national intelligence assessment: australia's experience
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This article was downloaded by: [University of Alabama at Tuscaloosa]On: 19 December 2014, At: 15:15Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK
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National intelligenceassessment: Australia'sexperienceA. D. McLennan aa Former Deputy Director of the Office ofNational Assessments , AustraliaPublished online: 02 Jan 2008.
To cite this article: A. D. McLennan (1995) National intelligence assessment:Australia's experience, Intelligence and National Security, 10:4, 72-91, DOI:10.1080/02684529508432326
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National Intelligence Assessment:Australia's Experience
A. D. McLENNAN
WHY INTELLIGENCE?
The world brims with information. Why add intelligence to the flow (oroverflow) and so complicate the policy-maker's day? While tactical intelli-gence is central to capability, and so argues its own case, strategic warningis more complicated. This is because of the time scales, ambiguities andstakes involved. Strategic warning does fit what we are discussing here;intelligence for policy-makers in an overcrowded market.
In fact, this market condition is part of the case for intelligence,which is threefold. First, bulk information needs digestion, refinement,abbreviation and packaging to meet policy-makers' requirements. Theirtime and attention span is limited. So brief, relevant and pointed intelli-gence helps efficient decision making. It is focused, not discursive, andshould serve to point up what is possible. Which is to say that intelligenceis an aid to clear thinking in policy analysis and decision making.
Another part of the case for intelligence is detachment. Intelligenceanalysis is a step removed from policy decision-making - deliberately so.Analytic intelligence provides a reality check on policy-driven hopes andaspirations. It fosters objectivity. Sensible policy-makers realize this,provided that they receive sensible intelligence advice. Often, soundpolicy decisions will fall out naturally from furnished intelligence. In factintelligence helps the balance of temperaments. Policy-makers, optimistsby nature, are apt to clutch at straws and tiny crevices as they scale impos-sible heights to reach desired goals. Whereas intelligence analysts areprone to pessimism, to emphasize the difficulties and seek security ofjudgment in worst casing. Maybe this polarity exaggerates, but it is not abad practical guide.
The third part in the case for intelligence is the access it affords tospecial sources of information.
SECRET INTELLIGENCE
Intelligence from secret sources provides information that is otherwiseunavailable, may change the picture, or confirm and strengthen what isotherwise known or suspected. Indeed, all-source intelligence, where the
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different elements reinforce one another, provides the most reliableinformation picture.
That said, secret intelligence, has its drawbacks. First, getting it isexpensive and handling complicated. It is a scarce resource that should behusbanded, not dissipated against soft, low-value targets. Second, secretacquisition compromised can cause diplomatic embarrassment and worse,to the point of negating policy purpose or even costing lives. Finally,clever adversaries can exploit secret intelligence to sow disinformation orotherwise deceive.
The most highly classified information is not necessarily the most accu-rate or valuable, although it will probably be the most expensive to get.Secrecy fetishists stumble over this point, confusing higher classificationwith greater validity. Which is to say, secret intelligence - like all informa-tion - needs evaluation and analysis to place it in context.
A compelling but lone piece of raw intelligence, floated past policy-makers without context, can greatly distort policy. This is not to put thekibosh on secret intelligence but to state the case for analysis. That is,secret intelligence properly directed is very valuable, often essential - buthandle with care.
Critics who would do away with secret intelligence argue from a varietyof standpoints and reasons that range from moral naivete ('gentlemendon't read others' mail' or 'open covenants openly arrived at') to malig-nance inspired by jealousy, political conviction or design. Ironically,some of the most trenchant, indeed rabid critics of intelligence secrecy arefailed applicants for appointment to the intelligence services.
As to design - this an historical example - the Soviet Union/KGB triedevery trick to discredit Western intelligence. They understood very wellits critical role as both sword and shield. In particular, the core (andultimately successful) policy of Western reliance on nuclear weapons tocounter Soviet hegemonic designs depended on the most elaborate intel-ligence support. So 'helpful idiots' and conscious agents alike were grist tothe KGB's mill.
AUSTRALIA'S INTELLIGENCE TRADITION
Before discussing Australia's contemporary approach to national intelli-gence some historical points are germane. First, Australia has traditionallysought security in alliance - with Britain through the empire; later withthe United States through the Australia, New Zealand, United States(ANZUS) treaty of 1951. This policy has seen Australia dispatch expedi-tionary forces to wars in many parts of the world: the Middle East in bothworld wars, Western Europe, Southeast Asia and the Pacific islands,
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Korea, even Murmansk. Australia was a fully engaged Western partnerthroughout the Cold War. In fact, intelligence co-operation with allieshas developed as a natural adjunct of this approach to security policy.And has endowed Australia with global intelligence vision, a capabilityimpossible to attain solely from national resources.
Second, Australia's intelligence practice follows a pattern peculiar toEnglish speaking countries, one that distinguishes sharply between bothinternal and foreign intelligence, and collection and assessment. Whilethe model is not rigid, there are differences in detail among the Englishspeaking countries. But consistency in the general pattern is evident.
