models of mind and mental illness in ancient greece: i. the homeric model of mind

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MODELS OF MIND AND MENTAL ILLNESS IN ANCIENT GREECE: I. THE HOMERIC MODEL OF MIND BENNETT SIMON AND HERBERT WEINER’ Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Yeshiva University The present paper is the first of a series of three which deals with theories of mental activity and of mental illness that evolved in ancient Greece. The frame- work of these studies leads us to delineate three principal models of mind and of mental illness, models that arose from the time of Homer to the time of Aristotle (700-300 B. C.) These are: (1) The Homeric (or poetic) (2) The Platonic (or philosophical) (3) The Hippocratic (or medical) Each of these models is defined by its own outlook on normal mental function as well as on the nature, causes and treatment of abnormal functioning. The importance of these models for the history of psychiatry and psychology resides mainly in the fact that the problems and questions that they raised have endured as central to subsequent theories about the working of the human mind.2 Though the fuller explication and justification for this particular division of Greek thought on mental function will be elaborated in later papers, a brief state- ment is here in order. This particular schema facilitates an examination and dis- section of two related issues-issues which the authors feel have been major concerns for theories in psychology and psychiatry, as well as in certain of the social sciences. The first centers around the notion of a structure of mind-is there indeed a structure? What is its nature and what is its organization? Is the “substance” of mind unique, or is mind composed of elements common to the “outside” world? Is the structure of mind “analogous” to, or isomorphic with other structures? Do defects in the structure lead to abnormal mental functioning? The second issue has to do with the relative importance for mental life of forces arising from within and of those arising from without the person. How shall these forces be characterized? Is the person able to control and regulate these ‘The work was sup orted in part b Public Health Service Grant #5TI-NH-6418, N.I.H. (B.S.) and a Research &weer Program iward (5-K3-MH-18448) from the National Institute of Mental Health (H.W.). An outline of the material. was originall presented b one of us (B.S.) in a seminar on Early Greek Thought at Yale University, conductediby Prof. E. 1. Havelock, Sterling Professor of Classics. We thank himfor providing much of the original stimulus for the work as well as such articular ideas as are cited in the notes. Dm. Norman Reider and Morton Reiser (Albert Einstein? and Dr. Joseph Russo (Yale) read drafts in various stages and offered numerous valuable corrections and suggestions. Current address: Division of Psychiatry, Montefiore Hospital, Bronx, N. Y. 10467. is enormous. Some of the more noteworthy works in this area are: Aeare, J. I. Greek Theories of g i e n t u r y Cognition from AlcnuLeon to Aristotle, 1906; Brett, G. S. Psychology, Ancient and Modern, 1928; Burnet, J. Early Greek Phi& osophy (4th ed.) 1958; Zilboorg, G., and Henry, G. N. A Histoy oj Medical Psychology, N. Y., 1941. Same recent works of great value (which include more extensive bibliographies) are: Kantor, J. R. The Scientific Evolution oj Psychology, Vol. I, Chicago, 1963; Leibbrand, W., and Wettley, A. Der Wahnsinn, Freiburg, Miitichen, 1961; Watson, R. I. The Great Psychologists: From Aristotle to Freud, Philadelphia, 1963. Wbviously the literature on Greek thought about “psycholo 303

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Page 1: Models of mind and mental illness in ancient Greece: I. The Homeric model of mind

MODELS OF MIND AND MENTAL ILLNESS I N ANCIENT GREECE:

I. THE HOMERIC MODEL OF MIND BENNETT SIMON AND HERBERT WEINER’

Albert Einstein College of Medicine, Yeshiva University

The present paper is the first of a series of three which deals with theories of mental activity and of mental illness that evolved in ancient Greece. The frame- work of these studies leads us to delineate three principal models of mind and of mental illness, models that arose from the time of Homer to the time of Aristotle (700-300 B. C.) These are:

(1) The Homeric (or poetic) (2) The Platonic (or philosophical) (3) The Hippocratic (or medical)

Each of these models is defined by its own outlook on normal mental function as well as on the nature, causes and treatment of abnormal functioning.

The importance of these models for the history of psychiatry and psychology resides mainly in the fact that the problems and questions that they raised have endured as central to subsequent theories about the working of the human mind.2

Though the fuller explication and justification for this particular division of Greek thought on mental function will be elaborated in later papers, a brief state- ment is here in order. This particular schema facilitates an examination and dis- section of two related issues-issues which the authors feel have been major concerns for theories in psychology and psychiatry, as well as in certain of the social sciences.

The first centers around the notion of a structure of mind-is there indeed a structure? What is its nature and what is its organization? Is the “substance” of mind unique, or is mind composed of elements common to the “outside” world? Is the structure of mind “analogous” to, or isomorphic with other structures? Do defects in the structure lead to abnormal mental functioning?

