mission with hindrance african union (au) and peacekeeping operations

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Missions with Hindrance: African Union (AU) and Peacekeeping Operations

Adegboyega A. Ola

Afe Babalola University Ado-Ekiti, Nigeria [email protected]

& Stanley O. Ehiane

University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa [email protected]

Abstract Peacekeeping has been a dominant theme of the African Union (AU) for decades and major operations have been undertaken by the regional organisation. This article takes into perspective an assessment of the AU peacekeeping operations, amidst its challenges and politics within the context of continental peace and security. The paper discovers that AU missions on the continent have been stalled by a lot of factors in the last few decades. These dynamics have made the AU role appears to be facilitating role to the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping rather than a dominant character. The paper concludes that when the overarching issues were addressed, the AU capacities and the proclivities for successful peacekeeping operation are at its ultimate. Keywords: African Union, Conflict, Peace, Peacekeeping, United Nations 1. Introduction While it has been the responsibility of the United Nations (UN) to conduct peacekeeping operations on the continent, the trend is gradually changing. African Union (AU) is increasingly assuming responsibility of securing peace and ensuring stability on the African continent (Charles, 2010).

Journal of African Union Studies (JoAUS) Volume 5, Issue 1, 2016

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Since the end of the Cold War, increased attention has been drawn to the various violence and conflict around the world, especially in African states. There have been disturbing increases in armed conflict, which pose a great security challenge to African states (Stohl & Doug, 2009). The frequency and brutish nature of violent conflict had made it possible for peace support operations to become a common mode of international third party intervention to address protracted social conflict. In the last fifteen years, fifty new peacekeeping operations have been initiated in Africa, most often led by the UN or the AU Williams, 2015). There are now over one hundred thousand uniformed peacekeepers deployed across the continent serving on a range of missions (Williams, 2015).

The avalanche of violent crises on the African continent has made the region very volatile and depicts an environment where violent conflict has been institutionalized (Egena, 2011). The AU came into existence, when the African space had already become notorious for conflicts (Mathiasen, 2006). Therefore, conflict resolution is expected to be a major challenge to the Union. Peace and stability proved elusive in pre-colonial and colonial Africa. The scourges of the slave trade, inter-tribal warfare and the imposition of colonialism did not allow it (Sylvia & Okeke, 2013). One would expect emancipation and independence to have created an era of stability and relative peace. Instead, post-colonial Africa has experienced conflicts of a scale and magnitude heretofore un-witnessed (Sylvia & Okeke, 2013). Pre-colonial Africa may have been volatile but the rudimentary nature of the weapons and the unsophisticated organizational structure of the societies made conflicts disruptive and adventurous rather than catastrophic (Muluwa, 1999). Peace operations have increasingly become dynamic due to the intractable conflicts in some part of the world. The input of the combination of key

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implementing actors and agencies during the mission planning phase would enhance both overall concept of the operation and this could only be achieved through efficient gathering and processing of information and the dissemination of military information (Okeke, 2013). The inability of national defence forces to nip violent attack and reprisals in the bud like the current Burundi political violence has led to the increase in AU peacekeeping operation (Williams, 2005).

The AU has given some indications that it can do better than the defunct OAU. Where peaceful resolution had failed, the AU had resorted to military intervention (Muluwa, 1999). The AU’s first military intervention in a member state was the May 2003 deployment of peacekeeping forces from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to Burundi, to oversee the implementation of the various agreements (Williams, 2015). Furthermore, one of the objectives of the AU is to promote peace, security, and stability on the continent. Among its principles is the principle of “peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states of the Union, through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly” (Sylvia & (Okeke, 2013: 286). The study therefore examines the AU and peacekeeping in Africa. 2. The birth of African Union and the Evolution of

Peacekeeping in Africa The birth of the AU at the dawn of the 21st century enhanced engagement in peacekeeping initiatives as a tool to address conflicts and instabilities on the continent (Charles, 2010). When African leaders adopted the AU Constitutive Act in 2000, they were crucially conscious of the fact that the scourge of conflicts in Africa constitutes a major impediment to the socio-economic development of the continent and the need to promote peace, security, and stability as a prerequisite for the


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implementation of a development and integration agenda (Brian-Vincent & Dauda, 2011).

