myth, politics and political science

8/13/2019 Myth, Politics and Political Science

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University of Utah

Western Political Science Association

Myth, Politics and Political ScienceAuthor(s): Lee C. McDonaldSource: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1969), pp. 141-150Published by: University of Utahon behalf of the Western Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/446153.

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MYTH, POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCELEE C. McDONALDPomona College

1. Is the language of politicsineficacious withoutmythical lements?2. Is the language ofpolitical science ineficaciouswithmythical lements?3. What is the relationshipbetweenthe answer to question one andtheanswerto questiontwo?IIF NY LANGUAGE should prove invulnerable to mythologicalinfiltrationit would seem to be that language which is direct,literal,and used more to

do somethingthan to mean something. Such language was called by J. L.Austin "performative" anguage, thatis, language which performs n action ratherthan statesanything, s does our more common "constative" utterances. An exam-ple of a performatives the "verdictive" udgment: "We the jurydo herebyfindthe defendantguilty." Another would be the "exercitive" action: "I vote 'no ' "Still anothermightbe the "commissive" uttterance: "I pledge you my support."'Are mythical lements lien to suchspeech-acts?To answer this question we must ask another and tryto answer it, howeversketchily: what ismyth?In frequentusage today "myth" s treated as a synonym or"illusion," usuallyto be contrasted with "reality." Consider these book titles: Scott Greer, TheEmerging City: Myth and Reality; Raymond Vernon, The Myth and Reality ofOur Urban Problems; Boyd Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality; DelbertSnider,Economic Myths and Realities.2 Such usages are understandable,but theysadlyshrink once virileterm.The Greek "mythos"was "a tale utteredby themouth," generallyassociatedwith religious ceremony. It had a narrative and dramatic quality and pointedtoward the divine, that is, the unknown. It attemptedto capture in terms con-ceivable to humans some of the indeterminatequalities of this divine unknown.The language of these stories was consequently figurative,metaphorical, andambiguous. Myths are poetry,but a special kind of poetry the poetrymen liveby. As the bearer of other meanings, larger meanings, meanings beyond, mythshave the concreteness f images found in private poetry,but also a certain univer-sality. Hence, we have often been told that myth"does not tell truths,but doestellthetruth";a myth s something hat "neverwas, butalways is."NOTE: This article is a revisionof a paper delivered at the 1967 Annual Meeting of theWesternPolitical Science Association, Tucson, Arizona,March 16-18, 1967.'None of these utterances s purelyperformative.Each has what Austincalls "illocutionary"as well as "perlocutionary"force. That is, they ntend effects s well as produce effects.Moreover, something s stated in each of the cases above, or the utterancesmay be sointerpreted.But to so interpret hem would be to miss the point of what the jury,thevoter,or the politician is doing in each case. See J. L. Austin,How to Do Things withWords,ed. J.O. Urmson (New York: OxfordU. Press, 1965)."Free Press, 1962; Harvard U. Press, 1966; Harvest Books, 1955; SpectrumBooks, 1965 -respectively.

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142 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYLive mythshave potencyeven, or especially,whenwe are unaware of them asmyths. The opaqueness of dead myths Zeus, Perseus, Hercules --make them

