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Mimicry or synchrony: The effectsof intentionality attributions fornonverbal mirroring behaviorValerie Manusov aa Assistant Professor, Department of Communication , RutgersUniversity , 4 Huntington Street, New Brunswick, NJ, 08902Published online: 21 May 2009.

To cite this article: Valerie Manusov (1992) Mimicry or synchrony: The effects of intentionalityattributions for nonverbal mirroring behavior, Communication Quarterly, 40:1, 69-83, DOI:10.1080/01463379209369821

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Mimicry or Synchrony: The Effects ofIntentionality Attributions for NonverbalMirroring Behavior

Valerie Manusov

In many interactions, people have to make the choice between whether theybelieve another's nonverbal behavior was encoded with specific intent, as a socialrepresentation, or as a primarily symptomatic behavior. It is argued that theseattributions may alter the attributor's perceptions and evaluations of the other'sbehavior. This study looks specifically at how beliefs about intentionality behind apartner's use of nonverbal mirroring behavior affects the tatter's perception of theformer's personality, behavior, and message intent. It was found that participants(N = 60) who were allowed to make their own attributions saw their partner'sbehavior as somewhat intentional, evaluated their partner to be more competentand interpersonally attractive, and rated his/her behavior as more favorable andsincere and as less disjointed and exaggerated than those who were led to believetheir partner acted deliberately and, in some cases, those who believed their partneracted unintentionally. Participants who saw their partner's behavior as intentionalwere also more likely to read the relational messages of disinterest and dissimilarityinto the behaviors of their partner.

KEY CONCEPTS Nonverbal behavior, nonverbal communication, attributions,mirroring, relational messages

VALERIE MANUSOV (PhD, University of Southern California, 1989) is an Assistant Professorat Rutgers University, Department of Communication, 4 Huntington Street, New Brunswick,N] 08902. A previous version of this paper was presented at the Speech CommunicationAssociation, Chicago, 1990.

The intentionality behind social behavior is both a vital and an illusive construct forcommunication researchers. Scholars have argued about whether or not behaviorhas to be purposeful to be communicative, and they have disputed over the degree

of consciousness and control indicative of intentional actions (see discussions by Andersen,1986, in press; Bowers & Bradac, 1984; Knapp, Wiemann, & Daly, 1978; Miller, 1966;Motley, 1990; Ruben, 1984; Scott, 1977). These debates exist primarily to determine thetypes of behaviors that ought to be studied by communication researchers or to highlight thediversity of behaviors within a single discipline.

The discussion over intentionality has focused to a large degree on nonverbal phenom-ena where the purposefulness of behavior is typically more ambiguous than language use. Anumber of researchers have proposed different ways that the intentionality of nonverbalbehaviors can be conceptualized (e.g., Buck, 1982; Cronkhite, 1986; Knapp et al., 1978;Motley, 1986,1990). The most common way in which intentionality has been categorized isas a dichotomy: behaviors are seen as either spontaneous, unintended expressions ofinternal states or as other-directed, intended messages particular to communicative ex-

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changes. Goffman (1959) referred to the former as cues that are "given off" withininteractions and the latter as "given" with particular purpose.

More recently, however, Andersen (in press) argued that there are at least three forms ofnonverbal behavior. These include 1) noncommunicative, symptomatic behaviors; 2)gestalt-like representations of internal states; and, 3) highly deliberate, rhetorical cues.Similar to Motley's (1986) discussion of diverse behavior types, Andersen (in press) statedthat these categorizations represent "theoretically different classes of communicationbehavior." Each is seen to be encoded in a manner unique from the other behavior types.

The issue becomes even more complex because intentionality may be assessed from anumber of vantage points besides that of the encoder (see reviews by Burgoon, Buller, &Woodall, 1989; Stamp & Knapp, 1990). One of these perspectives, dealing with perceivedintent, focuses specifically on the attributions made about another's degree of intentionality.Although the receiver-orientation has garnered criticism because it focuses on only onedeterminant, it can be argued that nonverbal researchers should be encouraged to look atperceived intent, because the inherent ambiguity of nonverbal messages necessitatesunderstanding the way in which people interpret others' nonlanguage cues.

Although there may be consensus about the intent behind certain nonverbal cues (e.g.,emblems such as head nodding are typically seen as intentional), there is more often achoice to be made when interpreting nonverbal behaviors. A number of studies have foundthat people can distinguish between behaviors enacted either spontaneously or intention-ally (e.g., Motley & Camden, 1988), but less work has focused on whether they do so withincommunicative exchanges. Manusov and Rodriguez (1989), however, found that interac-tants' are likely to make a rudimentary choice between perceptions of intentionality forothers' nonverbal behaviors. Further, there appear to be systematic ways in which theseperceptual choices are made depending on message content, interaction context, andrelationship factors (Manusov, 1990; 1991).

