J. Value Inquiry 16:85-99 (1982) 0022-5363/82/0162-0085 $02.25. �9 1982 Martinus Ni jho f f Publishers, The Hague. Printed in the Netherlands.

Articles

M O R A L KINDS A N D N A T U R A L KINDS

GEORGE GRAHAM University o f Alabama - Birmingham

and

HUGH LaFOLLETTE East Tennessee State University

Talk of morally relevant similarities and differences is a central feature of morals and moral reasoning. It is at the heart of moral judgment and evaluation. If a person cannot see the moral difference between eating a carrot and eating his brother-in-law, we will not be able to get on a sufficient foothold with him even to disagree. Yet despite the notion's centrality in moral reasoning, it remains relatively unanalyzed. Moreover, some philosophers, impressed by the difficulty of identifying morally relevant similarities and differences, particularly in disputed cases, conclude that the notion cannot be satisfactorily analyzed. Since all persons and actions are similar in some respects and dissimilar in others, these philosophers contend, what anyone takes to be relevant qualities or similarities must be completely relative to his own particular interests or moral principles. There is no nonrelative way to identify or determine such similarities and differences.

We reject this philosophical pessimism. Furthermore, we think that the morally similar has strong affinities with a similarity-concept in philosophy of science and metaphysics which is very much in the air, the notion of natural kinds, of commonalities under scientific description. It is the business of this paper to exploit such affinities or analogies, thereby deepening our understanding of the morally similar, and providing insights into it which are not relative, at least not completely, to a person's own interests. We begin the paper by briefly describing the rationale for drawing these analogies. Then, we describe the characteristics the notion shares with the concept of natural kinds. Next, we try to show, using one example of a dispute over racial discrimination, that some moral controversies can be clarified and perhaps resolved, if certain affinities between the notion of morally relevant similarities and the concept of natural kinds are allowed to enter into the debate. Finally by briefly discussing the killing/letting-die distinction, we indicate the usefulness and range of application of these cited affinities. First some preliminaries.

86

In drawing the following analogies we shall not be suggesting that things morally similar and natural kinds are completely overlapping. To some extent, we simply want to isolate general features of taxonomic systems. Talk of morally relevant similarities and differences is essentially talk about a system of moral classification; analysis of virtually any taxonomic system would illustrate such talk. Natural kinds is one taxonomic model; others may have served this general purpose equally well.

There are, nonetheless, distinct benefits of using natural kinds as a model. For one thing, the categories of things morally similar and natural kinds do overlap in some cases, such that modification of natural kinds may alter the boundaries of things morally similar. Consider the history of the treatment of blacks in this country. During the time that blacks were enslaved, they were not considered "real human beings". Or to use the language of kinds, when blacks were excluded from the moral kind "individuals with rights", they were also excluded from the natural kind "human being". People of the day claimed that blacks were mere animals and thus had no rights. However, as everyday and scientific evidence amassed to demonstrate that blacks w e r e in the natural kind "human being", then it was not long until many people began to claim that blacks could not properly be excluded from the moral kind "individuals with rights". The boundaries of this moral kind followed the boundaries of natural kinds. Similar processes appear to have also brought about changes in the received views about women and, to some degree, children and nonhuman animals.

For another, by drawing the analogies with natural kinds we are able to focus on certain methodological features not present in other taxonomic systems. For instance, much scientific theory building consists of taking apart and putting together, often conjointly; that is, on the one hand, of dividing wholes into parts, analyzing complexes into component features, and drawing distinctions; while, on the other hand, of composing wholes out of parts, combining features into complexes, and making connections.1 For example, a person who offers human being as a natural kind should not only draw appropriate distinctions between those creatures who are human and those which are not; but also show how these distinctions cohere with the demands of a general theory of entities with biologies - of which humans are but one kind.

