namibia: crisis for the international community || namibia and its neighbors

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Namibia and Its Neighbors Author(s): Robert L. Dillingham, Jr. Source: Africa Today, Vol. 26, No. 2, Namibia: Crisis for the International Community (2nd Qtr., 1979), pp. 29-37 Published by: Indiana University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185853 . Accessed: 15/06/2014 06:24 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Africa Today. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 185.44.78.113 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 06:24:13 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Page 1: Namibia: Crisis for the International Community || Namibia and Its Neighbors

Namibia and Its NeighborsAuthor(s): Robert L. Dillingham, Jr.Source: Africa Today, Vol. 26, No. 2, Namibia: Crisis for the International Community (2ndQtr., 1979), pp. 29-37Published by: Indiana University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4185853 .

Accessed: 15/06/2014 06:24

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Africa Today.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 185.44.78.113 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 06:24:13 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: Namibia: Crisis for the International Community || Namibia and Its Neighbors

Namibia and Its Neighbors

Robert L. Dillingham, Jr.

For more than two decades, Namibia has been the center of controversy in which the awakened political conscience of the African masses and the urge for national liberation and self-determination contend with the forces of racism and colonialism.

This clash has had a distinctive international dimension due to the peculiarity of Namibia's position as an international territory, arising from its inclusion in the League of Nations' mandate system by the Treaty of Versailles, and South Africa's refusal, alone among the mandatory powers, to recognize the U.N. Trusteeship Council as the responsible international supervisory agency. As a result, the condemnations from the international community of South Africa's occupatiorn and administration and its racial policies as applied to the territory are related not only to morality but to international law.'

Critical to the outcome of the struggle is the relationship to Namibia of its neighbors, Angola, Botswana, Zambia, and, of course, South Africa, as well as Zimbabwe, also involved in a struggle to free itself from white minority rule. All are enmeshed in the Southern African economic complex dominated by South African and Western multi-national corporations.2

South Africa and Namibia

South Africa is now, and will inevitably remain, Narnibia's most important neighbor. Their economies have become so intertwined that

I Irir esxaiilpe ev Ct (iriiq hirr A Ltr. "I liek1 rid i)f the Waidliveim Initiatve. Africa Today Vol, 21 No. 2 (Sprinq 1974) pp4) 43. a1 e (Cririll. South West Africa and the United Nations 1.exxirrgtimr. lJniversjiv tIf Kentiickr Press. 1967)1

Il, (rwfrir -Sl Stoth West Africi M andate Trrniiiiatirii in II iHtslorieal Perspective. Columbia lotiril i, I rarnatisalioal law. V4ii ). iI 19 . pp 911 1-37-d. ilf(teriTed Nairirrs. A Trtist Betrayed: Namihia tNew \'rrk nIIiiterl Nations. 1974I

2 - bin) mot I mSI w' .itni) Kerrir rIh A flair)i Ie d C ooperation) and Conflict in Souithern Ar ica: Papers on a Regimonal Subsystem nWashi ington. I) ( C : l J i irversi v FIres ss AlerAca. 1m c . 1 7)l - Larry W Sir w imn.ii . - ire Srrbi orr iriate Stalie Si siet.iiin

rtiresril AlrAirea. Internalional Studies Quarterly, Vol, 12 (Septembier 11lti) pp 22)1 2n1. Kwamne Nkriiiailil. Neorolonialisnm: The Last Stage of lniperialisitn (New Yoirk lirternamait nl Prblibslrser. Ih).5) pp 11l 212. and n 1C' Potholm and Richard Dale leds.) Southern Akfica in Perspective: Essays In Regional Politics (New York: Free Press, 1972).

NH bvri l bill nhamhi. .Jr .. is.hairrnain f ili t Black Sttitlies Deparintment he til University f Noirtihrn C 't)Irad;. (Greelcv. C(Ao,radtlel * I'I. )m 1 (Xihidinddte. (Gradiiic SilhziiI i4f Interniationtal SidiS liei. Unriersitv, tif IenXiwr. His t riwal thesis is

I iti? let. - 'I-I Isili itIIIll AssismaIiti t,I tIilt S i itl 'west Africa Popkics ()ri.tiizatiin ISWAPO: Unitet Nafiiism idl Ametricanr

Nomprvernrtrnitrlrr Assistanrce (I 96r l l'Wf7i

Vol. 26 (1979l Nr. 2 29

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Page 3: Namibia: Crisis for the International Community || Namibia and Its Neighbors

even if an independent SWAPO government proves to be as thoroughly Marxist as South African officials imagine, it would face even more complex problems than those confronting FRELIMO in Mozambique in gradually disentangling itself from the system. Even the labor control laws,3 the aspect of the fabric most easily dealt with by political action, may need to be dealt with cautiously in order not to disrupt production precipitously and therefore cause a sharp decline in foreign exchange earnings.