There is a great deal left to explore about the conditions influencing choices about theintentionality of nonverbal messages; however the contention that systematic biases exist inthe ways in which people attribute intentionality makes it necessary to explore the potentialconsequences of these choices. This paper investigates some of the effects arising from thebelief that nonverbal behaviors were encoded with a particular type of intentionality. Thefocus of the present investigation will be on the use of nonverbal mirroring in communica-tive exchanges.

Interaction MirroringA number of nonverbal behaviors have been investigated for the degree to which

people will monitor their cues to achieve certain communicative ends. Among these arebehaviors used in deception (e.g., Buller & Aune, 1988), impression management (e.g.,Tedeschi & Norman, 1985), and relational messages (e.g., Coker & Burgoon, 1987). Thesenonverbal functions are typically seen as actions that occur in social settings and aretherefore a form of communicative display. Conversely, other cues are more commonlyviewed as spontaneous expressions of internal states rather than cues that might occur associal actions. In this latter category is nonverbal synchrony.

Rhythmic interactional behaviors, also referred to as dyadic entrainment (Condon &Ogston, 1967), interpersonal synchrony (Bernieri, Reznick, & Rosenthal, 1988), coordina-tion (Kendon, Harris, & Key, 1975), and behavioral matching or reciprocity (Cappella, 1981 )have been defined as "co-occurring patterns [that] pertain to similar and/or different flowsin the behavior of several interacting individuals" (Mathiot & Carlock, 1982, p. 178). Thebehaviors studied under the rubric of interactional synchrony vary from infants' movements

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corresponding with their caregivers' vocal cues (e.g., Cappella, 1981; Lamb, 1977) torhythms occurring in group discussion (e.g., La France & Broadbent, 1976; Scheflen, 1964).

Traditionally, this synchronous behavior has been viewed as an unintended conse-quence of empathie feelings or as a natural, endogenous occurrence similar to Andersen's(in press) first categorization of nonverbal behavior as symptomatic (see Allport, 1968;Chappel, 1970). Recently, however, Bavelas and her colleagues (Bavelas, Black, Chovil,Lemery, & Mullett, 1988; Bavelas, Black, Lemery, Maclnnis, & Mullett, 1986; Bavelas,Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1986) took issue with this perspective, focusing on the ways inwhich some of these cues occur in communicative exchanges. They argued that people usemimetic nonverbal behavior (e.g., facial "wincing," body lean) when interacting with othersbut not when experiencing the same emotive state in the absence of a conversationalpartner.

In their view, mimetic behaviors are a social or communicative act rather thanindicative of vicarious experience; mimicry is thus "an interpersonal event, a nonverbalcommunication intended to be seen by the other" (Bavelas et al., 1986b, p. 322). Bavelasand her colleagues do not argue that people use motor mimicry with specific intent. Rather,they believe that the behaviors may be a representative "gestalt" of the message oftogetherness. This is consistent with Andersen's (in press) categorization of iconic,representative nonverbal behavior and extends the conceptualization of nonverbal mimicryfrom only spontaneous extensions of internal states to a somewhat more intentional socialpresentation of "oneness."

Despite its conceptualization, the result of mimetic behaviors and nonverbal mirroringin interactions is typically the feeling of rapport and togetherness (Charney, 1966; La France& Broadbent, 1976; Trout & Rosenfeld, 1980). The research from which these conclusionsare drawn, however, is based primarily on dyads or groups who have had the opportunity todevelop a relationship with one another. When behavioral mirroring occurs in the initialstages of interaction, people may feel that the behaviors are "forced, awkward, andstrained" (La France & Ickes, 1981, p. 150). In their discussion of synchrony, the authorsstate that,

" In contrast to classroom and psychotherapy contexts, which are based on implicitif not explicit contracts to be involved in the interaction over a relatively extendedperiod of time . . . exchanges [that] are in a setting of no prior contact nor with anyexpectations of future contact. . . likely make it difficult if not actually inappropri-ate to [use mirroring in] the creation of a 'relationship' "(p. 151).

When people are seen as attempting to establish rapport through nonverbal mirroringbefore a relationship has been established, those with whom they are interacting maybelieve that the behaviors are manipulated inappropriately.

