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THE MATADOR PLAN

INTRODUCTION

“Unfortunately, it has come to this, that either Japan must stop her expansion, or

England must willingly give up some of what she has or hopes to have. Therein

lies a cause for war.”

Lt Cdr Tota Ishimaru, Imperial Japanese Navy

1. The fall of Malaya and Singapore to the hand of the Japanese is a

tremendous sign that showed the failure of Operation Matador. In this battle

study, there are chronology of events that will guide us very closely in knowing

and understanding the reason why this operation failed to meet its objectives. In

doing the research on the background of the battle of Malaya and the relativity to

the Operation Matador, our syndicate members came across a reference to a

plan of action for the defence of Singapore codenamed “Matador”. In fact there

were two plans, so totally different, that in the end they contributed to the

downfall of Singapore. Both had their weaknesses and one of the major ones

was the lack of co-ordination and command between the Army, Navy and Air

Force. The other and more serious was a clash of ideals. The drawn-up plan was

Land based Matador and Sea Based Matador.

2. From the research done, Operation Matador is not the sole reason for the

fall of Malaya or even Singapore, besides there is some other reasons that had

been identified as a contributing factor as well. This has been discussed in detail

under the column of Battle Analysis. An examine on the lesson learned from this

battle study would benefit the most as it focuses more on principles of war that

will teaches us how, why, when and where it is applicable for an action plan

taken at one time.

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AIM

3. This paper will examine two main part of the whole study on Matador Plan.

The first part is to analyse the incidents that occur prior and upon the operation

called The Matador Plan. Secondly, it is fundamentals to determine the lessons

learnt and the effects on both forces.

OBJECTIVE

4. The main objective of this battle study is to meet the requirement of the

EOBC serial 28/2006 and secondly is to learn and adapt the knowledge of the

war history generally on the Malayan Campaign and specifically the Matador

Plan. In this way the young officers would be able to use battle study as a

comparison between previous and present state of battle warfare in order to

meet any circumstances and decision makings in the near future.

SCOPE

5. Scopes of discussions are as follow:

a. Background.

1) Pre-war examination.

2) Forces involved.

3) The Attack.

b. Matador Plan.

1) Land Based Matador

2) Sea Based Matador

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c. Chronology of events.

d. Analysis on factors and effects.

e. Tactical aspects applied.

g. Lesson Learnt.

h. Conclusion.

BATTLE BACKGROUND

PRE-WAR EXAMINATION

6. Before we look further into the Matador Plan, the fundamental or the main

causes that inflict the war in Malaya should be given a consideration as it may be

very useful in understanding the battle study. The battle in Malaya was a conflict

between British Commonwealth forces, comprised of British, Indian, Australian

and Malayan units, and the Imperial Japanese Army from December 8, 1941 until

January 31, 1942 during the Second World War. Prior the attack by the

Japanese forces, the British government's plans relied primarily on the stationing

of a strong fleet at the Singapore Naval Base in the event of any enemy hostility,

both to defend Britain's Far Eastern possessions and the route to Australia. At

this time tension mounted in the region following the outbreak of the European

war and the French in Indo-China clashed with the Thais. The Japanese make

use of this as an opportunity with the increase on aggression over the region as

well.

7. Upon the completion of the Singapore Naval Base and airfields on

Singapore Island with other constructions on the Malayan Peninsula was

underway, it was decided by the Air Ministry in London that was a right time to

provide a fighter force for the area, even though few could be spared from the

defence of Britain and her offensive in the Middle East.

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However, a threat to British and American possessions in the area was not

considered to be imminent, as revealed in a letter from Prime Minister Churchill

to US President Roosevelt, dated 15 February 1941:

“I do not myself think that the Japanese would likely to send the large military

expedition necessary to lay siege to Singapore. The Japanese would no doubt

occupy whatever strategic points and oilfields in the Dutch East Indies and

thereabouts that they covet, and thus get a far better position for a full-scale

attack on Singapore later on. They would also raid Australian and New Zealand

ports and coasts, causing deep anxiety in those Dominions, which had already

sent all their best, trained fighting men to the Far East”.

