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Negotiated peace versus victor's peace:the geopolitics of peace and conflict inSri LankaJude Lal Fernandoa

a Trinity College DublinPublished online: 19 Jun 2014.

To cite this article: Jude Lal Fernando (2014) Negotiated peace versus victor's peace: thegeopolitics of peace and conflict in Sri Lanka, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 27:2,206-225, DOI: 10.1080/09557571.2014.888540

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Negotiated peace versus victor’s peace: the geopolitics ofpeace and conflict in Sri Lanka

Jude Lal FernandoTrinity College Dublin

Abstract In examining the failure of the 2002 peace process between the Sri Lankangovernment and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), this essay argues for theneed to go beyond the power dynamics of the local actors. The peace process was dismantledand military victory by the Sri Lankan government made possible not so much by theSinhala nationalist discourse, which opposed administration of development aid bythe LTTE, as by the global security discourse associated with geo-strategic interests.The EU-led development discourse, which was informed by the liberal internationalistethos, could have facilitated resolution and transformation of the conflict. In its place asecurity-based, realist discourse was prioritized in South Asia by the UK and USgovernments, particularly after the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This was thediscourse which provided the material basis for the Sinhala nationalists to consolidate theirpower in pursuing a military victory. The post-war era is marked by geopoliticization ofthe human rights discourse, deepening the conflict. This essay explores the correlationbetween the liberal peace model, human rights, international relations and geopolitics.

Introduction

Two kinds of peace have existed in Sri Lanka since 2002: a negotiated peace and avictor’s peace. The former came into effect with the signing of the CeasefireAgreement or Memorandum of Understanding between the Sri Lankangovernment and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in February 2002.It evolved through the subsequent peace process, which was supported byvarious international actors, among them the European Union, Japan, Norwayand the US (The Co-chairs). International support for negotiated peace implicitlyrecognized the need for a political process involving both parties, and included apromise of humanitarian and development aid. The second ‘peace’ emerged afterMay 2009, with the military victory of the Sri Lankan government over the LTTE.This victory was endorsed by the same group of international actors above, whothen recognized the Sri Lankan government as the legitimate authority over thewhole island, ‘appreciating’ its ‘humanitarian operation’ and entrusting theTamils to its responsibility. What were the factors that contributed to this shift or tothe failure of the 2002 ceasefire? Could the 2009 victor’s peace, with its massivehuman cost, have been avoided?

The main reason given by the Sri Lankan government and the variousinternational actors for the failure of the 2002 ceasefire was LTTE inflexibility. Thisinflexibility is said to be both political/ideological—demanding a separate state—

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and military—maintaining a military wing. Paradoxically, as the Sri Lankangovernment consolidated its victor’s peace in 2009 with continued militarization,international actors have accused it also of being inflexible and not bringing about‘good governance’. This notion of inflexibility reflects a ‘two-party theory’whereby the conflict is reduced to an antagonism between two local actors, whileits internationalized dimensions are overlooked. I will argue that there is a need togo further and examine broader international dynamics in the development andglobal securitization discourse. Although much of the academic literaturerecognizes an international dimension, the focus has been largely reduced to oneaspect: development discourse (Woost and Winslow 2004; Bastian 2007). Suchoveremphasis on development discourse overlooks the greatest determiningfactor in the failure of the peace process: the global securitization discourse, whichis characterized mainly by militarization. Passing references to the negativeimpact of the ‘global war on terror’ on the 2002 ceasefire and the peace process aremade in some of the literature (Rajasingham-Senanayake 2009; Stokke 2012).These lack an analysis of the geopolitical dynamics that underpin the globalsecuritization discourse.

The ambivalence of liberal peace

The immediate aftermath of the end of the Cold War in the 1990s marked thetriumph of liberal democracy and the market economy. In international relations,this translated into an emerging liberal internationalism, characterized bymultilateralism, diplomacy, cooperation and consensual negotiation (Murray2008, 2). In response to the unprecedented level of intra-state conflicts that eruptedin the same decade, major international actors returned to the notion of liberalpeace, which emerged in the aftermath of the First World War (Paris 2004, 5–7).This liberal peace model envisioned conflict resolution through marketization anddemocratization. The root causes of conflicts were seen as grievance-based(United Nations 1992). Many UN-led peace missions were based on this modelthat kept ‘faith in the peace-producing powers of liberalization’ (Paris 2004, 6–7).As intra-state conflicts generated trans-national impact across borders (9/11)accompanied by the geopolitical dynamics of the New World Order, a securityagenda based on realism, characterized by militarized state-building, developedalongside liberal internationalism giving rise to a global securitization discourse.This reactive approach was advanced by the UK and US governments (The WhiteHouse 2002). Conflicts were perceived as caused by greed-based terrorism (Collierand Hoeffler 1998) that must be eradicated through militarizing the states ratherthan by addressing grievance-based political dynamics through consensualnegotiations. Militarization became an essential part of conflict resolution and akey strategy of the liberal peace model implemented through invasions ofAfghanistan and Iraq, where peace-building was associated mainly with state-building (even at the expense of development). There are points of convergenceand divergence between the EU and the USA in this regard. Some countries in theEU, particularly France and Germany, have gained greater freedom to expressindependent views while not being fully indifferent to their alliance with the USA.In promoting trade and commerce, they find the ‘global war on terror’counterproductive (Coker 2003). The EU adopted a liberal institutionalistapproach and its policy statement: A Secure Europe in a Better World (Solana

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2003) admitted that ‘new threats’ are ‘multi-faceted situations’. Emphasis wasplaced on development (marketization), democratization (electoral process) anddiplomacy (consensual negotiations) (Chari and Kritzinger 2006, 204–208).