Moreover, La France and Ickes noted a positive correlation between mirroring and theperception that the behaviors were a purposeful attempt to influence another. This suggeststhat, on occasion, mimetic behaviors may be viewed as highly purposive and intentionaland that this may evoke interpretations from social perceivers about the message behind thebehaviors. If this is the case, mimetic behaviors, like other forms of nonverbal cues, can beseen as highly deliberate, similar to Andersen's (in press) third categorization of nonverbalbehavior, and perceivers can use this'interpretation in their attributions for another'sbehavior.

From these lines of inquiry, motor mimicry is seen as an important communicativeoccurrence (Bavelas et al., 1986a, 1986b, 1988) that decoders believe can be enacted withvarious degrees of appropriateness and purpose (La France & Ickes, 1981). In social

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interactions, people may therefore need to make a choice about the intentionality behindthe behavior and to offer evaluations when mirroring occurs. The following section exploressome of the consequences associated with choices about intent that may be attached tomirroring behavior.

Consequences of AttributionsA great deal of research has focused on the consequences of general attributions (e.g.,

whether a behavior was perceived to be internally or externally motivated; see Olson &Ross, 1985). Only recently has scholarship been directed to the effects of intentionalityattributions (Doherty, 1981 ; Passer, Kelley, & Michela, 1978). Specifically, O'Connor andGifford (1988) found that intent attributions are likely to affect perceptions of the sender'scharacter. They noted that people perceived as purposefully violating proxemic norms areliked less than those seen as having no choice in their rule violation. Although nocomparison was made to those who intentionally monitored their behavior, Sabatelli andRubin (1986) found that people perceived as high in ability to send spontaneous messagesare also rated higher in interpersonal attraction than those who rank low in this ability.

Contrary to the positive associations made between judgments of spontaneity andsender characteristics, Manusov (1991) found a trend to see those sending intentionalmessages as higher in social competence than those who acted more spontaneously.Similarly, Buck (1979) noted that nonverbal encoding ability (based on behaving intention-ally) is associated with positive perceptions even when the communicated messages arenegative, but there is no relationship with nonverbal sending accuracy (based onunintentional behavior).

Although there appear to be consequences resulting from intent attributions, thecontradictory nature of this line of research makes it difficult to say whether the assessmentswill have positive or negative consequences on judgments of another's personality.Therefore, a nondirectional hypothesis will be generated at this time.

H,: Attributions of intent will influence interactants' judgments of anotherperson's personality.

These judgments will include perceptions of competence, self-confidence, overallsocial evaluation, and social attractiveness. It is argued, for example, that people whobelieve another mirrored their behavior intentionally will judge that person as more or lesscompetent than those who are led to think that another acted unintentionally.

Allen and Atkinson (1981) found more consistent results for social judgments ofnonverbal behavior depending on whether or not the cues were sent intentionally, althoughtheir results were based on actual rather than perceived intent. In particular, cues denotingcomprehension are seen as more redundant and disjointed when encoded intentionally.Further, the authors note that intentional cues seem to represent an unauthentic "caricatureof spontaneous action" (Allen & Atkinson, 1981, p. 226). Similarly, Buck (1975) noted thatcues encoded purposefully are viewed as less appropriate than unintentional behavior andare ascribed to be less favorable.

Purposeful behaviors seem to be more easily decoded than spontaneous cues (Motley &Camden, 1988; Wagner, MacDonald, & Manstead, 1986; Zuckerman, Larrance, Hall,DeFrank, & Rosenthal, 1979). To account for this, Leathers and Emigh (1980) argued thatposed facial expressions are less ambiguous than those encoded unintentionally becausethey are "not apt to be modified or distorted by the impact of cultural display rules" (p.422). An alternative explanation, however, is that intended behaviors may be more clearbecause of their exaggerated character or "theatricality" (Morris, 1977; Soppe, 1988).

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As mentioned, these studies have been based on actual rather than attributed level ofintent. It can be argued, however, that people come to expect these differences when theybelieve that nonverbal messages were sent with certain degrees oi intentionality. Stamp andKnapp (1990), for example, found that participants believed that they used certain cues intheir assessments of intent. These included such things as vocal sincerity, smirking, and,ironically, contradictory verbal and nonverbal messages. Because the idea that actualdifferences may translate into perceptual expectations has not been previously tested in thisarena, a research question is put forward:

Q,: Will different attributions of intentionality result in diverse perceptions andevaluations for behavior?

