MH370 Aggregate Debris Drift Analysis

A probabilistic analysis based on Adrift forward data, and confirmed/suspected debris discoveries to date

Brock McEwen

June 30, 2016

Executive Summary• Study uses Adrift forward data and multiple debris discoveries to rank possible MH370 impact points

• Ranking based on how well each point explains where and when debris was found

• Partial credit given for nearness in time and place

• Top marks to locations which explain all/nearly all finds

• Tested impact points covered the entire Indian Ocean

• Incorporates all confirmed and suspected discoveries

• including Tanzania suspected flap (June 23, 2016)

• Averaging techniques were varied, to test sensitivity

• Broad conclusions• Data suggests many locations can explain all debris

• but none are anywhere near the search box

• and the best are nowhere near Inmarsat’s “7th Arc”

• Even if only “confirmed” debris is used, search box is strongly counter-indicated

• In fact, finds at Réunion and South Africa are among the hardest to reconcile

• Results suggest another large gap between search strategy and what the evidence can support• The possibility of an impact nearer the equator must be strongly considered

• An audit of MH370 search leadership generally - and the Inmarsat data particularly - is strongly recommended2

Debris says search here

Searching only here

Goals and Approach• Goal: use 1 drift model - and up to 16 debris items - to assess all possible Indian Ocean impact points

• Different from earlier studies:

1: Really a “study of studies”: each primary study is accessible by following the link on Slide 30 2: Explored implications of the apparent lack of debris on Australian shores; see link on Slide 303. Readers are encouraged to read the study at http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/2652

• Approach: use adrift.org.au forward “starts in March” data to rank potential Indian Ocean impact points• With ranking based on how well each coordinate explains the given surface debris set

• Similar to approach of Drs. Henrik Rydberg (2015) and Richard Godfrey (2016), except:

• Weights added to credit nearness of arrival time and discovery location

• Focus shifted from first/sum of probabilities to conditional tail expectation (“average of worst x results”)

• Restriction removed that impact must have occurred on 7th Arc

• Implicitly assumes that drift data is representative, and that debris drifted naturally to discovery point• Reality, of course, may well have been quite anomalous, on either front

• Many debris sets merit consideration (study will add these in 1 set at a time, to isolate impact)3

# of assessed…Conclusion

study author date models debris impact sitesMH370 Debris Drift Studies – A Comparative Analysis1 McEwen Dec ’15 9 1 (various) Search box counter-indicatedMH370 Probabilistic analysis of Shoreline Debris McEwen Apr ’16 1 02 Arc 7 34-37°S Search box counter-indicatedWas the ‘Curtin Boom’ MH370 hitting the water? McEwen Apr ’16 1 11 Maldives More indicated than search boxWhat the 9 debris finds may tell us about the MH370 end point3 Godfrey Jun ’16 1 9 Arc 7 28-40°S Search box counter-indicatedMH370 Aggregate Debris Drift Analysis (this study) McEwen Jun ‘16 1 16 Indian Ocean Search box counter-indicated

Why the “Adrift” Model?• Well-respected drift model

• Dr. Erik van Sebille quoted extensively during flaperon coverage

• Well-respected by (and respectful of) peers

• Well-documentedSee "Origin, dynamics and evolution of ocean garbage patches from observed surface drifters" (Sebille, England, Froyland - Dec, 2012)

• Heavily used model: the “Independent Group”, for example, has made copious use of Adrift

Dr. Henrik Rydberg: August 5, 2015: http://www.duncansteel.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/debris-origin.pdf

Dr. Richard Godfrey: March 24, 2016: http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/2462

March 31, 2016: http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/2495

April 2, 2015: http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/2536

May 11, 2016: http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/2631

June 2, 2016: http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/2652

• Data available online• Buillt-in download function permits data collection for free use (with conditions) for academic purposes

• Caveats• Use of Adrift.org.au model not meant to suggest superiority over all other models

• The ocean is a chaotic system, with significant potential for variance between model and reality

• While raw data was pulled from Adrift.org.au, I take full responsibility for any errors in data, processing, or interpretation; furthermore, all conclusions are mine alone, and may not reflect those of the raw data provider.