Similar processes are at work in moral theorizing. Any moral agent's attempt to defend his moral claims is arbitrary so long as he is permitted to select according to his own interests from among varying criteria of relevant similarities; thus conflicting interests may make for irreconcilable judgments and incompatible claims. To overcome this arbitrariness, we

87

must require that advanced claims be justified in a methodologically sound manner. The reasons given for the claim must ultimately draw the right moral distinctions and make the proper moral connections. For example, a person who advocates the use of the death penalty should not only draw reasonable distinctions between those crimes deserving death and those which do not; but also show how these distinctions are compatible with the demands of a general theory of retributive justice - the death penalty is but one kind of retribution.

So were we to widen our scope by drawing analogies between moral kinds and the general concept of a taxonomy, we would neglect certain utilities of comparison with natural kinds. We would neglect features which link the two notions historically and methodologically.

Let us now move on to the analogies.

II

There are perhaps several different ways of trying to elucidate the notion of a natural kind. We assume some central considerations ought to come from the work of Hilary Putnam on natural kinds. 2 So our analogies between moral kinds and natural kinds are drawn in part from Putnam's analysis. We shall begin by sketching certain features of Putnam's analysis from which we will draw the analogies.

As is known, Putnam has criticized what he calls the traditional theory of predicate meaning. According to the traditional theory, the meaning of a predicate or concept is provided by a list of properties which are necessary and jointly sufficient for the application of the predicate or concept. Thus, to use a favorite example of Putnam's , the meaning of the predicate " l e m o n " is given by specifying tartness, yellowness, and so on. However, as Putnam points out, the problem with this account is that not all lemons are normal lemons - however much that definition may capture normal lemons. This is because " l e m o n " is a natural kind term, and natural kinds have abnormal members. Therefore the definition must be modified at least to say that a lemon is a member of the natural kind whose normal members are yellow, tart, and so on. But three things must be noted about this modified definition. First, there are no conceptual or analytic truths to the effect that the statement "every lemon is P " is true (where " P " is a nontrivial predicate). Second, the modified definition does not determine the extension of the word " l e m o n " . Given the original unmodified definition, a person should determine whether something is a lemon by examining its properties, and seeing if they meet the definition. But this cannot be done even with the modified definition, because whether something is a member of a particular natural kind (like lemon) depends on

88

what we take to be the best scientific theory about lemons, and not on a definition. In fact, and this is the third point, Putnam argues that even the modified definition may misrepresent the characteristics or features of the natural kind - for we may be mistaken about which members of the natural kind are normal members and our understanding of the relevant features of the natural kind may change with developments in scientific theory. 3

As an alternative, Putnam argues that we should represent the features of natural kinds not by "something as simple as an analytic definit ion", but rather by describing a stereotype (or paradigm) of a lemon based on a simplification of our best current theory of lemons. These features Putnam calls "core facts"; identifying these core facts is always necessary and generally sufficient for approximating the conditions for the natural kind predicate's normal use. Note, though, that even if all normal members of the natural kind always " h a v e " these core facts, one cannot assume that just because something is of a certain natural kind it invariably has a specified property. Hence, being a member of a natural kind cannot serve as an explanation of its having certain features. For example, lemons, qua lemons, are not tart. They are not tart because they are lemons. Rather they are tart because of their acidic base (which, as it turns out, is part of the best scientific theory which justifies their classification as lemons).

Now under the guidance of some of Putnam's notions, we shall draw certain analogies between natural kind predicates, or predicates which identify natural kinds, and moral kind predicates, or predicates which identify things morally relevantly similar, and thereby help clarify the notion of morally relevant similarities and differences.

