3.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737, Supplement l Section 6.2

states that staff review will be in the form of an audit

that will include a review of the licensees method of

implementing R.G. l.97.

5. 4. 3. 2. PSE&G Di vision of Responsibility

5.4.3.3

Primary Responsibility:

• Coordinate NRC responses and/or audit.

• Provide technical support NRC responses and/9r

audit.

Guidance

None identified •

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'-

5.4."4. Prepare Design Modifications for R.G. 1.97 """ Design Change Package

(DCP) for all instrumentation modifications as determined

necessary for Salem per R.G. 1.97 must be prepared for meeting the

implementation schedule of O.L. Condition c. (7) - Unit 2_ -L:Lcens~'·

5.4.4.1 Requirements - No NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 requirements

specified.

5.4.4.2

5.4.4.3

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare design change packages for R.G. 1.97

_ instrumentation modifications.

Guidance

None identified.-

5.4.5. Procure Equipment for Instrumentation Modification - The R.G. 1.97 -

equipment-required per the approved DCPs must be procured on a

schedule to meet the implementation requirements.

-5.4.5.1 Requirements - No specific NUREG-0737 Supplement 1

requirements identified.

5.4.5.2 PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Resp6nsibility:

• Procure R.G. 1.97 equipment iri timely manner for

implementation.

Secondary Responsibility:

• None identified. 5_;24

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5.4.5.3 Guidance

None identified.

5.4.6 Implement R.G. 1.97 Modifications - In accordance with the

requirements of Operating License Condition C.(7) - Unit 2, all

R.G. 1.97 modifications as determined necessary must be imple­

mented by the 1st or 2nd refueling outages.

5.4.6.l Requirements - Operating License Condition

5.4.6.2 PSE&G Division of Repsonsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Perform modifications based on approval DCPs •

Secondary Responsibility:

• Provide technical support as determined necessary.

5.4.6.3 Guidance

None identified.

5.5 EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY TRAINING

5.5.1 Establish Systematic Training Requirements - Salem's systematic

(performance based) training requirements will be established as

determined necessary from the INPO accreditation program criteria

along with any training related EP requirements· from the DCRDR/EOP

Validation. The performance based training criteria will include

how PSE&G proposes to 1) perform a systematic analysis to deter­

mine discrete job performance requirements, 2) develop training

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objectives from the systematic analysis and describe the desired

trainee performance after training, 3) conduct training to meet

the specified objectives, 4) ~valuate trainees' performance during

training to demonstrate mastery of objectives, and Sf rev.ise

training program based on trainee performance on the job.

5.5.1.1 ·_Requirements_- NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 3.4.c,

3.8.d, and 7.1.d and Section 306 of the Nuclear Waste

Policy Act of 1982 and the proposed lOCFRS0.57 and

50.200 (SECY-84-76) requires that a systematic (task

analysis) approach be developed to act as a basis for

performing future operator training.

5.5.1.2

5.5.1.3

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Establish systematic training requirements.

Secondary Responsibility: .

• Provide necessary input from DCRD~/EOP validation

for establishing training requirements.

Guidance

· • _,,;,Proposed lOCFRSO. 55 rulemaking on training.

• · INPO Job and Task Analysis Guides (3 Vol.) Sept.

1983 •

5-26

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5.5.2 Develop ERC Integrated Training Plan - This plan will provide the

systematic training process for developing operator knowledge in

order to comprehend plant conditions and cope.with potential

emergencies effectively. The scope of the training plan will

involve overall emergency response capability training including

use of the SPDS, EOPs, and use of post-accident instrumenta­

tion. This plan should use criteria extracted from the Salem

systematic requirements developed from the Salem program for

complying with the INP·o Accreditation Program.

s.s.2.1

·s.5.2.2

5.5.2~3

Requirements - The requirements of an Integrated

Training Plan are not specified in NUREG-0737 Supplement

1, however, the plan was called out by the NRC in the

NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 NRC workshop tr~nscripts.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Develop Integrated Training Plan.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Provide ·document scope and input as necessary.

Guidance

• Prop6sed 10CFR50.55 rulemakirig~

• NUREG-0737 Supplement 1. NRC Workshop Transcript .

(Feb. 24, 1983) •

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5.5.3 Develop SPDS Simulator Hardware/Software - The hardware and

software for the SPDS needs to be incorporated into the Salem

Simulator. This needs to be accomplished sufficiently ahead of

SPDS implementation in order to conduct the SPDS man/machine

validation and operator training.

