norway and the peace process in sri lanka
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Norway and the peaceprocess in Sri LankaAlan Bullion aa Associate Lecturer/Research Associate inPolitics , The Open University , UKPublished online: 20 Sep 2007.
To cite this article: Alan Bullion (2001) Norway and the peace process in SriLanka, Civil Wars, 4:3, 70-92, DOI: 10.1080/13698240108402479
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Norway and the Peace Process in Sri Lanka
ALAN BULLION
This article explores the motivations and rationale behind Norway'sinvolvement in the Sri Lankan peace process. Although Norway wasoriginally approached by the Kumaratunga government as afacilitator, her role has since had tacit approval from regional actorssuch as India, global actors such as the US and Britain, and domesticprotagonists such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).However, it has also encountered considerable opposition from localforces such as sections of the Sinhalese sangha (clergy) and the ultra-nationalist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP).
The article also examines issues such as the complexities of third-party involvement in ethnic conflicts, the practical and philosophicaldifferences between facilitation and mediation, and whether, as inIsrael/Palestine and other peace processes where Norway has becomea player, this really provides a potential method of achieving a lastingand viable solution in Sri Lanka.
An estimated 64,000 soldiers and civilians have been killed and over800,000 wounded in Sri Lanka's bloody conflict since July 1983, whenfighting erupted in the northern Jaffna peninsula between the LiberationTigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF).It is reckoned that over 800,000 Tamil refugees have fled the island sincethen, with the flow to Europe, North America and Australasia still estimatedto be reaching 15,000-18,000 people a year.
Sri Lanka has a population approaching 19 million, which is broadlydivided into the Sinhalese majority (74 per cent), who are mainly Buddhist;the Tamils, who are predominantly Hindu (18.2 per cent); and the largelyTamil-speaking Muslims (7 per cent). The ethnic Tamils are furthersubdivided into the indigenous Sri Lankan Tamils (12.6 per cent); andPlantation Tamils (5.6 per cent), who left India to work on the island's teaplantations during the late nineteenth century after the failure of the coffeecrop.
The Sinhalese regard themselves as a numerical majority in Sri Lankaitself, but an embattled minority within the wider Indian subcontinent, as the
Civil Wars, Vol.4, No.3 (Autumn 2001), pp.70-92PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
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NORWAY AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN SRI LANKA 71
keepers of the Thereveda Buddhist tradition. In contrast, the Tamils areregarded as a minority within Sri Lanka, but a majority with respect to thelargely Hindu sub-continent.
Compared with that of other parts of the former British colonial empiresuch as neighbouring India, Sri Lanka's (then Ceylon) transition toindependence in 1948 was comparatively peaceful, with some degree ofconsensus between the different ethnic communities.
However, policies implemented by successive administrations sinceindependence on employment, education, language and religion wereincreasingly regarded as discriminatory by the Tamils. Until the mid-1970s,moderate Tamil politicians attempted to redress these perceived grievancesthrough the ballot box and established parliamentary procedures, in order toachieve a negotiated federal solution.
By this time, a new generation of disillusioned Tamil youth had decidedto reject the mainstream path followed by their elders and instead adoptedviolence to reach their ultimate goal of a separate homeland of Tamil Eelam.
MILITARY LOSSES MET BY RISE IN RECRUITS
Several attempts at reaching a lasting solution in Sri Lanka have beenderailed by successive governments, majority Sinhalese opponents, and theLTTE itself. As a result, this small developing Indian Ocean island has spentover six billion dollars on defence during the past 18 years.
Most of this money could have instead have been spent on povertyalleviation, education and healthcare. Defence costs will climb further tosome $862 million in 2001, or 22 per cent of total state expenditure, fromaround $728 million in 2000.
In order to successfully defeat the LTTE, former army commanderGeneral Gerry de Silva has said that SLAF should double in size from thepresent 120,000 to at least 240,000, compared with just 9,000 in 1983. It isunclear what the LTTE's total military strength is, but most estimates placeit at between 5,000 and 6,000 at most.
The slow war of attrition against the Tamil Tigers has increasinglysapped morale in the armed forces, with high rates of desertion and anegligible number returning to their ranks, despite the offer of an amnesty.1
There are also evident problems with recruitment, despite the relativelyattractive rates of pay, as families see body bags containing theiryoung soldiers returned to the villages. A campaign to recruit 15,000troops launched in February 2000 met a muted response. As a result offurther military defeats, the government called up all reservists at the endof April.
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Sri Lanka's cooperation on defence matters and training with the US iscontinuing to increase, as well as its purchases of vital military hardwarefrom Washington, including three Bell 412 helicopters. Another example isthe purchase of a AN/TPQ-36 Firewinder weapon-locating radar systemcosting $ 22 million, which enabled the armed forces to detect and pinpointLTTE artillery and target their fighters with greater precision.2
The Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF) has also acquired several Chinese-builtK8 and PT6 advanced training aircraft to strengthen fighter pilot trainingfacilities.3 Other key arms suppliers include the Czech Republic, Russia,Israel and Pakistan. The Sri Lankan military has tried to stop the LTTE fromtaking more territory using fresh supplies of Israeli-made Kfir fighter planesand Dvora naval gunboats, as well as supersonic MiG-27 planes and BMP3 amoured vehicles from Russia and the Ukraine.4
Sri Lanka also procured multi-barrel rocket launchers (MRBLs) fromthe Czech Republic in May 2000, after it struck a deal to sell infantryvehicles, battle tanks and rockets for the launchers. The acquisition of theseMRBLs boosted firepower significantly, as they can fire 40 shells a minute,with a range of 20 kilometres. The SLAF has the capacity to fire at least 16MRBLs simultaneously if necessary. Further supplies of Czech MRBLswere contracted in April 2001.5
STALEMATE COULD PROVIDE 'RIPE MOMENT1
The LTTE appears to be keener than ever before in the past five years toenter into negotiations. On the government's side, there is also the growingrecognition that there can be no military solution to the conflict.
The Tigers are certainly on the defensive in both the domestic andinternational arenas, and the Norwegian-led peace process can certainly beseen as a strategy to improve the image of the movement both at home andabroad.
The LTTE decision to enter into dialogue appears to come from arealisation that even while they cannot be defeated militarily, neither canthey win at present on the battlefield.
The military dealt a decisive psychological blow to the Tigers when itcaptured the strategic Jaffna peninsula from the LTTE in January 1996.Despite the advantage this gave President Chandrika Kumaratunga to reachan agreement with Tiger supremo Vellupillai Prabakharan from a positionof renewed strength, both sides have since fought towards what WilliamZartman has described as a 'mutually hurting stalemate', which cansometimes provide 'ripe moments' for negotiations to commence.6
According to John Darby and Roger Mac Ginty, this usually occurs when
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'the playing field is acceptably level to both sides and talks becomepossible'.7
This usually also involves the presence of a valid spokesperson(s) suchas Norway for the parties, creating a perception to both parties that there isa way out. The primary role of the third party is to recognise the onset ofripeness and to act within that moment to encourage both parties to enterinto negotiations.