Following the order of the previous discussion, let us initially assume that the meaning of a moral predicate or concept is given by an analytic definition, that is, by the determination of various properties that are necessary and jointly sufficient for the application of the predicate or concept. Thus, to use an example more or less at random, the meaning of the predicate "murde r " might be given as: killing another who is not

attacking you or anyone, and who you can reasonably assume has not and

will not seriously harm you or anyone. In other words, assume that certain actions qualify as murders just in case they have those features. However, the problem with this account is that not all murders are normal murders - assuming that this specification defines normal murders. This is because " m u r d e r " is a moral kind predicate, and moral kinds, just like natural kinds, have abnormal members, Therefore, the definition must be modified at least to say that murder is a member of the moral kind whose normal members are: killing others who are not attacking you or anyone, and who you can reasonably assume have not and will nor seriously harm you or anyone. But, to extend the analogy with Putnam, three things must

89

be noted about this modified definition of " m u r d e r " . First, there are no

analytic truths to the effect that the statement "every murder is P " is true

(where "P" is a nontrivial predicate). Second, the modified definition does not exhaustively determine the word 's extension. Under the original definition, a person should decide whether something is a murder by examining its properties, and seeing whether they meet the definition. However, this cannot always be done, even with the modified definition, for whether something is a member of a particular moral kind (like murder) rests on what we take to be the best moral theory about murders, and not on a definition. (Can we decide whether active euthanasia is murder just by consulting our definition?) Furthermore, even the modified

definition may be unacceptable, since we may be mistaken about which members of the moral kind are normal members, and our understanding of the relevant characteristics of the moral kind may change with developments in moral theory. (Suppose we "discovered" that all redheads who were " m u r d e r e d " were reborn as crown princes?)

Consequently we should say that features of moral kinds should not be represented by something as simple as an analytic definition, or even as a modified definition, but instead by describing a stereotype or paradigm of a murder based on a simplification of our best moral theory of murders. We could call such features "core facts" so that identifying these core facts is always necessary and generally sufficient for approximating the conditions for the moral kind predicate 's normal use. In the case of the moral kind predicate " m u r d e r " , the core facts would be, say, killing another who is not attacking you or anyone, and who you can reasonably asssume has not or will not seriously harm you or anyone (or simply - killing another who is innocent).

However, as we have already pointed out, these core facts only specify the normal members of our natural (or moral) kinds. Thus, even though certain substances fall under a certain natural kind predicate in most cases (for instance, things with tart tastes and yellow peels are usually lemons), in some cases they do not (for example, something can be an orange and yet be tart and yellow). Analogously, an action may fall under a certain moral kind predicate in most cases, but not all cases, (for example, in most cases killing someone innocent of harm is considered murder though in other cases such killings - say killing an "innocent shield" - are presumably not considered murder). How is the moral philosopher to determine which kind concept applies in such abnormal cases - in cases that do not fit the paradigm? To answer this question, we must explicate the notion of revelance by drawing still further analogies between moral kinds and natural kinds. 4

90

I I I

Pu tnam argues that in the use of a natural kind term - in addition to being pegged to a paradigm - there is also the presumption that what makes things belong to the kind is that things of the kind share a nature: in the case of " l e m o n " , having a certain acidic base; in the case of " g o l d " , having atomic number 79; in the case of " w a t e r " , being H20. He puts the point as follows:

A natural kind term ... is a term that plays a special kind of role. If I describe something as a lemon... I indicate that it is likely to have certain characteristics... (I) also indicate that the presence of these characteristics, if they are present, is likely to be accounted for by some "essential nature" which the thing shares with other members of the natural kind. 5

What Pu tnam is saying is this: that natural kind terms - for example, " l e m o n " , " g o l d " , or " w a t e r " - refer to things which share some general trait; their nature is general. It is shared by all members of the kind. He is also saying this: that natural kind terms play a role, they have a point; and the point is to identify things that are likely to have certain characteristics. And further this requires that a reason or justification be given for classifying things as members of the kind. In fact, the justification is the

presence of the nature. Thus i f the point of talking of something as a lemon is to indicate that it has a tart taste, and we wonder whether we should classify something as a lemon, the answer is affirmative if, perhaps, it has a certain acidic base, but negative if it does not. Or i f the point of saying something is water is to indicate that it evaporates when heated, and we wonder whether something really is water, the answer is aff irmative if, perhaps, it has a certain arrangement of its molecules, but negative if it does not. 6

