new material on the revolt of pugachev: ii

New Material on the Revolt of Pugachev: IIAuthor(s): B. H. SumnerSource: The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 7, No. 20 (Jan., 1929), pp. 338-348Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School ofSlavonic and East European StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4202280 .

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NEW MATERIAL ON THE REVOLT OF PUGACHEV-II.*

DURAND'S dispatches in January, I774, painted an ominous picture of growing alarm at St. Petersburg, of increasing rebel strength before Orenburg, of the Bashkirs having joined Puga- chev, and of Bibikov being unable to take effective action. By the end of the month he considered the general atmosphere to be one of extreme crisis: " . . . l'esprit de revolte semble souffler dans tout l'Empire, et se repand dans toutes les places et parmi tous les sujets. Si dans telles circonstances on se hazarde 'a demander des recrues tout seroit en combustion." 1 " Cette rebellion des Cosaques est un ulcere gangreneux dont la guerison fera difficile . . . On assure que Pugachew a demande qu'on lui livrat quatre personnes de marque qui sont le Prince Dol- gorouki, Orlow, Wasilchikow, et Czachar Czernichew, et qu'apres un tel preliminaire il entreroit en accomodement. C'est appar- eminent une nouvelle ruse de ce fripon qui veut occuper l'esprit des Peuples, en leur designant l'objet de leur haine."2 2 A good

* The French accentuation and spelling are those of the o rginal. 1 C.P.R., 95. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No. 46, 28 January, I774

(received 23 February). 2 C.P.R., 95. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No. 48, 30 January (received

23 February). The incitement of the rebels by Pugachev against Gregory Orlov is known from other evidence, see Dubrovin, Pvgachev i ego soobsh- chniki, II., 43. On the other hand deputations of the Yaik Cossacks at St. Petersburg had attempted not without success to enlist the Orlovs on their behalf against Zakhar Chernyshev (Kashpirev, Materialy, novoy russkoy-istorii, II., pt. 2, 280, 285-8. Dubrovin, I., 52, 75). Even during the revolt, overtures of a very dubious character were made through Gregory Orlov for handing over Pugachev (see Grot, Trudy, IV., 5I2,

524-5, 630. Osmnnadtsaty Vek, I., 244-5. Russkaya Starina, XVI., 494-50I). Further evidence as to hostility against the Orlovs has been published in Pugachevshchina, Vol. I., pp. 94, ii6, 236. The translated Bashkir document No. 89 is a particularly good example of the wild rumours current among the Bashkirs in the spring of 1774: 10,000 Kirghiz with Pugachev, Orenburg taken, Orlov captured and tortured to death, Ufa surrounded, Chelyabinsk taken, Moscow surrounded by the Turks, seventeen provinces loyal to Peter III., thousands coming quickly to join us, Peter III.'s two aunts, the daughters of Peter the Great, sup- porting him. The Orlovs owned large estates near Syzran, and their peasants there were active participants for a time in the revolt. Zakhar Chernyshev was well known to the Yaik Cossacks, owing to his position as president of the War College since 1763, and was more responsible than any

338



THE REVOLT OF PUGACHEV. 339

deal of information was retailed at this time by Durand as to Pugachev himself, the organisation of his forces, the camp at Berda, the adhesion of the Tartar peoples and the movements of the rebels. In the last two respects his news is either vague or, where precise, wrong. In the other respects he is fairly accurate, but he attributes exaggerated worth to outward pre- tences and the mockery of organisation and control which Pugachev and his lieutenants attempted to maintain.' It is true that Pugachev and his bandit chiefs, notably Chika, who masqueraded as Ivan Chernyshev, and Beloborodov, issued numerous orders not merely with respect to military operations, levies and provisions, but also enjoining some degree of discipline, approving what were virtually local soviets, and above all attempting to stop the pillaging of the Bashkirs; but the success of their efforts in imitation or make-believe of government was very slight, and at best only temporary and local.2