After the capture of the Jaffna stronghold in 1996, the Tigersdispersed into the jungles of the north and east and escalated activitiesaround the key eastern ports of Trincomalee and Batticaloa, using suppliescaptured from the armed forces and finance from the worldwide Tamildiaspora in Canada, Australia, Switzerland, Britain, France, Norway andelsewhere.
The military has repeatedly responded by launching successive assaultsupon Tiger training camps in these areas, as well as attempting to open upvital communication routes between Jaffna and the rest of the island, mostof which have been in rebel hands over recent years.
Until November 1999 the armed forces claimed to have driven back theTigers to a defensive position, with the gradual reduction of their territoryto about 3,200 square kilometres, from some 9,100 sq/km before the captureof Jaffna.
From November the Tigers captured several key army camps such asOddusuddan and Nedunkerni during the presidential campaign, whichculminated in the re-election of Kumaratunga on 21 December 1999, withjust over 50 per cent of the votes cast.
The LTTE subsequently launched Operation 'Oyatha Alaigal'('Unceasing Waves III') and captured a strategic army base at Elephant Passon 23 April 2000, and the town of Pallai near Jaffna on 2 May.
The Tigers declared a unilateral ceasefire on 24 December (ChristmasEve) 2000, one of the main benefits of which was that there were no furtherassassination attempts on opponents in Colombo.
However, although the LTTE renewed this truce each month until April2001, it was never properly reciprocated by the government, as the termsspecified by the Tigers were generally regarded as being unacceptable.
Colombo responded to the overture by lifting the embargo on the supplyof essential items to areas under LTTE control and symbolically releasingsome prisoners in an exchange. A five-day ceasefire was also declared inearly April to mark the Sinhalese/Tamil New Year. However, the Tigerspredictably increased their demands to the removal of the restrictions on themovement of fuel and cement, which the government decided wereunacceptable.
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A fresh four-day armed offensive by the government, named 'AgniKheela' ('Rod of Fire'), started on 25 April 2001 immediately after thetruce had expired. The LTTE put up strong resistance, forcing the troops toretreat to their original positions in Nagar Kovil, Eluthumaddaval and theKilaly lagoon.
Following heavy fighting, the Tigers anounced that it would not beextending its four-month truce. In a statement issued from the Vanni jungle,the LTTE said: 'We are compelled to make this painful decision as aconsequnce of the hardline, intransigent attitude of the Sri Lankangovernment which has not only refused to reciprocate positively to ourpeace gesture but intensified land, sea and air attacks causing heavycasualties on our side.'
However, it added that the LTTE 'will continue to support and cooperatein every way with the Norwegian government in its untiring and noble effortto bring about peace and a negotiated political settlement to the Tamilnational conflict'.8
According to government figures, at least 40 soldiers were killed on 26April 2001 in battles on the Jaffna peninsula, taking the number of troopskilled in three days to 131 with over 600 wounded.
However, as usual the Tigers disputed these numbers and said that 300soldiers had been killed and 1,200 wounded. Rebel radio reported that 33guerrillas had been killed, but government sources said the number was 180.The carnage was the worst since more than 300 combatants were killed infighting for a Jaffna suburb in September 2000.
This attack represented a concerted attempt by the Sri Lankan militaryto recapture the strategic Elephant Pass. The fighting, and a tougher stanceon negotiations by the LTTE after hints of conciliation, set back six monthsof Norwegian shuttle diplomacy and almost certainly ruined chances of thetwo sides meeting in May 2001, possibly in the Netherlands, as Norway hadhoped.9
Norwegian ambassador Jon Westborg and embassy Second SecretaryTomas Stangeland had passed through the frontline in Vavuniya in northernSri Lanka on 6 April 2001 and held eight hours of constructive talks withthe Head of the LTTE's political wing, S. P. Tamilchelvan.
However, this slow process of engagement received a significant setbackwith the resurgence of violence in late April. Norwegian peace envoy ErikSolheim arrived in Colombo on 30 April to try and salvage the peaceprocess after the worst fighting seen in over a year. He held talks withPresident Chandrika Kumaratunga and opposition leader RanilWickremesinghe, as well as the Indian High Commissioner, GopalkrishnaGandhi.10
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The Tigers said in a statement that the Kumaratunga government hadescalated the conflict by 'unleasing a major offensive against the LTTE'spositions in Jaffna' in late April and thereby 'seriously jeopardised' theNorwegian peace initiative. Norwegian envoy Erik Solhiem also describedit as a 'setback for the peace process'.11
Ruth Archibald, the Canadian envoy to Sri Lanka, also met withTamilchelvam in early May in an attempt to salvage the Norwegian-ledpeace drive. Canada has its own sizeable Tamil population. Colin Powell,the US Secretary of State in the administration of Republican PresidentGeorge W. Bush, also urged the two sides to stop fighting and start talking.12
Solheim subsequently flew to London for talks with LTTErepresentative Anton Balasingham on 8 May 2001 and to Sri Lanka forfurther discussions with Tamilchelvam, the leader of the LTTE's politicalwing, on 16-17 May. Norwegian Foreign Minister Thorbjoern Jagland alsovisited Colombo on 7-8 June for talks with Chandrika Kumaratunga andForeign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, although Solheim seemed to besidelined on this occasion, even though he was present in Colombo.
It was apparent that two issues of concern were troubling the Sri Lankangovernment. One was that the Tigers appeared to have moved the goalpostsin fresh pronouncements, with demands that the proscription on its activitieshad to be lifted before dialogue could commence. Kumaratunga andKadirgamar considered this new 'pre-condition' to be completelyunacceptable, although some foreign governments were pressing for acompromise.
More disturbing was the fact that criticism of Solheim's role andobjectivity, which had been voiced by some Sinhala opposition politicians,was now being taken seriously by the government. It was felt that Solheimwas 'tainted' by being too friendly towards key Tamil and had becomepartisan in his pronouncements.
Solheim had also reputedly upset ministers by making comments on thesituation to Richard Armitage, Deputy Secretary of State in Washington,and also urging him to put pressure on Kumaratunga to temporarily removethe ban on the LTTE, without informing Colombo first.13
Colombo justified the exclusion of Solheim from the talks, stating that itwanted to deal directly with Jagland rather than Solheim in future, as itwanted Oslo to 'upgrade' its level of participation. However, the Tigersrejected this explanation and demanded that as they had not been consultedon the matter, that Solheim should retain his role.