8. In October 1940, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was

appointed Commander-in-Chief Far East, and the G.H.Q. Far East opened at

Singapore on the 18th November, 1940. The Commander-in-Chief was

responsible for the operational control and direction of training of British land and

air forces in Malaya, Burma and Hong Kong, and for the co-ordination of plans

for the defence of these territories. It also includes the control and training of

British air forces in Ceylon and of reconnaissance squadrons in the Indian Ocean

and Bay of Bengal. His headquarters was an operational one, not administrative,

and had no control over any naval forces. So Brook-Popham the man in charge

on the spot had little control over the immediate military situation. Also just as

important, he had no authority over the Civilian population in case of an

impending war. This came under the direct control of Shenton–Thomas the

Governor of Singapore, and to all intents and purposes he had absolute control.

The only recourse Brook-Popham had to any control of the forces was directly to

the Chiefs of Staff in London.

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FORCES INVOLVED

9. In November 1940, the army strength in Malaya was 17 battalions, with 1

mountain regiment of artillery. Reliance for the defence of the Far East was to be

placed on air power until the fleet was available but it was the Governments

policy to avoid war with Japan. The strength of the air forces in Malaya in

November 1940, however, was only 88 first-line aircraft, of which only 48 could

be counted as modern. The previous month, the Singapore Conference had

recommended a strength of 582 aircraft for the Far East but it was admitted that

this was an ideal, and far beyond the bounds of practical possibility. In May 1941,

Lieutenant-General A.E. Percival had been appointed General Officer

Commanding, Malaya Command, and with it a motley collection of 85 000 British,

Australian, Indian and Malayan troops.

10. When in July 1941, the Japanese spread into southern Indo-China, the

potential danger to Malaya and Burma increased, as the move gave them a

naval base within 750 miles of Singapore and airfields only 300 miles from Kota

Bharu, the nearest point in Malaya. By the latter part of November, 1941,

information accumulated which showed that an early Japanese attack was likely,

despite the negotiations in progress in Washington. Both land and air

reinforcements had been reaching Malaya, and by 7th December, the eve of the

Japanese attack, there were 158 first-line aircraft available, with 88 in reserve;

the land forces counted 31 infantry battalions, plus the equivalent of 10 volunteer

battalions with some artillery, engineers, and a small armoured car unit, and 5

battalions of Indian States forces, with 7 field regiments 1 mountain regiment, 2

anti-tank regiments, 4 coast defence regiments and five anti-aircraft regiments of

artillery and 10 field and 3 fortress companies of engineers - a total strength of

close on 85,000 men. Almost one quarter of them were British, about one-sixth

Australians, nearly one-half Indian Army, and the remainder local forces.

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11. Even then, the R.A.F. Far East Command was not in a position to fulfil its

responsibility of being the primary means of resisting Japanese aggression, while

the Army strength was far short of what was required to compensate for the

deficiency in aircraft. There were only two-thirds the number of infantry required,

no tanks and few armoured cars, and the lack of mobile anti-aircraft guns was

serious. The Japanese Order of Battle remains unchanged throughout the course

of the Champaign. The Japanese 25th Army consisted of 36,000 men plus air

power, naval support and artillery support from the mainland, plus 100 tanks.

Even though the Japanese soldiers were not as many compared the British

forces they were significantly superior in close air support, armour, co-ordination,

tactics and experience, with the Japanese units having fought in China. The

Japanese had slightly fewer aircraft, their fighter aircraft were generally superior

and achieved air superiority.

THE ATTACK

12. Earlier the British had plans in place to forestall Japanese landings in

Southern Thailand but Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the

Commander-in-Chief of the British Far East Command refused permission to

launch Operation Matador and Operation Krohcol in advance of the Japanese

attack, not wishing to run any risk of provoking the coming war.

13. Incredibly, as late as 29 September 1941, it was still believed by British

military and civilian leaders in the Far East that Japan was committed to

concentrating forces against the Soviet Union, and it was therefore improbable,

so it was argued, that she would at the same time take on Britain, the United

States and the Netherlands. By mid-November 1941 the official assessment was

that war would not come until March 1942. The Japanese decided otherwise.

Now the Japanese has really been on an invasion plan to attack the Malayan

Peninsula and take over Singapore with a well planned tactics and operation.