While laying stress on the organised strength and successes of the rebels, Durand on the other hand recounted the difficult situation of Bibikov, hampered by bad weather, sickness, and the poor morale of his troops in face of the rising tide of revolt and the general rebellion of the Tartars: decisive action was im- possible.3 Equally significant in Durand's eyes was the attitude of Russians towards the revolt. " Ce qui prouve bien que les Russes vivent encore dans le Despotisme, c'est l'indifference, avec laquelle ils envisagent une rebellion assez dangereuse pour pouvoir rompre les renes du Gouvernement. Ils semblent regarder comme une affaire particuliUre 'a la Souveraine et 'a son fils un evenement qui n'interesse que leur curiosite. Ils en attendent les evenemens comme s'ils etoient etrangers, ils vous other single person for the increasingly disturbed state on the Yaik in the ten years prior to the outbreak of the revolt. Durand, unlike Gunning (see Sbornik, XIX., 391-2), does not bring out the responsibility of Cherny- shev in this respect.

1 C.P.R., 95. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No. 50, i February (received 28 February), specially for Pugachev as an old believer; No. 52, 8 February (received 7 March); No. 54, I5 February (received I4 March); No. 55, I8 February (received 17 March), Pugachev receiving subsidies from the Porte; No. 57, 25 February (received 24 March), Pugachev aiming for the North and Lake Onega (which might have had something in it if reported in July); No. 58 B, 8 March (received 31 March).

2Many of the new documents in Pugachevshchina, Vol. I., supply additional evidence as to the instructions sent out for the maintenance of order and especially for the prevention of Bashkir depredations; see, e.g., Nos. 23, 24, 27, 3I, 72-4, I22, I49, 176, 178-9, I89, 2I5, 222-5.

3 C.P.R., 95. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No. 50, i February (received 28 February); No. 51, 4 February (received 4 March); No. 54, I5 February (received 14 March); No. 59, ii March (received 4 April).



340 THE SLAVONIC REVIEW.

disent froidement qu'il est heureux pour l'Imperatrice que les Gardes n'ayant plus l'esprit de mutinerie qu'ils avoient autrefois, que si les anciens soldats de ce corps n'avoient point ete congedies et eloignes, le cri public aurait deja porte ceux cy a tenter quelqu' entreprise. D'un autre cote aucun d'eux ne paroit s'occuper du Grand Duc. Si l'Imperatrice n'est pas aimee, il faut que son fils soit peu estime, car malgre la haine qu'on montre pour la m6re, personne ne vante les qualites du fils." 1 At Moscow, too, Durand thought there was something of the same indifference. " Les propos qui se tiennent a Moscow sur la rebellion sont assez libres. On ne paroit pas s'en occuper comme d'une chose qui puisse causer un ebranlement general. Ces notions viennent par un canal qui leur donne plus d'authenticite qu'a tant ce qui debite." 2 This perhaps was to counteract his prophecy of three weeks before: "I1 faut necessairement que d'ici 'a quatre mois la position des affaires interieures de la Russie change, ou la confusion se communiquant d'une Province a l'autre deviendra generale." 3

Actually during the months of February and March Bibikov was making good headway against the rebels and was steadily drawing nearer to Orenburg. Durand entirely discountenanced the official optimism and reports of successes, and depicted in the darkest colours the condition of Russia exhausted on land and sea by the Turkish war and now riven by internal rebellion.4 Just after the double defeat of Pugachev at Tatishcheva and Sakmara and the relief of Orenburg, but just before these news

I'C.P.R., 95. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No. 52, 8 February (received 7 March). So, too, in No. 58 B, 8 March (received 3I March), expatiating on the unpopularity of Paul, " . . . que le regne du Gd Duc ne vaudroit peut etre pas mieux que celui de sa M6re; qu'on croit que ce Prince nourit interieurement une grande haine contre les Etrangers, qu'il replongera la Russie dans la barbarie et vrai-semblablement dans l'inaction au dehors." Yet later Durand could write to Vergennes, C.P.R., 96, No. 24, 28 October (received 2I November): "Elle (Catherine) n'ignore pas en meme tems que ce fils est adore tandis qu'elle est detestee de la nation comme maratre, comme usurpatrice, comme etrangere."