The second issue has to do with the relative importance for mental life of forces arising from within and of those arising from without the person. How shall these forces be characterized? Is the person able to control and regulate these

‘The work was sup orted in part b Public Health Service Grant #5TI-NH-6418, N.I.H. (B.S.) and a Research &weer Program iward (5-K3-MH-18448) from the National Institute of Mental Health (H.W.). An outline of the material. was originall presented b one of us (B.S.) in a seminar on Early Greek Thought at Yale University, conductediby Prof. E. 1. Havelock, Sterling Professor of Classics. We thank himfor providing much of the original stimulus for the work as well as such articular ideas as are cited in the notes. Dm. Norman Reider and Morton Reiser (Albert Einstein? and Dr. Joseph Russo (Yale) read drafts in various stages and offered numerous valuable corrections and suggestions. Current address: Division of Psychiatry, Montefiore Hospital, Bronx, N. Y. 10467.

is enormous. Some of the more noteworthy works in this area are: Aeare, J. I. Greek Theories of g i e n t u r y Cognition from AlcnuLeon to Aristotle, 1906; Brett, G. S. Psychology, Ancient and Modern, 1928; Burnet, J. Early Greek Phi& osophy (4th ed.) 1958; Zilboorg, G., and Henry, G. N. A Histoy oj Medical Psychology, N. Y., 1941. Same recent works of great value (which include more extensive bibliographies) are: Kantor, J. R. The Scientific Evolution oj Psychology, Vol. I, Chicago, 1963; Leibbrand, W., and Wettley, A. Der Wahnsinn, Freiburg, Miitichen, 1961; Watson, R. I. The Great Psychologists: From Aristotle to Freud, Philadelphia, 1963.

Wbviously the literature on Greek thought about “psycholo

303

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304 BENNETT SIMON AND HERBERT WEINER

forces or is he essentially their passive agent? Are external and internal forces in conflict, or are both necessary for the functioning of mind? Are processes in the mind similar to, or different from processes in the outside world? How does the mental structure mediate between and integrate the two sets of influences? Is human mental life the product of “nature” or of “nurture”? How are these influences related to disturbances of mental life?3

As shall be seen, the Homeric model is the exemplar of a view that has no clear notion of mental structure and that holds to the primacy of forces from the outside. The philosophical model stands at the other extreme, emphasizing mental structure and the importance of activity arising from within. The medical model is con- ceptually intermediate, and has its own notions both about the nature of the struc- ture and the nature of the internal and external forces.

These studies shall also utilize the framework of the three models to argue that the various viewpoints proposed as to the nature of mind and mental disturbance arose in the context of the activity, or craft, of those who articulated them-namely, the poet, the philosopher, and the physician, respectively. I n other words, it is felt that one must look to the actual practices in order to understand fully the signifi- cance of a particular theoretical viewpoint.

The term “model” is used here to designate the manner in which a particular thinker (or group of thinkers) described and conceptualized mental phenomena, including the assumptions implicit in the descriptions. From time to time, in Greek, as in modern thought, certain specific analogies of mind were proposed-(e.g., the soul is like a city, the mind is like a computer, etc.). Such analogies, in effect, similes, are of great significance, but they constitute only part of what is meant by a “model of mind.”

These considerations indicate something of the larger framework and back- ground of the present paper, which focuses primarily on the Homeric model of mind

*Recent theoretical discussions in psychoanal sis and related disciplines have raised anew these questions. Following are four illustrations of the i&rm in which these problems are being treated.

(1) In psychoanalytic theory-Cf. David Rapaport’s discussions of the “nutonomy of the ego.” He argues that a comprehensive theory of mental function must account for both the relative in- dependence of mind, and the constant interdependence of mind, with the body and with the social world. Certain mental functions (“ego functions”) maintain remarkable stability and autonomy both from internal stimuli (instinctual drives) and from the influences of the social world, or outer world. He argues that some notion of “structure” or “structures” must be invoked in order to explain such relative stnbility. Conversely, he puts forth a number of considerations indicating that even the “autonomous functions,” though quite stable, still require “nutriment” for their proper operations, and that the ‘hutriment” is contributed both py internal and external stimuli. Cf. Rapaport, D. “The Autonomy of the E 0, Bull. Menn. Clinic, 16:4, 1951 and “The Theory of Ego Autonomy: A Generalization,” Bull. d e n n . Clinic, 33:13, 1958

(2). In child development a central issue is the understanding of the complex inter-relations among innate influences, environmental influences, and the changing organization of the structure of the child’s mind. Cf. Benjamin, J. “The Innate and the Experiential in Child Development” in Lectures in Ezperimental Psychiatry, Brosin, H., editor, Pittsburgh, Univ. of Pittsburgh Prew, 1961, pp. 19-43.

(3) In the area of psychopathology, the possible relationship between forms of athological thinlung (as in schizophrenia) and the familial environmental of the patient is now und% intensive stud In general, in these studies, one finds less concern with the question of structure. Cf. & p n e L. and Singer, M. “Thought Disorder and Family Relations of Schizophrenics,” A.M.A. Arch. Gen. Psychi+ry, 9: 191-206, 1963 and 18:187-211, 1964.

(4) In the social sciences, a t large, the question of the relationship between the social system and the rmnd of the individual is a crucial one. How the social world is “internalized” or “re resented” in the mind of the individual, nnd how the thinking of the individual relates to the thingng of the group are perennial topics of importance. For some excellent discussion and a selection of writings from various authors see: Parsons, T., Shils, E. et all Theories of Society, Vol. 11, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1961.

