marcel chelba: the paradigms of kant’s critical philosophy and the place of the thing in itself...

7/24/2019 Marcel Chelba: The paradigms of Kants critical philosophy and the place of the thing in itself in transcendental topic

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Marcel Chelba

The paradigms of Kants critical philosophy

and the place of thething in itselfin transcendental topic

(The Juridical Paradigm and The Mathematical Paradigm)

A philosophical project

Tbingen, 23.10.2015

Thematization

Where is thething in itself? Inside our head or outside? It's a simpleideal ofreasonor the natural source of our sensations and perceptions? Neither one nor theother? Both one and the other? Simultaneously or successively? In other words,which is theplaceofthing in itselfintranscendental topic(as it was it charted byKant)?

To answer this question an overview over Kantian transcendental topic isabsolutely necessary, and for that, an investigation of the Kantian paradigms ofcritical philosophy is inevitable, because through them, Kant tried just that: toenunciate the major premises of histranscendental logic the stylistic matrix (Lucian

Blaga would say) of all his critical thinking.Paradigm is arevealing metaphor(in terms of same Lucian Blaga), is a

leitmotif that not only expresses a world, by simple analogy, but configures it fromthe inside is its genetic code and its founding myth, the first cause and the finalcause of its own being.

That is why the paradigms of philosophical thinking have methodologicalambitions; they prescribe its topic, the possible routes, the rest places and the finaldestination, the ontological frame and the immanent limits of its own freedom. Anycritical approach should start with the detection of the paradigms under the seal of

which the author worked it should be the ground zero of any hermeneutics, thefoundation of any attempt to a philosophical reconstruction.

1. Preliminary methodological considerations.

1.1. Preparative to a parabolic hermeneutics of Kant's critical philosophy

In many ways an author can be misunderstood. Most often, through the

removal of the author from the ambience of the era in which he lived; by forcinghim to answer posthumous to the questions of another era and the historicalinvestigation is intended to be, rightly the antidote to this hermeneutic

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answer. Only then can you claim that you understand something, and that youhave regarding the author a certain critical competence.

As is known, apompous and sophisticated dress rather hides what it wants tohighlight. A simple and transparent dress rather highlights what it wants to hide.The same happens with the philosophical languages. They are the veil of Maya, the

curtain that conceals more or less the ideas of philosophy. That is why, in thephilosophical exegesis, thesemiotic loyaltytosensemust prevail onsyntactic andmorphological fidelity to text. We can agree only on some universal truths.

The paradigms of kantian critical philosophy are shortcuts to the Unicornfrom behind the academic language, theguiding thread throughout hisphilosophical epic,with the prologue in Transcendental Aesthetic, climax in

Antinomy of Pure Reasonand outcome inTranscendental Methodology.Paradigms are not mere examples or metaphors meant to relax the

atmosphere, and to refresh intuitively the academic language, but rather somecontrol windowsto thetranscendental landscapeover which we try to raise during ouranalytical flight.

You have to reach where Kant reached; at the same altitude of thought saysHeidegger in his own way. You have to have before your eyes themetaphysicallandscapeto which refers Kant to receive from him an invitation to dinner.

Um klar vor Augen zu legen, was Kant hat sagen wollen, mssen wir mit dem Textvertrautwerden. Es bedarf einer Kenntnis des Aufbaus des Ganzen, des Zusammenhangs dereinzelnen Stcke, der Verschlingung der Beweisgnge, einer Kenntnis der Begriffe und Prinzipien.

Es scheint ein Leichtes zu sein, einfach festzustellen, was dasteht. Aber selbst wenn wir unseindringlich die Begriffe und Fragestellungen und Bedingungen zu eignen, indem wir sie aufhellen,beziehungsweise ihre Herkunft aus der Tradition fixieren und die Umwandlung, die Kant voll zog,auch dann fassen wir noch nicht, was da steht. Um so weit vorzudringen, mssen wir Augen haben,das zu sehen, was in Kants Blick stand, als er die Probleme fixierte und einer Lsung entgegenfhrte und in die Gestalt des Werkes zwang, das wir als Kritik der reinen Vernunft vor uns haben.Es hilft nichts, Kantische Begriffe und Stze nach zusprechen oder mit anderen zu umschreiben,

wir mssen dahin kommen, sie mit ihm zu sprechen in und aus derselben Blickstellung.2

Most often, however, the exegete, precisely because it does not have acomparable experience on the subject, remain trapped in the author's jargonlikethe butterfly in the light of a lamp.

I will try to solve, from the outset, this exegetical dilemma saying a certainstory, a kind of parable or philosophical allegory, which is paradigmatic (at leastfor now) to my own perception of the critical philosophy of Kant. Let's call itTheParable of the Unicorn.