2 Ibid. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No. 58 B, 8 March (rec. 31 March). 3Ibid. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No. 55, i8 February (rec. 17 March). 4Ibid. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No 58 A, 4 March (received 28

March) No. 6o, I5 March (received 7 April), where he reports for certain that " la communication est coupee avec la Siberie qui est A cette Couronne ce que le Perou est A l'Espagne," and that Pugachev has in his own army " des Tartares de Crimee, des Persans, et plusieurs prisonniers Polonais et fran9ois, du nombre des confederes de Pologne, entre autre, un nomme Galien de Foix qui s'est echappe d'Orenburg." I know of no other reference to this Frenchman, and Durand has nothing further on either Frenchmen or Confederates with Pugachev. No. 62, 22 March (received I9 April), strongly emphasising the r6le played in the revolt by the raskolniki; No. 66, 2 April (received 28 April).



THE REVOLT OF PUGACHEV. 34I

reached St. Petersburg, he enjoyed himself with his most sombre colours. "Des annees s'ecouleront sur des annees, avant que la revolte de Pugachew s'eteigne, et il s'en ecoulera bien d'autres, avant que le mal qu'il fait, tant aux particuliers qu'a la Couronne, puisse s'oublier. Les Courtisans les plus rampans en convien- nent, tandis que les plus eclaires craignent qu"a la longue, et de proche en proche, l'incendie ne se communique au centre de l'Empire." 1 Consequently, when the news of the defeats of Pugachev before Orenburg and of the raising of the siege arrived, Durand made little of them: he merely reported the first official news in an en clair postscript without comment,2 and waited a fortnight. Then he communicated everything he could collect to show the unimportance of the governmental victories (Tatish- cheva was " une simple escarmouche ") and the continued seriousness of the situation, especially since Bibikov had died- poisoned.3

In fact, as has already been seen, the successes of March and early April were robbed of the most important consequences which should have flowed from them and the revolt was by no means ended. Durand's judgment, which was the opposite of Lobkowitz's,4 was in the main correct, and he summed up the situation with very fair accuracy: " De tous les rapports qui me sont faits, je vois que l'affaire dont il s'agit, n'est point terminde, et que cette rebellion coutera encore beaucoup de sang, d'argent et de peines; mais l'eloignement, et la division qui occupe ici les esprits, empechent qu'on ne s'affecte de ce qui se passe a l'extremite de l'Empire." 5

During the next two months there was a lull in the steady stream of news as to the revolt sent to Paris, Poland, Russo- Turkish relations and Potemkin's phenomenal rise bulking most largely; but Durand made it clear that there were no grounds for expecting the speedy suppression of the rebellion and that,

1 C.P.R., 95. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No. 69, I5 April (received 9 May). This dispatch closes with gossip on the unreliability of the Guards and of their being prepared to follow Paul and Panin in a coup d'etat.

2 C.P.R., 95. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No. 70, I9 April (received I2 May).

3 C.P.R.,95. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No. 73, 3 May (received 26 May); No. 74, 6 May (received 30 May); Bibikov, in fact, was not poisoned; he died of fever; No. 76, 13 May (received 6 June), concluding " . . . les Rebelles loin d'etre aneantis par leur defaite, etendoient leurs ravages, et se faisoient voir par tout et de tous cotes."

4 Sbornik, CXXV., 352, " die ganze Sache so gut ais geendiget." Gunning, though at first very optimistic, was justly apprehensive of the effect of Bibikov's death, Sbornik, XIX., 409, 4II.