5.5.3.1

5.S.3.2

s.s.3.3

Requirements - No specific NUREG-0737 Supplement 1

requirements.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Develop SPDS software and install hardware on Salem

Simulator •

Secondary Responsibility:

• Aid the hardware installation as part of the

Simulator update process.

Guidance

• Proposed R.G. 1.149, Nuclear Power Plant Simulators

for Operator Training.

5.5.4 Perform EOP Training - As part of the overall Salem training

program, EOP training will be included to establish an operating

staff that is capable and competent to respond to any off-normal

plant situation. This training will consist of classroom

instruction, simulator exercises, and/or walkthroughs, as

appropriate •

5.S.4.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 7.1.d

states that the licensee will provide operator training

on the use of the upgraded EOPs prior to implementation.

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5.5.4.2

5.5.4.3

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare training course and conduct operator

training.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Provide background and support on EOP development.

Guidance

• IN.PO Accreditation Program.·

5.5.5 Perform SPDS Operator Training - Prior to implementing the·SPDS

the control room operators must be fully trained in the use of the

SPDS for normal and emergency conditions. Training will include

use of the SPDS as (1) an aid for following the emergency

procedures, (2) the means for estimating off-site dose levels, ( 3)

an aid to declaring emergency action levels, and (4) as a means

for providing plant status (post~accident monitoring information)

to the TSC and EOF. SPDS training for the control room will use

the SPDS added to the simulator.

5.5.5.1

5.5.5.2

Requirements - NUREG---0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.c

states that SPDS. training will be performed to respond

to accident conditions.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare training course and conduct training.

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Secondary Responsibility:

• Aid or support training act{vities.

5.5.5.3 Guidance

• INPO SPDS Implementation Guideline.

5.6 SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS)

5.6.1 Perform SPDS Functional Analysis - This involves specification of

the function(s) the SPDS is expected to perform. The functional

analysis should identify the types of activities to be supported

by the SPDS in the control room, TSC, and EOF, and the kinds of

information required by prospective SPDS users. At a minimumn,

the analysis should define the role of the SPDS in relation to the

EOPs, the types of personnel who will be expected to use it, the

location of the SPDS units in the control room. Consideration

should also be given to design characteristics that will assure

reliability and availability goals stated in NUREG-0696.

5.6.1.l

5.6.1.2

Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.l~b,

4 .1. c, 4 .1. e and 4 .1. f states that the SPDS shall

continuously display information to the operators, and

shall provide sufficient information to determine plant

safety status including reactivity control, core

cooling, RCS integrity, radioactivity control, and

containment conditions.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility

• SPDS Project Manager - Assure preparation of the

SPDS Functional Analysis for SPDS display

development basis.

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5.6.1.3 . .

Secondary Responsibilities

• Input to and review of information to be provided by

SPDS for acceptability to operators and to assure

accurate representation to SNGS EOPs.

• Help define, or review and cordinate these

activities to assure licensing compliance .and task

. integration.

• Provide PSTG support for preparing Functional

Analysis.

Guidance

• NUREG ~ 0696, Section 5

• NUREG - 0800, Standard Review Plan Section 18.2,

Safety Parameter Display System, Rev. o, Nov. 1984

• Guidelines for an Effective SPDS Implementation

Program. INPO 83-008 (NUTAC), Jan 1983

5.6.2 Perform SPDS Parameter Set Selection - This involves the selection

of Salem specific parameters which shall be available on the SPDS

displays that must be sufficient to indicate the ERG control

functions. Thes.e parameters will be determined based on the

requirements of the Salem PSTG' s and the functional analysis

performed in 5.6.1. The parameter list must be verified by

demonstrating that the proposed parameters are sufficient to

monitor. plant status under different plant modes and meet the NRC

Critical Safety Function (CSF) requirements for continuous

moni taring.

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..

5.6.2.1

5.6.2.2

5.6.2.3

Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.l

states that the minimum information to· be provided shall

be sufficient to provide reactivity control, reactor

core cooling, reactor coolant system integrity,·

radioactivity control, and containment conditions.

Section 4.2.a states that the selection should be based

on a wide range of accident events including severe

accidents.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Develop Salem specific parameter list for SPDS using

generic parameter sets and Salem specific SPDS

monitoring requirements.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Aid parameter list development and provide in Salem

SPDS safety analyses.

Guidance - No specific guidance documents identified.