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14. On 7 December 1941, a British Hudson reconnaissance aircraft spotted

Japanese naval vessels 100 miles/160 Km north-east of Singora with others

steaming towards Pattani. Despite this clear act of war by Japan, 'Operation

Matador' was not fully launched. Even so, the advance to The Ledge could, and

should, have been immediately ordered. This was not done. As a result, an

invaluable twenty four hours was lost during which time the Japanese forces

landed and the British lost a most valuable opportunity. If they had held The

Ledge, the invasion could have been delayed even though the landings could not

have been prevented.

15. On the next day it was reported that Japanese troops were attempting to

land at Kota Bharu and at the same time Singapore suffered its first air raid. War

had come to Malaya. On 8 December the Japanese attacked the British air

bases in Malaya with the devastating result that by the end of the day a mere 50

British aircraft were operational, the rest being destroyed. Those still operational

were immediately ordered back to Singapore. Thus, on the first day of the attack

Japan obtained total air supremacy over Northern Malaya. The naval Force Z,

consisting of the battleships HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse, together

with four destroyers, and commanded by Admiral Tom Phillips had arrived right

before the outbreak of hostilities. Later the Japanese came to realised the

presence of the battleships and its marching to the Northern Malaya. Two days

later, on 10 December, the battleship Prince of Wales and the battle cruiser

Repulse, the only Royal Navy capital ships in the Far East, were sunk by

Japanese torpedo-bombers off Kuantan.

16. The negative effect of the sinking of the Prince of Wales on British morale

throughout the world was serious, with a concomitant boost to Japanese morale.

By this single stroke Japan gained complete naval command of the South China

and Java Seas and a large part of the Indian Ocean by leaving the east coast of

Malaya exposed and allowing the Japanese to continue their landings.

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The drift to war by the Japanese met its objectives by the invasion of the

Malayan Peninsula subsequently the Singapore Island.

MATADOR PLAN

17. What is Matador Plan? What is the relativity of the drawn up plan is all

about to this study? Matador Plan is a plan of action for the defence of

Singapore. The two plans were totally different, that in the end they contributed to

the downfall of Singapore. Both had their weaknesses. One of the major ones

was the lack of co-ordination and command between the Army, Navy and Air

Force. The other and more serious is the clash of ideals. The first one a Naval

plan by Churchill, the other a Land based plan by Brook-Popham. Now I will

outline both plans for a thorough understanding.

The Land Based Matador

18. History of Malaya War shows that Brook-Popham was the man on the

spot who could evaluate a more accurate assessment of the needs. His plan was

a land based Matador. This was a plan of action that envisaged an attack by the

Japanese from the North of Malaya via Thailand and the Kara Isthmus. It was

drawn up by Brook-Popham, in August 1941 and he submitted his plan to

London for approval. It is believed that if the plan was implemented at the right

time, it possibly could have delayed the Japanese long enough to allow the

British forces stationed in Malaya and Singapore to mount a delaying action until

reinforcements arrived.

19. Land Based Matador relied on assumption that the Japanese would land

on the east coast of Thailand at two points that of Songkhla and Pattani.  The

next would be advancing south to Jitra and lower down to Kroh.

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It was envisaged in Matador that two forces could intercept them just over the

boarder in Thailand, thus allowing long enough for the main force to assemble

and attack. There was only one problem, if the British were to implement this

without the Japanese being at war with Thailand first, it would be seen as an

attack by the British on a neutral country. To complicate matters further Sir

Josiah Cosby the British Ambassador in Siam the previous year 1940 had signed

a non-aggression pact with Pibul the President of Thailand. Requests by Brook-

Popham to London for additional resources to cover this Plan were made around

January 1941, but remained unfulfilled.

This plan was considered a good plan and consequently it also had its problem

due to unavoidable consequences. The main obstacle was one of them being

Churchill. It is known that Churchill had distrust of it lay in the political aspects

and at the same time he also favoured being a naval man with a naval solution

wherein the plan was mainly a Land Based Matador.