2Martin Heidegger,Phnomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft(pp. 1-8,

empfasis added).3


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1.2. The Parable of the Unicorn

If someone (a stranger) comes out of the woods and tells you that he sawthere a Unicorn3(let's say), you have only two ways to check if he's telling the truth

or lying. First, you can analyze the descriptions in accordance with the principle ofnoncontradiction (i.e., to evaluate the logical consistency of his words, as a systemof sentences). But even if you find that the Unicorn is a possible animal; until yougo yourself into the forest to see him with your eyes, you'll never know if thatanimal is real or was just a hallucination. In the same way, even if you can provethat that animal is absurd, that still would not mean that he does not exist. Forlogicalcriterion ofconsistency(which disregards any content of knowledge) can neverconclude on the existence4or non-existence5of things.Existence is not a logicalpredicate which can be denied without disappearing with it also the subject, says

Kant6.

3The motiv "Einhorn" (with the distinction See-Einhorn/Landeinhorn) is used by Kant inDereinzige mgliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes, p. 10, but I do not analyze thattext here.4Der Begriff ist allemal mglich, wenn er sich nicht widerspricht. Das ist das logische Merkmal derMglichkeit, und dadurch wird sein Gegenstand vom nihil negativum unterschieden. Allein erkann nichts destoweniger ein leerer Begriff sein, wenn die objektive Realitt der Synthesis, dadurchder Begriff erzeugt wird, nicht besonders dargetan wird; welches aber jederzeit, wie oben gezeigtworden, auf Prinzipien mglicher Erfahrung und nicht auf dem Grundsatze der Analysis (dem

Satze des Widerspruchs) beruht.Das ist eine Warnung, von der Mglichkeit der Begriffe(logische) nicht sofort auf die Mglichkeit der Dinge (reale) zu schliessen. (A 596, B 624,Footnote, emphasis added)5Das hchste Wesen bleibt also fr den bloss spekulativen Gebrauch der Vernunft ein blosses, aberdoch fehlerfreies Ideal, ein Begriff, welcher die ganze menschliche Erkenntnis schliesst und krnet,dessen objektive Realittauf diesem Wege zwar nicht bewiesen, aber auch nicht widerlegt werdenkann (A 641, B 669, emphasis added)6Gesteht ihr dagegen, wie es billigermassen jeder Vernnftige gestehen muss, dass ein jederExistenzialsatz synthetisch sei, wie wollet ihr denn behaupten,dass das Prdikat der Existenz sichohne Widerspruch nicht aufheben lasse? da dieser Vorzug nur den analytischen, als derenCharakter eben darauf beruht, eigentmlich zukommt.

Ich wrde zwar hoffen, diese grblerische Argutation, ohne allen Umschweif, durch einegenaue Bestimmung des Begriffs der Existenz zu nichte zu machen, wenn ich nicht gefunden htte,dass die Illusion, in Verwechselung eines logischen Prdikats mit einem realen(d. i. derBestimmung eines Dinges), beinahe alle Belehrung ausschlage. Zum logischen Prdikate kann allesdienen, was man will, so gar das Subjekt kann von sich selbst prdiziert werden; denn die Logikabstrahiert von allem Inhalte. Aber die Bestimmung ist ein Prdikat, welches ber den Begriff desSubjekts hinzukommt und ihn vergrssert. Sie muss also nicht in ihm schon enthalten sein.

Sein ist offenbar kein reales Prdikat, d. i. ein Begriff von irgend etwas, was zu dem Begriffeeines Dinges hinzukommen knne. Es ist bloss die Position eines Dinges, oder gewisserBestimmungen an sich selbst.Im logischen Gebrauche ist es lediglich die Kopula eines Urteils.Der Satz: Gott ist allmchtig, enthlt zwei Begriffe, die ihre Objekte haben: Gott und Allmacht; das

Wrtchen: ist, ist nicht noch ein Prdikat oben ein, sondern [A 599, B 627] nur das, was das Prdikatbeziehungsweise aufs Subjekt setzt. Nehme ich nun das Subjekt (Gott) mit allen seinen Prdikaten(vorunter auch die Allmacht gehret) zusammen, und sage:Gott ist, oder es ist ein Gott, so setzeich kein neues Prdikat zum Begriffe von Gott, sondern nur das Subjekt an sich selbst mit allen