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COMMONWEALTH AND NORWAY APPROACHED
In a post re-election BBC interview with George Arney broadcast inDecember 1999, Kumaratunga revealed that first the CommonwealthSecretary-General Chief Emeka Anyaoku, and subsequently the Norwegiangovernment had been approached since mid-1997 as potential mediators inSri Lanka's ethnic conflict.14
Anyaoku facilitated informal talks lasting some 18 months with theTigers, according to Kumaratunga. However, the failure of these, as withprevious attempts involving France, Britain and several other countries, ledto contacts in September 1999 and February 2000 with representatives fromNorway, facilitated in London by LITE ideologue Anton Balasingham.15
The initial London meeting was followed in the third week of January2000 with a delegation to Sri Lanka led by former Norwegian State Secretaryfor Development, Cooperation and Human Rights, Lere Lunde. Further talkswere held in February 2000 in Colombo between former Norwegian ForeignMinister Knut Vollebaek and President Kumaratunga, who was accompaniedby Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar.16
The next stage was talks held in Oslo in April 2000 betweenTharmalingam Sarvendra, Chief of the Tamil Coordinating Committee(TCC), and Anton Balasingham from the LTTE, and Norwegiangovernment officials, during which the revised devolution package andassociated issues were discussed.17
This evolving process was not derailed by the change of government inOslo at this time, due to a bipartsan concensus on foreign policy. ErikSolheim, who was appointed special advisor to the Norwegian Departmentof Foreign Affairs on 30 March 2000, had already been working awaybehind the scenes on the Sri Lankan conflict for at least one year. Hecontinued in this role, even though he was a member of the Socialist Left,which is a minority opposition party.18
However, there is a notable difference of perception between the variousprotagonists, with Colombo favouring 'good offices' and facilitation, whilethe LTTE insists on Norway's role as that of mediator.
NORWAY'S ROLE FOLLOWS MIDDLE EAST ACCORD
Norway is well-known for having played a leading role in the brokering ofthe Oslo Accords in the Israel/Palestine conflict up until 1993, and morediscreetly in peace processes such as those in Guatemala (1996), Haiti,Sudan, Cyprus, Kosovo (1999), and Colombia (2000).
Former Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Wegger Stroemmen hasemphasised that Norway is selective, and has frequently rejected requests
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for help in brokering peace conflicts. 'Sometimes people come to us aftermeeting a guerrilla leader in a bar who says he wants to make peace withthe President', he said.19
In the case of the Oslo process on Israel/Palestine, the Norwegiangovernment helped the process by providing confidential meeting placesand skilled facilitators to maintain a conducive atmosphere, in whichunexpected breakthroughs became possible.20
The Oslo-based International Peace Research Institute (PRIO), whichwas established as the world's first peace instutute in 1959, has also beeninvolved in helping to facilitate workshops on such disputes.
For instance, PRIO organised two 'consultations' involving participantsfrom Sri Lanka and elsewhere during 1988 and 1989, which were regarded'as a small but valuable example of how a respected institutional base canbe used to mount dialogue initiatives'.21
Norway has also been involved in several development and socialservice projects in Sri Lanka through agencies such as Cey-Nor, Worldview,Redd Barna and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation(NORAD).
As a small Scandinavian country lacking specific geopolitical and ex-colonial interests, Norway sees itself as well placed to act as an impartialthird-party mediator in such conflicts in other parts of the world outside ofEurope. Furthermore, as a wealthy country which benefits from substantialoil and fishing revenue, its contributions to foreign aid are the best in theworld, at over 1 per cent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).
However, its role as a mediator also has motives other than idealism. Thecountry is home to a sizeable Tamil refugee population of over 10,000,many of whom work in the fishing industry.22
Norway is likewise mindful of gaining kudos on the international stage,in order to enhance its standing at the United Nations (UN) and other fora.23
The first secretary-general of the UN, Trygve Lie, was a Norwegian.According to Chester Crocker, 'A small country like Norway was able
to play the role of third-party facilitator (in the Oslo peace process)precisely because it was perceived by the parties as neutral and impartial;Norway did not seek to assume the role of fully-fledged "mediator" and didnot seek the mandate to do so.'24
However, during his visit to Colombo on 3 March 2001, Erik Solheim,the Norwegian envoy, modestly described himself as merely 'a postman'between the two sides in the Sri Lankan peace process.25
Sri Lanka is increasingly attempting to get the LTTE and its activitiesbanned in western countries. In Britain, Tamil diaspora fund-raising effortshave been estimated at $450-500 million a year. The LTTE is one of 21
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organisations to be proscribed, number 12 on the list in connection withTerrorism Act 2000, presented by former Home Secretary Jack Straw to theHouse of Commons (HOC) on 28 February 2001.
An appeal was announced by LTTE representative Anton Balasinghamin London on 17 April 2001. However, the approval of the list is by bothHouses of Parliament is vitually a foregone conclusion. It was also acertainty that the LTTE will appeal against the ban. Chandrika Kumaratungaalso lobbied France to take similar steps on an official visit during lateMarch 2001. Appeals on this issue of harbouring Tamil militants have alsobeen made to Canada, South Africa, Thailand and Myanmar (Burma). Thelatter two countries are known to be used by the LTTE as bases for theconduit of arms and other vital military equipment to Sri Lanka.26
A statement issued by the British High Commission in Colombo said:'The decision reflects the British government's firm stance againstinternational terrorism. It should have no bearing on the peace process in SriLanka if both sides are genuinely committed to the search for a negotiatedsettlement.' It also endorsed the ongoing Norwegian initiative.27
Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, who had personally led thehigh-decibel campaign for the ban, said the British move should not betreated by the Sinhala community as an occasion for 'gloating,triumphalism or exultation'.
From London, the LTTE's representative Anton Balasingham said thatthe ban would 'impose severe restraints' on the Norwegian initiative by'adversely affecting Tamil interests'. However, he added that the LTTEwould continue to remain in the peace process, while fighting the ban.28
INDIAN INTERVENTION IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY
India, as the regional hegemon, would not be an appropriate mediator.Although Anton Balasingham has expressed his continuing admiration forIndia, Delhi would be seen by most Sinhalese factions to have too manypartisan interests in the conflict.29
There are influential elements within the present Indian Bharatiya JanataParty (BJP)-led coalition who are sympathetic to the Tamil plight in SriLanka, such as Defence Minister George Fernandes, but even they would bewary of making any firm commitments. This was demonstrated in October1999 by the extradition of a Tamil youth suspected of involvement in theassassination of leading moderate Tamil politician and lawyer NeelanTiruchelvam.30
Since the departure from Sri Lanka of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force(IPKF) in March 1990, India has indicated that it would not be interested in
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becoming directly involved in facilitating negotiations between the Tigersand the Colombo government.
India attempted to play this role several times between the Colomboriots of July 1983 and the signing of the Accord between Rajiv Gandhi andJunius Jayewardene in July 1987, even while clandestinely arming, trainingand funding various rebel Tamil groups, including the Tigers.31
However, the considerable costs of conducting what became a three-yearwar against the Tigers, with the loss of some 1,300 Indian lives, certainlyrules out another military intervention, short of any significant securitythreat to the southern state of Tamil Nadu or other parts of India.32
Above all, the Indian intervention in Sri Lanka from 1987-90 underlinedthe inherent limitations of what a regional external power can do to resolvewhat is essentially a domestic conflict, despite its nexus with Tamil Nadu.
