moscow's rule crumbles in daghestan

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This article was downloaded by: [University of California Santa Cruz] On: 24 November 2014, At: 15:13 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Strategic Comments Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tstc20 Moscow's rule crumbles in Daghestan Published online: 22 Oct 2007. To cite this article: (1998) Moscow's rule crumbles in Daghestan, Strategic Comments, 4:7, 1-2, DOI: 10.1080/1356788980474 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356788980474 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http:// www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

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Page 1: Moscow's rule crumbles in Daghestan

This article was downloaded by: [University of California Santa Cruz]On: 24 November 2014, At: 15:13Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: MortimerHouse, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Strategic CommentsPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/tstc20

Moscow's rule crumbles in DaghestanPublished online: 22 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: (1998) Moscow's rule crumbles in Daghestan, Strategic Comments, 4:7, 1-2, DOI:10.1080/1356788980474

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1356788980474

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) containedin the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make norepresentations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose ofthe Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be reliedupon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shallnot be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and otherliabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to orarising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematicreproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Page 2: Moscow's rule crumbles in Daghestan

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As President Boris Yeltsin’s adminis-tration slips further into financial andpolitical crisis, the weakness of the centralRussian state is reflected in its looseninggrip on the Russian provinces – especiallythe non-Russian ethnic republics. In thenorth Caucasus, the strategically vitalautonomous republic of Daghestan showssigns of slipping out of control, its govern-ment undermined by a mixture of ethnicrivalry, religious radicalism, and theactivities of guerrillas and brigands infil-trating from Chechnya.

The security situation in Daghestanworsened sharply in mid-August whenIslamist radicals (the so-called ‘Wahabis’)seized a group of mountain villages,

expelled the police and declared a separateIslamic state. The Daghestani policeseemed at a loss over how to react, andRussian soldiers in the region were quotedas saying that they were deeply unwillingto intervene.

Keeping a hold on the republic isimportant to Moscow for both domesticand geopolitical reasons. Disorder inDaghestan, on top of Chechnya’s virtualsecession, could spread to the rest of thenorth Caucasus and deal a serious blow toMoscow’s waning prestige. Even moreimportantly, Daghestan lies on the mainRussian transport link to the Trans-caucasus, and the only Russian route bywhich oil and gas from Azerbaijan can be

transported to the West. A loss of controlover Daghestan would therefore virtuallyensure that the main oil route would, asthe US administration wishes, go throughGeorgia to the Mediterranean port ofCeyhan in Turkey.

Many Russian officials regard this as athreat to the country’s influence in theregion; but there seems little that Moscowcan do to avert it. The traditional threat ofmilitary coercion carries little weight afterthe Russian military débâcle in Chechnya,and subsidies to maintain the rule of localpro-Moscow establishments are dimin-ishing fast as Russia’s financial situationworsens. Central subsidies in 1997 ac-counted on paper for up to 90% of Dag-hestan’s budget, but most of this neverreached the Daghestani population, eitherbecause it was never paid or because itwas stolen by Russian or Daghestaniofficials and their criminal overseers.

�������������� ���Daghestan’s most distinctive features areits ethnic diversity and strong Islamiccharacter. Its population of 2.1 million ismade up of 34 official nationalities withnumerous sub-groups, many of themoccupying only a single mountain valley.None of these ethnic groups constitutes amajority, or occupies a dominant positionin the republic, and most have land claimsagainst each other. A disastrous ‘domino’effect could occur if any one of themsucceeds in achieving its territorial aims.Nationalist unrest among the Lezginpeople in southern Daghestan also has thepotential to destabilise Azerbaijan, where alarge Lezgin minority has intermittentlysought union with the Lezgins of Russia.Daghestan is among the poorest regions ofthe Russian Federation, and high youthunemployment in particular is providing abreeding-ground for ethnic and religiousextremism.

Daghestan’s growing instability wasunderlined in May 1998, when an ethnic-ally-based criminal group with Islamisttendencies – led by the Khachilayevbrothers – seized the government head-quarters in Makhachkala after policeofficers tried to arrest one of the brothers.Over the past two years, there have beendozens of attacks on politicians, police

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officers and Russian troops. Chechengroups conduct many of these assaults.

The relative internal peace and stabilityenjoyed by Daghestan in the early 1990s(compared to much of the rest of theregion) was due above all to the continu-ation in power of the former communistestablishment, who were determined toprevent the growth of ethnic and religiousradicalism. They believed, correctly, thatsuch radicalism could destroy their ownauthority and plunge the republic into civilwar.

Daghestan was thus the last of Russia’sautonomous republics to declare its sover-eignty – in May 1991 – and the leadershiphas always displayed a pragmatic loyaltyto whichever political force has dominatedin Moscow. The local communist élite wasable to perpetuate its rule in part because itwas rooted not just in the former power ofthe Communist Party and Soviet state, butalso in an intricate web of local kinshipand patronage networks.