The Sea Based Matador

20. The Sea Based Matador referred on the need of resources especially the

battle ships to defend the Singapore Island. In Duff Coopers report of the

Defence of Singapore in 1939 it was stated that no less than 8 war ships would

be needed to defend Fortress Singapore. Churchill was not in the business of

land forces at the time, he was First Lord of the Admiralty as such was fighting

for his part in any forthcoming action. Churchill had been told of the situation of

what he later proclaimed in Parliament as, "Fortress Singapore" and its

armaments. He proclaimed that “It had several big guns and there were a lot of

troops on an island that he had never seen, but not enough in the way of Navy”.

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21. At Duff Coopers conference of the 29th September 1941 in Singapore, it

was stated that at the least Two Battleships would be needed as a

minimum. Those attended the meeting were Sir Robert Brook-Popham, Sir Earl

Page, Sir Archibald Clark-Kerr, Sir Shenton Thomas, Governor of Singapore and

Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton. Once Churchill became the Prime Minister he

held the final decision. But what Churchill sent and eventually happened, was a

cobbled result. 'The Prince of Wales' and 'Repulse' that turned up with escorts

called "Force Z". It was a disaster for the British upon the sinking of the two main

battle ships.

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

22. The chronology of events that involved along the path of Matador Plan

implementations are as follows.

a. In year 1937. Major-General William Dobbie Officer Commanding

Malaya (1935 - 1939), looked at Malaya's defences, he reported that

during the monsoon season from October to March landings could be

made by an enemy on the east coast and bases could be established in

Siam. He predicted that landings could be made at Songkhla and Pattani

in Siam, Thailand and Kota Bharu in Malaya. He recommended large

reinforcements to be sent immediately. His predictions turned out to be

correct but his recommendations were ignored.

b. In January 1941. A request for additional resources remained

unfulfilled which the plan intended to use and the previous year in 1940 Sir

Josiah Cosby the British Ambassador in Siam, had signed a non-

aggression pact with Prime Minister Pibul of Siam.

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c. In August 1941. The Commander-in-Chief (Cin C) of British Far

East Command Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham submitted a

plan code named Matador to London for approval. The plan relied on

assumption that the Japanese would land on the east coast of Siam at

Songkhla and Pattani, then advancing south to Jitra and lower down to

Kroh. It was envisaged that two forces could intercept them just over the

border in Thailand, long enough for the main force to assemble and

attack.

d. On November 29, 1941. Air Headquarters at Singapore is warned

to be ready to support Operation Matador at 12 hours notice.

e. On November 30, 1941. The Commanding Officer of the Japanese

25th Division, Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita, receives orders to

proceed with the invasion of Singapore. At the same time 21 Squadron

RAAF is based at Sungei Patani.

f. On December 2, 1941. HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse

arrive at Singapore Harbour escorted by a number of ships including

HMAS Vampire.

g. On December 4, 1941. The Japanese fleet leaves Samah Harbour

at dawn.

h. On December 5, 1941. When the threat of Japanese invasion

became more likely, the plan was modified to use the forces available, it

was to be put into action as soon as an attack was imminent. The plan

was that if an enemy attacked, or were invited into, Siam, troops under

British command would rush to Songkhla and defend it against a sea

borne attack.

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This job was allocated to Major-General Murray-Lyon's Indian 11th

Infantry Division who also had to defend Jitra, this over stretched his

resources and made it a difficult task to do.

i. On December 5, 1941. London gave permission for C in C Far

East Command to decide if Operation Matador should be activated. The

chief strategic decision to be decided was whether Siam should be

invaded in a pre-emptive move before the Japanese landings took place.

Sir Robert Brooke-Popham was ordered to launch Operation Matador.

The Malaya Command was responsible for the detailed planning of

Operation Matador.

j. On December 6, 1941. It had reworked the plan and allocated

forces for immediate deployment. Which is what General Officer

Commanding Malaya Arthur Percival recommended that evening in

meeting with the Governor Sir Shenton Thomas and Cin C Brooke-

Popham decided it is premature to launch the operation which included

the pre-emptive move into Siam. With hind sight this was the wrong

decision.

23. However, if Matador had been implemented the Japanese had a counter

worked out. They would use the Bangkok airport and the airfields of Southern

Siam to enable air cover to be established, and then invade from the Kra

Isthmus.