New Delhi is also vehemently opposed to any third-party intervention inthe region by the US or other powers, as this has frequently been suggestedas a possible solution by Pakistan to the Kashmir conflict, and was alsomooted by former US President Bill Clinton during his visit to the region inMarch 2000.33 It will therefore continue to keep a close watch on theprogress of Norway's role in Sri Lanka.
The choice of Norway as intermediary was greatly influenced by thepronounced distaste in South Block (India's defence establishment) towardsgreat powers such as the US becoming more directly involved in what itconsiders as South Asian internal affairs, which Washington is likewisesensitive to.
India would also be wary of smaller countries such as Norway beingused as potential proxies for US policy in the region. However, given thatthe ramifications of the conflict reverberate beyond Sri Lanka, New Delhimay also want the Sri Lankan conflict to be resolved in any way possible,so that it has one less regional security problem to worry about.
The Prime Minister of Norway, Jens Stoltenberg met with Indian PrimeMinister Atal Behari Vajpayee on 20 April 2001. Norway has ruled out anymediation in Kashmir and expressed a desire to step up cooperation withIndia for reforms to the UN system and UN peacekeeping operationsworldwide.
Stoltenberg said they were at present too preoccupied with Sri Lankaand also playing a role in Latin America and the Middle East. 'I don't thinkwe plan any special role in Kashmir. We are not going to take any specialresponsibility at present', he said.34
There are also growing indications of movement in India and tacitendorsement of the Sri Lankan peace process. During Kumaratunga's visitto New Delhi in February 2001, 'observers said there was a clear message
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from the Indian government that it was willing to draw a distinctionbetween the LITE as a banned organisation on its own soil and as a partnerin a political process in Sri Lanka if it was in the larger interests of peace inthe region', representing a substantive shift in favour of third-partyintervention.35
However, India's views on the subject of such intervention are generallywell-known. These include firm rejection of US suggestions for 'third-partymonitoring' in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Indian officials have repeatedlyemphasised that 'third parties' may often have their own agendas.36
Indian policy-makers seem to be weighing up the long-term implicationsof multilateral mediation in Sri Lanka for India's own internal conflicts.New Delhi is wary of the idea of 'truce monitors' - as it would set aprecedent for regional intervention, also did not wish to be directly drawninto the process itself.
It seems fairly certain that India did not previously expect theNorwegian initiative to come this far, to the point where the Sri Lankangovernment and the LITE are on the verge of talking to one another. NewDelhi was in all probability surprised at the meeting in November 2000between Solheim and Prabakharan that set in motion the recent chain ofevents.
The main opposition United National Party (UNP) has called for Indiato play a role in Sri Lanka's peace process. Opposition leader RanilWickremesinghe 'stressed the necessity of appraising India on thedevelopments of the peace process and the direct participation of India onthe issue'. Wickremesinghe also visited Oslo for talks during April.37
However, this appeal would probably be treated with wariness by India,and with contempt by the ultra-Sinhala nationalist Janatha VimukhtiPeramuna (JVP), which would see such a move as an opportunity to playthe anti-India card and capitalise on its resurgence in popularity, particularlyin the south of Sri Lanka.
KUMARATUNGA ENDORSES PEACE PROCESS
In an extensive interview with N. Ram, Editor of The Hindu newspaperpublished in mid-March 2001, President Chandrika Kumaratunga expressedcautious, guarded optimism on the Norwegian-led peace process.38
Kumaratunga confirmed, on the record, that working with Norwegianfacilitation, her government 'is in the process of trying to agree onconditions that the LTTE calls "conducive" (measures) before we begin totalk'; that 'talks about talks' have already begun and made progress; andthat 'yes, definitely' there has been forward movement in this peace
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NORWAY AND THE PEACE PROCESS IN SRI LANKA 81
process. 'So what I can tell you is, Ram, that this seems to be the bestwindow of opportunity that has been offered to any government since thewar began.'39
On the Tigers, she said 'they are weaker than they have been for a longtime. We've spent a lot of money and purchased military hardware, whichhas caused a lot of damage to the LTTE.'40 This included $20 million incredit from Pakistan during January 2001 specifically for militarypurchases.
On the strength of the LTTE, she claimed, 'They' ve also lost 2,700 cadreover the past six months. This is one of the reasons why they are seeminglymore flexible. And, of course, the international community's coming downon them a little bit, and the possible ban in the UK, is worrying them a lot.So we have to keep the international pressure on if we want peace in SriLanka. If the international community takes the pressure off the LTTE, theywill not be interested in peace at all. Because the LTTE does not believe inpeace.'41
However, there was some confusion over the status of the'Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)', which had been prepared by theNorwegians for both the Tigers and Kumaratunga to sign. In the interview,Kumaratunga claimed that the MOU 'doesn't yet exist', even thoughNorway and the Tigers were adamant it did.42
The MOU had orginally been drafted by the Norwegian governmentduring December 2000 in its role as facilitator for peace talks in Sri Lanka,with the intention of formalising a structured process of de-escalation. Thedocument, the initial draft of which had been acceptable to the LTTE, wasvirtually ignored by the Sri Lankan government for several weeks,following which Colombo introduced several changes.
However, the Tigers regarded this as unacceptable behaviour. 'The SriLankan government has deleted many matters that had been previouslydiscussed and agreed to by us and the Norwegian government and replacedthem with matters favourable to it', the LTTE's political spokesmanTamilchelvan told Norwegian ambassador Jon Westborg.43
'The agreement is supposed to set the stage for discussions of a finalsolution to the conflict and not disadvantage one party to the conflict to theadvantage of the other', he added. Tamilchelvam also claimed that theheading 'Memorandum of Understanding' had been replaced by the SriLankan government with the heading 'Agreement on HumanitarianMeasures'.
He stated that an acceptable version of the document must bear theoriginal title, and must state that the purpose of the MOU is to create anatmosphere conducive to a peace negotiation process. Tamilchelvan also
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stressed that attacks on Tamil civilians must cease if the peace talks were tobe at all practicable.
These opinions were subsequently endorsed in a wide-ranging interviewpublished in the Tamil Guardian with the LTTE's representative in London,Anton Balasingham.44 In this, he confirmed the existence of the'Memorandum of Understanding'.
Balasingham said the LTTE leadership 'had endorsed the document inprinciple without any alterations, except suggesting amendments to theformation of the monitoring committee'. However, he claimed that 'the SriLankan government has been sitting on the Norwegian proposal for sometime, even denying its existence'.
