Public Relations Review 30 (2004) 161–167

Message strategies of Saudi Arabia’s imagerestoration campaign after 9/11

Juyan Zhanga,∗, William L. Benoitb

a Department of Communication, Monmouth University, 400 Cedar Avenue, West Long Branch, NJ 07764, USAb University of Missouri, CA, USA

Received 13 October 2003; received in revised form 1 February 2004; accepted 20 February 2004

Abstract

The research applies Image Restoration Discourse to Saudi Arabia’s attempt to repair its damaged reputationafter 9/11. The country was accused of supporting terrorism and of failing to support a possible U.S. attack on Iraq.It was suggested that by relying heavily on denial and bolstering, the image repair effort was partially successful atdispelling the first concern; it was notably less effective in responding to the second accusation.© 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Keywords:Message strategy; Image restoration campaign; Reputation

1. Introduction: events and accusations

Nations have images, and relations between countries have always been shaped by images (Giffard &Rivenburgh, 2000; Kunczik, 1997). The United States has become the most important target of publicrelations efforts by countries seeking to improve their images (Bennett, 1988; Cutlip, 1997). Althoughimage cultivation is practiced increasingly by nations, it is rare for a country to try to restore a tarnishednational image through crisis management. The image restoration campaign by the Saudi government inthe United States since September 11, 2001 is such a case.

Saudi Arabia’s image in the United States was seriously damaged by its connections with terrorism.The country was home to 15 of the 19 hijackers, and over 100 Saudi citizens made up the bulk of theAfghanistan war prisoners detained at the U.S. Naval base in Guantanamo Bay (Most Guantanamo Baydetainees are Saudis, 2002). Osama Bin Laden was a Saudi national. The country was also accused of

∗ Corresponding author. Fax:+1-732-571-3609.E-mail addresses:juyan z@yahoo.com (J. Zhang), benoitw@missouri.edu (W.L. Benoit).

0363-8111/$ – see front matter © 2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.doi:10.1016/j.pubrev.2004.02.006

162 J. Zhang, W.L. Benoit / Public Relations Review 30 (2004) 161–167

aiding the Palestinian suicide bombers and failing to support U.S. plan to attack Iraq. A Rand Corporationanalyst even accused the country as being “the kernel of evil, the prime mover, the most dangerousopponent” in the Middle East (“Pentagon blasts Saudi Arabia report”, 2002). Two Gallup Polls quantifythe damage to Saudi Arabia’s image in the United States. In February 2001, 47% of respondents reporteda favorable attitude toward Saudi Arabia and 46% were unfavorable (“Overall opinion of Saudi Arabia”,2001). However, a year later (after 9/11), only 27% reported favorable attitudes toward Saudi Arabia andthe unfavorable group had increased to 64% (Overall opinion of Saudi Arabia, 2002). Although the polldid not attempt to ascertain the cause of this shift, surely the accusations sketched above contributed toSaudi Arabia’s image problem. Therefore, we argue that Saudi Arabia’s image suffered damage fromtwo primary accusations. First, it failed to combat terrorism. Second, it did not support the U.S. plan toattack Iraq.

1.1. Image repair campaign

Facing an image crisis, Saudi Arabia launched an extensive image repair campaign from mid-July 2002through early September 2002. The Saudi government spent more than $5 million by the September 11anniversary and hired prominent U.S. public relations firms, law firms, consultants and a media-buyingfirm. Adel al-Jubeir, an adviser to the Saudi government, said that his government was employing Amer-ican political campaign techniques to restore its image: hiring a publicity team, being more accessible tothe press, sending officials on speaking tours, cultivating research organizations and polling Americans ontheir opinions. The Saudi government ran hundreds of television and radio spots in America, placing adsin publications likePeoplemagazine andStars& Stripes(“Worried Saudis pay millions to improve imagein the U.S”, 2002). This study examines the message strategies that the Saudi government employed inrestoring its image in the United States. First we identify which message strategies were employed inthis public relations campaign. Then we evaluate the persuasiveness of this international image repaireffort.