The transition from the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to the AU fundamentally changed the norms underpinning the peacekeeping concept as it was previously known and implemented under the OAU (Maluwa, 2003). The normative differences between the AU and the OAU are significant. The differences reflect the desire and understanding of African leaders to create a strong institution capable of addressing challenges facing Africa and its people comprehensively (Kioko, 2003). The objectives of AU in the views of Sylvia and Okeke (2013) are supported by principles including the establishment of a common defence policy for the African continent; the peaceful resolution of conflicts among member states through such appropriate means as may be decided upon by the Assembly. The prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among member states; peaceful co-existence of member states and their right to live in peace and security; the right of member states to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security (Charles, 2010). The AU is therefore expected to chart a new and more dynamic course for the continent and its numerous peoples (Fielman, 2008).

The idea of African solutions for African problems is a relatively new concept which lay behind the birth of the AU (Cilliers, 1999). Unlike when most of the calamities bedeviling the continent were blamed on the colonialists and their successors, the new concept signals a new and more constructive attitude. It realizes that it is not enough to blame the West for Africa’s problems. It rather acknowledges that Africa must be responsible for its own challenges (David, 2005). Peacekeeping was therefore designed to deal with interstate conflict rather than intra-state conflict. It is based on


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the assumption that conflicting states have agreed to international assistance to regain stability (Cilliers, 1999).

Peacekeeping operations are known by their emphasis on restraint and a self-defensive posture and usually presuppose the existence of a cease-fire, while the political objective is of the utmost importance (Francis, 2006). The changes in the role and scope of peace operations over the last decade exposed a new range of potential unintended consequences for the host society as well as for the peace operations themselves (Aoi et al, 2007). Peacekeeping missions enjoy growing popularity as the international community’s tool of choice for conflict containment in different parts of the world (Berman & Sams, 2000). Essentially, the goal of peacekeeping is not the creation of peace but the containment of war so that others can search for peace in stable conditions (Francis, 2006).

The concept of peacekeeping according to Charles (2010) is based on two major tenets. First, the need to halt armed conflict in order to create a semblance of a stable environment in which negotiations can occur. The second purpose is to function as a deterrent against the outbreak of armed hostilities, following arrangement of ceasefire. Peacekeeping theorists believed that when violence occurs in a particular country, zone or region, there will be chaos and crisis which could endanger human lives and destroy properties (Cilliers, 1999). According to the peacekeeping theory, the presence of a peacekeeping operation in a conflict zone alters the situation on the ground and forces the belligerents to recalculate the dangers and opportunities as a result of the introduction of a new factor (Laura, 1997). Peacekeeping occurs when conflict has broken out and a third party, like the UN or regional organisation (AU) tries to intervene in order to assist in peacekeeping. Such initiatives aim at creating space for conflicting parties to negotiate a settlement (De Coning, 2006).


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Ngoma (2005) observed that there are three stages of peacekeeping. Firstly, when unarmed or lightly armed troops intercede between warring parties and it is called first-generation peacekeeping (Ngoma, 2005). Second-generation peacekeeping improves upon the first model by undertaking more complex functions, such as policing responsibilities (Ngoma, 2005). All belligerents will give comprehensive consent to the mission. Support structures will consolidate peace by disarming the warring parties, destroying weapons, repatriating refugees, monitoring elections and promoting formal and informal processes of political participation (Bakradze, 2001). These pertinent requirements for a peaceful environment show the magnitude of the task at hand (Ngoma 2005). Third-generation peacekeeping is designed to resolve major difficulties, such as guaranteeing the safe passage of humanitarian assistance, helping displaced persons and stopping the killing of ordinary citizens by more forceful measures (Bakradza.2001). These are followed by peace-enforcement missions to ensure that all agreements reached in prior negotiations are respected.

Peacekeeping has become the prominent intervention strategy for managing and resolving war and conflict in the world, and this was the primary purpose in which the United Nations was founded in 1945, in order to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and terrorism (Sylvia & Okeke, 2013) . A peacekeeping operation focuses exclusively on the consequence of conflict, which compels third party intervention in the situation (De-Waal, 2007). This is what the AU has been actively involved in Africa since its establishment in 2002.