TACTICAL ASPECTS APPLIED

24. There were a lot of differences between British prediction and actual

location of the Japanese landings in Malaya Peninsula. For detail, refer to figure

1 and figure 2 in appendix.

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The 'Red' dot on the map is where the last sighting of the approaching Japanese

armada was on the 6th December at approx 12.30am by British RAF spotter

planes. And the 'Orange' dot on the map the "presumed British" and "actual

Japanese" meeting place of the Japanese fleet on the 7th December 1941. The

real Japanese meeting place was just 200 miles from Songkhla, Pattani and Kota

Bharu, the assumed meeting place by Brook-Popham was some 400 miles,

double the distance and of course double the time. In the event the Japanese

landed at, Prachoup 1 craft, Chumphon 2 craft, Bandon 2 craft, Nakhon 3 craft,

Songkla and Pattani 18 craft and Kota Bharu 3 craft.

25. The Japanese had forestalled the effect of Matador by having a secondary

plan. In the event if Matador was implemented, the Japanese were under the

orders to occupy the airfield of Bangkok and the airfields of Southern Thailand to

enable air cover to be established, thus paving the way for the invasion from the

Kara Isthmus and the inevitable fall of Singapore. It shows the invader is truly

tactical enough to apply the secondary plan if the primary met with failure. It was

the combination of confused action and wildly differing approaches to what was

perceived as the enemies’ tactics that eventually lead to the fiasco of Malaya and

Fortress Singapore. Beside, the Japanese also use ‘blitzkrieg’ tactics that was

used by the Germans during Europe Campaign.

BATTLE ANALYSIS

ANALYSIS ON FACTORS AND EFFECTS

26. The Matador plan can be analysed from several factors which concluded

to its failure. The factors identified are as follows:

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a. Lack of Resources. The Matador plan relied on assumption that

the Japanese would land on the east coast of Siam at Songkhla and

Pattani, then advancing south to Jitra and lower down to Kroh. British

forces could intercept them just over the border in Thailand, long enough

for the main force to assemble and attack. But the plan was modified to

use the forces available and it was to be put into action as soon as an

attack was imminent. If an enemy attacked, or were invited into Siam,

troops under British command would rush to Songkhla and defend it

against a sea borne attack. This job was allocated to Major-General

Murray-Lyon's of Indian 11th Infantry Division who also had to defend

Jitra, this has over stretched his resources and made it a difficult task to

do. Beside, in the absence of the main fleets, RAF was fully responsible to

carry out its task effectively in defence, it was estimated that it required a

minimum of 336 modern aircraft including a long range striking force. At

the outbreak of hostilities it had a mere 158, most of which were

obsolescent. The lack of resources and the assign of multiple tasks at one

time by the British made them facing more difficulties in defending its

position against the Japanese.

b. Non-strategic defence position. The decision to defend the

Singapore base by holding the whole of Malaya meant that in the absence

of the fleet the task fell primarily on the RAF. Because of the key role

allotted to the air force it was decided that the primary task of the army

was to defend the airfields from which the RAF operated. These airfields

had been built without reference to the military but rather to suit civilian

requirements. From a military viewpoint they were located too close to the

coast and too close to the border of Siam to be effectively defended.

c. Time Window. Matador was approved late for the plan to

succeed. For Operation Matador to succeed, time was of the absolute

essence.

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British forces had to be in Singgora before the Japanese landed.

However, as Britain attempted to the very end to avoid war with Japan, the

military were forbidden to violate Siamese territory until an actual outbreak

of war. With such a constraint, and time being of the essence, Operation

Matador should have been abandoned.

d. Command and Control. Earlier on December 5, 1941, London

gave permission for Cin C the Far East Command to decide if Operation

Matador should be activated. The strategic decision to be decided was

whether Siam should be invaded in a pre-emptive move before the

Japanese landings took place. The Malaya Command was responsible for

the detailed planning of Operation Matador and on December 6, 1941 it

had reworked the plan and allocated forces for immediate deployment.