museum pieces. But the transparencyof live mythsmake them verymuch likepieces of music; they have a character of theirown, but are always subject toreinterpretation.3The transparency fmyth s of a piece with the transparency fmetaphor,bywhich, throughjuxtaposition, the ordinaryis seen as extraordinary. The possi-bilitiesof metaphor are infinite nd omnipresent. Because of what metaphorcando, we can neverbe sure that the ordinarywill remain only ordinary. Indeed, thesimplest descriptivetermsmay turn out to have somethingof this quality. Theymay be bearers of built-inconceptionswe have taken forgranted,butwhich condi-tiontheveryperceptionsthe terms re intendedto describe. It is unlikely, s ErnstCassirerconstantlyremindsus, that we can ever get outsideof, or get behind, ourmost basic language in order to perceive thingspurelyand unconditionally. Forexample, the Greek men, or moon, means "the measuring one," suggestingthatperiodic recurrence s what is importantabout the moon. The Latin luna means"the shiningone," suggesting hat visual excitationis what is importantabout themoon. Myth, says Cassirer (he should have said metaphor at this point) is notjust the shadow language throws n thought; tgenerates tsown light.4To conclude our definitional xcursion,we may lean on Philip Wheelwright,who says that metaphorical language, and by extension mythical language, isunique to the degree that it is tensive,diaphoric, and epiphoric. That is, to thedegree that it is capable of holding tensionswithin it, can accomplish transfer-ences from one thing to another, and is presentationalrather than representa-tional.5 It followsthat those elementsof realitythat are born in conflict, hat arecoalescent rather than dichotomous,that are presentational (that move into viewand then out), can be expressed onlyverypoorly n literal anguage and probablycannot be expressed at all in that most literal of languages, mathematics. (Lestwe are temptedto try o get along without anguage at all, itis well to be reminded,as Michael Polyani does for us, that when humans are denied all use of verbalcommunication, their performancein gettingout of mazes turnsout to be lessintelligent han thatofrats.")So, back to our direct,supposedly literal political performatives.Can we besure that the verdictof "guilty"does not carrywith it some lingering vertonesofbetrayal of the gods and betrayalof the tribe? May not the jury that findsguilt3 The analogy withmusic comes fromC. Ker6nyi n the Prolegomenonto C. G. Jungand C.Ker6nyi,Essays on a Science of Mythology (New York: Harper, 1963). Some of theremarks bove were influencedby JosephCampbell's essay in Henry A. Murray (ed.),Myth and Mythmaking (New York: Braziller, 1960). Campbell's monumental TheMasks of God, 3 vols. (New York: Viking, 1959, 1962, 1964), is a landmark in thestudyof myth. See also Mircea Eliade, Myths,Dreams, and Mysteries London: Har-

vill Press, 1960).4Language and Myth, Susanne K. Langer trans. (New York: Harper, 1946). Cassirer'stheoryof myth s developed more fully n Vol. 2 of his PhilosophyofSymbolicForms.Ralph Manheim, trans. (New Haven: Yale U. Press, 1955). See esp. Part I.5 Phillip Wheelwright,Metaphor and Reality (Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 1962), chaps.3, 4.' Michael Polanyi, The Study ofMan (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1963), 13-14.



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MYTH, POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 143feelwithoutconscious articulation the etymological ink between uris and "jury"?Is our negativevoterperhaps in some small degreestillthe religiousvotarymakinghis sacred vow? Is our politician's pledge of support,howeverplatitudinous,stilltingedwith the thoughtof giving physicalsecurity s his Germanic linguisticfore-bears would have done? The most routine bureaucratic definitionof "citizen"does not destroy ltogetherthe memoryof the citizen as member of a cityand thememoryof a cityas more than buildings. The mostunimaginativeuse of the word"party" cannot quite obscure the conceptionof partyas part of something.But thecitationof political wordswithlong etymologieswould provemypointtoo easily. Myth runs deeper into political experience than its penetrationintowords. It runs also into sentencesand even paragraphs. Even a prosaic Presidentleading a pragmaticpeople finds t impossibleto stick with literal language. Lyn-don B. Johnsonbegan histhirdState of theUnion message,I comebefore ou oreportntheStateoftheUnionfor he hird ime.I come to thankyou, nd toadd mytributencemore o the Nation'sgratitude. orthisCongress asalready eserved or tself n honored hapternthehistoryfAmerica.We could easilytranslate these three sentences ntomore literal anguage:Thisis the third ime have beenheretotalktoyouabout omeof theproblemsomeof thepeoplein the federal overnmentave beenworkingn. I thankyoumembersfCongress or some ofyou and quitea few otherpeopleprobably o, too,becauseyoupassedsome egislationnd did some other hings hat liked nd that ome other eopleliked, oo. Maybe ome eople ivingn futureimeswill ike hem lso.