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and mental illness. The discussion of this model will be organized in the following way: I. The sources; 11. Descriptions of ordinary mental function; 111. Description of unusual mental functioning, of mental distress and the relief of mental distress; IV. A formulation for explaining the Homeric model of mind; and V. Conclusions.

(I) The S o u ~ c e s : ~ The Homeric epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, are the earliest works of Greek

literature that have survived. The consensus of classical scholarship is that they were both composed sometime about the end of the eighth century B. C. It is un- clear if both are the work of the same person. Current opinion leans towards the idea that they were oral epics but were written down sometime soon after their composition. (That the Iliad and the Odyssey are oral epics, and not literary epics is very much related to the thesis of this paper, and shall be discussed below.)

They are first and foremost tales of action and adventure. It would seem, then, that they are a very unlikely place to look for a “model” of mind. There is certainly nothing resembling a “theory” about mind (or, in fact, a (‘theory” about anything) in Homer. But there are a number of reasons for examining the descriptions of, and the implicit assumptions about, mental activity that constitute the “model.”

First, the poems have a great deal of material in them about mental activity. The Odyssey, in particular, has a large number of situations in which there are descriptions of various kinds of psychological functions-thinking, remembering, planning and the like. Though they are stories of action, their author is very much concerned with portraying the “psychology” of his heroes.

Second, the Iliad and Odyssey are the earliest extant literary materials from Greece, (It is quite possible that they were the first material to be written down.) As such, they constitute the major source of information available about Greek thought before the seventh century B. C.

Finally, the Iliad and the Odyssey were of immense importance to the Greeks themselves. These epics have been considered as the “Bible” for classical civiliza- tion, especially in respect to their influences in child-rearing and education. Children were early told these tales, and schoolboys memorized the verses; the heroes of the epics were models for Greek youths to emulate. Even Plato, who said he would not allow Homer into his Republic, revered him as “he who has educated all of Greece.” To Aristotle he was “divine.”6

For Greek thought in general Homer always had to be taken into account. “As Homer says’) was a refrain down to the end of antiquity. What “Homer says” could be used as an illustration or example; it might be approved or might be refuted, but it could not be ignored.

‘The literature on Homer is immense. Perhaps one of the best single reference works is: A Companion to Homer, by Wace, A. J.. B. and Subbings, F. H., London, 1962. It contains a series of articles on various aspects of Homenc scholarshi and supplies abundant bibliography.

6These statements about the significance of komer are based primaril on the work of Jaeger, W. Paideia: The Ideals of CTeek Culture, New York, 1944, and Marrou, H. E A Hisloty of Education in Antiquity, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1956. A recent essay b Miiller, H. J. “Troy: The Bible of Greece” is an excellent summary of some of this material (in d m e r : The Iliad, trans. by Chase, A. H. and Perr , W. G., Jr., Bantam Books, New York, 1960). In Preface to Plato, b Havelock, E. H. (Cambridge, &Nard Univ. Press, 1962), there is an elaboratipn in the depth of t l e importance for Plato of the Homeric epics. Cf. Plato, Republzc X, 606, E; Anstotle, Poetice, l459a, 30ff. Note too, Rembrandt’s painting “Aristotle Contemplatlng the Bust of Homer.” For a bnef survey of Homer’s influence in the Middle Ages and Renaissance cf. Coulter, C. C. “A Song for Men in Time to Come,” Amer. J. Archaeology, 64: 177-184, 1950.

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(11) (1) There is no concept of a psychic structure, and no concept of psychic func- tions. Thus, one finds terms that apparently designate the instruments or “organs” of mental life--nous (“mind”) , phrenes (“wits”) , “heart.” However, there is no attempt made to describe the nature and organization of such “organs.” Nor is there any notion of a relationship among the different organs, such as an hier- archical organization.’

As for functions, there is certainly no term “function” (as there is no term “structure”). The point is that Homeric Greek does not classify mental acts in contemporary categories such as perception, cognition, learning, etc. Rather, it is rich in terms for describing what might be called “part-functions” such as: “recog- nizing,” “reminiscing,” “exhorting,” i.e., particular, concrete, aspects of mental functioning. There is no indication of any attempt to relate these part-functions to one another.

Further examination reveals lack of clear distinction between “structure” and “function.” This is seen in the fact that the same word may designate both the “or- gan’, and the end result of the organ’s function. Thus nous is the organ that ‘‘sees ahead and plans” but the same word can mean the plan itself. Thumos can be the locus of certain strong impulses, but it can also designate the impulse itself. It is ap- parent, then, that the nous does not simply mean “mind.” (2) What we consider as inner mental states or functions are preferentially repre- sented in terms of their concrete, observable, behavioral aspects. The vocabulary of mental functioning is exceedingly concrete. Thus, there is little use of a verb meaning “to see.” Rather, the verbs describe particular concrete aspects of seeing, such as “to stare,” “to pick out from a crowd,” “to glare at” and the like.* Second, Homer is generally much more interested in portraying details about how a character appears, while engaged in a particular mental process, than in the details of the process iteslf. Thus, the poet does not elaborate the indecision of Penelope but rather Penelope as indecisive-tossing and turning, and unable to sleep (Od. 4: 787ff).9