Peacekeeping operation in Africa has grown dramatically; the present of operations and peacekeepers in the continent is more than any other region or continent in the world. Out of 16 peace operations led by the UN in early 2005, seven were in


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Africa: Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Ethiopia/Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone, and the Western Sahara (Holt & Shanahan, 2015). These African missions accounted for about 75 percent of all UN peacekeepers deployed worldwide (Williams, 2013). 3. The Causes and nature of armed conflicts in Africa Violent crises remain one of the most crucial challenges facing the African continent in the 2st century. Armed conflict has killed a lot of civilians and displaced many more, leaving them to run for safety and well-being, disease, and malnutrition. Such violence has also upset a generation of children and recruiting them as child soldiers, broken bonds of trust and authority structures among and across local communities, shattered education and healthcare systems, disrupted transportation routes and infrastructure, and done untold damage to the Africa region (Fieldman, 2008). According to Williams (2013) various violence in Africa has cost the continent to lose about 900 billion dollars since the beginning of the new millennium in year 2000.

Violent conflict and the power of armed non-state actors remain defining priorities in 21st century Africa. Organized violence has killed millions and displaced many more, leaving them to run the gauntlet of violence, disease, and malnutrition. Such violence has also traumatized a generation of children and young adults, broken bonds of trust and authority structures among and across local communities, shattered education and healthcare systems, disrupted transportation routes and infrastructure, and done untold damage to the continent’s ecology from its land and waterways to its flora and fauna (Williams, 2010).

Contemporary armed conflict in Africa is characterized by various national and international actors, to include state and


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non-state actors, insurgents, and terrorists- such as the Boko Haram group in Nigeria. Saroja (2012) believes most of the conflicts nowadays are intra- state conflicts, unlike in the past when most conflicts arose from inter-state conflicts. Accordingly, most of these intra-state conflicts are based on political, religious, ethnic or separatist causes resulting in armed conflict and violence, which are majorly caused due to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the region (Muggah, 2010).The nature of violent armed conflict in Africa, as defined by the actors and the changing security environment, has certain implications for the role and readiness of the AU in African Peace Support Operation. According to Kobbie (2008), the causes of armed conflict include ethnicity, discrimination and national rivalries, the illegal exploitation and competition for natural resources, foreign intervention, the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, poverty, fundamentalism, religious cleavages, crises of identity within a society and exclusionary ideological beliefs, territorial disputes and the struggle for access to political power.

4. The African Union and Peacekeeping Operation: An

Assessment Owing to the changing nature of international conflict, the 1990s witnessed a growing need for humanitarian peacekeeping operations, especially in Africa (Ferreira, 2012). The conflict between Chad and Libya in 1981 furnished the AU with its first major peacekeeping experience and a first test of its capability to resolve conflicts on its own continent (Lemarchand, 1985). Under this initiative, a force consisting of troops from Benin and Zaire was to be deployed in Chad (Ferreira, 2012). The mandate of the force included supervision of the ceasefire, ensuring the freedom of


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movement, disarming the combatants, the restoration of order, and the establishment of the new Chadian army (Mays, 2002).

In Somalia, the African Union Mission for Somalia (AMISOM) and Somalia government forces have made considerable gains against Al-Shabaab, the militant group, particularly over the last 18 months (Maphosa, 2014). A military campaign that bought sudden and unexpected pro-gress in August 2011 has provided space for the conclusion of the political transition and the establishment of the new Federal Government (Freear & Coning, 2013). However, these security gains will only be sustained if effective and acceptable governance for those areas recovered from Al-Shabaab can be arranged (Williams, 2012). It is very important to note that the African military operations in Mali and Somalia are at very different stages of maturity. The force, and its supporting partners, in Somalia have accumulated a wealth of context-specific knowledge and expertise over six years of operations and under its own command (Maphosa, 2014).

The AU had been engaged in Burundi since the overthrow and assassination of the first democratically elected President of Burundi in 1993. But the full-fledged mission did not materialize until 2003 when the African Union authorized the creation of the African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) (Boshoff & Francis, 2003). The full deployment of the AU Mission stemmed from the ceasefire Agreement between the Burundi government and the rebels in December 2002. The AU deployed more than 3,000 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia, and Mozambique to monitor the peace process and provide security (Majinge, 2010). The mandate of the peacekeeping mission in Burundi was to facilitate the implementation of the ceasefire agreements, to ensure that the defense and security situation in Burundi was stable and further to protect politicians who had return from exile and


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would assume roles in the transitional government (Boshoff & Francis, 2003).