'As far as the LTTE is concerned the Norwegian Memorandum ofUnderstanding is a crucial document to promote the peace initiative and ifagreed on by both the parties and implemented with internationalsupervision will create a congenial atmosphere of goodwill conducive forpeace negotiations', he added.
On the vexed difference of opinion on faciliation and mediation,Balasingham also offered some trenchant observations.
We are fully aware that Mr Kadirgamar has been very particular indefining the role and function of a facilitator, mediator and arbitrator.He wants Norway to function within the rules of faciliation, which isconfined to bringing the parties in conflict to the negotiating table.Once that is achieved, in Kadirgamar's conception, Norway'sfacilitatory role comes to an end. I do not share his view because it isvery rigid, technical and non-creative. It is not flexible or dynamicenough to cope with the new set of problems and difficulties thatmight arise when the belligerents, with a lengthy history of mutualdistrust and hostility, face each other on the negotiating table withoutthe assistance, advice and guidance of a third party.
We favour the concept of third party involvement rather thanadopting the defined roles of facilitation and mediation. In ourperspective the third party involvement is crucial even after thecommencement of negotiations. Playing the role of neutral advisorand observer, in our case the Norwegians, can continue to involvethemselves in the negotiating process to prevent misunderstandingbetween the protagonists and to help to promote the forwardmovement of the dialogue without imposing 'judgmental decisions'on the parties. It is our view that without the presence andparticipation of an experienced third party the negotiations betweenthe two historical enemies may run into serious difficulties.
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Balasingham reiterated that the involvement of a third party was crucial inany negotiations between the Tigers and the Sri Lankan government, andsuggested that Norway might be able to fill that role as an extension ofOslo's efforts to bring about talks between the two sides. He said, 'in ourperspective the third party involvement is crucial even after thecommencement of the negotiations'.45
'It is our view that without the presence and participation of anexperienced third party the negotiations between the two parties may run intoserious difficulties. 'Playing the role of neutral advisor and observer, thethird party, in our case the Norwegians, can continue to involve themselvesin the negotiating process to prevent misunderstanding between theprotagonists and to help to promote the forward movement of the dialoguewithout imposing "judgmental decisions" on the parties', said Balasingham.
However, the Sri Lankan government said it saw no role for Norway,particularly one as a mediator, once any talks between itself and the LTTEcommenced. 'When it comes to substantive negotiation, the Norwegianswill have no particular role at all', Lakshman Kadirgamar told N. Ram in afrank interview with Frontline magazine.46
According to the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, the Norwegian role is'limited to bringing the two parties together. Shuttling back and forthbetween the parties. Carrying messages. And laying the groundwork forthem to meet. They will have no mandate to impose solutions. They willcertainly have no mandate to make any judgmental decisions. In that sense,they're not arbitrators, they're not judges, they're not mediators', claimedKadirgamar.
Kadirgamar also emphasised India's support for the Norwegian-ledpeace process.
Let me say in regard to the peace process, that India is very supportiveindeed. And any suggestions that the Government of India is not infavour of the peace process proceeding satisfactorily, or that theGovernment of India does not want Norway to be a facilitator - 1 cantell you these theories are utterly and totally unfounded! TheGovernment of India has made it absolutely clear that they are fullywith us in seeking to bring to an end this awful problem that hasbedevilled this country for so long. I detect nothing but goodwill onthe part of India and a kind of urging us on, willing us on, hoping andpraying that we would almost succeed in these efforts to bring peaceback to our country.47
Kadirgamar was also asked about the difference between facilitation.'We've made it very clear to the Norwegians - and they accept this fully -
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that they have been engaged by the parties as a facilitator and not amediator.'
The interviewer pressed Kadigamar for a working definition. 'As afacilitator, their task is to being the parties together. To facilitate the partiescoming together. Because these are two parties that have not been on talkingterms, to put it colloquially, for a very long time indeed and between whomthere is very deep mistrust and so on, because of all that has happened. Whatwe felt was that it was not possible for the parties to generate this peaceprocess by themselves: and, therefore, that it was timely to engage a thirdparty.'
'Well, a third party's role is limited. It is limited to bringing the twoparties together. Shuttling back and forth between the parties. Carryingmessages. And laying the groundwork for them to meet. There are logisticalthings they will have to attend to, in due course. There will be times andvenues and schedules and various things of that kind. But when it comes tosubstantive negotiation, the Norwegians will have no particular role at all.'
'They will have no mandate to propose solutions. They will certainlyhave no mandate to make nay judgmental decisions. In that sense, they'renot arbitrators, they're not judges, they're not mediators. Mediators tend tobe people who, at a certain stage, are entitled to say to the parties, "Now, wethink you're right and somebody else is wrong. And we say you must dothis, that or the other." And they assume a kind of judgmental character.That character the Norwegians will definitely not have in this process.'
Kadirgamar also admitted to Ram that Sri Lanka had secretly madeovertures to several potential third parties over recent years. 'We certainlyhad a large number of offers from friendly countries. Very large help. At onetime I counted 16 offers from friendly states (e.g. Canada, France etc).Finally, we and the LTTE, each for different reasons perhaps, decided thatNorway was most suitable for this purpose.'
He also clearly spelt out the reasons for choosing Norway.
We had in mind the fact Norway is a small country and, therefore, acountry which we thought has no agenda of its own, other than inrespect of Sri Lanka or in respect to the region, South Asia. Secondly,Norway is very far away and distance has an advantage in a situationof this kind. Thirdly, Norway has no colonial background at all andtherefore, there's no baggage that Norway brings to an exercise of thiskind. Then, fourthly, that Norway already has some experience in thisarea — in other disputes of a somewhat similar nature, although theymay not be identical. That's well known internationally: that they'vehad some experience.
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'We felt that nobody in the region, for instance, could have any seriousobjection to Norway. We are sensitive at all times to what our neighbours,in the region feel about a situation like this. We don't want to go out on alimb by adopting procedures and so on which are completely alien, ortotally objected to by our neighbours. So it was a complex decision. Takingall this into account, we picked on Norway. And we have no reason to regretthat choice', Kadigamar concluded.
Following the interview, the Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry released partsof a letter on 10 May 2001 sent by Kadirgamar to the Norwegiangovernment. This stated that Sri Lanka and the LTTE shared an 'overallobjective of finding a negotiated peace solution to the ongoing armedconflict'.
However, Anton Balasingham said that talks on several issues had beencontinuing for some time, but added that it was too early to say anagreement had been reached. Despite this, the LTTE in a statement said that'substantial progress had been made on the Memorandum of Understandingafter intense discussion for a considerable time with the Norwegianfaciliators. We hope an agreement can be reached soon on the Norwegianproposal after further discussion and clarifications on certain matters.'48
Norwegian envoy Erik Solheim confirmed this reading: 'It is correct thatthe government and the LTTE have agreed on certain matters, but they havenot reached an overall agreement that can be the basis for talks'.49
In conclusion on progress to date, it could be argued that to rely solelyon talks aimed at a lasting settlement to resolve the continuing crisis wouldbe a grave error. With the benefit of hindsight, it could be said thatKumaratunga's biggest blunder was her twin-track policy of attempting toachieve peace through a failed devolution package, while actively wagingcivil war against the Tigers in the north and east of the island.