The acidic base of lemons, and the molecular arrangement of water are, respectively, what may be called their nature. They are general features, shared by all members of the kind. And their presence justifies us in calling

something " l e m o n " or " w a t e r " . I f all this is right, we can now state how kind concepts apply in abnormal

cases - cases which do not fit the paradigm. On the one hand, differences between things or events are not relevant for partitioning into distinct natural kinds if they express specific (nongeneral) differences and cannot support justifications for applying the kind terms in question. On the other hand, similarities between things or events are relevant for grouping into the same natural kind if they are general and can support justifications for applying the kind term in question. Thus, two things may both be lemons, even though one and only one was picked by Tug McGraw. This is because being picked by Tug McGraw is merely a specific (nongeneral) difference between them. It is not relevant for partitioning the items in question into

91

distinct natural kinds. Thus, again, two things may both be lemons, even though (abnormally) they have neither a yellow peel nor a tart taste. This could be because they have the lemon acidic base ,or the lemon nature. Or again, something can be an orange and yet have certain features normally associated with lemons (like being tart and yellow). This could be because it does not have the lemon acidic base, or the lemon nature.

Two parallel points can be made about moral kinds, and consequently about morally relevant similarities and differences. First, nongeneral differences (name, location, etc.) are not relevant for identifying moral kinds (and hence are not relevant in applying moral kind predicates). Of course, in certain cases it may seem as if a name - or at least, one's identity - can make a difference, though this is only because that so-named individual has certain general properties. For instance, being Anwar Sadat (and not George Carlin or Studs Terkel) is morally relevant if Menachim Begin made a specific promise only to Sadat: Sadat has a right against Begin, a right which no one else has. However, this is only because one is basing such a right claim on a general moral principle: namely: "Anyone X who promises Y that he (X) will do A, thereby takes on a duty to Y that he (X) do A, and Y thereby has a right against X that he do A . " In other words, the relevant difference between Sadat and George Carlin or Studs Terkel is that Begin (X) has made a promise to Sadat (Y) and not to George Carlin or Studs Terkel (Z). And this general moral principle makes no essential reference to names or locations: if it did make such a reference, then the principle would be unacceptable. Moral kinds, like natural kinds, must be based on general characteristics or features of the act or person.

We have said that no difference is morally relevant unless it is general. However, this is consistent with the claim that a difference can be general without being morally relevant. For example, suppose Purely White, a wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, claims "Whites, but not Blacks, have a right to a free (public) education." Surely non racists would find this principle unacceptable, for it partitions the kind, say, "right-to-a-free education- possessing-individuals" solely in terms of race, irrespective of interests and the capacity to be educated. Nevertheless, it appears to be a general principle. So what could be wrong with Purely's claim? Is there some other and related mark of moral relevance which can be used to attack Purely White? We think so. And this brings us to the second point mentioned above.

Moral kind terms play a role. There is a point behind them. And this requires that a reason or justification be given for classifying actions or persons as members of the kind. We may call this reason their "na ture" . It is what best justifies the application of the moral kind term. To take the example at hand, apparently the role played by talk of certain individuals having a right to a free education is to indicate that they have certain

92

interests and capacities which ought to be protected and promoted. ' These are the interests and capacities necessary to benefit from an education. If so, and we wonder whether someone really has a right to a free education, the answer is affirmative if the person really has those interests and capacities, but negative if he does not. i f someone has the right to a free education "na tu re" , he has the right; otherwise not. To develop the point, ponder Purely.