Third, the Cold War gave permanence to the range of capabilities thatmake up the Australian intelligence community. Initially, the example ofbigger allies shaped Australia's approach to building up intelligence insti-tutions and practices. For they had larger intelligence assets; and moreexperience of the game and sophistication. But over time, Australia'sapproach to intelligence has evolved on the basis of experience, and theemergence of a sharper sense of national interest and intelligence needs.
At the same time, the scope of intelligence applications has widened,as has the art of policy analysis. Intelligence has won an accepted place ingovernment, if not always a loved one - an authority that it did not alwaysenjoy. In this sense, it has become part of the scenery. Though just howfar the role and applications of intelligence should extend is debatable.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
Happily, Australia possesses an authoritative definition of national intel-ligence assessment. In announcing to Federal parliament on 5 May 1977,the government's intention to establish the Office of National Assess-ments (ONA), the Prime Minister said that:
The office shall be concerned with national assessments, -'national'meaning a matter affecting the responsibility of more than oneminister, department or authority, or being of a level of importancewarranting Cabinet reference, or being of importance to basic
. government policy, or having major implication for the basicpremises of departmental policy or program. It shall avoid commentor advice regarding policy.1
He added that:
The Office will not be organized to collect intelligence by clandestineor other means. It will draw its intelligence from other sources.
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ROYAL COMMISSION FINDINGS
The ONA's establishment arose from a sweeping review of Australia'sintelligence needs - the Royal Commission on Intelligence and Security(RCIS), conducted by Mr Justice R. M. Hope. Set up in 1974, it reportedto the government in 1977. The inquiry covered the field ranging fromintelligence collection through assessment to arrangements for coordina-tion and higher policy direction. As well as intelligence assessment, theRCIS Third Report reviewed the machinery for control, direction andco-ordination of the Australian intelligence community by ministers andsenior officials. The linkage of the two was deliberate. As was, in thePrime Minister's statement quoted, the association between intelligenceassessment and national policy.
The RCIS Third Report was not published in full. But the Prime Ministertabled an abridgement of the inquiry's findings and recommendations.2
Key findings included:
• Australia's need for a highly professional system of intelligenceand security services
• as well as for intelligence of quality, timeliness and relevance, itsbeing increasingly important to policy formulation
• and not derived secondhand - 'We must have our own informa-tion, our own intelligence to maintain the necessary degree ofself-reliance in our international position'
• the need for intelligence assessment to be objective, and to beseen to be so; and
• adversely, that the intelligence community was fragmented,poorly co-ordinated and organized, and did not occupy an appro-priate place in the machinery of government.
As for assessment, the Prime Minister told parliament, Judge Hopeemphasized the government's need for an intelligence agency which couldprovide independent intelligence advice on matters of national impor-tance. When asked by the royal commission, the recipients of intelligencehad felt that, against the criteria of quality, timeliness and relevance,Australia's product was not as good as it should be. In all, Australia'sintelligence arrangements were not so good. Because of the government'sneed for sound intellgence, the situation called for improved intelligencearrangements, not abolition of the agencies as some of the more radicalcritics had hoped.
In emphasizing the need for objectivity in intelligence assessment, theinquiry criticized ownership of the intelligence machinery by the Depart-ments of Defence and Foreign Affairs. As principal customers, they had
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the greatest policy interest in intelligence outcomes. So assessment lackeddistance sufficient to ensure the independence that objectivity requires.
Moreover, other departments set little store by intelligence productcontrolled by Defence and Foreign Affairs. And while defence andnational security represented critical applications of intelligence assess-ment, it should have a wider value, particularly in the economic area.
OVERSIGHT AND CO-ORDINATION
The government adopted with little change RCIS's machinery recom-mendations for higher intelligence co-ordination, setting up both a Cabinetcommittee, chaired by the Prime Minister, to decide basic policy and pro-vide guidance on the government's requirements for intelligence, anda senior officials' committee to support the Cabinet committee. TheSecretary (official head) of the Department of Prime Minister & Cabinet,who is also secretary to Cabinet, chairs the officials' committee. Othermembers are fellow heads of relevant departments (Defence, ForeignAffairs and Trade, Attorney General's Finance); the Chief of DefenceForce; Director-General ONA; and the Director-General of Security,who heads the security service (ASIO) and whose minister is the AttorneyGeneral.
THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS
But the government modified significantly the royal commission's recom-mendations in relation to setting up an independent national assessmentagency. The main changes saw the Department of Defence retain theJoint Intelligence Organization (JIO), the defence assessment agency-minus its national intelligence responsibilities; and a much smaller thanenvisaged ONA, but one free to build from the ground up and withguaranteed independence - the Director-General's reporting to thePrime Minister and other senior policy-makers direct.
This outcome reflected Defence reservations about the royal commis-sion's recommendations, and wish to retain an organic defence intelligenceassessment capability. It meant two assessment agencies instead of one,and the potential for confusing rather than helpful competitive intelligence.But it also unshackled ONA from some stilted traditions and precon-ceptions that would have come with JIO. And ONA was beholden tono sponsor. Being tiny in bureaucratic terms - its output depended onabout 35 analysts and managers - obliged ONA to develop standing andinfluence on the basis of intellectual clout - or sink.