5 C.P.R., 95. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No. 73, 3 May (received 26 May).




on the contrary, the renewed, and unexpected, adhesion of the Bashkirs to Pugachev was causing the greatest concern to the authorities and had made him more redoubtable than ever.1L Towards the end of July fuller information leaked out at St. Petersburg as to the inability of Shcherbatov, who had been appointed as Bibikov's successor, to make any headway against Pugachev, who was said to have 6o,ooo men under him: unless peace with Turkey were quickly made and very large forces moved against him, it was very possible that he would be in Moscow before the end of September.2 Following on this came the (false) rumour of his capture of Kungur, the replacement of Shcherbatov by Galitsyn (" un homme de peu de capacite "), and then the news from a courier just arrived that Pugachev had taken Ekaterinburg (which was incorrect) and the mines, and was marching with all his forces on Kazan: again hopes of the Don Cossacks joining the rebels were held out.3 The rapidity of Pugachev's raid from the central Urals across the Kama to Kazan was such that, on the same day that Durand sent on the information of this courier, he also reported that the Court had received the news that Pugachev had been driven out of Kazan,

1 C.P.R., 95. Durand to d'Aiguillon, No. 8i, 3I May (received 24 June); No. 89, 28 June (received 2I July). C.P.R., 96. Durand to Bertin, No. 9I, 6 July (received 28 July).

2 C.P.R., 96. Durand to Vergennes, No. 97, 26 July (received iS August); " les inquietudes causees par la revolte de Pugachew viennent de se reveiller tout A coup et de jetter la consternation sur les visages des principaux personnages." This was due to the arrival of a courier from Shcherbatov, from whom Durand managed secretly to receive his news. The same dispatch informs Vergennes of Potemkin being in almost full control of the War College and of the probability of Zakhar Chernyshev being forced to retire: Durand had already reported the important appointment early in June of Potemkin to the Vice-Presidency of the War College. He writes of Chernyshev: " Malheureusement pour lui il a beaucoup de dettes, fort peu de biens, nombre de fantaisies, et plus de gout pour les affaires que pour un loisir exempt d'avanie."

8 C.P.R., 96. Durand to Vergennes, No. 98, 29 July (received 22 August); No. 99, 2 August (received 25 August); " On a decouvert quelques corespondances de Pugachew dans Moscou." No. ioo, 6 August (received) 29 August; "on soupgonne de plus en plus les Cosaques du Don de vouloir se joindre a. eux, et de n'attendre que la prise de Kasan pour se declarer." They did not so, and even in September, when Pugachev had fled to their borders, they refused to move-except against him. It is true that St. Petersburg continued to be nervous as to their attitude; cf. No. io, 9 September (received 3 October); " Ce scelerat a passe de Saratow chez les Cosaques du Don avec lesquels il traite, et la Cour est fort inquiet6e de cette demarche. Elle se flatte cependant que les Kalmouks ennemiiis de ces Cosaques se d6clareront contre Eux, si ceux ci prennent part a la revolte." Some of the Kalmuks did join Michelson just before his final defeat of Pugachev below Tsaritsyn.




but was attempting to retake it, and that there was very serious ravaging in the surrounding country: at the same time there arrived from the south the terms of peace concluded by Rum- yantsev with the Turks.' Durand, unlike Vergennes, did not at once explicitly avow that the setting free of troops from the Turkish campaign meant that the forcible suppression of the revolt was now inevitable. This was, in part at least, because he grasped something of the change in the character of the revolt, now that Pugachev was west of the Volga, followed by bands of badly armed peasants, proclaiming himself the liberator and avenger of the serfs, and promising them exemption from all taxes and forced labour.2 A gigantic social revolt in the central Russian provinces might indeed be put down by troops with their overwhelming superiority in arms; but could the troops -be trusted ? Durand was doubtful, and exaggerated the tales of reluctance of troops to act against the rebels.3 And what if Pugachev succeeded in reaching Moscow ? Durand had nothing but belated and usually inaccurate news of Pugachev's movements; these at first represented him as making for Moscow via Nizhny-Novgorod, and as getting to within a hundred miles of the old capital,4 and conditions there were such as to require drastic measures by Volkonsky and to render an explosion possible, and inevitable if Pugachev could seize it.5