Suppose the issue is not whether blacks have a right to a free education if whites do, but whether squirrels have a right to a free education if whites (white humans) do. Here it is not hard to think of a plausible reason why squirrels should not be classified as "right-to-a-free-education-possessing- individuals" if whites are so classified. The reason or rationale for acknowledging in a white, but not in a squirrel, a right to a free education is that whites, but not squirrels, have interests and capacities which would be protected and promoted by a right to a free education. Squirrels do not have the learning capacities necessary to benefit from an education. So, too, whites, but not squirrels, would be harmed, intellectually and emotionally, if they were deprived of an education. And this difference in interests and capacities reasonably distinguishes between any purported right to a free education which whites may have, but squirrels would not have.8

Back to Purely's whites. If the point in saying someone has a right to a free education is to say he has certain interests or capacities which ought to be protected and promoted, then the only relevant reason for making exceptions to the classification would be the possession of those interests and capacities (what other reason could one have for claiming or desiring this right?). More specifically, if the reason for acknowledging that whites should be classified as having the right is that whites have the interests and capacities, then the only relevant reason for excepting squirrels is that squirrels do not have those interests and capacities. But, blacks have the very same interests and capacities required to benefit from an education. And they would suffer, as whites would, if they were deprived of an education. Consequently, if we assume that whites have a right to a free education (that it would be wrong to deny a normal, intellectually able white a public eduction) for this reason, then this right should also be granted to blacks.

Of course, Purely may say he doesn't have to justify the exclusion of blacks. "Black and whites just are different, and I don ' t have to offer a reason for the difference in classification,!' But intuitively it seems he must. In fact, it seems apparent that even he would want to justify the difference in moral classification in other cases, such as the squirrel case. And the practice with natural kinds reinforces this intuition. Recall, to apply a natural kind term is to presume that a reason can be given to the

93

point of using the term for applying the term. So, to apply a moral kind term would seem to presume that a reason can be given to the point of using the term for applying the term. Purely may claim h6 doesn't have to give a

reason, but he must if he is to engage in rational discussion.

IV

No doubt Purely might say that color and interests and capacities are morally relevant; so, on this account, only creatures who are both white and have the interests and capacities to benefit from an education are the right-bearers. But this wouldn' t do either - for remember, the requirement of generality. This requirement supplements the justification requirement in the following way: The reason or rationale for classifying something in a natural kind must be the most general reason consistent with the point of the classification. So, if the point of saying X is a lemon is to say X tastes tart, then the application of the word " l emo n " to X is not justified by saying X was picked by Tug McGraw and has a certain acidic base. Rather, the basis of that taste, purely and simply, its acidic base, is the only relevant reason for making the classification. Or, if the point of saying Y is water is to express that it evaporates, this will not be explained by saying Y is transparent and has a certain molecular structure. Instead, the basis of its disposition to evaporate, purely and simply, its molecular structure, is the only relevant reason for calling Y "wa te r " . It provides a sufficient explanation of the water's disposition.

So, too, how do we reach such natural kind conclusions? Simple. We test. We demonstrate that lemons picked by Tug McGraw are just as tart as those picked by Anita Bryant. Or we demonstrate that tinted water evaporates just as easily as totally transparent water. Likewise with this moral kind: if the point of saying white individuals have a right to a free education is to say they have certain interests and capacities which ought to be protected and promoted (and what else could the point plausibly be?), the possession of those interests and capacities is the only relevant reason for so classifying them. This is the most general reason consistent with the point of the classification. We can demonstrate that blacks will benefit from a free public education just as much as whites. Hence, having a certain (white) color and interests and capacities is not morally relevant. Instead, the possession of those interests and capacities, purely and simply, is the only relevant reason for making the classification.

94

V

Thus far in the paper we have attempted to describe five different though related analogies between moral kinds and natural kinds. The upshot of all this for moral kinds is: (1) There are no conditions which are necessary and jointly sufficient for membership in a moral kind (or, equivalently, for persons or actions being morally relevantly similar to or different from other persons or actions). Or, as we have also put the point, there are no nontrivial analytic truths about moral kinds. For (2) the notion of a moral kind cannot be specified by anything so simple as a definition, but (3) must be drawn from paradigms of the kind and from the best available moral theory of the kind. On the other hand, independently of any such theory, a moral kind term or concept (4) should pick out general features of the persons or actions in question, and (5) carries the presumption that a reason or justification can be given for applying the term, consistent with the point behind using the term.