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LEGISLATIVE BASE
The ONA's status as a statutory body with its own Act of Parliament3 isbasic to its independence, and capacity for influence. The Act prescribesthe Office's functions as:
(a) to assemble and correlate information relating to internationalmatters that are of political, strategic or economic significanceto Australia and:(i) to prepare reports in relation to such of those matters as
are of current significance; and(ii) from time to time as circumstances require, to make
assessments in relation to such of those matters as are ofnational importance;
(b) to furnish reports prepared and assessments made, in accor-dance with paragraph (a) to appropriate Ministers and otherappropriate persons;
(c) to ensure that international developments of major importanceto Australia are assessed on a continuing basis; and
(d) to keep up review of the activities connected with internationalintelligence that are engaged in by Australia and to bring to thenotice of relevant Departments and Commonwealth authoritiesany inadequacies in the nature, the extent, or the arrangementsfor coordination, of those activities that become apparentfrom time to time and suggest any improvements that shouldbe made to remedy those inadequacies.
The Act obliges the Director-General to try to meet the request of aminister or prescribed senior official for a report or assessment intendedto assist in the formation of Federal government policies or plans. Subjectto this provision, the Director-General may not be directed as to the con-tent or conclusions to be reached in any report or assessment.
ASSESSMENT BOARDS
The Act established a National Assessments Board (NAB) and an Econo-mic Assessments Board (EAB) to consider draft ONA assessments -equivalent in character to National Intelligence Estimates. Membershipof both boards is prescribed. The Director-General (DG) presides anddirects the boards' proceedings. In the case of the EAB, he may nominatea member of his staff to chair meetings (in practice usually the DeputyDG, Economic).
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The Director-General is bound to consult the boards over national andeconomic assessments; and to strive for agreement. When agreement isimpossible, the Act obliges the DG to inform recipients of the assessmentsof the grounds of difference. That is to say, assessments represent theDG's view, not an assessment board's consensus and he is obliged to regi-ster dissent by other board members.
So Australia finally broke with the system of intelligence assessmentreached through committee consensus, part of the found legacy of itsintelligence system. Objections to the committee system are the self-interested influence of the owning policy departments and concerns thatassessments should not impede their interests, and committees' propensityto highest common factor analysis, that is using compromise, language toobscure differences that should be aired for policy-makers' benefit, some-times reached by trade-off of interests.
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
The language of section 5(1) of the ONA Act distinguished criticallybetween current intelligence - sub-section (i) - and national assessments- sub-section (ii). For the assessment boards come into play only in relationto the latter, their work being directed to 'matters of national importance'.
The ONA publishes current intelligence on the Director-General's sayso, that is without seeking the advice or imprimatur of the boards.Proceeding thus is far quicker and more efficient. And there is de factoconsultation over drafts with interested departments and agencies. Whilethe board members have no right of dissent in relation to ONA's currentintelligence reports, they are free to register disagreement with their ownministers and department officials.
In internal government terms, this mechanism is highly visible, thoughsubject to the constraints of national security classification. For ONA'scurrent intelligence product and departmental comment thereon are cir-culated through the government's internal communication system.
ACCESS TO INFORMATION
The ONA Act entitles the DG to full access to all information about inter-national matters of political, strategic or economic significance to Australiaheld by any department of state, federal authority or arm of the defenceforce. This provision is a weapon of last resort. In practice, the ONAnegotiates access to information that it needs. It has not always knownwhere to look or what information is available, a drawback exploitableby the obdurate. And governments are so big, information genuinely
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gets lost or otherwise (without malice) fails to reach those who need it.So there is a premium on ONA's developing cooperative relations with
departments and agencies that are potential information sources - winningtheir confidence. At the same time, the ONA should not be gullible.
STAFFING
The Governor-General appoints the DG of ONA for a term of up toseven years, which is renewable. His office is thus proof against politicalvicissitude, occasioned (say) by change of government or Prime Minister.
ONA staff may be appointed in three ways: under the Public ServiceAct as officials with permanent status; by secondment from other govern-ment agencies; or by contract.
Although Judge Hope envisaged ONA as having a core of permanentofficials, in practice analyst turnover is deliberately fairly high. And hopesthat departments would second good officials to ONA did not meetexpectations. Why should they surrender their best to another agencythat they may see either as a rival or, at best, an encumbrance? (Forsimilar reasons, ONA's sub-contracting drafting to other departments isimpractical.)
TEETHING
Getting ONA on its feet was not easy. Pressure to produce quickly tosatisfy the Prime Minister's expectations for quality intelligence, whilesimultaneously securing good staff and building up a suitable organizationand administrative base, created a dialectic of difficulties. Deciding howbest to produce intelligence, and strike the right balance between nationalassessments and current intelligence, was not resolved quickly, automati-cally or without experiment.