The liberal peace model reflects certain hegemonic concepts, interests andpower dynamics (Richmond and Frank 2009, 4). If its principles of democracy anddevelopment can be called ‘software’, then the state itself is the ‘hardware’ (MacGinty and Williams 2009, 46–47). States are not forged in a historical or politicalvacuum. There are geo-strategic, economic and ideological factors that determinethe making of states. In examining the failure of the 2002 peace process, I willcritique the geo-strategic interests associated with the global securitizationdiscourse rather than the economic interests associated with marketizationadopted by the EU. The marketization discourse was conducive to a negotiatedsettlement in so far as it discouraged a military solution.

The two different strategies towards implementation of liberal peace in SriLanka produced drastically different outcomes, ultimately exposing theambivalence of the model. In the initial phase of the 2002 peace process,development and democratization were prioritized as constituent elements ofconflict resolution and transformation, recognizing grievance as cause of theconflict. In the latter phase, militarization predominated, reducing the cause ofconflict to ‘terrorism’ and thereby excluding the LTTE. Some EU-led countriesresisted the latter position of the UK and US governments, while upholding bothdevelopment and a consensual negotiated settlement including both parties. Theirefforts ultimately failed. At this stage, the US need to securitize South Asia hadintensified, with ongoing conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both India and the UShad a growing need to encircle China and counteract its economic expansion inthe Indian Ocean region. The failure of the 2002 ceasefire and peace process has tobe analysed within the international context of the shift from US-led liberalinternationalism (of the Clinton era) to a realism associated with an over-relianceon military power. The resistance of some EU countries to this shift, whileunsuccessful, would give a ray of hope for a negotiated settlement, even if theEU’s position is interwoven with economic interests. Let us first look at how theconsensual negotiated peace unfolded in the first phase of the 2002 peace processbefore discussing how the shift towards victor’s peace was created.

Negotiated peace: a result of parity of status

The 2002 ceasefire and peace process between the Sri Lankan government and theLTTE came into effect at the interface between liberal internationalism on onehand and, on the other, a realist global securitization discourse. Although notinitially dominant, the global securitization discourse was not completely absentat the beginning of the 2002 ceasefire and peace process. It existed even before theceasefire was signed; the LTTE had been a banned organization in the US since1997. On the one hand, in keeping with liberal internationalism of the 1990s, theUS government supported the ceasefire and the peace process (joining with theEU and other international actors). Simultaneously, the US maintained a stancetowards the LTTE which was based upon the global securitization discourse, andwhich hardened as the peace process progressed.

There is a popular belief that the 2002 ceasefire came into effect because post-9/11 international relations exerted a negative impact on the LTTE. A close

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scrutiny of the sequence of events prior to 2002 ceasefire clearly reveals evidencecontrary to this interpretation. After consolidating control over the VanniMainland, the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire on 21 December 2000.Meanwhile, Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaranatunga of the People’sAlliance Party (PA) was facing a political crisis, having failed to deliver oncampaign promises of a political solution to the conflict and prosperity. Althougha shrinking economy, aggravated by the rising oil prices, could not support anexpansion of the war effort, the Sri Lankan government continued its militaryoperations. By mid-2001 (prior to 9/11), it met with a series of military setbacks,including a major LTTE attack on the country’s main airbase and internationalairport. The attack had an unprecedented negative impact on the foreigninvestment-based economic sector that had flourished since 1977, despite twodecades of war. These economic and political/military realities represented the SriLankan government’s hurting stalemate and gave rise to two major pragmaticpositions amongst the Sinhala polity and its constituency: a military victory overthe LTTE was not possible and a negotiated settlement should be considered; andthe economy could not be revived while continuing the war. As a result, snapelections were called which led to the formation of a new government under theleadership of the United National Front party (UNF) led by Prime Minister RanilWickremesinghe.1 In December 2001, the LTTE declared its second unilateralceasefire. The new government responded positively and the ceasefire wasformalized with the facilitation of the Royal Norwegian government in February2002. The unitary Sri Lankan state was at the weakest point in its history.

The UNF government launched a strategy consisting of three elements: aceasefire agreement and negotiations with the LTTE, an extensive economicreform programme and a conscious attempt to mobilize international support forboth these elements (Bastian 2007, 140). While cooperation and consensualnegotiations promoted by liberal internationalism had come under strain after9/11, the local power dynamic between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE,as well as the unfavourable economic reality facing the Sri Lankan government,gave a new impetus, prompting both the Sri Lankan government and theinternational actors to adopt a liberal peace agenda based on marketization anddemocratization. The primeminister, while touring the US seeking support for thepeace process, stated: ‘I would suggest that a reciprocal force is binding ourrespective interests together: business is good for peace and peace is good forbusiness’ (reliefweb 2002).

The LTTE’s readiness for negotiation was motivated by the need forinternational political recognition and accompanying economic assistance, theabsence of which represented the LTTE’s hurting stalemate: ‘We already have amassive permanent administrative structure in the areas under our control. Whatwe need is international legitimacy so we can coordinate and work with theSri Lankan government and the international community’ (Aglionby 2002).The grievances that provided the LTTE with popular support for a Tamil Eelamstate were two-fold. The first set of grievances were generated by British colonial

1 Since 1977, Sri Lanka has had both an executive presidency and a parliament. In the2001 elections, the UNF obtained amajority in the parliament, while the President was fromthe PA, which generated a tension between the two institutions. For a detailed account ofthis tension see Norad Evaluation Department (2011, 34–37, 43, 47).

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and Sinhala-centric post-colonial processes of discrimination against Tamils inpolitical representation, land, employment, education, language, industrializationand welfare. Demands for equal rights, particularly after Independence, wereviolently suppressed (Wilson 2000; Jayawardena 2003). A second set of grievances

was created by the military phase of the conflict between 1983 and 2001 throughlarge-scale displacement and devastation of the North and East. The Tamilresponse to the first set of grievances was articulated through a demand for self-determination (ratified by the Vattukottai Resolution in 1976 and theparliamentary elections in 1977 and 2004) on the basis of which the LTTEjustified building the de facto state (McConnell 2008). The second set of grievancescould be said to arise from humanitarian crisis as a result of the political conflict.