This created an impression amongst some observers that devolution wasprimarily being used to deceive world opinion that a political solution wasan attainable objective, while the military option was being pursuedrelentlessly. Meanwhile, the practical problems of displaced Tamils in thewar zones obtaining food, shelter and medicines were largely ignored by thegovernment.
MEDIATION CAN HELP SHAPE PEACE PROCESS
In the final analysis, as in other recent peace processes such as NorthernIreland, the Basque region in Spain, Israel/Palestine, South Africa, and theformer Yugoslavia, a combination of international mediation and domesticdialogue could help to achieve a viable, lasting solution to conflict.50
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However, mediation is a concept the meaning of which is hotlycontested. A useful working definition is 'a process by which theparticipants together with the assistance of a neutral party or persons,systematically isolate disputed issues in order to develop options, consideralternatives, and reach a consensual settlement that will accommodate theirneeds' .5I
According to Hans Kelman, this involves 'discovering possibilities forchange, identifying conditions for change, and overcoming resistances tochange'.52
Furthermore, Kelman contends that 'In deep-rooted ethnic conflicts...the relationship has come to a point where each party, in pursuit of its ownneeds and interests, threatens and undermines the needs and interests of theother party and seeks to destroy the other.'53
Kelman adds that:
the task of the third party is to create the conditions that allow ideasfor solving the conflict to emerge out of the interaction between theparties themselves. The facilitation of the third party, however, is animportant part of the process. The third party sets the ground rules andmonitors adherence to them; it helps to keep the discussion moving inconstructive directions, tries to stimulate movement, and intervenes asrelevant with questions, observations and even challenges. Third-party interventions may focus on the content of the discussion, e.g., bysummarising, highlighting, seeking clarification, or pointing tosimilarities or differences between the parties; on the process ofinteraction, e.g., by suggesting how interactions within the group mayreflect the dynamics of the conflict between the two societies; or ontheoretical formulations, e.g., by offering concepts that might beuseful in clarifying issues under discussion. The third party alsoserves a repository of trust for parties who, by definition, do not trusteach other: they feel safe to come to the workshop because they trustthe third party and are confident that it will see to it thatconfidentiality is maintained and that their interests are protected.54
More contentious, however, is the Habermasian argument advanced byDeiniol Jones that facilitative forms of third party intervention, such as theNorwegian mediation of the Oslo Accords, cannot operate without a moreformal and abstract notion of the 'right' in politics.55
Jones argues 'mediation is a form of conflict resolution in internationalpolitics which stresses the vital role of a third party in the process ofcreating and facilitating agreement between erstwhile disputing actors.Mediation plays a prominent role in contemporary international affairs.'56
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However, Jones adds that 'mediation is itself a disputed concept'.57 Hefurther argues that 'the third-party facilitator is an actor without any sort ofpower in the traditional realist sense'.58 Jones contends that essentially,'Facilitation is a form of politics that wills the good. It is aboutcommunication, empathy, mutual recognition and removing psychologicalbarriers to dialogue.'59 However, Jones says that 'Norway intervened as afacilitator and not a state, thus diminishing rather than enhancing theinternational status of the PLO.'60 To him this merely demonstrates some ofthe inherent problems of so-called impartiality: 'This position reflects theweakness of the small-state facilitator who, in a world of playgroundbullies, has to act as the "friend of both sides" to survive.'61
On the Israel/Palestine peace process, Jones critically contends that,'Norwegian facilitation exists in a space between the international and thedomestic, as do the Palestinian people and the Oslo Accords themselves.Norwegian facilitation was a peace process which sustained the existentialstatus of the Palestinians, a status which many believe to be at the root ofthe conflict between Israel and Palestine.'62
Thus the Norwegian-facilitated Oslo Accords have been criticised byJones as having 'been too weak to stop Israel from exploiting the weaknessof the Palestinians and the peace agreement during the interim stage'.63
Jones concludes, 'The Oslo Accords represent a form of concealedoccupation.'64
Jones cites Jan Egeland, a leading Norwegian facilitator of the OsloAccords, and also a former Deputy Foreign Minister. He claimed that, 'theNorwegian policy elite, unencumbered by large international problems oftheir own, had wonderful opportunities to develop imaginative and creativeforeign policies. Away from the international limelight, facilitators have theability to provide low-profile, secluded settings for exploratorynegotiations.'65 He also spoke of the 'perfect camouflage' that theNorwegians could offer to Israeli and Palestinian negotiators.66
Egeland has also stressed the more lasting and intangible benefits ofsuch faciliation: 'Many have asked does our role as an intermediary andfacilitator mean that we could criticise one or other of the parties. We couldcriticise them for human rights abuses, for lack of democracy, forsettlements etc. But we would be impartial as regards sympathy to one orother of the parties. We felt a friend to both sides.'61
This contrasts with the more positive description of 'the Oslo spirit' byJane Corbin: 'The Norwegian perspective - Egeland - emphasises thefriendships created between the main players, the small group setting, thesecrecy and intimacy of the facilitative approach...The emphasis is onbreaking down stereotypes, smoothing over existential obstacles, clearing
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up misunderstandings and overcoming a lack of willingness to talk. Thisview of conflict resolution uses the radical intimacy of the hearth to melt thevast, frozen structures of international politics.'68
However, Jones contends that 'facilitators use their weak internationalstatus to pursue their activities. As there is nothing at stake for thefacilitators, there is no incentive to cheat and lie. They have twomotivations, which stem from their weakness as international actors. First,a desire to appear basically neutral in then eyes of others. Second, a desireto ensure a peaceful international order. Being a powerless internationalactor in a competitive international arena means that the stance of neutralityis strategically rational, as is the maintenance of a peaceful internationalorder. The facilitator thus claims an interest only in the peaceful resolutionof the international dispute. Offering low-risk comunication in a trustedenvironment is the strategic interest of the facilitator.'69
Jones continues, 'thus the facilitator, like the psychoanalyst, does notattempt to impose a solution on the disputants. Like a magician, thefacilitator only invokes the sceptre of communicative power. The facilitatorwill create the conditions and parameters of debate and then will employ allthe known facilitative techniques designed to protect the state ofcommunication. Within this framework, substantive solutions are supposedto rise from the bottom up - from the participant's perspective.'70
Jones caustically comments that 'the Norwegian facilitative model, (is)based on the radical intimacy of the hearth'.71 'Thus, Norwegian facilitationis poised somewhere between the domestic and the international. Itemphasises the relations of the hearth - warmth, intimacy, empathy,friendship and so on. Yet it promotes these relations as appropriate in theinternational world. Norway wants to play an international role. However, itis too small and powerless a state to project its sovereignty safely in theinternational world in which it moves. As a result, the facilitator can actinternationally only by radically domesticating international politics. Owingto the weakness of the small-state facilitator, internationalpolitics must be radically tamed. International politics is safe, for thefacilitator, only if everyone is a "friend". The line between the internationaland domestic is thus blurred by the small-state facilitation. And in thecase of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this blurring is highly inappropriate.'72
However, further on Jones quotes a highly dismissive verdict of the Osloprocess from Palestinian author Edward Said, who says it is highlyerroneous to think that 'years of struggle against oppression and injusticecan be put to one side in favour of, to put it bluntly, a cosy fireside chat'.73
For other leading theorists, the intercession of third-party mediators isalso potentially problematic. In a persuasive critique of the still-prevalent
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Realist paradigm in International Relations (IR) discourse, Cyprus conflictanalyst Oliver Richmond has persuasively argued that usually: 'mediatorscan do little more than preserve ceasefires, and conduct talks for the sake oftalks, unless there is sufficient international interest to offer significantincentives for the disputants to modify their respective demands vis-ti-vissovereignty and territory'.74
He continues, 'Such contradictions look set only to increase as the trendof negotiating a reduction in the sanctity in state sovereignty continues withrespect to humanitarian intervention and regionalisation, unless the rewardsfor relinquishing the control of, or the dream of, statehood are outweighedby the rewards which a settlement framework can offer.'