The more literal of the two statements which still has about fourmetaphorsin it) is more easily subject to verification;but the object of thistypeof politicalspeech is not to transmitempiricallyverifiablepropositions,but to renew theauthorityof the speaker and to invigorate the sense of community among theauditors. Each is a means to the other. By this standard the latter statementrequires thirty-threemore words to achieve a lessereffect han the former tate-ment. It is awkward,undignified, nd bears no one anyhonor. Bycontrast, comebefore" suggests he formality nd dignity f a stateoccasion, and also a degreeofobeisance. The phraseregisters sense ofeventfulness, s in "I come bearing gifts."One seemsto see a tired but elated warriordismounting romhis steed amid cheersfrom the multitude, having ridden at breakneck speed from the neighboringkingdom.The dignityof Roman office till hovers over the word "tribute,"fromtheLatin tribus,or tribe,and later the tax paid by the tribes. The whole Americannation is personified nd given a singleemotion in "the Nation's gratitude." Andthat the Eighty-ninthCongress should have a whole chapter in the historyofAmerica suggests, mong other things, hat the history f America is a book withchapters,withan author,who mustsurelybe God.Because of its eventfulness, ts malleability,and its transparency,myth isuniquely able to bridge old and new, to absorb new meanings, to give structureto the inchoate. For thisreason, authority s a structuringgency always employsmyth. Historicalmyths, s opposed to naturemyths,have had a special appeal topolitical authorities. Primordialitybecomes authenticity. Indeed, as the Greek



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144 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYmythos as a tale toldbythemouth, he Romanauctoritaswasonewho declaredor told and bytelling rought omething ewintoexistence.Historical lacesaswell as historical ersons an absorbmeaningsn myth-likeashion, an become"happenings" hatbring peopleconsciousnessf itself.Political uthoritiesrelinksn a process hatbrings ew collectiveonsciousnessutofold collectiveon-sciousness:ValleyForge: Washington;Gettysburg:incoln;Dallas: Kennedy;Berkeley:Reagan.Butcollectiveonsciousnessoesbackbeyond he ife-spanfanypeople,backintothedarkunrecorded astwhere houghttselfwas born.The infinitearietyof mythologicalpplications s onlymatchedby the remarkable niformityfunderlying ythical hemes.Everyculture eemsto have some variation f theskyfatherwho impregnateshe earthmother, hedivine-humanero who over-comes henight-dwellingevil;paradise nd theplaceof thedead; holocaust ndinundation; heprimal eizure f fire rom heheavens.7ThatGod isfathersnotunrelated o the assertion hatWashington as the father f hiscountry. hat inChristwe become newbeing s notunrelated o thenew Soviet or,better, ewChinese man,born gain n the travail frevolution. hreeastronautsyingna vehiclenamedApolloare better ememberedhan hree ivilrights orkersyingin a ditch, s a ClassicsProfessoreminds s in a recent ssue ftheNewRepublic.The fallenAchillesnamedKennedy s memorializedn poetry ull of mythicalallusions,nd in an automotivege,a riderlessorsemarches n thefuneral aradeinhopesthathistoricalmemoryan save us fromn awfulmeaninglessness.Hence does the authorityf a founder ikeSolon pass downfrom uler oruler, oth s a creature f the earth nd as a creature f themind from lato'sphilosopher-kingoMachiavelli's rince o Hobbes'sovereignoRousseau'sLegis-lator oeverymodemhero-ruler.Politics s not necessarilyheprimarymediumofmythologicalonceptions.In ourdaytheeconomic pheremaybe a more ikelymedium. On television ecan findAdam and Eve strollingn the Salemcigaret aradise,uxtaposedwiththehell ofscience-fictionobots nd uncontrollabletomach cid. The royal igeris in your ank, he ndestructableero sJamesBond,and theearth-mothers afold-out.But withoutmyths here s no authoritynd without uthorityhereis no politics.Without omemythicallements he anguage fpoliticss ineffica-cious. Wemust nswer uestion umber ne n the ffirmative.