Namibia is an important source for key mineral resources that are exploited by both South African and Western capital industrial concerns. South Africa's industrial growth is highly dependent on the mineral exploitation. Diamonds, chrome, ore, copper, vanadium, uranium, manganese, lead, zinc, nickel, and asbestos are found in large quantities in Namibia. South Africa's control over these resources has become an essential factor in the ability of leading South African firms like Consolidated Diamond Mines of South West Africa (98% owned by De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd.) to limit new competition and to control production and prices of both primary and finished products.4 Close to 90% of all mineral output in Namibia is produced at present by only two companies: Consolidated Diamond Mines and Tsumeb Corporation (which is 2/3 American owned, American Metal Climax and Newmont Mining).' Consolidated Diamond Mines in 1971 produced 1.6 million carats of diamonds that had a value of over $58 million.6 More recent statistics for Namibia are difficult to come by, as South Africa now merges all Namibian economic figures with those of the Republic.

South African state policy is geared toward attracting foreign investors to provide the growth rate needed to sustain a large investment of capital to exploit new market opportunities, especially in the mining sector.' For example, the British mining company, Rio Tinto Zinc, in 1970 began construction of a $200-300 million open cast mine to produce uranium. The deal is a joint one with South African Development Corporation and was given the official blessing of the last Labour government, which allowed the nationalized United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority to sign a deal for 7,500 tons of uranium between 1976 and 1982 worth about $90 million in revenue to South Africa.8

1I-or exrnple see Marcelle Kooy. l'he Contract Labor System and the Ovambo Crisis of 1971 in South West Africa." African Studies Review (1 972). pp. :83- 1(4; International lIabour Organization. Labour and Discrimination in Namibia (Ceneva: International lIabour Office. 1977): and Rober Murray. et. al Role of Foreign Firms in Namibia: Studies on External Investment and Black Workers Conditions in Namibia (Uppsala: Africana Puiblications Trust. 1974) . 4. Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperlali The Economics of U S. Foregn Policy (New York: Modem Reader, 1969) p.35. 5) Ruth l-irst. Namibia (South West Africa): Econiomy. in Africa South of the Sahara 1977-78 (Lonidon: Europa PLublications Limited. 1977) P. 62:1; and Peter Frankel. The Namibians of South West Africa (l ondon- Minority Rights (Group Report Nt. 1). 1914) p. 22. 6. Peter Frankel. op. cit.. p. 22: 7 Harry Magdoff. op. cit.. p. 37.

St ewisart 'Smith. U.S. Neocolonialism in Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1974)

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Page 4: Namibia: Crisis for the International Community || Namibia and Its Neighbors

Robert L. Dillingham, Jr.

During 1973 the South African Minister of Mines announced that prospecting and mining grants were to be amended to raise the limit of participation by foreign companies from 50 percent to 75 percent. Mineral rights in Namibia are held by the South African administration and this proposal, together with an amendment which would require overseas companies to involve local groups only when the prospecting stage has been reached, was designed to make participation by overseas investors more favorable.'

Most active mines in Namibia have proved to be financial bonanzas for their owners and shareholders. Original investments have been paid back many times over.' For example, the Namibian diamond industry, purchased by Ernest Oppenheimer (i.e. Consolidated Diamond Mines) for about .$2 million in. 1919, yield-ed. profits before. tax of $500 million between 1963-1973.10

Similar examples can also be provided to show the importance of both the fishing and farming sectors of Namibia economy to South Africa. Fish product sales from Namibla have.yielded.an average revenue of between $55 and $65 million a year."' In the farming sector, export sales of Karakul sheep pelts (from which Persian lamb coats are made) brought close to $86 million in 1976. This sale is controlled by the South African Karakul Board which stimulates consumer demand for the pelts through international promotional campaigns. As a result the entire pelt production is taken up by the world fur trade at prices which are lucrative to the producer.'2 Nearly all of the Karakul pelts are sold on the London market through Hudson's Bay Company and Wood Hall Trust. Overseas middlemen and dealers also do very well from this trade. For example, Persian lamb coat sales in the.two largest markets of Germany and Denmark alone-were worth $36 million in 1970.'3

South Africa absorbs. all taxation levied in Namibia, but keeps it in a special account, controlled from Pretoria, for a variety of economic, political and military uses in the territory. It is derived mostly from taxation on South African and Western corporations, plus some income tax - paid almost exclusively by whites, due to their higher incomes. Africans in the tribal reserves (bantustans) have to pay an annual poll-tax to the tribal trust fund. These taxes average between $1.00 and $2.00 per person. 14

R ttih [ir,.I. op) cit.. P. 621

Ii. Rr ;ratkel. op. it.. p hit 2 24

12. State of South Africa: Economics. Financial and Statistical Yearbook for the Republic of South Africa 1978 OohannL'sburg: D)e Gama -I'tblishers Party .timitseo. 1978). pp. 197 1 98.