4

Tested potential impact locations• Entire Indian Ocean: generally, 6N to 44S, and from 40E to 120E

• Spaced at 2 degree intervals of latitude and longitude (745 test points)

How were these impact locations ranked?• For each starting point, Adrift model shows probability of an item

drifting to each ending point• Probabilities recomputed every 2-months

• For each combination of starting point and debris item…• Find Adrift probabilities for all nearby months and coordinates

• Weight each probability based on how near it is to the exact month & coordinates of the find (see charts at right), and then sum them all up

• Score for each starting point = average of worst x of all debris scores• Argument for large x: “don’t rule out a starting point just because model

can’t explain a couple items; model could be way off”

• Argument for small x: “who cares how well model explains best finds, if several finds look impossible”

• x will be varied through a range of values, to understand sensitivity

5

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5Month modeled minus month found

Weight

latlon -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3

3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0

2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0

1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

0 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4

-1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

-2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0

-3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0

Proximity weights - Base

Date weights - Base

Debris Used• Criteria:

• Suspected aircraft part (chasing irrelevant flotsam will corrupt results); see Appendix A for Category 4 details

• regardless of confirmation status (these seem to be taking a very long time, now)

• regardless of Inmarsat data compatibility (it is the Inmarsat-indicated search box whose validity we are testing)

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Category # Location Item Finder Date found Coordinates Month Lat Lon1 = officials“confirmed” MH370 origin (as of June 26, 2016)

1 Reunion Island Flaperon Begue Jul 29, 2016 21.115°S, 55.536°E 17 -21 562 Klein Brak, SA Engine cowling Luckhoff Dec 23, 2015 34.086°S, 22.146°E 21 -35 223 Xai Xai, Mozambique Flap fairing Lotter Dec 30, 2015 25.060°S, 33.696°E 21 -24 354 Vilankulos, Mozambique Tail stabilizer Gibson Feb 26, 2016 22.089°S, 35.519°E 24 -22 365 Rodrigues Island Interior wall Dominique/Vitry Mar 30, 2016 19.703°S, 63.427°E 25 -20 63

2 = rash of finds in May, 2016

6 Bernache, Mauritius Exterior Tourist May 10, 2016 20.021°S, 57.694°E 27 -20 587 Maputo, Mozambique Exterior von Bursgdorff May 22, 2016 26.083°S, 32.763°E 27 -26 348 Gris-Gris, Mauritius Exterior CG Foot Patrol May 24, 2016 20.522°S, 57.524°E 27 -21 589 Unknown, Mozambique Exterior Tourist unknown unknown 27 -25 35

3 = rash of finds in June, 2016

10 Raike Bay, Madagascar Exterior Gibson Jun 6, 2016 16.894°S, 49.906°E 27 -17 5011 Raike Bay, Madagascar Exterior “FB” Gibson Jun 6, 2016 16.894°S, 49.906°E 27 -17 5012 Raike Bay, Madagascar Interior screen Gibson Jun 6, 2016 16.894°S, 49.906°E 27 -17 5013 Kojani, Tanzania Wing flap? Locals Jun 23, 2016 5.032°S, 39.776°E 28 -5 40

4 = Maldives finds, May-Sept, 2015

14 Vabbinfaru, Maldives Wing Resort staff May 31, 2015 4.310°N, 73.423°E 15 4 7315 Maamendhoo, Maldives Exterior Mohamed Shifah Aug 12, 2015 1.818°N, 73.389°E 17 2 7316 Goidhoo, Maldives Hinge Locals Sep 15, 2015 4.873°N, 72.998°E 18 5 73

Further details: https://twitter.com/Bookofresearch/status/745609428615979008 (BookOfResearch) & http://www.duncansteel.com/archives/2495 (Godfrey)Consistent with R. Godfrey treatment, coordinates slightly shifted in two instances, to align with Adrift’s definition of the coastline

Adrift’s raw aggregate arrival probabilities, by month and by item

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Category 1 Category 2

Category 3

Category 4

These charts verify that each piece “has a chance” of being compatible with at least some impact locations

Key arrival times

Klein Brak takes awhile to reach from anywhere

Example: test [26°s, 90°e] (Category 1, average of worst 2)• Step 1: for 1st debris item =

flaperon found month 17, find date-weighted total probability of drifting from [26°s, 90°e] to [21°s, 56°e]:

• Step 2: repeat for each coordinate within 3° in all directions, assigning less weight as distance increases:

• Step 3: repeat for all 9 confirmed debris items:

8

Months adrift: 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 Totalvs. date found: -15 -13 -11 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 +1 +3 +5

Adrift probability: 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.05% 0.31% 0.30% 0.09% 0.06% 0.21% 0.10% 0.04% 1.17%…times date weights: n/a n/a n/a 0.30 0.51 0.84 0.97 1.00 0.60 0.05 0.00= date-weighted prob: 0.02% 0.16% 0.25% 0.09% 0.06% 0.13% 0.01% 0.00% 0.71%