IIMy claimregarding he languageofpolitical cience s probablymore con-tentioushanmy laimregardinghe anguage fpolitics.Here,too, assert,mythandauthoritywellhand nhand;but n a more oncealed ashion.What is science? It is impossible utfortunatelyeedless o developherea

roundedposition n whatscience s. Amongother hings,cientificctivityug-gests: (a) the xistencefcriteria f evidence ndmethods fvalidatingmpirical'See Joseph Campbell, The Hero With a Thousand Faces (Cleveland: Meridian Books,1956); and Mircea Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion (Cleveland: MeridianBooks, 1963).



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MYTH, POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 145observations authorized by a communityof scholars; (b) systematic xplanation;(c) futureorientation.

As to claim (a), littleneed be said at presentexcept to note that althoughpolitical authorityand scientific uthorityhave differentbjects, as authority hetwo are comparable. The relevance of this comment may become clearer in amoment. What I mean to assertby claim (b) is that the demand forexplanationand even understandingor verstehen s a legitimatescientific emand. It is a callformore than data, howeverrewardingthedata-gatheringprocess may be. Some-times impressivework in political science is less explanatory than it might bebecause it rests content with mere data. Any number of articles illustratethistendency. One example is "Some Effectsof Interest Group Strengthin StatePolitics,"byLewis Froman.8 The article offers ome interestingtatistics, magina-tivelyarrived at, to show that states with strongpressuregroups,compared withstateswith weak pressuregroups,had more elected officials,more elected judges,with shorter erms,under constitutions asier to amend. The data are interesting;but still they are only data. Why these correlationsoccurred, what they showabout the ways of interestgroups or state governments, r what their mplicationis forpresent xperienceor future hange are leftunexamined.Someone must,of course,gatherdata, and the scholar need not, indeed, can-not,workon all fronts t once. After ll, one can say,all our attempts o, ormulatehypotheses,patterns,paradigms, and models are but attemptsto "make sense" ofdata. Moreover, althoughmere data are never"self-explanatory,"he transforma-tion of random impressions nto data can have the effect f flattening ut, makinglevel, making observable fromabove, so to speak, the phenomena under study.This is the originalmeaning of "explain." My plea forexplanation is, therefore,strictly peaking a plea for elucidation- which originallymeant to shed lightupon. Data-making can be a useful process of reduction and denominating; butdata shedno light. If Cassirer s correct,mythdoes.'But whether we call it explanation, elucidation, insight,or understandingwhetherflattening,ighting, ooking,or standingunder- the quest forknowledgerequiresnot onlydata, butwhat Stephen Pepper calls "danda." 0 Data is evidencerefined hrough multiplicativecorroboration, y repetitive ests, r by observationsof a similarkind made by a seriesof observers.Danda is evidence refined hroughstructural orroboration,bymeasuringconformityo a preexisting onstruct. Thedistinction, t is important o note,is not thatbetweenobservation nd nonobserva-tion. Observersseekingdata on the strength f a chair will have a seriesof differ-ent observersperformthe same strength est on it. Observers seekingdanda onthe strength f the same chair will seek to find a concurrencebetween different8APSR,60 (December 966), 952-62.'Bronislaw Malinowski argued that mythsdo not, technically,"explain," for they do notassign causes. But they do "make everything lear." They are not Erklarung butbegrunden. To use Aristotle's terms,myth is not concerned with aitia, but archai(Metaphysics, 1013a), with foundation. Myth in PrimitivePsychology (New York,1926). Quoted byKer6nyi, oc. cit.10 WorldHypotheses (Berkeley: U. ofCaliforniaPress,1961. Copyright, 942).



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146 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYaspects of the chair- quality of wood, characterof the design, reputationof themaker, etc.

