nuclear terrorism resolutions 1.5

7/29/2019 Nuclear Terrorism Resolutions 1.5

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QUESTION OF: Nuclear Terrorism

SUBMITTER: United States

SIGNATORIES: United Kingdom, Germany, Argentina, Israel, Turkey

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1.5

Recognizing the rising significance of nuclear terrorism as a global threat;1

Acknowledging that the usage of radioactive materials for civilian purposes2

provides openings for the materials necessary for nuclear terrorism to fall into3

terrorist hands;4

Understanding the need for transparency with regards to act involving5

radioactive materials both within borders and on a transnational basis;6

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Reaffirming the role of the IAEA in promoting the use of nuclear energy for8

peaceful purposes;9

Realising the dangerous nature of using enriched nuclear materials classified as10

weapons-usable for civilian purposes;11

Regarding the free flow of highly-enriched nuclear materials in black markets12

around the world as a serious global threat;13

Noting that fissile materials enriched to only a low degree suffice for civilian14

purposes;15

Appreciating that some circumstances involving scientific purposes such as16

research may require the small-scale production and usage of highly enriched17

fissile materials;18

Applauding the current efforts undertaken by bodies including the IAEA and the19

NTI to combat nuclear terrorism;20

Respecting that countries should have a degree of confidentiality with regards to21

the disclosure of information regarding nuclear-related activities;22

Advocating that the United Nations as well as other relevant bodies should play23

an active role, due to their mission goal, to save succeeding generations from the24

scourge of war;25

Ascertaining the importance of preventing the information needed to construct a26

nuclear weapon or create weapons-grade fissile materials from falling into27

terrorist hands;28

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1. Urges the monitoring by sovereign governments of the sale of any30

isotopes capable of causing radiological terror through a nuclear or dirty bomb;31


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a. Recommends nations to monitor the transfer of the following32

isotopes capable of being made into a dirty bomb: americium-241, californium-33

252, caesium-137, cobalt-60, iridium-192, plutonium-238, polonium-210,34

radium-226 and strontium-90;35

i) Promotes the creation of a country-wide database where all36

sales of these materials must be recorded;37

b. Requires nations to implement strict controls with regards to the38

trading and movement of fissile material, including thorium, caesium, plutonium39

and uranium, by:40

i) maintaining high standards of security and communication41

with regards to cross-border transactions to avoid problems caused by42

miscommunication;43

ii) providing increased levels of security and subtlety for44

transactions within a nations borders;45

iii) declaring planned international transactions to the United46

Nations Security Council so as to promote transparency with regards to the47

acquisition of fissile materials to a reasonable extent of detail;48

2. Requires the strict regulation of the sale and trade of enriched and highly49

enriched fissile materials, in particular uranium;50

a. Urges the banning of the production and trading of highly enriched51

uranium for civilian usage;52

i) Recommends countries to declare current amounts of highly53

enriched uranium;54

b. Urges the improved security of facilities storing nuclear materials,55

in light of stolen materials appearing on the black market;56

i) Advocates that national governments oversee municipal57

governing bodies in matters involving the protection of fissile materials;58

c. Requires for any usage or preparation of highly enriched fissile59

materials for scientific and research purposes to be declared to the United60

Nations Security Council in advance;61


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3. Calls for international transparency when carrying out activities relating62

to radioactive material;63

a. Recommends that countries submit a brief record detailing all64

major activities relating to the use of special nuclear materials (i.e. fissile65

materials) for civilian/scientific usage;66

b. Calls fornations to immediately report any losses of control over67

fissile materials or significant amounts of radioactive materials in order for a68

cohesive global response to be formulated;69

4. Stresses the importance of the protection of any and all information70

relating to the nature and location of fissile materials;71

a. Urges that any countries possessing information regarding the72

creation of a nuclear weapon or processes involved in creating weapons-grade73

fissile material take extra security measures to ensure that the information is not74

divulged;75

b. Stresses that Private Sector Organisations that handle nuclear76

stockpiles should have the right to speak at and consult the Subcommittee, to77

enhance cooperation between all organizations on this issue;78

5. Advocates the establishment of a new sub-committee to be created under79

the Conference for Disarmament (the CD), to be called the UN Nuclear Terrorism80

Prevention Committee (UN NTPC), for the purpose of providing a platform for81

future discussions and collaborations regarding nuclear terrorism;82

a. Resolves to unify existing organisations acting against nuclear83

terrorism under a single umbrella organisation (to be referred to as the United84