The evaluations of behavior will include the degree to which the behaviors wereperceived as favorable, redundant, sincere, disjointed, ambiguous, and exaggerated. Forinstance, are people who believe another acted deliberately more likely to see theirpartner's mirroring as positive than those who think another interactant mirrored uninten-tionally?

As mentioned, most of the research on mimetic behavior has found a strong positivecorrelation between behavior matching and rapport (Tickle-Degnen & Rosenthal, 1987;but see Bernieri, 1988). Dabbs (1969) and Navarre (1982), for example, purported thatmimicking behavior and posture sharing result in more favorable evaluations. Similarly,mirroring behavior may lead to greater perceptions of rapport within group discussions (LaFrance & Broadbent, 1976), dance therapy (Schmais & Schmais, 1983), and in medicalcontexts (Harrigan, Oxman, & Rosenthal, 1985; Trout & Rosenfeld, 1980).

As also mentioned, the relationship between synchronous behavior and positive affectmay not be this linear. La France and Ickes (1981) argued that synchrony may only be seenas indicative of rapport in established relationships. This distinction is particularly relevant tothe present discussion on intent. Conceivably, during initial interactions, feelings of rapportwill be greater when nonverbal synchrony is seen as a more natural, less intentionalextension of an internal state rather than when perceived as intentional. The latter should beinterpreted as purposefully forcing a close relationship where there is none.

H2: When nonverbal synchrony is perceived to be deliberate in initial interactions,feelings of rapport will be less than when the behavior is said to beunintentional.

In instances where people are told that another mirrored their behavior on purpose,they may believe that the nonverbal behaviors do not represent real affect or togetherness.In those cases where people are informed the behaviors were unintentional, the respon-dents will be more likely to assume that the behaviors reflect a feeling of actual rapport.

Rapport is only one artifact of nonverbal synchrony. Bavelas et al. (1988) argued thatmotor mimicry is also used to communicate the relational message of similarity/togetherness, a finding reiterated by La France (1982). Bernieri et al. (1988) claimed thatsynchrony can signify interest or approval as well (for further discussion see Kendon, 1970).As with rapport, these relational messages can be seen as a byproduct of various types ofbehavioral expressions or as a reflection of deliberate communicative intent. When peopleare aware that others had intent behind their behaviors, however, they may be more likelyto assume that the encoder used the cues to communicate a particular message.

H3: Mirroring behavior that is attributed as deliberate will be read as sendinggreater relational messages of similarity and interest than will behaviors seen tointentional.

Attributions (or Nonverbal Mirroring 73

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Those who are told that another acted purposefully will be more likely to assume thatthe other meant to communicate something to them than will those who are told thatanother acted without clear intent. In this case, those who perceive their behaviors weremirrored intentionally will be more likely to assume that their partners tried to communicatetheir similarity to and interest in the respondent.

MethodOverview

Confederates in this study were trained to mirror participants' behaviors, and followingtheir interaction with a confederate, the participants in two treatment groups were told thatthe behaviors were done either intentionally or unintentionally. These bi-polar groups werechosen as representative of the extremes in behavioral attributions, although they do notreflect all of the choices people can make when they interpret another's nonverbalbehavior. Further, they are the attributions given to the participants by the experimenterrather than more naturally occurring attributions. A control group was included to assess theevaluations made without a pre-determined attribution.

Participants

Volunteers for this study were 60 undergraduates enrolled in communication courses ata large eastern university. They each had the opportunity to get course credit for writing aeport about their experience in the study. 48 of the participants were female.r

Procedure

Participants were asked to help in a study investigating topics in small talk. When theyarrived at the study, they met another student (a confederate) who was to be their partner ina five-minute videotaped interaction. The pair was brought into a room and asked to engagein small talk until the assistant working the camera instructed them to stop. The coordinatorthen asked the participant to begin the conversation.

After one minute of conversation, the camera-assistant pressed his stopwatch to signalto the confederate that time had elapsed. At this barely audible trigger, the confederatebegan to mirror the nonverbal behaviors of the participant without altering his or herconversation pattern. The confederate kept mirroring the participant's behaviors until theassistant let the pair know the conversation was complete. The camera-assistant thenpretended to make a choice between the members of the pair, but he always gave the tapeto the confederate and instructed him/her to go to another room. The participant was askedto wait outside the room until told to enter.