The LTTE thought and acted ‘like an emerging regional, or subnational, state’(Uyangoda 2007, 40). This entailed not only monopolizing civil administration,but also maintaining a conventional security apparatus in the areas under itscontrol, which led to dismantling of monopoly of violence of the Sri Lankan state.

The formalized ceasefire gave the LTTE political recognition and the SriLankan government leverage for an economic boom by attracting capital flow in a

liberal internationalist ethos. Space was created for negotiations to restructure thestate to accommodate Tamil demands and for the political transformation of theLTTE. The EU, both as an inter-governmental organization and at member-statelevel, adopted an equidistant stance following an orthodox approach to peace-building based on institutional and constitutional arrangements through anegotiated process that would tie together democratization and marketization,

principles that guided the EU’s own creation (European Union 2005, Article III-194 (1–2)). This approach, while interwoven with market interests, suited theeconomic and political goals of the two main protagonists of the conflict. As SriLanka’s dominant trading partner, the EU had direct economic links with the SriLankan government. As a liberal intergovernmental organization, the EU’sapproach to conflict resolution fitted very well with the Tamil demand for a

negotiated political solution. It is within this context that the liberal space waspromising, at least at the initial stage, and innovative interim arrangements wereset up towards resolution of the conflict.

The process of negotiation: untold progress

As the peace process began, development discourse came to dominate the peacetalks. There were six rounds of talks between August 2002 and March 2003 beforeparity of esteem was dismantled. Attending to the immediate humanitarian needsof the war-torn region was seen as a confidence-building measure between thetwo parties.

In the early stages of our talks with the LTTE, we are trying to resolve some of the

immediate practical needs of the people that can bring relief and normalcy to our

society. Economic reconstruction and development of the affected areas will be a

deciding factor in sustaining the momentum of political negotiations.

(Wickremesinghe 2002)

In the first round of talks, held in Thailand, the LTTE spokesperson stated:

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Over and above the intricate questions of conflict resolution and power sharing, thepeople expect a peace dividend; they require immediate relief to resolve theirurgent, existential problems. Therefore, the peace process cannot be undertaken inisolation without taking parallel steps towards the economic recovery of thesuffering population. (Balasingham 2002)

A closer look at the peace process reveals that direct meetings between the twoparties were productive within a liberal internationalist ethos. It is true that bothsides had different incentives: the LTTE for humanitarian assistance and politicalrecognition; the Sri Lankan government for economic growth through market-ization. However, both parties showed flexibility in attempting to resolve theconflict in a non-militaristic manner. The LTTE’s initial demand was an interimadministration to address humanitarian needs, but so as not to antagonize thehostile Sinhala Buddhist nationalist groups in the south at the outset of the peaceprocess, the organization agreed to joint sub-committees reflecting a level offlexibility on political front (Balasingham 2004, 383–391).

With the hope of permanent peace after the ceasefire, out of 160,754 internallydisplaced families in the North and East (515,085 individuals) 95,000 families(264,000 individuals) returned to their villages between February 2002 toDecember 2004 (Elankumaran 2010, 145). From the outset of the peace process,both parties made joint appeals to international donors for immediate economicassistance for humanitarian and reconstruction activities. Three innovative jointsub-committees were established to deal with various aspects of the initial phaseof negotiated peace: the Sub-committee on Immediate Human and RehabilitationNeeds in the North and East (SIHRN), the Sub-committee on De-escalation andNormalisation (SDN) and the Sub-committee on Political Matters (NoradEvaluation Department 2011, 39–40). Given the intractable history of the conflict,the meetings between members of the SDN and SIHRN were a historicachievement, signalling a way towards shared sovereignty. The Sub-committee onGender Issues was announced with the aim of including the gender perspective inthe peace process (Government.no/Document Archive 2003). As part of anagreement between UNICEF and the LTTE to set up a ‘credible reviewmechanism’ to stop the recruitment of minors, the LTTE handed over 300underage recruits to their families (Liyanage 2008, 109). Paying particularattention to the Eastern Province, it was agreed to appoint three committees toeach of the districts in the Province, representing both the LTTE and the Muslimpopulation in addressing land and other issues of mutual concern (Liyanage 2008,108). A former head of Amnesty International was commissioned to present aroadmap towards an effective mechanism to monitor human rights, which was tobe submitted after the sixth round of talks in Japan (Norad EvaluationDepartment 2011, 41). The plan included training of LTTE cadres and Sri Lankangovernment officers in human rights and humanitarian law.

High-ranking officials from a number of EU countries and internationalNGOs not only visited both Sri Lankan government and LTTE administeredregions and promised economic aid, but also facilitated meetings on the peaceprocess in major cities in Europe. Parallel to the peace talks, a one-day PeaceSupport Conference was held in Oslo in November 2002 with the participationof 100 delegates from 19 countries who pledged around 70 million US dollarsto a Northeast Reconstruction Fund (Norad Evaluation Department 2011, 40).

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This was a clear indication of the readiness of the international actors toimplement the liberal peace model based on development aid anddemocratization.2

Making a political breakthrough the LTTE leader stated: ‘We are prepared toconsider favorably a political framework that offers substantial regionalautonomy and self-government in our homeland on the basis of our right tointernal self-determination’ (Balasingham 2004, 400–401). This was the first timethat the LTTE referred to internal self-determination, signalling the possibility ofa negotiated political settlement other than a separate state. Democratization ofthe state is a constituent element of liberal peace, hence the discussion on federalpolitical structures as a possible model for internal self-determination duringthe third round of talks in Oslo. The LTTE also reported the formation of aPolitical Affairs Committee comprising 21 of its prominent members: ‘Thecommittee would undertake study of systems of government, particularlyfederal models’ (Balasingham 2004, 428). The LTTE upheld a bottom-upfederalism that included its de facto state with civil, financial and securityautonomy (Hellmann-Rajanaygam 2009, 80). This was radically different fromthe top-down power-sharing that was imposed by the Indo-Lanka Peace Accordin 1987. The Sri Lankan government and the international actors seemed open tothe bottom-up approach despite the fact that they did not make any formalcommitment. In the concluding remarks of the sixth round of talks, theNorwegian facilitators declared that ‘while substantial progress had been madeon the political level, there was slow progress on humanitarian issues and thesecurity situation’ (Hellmann-Rajanaygam 2009, 429). Chief negotiators fromboth parties not only refuted certain media claims about ‘irreconcilabledifferences’ that could cause a breakdown of the peace process, but alsoscheduled seventh, eighth and ninth meetings, none of which could be held(International Human Rights Association 2010, 67–70). How then was optimismlost and the development and democratization discourses of liberal peace fail,leading to a massive loss of life?