We take it that none of these features of moral kinds are obvious to the point of self-certification. But we think they resonate on reflection as soon as one makes the move of taking the possible existence of affinities between natural and moral kinds at all seriously. Moreover, our claim that moral and natural kinds are analogous is given some inductive support by the successful use of these cited affinities in the previous discussion of the right to a free education. Now we would like to reinforce this claim, and better demonstrate the utility of our explication, by examining a current controversy in moral theory.

Consider the question of whether there is a morally relevant difference between killing and letting die. This question is of interest in a variety of moral issues, such as whether we have an obligation to give to famine relief, and whether there is a morally relevant difference between active and passive euthanasia. 9 By concentrating upon it, we hope again to show the affinities in question, and the significant moral payoffs which attach to taking them seriously. We, of course, do not claim that the application of these affinities will completely solve questions about this distinction; nonetheless, we do think it at least helps focus discussion on the relevant

issues. Some philosophers have argued that there is a morally relevant

difference between killing and letting die, in particular that letting people die is not as bad as killing them. In fact, some have argued that this difference is "analyt ic"; that the bare fact that an act is a killing i s sufficient to make it worse than an act of letting someone die. But is it a nontrivial analytic truth that killing is worse than letting die?

Remember, the first affinity between natural and moral kinds is that there are no nontrivial analytic truths about membership in either kind.

95

That is, with respect to moral kinds, there are no conditions which are necessary and jointly sufficient for persons or actions being morally relevantly similar to or different from other persons or actions. If so, then the conclusion we are invited to draw is that - contrary to what some philosophers have argued - the bare fact that an act is an act of killing, while another act is an act (or inaction) "mere ly" of letting die, is not a morally good reason in support of the claim that the former is worse than, and morally different from, the latter.

Of course, the argument for this conclusion is based on an assumption which is supported only by induction and analogy - namely, that natural and moral kinds are alike in there being no nontrivial analytic truths about them. Nevertheless, it is possible to support the conclusion independently of this assumption, and thereby reinforce the assumption's inductive base.

It has been suggested that the bare difference, whatever it is, between killing and letting die, does not suffice to support the judgment that killing is worse than letting die. This claim can be defended on two grounds which are independent of supposed affinities between natural and moral kinds. First, there seem to be instances of letting die which are morally worse than killing. For example, if a sick person who could easily be cured is sadistically allowed to die, while a terminally ill patient is killed, upon her request, as an act of mercy, we have a morally good reason for saying the former is worse than the latter. TM Second, no other possible bare or analytic difference between killing and letting die would seem to rationalize that killing is worse than letting die. For example, even if letting someone die were only a case of inaction, whereas killing someone is a case of action, why should any moral conclusion follow from that fact? We ought to act in some ways, and we ought to avoid acting in other ways, and we can be equally morally blameworthy for not doing things as for doing them. (Not caring for your sick daughter may involve only inaction - but what of it?)

Consequently, there appear to be independent considerations buttressing our claim that there are no analytic truths about killing and letting die which show that killing is morally relevantly different from letting die. By buttressing this claim, these considerations also lend inductive support to our thesis that there are strong affinities between moral and natural kinds. Still, even if morally relevant differences are nonanalytic, these considerations do not show that there are no other grounds for claiming that killing is morally relevantly different from letting die. So we need to see whether the other analogies can give us further direction. We think they can.

Though the second analogy does not give us any direction, the third analogy, which says that we should draw boundaries around moral kinds in terms of paradigms and best available moral theories of the kinds in question, may offer some guidance. For instance, if we had a good moral

96

theory and appropriate paradigms of both killing and letting die, we could determine whether killing is otherwise worse than letting die.

Consider first the issue of paradigms. Obviously many actual cases of killing are terrible (think, for instance, of all the murders reported in the New York Daily News). On the other hand, many actual cases of letting

die are also terrible (think, for instance, of all the people of Cambodia whose painful and terrible deaths could have been avoided if only those who were in a special position to save them would have saved them, and not let them die. 11 If we construct paradigms from these cases, a paradigm

killing seems to be no worse than a paradigm letting die. At least it is not obvious that it is worse. Consideration of these paradigms seems only to reinforce the intuition expressed earlier: the difference between killing and letting die does not show that killing is, as such, worse than letting die.