Thus, Homeric discourse emphasizes everything that will enhance a pictorial,

The Descriptions of Ordinary Mental activity:6

‘The two major sources that deal specifically with “Homeric Psychology’) and upon which this essay draws are the justly famous works by E. R. Dodds, and by B. Snell (both of these are readily available). Dodds, E. R. The Greeks and the Irrational, Berkeley, 1956 (Chpt. I and 11). Snell, B. The Discovery of the Mind, Cambridge, 1953 (Chpt. I). Other important material is found in: Bohme, J . Die Seek und das Ich im Homerisehen Epos, Leipzig, 1929. Fraenkel, H. Wege und Formen Fruhgriech- ischen Denkens, (2nd Ed.), Munich, 1960. Fritz, K. Von “NOOX and NOEIN in the Homeric Poems,” Classical Philology, 40: 223-242, 1945; Part 11, Classical Philology, 41: 12-34, 1946. Harrison, E. L. “Notes on Hpmeric Psychology,” Phoenix, 14: 63-80, 1960. Onians, R. B. The Origins of European Thought, London, 1951. Snell, B. Die Ausdruecke Fuer den Begriff des Wissens in der vor-Platonischen Philosophie, Philologische Untersuchungen, 29, Berlin, 1924. Voigt, C. Uberlegung und Entscheidung . . . bei Homer, Berlin, 1934.

?The notion of an hierarchical organization among the components of the “mind has been a persistant theme in ps chological theoriea throughout the centuries. It is probably first articulated in Plato, but is also to ge found (in physiological language) in Hippocrates, particularly The Sacred Disease. In modern times the work of Hughlings Jackson in neurology placed great stress on the concept of hierarchies of organizations within the central nervous system.

8Cf. Snell, B. The Discovery of the Mind, pp. Iff. OCitatlons refer to the Greek Texts, (such as the Oxford Classical Texts) of the Iliad and the

Odyssey. The two translations best suited for use in conjunction with this paper are: The Iliad of Homer, trans. Lattimore, R., Chicago, 1951; The Odyssey, trans. Fitzgerald, R., (New York: Double- day, 1961).

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imagistic way of describing inner processes. It is apparent, then, that mental activity is not something that is regarded as intrinsically private and inaccessible to others, but rather as somehow amenable to observation and scrutiny. At least, one can say that those aspects which are more private and internal are not Homer’s main concern, but rather those which are public and common. (3) The tendency is to ascribe the origins of mental states to forces or agencies out- side of the person. Dreams are “sent” by a god; they may come from the under- world, pass through “the gate of horn,” into the dreaming person (IZ. 2: 6ff.; Od. 19: 56Off). If Achilles forbears and does not slay Agamemnon on the spot, it is because Athena comes down, pulls Achilles by his hair, and says “wait” (IZ. 1: 188ff). If a man knows how to sing, it is because a god has given him “song and lyre” (IZ. 13: 731). The outside agencies are often divine, but they may be other people, or drugs, or even strong emotions (IZ. 1: 78; II. 3: 98; Od. 10: ZSlff). (4) Inner mental activity tends to be represented as an interchange among several characters, either human or divine. Frequently a dialogue is involved. Thus, what we would consider as Odysseus worrying and then reassuring himself, is depicted as Odysseus bemoaning his situation to Athena, who then tells him to rest assured (Od. 20: 30ff). Situations where we could consider inner dialogue as appropriate, are often presented as outer dialogue. But even in an inner dialogue the person ad- dresses his “heart” or his thumos in language that is indistinguishable from that in which he would address a friend.I0

In general, the interchanges are more likely to be “interactions” thanl‘trans- actions.” That is, the influence flows more unidirectionally than it does recipro- cally.“ The gods, in general, influence the heroes more than the heroes do the gods. (5) Closely allied to the Homeric representation of inner states by means of a per- sonified interchange, is the tendency to describe mental activity as a story or nar- rative. Achilles’ anguish at going into battle, knowing he must avenge his friend, yet knowing he must die, is presented as: And then Hera put words into the mouth of his horse, Xanthos, and then Xanthos spoke to Achilles predicting his master’s doom. Achilles spoke back, then the Erinyes (“Furies”) took away speech from the horse and he became still (IZ. 19: 404ff). The Homeric narrative-be it for describing mental activity or anything else-is a rather strict linear-temporal style, (e.g., “and he did . . . and they said . . . then he said . . .”). It is ill-suited for dealing with re- lationships that involve simultaneity, and subordination, and as such poorly suited to an analysis of mental activity.12 (These two aspects of Homeric portrayal of mental states, namely the personified interchange and the narrative, are, of course, integral mechanisms of dream work.) (6) Feelings are portrayed as if “contagious.” They may be personified and con- cretised at times, such as Phobos, “Fear,” who strides through the ranks of the warriors (IZ. 9: Iff). In many instances much is made of the effect that the feelings

’ODodds, E. R., op cit. p. 16. ll“Interaction’l is used t o refer to “A acts upon B,” while “transactions” refers to A and B acting

upon each other. For these usages cf. Spiegel, John P.: “The Social Roles of Doctor and Patient in Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy,” Psychiatry, 17: 364376, 1954.