The process towards the victor’s peace

Although the securitization strategy followed by the US and India was evidentfrom the beginning of the ceasefire it did not have a negative impact on the peaceprocess, at least in its initial phase, due to three interrelated factors. Firstly, the2002 ceasefire and peace process emerged mainly as a result of an internal powerbalance between the Sri Lankan state and the LTTE. Despite opposition to thepeace moves among some sections of the Sinhala polity, a majority believed that amilitary solution was impossible. Secondly, the urgent need of the Sri Lankangovernment to overcome the economic crisis (Bastian 2007, 148) by ending the warfitted neatly with the development discourse of the liberal peace model whichsuited particularly the main strategy of the EU and of Japan. China also sent adelegation to meet the LTTE leadership—one of the first foreign missions to visitthe de facto state. Thirdly, the US’s need to intensify securitization reached its

2 For a detailed analysis of development aid associated with the peace process seeSriskandarajah (2003).

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height in 2003 with the invasion of Iraq. In what way, then, was the balance ofpower dismantled, strengthening the anti-ceasefire and anti-peace process groupsin the Sinhala society?

Barry Buzan and Ole Waever (2003, 114–115) have shown how the end of theCold War had weakened ‘a fairly marginal American engagement in South Asia’but how ‘all of this was pushed aside’ after 2001 as South Asia was treated morethan ever as a regional security structure. The stability of the existing Sri Lankanstate became a necessary component of US strategy, which meant restoring amonopoly of violence to the Sri Lankan state. The US welcomed the ceasefire onthe very day of its signing and ‘assured continuous support for a negotiatedsettlement’ (Tamil Net 2002), but this stated support has to be measured againstpractice. The US also prescribed the character of the political solution with thecontinuous use of words like ‘undivided Sri Lanka’, ‘territorial integrity’ and‘terrorism’ (the vocabulary of Sinhala nationalists) signalling its opposition to anysubstantial transformation of the existing state structure (Lunstead 2007, 39).It was clearly stated that ‘an independent Tamil Eelam is both unattainable andunwise’ (The Island 2002a), and that ‘the LTTE must unequivocally renounceterrorism in word and deed’ (The Island 2003a). Furthermore, State Departmentofficials and high-ranking members of the security forces increased their visits tothe island, particularly to key military establishments in the Tamil region underSri Lankan government control (Lunstead 2007, 17–18). A team from the USPacific Command conducted a security assessment of the area surroundingTrincomalee harbour in the Eastern Province, which came under the purview ofthe ceasefire. This took place within six months of the signing of the ceasefirewhile the Nordic ceasefire monitoring mission was in operation. This reportsuggested that the Sri Lankan government needed to recapture the LTTE-controlled areas around the harbour in order to win a future war (Athas 2003),signifying the strategic importance of this particular harbour in the Indian Ocean.This report is said to be very comprehensive and made a large number ofrecommendations on how to reform the security forces so as to win the war(Moorcraft 2013, 110). India adopted a similar approach, even though its directrole in the peace process appeared to be minimal. An Indian military report issuedin January 2003 reiterated the importance of reorganizing and relocating securityforces in the Jaffna peninsula. It recommended that the Sri Lankan governmentshould maintain the High Security Zones and not allow resettlement of displacedpeople as required by the ceasefire and peace process until the LTTE lays downarms (Tamil Net 2003). While it appears that the USA and India supported anegotiated settlement with the promise of development aid and a federal solution,their support was dependent on abandonment of the abovementioned bottom-upapproach to federalism. It is within this context that their notion of federalismbecomes ambiguous and superimposed. The liberal international ethos promotedby the EU had laid down conditions also, but none concerning the character of thepolitical solution. Its conditions were related to protection of human rights anddemocratization.

The first breakdown of the peace process took place only after the sixth roundof talks, which coincided with the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. Although thetalks ended on an optimistic note, this moment marked a conflict betweenunilateralist and multilateralist approaches in international relations, withunilateralism predominating. Whilst multilateralism helped neutralize the Sri

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Lankan conflict, unilateralism contributed to escalation of the conflicts in theMiddle East and West Asia. Referring to this, the LTTE stated its opposition to aunipolar international order: ‘It is regrettable that the US attacked Iraq withoutproper endorsement of the UN’ (The Hindu 2003). Within a few days, AssistantSecretary of State Christina Rocca reiterated the position regarding securitization:‘Even as we advance our efforts in the Middle East, South Asia remains at thefront-line of the war on terror, and regional stability remains critical’; she alsostated that the USA would reform Sri Lanka’s military institutions (The Island2003a). A preparatory meeting for the upcoming Tokyo peace process donorconference was due to be held in Washington. The US made a unilateral decisionto exclude the LTTE from this meeting. India, which had not attended theprevious donor meeting due to the LTTE’s presence, attended the Washingtonevent, directly joining the emerging securitization and exclusion process. Up tothis point, all parties had agreed to jointly address development issues as part ofconfidence-building measures and conflict transformation. This agreement wasbased on parity of esteem accorded to both parties as a constituent element of thebalance of power that had given rise to ceasefire and peace process (PermanentPeoples’ Tribunal 2013, 35). The LTTE, after making unsuccessful appeals toreconsider the decision, withdrew from the peace process (not from the ceasefire).