However, some philosophers have argued that the best moral theory says that killing is worse than letting die. For instance, on one such "bes t " theory: our "positive duty" to help people is weaker than our "negative duty" not to harm them. From this it is said to follow that our positive duty not to let people die is weaker than our negative duty not to kill them.

Any such moral theory is going to require defense of course, and so perhaps any final completely satisfactory answer to our question must await such a defense. On the other hand, this does not mean we have to remain meanwhile in limbo. The fourth and fifth analogies between natural and moral kinds can operate to supply some direction here even while we await the "final defense."

According to the fourth analogy, if killing is worse than letting die, this can only be because of some general difference between them. But so far we have been unable to pick out any such general difference. Many cases of letting die seem as bad as some cases of killing. Further, even if letting die were only a case of inaction, it would not follow that killing is worse than letting die. In fact, it may even be inaccurate to say that letting die is a case of inaction. This is because there is one very definite thing we do when we let someone die: we let them die. Granted that letting someone die is done differently than killing them (it is an action performed by way of not doing something else) - it may be an action nonetheless. 12 Finally, possible paradigms of each seem equally bad.

So, is killing worse than letting die? This brings us to the fifth and final affinity between natural and moral kinds. According to this, any way of classifying persons or actions as morally similar or different has the presumption that there is some justification or reason for the classification, and more especially (in terms also of the fourth analogy) that this justification or reason is the most general one consistent with the point behind the classification.

Now what is the point behind classifying something as a killing? It is

97

presumed that we are here concerned with moral issues, and in par t i cu la r with whether killing is worse than letting die. That would mean that the point behind classifying something as a killing is to object to it f rom the moral point of view. (On the other hand, if our purposes were medical or theological, such a classification might have some other point.)

In the present context, then, the point behind talking of something as a killing is to raise a moral objection against it; so the question raised by the fifth analogy is whether the most general reason we have for objecting to killing is stronger than the most general reason we have or could have for objecting to letting die. If it is, then killing is morally worse than, and so morally different from, letting die.

Now, suppose we wonder why we object to killing. There seem to be two sorts of reasons. One sort has to do with bad effects on persons other than the person killed. For instance, those left behind may grieve for loss of him, or his children who need him may be caused some hardship because, once dead, he can no longer provide for them. But this does not seem to be the most general reason why we object to killing. We cannot explain why killing is objectionable simply, or generally, in terms of bad effects on the survivors. Many of us will not be missed. Also, many of us do not have children. Instead, the most general reason why killing is objectionable has to do with another sort of reason. Something bad is done to the victim himself: he ends up dead. He loses a life he had before.13

But note, the same justification can be made for objecting to letting die. The most general reason why it is morally objectionable to let someone die, by (for instance) not acting to save him, is that he ends up dead. He loses a life he had before. Less general reasons again have to do with bad effects on those who survive.

These less general effects explain why certain acts of killing are worse than certain acts of letting die (and vice versa). (For example, when a killing not only deprives a person of his life, but has such other effects, whereas a letting die has no such other effects, we have good reason to say this killing is worse than that letting die.) But these less general effects cannot justify saying killing as such is worse than letting die. The exact same general justification for classifying killing as morally objectionable shows why letting die is morally objectionable. As such, killing seems morally relevantly similar to letting die.

Of course we may be confused about the most general reason for saying killing is objectionable. Or, perhaps the best moral theory is one which says our positive duty not to let people die is weaker than our negative duty not to kill them. All of which is to concede that the preceding discussion is not meant to prove that killing is not morally relevantly different than letting die. Instead, it is meant to show that certain affinities exist between moral and natural kinds, and that they should be taken seriously, for they can

98

help clarify and guide the resolution of moral disputes. For, by allowing such affinities to operate here, we have been able to isolate crucial questions which must be answered if we are to determine whether there is a morally relevant difference between killing and letting die.