Wf. Havelock] E. H., op. cit. and Thornton, H. and A.: Time andStyle: An Essay in Clasaiacl Literature, London: Methuen, 1963.

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of one person (grief, longing, joy, etc.) have on others around him. It can be seen that the tendency to represent inner states as an interchange facilitates this spread of feeling from one person to another. (7) There is no word for “self” or “oneself” in Homer. Rather, the root auto in Homer can mean “of itself” or “by itself.” It can also refer quite concretely to one’s body, one’s bulk, or even one’s corpse (L?. I: 4; Od. 9: 257). The “self” or the identity, is defined concretely and specifically in terms of “Who is your father”? “Whence do you come”? Further, one’s identity is largely couched in terms of the story, or stories, of one’s life. The events in which a man participated, actively or passively, constitute his identity. If the version of events is different, then the identity is different. This becomes particularly important in the Odyssey, where the hero, Odysseus, frequently dissimulates, and tries to hide his true identity. I n this setting, the demands of the situation, and the demands of the audience dictate who he is and what is the story of his life. What develops in later Greek thought, is that the definition of self and of identity becomes contingent upon an active process of examining, sorting out, and scrutinizing the “events” and “adventures” of one’s own life. The activity of introspection becomes closely connected with the idea of “the true self,” as typified by the Socratic use of the phrase “know thyself.”la

It is important here to emphasize a point that is obvious to the reader of Homer, namely that the heroes are not mere puppets, or playthings of the gods. The ubiquity of influences from the outside-especially divine beings-somehow does not rob the characters of their vitality. It was already observed in antiquity that Homer uses divine intervention in a manner that is consistent with the overall character of the hero. Athena, the goddess of wisdom, accompanies Odysseus, who is “rich in wiles.” It is to Agamemnon, a headstrong but confused king, that Zeus sends down a deceiving dream. Modern criticism has pointed out something more, however: Homer’s use of the gods is an integral and essential part of the portrayal of char- acter, and not merely compatible with character.“ One can then view the gods as projections, not merely of unacceptable impulses or wishes, but more as “projections of self-representations.”16 Moreover, it is apparent that Homer uses the gods to indicate relationships and connections among the various individuals in the tale. In this sense, the gods can be said to represent something of the “object relations” of the individual.”

This interpretation of the role of the gods is certainly consonant with the idea that the “self” is defined primarily by a story. The “self” then is a complex resultant of interchanges with both gods and men, as revealed in, a story. The “self,” or one’s “identity,” then, is not clearly localized as “within,” but rather as both “within” and “without.”17

1aThis thesis is developed by G. Misch in A History of Autobiography in Antiquity, Cambridge, Maas., 1951.

“Harrison, E. L., op. cit. 1”r. Norman Reider suggested this phrase. Wf. the definition of: “Object-relationship.” “The relationship of ps chic components, particu-

larly the affects, to an object outside of oneself.” In Hinsie, L. E. and Siatzky, J., Psychiatric & tionary, New York: Oxford University Press, 6953.

]‘For a recent statement on the complex question of the definition of the “self,” cf. Jacobson, E., The Self and the Object World, New York: International Universities Press, 1964.

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(111) MentaE Disturbance The descriptions of disturbed mental activity, and of mental tensions follow

very much the same lines as those of usual or ordinary mental activity. By and large, the disturbance, or tension, is something that is initiated from outside of the person, as “Zeus took away his wits,” or “the gods can make even the wisest appear wit- less.” As Dodds has described, the notion of at&, an “infatuation” sent by a god is commonly used to explain the aberrant behavior and thoughts of the heroes. But, it is not merely gods that are the outside agencies; wine, love, rage, etc., can all deceive or cloud one’s senses as well as can Zeus.1s The source of one’s mental dis- tress can as easily be what “Agamemnon did to me” as “what the gods did to me.” It is important, particularly from the viewpoint of later models of mind, that the language does not clearly differentiate among these diverse kinds of external in- fluences. Philosophy and medicine, as part of their interest in the nature of the mind, have to distinguish among the various types of stimuli that affect the mind.

There is no notion that mental disturbance arises from a disorder or derange- ment within the mental structure. Nor can one detect evidence of a concept that an alteration in the relationships among different parts of the mind is a cause of mental disturbance or tension. There are certainly situations of “internal conflict” described in Homer. However, the conflict is not between “reason” and “emotion,)f nor between “mind” and “heart.” More typical is an opposition between one im- pulse and another, or some uncertainty about whether to act now or 1~ter . l~

The most important kinds of tension, however, are those arising in the context of the action of the story. For example, the “wrath of Achilles” is the main topic of the Iliad. The story traces its origins in the interactions of the heroes and the gods, and spells out its unrelenting nature and its dire consequences. Similarly, the “folly” of the suitors constitutes a major theme of the Odyssey. Another kind of mental disturbance is “excessive forgetting.” Throughout the Odyssey, Odysseus is in danger of being made to forget his homeland, his wife, in fact, his very identity. Various agents and forces appear in the poem that can induce oblivion. These in- clude the Lotos-eaters, Calypso, Circe, and the song of the SirenS.2O As in the case of ordinary mental activity, the trend is to depict mental distress or unusual mental activity as interchange among various characters; here, too, the interchange is more “interactional” than “transactional,” the direction of influence is described from outside, inwards, and there is relatively little reciprocity.