Data-gathering is clearly a more "social" enterprisethan danda-gatheringsince collaboratorsare absolutelyessential. Is it possiblethatdata-gathering tudiesreceive more professionalattention than nonmultiplicative tudies,partlybecausedata-gatherersmust be gregariousand danda-gatherersneed not be so much so?Data can be discredited more easily than danda, which is at once its strength ndits weakness- strengthbecause data is withoutambiguity,weakness because it iseasily displaced and hence transient. Ghosts at one point in time were taken asdata. When discreditedas data, theycould still ive on as danda, entities xplain-able byreference o something lse.Since the whole world- or forthatmatter, any "world": the planet calledworld, the world of the Enlightenment, he world of the U.S. Senate, the worldof Sammy Davis, Jr. since none of these can be experienced as data, all worldhypotheses require danda for validation; but world hypothesesalso come intoexistenceprior to any systemby which they may be validated. They reston whatPepper calls "root metaphors." Even views of realitythat are hostileto metaphor,themselves eston rootmetaphors. (One is reminded ofJohnLocke in Essay Con-cerningHuman Understanding. In one veryshortpassage [Bk. III, ch. 10, sec. 34]which argues that metaphormisleads judgment,Locke is forced to employaboutten metaphors.) Systematicinquiry into the world of politics has always beenbuilt on different inds of root metaphors. Aristotlewas biological. Hobbes wasphysicalistic. Bentham was mechanistic. Karl Deutsch is neurological." DavidEaston is electronic. Easton's SystemsAnalysisofPolitical Life 2 has as its admittedcognitiveparent the computer (even though"life" is a biological term).There is nothing wrongeitherwithseeking political data that can be digestedby a computer,or with conceiving political systems s if theywere computersys-tems so long as one is clear about what one is doing, and is reasonablymodestabout it. Easton is usually clear, but he sometimesforgets he "as if," and treatsthefigurative s the literal. His macroscopicanalysesof systemnputs,outputs, ndfeedback loops are well known. Let us plug in at random to a discussionof "thesystemic eedback loop":Through he nterlockinghainof feedbackoops, ll oftheparticipating embersfanyone loopmaybe coupled, fonly oosely,withmany thermembersn thesystem. opointthisup, I have deliberatelyelected heparticipantsn the various eedback iads sothat n unbrokenine couldbe drawn hroughhe six differentctorswhomakeup the sixpairs n thesixdifferentoops. If we lookat each loop as a link n a continuoushainwhichthey ndeedformpictoriallynd literally--wecan appreciate hatthe interactionaround nyone feedbackoophas thepotential,f t is strongnough, o pass its nfluencedown he hain oother nitsn the ystem."But what does it mean to say that the chain is both pictorial and literal? It issurelynot literal in referenceto what Mayor Daley actually does, or to what theRev. JamesBevel or Saul Alinskydo to Mayor Daley. Is it then iteral n referenceto what a figurative olitical computerwould do?" See The NervesofGovernment New York: The Free Press, 1963)."2New York: Wiley, 1965.":Ibid., p. 376. Italics added.



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MYTH, POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 147Easton declares that this system s not yet ready formicroscopicdata (whichmeans,presumably,data about specifichuman beings) :