The Tokyo donor conference, which was attended by 52 countries andpromised aid to the value of US$4.5 billion, called on the LTTE to return to thenegotiating table. Economic grievances and urgent humanitarian needs have beenpart of the political grievances articulated by the Tamils through their demand forself-determination. One of the consequences of securitizing the developmentdiscourse is that it reduces the conflict to mere economic grievances andminimalizes the political aspect. It projects the political leadership as greed-drivenand insulated from the people, who are treated as helpless victims. The donorconference did not recognize the need for a substantial transformation of theunitary state structure and the word federalism was kept abstract. No emphasiswas placed on a resolution that recognizes parity of esteem between the two partiesas a means to overcome the history of formation of conflict dynamics. In theaftermath of the Tokyo conference, with renewed confidence in a unitary system,the Sri Lankan government proposed an Interim Apex Body that undermined therole of the LTTE and virtually withdrew from a federal solution (NoradEvaluation Department 2011, 46). By this time, the joint sub-committees forhumanitarian needs had become defunct due to continuous delays by the SriLankan government and the international actors in allocating funds and theexclusion of the LTTE from the Washington meeting. Many Tamil activists arguedwhether the word ‘federalism’ would make any sense when the Sri Lankangovernment and the international actors could not support at least the basic jointsub-committees for humanitarian needs. Nevertheless, political space fornegotiations remained open. The LTTE presented to the Sri Lankan governmenta comprehensive proposal for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). Thiswas a demand based on the principle of internal self-determination as a pre-condition for resumption of the peace process. As one prominent Sinhala politicalscientist commented that this was ‘the first concrete set of ideas that the LTTE haselaborated as its blueprint for a negotiated solution’ and ‘would envisage a radicalreconstitution of the existing State’ (Uyangoda 2007, 19). The EU welcomed theproposal, stating that it ‘represents an important step forward in the peace

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process’ and hoped that ‘direct talks between the parties aimed at reaching anagreement on a solution acceptable to all communities’ would be resumed (TheIsland 2003b), but the US signalled a resolution based on a securitized agenda:

the parties to the conflict appear to be ready to reach a resolution, more so than anyother time in the past twenty years . . . Logically, down the road, this is going toinclude disarmament . . . Internal self-determination, within the framework of oneSri Lanka, is not going to be consistent with separate armies and navies for differentparts of the country. (Armitage 2003)

The internal and external dynamics of the peace process demonstrate that theliberal peace based on development discourse became a failure not merelybecause of ideological opposition by the Sinhala nationalist or because of theLTTE’s withdrawal from the peace process. Sinhala groups opposed to anegotiated peace existed even prior to the ceasefire. President ChandirkaKumaranatunga, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) and the far right SinhalaUrumaya (which later became Jathika Hela Urumaya—JHU) began forming analliance against the ceasefire from its inception, but did not have a large followingat this stage due to war-weariness, the shrinking economy and the apparentwidespread international support given to the peace process. If power is definedby material capabilities; military, technological, economic, political anddiplomatic, the ideological force of these groups alone could not have alteredthe balance of power of the ceasefire and peace process. It is in the context ofgrowing international securitization that their confidence in military powerincreased, as expressed by one of their major newspapers:

A new relationship is being forged on our own sub-continent between the USthe hyper-power and the emerging regional super-power India, which appearsto be cosying up to the US . . . abandoning its old friend Iraq . . . There is nogainsaying the fact that the US would have a major presence in the region tosafeguard her interests . . . at the end of the day it would be better to ensurethat our powerful friend’s interests and ours converge . . . in safeguarding theunity and territorial integrity of this country. (Karl 2003)

The interdependence between the internal and external factors that contributed tothe failure of the peace process has to be assessed by the degree of impact each ofthese had on the balance of power between the two parties. In order to containSinhala nationalist pressure, the Sri Lankan government not only withheld fundsto the joint sub-committees, but also let it be known to its constituency that it hadpowerful allies internationally (meaning economic and military support whichwas later coded by the UNF as ‘international safety net’ (The Island 2002b;Liyanaarachchi 2005)). This approach helped increase the Sinhala nationalistopposition’s confidence in regaining political power. Despite the history ofinternal Sinhala nationalist opposition to Tamil demands (Hellmann-Rajanaya-gam 2009, 81–82 and 84–90), the unitary character of the state could not have beensecured without the external support that dismantled the balance of power of theceasefire and peace process. Immediately after the LTTE proposed the InterimSelf-Governing Authority, the President, with the backing of Sinhala nationalistgroups, dissolved parliament (led by the UNF) and called for new elections. TheUNF-led government lost power in April 2004, and the United People FreedomAlliance party (UPFA), under the leadership of the President, acquired a majority

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in parliament with the support of JVP and JHU. These parties not only ruled outnegotiation on a unitary state structure, but also argued for a military solution.The UPFA argued that the ISGAwas a roadmap to total separation, but proposedno alternative to the unitary state structure. The LTTE stated that the ‘proposal isnot rigid or final and it is open to discussion’, while expressing its willingness tocome to the south to address the Sinhala people in order to dispelmisunderstandings and confusion (Tamil Net 2004). Instead of creating spacefor consensual negotiations, the US clearly signalled its position, not only byrenewing the ban on the LTTE in June 2004, but by expressing its readiness torevive free trade agreements with the UPFA-led government, furthering thegovernment’s material capabilities (The Island 2004). Indian and US intelligenceservices began working with the Sri Lankan government in monitoring LTTE’smaritime movements and US Navy SEALS trained the Sri Lankan Navy, helpingto transform the Sinhala ideological force into material capability (Moorcraft 2013,59). By 2005, with the special permission of the US, the Sri Lankan governmenthad acquired nine Israeli-made Kafir fighter jets in addition to the existing seven(Moorcraft 2013, 64). The ISGA proposal may or may not have led to a looselyconfederal arrangement, but the main question is why the international actors didnot put pressure on the Sri Lankan government to come to the negotiating table orsuggest an alternative to the unitary framework.