Daghestan’s Constitution, adopted inJuly 1994, is characterised by the need topreserve the inter-ethnic balance. Theruling State Council has a rotating Chair,which can be occupied by a representativeof a single ethnic group for four years, andthen has to be given up in favour ofanother group. However, the State CouncilChairman, Mahomed Ali Mahomedov (anethnic Dargin), has become in reality therepublic’s acting President. In 1996, hesuccessfully pressured the People’s As-sembly to extend his powers for anothertwo years, and to cancel the rotation of theState Council Chair. Mahomedov was re-elected for a further four years in June1998. While this has averted a publicstruggle for the succession, it has greatlyincreased the hostility of some of the othernationalities to his rule.

���������������� The key to Daghestan’s growing instabilityis that both the power and the internalunity of the old Soviet establishment in therepublic are crumbling. The republic’srising power-centres are the new ethnic-ally-based criminal networks, to whichMahomedov and the other survivingSoviet-era politicians now look for supportand defence. As a result of this crimin-alisation of politics, more than 40 Dag-hestani politicians have been killed overthe past three years.

Each major ethnic group – notably theAvars, Chechens, Dargins, Kumyk andLaks – has its own powerful criminalleaders who base their groups on theirclan and kinship networks and competeagainst other ethnic groups. These men are

of the post-Soviet generation and their riseis due to their strong leadership, courage,ruthlessness and skilful exploitation ofeconomic and social anarchy.

They tend to come from underpri-vileged rural backgrounds, and oftenstarted their careers as bodyguards ofleading communist figures in the late1980s. Their chief activities in Daghestaninclude weapons trading and drug smug-gling across the Azeri border, sturgeonand caviar piracy, bank fraud and, mostimportantly, gaining a share of control offederal subsidies. Some of these groupshave strong links to Chechen criminalgroups.

The Khachilayev group has strongChechen support and is a key example ofhow criminality, ethnicity and Islamicpolitics merge in Daghestan. Their politicalrise was due to their criminal wealth andtheir ability to turn themselves into rep-resentatives of their Lak nation. They thensought to give their power a religious baseby founding the Union of Muslims ofRussia, on which ticket Nadirshah Khachi-layev became a member of the RussianFederation’s parliament in 1995.

������������� Daghestan also contains more genuineradical Muslim groups, which have linksto the Middle East. Opposition to thesegroups comes from Moscow, Mahomedovand the former Soviet establishment, aswell as Daghestan’s Sufi Muslim brother-hoods whose traditional, local variant ofIslam is threatened by the new-style fun-damentalism. The alleged fundamentalistthreat throughout the former Soviet southhas also played a part in the rapprochementbetween Moscow and Uzbeki PresidentIslam Karimov’s regime.

All of these forces dub the new radicals‘Wahabis’ and claim that their ideologyoriginates in Saudi Arabia and is thereforeessentially foreign to the Caucasus. Theradicals reject the term Wahabi but doadhere to a full-scale Islamist agenda.They wish to create a Shariah-ruled coun-try and claim that Muslims can stay withinRussia only in the unlikely event thatRussia agrees to transform itself into sucha state.

The radicals are gaining support inDaghestan, both because their social ideo-logy appeals to the increasingly impover-ished and desperate population, andbecause it is the only movement that cutsacross ethnic lines and may avert a slideinto communal violence. The radicalsreceive strong military support fromChechnya and especially from the warlordEmir Khatab, a Jordanian-born Chechen

and a genuine Wahabi. The Islamists areunlikely to be strong enough to seizepower in Daghestan, but they are alreadyplaying an important role in making therepublic ungovernable.

������������Chechen nationalists and Islamists hopethat Daghestan can be drawn into analliance with Chechnya with the aim ofoverthrowing Russian rule throughout thenorth Caucasus. In April 1998, thenChechen Prime Minister Shamil Basayevand ‘Foreign Minister’ Mauvladi Udugovfounded the Congress of Chechen andDaghestani Peoples, which declared as itsgoal the unification of Daghestan andChechnya as an independent state.

Chechen President Aslan Maskhadovpublicly stated in May 1998 that herespects the Ingush and Daghestanipeoples’ choice to remain within the Rus-sian Federation. However, the Daghestaniauthorities believe that the Chechenleadership is pursuing a policy of terri-torial expansion, with the help of theChechen minority living in north-westDaghestan.

�������������������� ���While there is almost no prospect ofDaghestan seeking or receiving formalindependence from Russia, in practice theregion is already largely out of Moscow’scontrol. This is, however, a very differentprocess from that which occurred inChechnya in the early 1990s, when aviolent nationalist revolution resulted inthe destruction of Communist authorityand a declaration of independence. Rather,it is a creeping loss of control made worseby Moscow’s lack of policy towards therepublic. Russian forces have alreadyabandoned any pretence of controlling theborder with Chechnya, handing overresponsibility instead to the ineffectiveDaghestani police.

Obsessed by its struggle for financialand political survival, the Yeltsin adminis-tration lacks not just the money but alsothe attention to spare on Daghestan. Thecentral government’s actions in therepublic are increasingly restricted tomediating between Daghestan’s rivalfactions, without much success. There hasbeen much discussion – both in Russia andthe West – of Russia’s need to establish aroute, via Daghestan, for Caspian oil as akey means of maintaining geopoliticalleverage in the region. But, at present,Russia is involved in a process resemblinga de facto withdrawal from Daghestan, andthe chances of a Russian pipeline route aregrowing less and less.

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