5. 6. 3 J;'repare and Submit SPDS Safety Analysis Report and Implementation

Plan - This SPDS Safety Analysis is conducted to assure that the

SPDS design is sufficient to assess the safety status of each

identified safety function for a wide range Of accident events.

This report was submitted to the NRC for review by 1/30/84 and the

SPDS will be implemented by 6/87~

The Implementation Plan will describe the entire implementation

process for the SPDS system. The plan will describe the design,

development, installation,· t~aining and functional operation of

the system. This plan.will be submitted to the NRC for review

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with the SPDS Safety Analysis. The detailed info!mation to be

included. in the SPDS Safety Analysis and Implementation Plan shall

contain parameter selection, signal validation, human factors

review, reliability, verification and validation, man/machine

validation, and circuit isolation.

S.6.3.1

S.6.3.2

s.6.3.3

Requirements - NUREG -0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.2

states that a written safety analysis, describing the

basis on which the selected SPDS parameters are

sufficient to assess the safety status,and an

implementation plan shall be submitted to the NRC for

review.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibilities:

• Develop SPDS Safety Analysis and Implementation

Plan.

• Develop scope and assure proper Safety Analysis

Report and Implementation Plan development for

submittal to NRC.

Secondary Responsibility:

e . Provide appropriate input for report development.

Guidance

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.2.

e· Guidelines for an Effective SPDS Implementation

Program INPO 83-003 (NUTAC), January 1983.

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5.6.4 Prepare Functional Requirement Document - The Salem Functional

Requirements Document which is the design basis for the system .

will be revised with information completed/planned as a result of

this phase of the ERFCS/SPDS development. This will include the

parameter set, circuit isolation, Verification & Validation plari,

human factors, Man/Machine validation and system reliability.

This document will not be submitted to the NRC, but must be

prepared for baseline reference for future efforts.

5.6.4.1

5.6.4.2

5.6.4.3

Requirements ~ No specific NUREG-0737 Supplement 1

requirements.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• To develop or assure proper development of the

Functional Requirements Document for both software

and hardware.

Secondary Responsibilities: _

• Review and provide input to Functional Requirements

Document.

• Review design doc_ument to assure licensing

requirements are incorporated.

Guidance

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.2.

• NSAC-39, Verification and Validation for SPDS,

December 1981. _

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••

5.6.5 Develop Static SPDS Displays - Static displays will be designed

and built on the SPDS IDT CRl's to assure display/CR!' configura­

tion acceptability. The computer display conventions will be

included at this time to assure htiman factors principles ai:e

incorporated.

5.6.5.l

5.6.5.2

5.6.5.3

Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, Sections 4.1.a

and 4.1.b states that the SPDS should provide a concise

display of critical plant variables and continuously

display information from which plant status can be

readily and reliably assessed by control room personnel.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare or assure preparation of SPDS static·

displays.

Secondary Repsonsibility:

e Build displays on IDT SPDS CRTs.

• Provide direct input arid evaluation on the SPDS

display development.

• Review SPDS displays to assure minimum NRC

requirements are met.

Guidance

. • EPRI-NP-3701, Vols. 1 and II, Computer Generated

Display System Guidelines, Sept. 1984~

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5.6.6 Prepare SPDS Human Factors Program and Perform Review - The SPDS

displays shall be designed to incorporate accepted human factors

principles so that the displayed information can be readily

perceived and comprehended by the SPDS operator. A SPDS human

factors program will be prepared which includes readability,

parameter responsiveness to the CSFs, glare, labeling, alarms,

anthropometrics and SPDS location. A human factors review will be

performed to assure proper human factors design application.

5.6.6.1

5.6.6.2

5.6.6.3

Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1, Section 4.1.e

sta_tes that the SPDS shall be designed to incorporate

accepted human factors principles.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Develop SPDS human factors program. Perform and

document HFE review based on survey guidance and

established HFE computer conventions.

Secondary Responsibilities:

• Aid review and help establish HFE- computer

con veri tiqn.

• Establish Salem computer conventions as part of

DCRDR.

Guidance

e NUREG-0700

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.2

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5. 6. 7 Determine Process for Signal Validation - Signal validation is the

process for assuring that ·the input signals being displayed by the

SPDS are valid and that the operator is alerted if a signal is

suspect. This involves the use of algorithms for comparing

multiple signals to a processed signal in order to remove a failed

instrument channel as a signal input.