At thispreliminarytate n a theoryfpolitical ystems,henwe are still ryingogetourgeneral earings, detailed nalysis f thiskind annot nd neednot be undertaken..... forpurposes fmacroanalysise do notneedto pushanymoredeeply.... It is as thoughwewere nitially econcilingurselveso using telescope ather hana microscopeecauseweare notyetsufficientlyonfidentf the units nd processes hat we wantto lay open todetailed nalysis."4This is a very strange analogy. We do not yetknowwhat to put under our micro-scopes; but we will know if we spend more time lookingat starsthroughour tele-scopes. Easton's telescopeis a strangemetaphor. But itmay suggest truth,never-theless,a possibility ven forbad metaphors. It suggests hat in cognitionwhole-ness precedes particularity,danda precedes data. There must be some coherententity ywhich to comprehenda set of particulars. Raw empiricism s notenough.As Polanyinotes,one does notcome to understandthepurposeofa watchbytakingit apart.15The futureorientation of Easton's remarks re also worthyof note,but com-ment on that comes later. For now, my point is that Easton - whom I do notdeny is acting like a scientist is building his whole systemnot on data or literalexperience,but on analogy,metaphor,and possiblymyth. The terminology f thecomputer pervades even his discussion of history, historyn which the computerwas unknown. Under the heading "Rules forthe retrievalof storedexperiences,"he refers o "a social memorybank" as a "potentialresource forthe authorities."Membersould notpossiblyecall hewhole fhistoryransmittedoeachgeneration,ven fitweredesirable rnecessary. etrievals always elective.Whata person ecallswillhingeon thoserulesgoverningheways n whichhe scanshismemory,hecriteria fappropriate-ness used to make selections rom he informationetrieved,nd the rulesregulatingheway he goes about synthesizingnd reorganizinghe knowledge ecalled for mmediateuse.... The rules hemselvesonstituteartoftheavailableresourcesecessaryorhandlingfeedback esponse."President Johnson's metaphorical language was translated into literal languageonly by increasingthe numberof words. In thiscase one mightattemptthe samething and actually shorten the number of words. We mightread thispassage tosay: "Habit affectsmemoryand people rememberfromhistorywhat is useful forthem to remember." In the case of both Johnson and Easton, the metaphoricalbase renews the authorityof the speaker in his own communal context. In onecase it is historicalgrandeur appealing to the citizen and legislator; in the othercase it is computer-talk ppealing to thescientist fthecomputerage.My conclusion at this juncture is that satisfying xplanation or elucidationrequiresmore than data and once we are beyonddata we findourselves eaning onthe metaphorsand myths hat stand between us and the unknown. We mustusethe known to get at the unknown and this is what mythprimordiallydoes. Sisy-phus may have started out as a datum; but he became a mythbygivingshape andmeaningto all the elusiveSisyphianexperiencesman has had.14 Ibid., pp. 376-77.15Op. cit.,p. 49."IOp. cit., p. 458.



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148 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYThe third spect of scienceworthy f note hereis its future rientation.Thomas Kuhn inhissplendidittle ook,The StructurefScientificevolutions,17showsby historicaltudyhow importanthe senseof forwardmotion s to thescientificommunity. cientific aradigmsprovidethe structurewithinwhichresearchersan work nd feelthey re "making rogress."Whenunusuallyrea-tivemen comeup withnewparadigmshatgivepromise fgreater orwardmove-ment,old paradigms an lose theirgripon the imaginationwithremarkablerapidity.When Renaissance ainterswereconcernedwithperfectinghetechniquesflinearperspective,ftransforminghree-dimensionalision nto two-dimensionalsurface, hey hought f themselvess scientists.Whenperspectiveeasedto bean interestingroblem o them, hey toppedbeingscientistsnd began calling

themselvesrtists.Copernicus estroyedut did not replacethe earlierviewofterrestrialotion,nd thesame could be saidforNewton ngravity,avoisier nthepropertyfmetals, nd Einstein n spaceand time. This iswhat Kuhn callstheincommensurabilityf scientificaradigms.It is interestinghatbothDavid Truman n his 1965presidentialddress otheAmerican olitical cienceAssociation,nd GabrielAlmond nhis1966presi-dential ddress o thesamebody,mentioned uhn's book. Theydid so becausehesupportsheclaimthat heconcept fsystemscentral o the cientificndeavor.TrumanusesKuhnwithgreat aution, utAlmond,nciting uhn,glides ver heprinciple f ncommensurabilitynd thephenomenonffuturism. eing uddenlyand overtlymythical, lmond ays hat n oldergeneration Herring,chattsch-neider,Odegard,Key- saw a new land on thehorizon,nd a newergeneration- Truman, Easton,Dahl, Deutsch "have beenmoving cross theJordantopossess t." 8s ButwhatKuhn seems o me to be sayings thatscience s notascumulative s wehavethoughttto be. Knowledge roduced ya scientificystemcannot e "possessed"heway and can bepossessed.One cannothelpbutbe struck ythesense fmovementntothe future hatanimates o much politicalsicencewriting, sensethatcommunicatestselfnoften uitemetaphoricalanguage. The September 966 issueof The AmericanPoliticalScienceReviewmaybe taken s a representativexample.Eightoftheeleven articles ouldbe called future-orientedof theseeight,ncidentally,evenare quantitative.Of the three resent-orientedrticles,woarenonquantitative).What meanbyfuture-orientations indicated yconclusionsike hese:... the social scientificxaminationnto the complexitiesf judicial decision-makingasbarelycommenced. It is no shame thatwe are onlynow at the stateofhypothesis ormulationand techniquedevelopment.The first oddles are alwaystheshakiest."Inter-nation imulation and man-computer imulation n generalmay be consideredway sta-tions on thepath to all-computer imulations.'... the intention of the present investigation [is] to make an initial excursion into thisuncharted area.'17 Chicago: U. ofChicago Press,1962.18"Political Theory and Political Science," APSR, 60 (December 1966), 869-79, at 875."' Theodore Becker,"A SurveyofHawaiian Judges,"677-80, at 680.0William Coplin, "Inter-National Simulation and ContemporaryTheories of InternationalRelations," 562-78, at 578.21 JackDennis, "Support forthe Party Systemby the Mass Public, 600-615, at 613.