Pressure to contain costs led to reliance on other departments andagencies for administrative help and other assistance. In some cases, thisworked well, in others it proved a false economy and the ONA had todevelop its own resources. The office was not over generously endowed,the government deciding that the transfer of external intelligence responsi-bilities to ONA from JIO should see no net increase in resources allocatedto assessment.
As a bureaucratic interloper, the ONA struggled to establish its repu-tation and win standing and credibilty within the government. Defence inparticular, and JIO as its intelligence arm, reckoned the newcomer to bea challenge. This attitude went back to the royal commission and Defence'sefforts to retain control of strategic intelligence; or at least not be bound
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by the strategic assessments of an institution outside its control. Theserepresented Defence's root objections to the original Hope proposals.They would endure so long as Defence was unpersuaded of ONA's com-petence in strategic assessment.
Organizationally, Foreign Affairs geared up for bureaucratic war withthe ONA, until good sense prevailed. For while ONA's intelligence advicemight cut across Foreign Affairs policy preferences, such a tiny agencywas not going to challenge DFA's majestic place in the bureaucracy. TheONA was no CIA, its DG no Director of Central Intelligence.
The new body found it hard to engage the interests of the economicdepartments. While not ill disposed or feeling bureaucratically chal-lenged, as were Foreign Affairs and Defence, the economic departments,especially Treasury, were confident of the sufficiency of their own analyticcapabilities; conscious of ONA's small resources for economic analysis;and unconvinced that intelligence advice or sources had much to offer inthe formulation of sound economic policy.
And for the Department of Trade in particular, intelligence wasbugaboo. Trade thought that any association with intelligence, even itsanalysis, would risk tainting the department's reputation and so detractfrom the exercise of its responsibilities, especially for trade promotion.Trade did not want Australian businessmen, or their targets/customersabroad, to think that it engaged in spying.
GETTING THERE
The foregoing is not a litany of complaints against those who stood inONA's way. Rather, it illustrates the real-world obstacles to achievingONA's intended, influential place; and to its establishing a respectedreputation. That the ONA accomplished by hard work.
The means of doing so required securing high-level access by theDirector-General himself and for ONA's reporting. It also meant meet-ing important customers' needs (if only in the negative-don't do it!) withsound intelligence advice; having strong leadership and firm directionwithin the ONA as well as good people, fairly treated but with highexpectations of performance and subject to rotation - no jobs for life.
DIRECTOR-GENERAL
An advantage of Australia's getting away from the committee system ofnational intelligence assessment was that ministers and others can pinresponsibility for intelligence judgments on the Director-General per-sonally. That has consequences. If intelligence judgments are the DG's
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sole responsibility, that official must have independence and freedom toexpress personal views. Thus the need for a statute, given ONA's smallsize as an assessment agency and so lack of bureaucratic weight. Thestatutory basis of the appointment also means that the DG is not beholdento another agency or policy department for a renewal of the appointment.
If the DG has sole responsibility, the judgments must be truly theincumbent's, either through direct authorship, or because of a genuineembrace of the analysts' judgments.
There is no escape for the DG in the notion of 'analyst autonomy',namely the notion that analysts are the experts and it is not the business ofintelligence managers to question their judgments.
Because of the personal responsibility the DG needs to be good at thejob. That includes ability to attract good staff- a major preoccupation ofON A managers and an endless one, because of analyst turnover.
VALUE OF INTELLIGENCE
The DG's relations with the Prime Minister, to whom the incumbentreports, and other ministers with intelligence interests is critically impor-tant to ONA's standing and success, as is preserving the confidentiality ofthe DG's intelligence advice.
Ministers may accept that advice and its implications for policy - orthey may not - because they disagree with the assessment, or for otherunrelated or compelling reasons. It is important that ministers under-stand the real world. Intelligence can give them reality, unvarnished bypolicy slant or interest, or by dictates of political fashion. Confidentialityis needed, not just to protect sensitive intelligence sources and matters ofdiplomatic proprietary, but also to protect fearless analysis and expres-sion, and because it would be politically hard for ministers to walk awayfrom complicating intelligence judgments, were they public knowledge.Given the political environment into which intelligence is delivered,ensuring privacy is a condition of frank judgment and so of the utility ofintelligence.
STAFFING
No jobs are provided for life because the ONA is small and would ossifywithout the refreshment afforded by analyst and management staff turn-over. With ONA's reputation and prestige secured, having worked therehas become a career plus within the government, thus helping to attractfurther good staff.
If ONA's management does not want analysts to overstay, neither do
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analysts. For the ONA is too small to offer a career structure. So goodanalysts need to move on for their careers' sake. By doing so, they cangain useful experience in the field and (especially) in policy work. Somereturn later to ONA at higher levels, thus better equipped. So ONA'sinterests, and those of its analysts, are differently motivated but congruent.