5.6.7~1

5.6.7.2

5 .• 6. 7. 3

Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.b

states that the SPDS will display information from which

plant status can be reliably assessed.by control room

personnel. NUREG-0696 states that displayed data shall

be validated where practical on a real-time basis to

ensure presentation of the most current and accurate

plant status, not compromised by faulty processing or

failed sensors.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare or ·assure preparation of the SPDS. signal

validation algorithms

Secondary Responsibility:

• Develop software routines for algorithms.

Guidance

• EPRI NP-210, ·On-line Power Plant Signal Validation_

Technique, Nov. 1981.

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••

5.6.8 Develop Software Design Specification - In order to effectively

perform the SPDS Verification and Validation, a software

specification must be developed. This specification is based on

the system requirements established in the SPDS Functional

Requirements Document; and will contain the actual system design

specifications.

5.6.8.1

5.6.8.2

5.6.8.3

Requirements

No specific requirement provided in NUREG-0737

Supplement 1.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Develop software design specification for developing

dynamic SPDS software.

Secondary Responsibility:

• Review software specification against Function

Requirements Document for _complete conversion.

Guidance

· • No specific documents identified.

5.6.9 Determine Parameter Use and Processing - The specific

instrumentation for acquiring SPDS parameter signals, including

the number of singals to be used, must be determined. These

should be selected from safety-related and normal post-accident

.monitoring instrumentation. The means of processing and averaging

(algorithms) the input data to the SPDS.must also. be determined.

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5.6.9.l

5~6.9.2

5.6.9.3

Requirements - No specific NUREG-0737 Supplement 1

requirements.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Select SPDS .·instrumentation and determine signal

processing algorithms•

Secondary Responsibility:

• Convert processing algorithms into SPDS subroutines.

• Compare instrumentation for consistency with DCRDR

identified and Regulatory Guide 1.97 instrumenta~

tion, as necessary

Guidance

• PSE&G Regulatory Guide 1.97 Position Report.

5.6.10 Develop Dynamic Display Software - Software for driving the

static displays must be developed. The software package will

also utilize the signal validation and the parameter selection

and processing results. Verification and validation will be

applied to the software package.to assure proper software.

development •.

5.6.10.1 Requirements - No specific NUREG-0737 Supplement 1.

requirements provided •

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• S.6.11

5.6.10.2

5.6.10.3

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility

• Develop all SPDS computer software

Secondary Resp6nsibility

• Review software algorithms for proper

translation.

• Review software algorithms for proper

tr ans la ti on.

Guidance - No specific guidance documents

· identified •

Perform SPDS Hardware Installation - The SPDS hardware along

with al~ necessary cabling must be installed in the control

room, EOF and TSC. Special attention must be paid to all

interfaces between the SPDS and existing plant instrumentation

to ensure that the integrity and reliability of existing

instrumentation cannot be affected by any malfunction of the

SPDS hardware.

5.6.11.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.c

states that the SPDS shall be suitably isolated from

electrical or electronic interference with equipment

and sensors that are in use for safety systems •

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5.6.12

5.6.11.2

5. 6 .11. 3

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility

• Implement all ERFICs/SPDS hardware per approved

DCPs.

Secondary Responsibilities:

• Issue all DCPs as necessary for installation·

hardware.

• Identify all hardware installation requirements

and review instrument inputs for circuit

isolation.

Guidance - No specific guidance documents·

identified.

Perform SPDS Verification/Validation (V&V) - The verification

process will be conducted to assure that the SPDS system is

designed, tested and installed as described by the functional

requirements. The validation process assures that once the

system has been installed and is operational that it is

functionally adequate. The evaluation wil_l demonstrate that the

system actually accomplishes the role it is designed to

perform. This involves the development of a V&V test plan and

validation test procedures, conducting the actual software and

hardware V&V in accordance with those procedures, and developing

a final V&V test report. This process must be performed

independent from the engineering/computer staff.

5~6.12.1 Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 Section 4.1.a

requires that the SPDS be developed with a high

degree of reliability.

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• 5.6.12.2

5.6.12.3

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• To develop (or contract for) a verification and

validatioo program including test plans and V&V

implementation.

Secondary Responsibility: ·

• Aid development of V&V program, review Validation

Test Report summarizing the V&V efforts, and make

document available for NRC review as necessary.

Guidance

• NSAC-39, Verification and Validation for SPDS,

December 1981.

• Component verification and System Validation

(INPO NUTAC) October 1983.

5.6.13 Perform Man/Machine Validation of SPDS Displays - During the

DCRDR Validation of Control Room Functions, the SPDS 'displays ' should be evaluated for their relationship to other control room

·'

_instrwnents and their ability to aid to the operators in use of

the EOPs.