What “relief” is available for mental disturbance and mental distress? “Ther- apy” too is portrayed as something that is transmitted from one person, or agent, to the afFlicted person, and is also presented as an “interaction.” Among the “agents” that bring relief gre food, wine, and certain drugs (such as the herb nepenthe, “no- pain” which abolishes grief (Od. 4: 221ff) ). “Other people” bring relief, be they friends, or gods. “Words” are an important instrument of relief, be they as prayers, or as conversation.21 Scattered throughout the poems, particularly in the Odyssey,

I*Dodde, E. R. Op cit., p. 2f. lgE.g., Od., 20: 9ff. Wf. Taylor, C. H., Jr. “The Obstacles to Od seeus’ Return” in Essays on the Odyssey, ed.

Taylor, C. H., Jr., Bloomington Indiana: University l%eas, 1963, who also makes this point about the temptation to forget.

Viator . . . Richard Siebecks, Eine Festgabe . . . Tubingen, 1959. “Lain-Entralgo, P. : Therapeulische Katharsis. u d Logothetapie im-Homeriechen Epos, in: Medinrs

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are references to the role of the bard, and the singing of epic tales (e.g., Od. 8: 73ff). “The song” is an extremely important form of relief and of comfort. This thera- peutic role of the bard is summairzed in the lines of Hesoid (who lived no more than a century after Homer) :2z

“. . . for though a man have sorrow and grief in his newly-troubled soul, and live in dread because his heart is distressed, yet when a singer, the servant of the Muses, chants the glorious deeds of men of old and the blessed gods who in- habit Olympus, a t once he forgets his heaviness and remembers not his sorrows at all” (Theogony, 98ff).

Is there an explicit idea of mental “illness” in Homer? With only one exception, strange or aberrant behavior (or thinking) is not labelled as a sickness or illness (Od. 9: 411). Again, one cannot say that Homer did or did not believe in such a notion, but only that it was not prominent or given an important place.

(IV) An Explanation for the Homeric Model of Mind: The Craft of the Oral Ep ic Poet (the Bard)

How is one to characterize the nature of the Homeric model of mind? Labels that come readily to mind, such as “animistic thinking,” “externalization,” “pro- jection,” indeed may be applied to certain features of the model. Yet as has often been pointed out, “primitive thinking,” and “the thinking of primitives” must be understood in their proper settings in order to appreciate the adaptive significance of such thinking. The purpose of this section is to explicate a theory to explain the Homeric model of mind as appropriate and adaptive in its own context. That con- text is to be found in the method of composition and performance of oral epic poetry.

The following explanation, linking the Homeric conceptions of mind to the nature of oral epic poetry is original to the authors. It draws heavily upon Have- lock’s exposition of the psychology of the poetic performan~e.~~

As has been noted above, the Homeric epics were composed as oral epic poetry. The Greeks themselves were curious as to some of the distinctive features of such poetry. I n one of the Platonic Dialogues, the Ion, Socrates addresses a rhapsode- a man who performs the Homeric poems:24

Socrates (to the rhapsode) “This gift . . . you have is not an art, but . . . an inspiration. There is a divinity moving you, lihe that in the stones which Euripides calls a magnet . . . For that stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a similar power of attracting other rings, and sometimes you may see a number of pieces of iron and rings suspended from one another so as to form quite a long chain, and all of them derive their power of suspension from the original stone. Now this is like the Muse, who first gives to men inspiration herself; and from these inspired persons a chain of other persons is suspended who take inspiration from them. . .

21Hsvelock, E. A. Op. Cit., p. 155. Wd. p 145-164. %Ion in h e Dialogues of Pluto, trans. Jowett, B., 2 vols., New York: Random House.

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Do you know that the spectator is the last of the rings which, as I am saying, derive their power from the original magnet . . . the God sways the souls of men in any direction which he pleases, and makes one man hang down from an- other. . .”?

This is Plato’s description of the “psychology” of the poetic performance. The influence moves from Muse to poet to audience, and the analogue is the magnet which in turn attracts the magnetized. Thus the idea of a magnet is in fact, prob- ably a good analogue, as well, for the Homeric descriptions of mental activity. The initiating agents are an outside source, yet there is some “interaction” or “attrac- tion” among the links in the chain of influence.