13. Peter Frankel, op. cit.. p- 24. 14 lbidi p. 25

Vol. 26 (1979) No. 2 31

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Page 5: Namibia: Crisis for the International Community || Namibia and Its Neighbors

Since almost all African agricultural production is at the subsistence level or geared to local markets, and the control of the major sources of foreign exchange earnings - mining, fishing and the products of white farms and ranches - is in the control of South African or multi-national corporations or local white capital, a high level of economic expertise will clearly be required to bring these means of production under the effective control of the people without major disruptions in the economy.

Even more difficult is the question of trade. Namibia's geographical remoteness from other industrial countries, the possibility that South Africa will be able to retain control of the only deep water port, Walvis Bay, for some time after independence comes to the rest of the country, and the absence of any significant processing and manufacturing industry in the territory means that Namibia will remain dependent on South Africa for most of its consumer goods for a long time to come. Formidable as the task of breaking the political ties with South Africa is proving to be, breaking the economic ties will be an even greater challenge. Clearly only a SWAPO government will even attempt the task. Any "independent" governlment emerging from the present DTA-South African initiatives will certainly take the path of least resistance and keep the present relationships - and the exploitation - intact.

Angola and Namibia

Of its independent African neighbors, Angola, immediately to the north, is currently the most important, and is likely to remain so even after independence. The present MPLA government of Angola under President Augustinho Neto is a strong supporter of SWAPO's liberation struggle, dating back to the days when it too was a liberation movement, fighting for independence from the Portuguese. SWAPO guerrillas moved through MPLA-controlled territories to reach northern Namibia long before Angolan independence.

Since independence, Angola has been SWAPO's main external base. The dimension of the threat as seen from Pretoria can be measured in the spectacular increase of South African military installations and personnel in Namibia since 1974, and frequent military incursions into Angolan territory to attack SWAPO bases and refugee camps. 5

Angola's turbulent transition to independence resulting in large part from massive foreign intervention, has also provided South Africa with another tool to attempt to neutralize Angola's support for SWAPO. It continues to provide important support to the dissident UNITA guerrillas inside Angola, with whom it developed a close relationship during its ill-

15. See E. J. Kahn, "A Reporter at Large: 'Who Cares? ... We Do.' ", New Yorker, June 25, 1979, p. 60ff. pp. 77-79 has a brief conservative summary of the military situation.

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Page 6: Namibia: Crisis for the International Community || Namibia and Its Neighbors

Robert L. Dillingham, Jr.

fated invasion of Angola in the 1974-75 internal unrest. MPLA's claim that South Africa maintains a base in Namibia's Caprivi Strip for the training and equipping of UNITA personnel appears to be well-founded. 16 The fact that, even with the help of Cuban troops, Angola has not been able to crush UNITA or keep the Benguela railway open indicates that South African and other external assistance to UNITA has been extensive.

The principal economic link between Angola and Namibia is the Cunene River scheme, initiated by South African capital in cooperation with Portugal in the pre-independence era. The Cunene originates in Angola, and forms the boundary between Angola and Namibia for almost 200 miles as it flows toward the Atlantic. A dam near Culueque (Kalueke) in Southern Angola and a power-station at Ruancana Falls just downstream from the point where the river becomes the boundary line are two of the major components of the scheme. The irrigation of farmland in northern Namibia (Ovamboland) and Southern Angola, and the provision of electric power for various purposes, but especially for the Tsumeb and Rossing mines, are among the scheme's principal economic benefits. The project has cost the South African government close to $120 million. The South African government has been fearful that the dam could be attacked by SWAPO guerrillas and close to 5,000 South African troops have been stationed near this area. The Gove -Dam in the Huambo course of the Cunene River has also been completed with South African capital. 17

While South African involvement in the scheme clearly is awkward for the Luanda government they have not closed it down, and have allowed the completion of some of its unfinished components because of its long range economic value. It should prove an important link between the two countries when Namibia becomes independent.