2. Literature review

2.1. Public diplomacy and message strategies

Strategies to shape messages were scarcely attended in public diplomacy research.Manheim andAlbritton (1984)briefly mentioned that public relations firms hired by foreign governments might helpshape message strategies for the client.Zaharna and Villalobos (2000)reported that the U.S. public rela-tions firm hired by the Colombian government coached visiting Colombian officials on their presentations.The public relations firms hired by the Mexican government drafted the embassy’s press releases, factssheets and all media pieces following embassy guidelines.

2.2. Image restoration theory

Benoit’s (1995)image restoration theory is applied to analyze the campaign’s message strategies. Thetheory argues that there are five general options available for self-defense: denial, evading responsibility,reducing offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification (seeTable 1).

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Table 1Typology of image restoration strategies

Strategy Key characteristics Example

DenialSimple denial Did not perform act Tylenol: did not poison capsulesShift the blame Another performed act Tylenol: a “madman” poisoned capsules

Evasion of responsibilityProvocation Responded to act of another Firm moved because of new taxesDefeasibility Lack of information/ability Executive not told meeting was movedAccident Mishap Tree fell on tracks causing train wreckGood intentions Meant well Sears wants to provide good auto repair service

Reducing offensiveness of eventBolstering Stress good traits Exxon’s “swift and competent” cleanup of oil spillMinimization Act is not serious Exxon: few animals killed in oil spillDifferentiation Act is less offensive Sears: unneeded repairs were preventive maintenance, not fraudTranscendence More important values Helping humans justifies testing animalsAttack accuser Reduce accuser’s credibility Coke: Pepsi owns restaurants, competes directly with you forCompensation Reimburse victim Disabled movie-goers given free passes after denied admission to

Corrective action Plan to solve/preventrecurrence of problem

AT&T long-distance upgrades; promised to spend millions moreto improve service

Mortification Apologize AT&T apologized for service interruption

Source: Brinson and Benoit (1999).

3. Method

3.1. Rhetorical analysis

This study employs the method of rhetorical criticism, which helps understand how people “use symbolsto influence one another” (Campbell & Burkholder, 1997). Rhetorical criticism is the “systematic processof illuminating and evaluating” persuasive messages (Andrews, Leff, & Terrill, 1998). Unlike contentanalysis, rhetorical criticism examines the relationship of context and message. The rhetorical critic alsocan make a judgment of the importance of the elements of the message as a gestalt that considers notonly simple frequency but also prominence as indicated by placement, development, and relationship ofideas in the persuasive message(s).

3.2. Texts

The texts were obtained from three sources. The Saudi Embassy website is the most important datasource. All of the news releases, statements and speeches were downloaded from the “News Room” link.Four widely aired TV/Radio spots were also located. Stories about Saudi Arabia in theWashington Postand theNew York Timeswere searched in Lexis-Nexis from September 11 through June 21, 2002, when theArab ministers met in Cairo and decided to launch media campaign in the West (“Arab states start mediacampaign”, 2002). The news stories were screened and those that quoted Saudi news sources were used.

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4. Results

The textual analysis is divided into sections for each accusation and the Saudi responses into strategiesof the typology of Benoit’s image restoration theory.

Accusation 1: “Saudi Arabia supports terrorism, or at least did not actively combat terrorism.”

4.1. Denial

The Saudi Government relied heavily on denial to respond to this criticism. It denied “any connectionto terrorism” (“Crown Prince Abdullah condoles American people”, 2001). It asserted that “there is noproof” that Saudi money went to the Taliban (“Prince Nayef reiterates Kingdom’s rejection of terrorism”,2001). The accusation that Saudi was hesitant to fight terrorism in Afghanistan is “just not true” (“FoxNews’O’Reilly Factor interview with Al-Jubeir”, 2001). Islam “forbids terrorism” (“Saudi royal familycontinues to condole Americans”, 2001) and the terrorists were not “true Muslims” (“Crown PrinceAbdullah’s interview with ‘Time’ magazine”, 2002). Furthermore, Saudi “did not fund (Palestinian)suicide bombers” (“Saudi Arabia does not pay suicide bombers”, 2002).

