never again' isn’t enough

10/4/2014 'Never Again' Isn’t Enough

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/07/never_again_isnt_enough_rwanda_intervention 1/10

BY

'Never Again' Isn’t EnoughSlogans won't stop another genocide like Rwanda's. But there are other things that

might.

JON AS CLAES

The 20th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide offers an opportune

moment to reflect on the horrific events of 1994, and honor the countless

victims and survivors who still carry the collective trauma of mass murder.

Remembering these deliberate efforts to extinguish an entire ethnic community

should not only give us pause, but also encourage our atrocity prevention

community, including humanitarian and peace organizations around the

world, to rethink how such failures of humanity can guide us forward, beyond

"Never Again" slogans.

Once the plane of President Juvénal Habyarimana was shot down on April 6,

1994, as it prepared to land in Kigali, the decapitated Hutu regime moved to

exploit the resulting leadership vacuum. In response to the perceived existential

threat posed by the armed Tutsi opposition moving towards the capital, it

adopted a genocidal strategy. Government forces and militias, armed with

grenades and machetes, walked house-to-house to slaughter the Tutsi

population and Hutu moderates, in an effort to purify the country. Despite the

warning signs and urgent requests for reinforcements and protection, U.N.

peacekeepers and foreign diplomats in-country stood by, lacking the authority,

capacity, or home-capital buy-in to halt the killing of roughly 800,000 Rwandan

citizens in 100 days. The genocide against the Tutsi population came to a halt as

the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) took control of Kigali in July 1994, taking the

lives of tens of thousands of Hutus en route, and committing to violent

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/07/never_again_isnt_enough_rwanda_intervention

http://foreignpolicy.com/profiles/Jonas-Claes

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Juv%C3%A9nal_Habyarimana



retribution both within Rwanda and neighboring Zaire (now the Democratic

Republic of Congo). The RPF rebel leader, Paul Kagame, assumed the

presidency in 2000, and has remained in power ever since.

From former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, who called the

Rwandan genocide "100 percent American responsibility," to one million

handcrafted bones spread over the National Mall in Washington, the

peacebuilding community has approached commemorations as opportunities

to recount the horrid images of mass carnage, assign blame, and lament the

lack of institutional and political progress to date.

One decade ago, references to Darfur served to

illustrate the continued lack of political will in the

face of ongoing mass violence, and the immoral

inconsistency of our international response. This

week, Syria or the Central African Republic will

serve as a current analog, highlighting the

challenge posed by state-sanctioned incitement

and mass murder, the risk of international

indifference or impasse, and the impact of

impunity.

One decade ago,references toDarfur served toillustrate thecontinued lack ofpolitical will in theface of ongoingmass violence,and the immoralinconsistency ofour internationalresponse.

As an atrocity prevention community, we can do

better.

The first step towards constructive

commemoration is to recognize the deplorable logic behind the inconsistent

international response to mass violence, as powerful countries seem to act more

decisively to save innocent lives in some countries than in others. The extent of

diplomatic investment or the likeliness of a forceful "Libya-style" response to



imminent or ongoing mass killing depends on rarely-acknowledged factors that

don't have anything to do with how grave the humanitarian crisis might be: the

power of the individuals orchestrating or executing the killings; the strategic

value of the region; the support for international action from the region; the

level of international media coverage and popular domestic appetite to

intervene; and what military or financial resources are available.

Prior to 1994, Rwanda had never been of more than marginal concern to

Washington. As now-Ambassador to the U.N. Samantha Power noted in her

book on the genocide, A Problem from Hell, as the tragic events unfolded,

Pentagon staff officers scrambled to find expertise on the central African

country, questioning whether the warring parties consisted of "Hutu and Tutsi

or Tutu and Hutsi." The memories of the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia

six months earlier were still vivid and strengthened both popular and political

resistance to humanitarian intervention by the United States. "Anytime you

mentioned peacekeeping in Africa, the crucifixes and garlic would come up on

every door," one U.S. official said, according to Power. Beyond individual

efforts to evacuate expatriate communities, there was little international or

regional concern about the fate of the Rwandan population.

In an ideal world, the urgency and gravity of a humanitarian crisis would trump

realpolitik. But double standards are an unpleasant reality of international

politics, driven by the sum of national interests, and will remain part and parcel

of the international response to man-made humanitarian crises. Recollecting

the horrific images and stories from the Rwandan genocide may have emotional

resonance, but the pressures of morality, legal obligation, or guilt aren't enough

to improve the international response to ongoing atrocities in the 21st century.