Nations Alliance Against Radioactive Threats [UN AART]);85

i) Recommends that the members of AART (be voted upon by86

the nations participating in the NTPC;87

ii) Asks fortasks involving these organisations collected under88

AART to be shared between the organisations in a manner to be decided upon by89

the NTPC;90


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iii) Requires for member organizations of AART to maintain91

communications between both themselves and related governmental and UN92

bodies;93

iv) Proposes that the NPTC be regularly used as a platform for94

debates between both member states and AART members95

b. Calls for individual states to settle radioactive material-related96

disputes through the NTPC, of which such discussions could involve:97

i) the illegal obtaining or trade of radioactive materials or98

SNMs by terrorist organizations;99

ii) the obtaining of radioactive materials or SNMs from failed100

states or collapsed governments;101

c. Requests the AART to act as a UN watchdog;102

i) Calls forthe monitoring of both suspected nuclear terrorist103

activities and public activities being carried out by governments, particularly104

those extending across borders;105

iv) Recommends that the AART keep track of all trade records106

of nuclear materials107

d. Promotes the NPTC as a platform for the discussion of the108

international regulations involving nuclear activities that could further the109

threat of nuclear terrorism;110

ii) recommends that the committee meet both in times of need111

as well as on a 2-year basis to discuss any changes that may be needed to global112

regulations;113

iii) requests that the AART advises the NPTC on these updates114

to regulations;115

e. Gives the member organisations of AART the right to speak alongside116

other nations in the NTPC;117

i) extends this right to allow members of AART to specifically focus118

designated discussions on issue they see as contentious;119

6. Urges for governments to recognise the growing significance of nuclear120

activities carried out by the private sector;121


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a. Requires regional bodies to regulate such activity through:122

i) collaborating with other member nations to create a123

cohesive, well-defined set of restrictions to be placed upon the private sector;124

ii) regularly inspecting all private-sector facilities on a125

biannual basis;126

iii) requiring private sector companies to submit full and127

detailed reports on all aspects of their activity to the governing body of their128

country;129

iv) urges countries to act upon any suspicious or seemingly130

mendacious activity as gleaned from the aforementioned reports;131

v) urges the establishment of rules to govern physical132

security of nuclear materials, civil and fissile, emphasizing these rules shall also133

govern Private Sector Organizations handling nuclear materials134

vi) urges countries to establish protocols to govern the135

transportation of nuclear materials136

b. Stresses the growing risk of a large black market in radioactive137

materials as a legitimate one, and urges countries to tackle this via:138

i) monitoring all known and suspected illicit trading of139

nuclear activity by members of the private sector;140

ii) allowing local task forces the ability to deal with of areas141

suspected to be involved in the illicit trading of radioactive materials through142

both force and technology;143

iii) offering local task forces a direct line to call the overarching144

government for support in the cases of suspected large volumes of the illegal145

trading of radioactive materials, in particular those where special nuclear146

materials may be involved or potential retaliation is suspected;147

iv) enforcing stricter border controls and security to prevent148

private-sector cross-border dealings and potentially devastating consequences149

that may arise from such transactions;150


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v) providing customs and border control authorities with151

geiger counters and other detectors of radiation for the purpose of detecting152

radioactive materials;153

7. Advocates the creation of a set of internationally recognised disaster-154

response protocols for the purpose of preparing local authorities for cases of155

nuclear terrorism;156

a. Urges municipal governments to provide local authorities with the157

adequate materials and training to be able to cope with small-scale radiological158

terrorist attacks, including;159

b. Stresses the need for governments to provide their national160

defense systems with the tools necessary to deal with large-scale attacks on161

behalf on nuclear terrorists in terms of disaster relief in particular;162

c. Calls forneighbouring countries to offer assistance with recovery163

in the times after nuclear terrorists attacks, should they occur;164

d. Recommends that plans of action be established regarding the165

event of thievery of nuclear materials to166

i) recapture the nuclear materials167

ii)prevent radioactive leakage, both intentional or accidental,168

iii) prevent possible detonation,169

e. Recommends that countries collaborate to create such protocols;170

8. Decides to remain actively seized in the matter.171

nuclear terrorism resolutions 1.5

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