After enough time passed for the confederate to have ostensibly viewed the tape andcompleted a questionnaire, the participant was asked to enter the room. At this point, theparticipants were placed into one of three groups that were randomly assigned andcounter-balanced. (The confederates were unaware of the condition to ensure theirbehavior remained the same across interactions). The deliberate/intentional conditionparticipants were instructed that the experimenter had watched the videotape and noticedthat their partner seemed to be mirroring their nonverbal behaviors. When asked about this,the partner replied that he/she had "done this intentionally, although did not say why." Forthose in the unintentional treatment, the experimenter said that when asked about thebehavior, the partner responded that he/she was "unaware that [he/she] was doing this,that it was unintentional." Finally, there was a control group who watched the videotape

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with no instructions except that, like the others, they would be completing a questionnaireabout the interaction and their partner following the completion of the tape. Theparticipants then viewed the tape, completed the questionnaire, and were debriefed aboutthe study. .

Confederate Behaviors

Five confederates (four male) were trained extensively to mirror the behaviors ofanother during interactions. The behaviors they learned to mirror included posture, facialexpressions, direction of gaze, vocal tones, head, arm, leg, and trunk movement. These cuesare those that have been studied in previous research on nonverbal synchrony and mirroring(e.g., Bavelas et al., 1988; Harrigan et al., 1985; Kendon, 1970; La France & Broadbent,1976), and the composite was included in order to increase the likelihood that the behaviorswould be noticed.

For example, if the respondent crossed his/her left leg and shook his/her foot, theconfederate would cross his/her right leg and shake that foot at the same pace so that is wasa mirror image of the participant's behavior. At the same time, the confederate would use asimilar vocal tone and pitch as the respondent, laughing and pausing if the participant did.The confederates were trained to alter their behavior slowly after the participants changedtheir movements or facial expressions so that the movement did not seem too artificial. Tobe sure the confederates were using these behaviors, a subset (N = 30) of the videotapeswere coded for the differences in use of behavioral mirroring between the first (non-mirroring) and fourth (mirroring) minutes of the interaction.

Manipulation Check

To see if the participants accepted the intent attribution made by the experimenter, andto assess how the control group perceived the intentionality of their partners' behaviors, theparticipants were asked to rate the degree to which their partner's behaviors were intendedor unintended, deliberate or spontaneous, and controlled or not controlled. These itemswere embedded within the entire measurement of the participants' perceptions ofbehaviors, and were rated on 7-point scales with 1 indicating a greater degree of intent.

Dependent Variables

Personality judgments. Two scales were used to assess the participants' perceptions oftheir partners. As in a recent investigation (Manusov, 1991), Tetlock's (1980) scale ofdispositional attributions was used. This instrument measures perceptions of competence,self-confidence, and overall social evaluation. Further, in line with Sabatelli and Rubin's(1986) beliefs about the consequences of effectively using spontaneous nonverbal cues, anassessment was made about the confederates' interpersonal attractiveness. This scalemeasures beliefs about another's warmth and likableness.

Behavioral judgments. Following the review of research noting differences in intention-ally or unintentionally encoded behavior, participants were asked to assess their partner'snonverbal cues on 7-point semantic differential scales, with scores of 7 indicating morefavorable perceptions on that variable. For example, overall positivity of the behaviors wasmeasured on three scales: favorable/unfavorable, good/bad, positive/negative. Scores of 1indicated highly positive or favorable perceptions. Redundancy was based on two items:repetitious/not repetitious and redundant/not redundant. Sincerity was assessed with scalesmeasuring authentic/unauthentic and sincere/insincere. The disjointed nature of the

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behaviors was measured with disjointed/not disjointed and smooth/not smooth, and claritywas scaled with two items: ambiguous/not ambiguous and clear/not clear. Finally,exaggeration was assessed by exaggerated/not exaggerated and overdone/not overdone.

Relational messages. Rapport was measured by a scale developed by La France andBroadbent (1976). Participants were asked to complete three semantic differential itemsabout what their partner communicated to them. These included rapport/no rapport,involvement/disinterest, and togetherness/separateness. Lower numbers indicated greaterperceptions of rapport. Communicated messages of involvement/interest and similaritywere taken from Burgoon and Hale's (1987) relational messages scale which includesLikert-type measures of partner's nonverbal messages. These were rated on 7-point scaleswhere 7 indicated greater similarity and interest.

ResultsConfederate Behavior

Two trained coders reviewed 30 randomly chosen videotapes during either the first orfourth minutes of the interactions. The coders were unaware of the interaction period theywere coding. For each of interactions, they rated the confederates' overall behaviors for thedegree to which they appeared to mirror the participant's behavior. These ratings weremade on three 5-point semantic differential scales based on conceptualizations of mimeticbehavior and included mirroring/not mirroring, in sync/not in sync, and coordinating/notcoordinating where higher ratings indicated greater mirroring. The alpha reliability for thisscale was .87. A t-test was then run to see if the confederates' behaviors were adequatelymore mimetic after the first minute of interaction. The results were significant, t(1,14) =-6.05, p < .001 (first minute M = 2.6, fourth minute M = 3.9).