Next, the Saudi declared that it “stands firm behind efforts” to combat terrorism (“Prince Bandarstresses Kingdom’s stand against terrorism”, 2002). “Everything the U.S. has requested. . . Saudi Arabiahas provided” (“Fox News’ O’Reilly Factor interview with Al-Jubeir”, 2002). Saudi Arabia “has takenmany actions to fight global terrorism” (“Summary Report: Initiatives and actions in the fighting againstterrorism”, 2002). The “Flags” spot reported that Saudi donated “more foreign aid per capita than anyother nation.” Of course, these statements could be dismissed as self-serving. Therefore, third-personendorsement was adopted. The “Bush Quote” spot pointed out that President Bush acknowledged that“As far as the Saudi Arabians go. . . they have been nothing less than cooperative” (“Bush Quote”,2002). The spot “Powell Quote” uses Colin Powell’s words: “Saudi Arabia has been prominent amongthe countries acting against the accounts of terrorist organizations” (“Powell Quote”, 2002). These sourcesmake Saudi Arabia’s denial of the charge more persuasive.

4.2. Attack accuser

A smaller component of the defense enacted the strategy of attacking accusers. Saudi rhetoric assertedthat western media tended to “arbitrarily throw out accusations against Muslims” (“Imam of Makkahcalls for wisdom and reason”, 2001). Saudi Prince said that “90 percent of what the U.S. media saysabout my country is incorrect or misleading.” (Nader, 2002) Such claims could reduce the persuasivenessof those accusations. The Rand analyst who attacked Saudi Arabia received most of the counter attacks:He is “shallow, and not honest about the facts,” and “has barked about these things” just to “drive awedge between our two countries” (“Saudi–U.S. relations discussed with Adel Al-Jubeir, Foreign PolicyAdvisor to Crown Prince Abdullah bin Abdulaziz ‘Meet the Press,’ NBC-TV”, 2002). These statements,if accepted by the audience, would tend to reduce the credibility of the accusations against Saudi Arabia.

4.3. Differentiation

Saudi Arabia could not deny that it had provided assistance to the Palestinian suicide bombers’ families.Instead, it employed differentiation to respond to this accusation. The defense protested that Saudi money

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for Palestine was not to support the bombings but “to put food on their tables and medicine in theirpharmacies.” If some money had gone to the Palestinian suicide bombers’ families, “it’s to help them intheir need.” So, while denying financial support for Palestinian suicide bombings, the Saudi Governmentadmitted that money had been sent to Palestine to provide food and medicine (Katz, 2002).

4.4. Good intentions

When Saudi prince Alwaleed donated a $10 million check to New York after September 11, he statedthat “I believe the government of the United States of America should re-examine its policies in theMiddle East.” The comment led Mayor Giuliani to reject the check. Guiliani asserted that the Saudiprince was trying to justify the terrorist attack. Responding to the accusation, the Saudi prince claimedthat “I wanted to show the good face of the Arab world.” “We tried to tell America, ‘Please try to look atthis problem and resolve it so that we can remove Bin Laden’s breeding ground.” Thus, the Saudi princeargued that he meant well and his comments were well-intended (Nader, 2002).

Accusation 2: “Saudi Arabia failed to support the U.S. plan to attack Iraq.”

4.5. Defeasibility

Saudi Arabia suggested that it was inappropriate for it to support an attack on Iraq without the supportof the United Nations: “There is a UN mechanism that we go through.” “We should go through a process”(“Fox News’ O’Reilly Factor interview with Al-Jubeir”, 2002). This suggests that Saudi Arabia did nothave the legitimate authority to support such an attack without approval from the UN. Another argumentis that the United States does not yet have a specific plan: “You’ll have to make the case. I don’t believethat the decision has been made yet” (“Adel Al-Jubeir Foreign Policy Advisor to Crown Prince Abdullahbin Abdulaziz on CNN’s ‘Crossfire,”’ 2002). Thus, these remarks suggest that Saudi Arabia has not yetbestowed or withheld its support because the United States has yet to provide a plan of attack.