The AU mission also sought to create conditions that would allow internally displaced persons and refugees, who lived in the eight Burundian provinces and three refugee camps in Tanzania, to return to their homes (Muggah, 2010). The African Union Mission in Burundi (AMIB) mission also had the task of establishing conditions that would enable a UN peace operation to enter the country, since the UN was reluctant to enter a situation that had the potential to relapse into conflict (Rodt, 2012). A comprehensive ceasefire agreement was reached on the 16thof November, 2003. The mandate of the AU in Burundi was concluded on the 31st May 2004. Africa Union was able to contribute to the resolution of the dispute by addressing its underlying causes and contributed to peace and stability in Burundi even in the face of serious policy, institutional and conceptual limitations.

The Darfur situation has become the AU’s most significant test to date and defies simplistic analysis (Murithi, 2010). The conflict in Darfur is synonymous with the AU peacekeeping efforts on the continent (Agoagye, 2004). Arguably, the conflict of Darfur in Sudan is and has been a litmus test for the newly created AU. From the beginning the organization was actively involved in the resolution of the conflict (Swigert, 2005). After the conflict arose in Sudan’s Darfur region in 2003, the African Union took the lead in the peace process and in deploying personnel to monitor the situation. The AU has gone to the Darfur region of Sudan with troops to protect AU ceasefire monitors and is in the process of vastly expanding this critical mission (Swigert, 2005).

The African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) was established in July 2004 with a mandate to monitor the ceasefire and provide security to civilians in the region (Mans, 2004). The instability in Darfur has assumed regional and


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international dimensions, evolving into a large-scale humanitarian crisis in Sudan and bordering countries, claiming between 200,000 and 220,000 lives, displacing over 2 million people into more than 100 camps in Darfur and in neighboring Chad (Beswick, 2010). All these crises led the African Union to intervene in the Sudan crisis by deploying a peacekeeping troop and initiated a peace talk seeking an agreement, to disarm the Janjaweed, rebuild Darfur, and the integration of various armed groups into the national army. The AU established a Ceasefire Commission (CFC) on May 28, 2004 and sent a small group of troops to monitor the scene (Boutellis & Williams, 2013).

The involvement of the AU in ensuring peace in Comoros started in 1995 when AU was still known as the OAU when President Djohar’s Government fell after a coup (Murithi, 2010). This crisis led to the condemnation of the coup by the OAU, and the international community’s refusal to recognise the government. However, it was the outbreak of the secessionist crisis in the island of Anjouan in August 1997 that led to factual involvement of the OAU, as the demand for secession was a major challenge to the OAU principle of respect for the territorial integrity of member states (Swigert, 2005). The OAU was also involved in the making of the Antananarivo Peace Agreement in 2001 (Muggah, 2010). Since the establishment of AU, the organization has been actively involved militarily on several occasions. In 2004, elections were held for assemblies both at the national and local levels and in order to secure peace during and after the election in Comoros, AU sent 39 troops as an Observers Mission in the Comoros (MIOC) for a few months. Based on the AU effort in ensuring peace, the elections were held in a calm atmosphere (Lamamra, 2010). In 2006, when the presidential election of the Union of Comros was held, the African Union also monitor the election just like the previous one in 2004 by


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sending troops from South-Africa, Nigeria, Mozambique, Egypt, the DRC, Mauritius, Madagascar and Rwanda to Comoros consisting of both military and civilian police in ensuring a peaceful election (Mkwezalamba & Chinyama, 2007).

The crisis in Mali could be traced to many years of poor governance after a 1968 coup d’état followed by a fragile democratic transition 22 years later (1990). In March 2012, another coup occurred in Mali that overthrew Mali’s democratically elected government and led the military chain of command to collapse (Williams, 2013). The insurgents include Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, a United States (U.S.)-designated foreign terrorist organisation, along with two loosely allied groups (AQIM), a U.S. designated foreign terrorist organisation, terrorised the country. According to Arieff & Johnson (2013), insecurity in northern Mali displaced over 350,000 people and exacerbated regional food insecurity and poor humanitarian conditions.