General Officer Commanding Malaya Arthur Percival recommended in

meeting with the Governor of Singapore Sir Shenton Thomas and Cin C

Brooke-Popham decided it is premature to launch the operation which

included the pre-emptive move into Siam.

e. Political Aspects. British do not want to be the first nation to

trespass the non alliance of Thailand in the war and will not approved

matador planned until there is solid evidence that shows that the

Japanese is up to move to Thailand territory. To forestall the anticipated

Japanese invasion the British High Command evolved a plan to seize the

Siamese port of Singora which is 'Operation Matador' and to delay the

anticipated Japanese advance from Patani by holding a position called

'The Ledge'. This plan required crossing the international frontier into Siam

thus making Britain guilty of violating official Siamese neutrality. In the

year 1940 Sir Josiah Cosby the British Ambassador in Siam, had signed a

non-aggression pact with Prime Minister Pibul of Siam.

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f. Lack of Importance. Under the command of Jen AE Percival, there

were some 85000 British, Australian, Indian and Malayan troops. However

some of the problems associated with this force included poor quality

officers, poor training, especially in jungle warfare, lack of civilian labour to

construct defences and lack of homogeny.

g. The Blame. The blame of Matador Plan failure cannot only be

pointed to General Percival because the launch of the plan must be

approved from Churchill in London. He must have disliked it so much and

there weren’t any reference to it in Churchill's memoirs as well.  He seems

to have conveniently forgotten all about it.  Churchill’s distrust of it lay in

the political aspects, he also favoured being First Lord of the Admiralty  a

naval man, a naval solution thus the sea based matador were developed.

h. Operation Theatre Priorities. The Matador Plan was stalled

repeatedly by Churchill, who wanted the scarce resources of aeroplanes,

troops and other equipment diverted to his other priority areas, such as

the Middle East and Russia. Britain's defence, the Middle East and the

Soviet Union had all received higher priorities in the allocation of men and

material, so the desired air force strength of 300 to 500 aircraft was never

reached whereas the Japanese invaded with over two hundred tanks, the

British Army in Malaya did not have a single one.

i. The Wrong Assessment. Other than that, the war in the Middle

East, the world's oil pipeline and gateway to India, was not going well. At

the same time, Russian vulnerability added to the complexities of the

situation. In 1941, Churchill delivered 440 aircraft to Russia. He also

diverted an entire division, which was bound for Singapore, the 7th

Australian Division, to the Middle East and one brigade of the 9th Indian

Division to Iraq. Churchill estimate, Japan will not enter the war unless the

Germans had invaded Britain successfully.

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j. Lack of Intelligence. British intelligence had failed in providing the

real assessment of Japanese assault on Malaya. As a result the British

had failed to provide an adequate force and resources to meet the

Japanese thrust.

LESSON LEARNT

27. In the final analysis, it was a British failure to adhere to the principles of

war in the implementation of the Matador Plan and the Japanese vision and

motivation that led to the defeat of the British in the Malayan Campaign.

a. Selection and The Maintenance Of The Aim. British has made the

wrong decision making on the aspects of strategic defence plan of Malaya

rather than knowing and understanding the Japanese strategic plan to

conquer Malaya and Singapore. Japanese intentions are as follows:

1) Japan maybe to conquer Singora and Patani as habour to

seize the important air field at Kedah and then move to North West

of Malaya.

2) Landed at Kota Bharu to take over the air field.

3) Landed at Kuantan and move to west over the Kuantan-

Raub road or Mersing road for Singapore assault through North of

Malaya.

Percival was unaware of these intentions and put the little sources to

defence the other different area. On the other hand, the British thought

that Japan will assault Malaya through Singapore.

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b. Maintenance Of Morale. The Japan inner strength was very high.

All the Japan soldiers had their ideology which is “east for east” where in

their psychology they had to rise with the morale in order to face war

difficulties. Japan had all the factors that guaranteed the success with

having good war equipment, efficiency and encouragement.

c. Concentration of Force. The British didn’t forestalled a large

number of forces at the planned or strategic location in order to resist any

Japanese landing from the North wherein this was an advantages to the

Japanese forces.

d. Economy of Effort. The highest Japan Royal Company gave 100

days to conquer Malaya and Singapore. Thinking about the mission, Jen

Yamashita gave their order to throw the unnecessary equipment from their

soldier and planning to remain a smooth movement from combination of

expensive British roads and cheap Japan bicycle. He ordered his soldier

that didn’t have any vehicle to ride bicycle. This is not just gave the

smooth movement but also reduce man power from jungle tracking and

walk.

e. Surprise. Japan has attack Malayan from North where the British

defence was very weak at the enemy aimed position. They attack Malaya

in raining season when British not expected the Japan will attack on that

time. That situation was entirely a surprise and a piece of well planned

action.

f. Offensive Action. Japan launched amphibious assault in north

beach Malaya at Kota Bahru to move down into East beach of Malaya.