Above all, Durand was convinced that, whatever the fate of Pugachev himself, the spirit of revolt was so deep and widespread

1 C.P.R., 96. Durand to Vergennes, unnumbered, 6 August (date of receipt not marked) en clair. Durand states that the Court received the news of the peace and of the recapture of Kazan on the same day, evening of 3 August. The news of the capture of Kazan by Pugachev, which Durand does not seem to have known till its recapture, had reached Catherine on i August. Neither Gunning nor Lobkowitz was better informed than Durand at this juncture.

2 C.P.R., 96. Durand to Vergennes, No. 5, 23 August (received I 5 September).

3 C.P.R., 96. Durand to Vergennes, No. i8, 7 October (received 31 October).

4 C.P.R., 96. Durand to Vergennes, No. I, 9 August (received 2 September); No. 3, i6 August (received 8 September). In fact, Pugachev could not be persuaded by the desperate remnant of his Yaik Cossacks to dare an attempt on Moscow, or Nizhny Novgorod, and he headed south towards the Don. He was never nearer than 3oo miles from Moscow. By I9 August Durand knew that Pugachev was not making for Moscow, but he first thought he was fleeing back to the Urals; on 2 September he wrote of him, correctly; as being between Penza and Simbirsk, making for the South.

5 C.P.R., 96. Durand to Vergennes, No. i, 9 August (received 2 September; No. 4, I9 August (received 12 September); No. 5, 23 August (received 15 September): " La frayeur est encore telle i Moscou que les




that force alone could not remedy the terrible wounds caused to Russia, and that the whole internal structure of the country was tottering, and perhaps irremediably sapped: ". . . il est 'a craindre que de proche en proche le soulevement de la Campagne contre la Noblesse ne fasse des progres qui ne vont a rien moins qu'a priver l'Empire de la partie la plus considerable de ses recoltes, et 'a diminuer de plus en plus la population." I " C'est ,donc une hydre dont les tetes renaissent a mesure qu'on les coupe, car apres des pertes de ce genre il est bien singulier que le Monstre ne soit pas terrasse." 2 " En rassemblant tous ces symptomes, on voit que la Russie est un malade qui en a pour long tems 'a se retablir; que la paix avec les Turcs lui rend des forces, mais sans remedier aux vices interieurs de la constitution, et qu'il se passera des annees avant qu'elle puisse agir au dehors autrement que par l'intrigue.>" 3 On the first news of the capture of Puga- chev, which he disbelieved, he wrote: " Ce qui est certain, c'est que du cote des Paysans de la frontiere de'la Siberie et des peu- plades errantes sur la surface de l'Empire, les dispositions 'a la revolte ne s'etoufferont de longtems. Mais y aura-t-il une succession de chefs assez hardis, pour ne pas craindre le sort terrible qui attend Pugachev ? Je l'ignore. Je sais seulement que c'est une chose qui n'est pas contraire a ce qui s'est vu dans tous les pays du Monde oiu l'exemple du crime a ete plus con- tagieux que les supplices n'ont eu de force pour l'arreter." 4 In mid-November, after describing the deplorable situation in Bashkiria and the Ural mines and the continued danger from the nomads, Durand indulged himself in the following prophecy: " Cet Empire est donc plus considerable par l'opinion que par le nombre de tant de sujets si peu accoutumes a l'obeisance et a l'union mutuelle. Tot ou tard il eprouvera le sort de l'Empire

Marchands de cette Ville mandent en dernier lieu a leur Correspondances de suspendre leurs envoys, et ce n'est pas sans peine qu'on a empeche les plus riches de ceux qui ecrivent, de s'en fuir du cot6 de Petersbourg avec leurs principaux effets."