As long as the present situation continues the problem of refugees will be a vexing one for Angola. Even before independence southern Angola was a major route for refugees moving toward Zambia and Tanzania to join SWAPO. Since independence a number of refugee camps such as the one at Kassinga brutally attacked by South Africa in May of 197818 have been established in Angola. Clearly the support of these refugees or their resettlement, even if relatively short term, almost certainly place economic burdens on the host country even if the UNHCR and other international aid agencies are asked to provide assistance. With South Africa prepared to send troops hundreds of miles inside the country, as demonstrated at

I ) Namibiar: Angola Border Tense. Southern Africa, Vol. 1t). No. 1. January February 1977. p. 20).

1 7 Angola. Economy. Africa South of the Sahara 1977-78 (L ondon: Europa Publications Limited 1977. pp. 146-147.

18. A detailed account of this can be found in The Kassinga File, South African Information Programme, Intemational University Exchange Fund, Geneva, 1978.

Vol. 26 (1979) No. 2 33

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Page 7: Namibia: Crisis for the International Community || Namibia and Its Neighbors

Kassinga, the security burden becomes even more serious. The converse of this problem is the presence in Namibia of a significant, though uncer- tain, number of UNITA sympathisers as refugees from Angola. SWAPO and others have charged that many of these were allowed, and even en- couraged. to vote in the December elections.

Another important plus for SWAPO is the good relationship Angola enjoys with the Soviet Union, Cuba and East Germany, the principal suppliers, aside from the OAU, of arms and training to the SWAPO guerrillas.

Despite the paucity of economic ties and the lack of good road or rail links between the two countries, the presence of a firm friend to the north should be of great significance to any future SWAPO government in Namibia. The fact that Angola is the only oil producer in southern Africa may also prove important, though the lack of refining capacity in both countries poses serious problems for its utilization at present. Barring a major change in government in Luanda, Angola will certainly continue to support SWAPO and oppose continued South African rule or any "internal settlement" in Namibia.

Namibia and Botswana

Namibia's eastern neighbor, Botswana, although it has been independent for more than a decade, is only gradually breaking out of the grip of its dependency on South Africa. With a topography and climate very similar to Namibia's, the economies are likewise similar, although Botswana is able to produce more cash crops along its eastern border and cattle rather than karakul sheep are the principal source of export earnings from the more arid grazing lands. The similarity has been heightened by the fairly rapid discovery and exploitation of minerals, especially copper, nickel and diamonds, since independence. While Botswana has achieved some independence in foreign exchange, and several years after independence established its own currency, it is still joined with South Africa and the two other former high commission territories, Lesotho and Swaziland, in a customs union, and in many other ways is heavily dependent on South Africa.

Despite efforts to discourage the use of its territories by guerrillas, Botswana has paid a high price for its proximity to the struggles in neighboring Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa. It recently has had over 18,000 refugees in the country, mostly from Zimbabwe, in addition to 5,000 Angolans allowed to settle and become citizens, and many times this number have moved on to join ZAPU in Zambia.'9 The Soweto

19. Africa Confidential, Vol. 2(0. No. 7. March 28. 1979'

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Robert L. Dillingham, Jr.

disturbances brought several hundred South African refugees to the country. Prior to the end of Portuguese rule in Angola, Botswana was a major transit route for Namibian refugees as well, but the inhospitability of the Kalahari desert, which straddles the border, and the greater accessibility of the routes to the north through Angola and Zambia, have caused this route to fall into virtual disuse. In addition some 50 student refugees, most claiming allegiance to SWANU, are at Francistown.

Botswana has never allowed guerrilla bases on its territory, but ZIPRA, the military arm of ZAPU, has frequently used Botswana territory for purposes of transit or tactical retreat. Hot pursuit by Rhodesian troops and the threat of Rhodesian raids on refugee camps finally forced Botswana in 1977 to create a 700 man army, which has already suffered casualties from invading Rhodesian' troops. While the Botswana government under President Seretse Khama would clearly prefer peaceful routes to independence in neighboring countries it has increasingly supported the liberation movements and is now a full participant with Tanzania, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique in the group of front line states, and has accepted membership in the UN Council for Namibia.20

The principal point of tension for Botswana in relation to Namibia is in its northern border with Namibia's long and narrow Caprivi Strip, whose easternmost tip is separated from Rhodesia by only a few hundred yards of Botswana territory on the south bank of the Zambezi. South African con- trol at this point and its contention that the four countries meet at a hypothetical point in mid-river prevented US AID from building a bridge from Botswana to Zambia as the termination of an all weather road which it built from Francistown to the ferry at Kazangulu.2" A recent sinking of the ferry, apparently by South African military action, has now effectively closed Botswana's border with Zambia.