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This movement is done by landed at Patani and Singora in Thailand,

whereas they move to South through road land to cross Malayan-Thailand

borders to attack from west of Malaya.

g. Cooperation. Cooperation can be analysed by comparing the both

forces and there are:

1) Original defence planning on Malaya and Singapore depend

on two factors, and it was British Far East Armada and American

Pacific Armada. Far East Armada was supposed to have 1 carrier,

7 battleship, 11 cruiser and 24 destroyer was not to send because

the strategic situation at Europe and Mediterranean and the effect

from France failure. The British had no option rather than to deliver

2 battleships that are Repulse and Prince of Wales, while America

Pacific Armada was destroyed at Pearl Harbour. It was a fail of

cooperation that British had no choices to support while Japan

easily landed at Malaya.

2) While the Japanese had successfully integrated their entire

asset including land, sea and air in giving the maximum fire power

and manoeuvre. The cooperation between 3rd div (Air)

Commander, Southern Squadron (Sea) Commander with all (Land)

Army Chief’s a success to destroyed the British defence position.

25th Army Commander Lt Jen Yamashita had given his authority to

coordinate the sea and air asset in order to achieve ‘mui’ in

conquering Malaya and Singapore.

h. Security. Beach defence built at Malaya in order to face the

Japanese landings, including concertina wire, under water obstacles and

machine gun placement were not good enough to give a supreme security

and protection for the British. The implication from this, the British suffered

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a lot of casualties. Japanese also suffered a lot of casualties and this has

shown that the British weakness in order to make sure the safety of their

soldier itself.

i. Flexibility . To launch the Matador Plan Percival needed permission

from British government in London. British government refused to launch

this plan until they have proofs that the Japanese has landed in Thailand.

That situation shows that matador plan does not have the flexibility for an

execution purposes.

CONCLUSION

28. The Matador plan can be analysed from several factors which conclude to

its failure. The factor involves all aspects from the column of battle analysis.

Matador was approved late for the plan to succeed. For Operation Matador to

succeed, time was of the absolute essence. The delays in mobilization meant

that the troops did not receive the order to launch 'Operation Matador' effect, and

morale suffered. An attempt by British troops to advance to The Ledge fell six

miles 9.6 km short of its objective when on 10 December 1941 Japanese troops

overran the leading battalions. Another disaster, and with it any real chance for

British troops to delay the Japanese advance until relief came, occurred on 12

December 1941 when the strategically-located and well-prepared Jitra position

was abandoned within twenty four hours of being attacked.

29. The intention of the British had been to hold it for approximately three

months. Thus, after the twenty years of preparation to avoid such an eventuality,

the fate of Malaya, and with it Singapore, was sealed in the first four days of the

campaign. In the words of Major General Woodburn Kirby, 'One can sum up by

saying that those responsible for the conduct of the land campaign in Malaya

committed every conceivable blunder. They underrated the enemy, paid

insufficient attention to the training of their troops and delayed taking urgent

decisions even after the Japanese had landed on Malayan soil.

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Singapore and the naval base were lost between 8 and 12 December'. Prime

Minister of Britain, Churchill and all his decision made during the Malayan

Campaign was also considered as a worst decision making in the war campaign

ever in the history.

Appendix 1

Figure 1: This shows what Brook-Popham had assumed happened from the

intelligence he had received.

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Figure 2: This is what actually happened from the records of the Japanese

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Cull Brian, Buffaloes Over Singapore, Grub Street, London 2003.

2. Lt Gen AE Percival, The War in Malaya.

3. Sir John Smyth V.C, Percival and The Tragedy of Singapore, 1987.

4. Wikipedia, Battle of Malaya, HTML.

5. Chye Kooi Loong, The British Battalion In The Malayan Campaign 1941-

1942, 2002.

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