One problem is the recruiting mistake - the analyst who is not goodenough to leave ONA on promotion or even at grade. A variant is theanalyst who wants to settle into a comfortable niche in ONA life. Badstaffing appointments, however, are not entirely avoidable, whatever theeffort put into recruitment. At worst, ONA could fill up with deadbeats.Getting rid of recruiting errors depends partly on how officers entered theONA -whether as permanent civil servants, on secondment or term con-tract. Forced redundancy - firing - is the ultimate weapon: but risky foran intelligence agency. Those who leave disgruntled have capacity to dogreat harm.
MESSAGE AND TARGET
Understanding the importance of ONA's means of getting there; apprecia-ting users' requirements for intelligence - and also what they needed toknow or think about, but did not-were critical to ONA's success. As wasbrevity - a clear message, easily understood and focused to meet policy-makers' needs. So in ONA's product, the summary is central, not a peri-pheral afterthought. It puts up front the distilled message that the analysisseeks to impart. A skilful summary also catches attention, and encouragesreaders towards the full text. Or at least meets the senior policy-maker'sneed for economy of effort.
Consistent with its charter, ONA aimed at the high-level audience ofpolicy-makers. Other readers' claims had less priority. ONA's reportseschewed long, descriptive narrative. Its analysts did not write for fellowdesk officers or specialists, though often their instinct was to do so. Thisdiscipline was consistent with ONA's responsibility to provide a specializedinformation service for senior policy-makers. And it forced desk officersand intelligence managers alike to think about the essentials of what theyhad to say.
So ONA's product was strong on judgement, sparing on fact —but notcareless or inaccurate. It was also a vehicle for conveying to policy-makersintelligence fact that was unlikely to come to their attention from othersources - thus applying to raw secret intelligence the filter of assessment,putting it in context. For unevaluated, raw intelligence circulating at highlevels in the government, can prove a loose cannon. Sensible intelligencecollectors appreciate this risk, even if it sometimes disguises the extent or
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value of their contribution to the intelligence picture that reaches thesenior policy-maker.
Because judgmental, some have said that ONA's reporting representspolicy advice, not intelligence. They did so usually because the agency'sintelligence reporting offended policy preferences. Such criticism is anoccupational risk for intelligence producers. It is also a reminder of theirneed for vigilance against crossing the line that separates policy-relevantintelligence from policy advice. But it should not, and does not, preventON A product from addressing the implications for Australia of its findings.Failing to do so would be negligent and inconsistent with the mandate.
If intelligence is good - if it meets the criteria of quality, timeliness andrelevance - it will help policy, if only in the negative. But intelligenceadvice does not determine policy - nor should it. For intelligence is onefactor in the policy equation. Sensible policy-makers will take account ofsensible intelligence advice. But other factors may reasonably (or under-standably) lead policy in directions that do not easily square with soundintelligence assessment. That is both the prerogative and burden ofpolitical choice.
CRISIS REPORTING
Intelligence reporting on international crises tests the system like nothingelse, especially if the crisis is protracted, and Australian forces may beinvolved. Crises may be close at hand or distant. They may have powerfulpolitical resonance (starving Africans) or, though distant, threaten thebalance of power and so Australia's security, for example, the Sovietinvasion of Afghanistan. In addition each crisis is different. Intelligencesources that have great bearing on one situation may scarcely figure inanother. Assessment is based on information from all sources, rangingfrom the public media to the most esoteric. Information overload becomesacute. Managing crisis reporting demands more staff, in effect robbingother parts of ONA to bring in analysts who, by definition, are unfamiliarwith the problem or issue at hand. And, it should be stressed, the ONA isa small agency with no reserves.
Above all, crises engage ministers' attention. Alert to both strategicinterests and domestic political considerations, they expect results. Andministers both wear the political responsibility and pay the bills. (Intelli-gence is not cheap, though in the long run is much less costly than strategicblindness.)
Cable News Network (CNN) has changed the face of crisis reporting.Policy-makers, indeed entire nations, follow war by television. What theysee naturally influences their thoughts, actions and decisions. A two-
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edged sword, CNN can be exploited for tactical purposes. And by focus-ing elsewhere, it can make some crises invisible, though they rage on.
Generally the electronic media, being instant and visible/audible,have great impact. But they tell only part of the story, and so distort.Intelligence's function is to illuminate what is otherwise unknown, pulltogether the overall picture, examine choices and possibilities, put this allon one page and get it to policy principals at the opening of business. Thisis no mean task.
The function of crisis reporting is not to be first with the news. Thoughit may be, or it may be a unique source of information, because of accessto secret intelligence sources. A major purpose of crisis reporting, germaneto intelligence generally, is to ask the right questions. An example: typi-cally, attention will focus on who will win an election, when the issue thatmatters is what consequences will flow from the result.
RESEARCH AND BRIEFING
The ONA carries out research and presents intelligence briefings. Butbeing policy oriented, it is operational and not a think-tank that engagesin long term research. Given limited resources, this function lacks priority(and demand). Others with more resources are free to do it.
A fond illusion among some policy officials is that a posting to theONA represents a sabbatical - 'time to think'. This view can foster theassumption that the ONA is a spare resource that can help out in time ofneed. In practice, this usually means helping departments with briefingexercises for major events, such as international visits.