1 C.P.R., 96. Durand to Vergennes, No. 8, 2 September (received 26 September), painting a gloomy picture of the refusal of the serfs to work for their masters. In his No. i8, 7 October (received 3I October), he wrote of prospective famine in the regions devastated by the rebel bands. This was in fact correct. At the end of the year Durand twice refers to the famine intensifying the deplorable conditions of the ravaged areas. A bad harvest combined with the ravaging and chaos in the area of revolt west of the Volga to produce famine conditions, which required energetic and comprehensive measures on the part of P. I. Panin and the governors.

2 Ibid. Durand to Vergennes, No. I5, 27 September (rec. 20 Oct.). 3 Ibid. Durand to Vergennes, No. I 6, 30 September (rec. 24 Oct) . 4Ibid. Durand to Vergennes, No. I9, ii October (rec. 3 Nov.).




Roumain qui avec plus d'art ne put se deffendre contre des -Barbares souvent vaincus, sans etre domptes et peut etre que la revolte derniere est le commencement d'une decadence 'a laquelle ne remediera pas le Traite que Catherine seconde vient de con- clure." 1 It is probably fair to say that the attitude of Durand towards the closing events of the Pugachevshchina was funda- mentally influenced by his desire to find an offset to the defeat sustained by French diplomacy at Kuchuk Kainardji.

One change is noticeable in Durand's attitude after the begin- ning of August. He no longer has any illusions as to the purely destructive, anarchical aims of Pugachev and his rebel bands; and he depicts their savage cruelty and the ruinous losses caused by their excesses.2 Pugachev for the first time becomes for him a " scelerat," entirely devoid of any political capacity or con- structive plans. " II eut ete plus dangereux s'il se fut entendre avec la partie de la noblesse qui soupire apres une revolution, s'il eut continue 'a revendiquer le trone en faveur de l'heritier legitime; s'il eut ete moins cruel dans ses executions." 3

At Paris Vergennes was far more heartily disgusted with the brutal excesses of the rebels. He recognised at once that the signature of the Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji would doubtless enable the Russian government to put down the revolt, and however bitterly he lamented this blow to French policy, he was perhaps sincere in expressing his hopes that Catherine would be able -to re-establish peace in the interior of her empire.4 At any rate, there is no doubt of the joyful alacrity with which, two months later, he hailed the first news of the capture of Pugachev; perhaps his tone was intended as a rebuke and a hint to Durand. " Nous partageons bien sincerement la joye que toute l'Europe doit ressentir de la prise de Pugaschew. Tous les gouvernemens sont interesses 'a l'extinction d'une rebellion dont les principes sapoient le fondement de toute l'autorite et bouleversoient toutes les constitutions. L'humanite avoit d'ailleurs 'a fremir de l'exces des horreurs auxquelles ce rebelle et les entousiates qu'il seduisoit, se

1 C.P.R., 96. Durand to Vergennes, No. 30, i8 November (received I2 December). In December he made further references to the permanent frontier danger represented by the Bashkirs, Kirghiz and North Caucasus tribes, with whom it would be most exhausting for Russia to cope.

2 E.g., C.P.R., 96. Durand to Vergennes, No. 4, I9 August (received iz September); No. 5, 23 August (received I5 September); ". . . on compte plus de deux mille Gentilshommes, femmes et enfants pendus, ecrases ou bizarement suplicies."