Amidst narrowing political space, the prospects for negotiations were revivedwith the 2004 tsunami, when both parties agreed to form the Post-TsunamiOperational Management Structure (P-TOMS) in 2005 to address issues ofreconstruction and resettlement in the affected areas (Asian Tribune 2005). Thisagain was a result of pressure exerted upon the Sri Lankan government byinternational actors, mainly EU countries. It could have been a form of a sharedhumanitarian sovereignty that would have both de-securitized and de-ethnicizedthe conflict while resurrecting the peace process. Nevertheless, the US decided notto allocate funds to the mechanism as LTTE was party to it. The decision was firstrevealed by the far right JHU, after a meeting with the US ambassador in Colombo(LankaNewspapers.com 2005). Meanwhile, the JVP obtained a court order againstthe P-TOMS while demanding that the US implement the ‘global war on terror’against the LTTE (BBC Sinhala.com 2005). The emerging anti-ceasefire and anti-peace process currents spread far and wide within the Sinhala constituency,awakening a hope in a military victory. These issues greatly informed the 2005presidential election campaign, which was contested by the UPFA under theleadership of Mahinda Rajapakshe and supported by JHU and JVP. Soon after theUPFA victory, in May 2006, while the UK government held the EU presidencychair, the LTTEwas banned by the EU as a terrorist organization. The reason givenwas violation of human rights by the LTTE, but the ban went against the EU’sstated principles of a negotiated settlement and reflected a selective application ofhuman rights standards to conflict zones (Cacicedo 2009, 2; Council of theEuropean Union 2006). It was evident that the absence of meaningful negotiationshad generated a political vacuum and that there were violations of the ceasefireand human rights by both parties. That is why the political process should havebeen promoted rather than the securitizing process that furthers violence. The EUconsulted the head of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Swedish MajorGeneral Ulf Henricsson, prior to the ban. He opposed it, as it would encourage theSri Lankan government to seek a military solution. Henricsson later revealed that

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the EU went ahead with the ban under pressure from the UK and US (Henricsson2007; Moorcraft 2013, 112). The foreign minister of the Sri Lankan government atthe time confirmed the differences between some members of the EU and the USgovernment in this regard:

Then, seven countries in the 25-member EU did not agree with the LTTE ban, and itbecame a difficulty to adopt the ban as a unanimous decision. Therefore, I metSecretary of State Condoleezza Rice several times and through the offices of DeputySecretary of State Nicholas Burns, got the consent of those seven nations toproscribe the LTTE on 29 May 2006. (Samaraweera 2012)

Securitization, geopolitics and the unitary state

Throughout the peace process the US and India effectively upheld Sri Lanka’sunitary state structure by opposing not only a bottom-up approach to federalismthat incorporates the Tamil de facto state but also declining to allocate funds tojoint mechanisms that would encourage shared sovereignty. This later became thestance of the other international actors too. Why is Sri Lanka’s unitary structure soimportant and how does it relate to securitization? The answer is twofold: thegeographical location of the island and enduring racial legacy from Britishcolonial rule.

The island lies in the heart of the Indian Ocean with close proximity to Indiaand with one of the world’s biggest natural harbours in Trincomalee. This isconsidered to be the most important factor that attracted colonial powers anddetermined the island’s strategic value. During the British colonial period, Indiawas the main theatre of exploitation. The Tamils in the North and East (with theTrincomalle harbour) had a closer affinity to India than the Sinhalese. A strategiclocation needs political/military stability. It should remain as one political unitunder one political command, and so the British created a unitary politicalstructure in 1833 by amalgamating Tamil and Sinhala regions. The Sinhalese wereencouraged to consider themselves racially superior to Tamils, leading to aperception among the numerically greater Sinhalese that the entire islandbelonged to them and the rest were ‘invaders’ (Agnell 1998; Jeganathan 1995). Theunitary structure and ideology of racial superiority gradually separated theSinhalese (who were a minority in the Indian subcontinent) from India as well asfrom the Tamils. The forged Sinhala mindset did not fully tally with more liberaltendencies within the British Empire, but served British strategic interests. As aresult there was no serious political uprising by the Sinhalese against colonial ruleafter 1848, even though there have been cultural and religious revivals whichcontinuously vilified non-Sinhala ethnic groups: the Muslims (1915), theMalayalis (1930s) and the Tamils (since 1948). Whilst the Tamils in the Northand East, following the Indian freedom movement, demanded swaraj for thewhole island, the Sinhala polity asked only for a dominion status (Fernando 2013,187–88).

The post-colonial nation-building process has been a violent consolidation ofthe existing political structure and national ideology that gained constitutionallegitimacy in 1972 with a unitary state structure in which primacy was given toSinhala Buddhism. This process was resisted by the Tamil national polity forabout 30 years since Independence in 1948 through non-violent protests and later

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moved to an armed phase. During the Cold War, and particularly from 1977, theSri Lankan government began to introduce a market economy and upgraded itssecurity apparatus through strong alliances with the US, Britain and Israel(Balasingham 2004, 49–50; Bastian 2007, 85–86; Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal2013, 31–32). India, which was an ally of the USSR, backed the Tamil nationalleadership in an attempt to counterbalance the Sri Lankan government (Krishna2001). Towards the end of the Cold War, India moved away from the Moscow axisand changed its initial position, even politically and militarily collaborating withthe Sri Lankan government through the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord in 1987, whichaimed to disarm the LTTE and implement devolution of power under the unitarystate system. The LTTE’s armed opposition to this move and the withdrawal ofIndian troops culminated in the gradual formation of the de facto Tamil state inthe early 1990s (Stokke 2006, 1022).