Item Location WProb RankFlaperon Reunion 10.17% 1Tail stabilizer Vilankukos, Moz. 3.37% 2Interior wall Rodrigues 3.07% 3Flap fairing Xai Xai, Moz. 2.50% 4Engine cowling Klein Brak, SA 1.03% 5

The score for this location would be the average of the worst two

items: 2.50% + 1.03% / 2 = 1.77%

53 54 55 56 57 58 59-18 0.2 0.4 0.2-19 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2-20 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2-21 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4-22 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2-23 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2-24 0.2 0.4 0.2

53 54 55 56 57 58 59-18 0.26% 0.48% 0.35%-19 0.48% 0.52% 0.35% 0.40% 0.38%-20 0.49% 0.44% 0.45% 0.83% 0.88% 0.79% 0.48%-21 0.65% 1.21% 0.78% 0.71% 0.50% 0.86% 1.01%-22 1.16% 0.50% 0.49% 0.66% 0.48% 0.47% 0.89%-23 0.55% 0.73% 0.32% 0.66% 1.04%-24 0.54% 0.51% 0.67%

…= score for this item = weighted sum over all coordinates = 10.17%

Sum of date-weighted probabilities by lat and long …times proximity weights

x

Heat Maps

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• A visual ranking of all possible impact points• “The higher the ranking, the brighter the square”

• For graphing purposes, all rankings are made relative to all other squares in the chart (see Slide 26 for sample absolutes)

• Empty squares indicate either zero or negligible (<5th percentile) total score

• Results are shown for each of four debris sets (1-4 cumulative), and each of four average of worst thresholds

• Map annotations• Red dots: places associated with commonly postulated theories

• from north to south: Kuda Huvadhoo (Maldives), Diego Garcia, Christmas Island

• Yellow dots: places associated with acoustic “events” compatible with MH370 range from last known position

• From west to east: reported event time event location more details

• Curtin “triangulated” Sept, 2014 Mar 8, 2014, 00:25 UTC [2.1°N, 69.3°E]

• Curtin “original” June, 2014 Mar 8, 2014, 00:39 UTC [5.9°S, 77.2°E]

• Chinese seismologists March, 2014 Mar 7, 2014 18:55 UTC [3.1°N, 96.9°E] USTC article

• Search box: plot of actual towfish scanning conducted in the past 15 months

• 99% contained to a diagonal strip running along Inmarsat’s 7th Arc between roughly 36.5°S to 40°S

Curtin summary

Results: Category 1, average of worst 4

10

Results: Category 1, average of worst 3

11

Results: Category 1, average of worst 2

12

Results: Category 1, average of worst 1

13

Results: Category 1+2, average of worst 4

14

Results: Category 1+2, average of worst 3

15

Results: Category 1+2, average of worst 2

16

Results: Category 1+2, average of worst 1

17

Results: Category 1+2+3, average of worst 4

18

Results: Category 1+2+3, average of worst 3

19

This run used as baseline to test sensitivity to looser definitions of

“nearness”: see Slide 40

Results: Category 1+2+3, average of worst 2

20

This run used as baseline to test sensitivity to tighter definitions of

“nearness”: see Slide 41

Results: Category 1+2+3, average of worst 1

21

today

Results: Category 1+2+3+4, average of worst 4

22

Results: Category 1+2+3+4, average of worst 3

23

Results: Category 1+2+3+4, average of worst 2

24

Results: Category 1+2+3+4, average of worst 1

25

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

[-28, 100] [-30, 98] [-32, 96] [-34, 94] [-36, 92] [-38, 88] [-40, 84] [-20, 96]

Absolute Probabilities - Category 1+2, Worst 2

Rodrigues interior

Mozambique exterior

Mossel Bay "Roy"

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

[-28, 100] [-30, 98] [-32, 96] [-34, 94] [-36, 92] [-38, 88] [-40, 84] [-4, 68]

Absolute Probabilities - Category 1+2+3+4, Worst 4

Vabbinfaru wing

Rodrigues interior

Mossel Bay "Roy"

Maamendhoo surface

Goidhoo hinge

Absolute values – comparing selected points

26

This is why there is someheat on the 7th Arc…

…but this is why it’s not very much This is why there is some

heat on the 7th Arc…

…but this is why it’s not very much

“best of worst” scores are generally an order of magnitude higher off-arc than on-arc - even for some confirmed items (e.g. “Roy”)

Anyone claiming the debris supports this or that part of Arc 7 should admit that the debris, by itself, tends to counter-indicate the entire arc

selected 7th Arc coordinates selected 7th Arc coordinatesoff-arc off-arc

The presumption the Inmarsat data is valid has forced otherwise promising locations out of frame

Observations• Slides 21 and 25 show that, surprisingly, many impact locations can explain all debris discoveries