The ONA product will typically focus on such occasions. But its pur-pose is different. ONA's becoming a briefing prop for policy departmentswould undermine its intended statutory purpose and responsibilities.
INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION
Getting assessment right was ONA's first prority. But section 5(l)(d)of the ONA Act (above) also imposed on the DG responsibility for co-ordination of Australia's foreign intelligence effort, though with weakauthority to do so and no dedicated resources. This, however, is consistentwith the view that he should not be a Director of Central Intelligence.
Pursuing that responsibility took two main forms. First, reports bythe DG to the government on intelligence community performance arecommunicated to Cabinet through the coordinating committee of seniorofficials of which the DG is a member. Second, the incumbent hasplayed an important role in improving the coordination of intelligence
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requirements. The first of these functions proved unpopular with theagencies and their departmental owners. Few like others assessing theirperformance or trespassing on their turf. Defence in particular, havingmost of the money, and its agencies who benefited thereby, have stead-fastly resisted the notion of a unified intelligence community budget - asingle pot of money - to be distributed according to need. Despite thisresistance, the ONA did quite a lot of reporting on agency performance,though without much practical effect. This outcome; the need to geton with others upon whom the agency depended; and their warinessrestrained performance reporting. In consequence, some old problemsfestered. Others were fixed outside the intelligence context.
But effective personal relationships developed over time. Ad hocdeals, specific needs, and the fact of meeting regularly to work over acommunity-wide agenda saw progress achieved, and a better sense ofcommon intelligence purpose and identity emerge. This was particularlygratifying, considering Judge Hope's comments on past anarchy. But thespeed of advance was at tortoise pace, not that of the hare. Arguably, thiswas necessary for the gains achieved to stick.
More visible success attended ONA's efforts to coordinate nationalintelligence requirements because the agencies found the role helpful andunthreatening. The task sounds easy but was not in practice. It demandedsustained energy and vast bureaucratic effort to establish a reliable system.Also done on the basis of no dedicated resources, the job was one forintelligence practitioners, not outsiders. Customers were consulted as totheir information needs. The trick was to reconcile these needs, put themin priority order, and distinguish overt requirements from those thatdemanded secret (and so expensive and risky) collection effort. SecuringCabinet agreement to national intelligence assessment priorities was anessential precondition to developing collection requirements. Because ofthe statutory responsibilities of the office, the DG of ONA played acentral part in this exercise too. Again, though appearing to be a simpletask, it took years of polishing to perfect.
HOPE RETURNS
The change of government in 1983, and a security scandal involving theKGB, led to another intelligence inquiry. The obvious choice, JudgeHope returned to conduct the Royal Commission into Australia's Securityand Intelligence Agencies (RCASIA). Its terms of reference were widefor the government was keen to find a politically acceptable basis forAustralia's intelligence activities, as well as to clear up real problems thatthe scandal had exposed. Among the government's motives was the
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desire to establish domestically and internationally a responsible reputa-tion for the management of national security affairs. The inquiry advancedthese aims. Except for the morbid few, intelligence has become as politi-cally uncontentious in Australia as the armed forces.
When he reported in December 1984, Judge Hope concluded that theONA, though small, had established its independence and authority, thisthrough the quality of its product. Furthermore, he believed that theoffice was held in high regard, and that although there were still someproblems, the agency had fulfilled much of the purpose for which it wasestablished.4
While Hope did not spell it out, basic to these findings was ONA'sreputation with the Prime Minister and some other senior ministers.Judge Hope also found that ONA's national assessments were of highquality: and that it produced valuable current intelligence. But he worriedat ONA's tendency towards producing more of the latter and less ofthe former. This worry led Hope to recommend coalescence of the twoassessment boards into a National Intelligence Committee (NIC). As wellas passing on the substance of assessments in the usual way, the NICwould have 'programming and similar functions' to assist the ONA inresponding to the government's needs for intelligence. Not intended tocircumscribe ONA's independence, these arrangements aimed to involvecustomer departments more closely in the intelligence assessment system.
The trouble was that they would have risked circumscribing ONA'sindependence of judgment which, under prudent management, was atthe core of its usefulness to the government. So after Cabinet-level con-sideration. Hope's recommendations saw light of day in amended form.The assessment boards survived, their functions unchanged. NIC wasestablished as a separate body to advise the DG on ONA's work pro-gramme. The DG chaired NIC with the main customer departments as itsmembers, including the economic departments.
NIC now meets monthly to review ONA's work programme. Depart-ments are invited to say whether ONA's product has met their needs, andto suggest subjects for future assessments. Their approval, agreement ordisagreement with ONA's assessment - that is, its intelligence findings,and judgments - are not up for discussion. Customer departments havetheir own channels for making clear their views on the substance ofONA's assessments.