The island’s strategic importance for both trade and warfare has grown as ‘theIndian Ocean and its adjacent waters’ has become a ‘central theatre of globalconflict and competition this century’ (Kaplan 2009, 25). The US’s Marine CorpsVision and Strategy 2025 gives a high value to the Indian Ocean in the emergingpower dynamics between the US and China, China and India, and India and theUSA (Kaplan 2009, 25). Sri Lanka is located near to at least four major shippinglanes that connect the resource-filled Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean,South China Sea and the Western Pacific Ocean between East and West. In a jointarticle written by a high-profile USmilitary officer and a senior instructor at the SriLanka Military Academy, the island is named as ‘the most ideal location to fulfill aplethora of tasks in furthering not only the security interests of the USA, but thoseof Sri Lanka and India’ (Anderson andWijeyesekara 2011). As was the case duringthe British Empire, it is this strategic importance that underpins the inherentworth of the unitary state structure, which is perceived to be amore stable politicalarrangement than two states or a confederal arrangement. US Under Secretary ofState Nicholas Burns affirmed this position:

The US government is not neutral on its stand on LTTE . . . The government has aright to try to protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Thegovernment has a right to protect the stability and security in the country. (DailyMirror 2006)

In this geopolitical setting, Tamil Eelam becomes ‘untenable’ and ‘unwise’compared to Independence of, for example, Kosovo or South Sudan. Thegeopolitical value of South Sudan lies in its oil wealth. Before its Independence60 per cent of oil exports under Khartoum government went to China (Hurst 2006,5). It could be argued that the support given to South Sudanese independence bythe Western governments was motivated by an economic interest and the need tocontain China’s sphere of influence in Africa. While Kosovo does not have oil, theTrans-Balkan oil and gas pipeline is proposed to run through neighboringAlbania, and the US’s biggest military camp in Europe is in Kosovo. Anindependent state for the majority of ethnic Albanians living in Kosovo waspromoted by the US-led governments under these economic and militaryconditions (Vladimir Putin Political Analysis 2008; Global Research 2012; Monbiot2001). The geopolitical value in Sri Lanka is not economic but geo-strategicbecause of its location as an island in the Indian Ocean. This value can bemaintained as long as it remains as one unit under one central command, which

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was challenged by the LTTE. This does not mean that India, the US and the UK arein total agreement with the Sinhala Buddhist nationalist groups, but the latterform the ideological force of the unitary state. The more the unitary state ispromoted for geopolitical interests the stronger this force becomes, reflecting aninterrelationship between internal and external dynamics, a factor that has notbeen analysed by the regional security complex theory of the Copenhagen Schoolin its treatment of Sri Lanka (Buzan and Waever 2003, 103, 106).

Despite occasional rhetorical opposition, the Sri Lankan government led by theSinhala polity has proved to be a close ally of the US. For example, in 2007, bothgovernments entered into a military pact and in 2010 and 2013 both naviesconducted training sessions in the sea of Trincomalle (Permanent Peoples’Tribunal 2013, 36–37; Tamil Net 2013). This is in contrast to the uncompromisingnationalist ethos of the LTTE, which has opposed both Indian and US strategic/securitizing moves. The LTTE could have contributed to the emerging multipolarworld, as was evidenced by its opposition to the invasion of Iraq. Even a union ofstates under a confederal settlement would have altered the existing geopoliticalconfiguration in the Indian Ocean. This does not mean that the LTTE could havemanaged without the impact of economic globalization. In fact, it benefited fromits transnational network of funding and even sought development aid during thepeace process whilst demanding its right to decide the economic and politicalactivities of the de facto state.

China’s position is mostly (though not solely) conditioned by its interest ineconomic expansion throughmaritime trade (String of Pearls) (Vaughn 2011, 5–6).Supporting the unitary state structure and increasing military support to the SriLankan government became China’s main strategy in outweighing the growingUS sphere of influence as well as in competing with India. China also encouragedPakistan to contain Indian influence in supplying ammunition to the Sri Lankangovernment during the war (Hargreaves et al nd, 10–12). However, the Chineseaxis did not play a direct role in the initial dismantling of the balance of power ofthe peace process. As a matter of fact, the UFPA government followed the masterplan provided by the US Pacific Command in 2002 (as mentioned above) inexecuting the war which started from the adjunct region of the Trincolmaleeharbour in mid-2007. The UFPA government’s first military ‘shopping tour’ wasto India (Moorcraft 2012, 111–112). Meanwhile, Israel, Russia, Singapore, the UKand Ukraine also increased the sale of major conventional weapons to the SriLankan government during this period (Lindberg et al 2011). The sophisticatedmilitary knowledge necessary to wage counterinsurgency warfare against anorganization like the LTTE was provided by the US by training high-ranking SriLankan military officers in Fordbrag and Fortlevenworth (Permanent Peoples’Tribunal 2013, 35).

As the second and final phase of military operations unfolded towards theNorth from the East, around 500,000 people moved further into the de facto state,reflecting the intrinsic correlation between the security of the Tamils and theirdemand for self-determination. The UN decided to leave the region at the requestof the Sri Lankan government in 2008 (United Nations 2011, 20–21). In the lastphase of the war, the de facto state that had covered around 15,000 squarekilometres was reduced to less than 1 square kilometre with a population ofaround 300,000, leading to a bloodbath (Hull and Sirilal 2009). According to theBishop of Mannar at least 146,000 people are unaccounted for (Perera 2011; United

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Nations 2012, 38–39). The Report of the Secretary-General’s Internal Review Panel onUnited Nations Action in Sri Lanka (Petrie Report) (United Nations 2012) noted thatnot a single Security Council meeting was held regarding the situation during thisperiod (at No 33). It has been revealed that both India and the US had satelliteimages of Sri Lankan troops utilizing long-range heavy weapons and aerialattacks against the civilians (Wikileaks Cable, 2009a). As Sir John Holmes, the UNHumanitarian Coordinator at the time, later stated in an interview, ‘There was abit of a diplomatic dance around all this, with everybody knowing that the end ofthis was going to be an inevitable military victory for the government’ (Sri Lanka’sKilling Fields 2012). The stated concern about civilian casualties did not match theactual practice of international actors who supported the unitary state structurefor different reasons, but the outcome was the same: a victor’s peace with serioushuman rights implications. However, it has emerged through the Petrie Report(United Nations 2012) that there was a conflict of interests within the UN structureduring the last phase of the war; one was geared by humanitarian and humanrights concerns and the other by strategic and securitizing interests (at No 44, 55).This reflects on a different plane the diverging characters of the EU and USapproaches during the peace process. In fact, some of the EU member states of theCo-chairs had wanted to exert pressure on the Sri Lankan government to stop thewar, but were thwarted by other international actors. At last the Co-chairs decidedto exert pressure on the LTTE to surrender and ‘release the civilians’ (WikileaksCable 2009b). This was a total reversal of the 2002 ceasefire and peace process.

