AU/ACSC/205/2000-04

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

AIR UNIVERSITY

MORALITY IN MODERN AERIAL WARFARE

by

Jeffrey L. Gingras Maj, USAF Tomislav Z. Ruby Maj, USAF

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Graduation Requirements

Elective Instructors: Lieutenant Colonel Mark San Souci

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 2000

ByrdjoDistribution A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this elective paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the

official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance

with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States

government.

ii

Contents

Page

DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................................ ii

PREFACE...................................................................................................................................... iv

INTRODUCTION ...........................................................................................................................1

STRATEGIC AERIAL BOMBARDMENT: THE BASICS ..........................................................4

AIRPOWER THEORISTS AND MORALITY ..............................................................................6

CURRENT LEGAL NORMS, GUIDELINES, AND PHILOSOPHY .........................................10

JUST WAR AND AERIAL WARFARE ......................................................................................14

MORAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR TARGETING.....................................................................18

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF MORALITY IN AERIAL WARFARE ...........................21

World War II............................................................................................................................21

Korea .......................................................................................................................................22

Vietnam ...................................................................................................................................22

DESERT STORM ...................................................................................................................23

ALLIED FORCE.....................................................................................................................28

MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF AERIAL BOMBARDMENT WITH RESPECT TO

NON-COMBATANTS............................................................................................................37

THE APPLICATION OF MORALITY TOWARDS FUTURE AIR OPERATIONS .................39

CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................45

BIBLIOGRAPHY..........................................................................................................................47

iii

Preface

Our politicians need to understand that this isnt going to be clean. There is going to be collateral damage. There will be unintended civilian casualties. We will do our level best to prevent both, but theyve got to grit their teeth and stay with us. We cant cut and run the first time we hit the wrong end of a bridge. We cant cut and run the first time we kill innocent people that clearly we did not intend to kill.

Lt Gen Michael Short

Address to the Air Force Association Air

Warfare Symposium, 25 February 2000

There is a moral way to wage war, be it in the air, on the sea, or on the ground. This paper

contends that the US Air Force can maintain a high level of morality in the conduct of air

operations. In doing so, we will save the lives of both our airmen and innocents on the ground.

The authors intend to show that there is a long tradition of morality in war and that we can and

should maintain high standards. We do NOT advocate, nor should the reader infer that we

believe it is possible to conduct a war in which no innocents are harmed. We DO urge senior

commanders to balance the proportionality of probable non-combatant casualties against the

military necessity of the given targets. If that balance cannot be made, we urge our leaders to say

so.

Lt Gen Mike Short, the air commander for Operation Allied Force, quoted above, makes the

proper case that there will be unintended casualties and that we, as a nation, must understand this

when waging war. What the authors make clear is that anything beyond the proportional loss of

life due to necessity is immoral and must be prevented.

iv

Part 1

Introduction

If strategic advocates propose that success can be attained only by violating noncombatant immunity, the moral judgment is simple: there is no justifiable war that is pursued by murderous conduct. A more complex decision arises when the proposal is that standards of proportionality must be loosened to achieve success. The nature of the proportionality criterion is that it is inherently open to revision; a claim that it is too tightly drawn and should be revised in the name of a competing norm cannot be instantly rejected. But continuous, incremental relaxation of standards of proportionality can yield simply another version of must win.

Reverend Bryan J. Hehir

Kosovo: A War of Values and the Values of War

America, May 15, 1999

The United States finds itself today in the position of being able to attack a wide variety of

targets throughout the world with precision undreamed of even 20 years ago. This precision

engagement capability, a core competency of the US Air Force, leads to a serious debate about

the ability of the US to project power at any place and at any time with a precision that will

minimize the threat to non-combatants. However, despite the promise of precision engagement,

we have yet to see it brought to fruition. Although precision weapons capability has continued to

improve, we found during Desert Storm and Allied Force, that we still incur politically and

morally unpalatable levels of civilian and non-combatant casualties due to poor planning and

poor employment. We also find it generally accepted that we need to inflict various levels of

pain upon the enemy population in order to bend them to our will.

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This paper contends that aerial operations can be conducted using just war guidelines, which

can preserve and enhance the USs traditionally high moral position. It is entirely possible to

carry out an air operation to achieve strategic and operational objectives while upholding

morality, minimizing casualties on both sides, and bringing about a swift end to the conflict. To

do so, however, will require an acknowledgment that the US Air Force (USAF) may have to

institutionalize changes to achieve that goal, continue to develop and procure even more lethal

and non-lethal weapons, and perhaps forsake hitting certain targets in the future if non-combatant

casualties are disproportionate to the gain. The USAF, rather than defending past actions as the

unintended result of a job in which our purpose is to kill people and break things, should be in

the forefront of the effort to achieve the antiseptic lethality that pundits recently hailed as the

future of air operations.

The applicability of this paper is bound by aerial warfare employed against an industrial

state. Morality, as applied here, will be bound by aerial warfare (non-nuclear, -biological, or -

chemical) where the intended target is identified before the aircrew has flight-planned for the

mission. This paper will not consider close air support or armed reconnaissance where the flight

crew in unaware of the target's position or the proximity of non-combatants to the desired target.

We will define what morality is, and should be in war, using precedent, centuries of Just

War tradition, and the concepts of the authors. We will look at the history of aerial

bombardment from a moral standpoint and then detail how the US fared in both Desert Storm

and Allied Force. Finally, we will make the case for morality in future operations and show that

it is not only possible, but also necessary, for us to take this path. As time and technology

progress, we should develop and field the capability to carry out an aerial operation where the

risk to non-combatants is minimized. If there are effects that need to be achieved in an area

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populated with non-combatants, we should employ emerging lethal, non-lethal, or information-

based weapons against them, ensuring that the noncombatants are affected only to a level

proportionate to the necessity of the target.

This paper will step through a methodical thought process to support the conclusion of the

applicability of morality within an aerial bombardment campaign. A basic description of the

basics of aerial bombardment will be followed by the USAF's current legal norms, guidelines

and philosophy. With these areas covered, we move on to Just War with respect to aerial

warfare and discuss moral considerations for targeting. We will then present a historical

perspective on the effectiveness of previous aerial bombardment campaigns. Lastly, the paper

will