The particular mental activity that is of greatest interest to the poet is that activity involved in his poetic craft. Studies of the nature of oral epic poetry, based both on Homer and on direct observation of certain contemporary societies, have contributed much to an understanding of the subjective and objective aspects of the mental life of the poet. Plato’s formulations represent something like the sub- jective view that the poet has about the origins of his poems. He sees himself as in- spired and influenced by the Muse (or other divine agency). In turn, through him, influences flow which affect the thoughts and feelings and actions of the audience. But what distinguishes this poet from a literary poet who may also invoke a Muse, or claim some divine inspiration? The hallmark of the viewpoint of the oral poet is the idea that not only his inspiration, but that his very craft and his technical com- petence, also originate from an outside source. In addition, the bard does not con- ceive himself as creating new original poetry.26

These studies also tell us a great deal objectively about the nature of the oral epic poem. The general conclusions can be summarized as follows:a6

(1) Oral epic poetry exists only in societies that are preliterate, or have achieved only a limited contact with literacy. (Only a small number of preliterate societies, however, actually have developed an extended body of oral epic literature.)

(2) The poet, or bard, does not compose a poem in private, memorize and then recite it. Nor does he memorize poems that he hears from others. He composes on the spot, as he sings in front of the audience. He is able to so compose because he has available to him traditional stories, traditional language, and traditional meters.

(3) The precise form of the poem that emerges is very much under audience control and influence-the bard is attuned to what the audience wishes to hear. (An extreme example is that the same battle between Crusaders and Moslems ends in victory for one side or the other, depending on whether the audience is Christian or Moslem.)

(4) The audience, in turn, is very much attuned to the bard and his story. If the poet is a good one, and the audience is receptive, the audience quickly identifies itself with the characters in the epic. Similarly, the bard may “lose himself” and

Whnpare Milton, for bxample, at the example, at the beginning of Paradise Lost (Book I). Though he deliberately imitates Homeric and Hesiodic terminology, he still claims that his song “pursues things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme.“ Paradise Lost, ed. Le Comte, E. (New York: Mentor Books, 1961).

W f . Lord, A. B. “Homer and Other Epic Poetry’’ in W&ce and Stubbinps, op. Cit., p . 179-214 for a recent review of the major issue8 in pal e IC poetry, and a good bhhography, inching the references to Lord‘s own work and that of his teacger, Ivblman Parry.

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become identified with the characters in his poem. The closest modern example of such a relationship between performer and audience is a jazz performance where the audience and performers together shape the final form of the music.

In addition, the bard has available to him a variety of literary devices for en- hancing the sense of identification of the audience with the characters in the poem. The most important of these is “the poem within the poem,” i.e., a scene within the poem, where a poet (like the performing bard) sings a tale (similar to that being sung) to an audience (just like the present audience).

In the light of these considerations, one can now review some of the features of the Homeric model of mind: In the setting of oral epic poetry, there indeed is no such thing as the “mind” of the poet, initiating and deciding. Subjectively, he is aub- ject to the god; objectively, he is under the continuous influence of his audience and of the tradition he has received. “Mind” in this setting is not fixed, structured, bounded, and internalized. It is a kind of continuous fusion and defusion of poem, poet, and audience.

In regard to mental distress and its relief-again the bard-audience relationship is relevant. As was noted above in the Homeric poems, the bard has a therapeutic role. But he can induce distress as well as alleviate it. Throughout the course of the performance, the audience is subject to repeated experiences of mounting tension and its relief. Thus, it is as if “disease” and “the cure” both originate from outside, though both actually operate in a field of a close and continuous relationship be- tween audience and poet.

The essence of this formulation, then, is that the Homeric model of mental activity is closely associated with, and a reflection of, the mental processes involved in the composition and performance of oral epic poetry. The “mind” that is de- scribed in Homer is the (‘mind” of the poets who created the Homeric poems.

This hypothesis does not mean to exclude or minimize the importance of other determinants in shaping as complex a phenomenon as a “model of mind.” Rather, the theory here proposed provides a link in the causal chains. What we propose is that a variety of factors-historical, psychological, sociological, and technological- are involved in shaping the view of mind that is to be found in Homer. But we feel that these factors exert tl$ir influence through oral epic poetry-which acts as a kind of “final common pathway.” Another way of stating this proposition is that the Homeric model of mind and Homeric poetry are both products of the same forces. The institution of oral epic poetry and the “model” of mind in the poem were both adaptive for the culture in which they flourished. Briefly, oral epic poetry serves as an important educational institution in the “tribal” societies where it flourishes. It performs this educational function in large measure by virtue of its power to blur the lines of individual identity. Principally by encouraging a process of identificution, the poetry links previous generations with the present generation, and with genera- tions to come. It emphasizes the commonalitp of the group from generation to genera- tion, and from sitwtion to situation. The poetry-and its mode of composition and transmission-is a reflection of the need for continuity within the culture. At the same time, heroic poetry is itself a major institution for maintaining that continuity.

What we fmd, then, is that precisely those aspects of human mental life which are consonant with and syntonic to the method of education that is essential for epic poetry are the ones that are highlighted within the poetry itself. For Homer,

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‘(mind” is primarily public and accessible to observation; it is open to external in- fluences. Affect is readily contagious, and mental processes are described aa if inter- actions. In the culture that was the setting for the creation of, and the oral trans- mission of, Homeric poetry, public mind, not private mind was most important.’’* 18

(V) Conclusions In the preceding section, some considerations were outlined about the context

and setting of the Homeric model of mind. Over the centuries from Homer to Aristotle, sweeping changes took place in Greek life. Oral epic poetry and the general conditions that favored it as an institution disappeared while literacy and writing became widespread. New models of mental life arose that dealt better with the de- mands of a society in which much greater emphasis was placed on the importance and uniqueness of the individual. Subsequent papers will take up in detail the philosophical and medical models.