Other important NIC functions are for members to say whether theywould prefer proposed ONA product to take the form of current intelli-gence reports or national assessments; and what angles they would likethe ONA reports to cover. NIC also notes statements of national intelli-gence requirements proposed by the collection requirements committee,
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thus further consolidating the requirements-collection-assessment cycle.While a steady programme of national assessments has continued,
customer preference expressed through the NIC favours current intelli-gence reports, for they are less cumbersome for everyone, quicker andmore succinct. The notable exception is that everyone expects nationalassessments on the deployment of forces abroad, where Australian livesmay be at risk.
Within the provisions of the Act, the ONA is obliged to furnish anassessment on request. Its sources are limited and sensible prioritiesshould prevail. The agency has to consider rival bids for its attentionand effort. These constraints are understood, and the NIC is conductedcordially.
The NIC functions as an institutionalized form of feedback on ONA'swork programme. Less formal channels, such as desk level contactsbetween ONA analysts and their counterparts in policy departmentswork to the same ends. And similar contacts further up the line work tothe same end. Accurate intelligence about the policy context in which it iswriting is vital to the agency.
RCASIA also investigated and disposed of a couple of canards. Onewas that ONA was Foreign Affairs owned, with that department effectivelyproviding its staff. The other was that the ONA stepped over the line andproffered policy advice, not intelligence assessment. Judge Hope exa-mined and dismissed specific claims on the latter point. On the former,ONA's own statistics demonstrated a bureaucratically cosmopolitanstaffing mix, although it is true that Foreign Affairs is well represented.That it is reflects the experience of its staff, both in policy work and in thefield, which strengthens ONA's assessment capabilities. In its dealingswith Foreign Affairs, as with other departments, ONA demonstratesrobust independence.
scis REVIEW
Huge events - the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the ColdWar - prompted another intelligence review in 1992. No scandal precipi-tated this one. So the Secretaries Committee on Intelligence and Security(SCIS), the group of senior officials who advise Cabinet on intelligencematters, did the job. Driving the review were hard-to-answer questionsabout Australia's intelligence needs in a situation of palpably-reducedmilitary threat but consequently increased uncertainty. The reduction ofoverlooming, steadfast, and thus predictable threat rendered the futuremysterious. As an innovation, the review extended to cover the diplomaticreporting function of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade
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(DFAT) - a source confidential to the government and voluminous, butnot dependent on secret intelligence sources and methods. Secret intelli-gence sources are especially employed to illuminate capabilities andintentions that competitors and adversaries seek to conceal.
Announcing the results of the government's review on 21 July 1992,the Prime Minister made the following points:
• the more fluid international environment would require asharper appreciation of Australia's interests and so need to allo-cate resources effectively, and
• as with defence policy, greater national self-reliance in intel-ligence
• that said, the government recognized the benefits derived fromlong-established intelligence links with the US, UK, Canadaand New Zealand; and the need for Australia to strengthenregional intelligence liaison
• the end of the Cold War had not diminished the need for accu-rate and informed judgments about issues and regions importantto Australia-so intelligence assessment and collection remainedessential
• the intelligence structure set in place following Judge Hope'sreviews would continue, based as it was on the philosophy ofseparating assessment, policy and foreign-intelligence collectionfunctions
• because the intelligence agencies have properly focused onregional areas and issues most relevant to Australia's nationalinterests the end of the Cold War did not call for a fundamentalreordering of intelligence priorities
• relatively speaking, economic issues would become more impor-tant, but political and strategic questions would remain the firstpriority for Australia's intelligence agencies - economic assess-ment depending less on intelligence sources than does political-strategic
• transnational criminal activity, mass movements of people andproliferation of weapons of mass destruction would warranthigher priority.
Other major points included institution of a new device called the ForeignIntelligence Planning Document. It would provide for the integration ofjudgments about changes in the international environment with decisionsabout resources, and the balance and mix of skills across the intelligenceagencies. Because of the DCs responsibilities for foreign intelligence co-
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ordination, the ONA has a major part to play in this exercise. And anunloved one to the extent that it offends proprietorial interests.
Finally, the Prime Minister's statement recognized that the 1992 reviewwas not one-off. Review of intelligence needs and performance wouldcontinue so as to ensure that Australia kept up with a changing world.5
The striking points implicit in the statement were threefold. Theliquidation of the Warsaw Pact was less consequential for Australia'sintelligence effort than that of some of its intelligence partners. Thegovernment has a permanent need for intelligence and its apparatus, andso to monitor intelligence planning and performance. And, finally,economic intelligence is no panacea for political-strategic.
In essence, Australian intelligence - including national assessment -has arrived, the need for it undisputed, and its future thus assured. Theprice of success, of coming in from the cold, is 'accountability', namely,overview, examination, reporting, appraisal, bureaucratic oversight andself-reflection. It is a necessary consequence and a tricky one because ofthe opportunities for make-work, self-promotion, and empire buildingthat it presents.
ECONOMIC INTELLIGENCE
Some may find questionable the continued priority afforded political andstrategic intelligence. Especially as Australia stands to benefit so muchfrom economic growth in East and Southeast Asia. And economic forcesindeed move history - no Great Depression, no Third Reich.