Particular behaviors were also coded. These included 5-point ratings (with highnumbers indicating greater mirroring) for the degree to which the confederate mirrored thefollowing behaviors: posture, hand movements, leg movements, head movements, andfacial expressions. Unfortunately the tapes were not of sufficient quality to allow for checkson vocal and verbal behavior. The variables had adequate interrater reliability, (alpha = .55for face to .77 for posture). In all cases, t-tests showed that the confederates altered theirbehavior during the mirroring manipulation, and that the change was in the expecteddirection. See Table 1.

Manipulation Check

The alpha reliability for the intent manipulation check was .72. A oneway analysis ofvariance was then run to see if there were significant differences between the three groupson perceptions of behavioral intent and to assess the mean for the control group. The testwas significant, F (2, 57) = 10.61 p < .001, and a Student-Newman-Kuels post hoc analysis

TABLE 1 Means and Tests of Significance for Behavior Checks

Variable

PostureHand MovementsLeg MovementsHead MovementsFacial Expressions

Non-MirroringMean

2.202.132.332.302.46

MirroringMean

3.803.904.003.373.30

t Value*

-6.90-5.90-6.17-4.98-4.00

•All t-values are significant at the .001 level, df(1,14)

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showed that there were significant differences between all three groups on perceived intent.The deliberate group mean was 2.68, the control mean was 3.51, indicating a somewhatintentional perception of the nonverbal behaviors that occurred in the interaction, and theunintentional group mean was 4.21. The experimental manipulation thus appeared to besuccessful.

Dependent Variable Reliabilities

Personality assessments. Alpha reliabilities for Tetlock's (1980) subscales were .77 forcompetence, .79 for social evaluation, and .21 for self-confidence. The latter measure wasleft out of subsequent analyses because of poor reliability. Sabatelli and Rubin's (1986)measure of interpersonal attractiveness had an alpha reliability of .74.

Perceptions of behavior. The alpha reliabilities for the behavioral scales of favorableness,redundancy, sincerity, disjointedness, exaggeration, and clarity were .84, .79, .87, .55, .79,and .69 respectively. Although the reliability for disjointedness was somewhat low, it wasretained in the analysis for conceptual completeness.

Rapport and relational messages. The alpha reliability for La France and Broadbent's(1976) rapport measure was .87. The relational messages of similarity and involvementtaken from the relational message coding scale by Burgoon and Hale (1987) had reliabilitiesof .67 and .88 respectively.

Hypotheses

Oneway Anovas were used for all of the analyses. Further, all post hoc comparisonswere made using the Student-Newman-Kuels (SNK) test. Scores of 1 indicate more positiverankings on these scales.

Hypothesis one predicted that there would be differences on personality judgmentsbased on the intent manipulation. The Anova for social evaluation was not significant, butthere was a significant difference for perceptions of competence, F (2, 57) = 3.20, p < .05,eta2 = .06, and for interpersonal attractiveness, F (2, 57) = 4.80, p < .01, eta2 = .19. Themeans for competence were 3.53 for the unintentional group, 3.75 for deliberate, and 3.20for the control, with low numbers indicating greater competence. The SNK test showed thesignificance was due to differences between the deliberate and control groups. Interper-sonal attractiveness means were 2.97 for unintentional, 3.23 for deliberate, and 2.29 for thecontrol group. Post hoc analyses showed that the control group differed from both othergroups. See Table 2. This provides partial support for the first hypothesis. Power for thesetests was approximately .65 for a medium effect size.

The research question asked whether perceptions of behaviors would be differentbased on attributed intent. Oneway Anovas found significant differences for favorableness,F (2, 57) = 8.06, p < .001, eta2 = .33) with post hoc tests showing the difference due to thecontrol group varying from the two others, sincerity F (2, 57) = 6.19, p < .004, eta2 = .51and SNK tests finding the difference due to the control and deliberate treatments,

TABLE 2 Means

Variable

CompetenceSocial EvaluationSocial Attractiveness

and Tests of Significance for Personality Assessments

IntentionalMean

3.753.053.23

UnintentionalMean

3.532.972.97

ControlMean

3.202.622.29

F

3.201.764.80

P.05*n.s..01*

* Intentional group differed significantly from control group.