3Ibid. Durand to Vergennes, No io, 9 Sept. (rec. 3 Oct.). 'Ibid. Vergennes to Durand, No. 140, 6 September.




portoient. I1 faut croire qu'il subira biehto6t le supplice d'u au tant de forfaits, et que ses partisans ne se trouvant plus animes par ce scelerat, rentreront d'eux memes dans le devoir." 1

Durand was far more reserved: he was very sceptical as to the correctness of the first news of the capture of Pugachev, which were communicated to him officially by Potemkin, and considered it quite possible that P. I. Panin had been imposed upon.2 Nor did he express any particular satisfaction at the formidable rebel having been brought to book; as already shown above, he pre- ferred to dwell upon the likelihood of new leaders appearing to take his place, and upon the catastrophic internal condition of Catherine's polyglot empire. In addition, he took care at the same time to emphasise the cruel reprisals being carried out by the authorities, in particular by Panin, to whom Catherine had turned at the end of July with the offer of the command against the rebels practically on his own terms. P. I. Panin had retired in I772

from a command on the Turkish front in dudgeon against what he considered to be inadequate reward for his services, and he was the centre of much rumoured intrigue against Catherine at Moscow. He consented, however, to reappear in the role of saviour of his country, armed with viceregal powers. Durand, in reporting his appointment, at once served up a strong dose of hostile gossip, severely questioning his motives for acceptance of the post,3 and whenever possible he criticised his actions and policy, retailed stories against him, and deplored the cruelty with which he sup- pressed the rebel bands of peasants.4

C.P.R., 96. Vergennes to Durand, No. I50, 5 November. 2 C.P.R., 96. Durand to Vergennes, No. i8, 7 October (received

31 October), en clair, postscript stating arrival of courier from P. I. Panin with the news of the capture of Pugachev; No. I9, i i October (received 3 November). On the same day that Vergennes received the former he was also informed of the capture of Pugachev by Prince Baratinski, the Russian Minister at Paris. There is no trace of Vergennes doubting the accuracy of the news. Durand accepted it as correct in his next dispatch, No. 20, I4 October (received io November), but he added that the capture had only been effected as the result of negotiations with the Yaik Cossacks, who had obtained the confirmation of all their privileges and the redress of their grievances, No. 2I, i8 October (date of receipt not marked); this was untrue.

3 Ibid. Durand to Vergennes, No. i, 9 Aug. (rec. 2 Sept.). 4 E.g., C.P.R., 96. Durand to Vergennes, No. i6, 30 September

(received 24 October); No. I9, ii October (received 3 November); No. 27, 8 November (received 3 December). There is no doubt that the serf rebellions were ruthlessly crushed; that Panin, who had much of the despot in him, exceeded his powers, wide though they were; and that Catherine had great difficulty with him and failed to control him; see Sbornik, VI., 8I-83, II2, I20, i8o. Durand does not seem to have heard rumours of what was in fact one of the main initial difficulties arising out of Panin's.




On the investigation and punishment of Pugachev and the captured rebels Durand has little that is of interest; he is mainly concerned with the attitude of Moscow towards the execution of Pugachev in view of Catherine's visit to the second capital.' This visit had been first suggested at the time of the Kazan catastrophe: Catherine was persuaded without much difficulty to defer it till the immediate danger of Pugachev had subsided. Durand spoke of it in mid-August, when he reported that the visit would take place at the end of September, " pour convaincre par la l 'Europe de sa securite, et sur la revolte et sur la revolution qu'elle avoit lieu de craindre, tant que la guerre contre les Turcs l'exposoit a des revers." 2 Later, in the autumn, it seemed likely that Catherine intended the visit to be a long one, lasting some two years and including visits to the Volga and the south. Durand disliked having to go to Moscow at all, and was appalled at the prospect of following the Court round Russia for two years. He expressed a desire for his recall on grounds of ill-health, and tried to persuade Vergennes to excuse him from going to Moscow at all. Vergennes was ready enough to agree to his recall, but he insisted on Durand accompanying Catherine to Moscow and remaining there till the arrival of his successor, who was to be the Marquis de Juigne.3 The marquis arrived in Russia in July, I775.