This shouldn't lead to defeatism, because we can reduce the inconsistency of

the international community. By identifying the policy measures that work, and

those with minimal or negative impact, we can help local partners and

international policymakers develop more effective responses to the earliest

warning signs of mass atrocities. And early prevention is not just a question of

alleviating the guilt of Western policymakers: It serves our national interest,

precluding the need for costly interventions after the bloodshed has become

too much to bear.

The community of organizations working to prevent genocide and atrocities,

located both in the developed world and in countries that are at risk for mass

violence, is dominated by advocacy groups attempting to raise awareness and

build local capacity. The memory of Rwanda should move us beyond moral

outcries, toward the development of empirically tested policy instruments and

efforts to quantify the benefits of preventive action. Evidence-based research, to

see whether, say, diplomatic pressure or financial sanctions would be more

effective in a given situation than police reform or media training, would help us

along the way. The development of practical training courses for policymakers,

featuring realistic scenario-exercises, would allow U.S. embassies, aid missions,

and armed forces to identify risk factors early on and design effective responses

before the eruption of mass violence.

Since Rwanda, consecutive U.S. administrations have expressed their

frustration about our collective inability to prevent genocide and crimes against

humanity. In 2012 remarks at the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, President

Barack Obama expressed his commitment to "build the capacity of key

partners," and "work with our allies to ensure that the burdens of atrocity

prevention and response are appropriately shared." The creation of an inter-

http://www.usip.org/publications/obama-announces-formation-the-atrocities-prevention-board



agency Atrocities Prevention Board illustrates just how much the issue has been

prioritized and offers the humanitarian voice an important seat at the decision-

making table.

But more effective cooperation among countries across different continents

requires stronger diplomatic, economic, and military role for regional

organizations. It also requires like-minded allies to consult more frequently and

plan for atrocity contingencies, both around the corner, and over the horizon.

But beyond modest support for regional organizations or U.N. operations in

conflict-prone regions, there has been little progress on this kind of multilateral,

anticipatory collaboration.

Preventing the next genocide, in other words, means building the infrastructure

to deal with one before it starts. "Never Again" just isn't enough.

ABDELHAK SENNA/AFP/Getty Images

BY

War Is ComingWhy there is no appeasing Russia's mad king.

MIK H EIL S AAK AS H VILI

In early March, the Russian Federation, after staging a referendum under

Kalashnikovs in Crimea, proceeded to annex the region and laid the

groundwork -- according to Moscow -- for "new political-legal realities," that is

to say, a new Russian paradigm for a lawless world. As German Chancellor

Angela Merkel said in her speech to the Bundestag on March 13, Russia is

bringing the law of the jungle to the table. For those of us who have lived

through Vladimir Putin's attempts to reverse the results of what he calls "the

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/04/23/fact-sheet-comprehensive-strategy-and-new-tools-prevent-and-respond-atro

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/04/04/war_is_coming_ukraine_putin

http://foreignpolicy.com/profiles/Mikheil-Saakashvili

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/23/world/europe/ukraine.html?hpw&rref=world

http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/98ffbd4c-aa8c-11e3-9fd6-00144feab7de.html

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm



greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century -- the dissolution of the

Soviet Union -- what is happening in Ukraine is not unexpected. Nor does it

mark the last act of the drama.

It should be abundantly clear now that Putin's initial plan of taking eastern

Ukraine by mobilizing the Russian population there has failed. But that doesn't

mean he's giving up. Russian strategists are talking about a "weekend of rage"

that could involve some kind of armed siege of government buildings in

southern and eastern Ukraine. If these local provocateurs and "self-defense

forces" manage to hold these buildings as they did in Crimea, it might serve as a

basis for further military intervention. Not that we should be surprised by this

cynical playbook any more.

History can be a useful guide for politicians: first, to help prevent new disasters,

and second, to help react to disasters that inevitably happen anyway, despite

the best laid plans. And yet, plenty of politicians are making the same mistakes

they should have learned from decades ago. These days, I can't help but be

reminded of Yogi Berra's famous quote, "It's déjà vu, all over again."

In Chechnya, tens of thousands of people were killed just to make Putin

president and consolidate his power. Then, when the Colored Revolutions --

and their successful reforms -- became a menace to his rule, he invaded Georgia

in order to kill this contagious model and again reconfirm his power. Now, as

before, faced with eroding popularity in Russia, a shale gas revolution in North

America, and the need for consistent port access to equip his allies in the

Middle East, Putin attacked Ukraine and seized Crimea.