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TABLE 3 Means and Tests of Significance for Perceptions of Behaviors

Variable

FavorableSincerityDisjointedExaggeratedRedundancyClarity

IntentionalMean

3.204.143.663.753.653.26

UnintentionalMean

3.103.263.762.823.973.03

Contro/Mean

2.092.602.842.683.102.99

F

8.066.193.663.201.391.15

P.001*.003**.032*.048***

n.s.n.s.

'Control group mean significantly different from both other groups."Control group mean significantly different from international group mean."'Intentional group mean significantly different from unintentional group mean.

disjointedness, F (2, 57) = 3.66, p < .03, eta2 = .18 with SNK tests finding a differencebetween the control and both others, and exaggerated, F (2, 57) = 3.20, p < .05, eta2 =.25) with the deliberate and unintentional treatments differing from one another. Thedifferences were all in the hypothesized direction. There were no significant differences forthe measures of redundancy and clarity. See Table 3 for means.

Hypothesis 2 predicted that there would be significant differences in perceptions ofrapport based on the experimental manipulations. The f-test was not significant (F (2,57) = 2.37, p < .10).

Finally, hypothesis 3 stated that the deliberate treatment would result in the belief thatone's partner communicated the relational messages of similarity and interest/involvement.Oneways found that there were group differences for similarity messages, F (2, 57) = 6.49,p < .003, eta2 = .26, with post hoc tests showing a significant difference between thedeliberate (M = 3.54) and control groups (M = 4.63) and for relational messages ofinterest, F (2, 57) = 8.81, p < .001, eta2 = .32. The post hoc test found differences betweenthe unintentional (M = 4.50) and deliberate (M = 3.96) treatments and the control group(M = 5.15). See Table 4. These differences were not in the hypothesized direction,however.

DiscussionThis paper provides a partial answer to questions regarding the role of intent attributions

on subsequent perceptions of nonverbal behavior. In particular, the study measured someways in which beliefs about the degree of intent behind another's use of mimetic behaviorled to evaluations of the sender's personality, behavior, and relational messages. It wasfound that people who made their own assessments of their partner's behavior believed thatthere was some intent behind the message, and this seems to resemble Bavelas et al.'s(1986a, 1986b, 1988) conceptualization of mirroring behavior as a social representation ofinternal feelings rather than an endogenous occurrence. Further, those who made this

TABLE

Variable

RapportSimilarityIntimacy

4 Means

IntentionalMean

4.793.543.96

and Tests of Significance

UnintentionalMean

4.504.044.50

for Relational Messages

ControlMean

3.714.635.15

F

2.366.508.81

Pn.s.

.003*

.001**

*Means for control and intentional conditions were significantly different.*'Control group mean significantly different from both other groups.

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choice evaluated their partner as more competent and socially attractive than those whowere led to believe that the behaviors were deliberate or unintentional. They also saw theconfederates' behaviors as less disjointed and exaggerated and as more favorable andsincere than one or both of the other attributors.

In terms of relational messages, the deliberate group assumed their partners delivered astronger message of dissimilarity and disinterest. This result was contradictory to thehypotheses but consonant with the above findings. Although it was suggested that receiverswho believed a person acted with intent would view that person as sending more clearrelational messages, the meaning that was read into the behaviors was of more purposefulnegative tone.

The results presented here imply that the biggest difference between groups was basedprimarily on the control group differing from the others, particularly the intentionaltreatment. As mentioned, the people in this group appeared to see mirroring much likeBavelas et al. (1986a; 1986b) conceptualized it, and this resulted in relatively favorableviews of the participant and his/her behaviors, although not necessarily greater rapport.

Besides the apparently manipulated feeling suggested by those in the intentional group,those in the unintentional treatment may also have responded more negatively than thecontrol group because of a possible "discounting effect."1 That is, those who were told thattheir partner did not mean to act as they did may also have assumed that their partner didnot mean to send the positive relational messages or was playing them down in some way.This too could lead to less positive feelings and perceptions than would occur in a more"typical" interaction.

Overall, making the participants in the treatment group aware of the behaviors(whether sent with supposedly clear or no intent) seemed enough to result in less favorableimpressions. This manipulation is not unlike other contexts where another person may leadan interactant to make a certain attribution about a third interactant (e.g., "I think she maytry to show you she's interested in you" or "He may not be aware of it, but he seems rathernervous to be talking to you"). Nonetheless, it does not mirror most real-life interactions.