Richmond concludes, 'ethnic disputes clearly test the state far beyond itsconceptual limits. It is not the conflict or dispute that should be defined asintractable, but the concept of statehood and perhaps even the internationalsystem itself.'
In a subsequent article, Richmond adds that often 'the best the mediatorcan do is to persuade the parties to change their perceptions and see aturning point in their relations' .75 Richmond also warns that disputants cansometimes use mediation processes to achieve 'devious objectives', whichin the case of both the LITE and Sri Lanka could involve buying time toregroup, rearm and reorganise for future conflict; the legitimation of theprocess in the eyes of international actors; and for the Tigers an attempt towin back support in the face of increasing criticism and proposals to ban itsproseltysing activities in Europe.76
CONCLUSION
At present, all the major actors in the Sri Lankan conflict are firmly weddedto the traditional Westphalian discourse of state sovereignty. While theLTTE aspire to a separate homeland of Tamil Eelam, which would confirmits status in the international system with a vote at the United Nations (UN),the Sri Lankan government and most opposition parties still regard thesecurity of the existing state and its sovereignty as fundamentally inviolableand non-negotiable.
In the end, of course, it still requires the belligerent parties tomake a strategic decision for peace. As long as elites on both sidescontinue to at least consider violence as a legitimate means through whichto achieve their respective political goals, Sri Lanka will remain in theshadow of war.
As Knut Vollebaek, Norwegian Foreign Minister, said in February 2000:"The conflict in Sri Lanka can only be solved by political means. A basis for
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dialogue must be established between the parties...We have also discussedmodalities for commencing direct talks...this places a heavy responsibilityon the parties themselves.'77
If the Norwegian-brokered peace process is to succeed where previousattempts have so lamentably failed, the dialogue must move on fromentrenched polarisation to more open pluralism, with definite proposals fordeep and meaningful autonomy which aim at satisfying the interests of allconcerned, both among the protagonists and wider civil society in SriLanka.
NOTES
This article was first presented as a paper 'From Violence to Polities' at INCORE, The Universityof Ulster, Derry/Londonderry, 27-30 June 2001.
1. 'Few return as Sri Lanka army amnesty begins', Reuters (Colombo) 22 Feb. 2000.2. 'Chinese jets expand Sri Lanka Air Force', Tamil Guardian (London) 4 April 2001, p.23. 'Sri Lankan Army buys Russian armoured vehicles', Tamil Guardian, 11 April 2000, p.2.4. D.B.S. Jeyaraj, 'Continuous war or sustainable peace', Frontline (Madras) 3 March 2000,
pp.52-3.5. 'Sri Lanka acquires new Czech armour and more MRBLs', Tamil Guardian, 18 April 2001,
p.2.6. I. William Zartman, 'Conclusions: the Last Mile', in Elusive Peace Negotiating and an End
to Civil Wars (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1995) p.333. See also I. WilliamZartman, Ripe for Resolution, Conflict and Intervention in Africa (NY: Oxford UP 1985).Ronald Fisher says, 'Thus the parties are in a costly deadlock and the prospects are that thesituation will get worse. This mutual sense of futility must be combined with requitement (abelief that the other party will reciprocate a conciliatory move) and the perception of a wayout, indicating that the issues in the conflict will be reduced. At this point, the parties arelikely to be receptive to the efforts of a third party and are predisposed to move intonegotiations.' Ronald J. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution (NY: Syracuse UP 1997)p.177.
7. J. Darby and R. Mac Ginty (eds.) The Management of Peace Processes (Basingstoke:Macmillan 2000) p.244.
8. 'Sri Lankan intransigence cited as truce lapses', Tamil Guardian, 25 April 2001, p.1.9. 'Fresh clashes push Sri Lanka death toll to 300', Reuters (Colombo) 27 April 2001.
10. 'Norwegian peace envoy arrives in Sri Lanka', Reuters (Colombo) 30 April 2001.11. 'Offensive 'seriously undermines' Norwegian initiative', Tamil Guardian, 2 May 2001, p.1.12. P.Conradi, 'New bid to end Sri Lanka war', The Sunday Times (London) 6 May 2001, p.25.13. D. Jeyaraj, 'The Facilitator Fracas', Frontline, 6 July 2001, pp.44-5.14. 'Chandrika's BBC Interview', Tamil Times (London), 15 Jan. 2000, pp.19-20.15. 'Norway minister meets Sri Lanka rebel in London', Reuters (Oslo) 14 Feb. 2000. According
to an interview in the Tamil Guardian, 25 March 2000, p.3, Balasingham also visited Norwayfor urgent renal surgery.
16. 'Norway to try to broker Sri Lanka peace', Reuters (Oslo) 17 Feb. 2000; 'PeacemakerNorway picks up Sri Lanka challenge', Financial Times (London) 19 Feb. 2000, p.6. Alsopresent at the meeting were Sri Lanka's High Commissioner in India, MangalaMoonesinghe, and Foreign Secretary Lionel Fernando. Vollebaek also met with Ranil
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Wickremesinghe, leader of the opposition United National Party (UNP).17. 'Peace talks to begin in April', Thinakaran (Colombo) 29 Feb. 2000, p.1. 'Norwegian
delegation to meet Pirapaharan', Tamil Guardian, 22 April 2000, p.1.18. 'Norway appoints special mediator for Sri Lanka', Tamil Guardian (London) 8 April 2000,
p.2.19. 'Norway tries to help Sri Lanka after Mideast peace', Reuters (Oslo) 4 Jan. 2000. 'Norway
explores peace prospects', Tamil Guardian, 15 Jan. 2000, p.1.20. H. Miall, O. Ramsbotham and T. Woodhouse, Contemporary Conflict Resolution
(Cambridge, UK: Polity 1999) p.159.21. R. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution (NY: Syracuse UP 1997) pp.133-4.22. ø. Fuglerud, 'Time and Space in the Sri Lanka-Tamil Diaspora', Nations and Nationalism
(Cambridge) 7/2 (April 2001) p.196. The total number of Tamil refugees worldwide isestimated at 817,000, according to the Tamil Guardian, 27 June 2001, p.1.
