normative & analytical_jurisprudence
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Analytical NormativeJurisprudence
Agus BrotosusiloFaculty of Law University of Indonesia
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NormativeJurisprudence
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Normative Jurisprudence A philosophical system of legal and moralprinciples purportedly deriving from a
universalized conception of human natureordivine justice rather than from legislative orjudicial action; moral law embodied inprinciples of right and wrong .
Tending to establish a standard ofcorrectness by prescription of rules;evaluativerather than descriptive. Normativeethics---any system dictatingmorally correctconduct---is distinguished from meta-ethics---the discussion ofthe meaningof moral terms
without issuing directives. 3Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
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AnalyticalJurisprudence
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Analytical JurisprudenceA method of legal study thatconcentrates on the logicalstructure of law; themeanings and uses of itsconcepts; and the formalterms and the modes of itsoperation.
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A wider variety of Analytical
Jurisprudence (Summers, 1966):
Analysis of the existing conceptualframeworkof and about law;
Construction of new conceptualframeworks with accompanyingterminologies;
Rational justificationof institutions andpractices, existingand proposed; and
Purposive Implication, the tracing outof what the acceptance of socialpurposes implies in terms of socialarrangements and social ordering.
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The Modern Analytical Jurisprudence:
Raz (1975) in MacCormick (1983)
The best defence yet offered for the
positivist thesis on the conceptual
independence of law from morality
(MacCormick , 1983):
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Razs breaks in legal thinking:
One result of pursuit of reason for
action is to direct our attentionwhenlooking of a concept like obligation--,
to the kinds of reasons we address
when contemplating an actual orsupposedobligation to act.
Raz shows that there is a differencebetween there being some sound
reasons for conduct being legally
obligatory and its actuallybeing so.8Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
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Raz, 1975:
When we considering whether
todo Xshould be an obligation,we are at the deliberative
phase of practical reasoning.
When an authoritative decisions
is taken that to do X isobligatory, further deliberationis
excluded.
9Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
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e reason o acin external forces
Even H.L.A. Hart (The Concept of Law),Austinsmost trenchant contemporary
critic, sought the reason in external
serious social pressure.
John Austin: habitual obedience
The continuity of law
H.L.A. Hart: the rule of recognition.10Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
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Analytical Jurisprudence:Visser t Hooft, 1988.
Aliran Filsafat Hukum yang
dengan bantuan misalnya
pemahaman-pemahaman FilsafatBahasa berupaya untuk
menjelaskan pengertian-
pengertian yang digunakandalam Ilmu Hukum Praktikal
(Practische Rechtswetenschap).
11Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
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TOPIK-TOPIK MENARIKDALAM WACANA HUKUMThe Concept of Law;
A Theory of Right;The Economic Analysis of Law;
Libertarianism;A Theory of Justice.12Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
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The Concept of Law:Law is a system of rules (Hart)
Primary Rules Secondary Rules
(duty imposing (power-conferring
rules citizens) rules officials)
Rules of Adjudication
Rules of ChangeRules of Validity
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Harts Rules of Adjudication:
Rules which confer
competence on officials to
pass judgement and toenforce law
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Hart:
The minimum contentof Natural Law:
Persons
The Minimum form of Protection of Property
Promises
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on u er:The Morality of Law, 1969.
8 (eight) procedural quality of legalsystem:
1. Generality;
2. Promulgation;3. Prospective;
4. Clear & Intelligible;
5. Free of Contradiction;6. Not require the impossible;
7. Constant in time;
8. Binding power.Agus Brotosusilo, 1992. 16
R ld D ki
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Ronald Dworkin:
Taking Rights Seriously, 1978.
Dworkins attacks on the model of
positivism represented by Harts
Concept of Law began as an assault
on its theory of adjudication.
Dworkin was concern with the
inadequacies of positivistic
explanations of how disputes were
determined when, as is so often the
case, we run out of rules. 17Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
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Dworkin:
moral - rules
Dworkin has attempted to
construct a theory of law out of
theory of adjudication.
He shows that Judge use, and
must use, moralconsiderations in
addition to rules found in
legislation and case law.
18Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
D ki Th l d t
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Dworkin: The law does notjust consists of rules
Dworkin argues that these moralconsiderations are integral to the
moral theory justifying the enacted
and case lawbinding on Judges.