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MYTH, POLITICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE 149This studycan be interpreted s an introductoryxplorationof the processesbywhichmoregeneralpoliticalbeliefs nd behavior are affected ythelocal community.'Future analyses of recruitment eed not be confinedto the simple categoriesused for illus-trativepurposes here.'Andsoon.Am I suggestinghattheconquest fthe futures theunderlying yth fallscience nd thereforefpolitical cience?Not quite. Forone thing,mythshem-selves re past-oriented,otfuture-oriented.heyare composed fimagesfromthepastthat llumine hepresent yrevitalizinghepast. Bycontrast,deologysuniquely uture-oriented.t "explains" he future y ogicalprojection. deologyis abstractwhereasmyths concrete.Because tmaybe usedforpurposes fcon-trol,measurement,nd predictionnhuman ffairs,deologys likea science.Butit is a pseudo-science,or tcannotdeliver n itspromisesnd projections.Myth,on theotherhand,makes no promises. t justis. Thereis a singular logic"toideologiesikeMarxism, acism, r JohnBirchism,hat"explains"more than tis entitled o. There is no such singularogic to myth.It illuminates reciselybecause f ts ensive,iaphoric,ndepiphoricualities;butthese ery ualities lsomeanthat the samemyth an meansharply ifferenthings odifferenteople.24Perhapswe can say that whilePromethean nd Faustianmyths re relevant oscience, heconquest nd control fthe future s not themyth ut the deology fscience.Is the anguageofpolitical cience nefficaciouso longas mythicallementsremain? f sciencemeansonly hecollectionfquantitativeata the nswersyes.If sciencemeansalso explanationnd elucidation ythe structuralorroborationsofdanda,theanswersno. The coherences e seek ntryingo relate nd explainthevarious inguistichenomena fpolitics annotbe expressedn an utterly re-cise and univocalmanner o longas mythical rmetaphoricallements emain;butthese lements o notnecessarilyegate nd theymayenhance he xplanatoryfunction.

IIIWhat is therelationshipetween heanswer o question ne and theanswertoquestion wo?The "X" on a ballot s theresult f a sublingual ct,and it is exceptionallyobjectifiable.t comes ntobeingat a clearlydentifiable omentn time nd itstaysnplace. Voting tatisticsreadmirable s data,andit snot urprisinghere-forethatpolitical ciencemostfulfillsherequirementsfquantitativecience n' Robert Putman, "Political Attitudes nd the Local Community,"640-54, at 652.23 Leo Snowiss,"CongressionalRecruitment nd Representation," 27-39, at 639.' ErnstCassirer, n The Myth of the State (New York: AnchorBooks, 1955), performeddisservice n confusingthe distinction have been trying o make here. What Cassirercalls "mythmade accordingto plan," I would call ideology. Even in his earlierwritings(see footnote4 above), Cassirer's distinctionbetween mythicaland scientific hinkingwas too dichotomous. In The Myth of the State, writtenoriginally n 1945, Cassirer isovercomewith antipathyto the darkly rrationalvolkgeist f Nazism. But at least halfof what bothered him could betterbe called ideology. We mighteven say that thismostdistinguished tudentof mythwas himself aptured by a myththat picturesa shining,plumed knightof scholarshipperenniallydoing battle withdark, satanic myth. See p.375.