23. On possible Norwegian motives for mediation, see D. Jones, Cosmopolitan Mediation?Conflict Resolution and the Oslo Accords (Manchester UP 1999) pp. 112-3. Norway is alsoseeking election to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for a rotating seat in2001-02. For details see 'Norway minister to discuss Sri Lanka peace', Reuters (Oslo) 3 Jan.2000. On Norway's historic support for the state of Israel, see Hilde Henriksen Waage, 'HowNorway Became one of Israel's Best Friends', Journal of Peace Research (Oslo) 37/2(March 2000) pp.189-212.
24. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osier Hampson, and Pamela Aall, 'A Crowded Stage: Liabilitiesand Benefits of Multiparty Mediation', International Studies Perspectives (Storrs, CT) 2/1(Feb. 2001) p.63.
25. 'Hitting the Tigers in their pockets', The Economist (London) 10 March 2001, p.80.26. P. Chalk, 'Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE) International Organisation and
Operations - A Preliminary Analysis', Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS),Commentary No.77 (Winter 1999).
27. N. Subramanian, 'A ban and a peace process', Frontline, 30 March 2001, pp.14-15.28. 'Tigers say no talks while banned in Sri Lanka', Reuters, Colombo, 9 April 2001; 'LTTE
"will not negotiate as outlaws", Tamil Guardian (London) 11 April 2001, p.1.29. 'The Wooing Game', Frontline, 24 Dec. 1999, pp.126-8.30. 'The Case of Eric Soundranayagam', Frontline, 26 Nov. 1999 pp.49-52.31. For a full history of the IPKF misadventure, see A. J. Bullion, India, Sri Lanka and the Tamil
Crisis 1976-94: An International Perspective (London: Pinter 1995) esp. Chs.7-8. For apostmodern perspective, see also S. Krishna, Postcolonial Insecurities, India, Sri Lanka andthe Question of Nationhood (Minneapolis: U. of Minnesota Press 1999) esp. Ch.6.
32. Former Indian foreign secretary J.N. Dixit recently commented 'I would not send Indiantroops to Sri Lanka because I don't think we as a government or civil society have the willto sustain decisive action, even if it is in the country's interest', India Today International(New Delhi) 20 March 2000.
33. D. Gardner, 'Subcontinental stand-off, Financial Times (London) 22 Feb. 2000, p.20;'Clinton urges India, Pakistan dialogue on Kashmir', Reuters (New Delhi) 22 March 2000;D. Gardner, 'Clinton magic may have worked to calm subcontinent', Financial Times(London) 5 April 2000, p.10.
34. 'Norwegian PM for strong ties with India', The Hindu International (Madras) 28 April 2001,p.2.
35. Subramanian (note 27).36. J. Cherian, 'A significant neighbourly call', Frontline, 16 March 2001, pp.11-12.37. 'Sri Lanka opposition wants Indian role in peace bid', Reuters (Colombo) 18 April 2001.38. 'The best window of opportunity since the war began': N. Ram interviews President
Chandrika Kumaratunga, Frontline, 16 March 2001, pp.4-10.39. Ibid. p.4.40. Ibid. p.8.41. Ibid. p.8.
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42. Ibid. p.9.43. 'Tigers reject Sri Lanka's changes to agreed MOU', Tamil Guardian, 11 April 2001, p.3.44. 'The LTTE is very serious about talks. I would say deadly serious', Interview with Anton
Balasingham, Tamil Guardian, 19 April 2001, p.3.45. 'Third party "crucial" in any peace talks, LTTE says', Tamil Guardian, 18 April 2001, p.1.46. 'I can confirm that the peace process is moving': Interview by Editor N. Ram with Lakshman
Kadirgamar, Frontline, 27 April 2001, pp.124-7.47. Ibid. pp.124-5.48. 'Tamil Tigers deny agreement reached with Sri Lanka', Reuters (Colombo) 11 May 2001.49. 'Tamil Tigers soften rejection of govt. claim', Reuters (Colombo) 11 May 2001.50. For fuller discussion, see R. Rotberg (ed.) Creating Peace in Sri Lanka: Civil War &
Reconciliation (Washington DC: Brookings/WFP 1999) esp. Chs.8-12. See also, L.Philipson, Breaking Recurring Themes in the Cycles of War and Peace in Sri Lanka,Research Paper 3 (London: The Centre for the Study of Global Governance, LSE 1999) esp.Ch.6.
51. J. Folberg and A. Taylor, Mediation: A Comparative Guide to Resolving Conflicts withoutLitigation (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass 1986) p.7.
52. H.C. Kelman, 'The Role of the Scholar-Practitioner in International Conflict Resolution',International Studies Perspectives (Storrs, CT) 1/3 (Dec. 2000) p.284.
53. Ibid. p.280.54. Ibid. pp.276-7.55. Deiniol Lloyd Jones, 'Mediation, Conflict Resolution and Critical Theory', Review of
International Studies (Cambridge) 26/4 (Oct. 2000) pp.647-62.56. Ibid. p.648.57. Jones, Cosmpolitan Mediation? (note 23) p.10.58. Ibid. p.18.59. Ibid. p.129.60. Ibid. p.144.61. Ibid. p.146.62. Ibid. p.160.63. Ibid. p.71.64. Ibid. p.147.65. Ibid. p.18.66. Ibid. p.19.67. Ibid. p.146.68. Ibid. p.143-4.69. Ibid. p.19.70. Ibid. p.19.71. Ibid. p.143.72. Ibid. p.144.73. Ibid. p.73.74. O.P. Richmond, 'Mediating Ethnic Conflict: A Task for Sisyphus?', Global Society
(Abingdon) 13/2 (April 1999) p.198.75. O.P. Richmond, 'Ethno-Nationalist Debates and International Peacemaking: The Case of
Cyprus', Nationalism and Ethnic Studies 5/2 (Summer 1999) p.50.76. O.P. Richmond, 'Devious Objectives and the Disputants' View of International Mediation:
A Theoretical Framework', Journal of Peace Research (Oslo) 35/6 (Nov. 1998) p.707.77. Cited in The Sunday Leader (Colombo) 20 Feb. 2000, p.13.
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