• However, none of these locations are anywhere near the search box

• Heat maps suggest “average of worst 2 or 3” may offer the most insight• “Average of worst 4” tends to underweight problematic debris; “average of worst 1” tends to overweight it

• The lower the value (i.e. test location asked to explain all finds), the more counter-indicated the search box

• Even if only “confirmed” debris are used, the current search box is strongly counter-indicated• In fact, the earliest finds in Réunion and South Africa are among the hardest to reconcile (see Appendix C)

• near-convergence of slides 12 & 16 suggests the worst among 5 is usually also the worst among 9

• So this should not come as news to informed search leaders – yet search strategy has not responded

• If the Maldives debris is validated, the entire 7th Arc would be called into serious doubt• Underscores the need for serious research into these items (see Appendix), to establish origin

• False narratives planted in the media resemble a deliberate attempt to push this evidence out of frame

• Urgency is magnified by the unsuccessful deep sea search results to date, and its apparently imminent wind-up

• Results suggest further debris finds in East Africa and surrounding islands are unlikely to move the needle• After so long at sea, the “where and when” of such finds now supports nearly every popular theory 27

Conclusions and Recommendations• The only portion of Arc 7 not receiving a “zero” in this study is too far north to fit the fuel/BFO analysis

• suggests that impacts other than on Arc 7 should be carefully considered

• In particular: equatorial impact sites should be carefully investigated, given that they also explain…• lack of debris on Australian shorelines in 2014 (current search box makes no sense from that perspective, either)

• acoustic recordings which, if not MH370 impacting/imploding, were a curious coincidence

• the October, 2014 claim that debris was expected in Sumatra (only rational if impact was equatorial)

• a mass sighting by Maldives islanders of a large, low-flying aircraft, for which official explanations fall well short

• Results suggest a significant disconnect between search strategy and what the evidence can support• This disconnect is consistent with a broad and disturbing pattern of search dysfunction

• See Slide 30 for prior tests of the integrity of search decisions and strategy

• These gaps are closed not by trying a new search area, but by holding search leadership to account

• A rigorous public enquiry is strongly recommended• into MH370 search conduct in general

• into the Inmarsat data in particular

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Limitations• Adrift data becomes less helpful over short or long horizons

• Too short: actual weather can significantly reduce prediction accuracy

• Too long: origins become increasingly difficult to deduce with precision

• Particularly for Adrift data, which assumes objects “bounce” off of shorelines, when in reality some would “stick”

• Assumptions must be made• Debris may have come to their locations by means other than natural drift

• Scoring system (“nearness” weights, “worst of” formula) may be improved

• Peer review of all assumptions and analysis is warmly welcomed:• Adrift raw drift data: (please deal directly with Dr. Erik van Sebille, its owner)

• MS Access database*: here (13Mb)

• MS Excel heat mapper: here (5Mb)* Most raw data removed, out of respect for both file size restrictions and Dr. Sebille’s intellectual property

• Parallel analyses: it is hoped this study will encourage similar work• GEOMAR (2016) derived unconditional heat maps broadly consistent with results published here

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Further Work

AcknowledgementsI’d like to express my gratitude to Dr. Erik van Sebille: this study would not be possible without his expertise, the Adrift model in which it is embedded, and his generosity in making his base data freely available for purposes such as these.

I’d also like to thank the members of the Independent Group for their dedication and expertise generally, and Drs. Henrik Rydberg and Richard Godfrey for their work on these types of study in particular. I’d also like to express my appreciation to Dr. Duncan Steel for his vital and patient assistance over the past two years.

Finally, I’d like to acknowledge all loved ones of those on board MH370, for their courage in the face of such enormous hardship. I do not know how you manage. It is for your closure that I strive.

Date Title Tested integrity of… Available

Jan.16/’15 Time to investigate the investigators 2014 search decisions/directives here (pdf, 2Mb)

May22/’15 Stochastic simulation of hypothetical MH370 end-of-flight scenarios 2015 decision to widen search box here (pdf, 2Mb)

Dec.7/’15 MH370 debris drift studies – a comparative analysis search box feasibility in light of flaperon here (pdf, 13Mb)

Apr.18/’16 MH370: probabilistic analysis of shoreline debris search box feasibility, given no Australian debris here (pdf, 12Mb)

Apr.24/’16 Was the ‘Curtin Boom’ MH370 hitting the water? assumption only Arc 7 impact explains debris to date here (pdf, 9Mb)

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Also by the author

Appendix A: Support for including “Category 4” debris

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• Between May and September of 2015, several items were found on the Maldives archipelago’s shorelines