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150 THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLYthe area of votingstudies. But the contentof mostpolitical behavior is linguistic:bargaining, conciliating, threatening,exhorting,persuading, reporting. All thisgoes on somewherebetween the two poles of violence, which is speechless, andcontemplation,which is speechless. Michael Polanyi notes that foran observertosay "the stone is rolling" involves two logical levels,one forthe observerand hisstatement, second for the stone. When an observersays "the cat sees a rat" athird evel is introduced,requiringof the observer ome awarenessof theexperienceof seeing that he shares with the cat.25 Polanyi's argument is that significantknowledge is always personal knowledge. The personality f the knower s boundup with the object of his knowing and must be. If the scientific bserver s notlooking at a looking cat, but speaking to a speaking citizen,and the citizensays,"Ronald Reagan says he believes in individualism" we are confrontedwith aboutfive ogical levels withwhichthepoliticalscientistmust deal.Politicking and the analysis of politickingare, of course, sharply differententerprises. If unexamined mythis omnipresenton the stump it need not be inthe professional ournals. Politics is drama. Need the drama criticbe dramatic?26No necessityrequireshim to be; but he will shed little ightunless he is. Wherewould scientific olitical analysis be withoutconceptslike election,vote, rule, law,power, authority,represent,community,govern, charisma, republic, democratic,liberty, quality, fraternity words whose contextual meanings are so steeped inthe historicexperiencesof concretecommunitiesthat a lack of awareness of thoseinvestedmeaningsleads to impoverishedunderstanding? The aim ofmethodologi-cal precisiondrives us away fromthe figurative oward the literal in the hopes offinding a neutral language. But if political language is always contextual andcontextual language is never neutral,the price we pay forneutral language maybe lossoftouchwithpolitics tself.I am not, of course, advocating surrenderto imprecision. We can use con-trolled metaphor to explain rampant metaphor. We can use conscious mythtoexplain unconscious myth. But if we try too hard to avoid dependence uponmetaphors,we may succeed, becoming literal but lifeless. If we trytoo hard tolive withoutmyth,we may onlywind up enslaved to ideology,thereby losingdownwhat is, n fact, n open future.

The literatureon ideology, ike the literatureon myth, s, of course,voluminous;but rarely is a clear distinctionbetween the two sustained. One exception is BenHalpern, "The Dynamic Elements of Culture," Ethics, 65 (1955), 235-49. See alsoRobert Tucker, Philosophyand Myth in Karl Marx, Cambridge U. Press, 1961). Theproblem of scientific nd political language is dealt with acutely by Margaret Mac-donald in "The Language of Political Theory," in AnthonyFlew (ed.), Logic andLanguage (Anchor Books, 1965), FirstSeries,No. IX. Michael Oakeshottdescribestheclassical view of politics as "poetic activity" n The Voice of Poetry in the Conversa-tionofMankind (London: Bowes and Bowes, 1959).25The Study of Man, 74-77. See also his Personal Knowledge (Chicago: U. of ChicagoPress, 1958).' See Richard M. Merelman, "Politics as a Dramatic Form," paper delivered at the 1966Annual Meeting of theAmericanPolitical Science Association,New York City,Septem-ber 6-10 (mimeo.). Robert E. Lane, in The Liberties of Wit (New Haven: Yale U.Press, 1961) chides literarycritics and students of literaturefora lack of conceptualrigor. A good many of his blows strikehome; but rigorand literary llusivenessneednot be enemies; nor s rigorwithout ensitivity scientific irtue.

myth, politics and political science

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