Conclusion

The 2002 ceasefire and peace process evolved due to internal power dynamics andthe external context of liberal internationalism. The greatest challenge it faced wasnot the hostile internal actors, the nature of the development discourse(marketization) or the different development priorities put forward by the twoparties. Rather, the external actors that stressedmilitarization generated a constanttension between militarization on one hand and development, democratizationand protection of human rights on the other. That tension eventually doomed thesearch for a negotiated end to the conflict. Certain international actors gatheredtogether in the early phase of the 2002 peace process to make the island of SriLanka a showcase of liberal peace achieved through development anddemocratization. By 2006 they had rallied to peace-building through militarizedstate-building. These two approaches reflect two contradictory discourses withinthe liberal peace model: hyper-conservative and orthodox discourses. These are alsorelated to international relations where the US laid emphasis on the formerapproach whereas the EU in general, and some of its member states in particular,encouraged the latter approach. However, the difference between these twoapproaches diminished within the emerging geopolitical dynamics surroundingthe Indian Ocean.

Sri Lanka’s ‘successful’ counter-insurgency model is a product of theglobalized security discourse and geopolitical strategy of the major powers whoreframed a grievance-based conflict as greed-driven terrorism. As the evidence oflarge-scale massacres in the last phase of the war emerged, it appears that there isa change of positions by the international actors. The Report of the Secretary-

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General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (Darusman Report) (UnitedNations 2011) admitted that there were at least 40,000 civilians killed andrecommended an international independent investigation into alleged violationsof international humanitarian law by both parties in the last phase of the war. TheEU also called for the same. The Sri Lankan government established its ownLearnt Lessons and Reconciliation Commission (Embassy of Sri LankaWashington DC 2011). Instead of adopting the UN report the US (later supportedby India in 2013) adopted the Learnt Lessons and Reconciliation Commissionreport at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in 2012, 2013 and2014 to pass a resolution(s) on Sri Lanka calling for an internal accountabilityprocedure (Embassy of the United States: Sri Lanka and Maldives 2014; TheHindu 2014). This despite the fact that the Learnt Lessons and ReconciliationCommission report has been rejected by major international human rightsorganizations as structurally and procedurally flawed (Amnesty International2010). A few days after the US-led UNHRC resolution concerning violations ofhuman rights in Sri Lanka was passed in March 2014, a US-Sri Lanka joint-defenseworkshop commenced in Colombo ‘in support of Sri Lankan Government and USPacific Command Theater Security Objectives’ (News 1st 2014).

In fact, the Sri Lankan government mandated the Learnt Lessons andReconciliation Commission not to probe into violations of human rights, but toinvestigate how the 2002 ceasefire and peace process was ‘unrealistic andunworkable’ as it violated the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the island(No 2.24). Adaptation of the Learnt Lessons and Reconciliation Commission reportbyUNHCR clearly shows how the human rights discourse has been geopoliticizedin favour of the unitary state, even though the UNHRC resolution is perceived bythe Sinhala nationalist lobby as a Western conspiracy (Gunatilleke 2014). Thisresolution was opposed in the UNHRC by the Chinese as an infringement of SriLanka’s sovereignty (Daily News 2014). However, both those who support andthose who oppose the resolution hold on to the unitary state structure which is thecore factor of the conflict. There is no moral, legal or political pressure on the SriLankan government. Instead the consolidation of the unitary state by the SriLankan government has gained unprecedented proportions in the name of ‘post-wardevelopment’ aided by themain international actors—withChina emerging asthe main single donor. The aim has been to sever the Tamils’ relationship to theNorth and East and prevent the re-emergence of Tamil national resistance(Goodhead 2012, 133). The Northern Province has become the most militarizedregion in South Asia in terms of force density: 200 soldiers per 1000 civilians. Thisexceeds the ratio in Chechnya, Kashmir and Iraq (Anonymous 2012). The securityforces engage in both civil administration and economic activities. Reconstructionhas been ideologized on the basis of Sinhala Buddhist identity through Sinhalasettlements, building of Buddhist shrines, renaming roads and regions, etc. Thevictor’s peace, therefore, is more geo-strategic than local.

The question that remains is whether an orthodox peace and protection ofhuman rights can be achieved while maintaining the unitary state structurethrough militarization of the North and East. In resurrecting a liberal space forconflict resolution and peace-building the EU countries who opposed the hyper-conservative approach, as well as the some sections within the UN who wereconcerned about the humanitarian and human rights situation during the lastphase of the war, could give leadership to re-configure the asymmetrical

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relationship between the Sri Lankan state and the Tamil national movement. SriLanka remains a useful case study for theorists in peace and conflict to explore thecorrelation between the liberal peace model, human rights, international relationsand geopolitics.

Notes on contributor

Jude Lal Fernando is Assistant Professor in Intercultural Theology andInterreligious Studies and a Lecturer in International Peace Studies in the IrishSchool of Ecumenics at Trinity College Dublin. One of the key areas of his researchis Religion and Politics in South Asia. His latest work isReligion, conflict and peace inSri Lanka: the politics of interpretation of nationhoods (Berlin: LIT Verlag, 2013). He isalso a Visiting Professor in Tampere University in Finland. Email: fernanla@tcd.ie

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