The joint peacekeeping operation goal was to provide support to the Malian authorities in the restoration of state authority; support the preservation of Mali’s national unity and territorial integrity; provide protection to civilians; reduce the threat posed by terrorist groups; support the Malian authorities in the implementation of the roadmap for transition; and assist the Malian authorities to reform Mali’s defence and security sectors. In a difficult context, African-led International Support Mission in Mali AFISMA, jointly led by the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), brought an important contribution to preserve the unity of Mali and restore the security throughout the nation (Rodt, 2012).


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5. African Union and the Challenges of Peace Keeping Operations

Africa faces several challenges in its endeavours to implement her integration and development agenda (Mkwezalamba & Chinyama, 2007). After years of transiting from the OAU to the AU and, soon, to the proposed Union Government, it is impossible to ignore the relevance of problems encountered towards a meaningful continental integration (Saroja, 2012). Half a decade after the creation of the AU, citizens of Africa are yet to realize a full integration into governance structures of the continent. When the newly mandated AU replaced its predecessor, the OAU, many were hopeful of, and subscribed to the new vision of the AU- a peoples-driven AU (Saroja, 2012).

The creation of new organs such us the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC), the Pan African Parliament (PAP), the Peace and Security Council (PSC) as well as the adoption of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and its African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) heightened hopes for a continental body more responsive to the voices of its citizens (Afedo, 2009). Despite achieving decolonization and conflict resolution on the continent, the OAU fell far short of achieving its original, idealistic and purpose envisioned by the likes of Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and Julius Nyerere: a continent able to and playing an assertive role in the international community; whose people will be free from misery and deprivation (Stohl, & Tuttle, 2009).

Africa is not a monolith. Not in religions, not in economic systems, and especially not in languages (Fieldman, 2008). As a result, there are inherent difficulties in attempting to create a cohesive force from widely disparate populations. Should a nation’s military choose only soldiers who speak the same


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language; numerous others will be disenfranchised, which can lead to internal dissent (Ngwane, 2000). On the other hand, it can be costly in both money and time to train and fully integrate a military force of different linguistic backgrounds. One of the immediate problems faced by African leaders following the launch of the AU was the question of Madagascar. There was no doubt the fact that the world was watching to see if the Union would maintain its unity and cohesion. All the member states, except three adhered to the AU’s position on non-acceptance of un-constitutional regimes in the continent. At least this offered a hope for unity under the AU, and is in fact a good beginning for the Union (Egiebade, 2004). Another challenge confronting AU is how to make African governments incorporate regional agreements into national policies. The policies of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation as well as unsound package of macro-economic policies imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, are biased against African countries on one hand and peace keeping operations effort on the other hand (Ngwane, 2000). Another challenge that the AU has to contend with in its effort to promote peace keeping operations in Africa is the inadequate and inefficient infrastructure, especially transport and communications. In addition, the challenge the AU has to contend with in its effort to integrate African economies is the prevalent of civil strife and conflicts. The lack of sustained political commitment to put in place agreed policies and plans has been one of Africa’s major shortcoming and in the context of the AU, this is an issue that needs to be addressed (Ngwane, 2000).

It is pertinent to point out that in spite of the transformation of the OAU to AU, Africa is still the poorest continent in the world with almost half of its population still living in absolute poverty. This is despite the fact that Africa ranks as the most richly endowed continent in terms of natural


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resources. The AU is faced with some challenges that can jeopardize its objectives if not properly handled. The first and perhaps the most important challenge is how to promote inter and intra-African trade (Rodt, 2012). Africa countries produce only raw materials for which there is virtually no demand elsewhere in in the continent. However, for many African countries, few commodities often make up the bulk of exports to the rest of the continent. Three, African countries are still “grapping to undo a legacy dominated by trade with their former colonial rulers rather than with each other” (Mutume, 2002: 4).