While Botswana is a multi-party democracy with basically a capitalist economic structure its good relations with Angola and Mozambique would indicate that positive ties would quickly be established with a SWAPO government in Namibia. Plans have already been discussed in the Council for Namibia and elsewhere for road and rail links from Botswana to Walvis Bay, to lessen Botswana's dependency on the present Rhodesian railway line that runs along its eastern border from Bulawayo to Mafeking in South Africa and is its major transportation outlet to the outside world.

2). If-or ( detailed study of Botswaia's foreign policy see Richard Dale. The Challenges aid Restraints of White Power for a Small Africani State: Rotswana and its Netghhors. Africa Today Vol. 25. No 3 (July-September 1978X pp. 7 23,

21. Africa Contemporary Record, 1976-77, p. B751.

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Page 9: Namibia: Crisis for the International Community || Namibia and Its Neighbors

Zambia and Namibia

Zambia, which borders Namibia along the Caprivi Strip, has played a very critical role as a strong leading advocate of Namibian independence and a member of United Nations Council for Namibia. Despite President Kaunda's moderate stand on guerrilla warfare, the Zambian government has allowed SWAPO guerrillas to establish some military bases in the country. For the most part, however, SWAPO guerrillas have had to take second place to guerrillas from Zimbabwe.

The United Nations Council on Namibia has established the United Nations Institute for Namibia on Zambian soil. The Institute to date has trained over 200 Namibians in areas of political administration, economic development, science and technology, etc., to lay the basis for a core of trained people to take up key posts in a newly independent Namibia. Several Zambian diplomats have served as the Chairperson of the UN Council for Namibia; most recently, Rupiah Banda.22 These individuals have been critical in pointing out the problems that SWAPO has faced in waging a successful guerrilla campaign in Namibia. They have also continued to expose the atrocities of apartheid measures in Namibia.

Zambia has done more than its share in resettling Namibian refugees. The country has engaged in projects like those of Angola and Botswana with major settlements of Namibian refugees in and around Lusaka, Lwatembo and areas near the Caprivi Strip. In addition, it has, like Tanzania, had to do a great deal of adjudicating of internal differences within SWAPO and has also had to establish a separate settlement for 185 SWAPO dissidents in the north of the country.

Zambia is committed to aiding the struggle for political independence in Namibia. The intensity of the problems that Zambia will experience in the future depend whether a resolution of the ongoing political crisis in Zimbabwe can be achieved. Patriotic Front guerrillas have condemned the recent elections there and have avowed to continue the armed struggle. The Zambian government has experienced repeated attacks by the Rhodesian armed forces who are trying to destroy guerrilla bases in the country. A resolution of the Zimbabwe crisis would greatly aid Namibia's drive toward independence from South African rule and administration. However, Zambia has not been immune from hit and run attacks by the South African army seeking to destroy SWAPO bases. These have not been as large in scope as the Rhodesian incursions, or the South African attacks on Angola, but could intensify as the fighting becomes more bitter.

Namibia's direct relationships with Zambia after independence will probably be even less intensive than those with Angola or even Botswana,

22. See UN Council for Namibia. Report of the Mission to Angola, Botswana. and Zambia (General Assembly: Official Records. Ninth Special Session, Supplement No. 1A/S-9/4. New York, 1978).

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Page 10: Namibia: Crisis for the International Community || Namibia and Its Neighbors

Robert L. Dillingham, Jr.

because of the paucity of transport routes and natural economic ties. However, friendship between the two countries should be firm.

Conclusion

South Africa's refusal to cooperate in the UN supervised elections in which SWAPO would take part, its intensive military build-up in the territory and the incursions into Angola, plus its endless political maneuvering, clearly indicate that it intends to hold on to its own privileged position and that of the white settlers as long as possible, even to the extent of undermining the peace and stability of Namibia's other neighbors.

On the other hand, accession to power of a SWAPO government, either through elections or success in guerrilla warfare, will radically change South Africa's position. The boundary of white dominance will be moved back to the Orange River and the forces of black nationalism in the Republic itself will be strengthened. While the close economic ties between the two entities will enable South Africa to maintain some semblance of influence even over an anti-South African government in Namibia, those ties will certainly loosen as rapidly as the new government can create alternate structures without undue disruption to the economy. Predicting when this will happen is presently impossible, that it will happen is much more certain.

Of Namibia's other neighbors, the role of Angola as the main base for SWAPO operations and the main conduit of external aid to SWAPO is clearly the most crucial. Botswana and Zambia, as members of the UN Council on Namibia, nevertheless have a crucial role to play. Barring major political changes internally, or inexorable outside pressures, they can be expected to intensify rather than lessen their support for Namibian independence and to play an important role as friends of a genuine black majority government in Namibia when that day comes.

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