5.6~13.l Requirements - NUREG-0737 Supplement l Section 4.1.b

states that the SPDS will provide plant status which

can be readily and reliably assessed by control room

personnel.

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5.6.14

5.6.13.2

5.6.13.3

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Prepare Man/Machine Validation program and

arrange for appropriate personnel to be available

during validation. ·

Secondary Responsibility:

• Support Man/Machine Validation with simulator and

validation crew support.

• Provide SPDS operating crew for validation •

• Provide scenario input and valida.tion experience

to SPDS validation.

Guidance

• NUREG-0700.

• DCRDR Validation Results (to be conducted).

• NSAL-39 Verification and·Validation for Safety

Parameter Display Systems, December 1981.

Prepare for NRC Audit - The NRC will either perform a second

"Preimplementation Audit" or a "Validation (post-implementation)

Audit", but likely not both. The preimplementation audit will

involve a review on how the NRC requirements are met. prior to

SPDS implementation. The validation audit will look more

heavily at the SPDS man/machine validatioo, operability and

training aspects.

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• 5.6.14.1

5.6.14.2

5.6.14.3

Requirements - No NUREG-0737 Supplement 1

requirements specified.

PSE&G Division of Responsibility

Primary Responsibility:

• Coordinate NRC audit at SNGS.

• Provide the technical support and documentation

for NRC audit.

• Support NRC audit as required.

Guidance

• NUREG-0800, Section 18.2 •

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SECTION 6. EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY TASK INTEGRATION

Section 3, "Coordination and Integration of (ERC) Initiatives" of

NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 discusses the NRC's philosophy and suggested approach

to the ERC task integration. The NRC does not dictate how ERC task

integration will be accomplished, since every plant has different needs and

various stages of task completion, but provides suggested methodologies to be

considered. In addition, an: INPO NUTAC developed document "Guidance for an

Integrated Implementation Plan for Emergency Response Capabilities" (INPO 83-

048) also provides various methodologies for accomplishing this integration.

The following discussions elaborate on the methodology:

· 6.1 Task Integration Step No. l; PSTG Development for Task Integration

WOG

Technical

Guidelines

'(ERG's, Rev. 1)

' I PSTGs /

l l I ! !

SPDS R.G. 1.97 DCRDR EOP

Parameter Compliance Information Development

Set and Control .

Requirements

6.1.l Prerequisites -

a) PWR Technical Guidelines, WOG ERG's (Rev. 1)

b) WOG ERG Calculational Procedures

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•• 6.1.2

c) Salem Nuclear Generating Station EOP Procedures Generation

Package (PGP)

d) Plant Specific design details

Integration Activities - The Plant Specific Technical Guidelines

(PSTGs), are the base document for almost all ERC task develop­

ment activities. As discussed in Section S.3.2, the PSTGs will

be derived from the WOG ERGs using Salem Nuclear Generating

Station specific design and system requirements and the action

set-points. This document will be the basis for determining the

DCRDR information and control requirements, the EOP upgrade

development, the SPDS parameter set selection, and the R.G. 1.97

instrumentation requirements.

The EOP development process will use the PSTGs to acquire the

basic plant specific information necessary for converting the

function type statements of the ERGs to the task related actions

of the EOPs. At this point in the EOP development process, the

EOPs are rough draft and will require further human factoring

and step refinement from information received during the task

analysis and EOP Validation. The PSTGs can either be used

directly in the DCRDR task analysis or can be enhanced by

providing the EOP writers guide format and EOP design input. In

either case, the Salem Nuclear Generating Station plant specific

technical data will be in use, but no plant specific technical

data will be included in order to prevent predetermining the

adequacy of the existing control room instrumentation.

The DCRDR process will use the PSTGs/Draf t EOPs as a basis for

identifying the information and control requirements to be

determined during the DCRDR System Function Review and Task

Analyses.· These information and control requirements will be

compared against the Control Room Inventory to determine

instrument deficiencies in the control room.

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The SPDS parameter set selection will be based on the PSTGs for

determining the EOP entry conditions and the EOP monitoring and

control requirements. This activity is further discussed in

Task Integration Step No. 2.

The R.G. 1.97 post-accident monitoring instrumentation require­

ments are also based on the PSTGs. Type A variables are based

on the PSTG entry conditions and the monitoring and control

requirements. Other R.G. 1.97 variable positions are based on

their specific use and need as determined by the PSTGs.