• These have been loudly discounted at various times, on various grounds:• Incompatible with the Inmarsat data-indicated impact location”

• quite true, per slides 22-25

• but if we are testing the Inmarsat data’s validity, we cannot use this fact alone to exclude from consideration

• “Surfboard”

• not true: scmp news article

• “Officially dismissed”

• not true: no Category 4 item has been reported as assessed - or even collected - by Malaysian officials

• furthermore, only “most” (?) collected items were ruled out: cbc news article

• “Detritus from a capsized barge”

• not true: cargo was a set of wall panels for a resort construction project

• and capsizing post-dated the Vabbinfaru object by several months

• However, the following slides present a case for considering these items as potential MH370 debris

Item 14: found……in Vabbinfaru, Maldives

…by Banyan Tree resort staff...on May 31, 2015

32

33

Cross-section?

Carbonfabric?

Bondingadhesive?

Vabbinfaru Piece #1: COULD it be from MH370?

Taper?

A320 outboard flap:http://www.compositesworld.com/articles/reducing-manufacturing-cost-via-rtm “NO STEP”: courtesy Blaine

Gibson (used by permission)‘Potted’Nomex?

https://www.flickr.com/photos/jeroenakkermans/14711470172/in/album-72157645416293108/

https://www.flickr.com/photos/jeroenakkermans/14701535282/in/album-72157645790319631/9M-MRD (MH17):

Lettering?

not ‘F’

partial letter aligns with top of ‘IC’: indicates ‘T’

Trailing edge wedge?

http://www.google.com/patents/US20130299061

All images outlined in red were of an object found May, 2015 in Vabbinfaru, Maldives: https://www.facebook.com/modrindo/posts/10152868169331503

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Item 14b: found……in Vabbinfaru, Maldives

…by Banyan Tree resort staff...on May 31, 2015

Whether this piece “came off” of Item 14 or was found nearby is not yet known; regardless, not

included as distinct item in study

35

36

Item 15: found……in Maamendhoo, Maldives

…by Mohamed Shifah...on Aug 12, 2015

http://www.vaguthu.mv/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/11110465_877646102271742_1040034922992941532_n67-e1439386538879.jpg

http://www.vaguthu.mv/en/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/11110465_877646102271742_10400349229929

41532_n68-1024x576.jpg

http://www.vaguthu.mv/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/11059966_658583127574870_7234545628701873950_n14-e1439386644100.jpg

https://mobile.twitter.com/drmikehunt/status/631466945485758464/photo/1

Possible engine pylon housing?

37

Item 16: found……in Goidhoo, Maldives

…by locals...on Sep 15, 2015

Possiblehoneycombcore?

Possible interior fragment (cabinet door/hinge)?

http://www.vaguthu.mv/en/28402

http://www.maldivesfinest.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/fire-bottle-1.jpg

http://www.maldivesfinest.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/fire-bottle-2.jpg

Item 17? Found……in Baarah, Maldives

…by locals...on Mar 24, 2014

NOT included in study:(either it is from MH370,

& impact was VERY near Baarah, or it is not, & we ignore)

…but still very interesting…

38

• Model gives partial credit for nearness in both time and space• Weights vary from 1 (perfect fit to actual time and place of find) to 0 (way too far away)

• To pressure-test key conclusions, the speed at which weights drop to 0 was varied• “Tight” = drop to zero more quickly; “loose” = drop more slowly

• To keep number of runs manageable, baselines were selected• Category 1+2+3, Worst of 3 (Slide 19) & Worst of 2 (Slide 20)

• Slide 40 = Slide 19 + loose weights

• Slide 41 = Slide 20 + tight weights

latlon -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3

3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0

2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0

1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

0 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4

-1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2

-2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0

-3 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0

latlon -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3

3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0

2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0

1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0

0 0.2 0.4 0.6 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.2

-1 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.0

-2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.0 0.0

-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0

latlon -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3

3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0

2 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.0

1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3

0 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.5

-1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.3

-2 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.3 0.0

-3 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.3 0.0 0.0

Appendix B: testing sensitivity to arrival time restrictiveness

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

-25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5

Weight

Month modeled minus month actually found

Tight Base Loose

Proximity weights - Base

Proximity weights - LooseProximity weights - Tight

Date weights

39

Appendix B: testing sensitivity to looser definitions of “nearness”

40

Same as Slide 19, except applied loose weights

Appendix B: testing sensitivity to tighter definitions of “nearness”

41

Same as Slide 20, except applied tight weights

Appendix C: Réunion flaperon only

42Incongruity of flaperon with search box should have been understood a year ago

Appendix C: Klein Brak engine cowling (“Roy”) only

43