4.6. Good intentions

Saudi Arabia also reacted to the accusation by arguing that it did this in the interest of the United States.“Our view is that. . . it [to attack Iraq] would not serve America’s interests, or the interests of the region.”It is “counterproductive” and would have “grave consequences for American interests in the region, aswell as the interests of your friends and allies” (Katz, 2002). These kinds of statements appear to functionas evidence of Saudi Arabia’s good intentions.

4.7. Bolstering

Bolstering often does not pertain to a particular accusation; it emphasizes the accuser’s positive qualitiesto counterbalance the accusations. Saudi Arabia bolstered its image in four ways. First, it expressed shockand concern over the 9/11 tragedy. Immediately after the attack, the Saudi royal family paid visits to U.S.diplomats to offer condolences. Saudi Foreign Minister went to the United States to “offer in person thecondolences.” These kinds of actions could help bolster the country’s image. Second, the country offeredaid and support to the victims of the terrorist attacks. Saudi Prince Alwaleed donated a check of $10

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million for the Twin Towers Fund, though it was rejected. The Saudi Mosaic Foundation gave donationsto the DC schools and the fund that aids September 11 victims. A racehorse was given to the 9/11victim families. Third, the country discussed humanitarian efforts in other countries. Saudi Televisioncollected donations for Afghani refugees. Saudi Arabia claimed that it “has long been committed toproviding humanitarian assistance to Palestinians” and is “committed to the peace process for over 30years” (Al-Jubeir, 2002). These actions show that the Saudi government possesses general humanitarianqualities. Finally, the Saudi government reiterated its friendship with the United States: “We have beenstaunch allies. . . and effective partners” (Katz, 2002). The “Allies” spot features snapshots of Saudileaders with eight U.S. presidents. The voiceover says, “We’ve been allies for more than 60 years.” Thevoiceover of the spot “Flags” said that “One country [Saudi Arabia] has been an ally for over 60 years.”These messages employ bolstering because they serve to stress that Saudi Arabia is a valuable ally ofthe United States. Furthermore, the country quickly retreated from its initial opposition to attacking Iraqafter Bush addressed the United Nations. It also indicated that it would make up any shortfall that mightresult from war if oil price is pushed high.

5. Implications

This research applied Benoit’s Image Restoration Theory to analyze the message strategies of theSaudi image restoration campaign after September 11. Part of the message strategies appeared to beeffective. The fact that Saudi Arabia had revoked Bin Laden’s citizenship was consistent with denialof the first accusation. The country’s denial was also supported with endorsement from President Bushand Secretary of State Powell. However, the response to the rest of this first accusation was noticeablyweaker: No evidence supported the claim that funding had not supported the Palestinian suicide bombers.Furthermore, there was no attempt to deny the second accusation. Instead, the country pled defeasibilityand good intention. Bolstering probably helped but could be expected to help only a little. Thus, wejudge the overall defense as only partially effective. This is supported by some external evidence. AnOpinion Dynamics poll in April 30–May 1, 2002 found that 22% considered Saudi Arabia U.S. Allyand 56% did not. AWashington Postpoll conducted September 1–3 of 2002, near the end of the Saudicampaign, reported that 39% considered Saudi Arabia a friend and ally while 44% considered it to beunfriendly or an enemy. Thus, there was positive movement in attitudes, as favorable responses rose(22–39%) and unfavorable ones dropped (56–44%). Other evidence suggests that many people believedthat Saudi Arabia’s advertising blitz was an attempt to “capitalize on September 11 and promote theircountry (53%) than a sincere show of support for Americans during the difficult time (21%).” (Fabrizio,2002) This evidence is generally consistent with our evaluation that the strategies were partially effective.

6. Conclusion

Saudi Arabia developed an extensive image repair effort to restore its reputation after 9/11. Denial,attacking accusers and bolstering were major components of the image repair effort. Defeasibility, goodintentions and differentiation received scant emphasis in the defense. Thus, as a whole, this image repaireffort was partially effective. This case study shows that countries can have modest success improvingtheir reputation through the use of image repair discourse.

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