Durand, as was to be expected, sent home gloomy prognostica- tions as to the Moscow visit and again brought Paul into as much prominence as he could, hinting at the possibility of " quelqu' entreprise audacieuse," probably in the shape of his coronation.4

appointment-namely, his bad relations with Volkonsky, the governor- general of Moscow; see Sbornik, XIII., 420. Osmnadtsaty Vek, I., I38-39. P. Lebedev, Grafy N. i P. Panini (St. Petersburg, I863) gives a very curious, but unreliable, picture of P. Panin in discomforted retirement at Moscow, and of the role he played in the Pugachevshchina.

1 C.P.R., 97. Durand to Vergennes, No. 4I, 23 December (received i6 January), reporting nervousness of the Court as to what will be the effect in Moscow of Pugachev's punishment; No. 44, 3 January, I775

(recqived 26 January), ". . . Pugatschew sera condamne a comparoitre avec une couronne et un sceptre de fer ardent, apres quoi A etre escartele'." No. 47, I3 January (received 7 February), Catherine deferring the definite settlement of the date of her departure because " Elle veut savoir sans doute ce qui ce passera au moment de l'execution de Pugatschew. Des scelerats avoient form' le projet de le soustraire a la Justice et le complot n'a ete arrete que par I'augmentation des troupes qui en imposent a Moscow. L'appareil du suplice est capable de reveiller des fanatiques et de causer quelques scandales qui en feroient pr6voir de plus grands."

2Ibid. Durand to Vergennes, No. 4, I9 Aug. (rec. I2 Sept.). 3 Ibid. Vergennes to Durand, unnumbered, 22 December; No. 69,

bis, 28 December. 4 Ibid. Durand to Vergennes, No. 44, 3 January, T775 (received

26 January).




He had to admit however that Paul had no money, that there was no leader to put himself at the head of the Moscow malcon- tents, and that, when the Imperial family arrived in Moscow, Paul and his wife antagonised the Moscow nobility by their uncon- cealed dislike of their town and their ways.' Only the common people showed their feelings for Paul, by crowding outside his windows. Yet Catherine seemed very secure; " si elle aper9oit qu'elle n'est point aimee, Elle semble ne pas craindre cette mauvaise volonte de ses sujets." 2 Like Gunning (Sbornik, XIX., 448-9), Durand did not fail to record his depreciatory impressions of Catherine's arrival, for which very few of the provincial nobility had come to Moscow. " Est-ce mecontentement ? est-ce indifference de la nation ? Selon moi ce sont ces deux Causes qui jettent les Russes dans un engourdissement si etrange que la vue d'une souveraine qui depuis neuf ans n'etoit venue dans cette residence et qui y est entree en triomphe apres un paix glorieuse n'a produit qu'un morne silence et un mediocre concours. On n'a aperSu aucune allegresse dans un Spectacle qui eut attendri des sujets qu'un gouvernement moins austere n'eut point avili." 3

It is evident that Durand was very anxious to leave a country which he despised and disliked-all the more in that he had failed to make any impression on the general anti-French direction of Russian policy. He saw no hope of winning ground with Potemkin, and he knew that his unpopularity at Court had been much increased by the well-founded belief that he did his best to blacken Catherine in the eyes of his government and to paint the condition of Russia in as gloomy a light as possible. Ver- gennes, for his part, was anxious to break away from Choiseul's meddlesome policy and d'Aiguillon's lax and incoherent conduct of foreign affairs, and to put Franco-Russian relations on a better footing-a policy in which he was not unsuccessful. This obviously required a French Minister at St. Petersburg less permeated by the traditions of " le secret du Roi " and not branded as an enemy of Russia.

B. H. SUMNER. Balliol College, Oxford.

1 C.P.R., 97. Durand to Vergennes, No. 53, 31 January (received 23 February); No. 63, from Moscow, I3 March (received I3 April).

2 C.P.R., 97. Durand to Vergennes, No. 67, from Moscow, 27 March (received 27 April).

3 C.P.R., 97. Durand to Vergennes, No. 56, from Moscow, I4 February (received 20 March). This is Durand's first dispatch from Moscow.



new material on the revolt of pugachev: ii

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