The law does not just consists of
rules, as positivists such a Hartmaintain, but there is no reason why
a positivists theory should not be
constructed to embrace other
standards than rules.19Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
R ld D ki
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Ronald Dworkin:Laws Empire, 1986.
In Laws Empire (1986), Dworkinbegin with question that is at the
heart of the whole legal system: in
difficult cases, how do (and how
should) Judge decide what the law
is?
He shows that Judge must decide
hard cases by interpreting rather
than simply applying past legal
decisions. 20Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
D orkins general theor
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Dworkins general theoryof interpretation
Dworkin produces a general theory of
what interpretation is---in literature as
well as in law---and of when one
interpretation is better than the
others.
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wor n s ree eor es on
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wor n s ree eor es onthe General Character of Law
Reflected in Legal Interpretation:
1. The law of a community to be only
what the established conventions of
that community say it is.
2. Legal practice is best understood as
an instrument of society to achieve
its goals.
Dworkin argues forcefully and
persuasively against both these
views. 22Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
Dworkins concept of
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Dworkins concept of
political and legal integrity
3.Dworkin insist that the mostfundamental point of law is notto report
concensusor provide efficient meansto
social goals, but to answer the
requirementthat political community actin a coherent and principled manner
toward all its member.
Dworkin systematically demonstrate
that his concept of political and legal
integrity is the key to Anglo-American
le al theor and ractice.Agus Brotosusilo, 1992. 23
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Hart vs. Dworkin
Hart demonstrated the need for
those interested in the concept oflaw to appreciates the insights of
analytical, particularly linguistic
philosophy.
Dworkin has place the issue of
jurisprudence backwhere they werein the days of Bentham--, in the realm
of the moral andpolitical philosophy.
24Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
D ki k ti l f
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Dworkins skeptical of
The Economic Analysis of Law
Dworkinscontribution to jurisprudence arematched by his contribution to the
development of a liberalpolitical theory.
It is his view that the right to equal concern
and respect is the fundamental principle of
moral theory (and of American
constitutional law), and that utilitarianism
is no substitute for a theory committed toTaking Rights Seriously.
As a critic of utilitarianism Dworkin is
naturally skeptical of The Economic
Analysis of Law 25Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
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A Theory of Right .
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Hart:
Rights-based theories individualinterest
Goal-based theories communityinterest
Agus Brotosusilo, 1992. 27
Tentang hakekat Right
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Tentang hakekat Right
dikenal 2 (dua) teori:
Teori yang menekankan will
atau choice (Hart); dan
Teori yang menekankan interest
atau benefit.
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Will/Ch i Th
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Will/Choice Theory:
Hart
Pendukung will/choice Theory, misalnyaHart (1955): tujuan hukum adalah untukmenjamin sarana yang memungkinkanekspresi diri seluas-luasnya bagi individu,tingkat maksimum pengejawantahan-diriindividu.Teori ini terkait sangat erat dengan idekedaulatan; Satu-satunya jalan untukpenyelesaian perbedaan kehendak adalahdengan merumuskan kehendak yangsuperior,yang mengatasi semua posisi.
Teori ini juga berhubungan erat dengan ideindividualism-moral. Berdasarkan teori inidiskresi individuel adalah ciri tunggal darikonsep Right. 29Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
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The interest/benefittheory:Lyons, McCormick, Raz, Campbell
Sebaliknya, para pendukung theinterest/benefit theory berpendapat
bahwa tujuan Right bukan untuk
melindungi pengejawantahan-diri
individu, tetapi untuk melindungikepentingan-kepentingan tertentu.Rightadalah kepentingan-kepentinganyang dijamin untuk pribadi-pribadi olehaturan-aturan yang mengatur hubungan-hubungan sosial dalam masyarakat. 30Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
K k t t d i
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Kekuatan utama dari
the interest benefitth oryKekuatan utama dari theinterest benefit th ory adalahbahwa teori ini mencakup semua
type Right, termasuk (a.l. hakuntuk pendidikan, perawatan
kesehatan, pemukiman yang
layak), tidak hanya terbatas padaapa yang disebut sebagai
liberties.31Agus Brotosusilo, 1992.
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Related discussion:
The Economic Analysis of Law;
(4THCourse)A Theory of Justice.
(including: Libertarianism)(7THCourse)
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