Underlying the judgment about intelligence priorities is the fact thateconomic information is more freely available than is political-strategic.It will become all the more so as former communist countries embracecapitalism, even those where a communist party retains power. Secretintelligence has less to contribute in the economic area. And the analyticresources of specialized economic departments are large, let alone thoseof the private sector.
That said, economic assessment has contributed notably to ONA'swork and reputation. This is partly because it informs political-strategicanalysis. The fate of the Soviet Union makes no sense if the economicdimension is neglected, a prescription that applies to many other countries.(Though capacity to disrupt the international security order is not a directfunction of economic strength, for example, Iraq, North Korea.) Thought-ful economic analysis has also influenced Australian policy in importantways by prompting recognition of white South Africa's vulnerability tofinancial sanctions, themselves driven by market forces, and the bearingof the US twin-deficits problem on economic difficulties that were ascribed
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to Japanese trade competition (hot that the US was alone among OECDcountries in consuming, not saving).
National assessment, and economic intelligence more widely, has acontribution to make to government planning and policies. But it is of adifferent order to that associated with traditional political and strategicintelligence. To be remembered is that economic intelligence had itsorigins in the need to calculate the military potential of closed societies.That said, some ONA economic intelligence product, especially in theresources area, is most useful to departments at desk level. Meeting suchdemand needs to take account of the conflicting pressures on ONA'sanalytic staff.
Commercial intelligence is more contentious, for what interest does thegovernment have in market information? Trade promotion is one thing -a respectable activity expected of governments. Covert collection ofmarket intelligence, its analysis and passing it on to private corporationsis something else. Ethics aside, the problems posed include the risk ofcompromising intelligence sources and methods by passing informationoutside the controls of the national security handling system, and maybejeopardizing strategic security. Who is told what? All interested com-panies or only some? What is the basis of selection? Importantly, for asmall economy like Australia's which relies on foreign capital investmentand attracting the multinationals, what is an Australian company? All ofwhich is to say that the case for expanding commercial intelligence is notthe self-evident proposition that it might at first seem.
REVIEWED TO DEATH?
The number of Australian royal commissions into intelligence mattersmight raise British eyebrows. While rare in the United Kingdom,Australian governments have made much use of royal commissions, oftenwhen political controversy has demanded impartial and prestigious inves-tigation. Political controversy surrounded the Petrov Commission in 1954,when the KGB station chief in Canberra defected; and also triggered thetwo Hope Commissions. As well as royal commissions, administrativeinquiries into intelligence matters have been held. They lack the royalcommission's power to summon witnesses and take evidence under oath.
By nature the assessment agencies are less likely to cause political con-troversy - though they can - than are the secret intelligence collectors.This is because the collectors employ intrusive methods, whereas theassessment agencies' forte is analysis. So in Australia, the assessmentagencies have largely been caught in the net of wider inquiries into intelli-gence, but usefully so because these inquiries have led to stock taking
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of the government's needs for intelligence. And they have obliged theagencies to think about their own role, methods and purposes, worthwhilegoals often neglected in the press of everyday business.
CONCLUSIONS
In the ONA, Australia has produced a hybrid among assessment agenciesof the English-speaking intelligence world. The ONA is a discrete agencythat performs the central intelligence function, synthesizing the all-source,analytic picture while not being subordinate to any department or agency,nor subject to external direction as to its intelligence findings.
So ONA's function is comparable to that of the Intelligence Directorateof the CIA. But it operates in a different constitutional setting - theAustralian version of Westminster system which embeds the executive inparliament.
ONA's analytic resources are a bit larger than those of the CabinetOffice Assessment Staff in London. And its ambience is rather like that ofthe Intelligence and Research Bureau (INR) of the State Department inWashington. The INR is also a small fish; but in the right hands and set-ting, its intelligence judgments are sharp and influential.
Crisis reporting, highly visible to senior policy-makers, tests ONA'sreputation and resources. Every crisis is different. ONA's crisis reportingcomplements CNN, it does not compete.
Reporting on distant critical events reminds Australia of the value ofits international intelligence links. For Australia, self-reliance in intelli-gence does not mean self-sufficiency. Using others' intelligence reinforcesthe need for independent national intelligence assessment capability.
ONA developed out of a need and in reponse to environment. Corres-ponding with national character, the bureaucratic setting of Australianintelligence is different from that of even like-minded countries and intel-ligence partners. But that is another story.
NOTES
1. Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 5 May1977, pp.1630-4.
2. Royal Commission on Intelligence, Third Report, Abridged Findings and Recommen-dations, Australian Government Publishing Service (AGPS), (Canberra, April, 1977).
3. Office of National Assessments Act 1977.4. Royal Commission on Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies, Report on the
Office of National Assessments and Joint Intelligence Organization, Dec. 1984 (Canberra:AGPS, 1985).
5. Statement by the Prime Minister, the Hon. P.J. Keating MP: Review of Australia'sIntelligence Agencies, (Canberra, 21 July 1992).
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