6.2 Task Integration Step No. 2; ERG/PSTG Functional Analysis Development

WOG

ERGs

.CONTROL ROOM

INFORMATION

CONTROL REQ •

ERG

.FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS

SALEM PSTG

FUNCTIONAL

ANALYSIS

SALEM SPDS

PARAMETER

SET

6.2.1 Prerequisites -

SALEM

EOPs

a) WOG Technical Guidelines, WOG ERGs (Rev. 1).

b) Salem PSTGs •

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\.

• 6.2.2 The WOG ERGs and the Salem PSTGs are "function" based docurnen ts

whe.re a function represents a higher order activity by which the

EOP developer translates the objectives of the ERGS into the

PSTGs.

6. 3 TASK INTEGRATION STEP NO. 3 ~ SPDS Parameter· Set Selection

Salem

PSTGS

Salem

Functional

Analysis

SPDS

Parameter

Set

·e..3.1 Prerequisites -

a. PWR Technical Guidelines, WOG ERG's (Revision 1 or later)

b. Plant Specific Techrifoal Guidelines

c. Salem SPDS Function Analysis

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• 6. 3 .• 2

Integration Activities - Since the SPDS will be structured

around the use of the Salem EOPs, the SPDS parameter set must be

integrated closely with informational requirements of the EOP

Upgrade process. The Salem PSTGs establish the basis for the

informational needs of the EOPs and will therefore be used as

the basis for selection of the SPDS parameters.

The Salem SPDS parameter set can then be determined by applying

the PSTG entry condition and the monitor and control functions

of the PSTGs.

This process requires close integration of the two programs and

any major revisions to the PSTGs will need to be reviewed to

assure that the SPDS Parameter Set and PSTGs are consistent •

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')

6.4 TASK INTEGRATION STEP NO. 4; CONTROL ROOM HUMAN FACTORS GUIDELINE

DEVELOPMENT

NU REG

-0700

I>CRDR Human

Factor~ Guideline

Salem

Control Room

I&C

I

Control Room SPDS R.G. 1. 97

Conventions Conventions Instrument

Design

6 •. 4 .1

6.4.2

Prerequisites -

None.

Integration Activities - The control room human factors

guideline being developed as discussed in section S.2.2 will be

beneficial to several ERC task activities. It will primarily be

used to establish specific Salem control room conventions that

can be used to justify exception to the human factors

engineering checklist requirements. Secondly, it will document

. the standard human engineering design characteristics of the

existing computer systems in the control room. This will allow

the SPDS display designers the ability to use the same or

similar convention.s when. developing the SPDS displays. The

human factors conventions can also be used to develop the R.G •

1.97 instrumentation modifications in the control room.

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6.5 TASK INTEGRATION STEP NO. 5: PERFORMING DCRDR AND EOP VALIDATION

CONTROL DRAFT SALEM

ROOM EOPs SIMULATOR

I&C SCENARIOS

NEEDS

I I l ' DCRDR/EOP SPDS

VALIDATION SCENARIOS

I I ' • DCRDR EDP SPDS

VERIFICATION TRAINING VALIDATION

6.5.l

6.5.2

Prerequisites -

a. Draft Salem EOPs

b. Selected Accident Scenarios

c. Control Room Task Analysis

d. Control Room Inventory

Integration Activities - The DCRDR/EOP Validation primarily

serves to determine whether the control room operating crew can

effectively perform system functions within the structure of the·

EOPs and within the existing design of the Salem control room.

Accident scenarios will be selected that will exercise the Salem

system functions and most of the EOP steps. This process assure

that ·under accident conditions the man/machine interface in the

control room is more effective.

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• Additionally, ·the methodology for validation of the EOPs and the

scenario used in the validation will benefit a similar

validation to be performed on the SPDS. This will further.

assure that the operators use of the EOPs are effective.

The DCRDR/EOP validation, through the videotaping of the

scenarios, can benefit Salem EOP Operator training.

6.6 TASK INTEGRATION STEP NO. 6: R.G. 1.97/CONTROL RoOM INTERFACE

DCRDR/EOP

VALIDATION WOG ERGS

R.G. 1.97

.--~~~~~~~--4 TYPE A

R.G. 1. 97

INSTR.

. I.D. in CR

6.6.1 Prerequisites -

VARIABLES

SALEM

TECH.

SPECS

. a. R.G. 1.97. Position Report.

b. DCRDR/EOP validation.