And yet, even with these myriad examples, the West continues to

misunderstand or excuse Putin's aggression. These days, many pundits are

busy with soul-searching, with one of the constant refrains being how the West



overreached with NATO and EU expansion, and how it needlessly provoked the

Russian bear. The conclusion they come to is that part of the reason for Russia's

behavior, however petulant, lies in Western activism. It's a particular kind of

intellectual self-flagellation and, for Putin, a reflection of Western weakness that

only emboldens him.

Neville Chamberlain, when presenting the case for the great European powers to

acquiesce to Hitler's occupation of the Sudetenland, argued that Europeans

should not care about a "quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom

we know nothing." I hear a lot of pundits now talking about the "asymmetry of

interests," implying that Russia is entitled to annex neighboring countries' lands

for the simple reason that it cares for these lands more than the West. Others

opine that we should all get used to the idea that the Crimea is gone, and that

Russia will never give it back. This is exactly what I was told in the summer of

2008 -- that I should be resigned to the idea that a part of Georgian territory,

then occupied by Russia, was gone for good.

But this logic has its continuation. As we know from history, the cycles of

appeasement usually get shorter with geometric progression. Soon, the same

pundits may declare -- with their best poker faces on -- that now Moldova is

"lost," or Latvia "lost," even some province of Poland. And just because Russia is

not in the mood to give it back.

The biggest casualty for the West will not be the countries which already are, or

strive to be, Western allies, but rather the principles on which the Western world

is built. The truth is that Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova are being punished by

Russia for their desire to live in a free and democratic society -- one very

different from the Putin model.

The biggest



The biggestcasualty for theWest will not bethe countrieswhich already are,or strive to be,Western allies,but rather theprinciples onwhich theWestern world isbuilt.

Certainly, Moscow didn't seem to care much about

the minority Russian populations in its near

abroad -- so long as they were comfortably ruled by

corrupt cronies of the Kremlin. But over the

ensuing decade, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova

have learned to look to the West, not so much

because of geopolitical priorities, but because

people there aspire to a Western way of life that

respects human rights and universal values. For

this reason, the West must shelter these countries

not just out of pragmatic calculations, but for the

very principles that turned the Western

democracies into the most successful societies in

history.

The basic facts are very clear. Russia presents the greatest challenge to

international law and order since the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. And even

though the West has much greater superiority over Russia -- both economically

and militarily -- than it ever had over the Soviet Union, today's leaders are

reluctant to take advantage of this asymmetry.

The problem, perhaps, is due to the ambivalence of most regional experts that

guide Western leaders' thinking. Their fundamental misreading of Russia is

based on the fact that they don't understand the difference between the Soviet

nomenclatura and modern Russia's corrupt elite. They grossly underestimate

the attachment of Russian elites to their mansions and bank accounts in the

West. Likewise, Moscow's key decision-makers are way more dependent



financially and psychologically on the West than the bureaucrats of the

Brezhnev era. Sanctions can successfully divide this group from Putin's inside

circle, but they have to go further and exact greater pain.

And yet, despite President Barack Obama's rhetoric, the West -- particularly

Europe -- appears reluctant to impose tougher sanctions. Unlike during the Cold

War, Western companies draw much more benefit from Russia today, and thus

they too will have to pay the price of sanctions. But after the first round of

sanctions, stocks rebounded as markets were relieved that the measures didn't

seem far-reaching. So how does the West expect to be taken seriously by Putin

when even Wall Street isn't buying the seriousness of the Western alliance's

intentions? The dilemma is simple: Is the West willing to pay this price now, or

delay the decision and pay a much higher price in the future?

The choice can best be described in medical terms. The cancer of Russian

aggression first showed up in Georgia, but the West decided to neglect the

diagnosis and preferred to treat the illness with aspirin. Crimea is the metastasis

of what happened in Georgia, and yet the West is still excluding the surgical

option -- that is to say military intervention -- as carrying too high a risk. But at

least it should apply chemotherapy. Yes, this means that the West will feel the

effects of its own drugs, and particularly European companies in the short term.

But in the long term, this painful dose is the only way to help kill the cancer that

is Putin.

Winston Churchill once prophetically told Hitler's appeasers: "You were given

the choice between war and dishonor. You chose dishonor and you will have

war." Surely, we cannot expect modern-day politicians obsessed with polls and

midterm elections to be Churchillian all the time. But at a minimum they



should not want to go down in history as the Neville Chamberlains of the 21st

century. And misreading Putin for the man that he is -- and has always been -- is

at the heart of appeasement.

Ed Johnson for FP

never again' isn’t enough

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