VI

Our main aim in this paper has been to provide some analogies between the notion of things morally relevantly similar and natural kinds. Considerably more work needs to be done to detail these analogies. For one thing, a theory of natural kinds, indicating which predicates are natural kind predicates, must be filled out and defended against anti-natural-kind worries. (We take Putnam's work on natural kinds to be a beginning for this project. 14) And the relative merits of the analogies must be sorted out, and supplemented by other elements in moral theory. We hope at least to have done enough here to show that such analogies exist and will be useful ingredients in any account of the morally similar. 's

NOTES

1. See Paul Snyder, Toward One Science (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc., 1978), pp. 84ff.

2. See especially: "Is Semantics Possible?" and "Meaning and Reference," both in Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds, Stephen P. Schwartz (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977); and "Meaning of 'Meaning ' , " in Language, Mind and Knowledge, ed. Keith Gunderson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975).

3. However, if none of the things we now call " l emon" are included in the "scientific" class of lemons, it would be more accurate to say that the concept of lemon has changed.

4. The criteria we are about to discuss (generality and presumption of a justification) are closely interrelated; as will be suggested in Section IV.

5. "Is Semantics Possible?" p. 104. 6. We are not claiming here that we have provided the point of classifying lemons and

water; or even that there is one such point. We are only trying to say how one might determine how a specific object is classified once we know the point of the classification scheme; or the points of the scheme, if the scheme has more than one point. The scientist will provide an account of the point(s) or purpose(s) of the scheme.

7. Of course, whether this is the point of such talk is determined, in large measure, by the best available theory of rights and a right to an education.

8. Notice that whites, qua whites, are not right-to-a-free-education-possessing-individuals. They have this right not because they are white, but because they have certain interests, etc. Thus whites who do not have the interests will not have this right. Likewise, squirrels do not fail to have this right just because they are squirrels. Rather they do not have the right because they do not have the requisite interests, and hence could not benefit from the right. Thus if a squirrel could so benefit, then, we would contend, there would be no reason to deny him the right.

99

9. For an indication o f these interests, see P. Singer's, M. Slote's, and O. O'Neil l 's essays in

World Hunger and Moral Obligation, ed. William Aiken and Hugh LaFollette

(Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1977); and James Rachels, "Act ive and Passive Eu thanas ia , " New England Journal o f Medicine 292 (9 January 1975): 78-80.

10. On this point, see Rachels, "Active and Passive Eu thanas ia . "

11. It should be mentioned that not every act o f not saving someone is an act o f letting them die. If you and a friend are watching a child drown, and you do not save the child, you

do not let the child die, if your friend saves him instead. On the other hand, if you know

that no one else can or will save the child, but that you can, and you do not save the

child, you let him die. Just such a.position is what we mean when we speak of being in a

"specia l" position to save the Cambodians . 12. For more on the idea that certain omissions are actions, see (by one of the present

authors) "Doing Something Intentionally and Moral Responsibil i ty," for thcoming in

Canadian Journal o f Philosophy. 13. This account of the badness of death is from Thomas Nagel, " D e a t h , " Nous 4, no. 1

(1970): 73-80. Note that this is only the most general reason we have for objecting to

killing: as a matter of fact, more killings are bad because of their effects on victims than

because o f their effects on those who survive. This is consistent with the fact (which we

take to be a fact) that some killings are not bad for the victims (as when the life of a

victim is very bad - and might make suicide or euthanasia morally acceptable). It is also

consistent with the fact (which we take to be a fact) that some killings may be bad only

for those who survive. 14. Note again, we have simply used certain of P u t nam ' s notions as starting points for

analysis. We do not mean by this to be committed to every point in his account.

15. Several persons read and commented upon earlier drafts of this paper. Special thanks to

James Rachels and Richard Rorty.