6-8

SPDS

SIGNAL

LIST

• I

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6.6.2 Integration Activities - As discussed in Section 5.4.1, the

Salem R.G. 1.97 Position Report was submitted to the NRC ·on

4/2/81. In this report, the Salem Type A variables (parameters)

must be determined. Type A variables are those that provide

primary information to the control room operators in order to

take manually controlled action for which there is no.automatic

control. Even though there are Type A, B, c, D and E variables

required by R.G. 1.97, only those of Type A will be given

special conSiderations for ERC integration, sinc·e these are the

required Category l instruments.

The R.G. 1.97 Type A variables will then be input into: 1) the

Salem Technical Specifications, 2) the SPDS signal list, and 3)

will be given special identification in the. control room.

Section 3.3 of the Salem Technical Specifications will be

modified to reflect the Type A accident monitoring instrumenta­

tion. This will be in accordance with the October 12, 1983 NRC

interval memorandum from Mattson to Eisenhut entitled,

"Technical Specifications for Post-accident Monit~ring

Instrumentation".

The SPDS signal list for use in the SPDS entry conditions will,

·to the greatest extent, use the instrumentation specified as

_R.G. 1.97 Type A variable. This is due to their higher

reliability and redundant'instrumentation.

The Type A variable instruments will also be specially marked to

denote them as post-accident monitoring instruments for use with

the EOPs •. The identification methodology will be consistent

with the results of the DCRDR/EOP Validation and Control Room

survey.

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6.7 TASK INTEGRATION STEP NO. 7: SPDS VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION

HUMAN FACTORS PSTG/EOP R.G. 1.97

GUIDELINE DEVELOPMENT INTERFACE

I I ~ . ~

DCRDR/EOP SPDS

HEDs DEVELOPMENT I I

I __. ' I ... - - - -• •

FUTURE SPDS SPDS

MODS

6.7.1

6.7.2

TRAINING

Prerequisites -

a. Salem PSTGs/EOPs

b. Salem R.G •. 1.97 Position Report

c. SPDS V&V Program Plan/Procedures

Integration Activities - The Salem SPDS verification and

Validation (V&V) program is being expanded beyond the NSAC - 39

requirement·s to include other ERC integration activities. The

SPDS development process is-dependent on other ERC activities

including the EOP Upgrade,-R.G. 1.97 instrumentation, and the

DCRDR (NUREG-0700) human factors conventions. In addition,

resulting products of the SPDS development process include SPDS

training, and potential future modification that may be

necessary from the HEDs identified during the DCRDR/EOP

Valida ti on process.·

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The SPDS V&V program will review the input documentation and

results of the SPDS development process to additionally ensure

that all ERC integration activities involving the SPDS are

documented properly.

6.8 TASK INTEGRATION STEP NO. 8: SALEM ERC INTEGRATED TRAINING PLAN

INPO

ACCREDITATION

PROGRAM

SALEM

JOB/TASK

ANALYSIS

RESULTS

EOP

TRAINING

PLANS

INTEGRATED

TRAINING

PLAN

6.8.l Prerequisites -

a. INPO Accreditation Program

DCRDR

TASK ANALYSIS

VALIDATION

RESULTS

SPDS

TRAINING

PLANS

b. DCRDR/EOP,Task Analysis and Validation results

c. Salem Training JOB/TASK Analysis Results

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• L

6.8.2 , Integration Activities - Ai; discussed in Section 5.5.2 the Salem

ERC Integrated Training Program will be the basis for emergency

resp0nse training including training on the EOPs, SPDS, and use

of the control room instrumentation (i.e., R.G. 1.97 instrumen­

tation). This program should be developed in conjunction with

the INPO Accreditation Program as made Salem plant specific.

As part of the DCRDR/EOP Validation task, videotapes of operator

actions during accident scenarios were recorded. These along

with the INPO job/task analysis results· conducted for Salem can

be used to support the performance based requirement of the ERC

Integrated Training Program •

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SECTION 7. ERC PROJECT MANAGEMENT/ORGANIZATION

An Emergency Response Capability Project Management Organizat,ion will be

established to assure that: l) specific ERC task activities are accomplished

by defining PSE&G divisions of responsibility, 2) proper task integration is

be~ng performed, 3) the ERC tasks are being performed on a schedule consistent

with our Operating License Conditions, and 4) proper reporting and

documentation is being accomplished. This will.be accomplished through an

established PSE&G division of responsibility for each project, and ERC

Coordinator, and an ERC management reporting process.