The diversity in African countries’ sizes, national resources, level of development and connections to global markets has been a major stumbling block to successful peace keeping operations. Obviously, many African states achieved only political independence and not economic independence as their economies are still tied to the apron string of the Western powers. They depend on foreign aid and loans to supplement their annual budget (Charles, 2010). Many African countries also face internal economic problems. Agriculture, which is the backbone of African economies, is on the decline, while African exports face constant fluctuations and occasional decline in international market. For instance, Benin Republic does not have the same economic interests as its giant oil-rich neighbour, Nigeria. Similarly, South Africa and Malawi do not experience the costs and benefits of regional trade arrangements in the same way (Harsch, 2002).

Unlike the other regional institutions such as the European Union (EU), the AU receives poor funding and non-payment of dues by the Africa states. Between1993-2005, the AU Peace Fund was greatly financed by non-African actors by contributing 45 million US dollars out of the 60-70 million that AU was able to raise (David, 2005). In 2009, AU Peace


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fund had a negative balance because of the lack of fund by other African nations. Another challenge is the membership of Morocco, an important African country since 1984. It should be noted that Morocco has been outside the OAU because of the recognition and admission of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) by the organisation (De-Waal, 2007). Furthermore in spite of their exit, the crisis generated over the matter has persisted, rearing its head intermittently within the ranks of the organisation. Morocco has not subscribed to the Constitutive Act of the AU. She has recently joined the CEN-SAD and also continued to retain membership of the LEMA to institutions recognised as RECs and building blocs of the AU (Egiebade, 2004).

Another major obstacle is the known division among African as Franco and Anglo- Phone countries which has disunited African peoples. Many issues have been decided not on their merits but on this line of divide. For example, appointing a Secretary-General for the continental organization has been politicized on this line of divide (Brian-Vincent, & Dauda, 2011). The greatest challenge before the AU in the views of Olubomehin and Kawonishe (2004) is how to incorporate the generality of Africans into integration schemes in the continent. There is enough evidence to support the fact that, apart from all else, regional efforts have failed in Africa because such efforts side-tracked the people. In this wise, the AU itself seems to have fallen into the same pit, as did the OAU, which it replaced. Its Act seems more an instrument for “building a coalition of states” rather than “uniting of people” as obvious in the provisions for the Union’s structure and decision-making process (Okeke, 2013: 288).


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6. Concluding Remarks

The ability of AU to face Africa’s peace keeping operation and development challenges will give it the necessary credibility and effectiveness to pursue its stated objectives (Ogaba, 1999). The effectiveness of the peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the AU greatly hinges on the ability of the force to keep peace. Again, the experience in Darfur has shown that African military personnel have marginal experience in keeping the peace in conflict zones like Darfur or Somalia.

The future of peacekeeping in Africa fundamentally hinges on the political will of African states first to realize that it is Africa, which should be responsible for Africa (De-Waal, 2007). Indeed, the AU has recognized the important role of regional organizations in peacekeeping by stating that regional brigades shall constitute the African Standby Force (ASF) which is slated to be unveiled in 2010. ASF is envisaged to cooperate where possible with the UN and sub-regional African organizations in securing peace and stability in Africa.

The foregoing study examined the potential problems the AU in its efforts to integrate African economies. A successfully implemented cooperation and peace keeping operation strategy holds enormous benefits for the continent and will place it as a respectable partner in the global economy (Kobbie, 2008). The establishment of the African Union has brought a new ray of hope to Africa. Although the Union had taken off, a lot still has to be done for the Union to achieve its desired objectives. Africans must finance the Organization. Member states must pay their dues and contributions as at when due to enable the Union to meet all its financial obligations. There is a need for a strong intellectual debate to find feasible pathways and signposts to make this peace keeping operation possible. Through this debate and other citizen-based and community


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activities, we need to work out the values and visions that Africans must share to accelerate the formation of integrated Africa.

Enhancement of regional cooperation and peace keeping operation is essential for Africa to deal effectively with other development challenges that are internal in origin. Effective regional cooperation and peace keeping operation are also required to mitigate the over-reliance on official development assistance. Also, Africa needs greater regional cooperation and peace keeping operation for a common front and stronger voice to engage the rest of the world for the reshaping of the global economic, financial and political systems. In conclusion, the challenges facing the AU is no doubt, huge but with good political will, good governance self-reliant economy and patriotism on the part of African peoples, the new organization in the view of Charles (2010) will propel the continent to the "Promised Land".

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