Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka:Some philosophical problems

Jan WesterhoffDepartment of Philosophy

University of Durham

www.janwesterhoff.netwesterhoff@cantab.net

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

Jan Westerhoff

October 2007

Nāgārjuna’s historical background

• 2nd to 3rd century AD

• lived mainly in Southern India

• six extant philosophical treatises, plenty of later commentarial works

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

Jan Westerhoff

October 2007

The theory of emptiness

everything is empty of svabhāva epistemological and ontological notion of

svabhāva:• essence: what an object cannot lose while

remaining that very object• substance: something which does not depend

for its existence on anything else

Only substance-svabhāva is the Mādhyamika’s object of refutation.

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

Jan Westerhoff

October 2007

Two general problems Madhyamaka arguments present both general

and specific arguments for the thesis of universal emptiness.

Reflective problems for the thesis of universal emptiness:

• the emptiness of emptiness• the emptiness of the theory of emptiness (the

antirealist’s dilemma)

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

The emptiness of emptiness Is emptiness itself empty?`Ultimate reality for the Buddhas is svabhāva

itself. That, moreover, because it is nondeceptive is the truth of ultimate reality. It must be known by each one for himself.’

Svabhāva and emptiness are characterized as changeless, not originated, and not dependent on anything else.

Emptiness appears to be a contradictory concept.

Candrakirti’s Madhyamakāvatārabhāsya 108: 16-19.

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

Priest’s response The contradictory notion of emptiness shows

that reality itself is contradictory.

`Reality has no nature. Ultimately, it is not any way at all. On the other side of the street emptiness [the lack of an ultimate nature] is an ultimate characteristic of things. The paradox is grounded in the contradictory nature of reality itself.’

Graham Priest: `Nāgārjuna and the limits of thought’, in: Beyond the Limits of Thought, OUP 2002, 267.

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

Jan Westerhoff

October 2007

An alternative response `being changeless, not originated and

independent’ means something different when applied to svabhāva and to emptiness

• emptiness is independent because its existence does not depend on some specific object

• emptiness is changeless and not originated because it is the property of every object and not produced together with the empty object

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

Jan Westerhoff

October 2007

Emptiness does not exist by substance-svabhāva

emptiness is not a property phenomena have independently of anything else

example of vitreous floaters

emptiness is dependent since its purpose is to dispel an erroneous conception of objects

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

Jan Westerhoff

October 2007

Emptiness is the essence-svabhāva of all objects as heat is the essence of fire emptiness is the

essence of all things

the notion of emptiness is not contradictory because emptiness does not constitute an underlying substance

emptiness is no noumenal reality but simply a property objects could not lose without ceasing to be those very objects

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

Jan Westerhoff

October 2007

The emptiness of the theory of emptiness

Antirealist’s dilemma: For the global anti-realist, what is the status of

the theory of global anti-realism itself?• it is an absolute truth: inconsistency• it is relative: no impact

Emptiness of the theory of emptiness: If everything is empty, what is the status of the

claim asserting universal emptiness?• it is not empty: inconsistency• it is empty: impotence

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

Thomas Nagel

The claim `everything is subjective’ must be nonsense, for it would itself have to be either subjective or objective. But it can’t be objective, since in that case it would be false if true. And it can’t be subjective, because then it would not rule out any objective claim, including the claim that it is objectively false. […] It is a report of what the subjectivist finds agreeable to say. If he also invites us to join him, we need not offer any reason for declining since he has offered us not reason to accept.

The Last Word, OUP 1997, page 15.

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

Nāgārjuna’s opponent

If there is no substance of things, your statement [that everything is empty] must be devoid of substance too. Therefore it cannot deny the substance of things. […] A non-existent fire cannot burn, a non-existent knife cannot cut […]. But if your statement has a substance your original position is destroyed. There is a contradiction and you have to give the special reason why your statement is not to be counted amongst all things.

Vigrahavyāvartanī 1-2.

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

Jan Westerhoff

October 2007

Considering possible replies embracing the first horn is not attractive

finding a reply to the `no impact/ impotence’ charge

• alternative interpretation of the second horn

• understanding the force of Nāgārjuna’s opponent’s argument

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

The `no thesis’ reply‘If I had a thesis the difficulty you mention would apply to me. However, I do not hold any thesis. Therefore there is no defect in my position.’

Nāgārjuna denies that he asserts any thesis which is to be interpreted according to the opponent’s semantics:

• referring to a `ready-made world’• relying on an objective reference relation

Vigrahavyāvartanī 29.

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Nāgārjuna’s Madhyamaka Slide

Jan Westerhoff

October 2007

A question of semantics In order to reply to the second horn of the

dilemma it is necessary to develop a theory of meaning and truth which dispenses with the notion of a non-linguistic world.

treat language not as a means of representation but as a set of conventions for coordination between agents

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