An anticipatory comparison of the Homeric with these later models can well serve to highlight further some implications of the Homeric model. In Homer, in general, there is little importance attached to any idea of mental structure; further, the important stimuli or forces tend to be ones that originate from the outside. Later thinkers saw some intrinsic connection between a lack of structure and the accessibility of the mind to outside influences. In Plat0 and Aristotle, there is some association between the notion of a structure and the relative permanence of mind. A structure means some limit as to what outside influences can do. Structure is a barrier. It is also a mediator, and has the capacity to select and control what enters from the outside. Among the important mediating tasks of the psychic structure is the establishment of a proper balance between self and others.

Another cardinal point of the philosophical model is that the mental structure cannot be merely a “container” that takes and holds and retains unchanged various outside stimuli. Rather the structure is constantly changing outside stimuli and assimilating them to itself. Such an assumption, a structure that is active, is neces- sary for dealing with the question of how the person’s experience with the outer world (both the social and the biological world) becomes registered, represented, and integrated into the inner world that is the mind. The nature of memory is one aspect of this question-how do past experiences remain “in the mind” and con- tinue to influence subsequent thinking and behavior. Similarly, it becomes possible to consider the ‘(nature-nurture” controversy in a more sophisticated manner, when one assumes some activity on the part of the mental apparatus.

“In defense of this admittedly speculative formulation about the role of the poem and the poet in shaping ideas about mental life, two further oints are: (I) The formulation relattes c m h t to form, i.e., the Homeric ideas about mental life to t i e form of the poem and the requirements of poetic creation.

(2) This formulation is very much in the tradition of Dprkheim’s views about the origin and nature of Ulinki i.e., that the forms of thought are grounded in the form of social organization. Cf. Durkheim, E., Elements Fmma of Religwv f i fe , trans, Swain, J . W., Glencoe, Ill.: Free Prw, 1954, and Durkheim, E., a 2 M a w , M. Pmmitiue Classafimtion, trans. R. Needham, Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1963.

‘BFor a detailed discussion of the kind of social structure-an oikos, or extended household-that forms the framework of the Odyssey, see: Finley, M. I.! The World of Odysseue New York 1954. The social organization described in the Odyssey must be simi!ar to, though not identical with the social organization of the Greek world throughout all the centuries during which epic poetry waa being com- posed and orally transmitted.

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Further, in Homer one finds relatively little differentiation between what transpires inside the head and what transpires outside the head. (This is shown by (1) the similarity between external and internal dialogue and (2) the ease with which similies for mental processes are drawn from the physical and social world, and vice-versa.) Philosophy raises the question and begins the examination of the as- sumption of a congruence or isomorphism between inner and outer processes.

Finally, as has been noted, the Homeric discourse does not clearly distinguish between “inner mental acts” and overt, observable behavior. It is not until the idea of a mental structure appears that a firm distinction between “thought” and “action” is established. Neither does the Homeric model differentiate between “thinking” and “feeling.” The role of the bard-audience relationship is very much to the point here. For, in the composition and performance of the epic poem, the “thinking” and the “doing” are indivisible, as are the “thoughts” and “feelings” of the

In sum, our discussion has treated the two faces of the Homeric model of mind. The one-the Homeric model as adaptive in a culture marked by oral epic poetry- has attempted to “make sense of” or find the “kernel of truth” in Homer’s poetic and mythopoetic discourse. The “mind” portrayed in Homer is indeed the mind as experienced by Homer. The other aspect-Homer in comparison with later thinkers -highlights those features of the model that were discarded as incompatible with a scientific psychology.

Yet, one feature characteristic of Homer has continued to “plague” even sophisticated theories from antiquity to the present. This is the tendency to person- ify and reify what are in fact complex processes and complex interactions. “Zeus sent down madness” personifies the causes of “madness,” but even more, reifies “madness” itself as a concrete entity. Similarly, the search for “the cause’’ of mental illness has elements in it of animistic thinking. For, a “twisted molecule” or a “schizophrenogenic mother” when invoked as the cause of illness, is not entirely dissimilar to invoking “Zeus” or the “wrath of “Mental illness” too must be underetood as a shorthand, or intervening variable, that labels a rather complex state (or states), not as a “thing” with a life of its own. To the extent that theories in psychology and psychiatry continue to personify and reify, they may share in the “poetry” of the Homeric dkscriptions, but they lose in scientific utility and pre- cision.

lgMcLuhanl M. The Gutenberg Galazy, (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1962): T h i ~ work is a highly imaginative discueaion of the impact of literacy. He argues that the distinction between “thought” and “emotion” or “mind” and “heart” is a concomitant of literacy. Also, cf. Watt, I. and Goodie, J. “Consequences of Literacy,” Contemporary Studies in Society and History, 6: 305- 345, 1963.

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”%eider, N. “The Demonology of Modern Psychiatry,” A m . J . P8?p2h&t7yt 111: 851-856,1955.