7.1 ERC PROJECT DIVISICJt1 OF RESPONSIBILITY

The PSE&G responsibility for performing each of the overall projects

required by NUREG-0737 Supplement l are as follows:

• Detailed Control Room Design Review - General Manager Eng.ineering &

· Plant Betterment

• Emergency Operating Procedured Upgrade - General ~anager Salem

Operations

• Sa~ety Parameter Display System Development - General Manager

Engineering & Plant Betterment

• Regulatory Guide l. 97 Implementation - General Manager Engineering &

Plant Betterment

• ERC Training General Manager Nuclear Services

• Emergency Response Facility Implementation - General Manager Nuclear

.services

The PSE&G primary (lead) and secondary (support) responsibli ties for· each

of the specific tasks activities are provided in Section 5 of this plan•,

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• Each of the lead projects organizations for performing the ERC tasks will

be responsible for:

• Assuring.that their overall project (i.e., SPDS, DCRDR) is developed

and implemented on a schedule consistent with Confirmatory Orders

Dated 6/12/84 and 7/26/84.

• Assuring that each of their task activities required by NUREG-0737

Supplement 1 and as specified in Section 5 of this project plan are

performed.

• Maintaining adequate documentation of their entire project ~evelopment

and implementation to support NRC review and audit.

• Providing input on a regular basis to the ERC Coordinator for monthly

, reporting to PSE&G management. (See Section 7.2).

• Providing support and input, _as determined necessary, to other ERC

project activities.

The ERC project will be coordinated from a single source within PSE&G

which will enable a unified coordination and integration of ERC task

activities.

ERC Project Coordinator Responsibilities - The ERC Project Coordinator

will perform specific· res.ponsibili ties to assure proper integration and

schedule coordination of activities. This will include the following

activities:

e Coordinate all ERC task activities between the reponsible pSE&G

organizations to assure proper integration of ERC activities.

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• Define and obtain proper guidance in order that the ERC integration is

both licensable and beneficial to the project results. This may

involve modifications to the previously established ERC project

integration if individual task results or schedules are changed.

• Develop and maintain the overall ERC task integration schedule in

order to coordinate individual task activities for timely input into

task efforts.

• Provide proper NRC liaison on ERC status and activities.

• Provide review and maintain documentation of all ERC task activity

reports.

7. 3 PROJECT OVERVIEW/MANAGEMENT

The overall progress and coordination of the ERC projects will ·be·

directed by Vice President Nuclear. His responsibilities will be to:

• Assure that all projects are being conducted on a schedule consistent

with Confirmatory Order Dated 6/12/84 and 7/26/84.

• Resolve any "Management Attention" concern that are identified in the

ERC monthly reports.

• Resolve any interdepartmental concerns and disagreements.

• Review overall ERC activities to assure proper project direction.

• Interface with either PSE&G or NRC upper management regarding ERC

projects •

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I

L

7. 4 ERC PROJECT DOCUMENTATION AND REP.ORTING

Proper reporting and documentation is necessary for review of project

progress, concern identification, and retrieval of documentation of task

activity accomplishments.

7.4.l

7.4.2

Project Reporting ~ Monthly ERC project reports will be

developed by the ERC Project Coordinator for PSE&G management

and departmental review. The ERC monthly report will discuss

the "Activities Completed" during the report month, the

. "Activities Planned" for the. upcoming month (s}, and any areqs of

"Management Attention" that have been identified during the

report month or that may occur .in. the forthcoming month (s) ~

Each of the ERC task activity lead engineers will be responsible

for providing monthly input to the ERC Project Coordinator on a

routine basis and no later than the first working day of the

following month.

Activities or concerns on a more urgent basis will be brought to

the immediate attention of the ERC Project Coordinator and to

PSE&G Management, as necessary.

Documentation - All ERC related correspondence and reports will

be filed in accordance with existing Salem project procedures.

Correspondence that is requesting action from other ERC or Salem

disciplines should be documented in a central file and be given

proper correspondence designators. All other ERC related

correspondence should be determined by the originator as to

whether it should be placed in the Salem file.

Correspondence distribution should consider both the direct and

indirect involvement of Salem ERC disciplines.

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7.5 ERC ACTION TRACKING

The specific activities or input requirements for completing the ERC task

activities will be tracked and provided to each of the project lead or

responsible organizations for actioning. The ERC action may consist of a

NRC requirement, NRC commitment or an internal integration input for task

completion. However, the ERC action tracking system will not be used to

track all task commitments, but only those actions that require

interdepartmental input or responsibility, such as a R.G. 1.97 commitment

that requires a SPDS action •

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