As a follow-up to the questionnaire, participants were asked to write down anyintentions or motivations that had come into their minds while interacting with or watchingtheir partners. While only about half of the participants did so, some interesting trendsemerged. Those who were told that their partner mirrored their behaviors deliberatelyfound specific, and generally negative, reasons for the confederate's actions. Respondentsmentioned manipulation, mocking, being annoying, and attempting to make the situationuncomfortable as possible motives within their partners. Although a few generated morepositive motives (e.g., "trying to make me feel comfortable" or "changing the rapport"),most also said that the actual result was greater discomfort.

In the unintentional condition, participants were most likely to note some personalityfactor or psychological state that could account for the mirrored behaviors (shy, guarded,laid back) or talked about the surface nature of the conversation ("He wanted to find outsome general information about me"). These responses seem to indicate that the behaviorswere generally seen as endogenous occurrences, only somewhat influenced by the socialsetting. For those in the control group, the responses were based primarily in factors of thesituation or context, highlighting an awareness of the social variable behind mirroringbehavior. Participants were more likely to mention conversational topics, focusing on thestudy goal, and specific interaction rules. Overall, these responses were more positive intone than either of the other two treatments.

This study is based on the argument that interpretations for nonverbal behaviors may beinfluenced by perceptual biases, and it provides some evidence in support of this claim. In

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so doing, it shows the potential consequences that such biases may have. This is particularlynoteworthy for researchers interested in relational development, because the evaluationone makes for another's behaviors may influence whether or not the attributor will pursue arelationship with the other. For example, if one interactant decided that the otherpurposefully communicated positive relational messages to him/her, the former may bemore likely to seek out a relationship with the other. This may be hampered, however, bybeliefs that the other was insincere in communicating this message.

Once a relationship is ongoing, the stage of and satisfaction with the relationship mayact as further biases in intent attributions. Manusov (1990) found, for example, that peoplewho are dissatisfied in their relationships are more likely to see negative nonverbal behaviorsas intended by their partner. This is consistent with attributions made for a number ofinteraction behaviors (Baucom, 1987; Fincham & Beach, 1988).

Although the results of the present study suggest some possible consequences of intentattributions, the present study is based only on intentionally-encoded behaviors. Much ofwhat occurs in interactions is done with much less intentionality, and it has been argued thatdegree of encoded intent produces very different types of behavior (Motley & Camden,1988). Until more research is done measuring both actual and perceived differences, therelative effects of each cannot be determined. This study should be seen as shedding light onsome occurrences that may result from beliefs about intent. More work is needed todetermine if there are strong enough factors that differentiate nonverbal behavior types thatwill override an interactant's preconceived ideas about another's degree of intentionality.

The study itself has some limitations. First, the confederate and participant roles weregender-skewed. Five out of six confederates were male and over 80 percent of therespondents were female. This cross-sex consistency is likely to have played a key role in thetypes of intentions perceived to be motivating the confederates. Only one respondent (inthe unintentional condition) assumed that the confederate acted as he did because heseemed to be interested in her romantically. Rules against making this kind of publicstatement may have kept others from writing this as a possible motive, however. Further, allof the ratings were quite positive. The fact that these results came primarily from womenmay have played a role in this.

Second, the laboratory setting may have influenced the reasons perceived as responsi-ble for the confederate's behavior. Although few respondents claimed to have "suspected"the confederate as being part of the study, the fact that the conversation was taped as part ofa research project may have altered the ways in which the interactants perceived themotives of their partners.

Third, while most respondents said that they had noticed the mirroring either during theinteraction or on the videotape, the extent to some of the participants were aware of thebehaviors may be questionable. Although not the goal of the investigation, the ambiguity ofthe consciousness level regarding perceptions of the mirrored behaviors makes it difficult todiscuss how effective the behaviors were in eliciting perceptions of rapport. In fact, thescores on the rapport measures tended to be quite neutral, indicating that the participantsmade few assumptions about increased or decreased togetherness being the result of theinteraction.

Despite these limitations, this study suggests that people are affected by the attributionsthey make (or are given) for another's nonverbal behaviors. In this case, the attributionsacted as perceptual and evaluative filters, influencing the participants to see and makeinterpretations for another's behaviors in a certain way. Future research should investigatethe result of more "real-life" attributions, those made by the participant for another'snaturally occurring behavior. Hopefully, this proposed research can help our understanding

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of the ways in which people make choices about others' intent within communicativeinteractions.

NOTES

1 This insight was made by one of the anonymous reviewers of this paper.

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