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So, willy-nilly, you will have to go into the forest. But the mere fact ofentering the forest (the realm of empirical experience) promises nothing itself. Ifyou will seesomethingis absolutely certain. The problem is that if you want to seeanything in particular, then you must know in advancewhat you are looking. As Pascalsaid:Console yourself [might now say the Unicorn],youwouldnot seek me,if you had not

found me.However,to start the search for that fabulous animal, you must first have his

identikit(and you'll manufacture thatimaginaryportraitrelying on the descriptionsbrought by the stranger), otherwise you would not know if that animal (maybeyou'll see) is the same (of the same species) that was seen by the stranger. You need,therefore, a synthetic a priori concept a transcendental scheme by which thatanimal to be recognized among the other beasts of the forest. Then, the strangershould indicate you where to look for: an itinerary (a search algorithm); becausethe forest is vast and you could rummage through it until the end of your life

without having the luck to see that animal. Or, to be given such an algorithm ofrecognition(erkennen), there should be a commontranscendental topic; a map whosesigns and landmarks to be understandable, spontaneous and unproblematic byeveryone (up-down, left-right, forward-back, I-you, inside-outside, everything-nothing, yesterday, today, tomorrow, first, second, third, etc.). Finally, through thismap it will be given all the conditions for verification and public approval of thetruth relating to Unicorn.

But this map, we should note, is not shown to us theUnicorn in itself, but thealgorithm by which he could be found. Even if a photo with an infinite resolution itwere, this map will never say anything about reality itself, but what we think istrue about it. This, because we'll never be sure that this map will guide us in thereal world at one and the same object either because, until we get to him, he willdisappear from there or will change so much that it is no longer recognizable orbecause on our first meeting with him we were wrong about him, either becausewe have meanwhile refined our senses (instruments of knowledge) and have acompletely different perception (we do not see the atom as a cake with raisins, butas a planetary system and then not as a planetary system, but as a cloud ofprobabilities and so on). The only absolutely sure thing is that we experiencesomething. Well, says Kant, just thatuntouchable limitof our empirical knowledge isthething in itself(the epistemological one). This map we are working continuallyand that, often, lose or throw ourselves into the fire, to redraw it over again (worseor better), isMundus intelligibilis(ourintelligible world).Mundus intelligibilisis not animage of oursensitive world(Mundus sensibilis) just asMundus sensibilisis not theimage of thereal world(Mundus realis). Oursensitive worldis already aninterpretation of thereal world: a simultaneous translation in five differentlanguages (five senses), each with its own topical is a dissection of the real worldin the direction of five orthogonal planes (linearly independent). Sensitivity is like aroom with five distorting mirrors that capture every a certain facet of reality, but

seinen Prdikaten, und zwar den Gegenstand in Beziehung auf meinen Begriff. (A 598-599, B

626-627,emphasis added)5


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only in relation to our ownsensitive faculty. Other beings that have differentsensitivities, could have a completely different perception of reality, they could seethings that we do not see or, conversely, could not see what we see. Whose realityis true? That which is seen through the eyes of a fly or that which appears in theeyes of an eagle? That which is seen through the eyes of a chimpanzee or that

which appears in the eyes of a man? The reality in which believes Kant, or that inwhich believe Jakobi?

But enyway would we perceive the world, our intellect is the only one whowill try to reunite the broken image of reality (the five different packages ofsensitive data) under the concept of a single object and thus facilitating decisions(edible or inedible, acceptance or rejection, withdrawal or attack etc.), and for thispurpose he will retranslate all the five stories of our sensitivity in its own languageand will tack them together into a new story, with a completely different topic(narrative structure). The main function of the intellect is to make us think that his

story is truer than that of sensitivity; that he speaks precisely about thething initself. In reality, however, thetranslation of the translationis a greater hermeneuticremoval from meanings of the original work. Intellect paints before our eyes aneven greater illusion than our senses. For what is an object? It's just our way to trimthe reality, according to the forms of our synthetic a priori intuitions and accordingto our own practical interests.

The empirical concept of a certain object is only a retrospective view of apast experience, starting, in ourfaculty of representations, from itsconditions of

possibility. What for us is a specific object for another being may be only a shapelessmass or, conversely, a constellation of objects. How many times have we changedourselves some concepts about physical world? In fact, I think the hardest questionyou could put it to a contemporary physicist is to ask him to define the concept of

physical object. The photon and all other particles that they discovered during thelast centuryare a kind of Unicorns some fabulous animals that were discoveredby mathematical induction, not as measurable objects, but only as probable limitsof some physical phenomena, otherwise unexplainable; some objects that, if it hadnot first been found to be possible, by calculation, no one would know where andwhat to look for. (I will return to this subject in the chapter onmathematical

paradigm.)

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Note that theforeigner(yoursensitive faculty) covers the road fromphenomenontoconcept(from Unicorn toportrait) andyou(yourintellect) are trying tofinish the tour fromconcepttophenomenon(fromportraitto Unicorn). But theportraitof Unicorn, just because you find him plausible, it makes you think that theUnicornin itselfis a priori possible, so that in the future, you will also dare to imagine otherstrange animals, including the path to their nests in the forest, long before anyonehad seen them in reality however, thisskill of anticipation(which lies at thefoundation of what modern physicists will callGedankenexperiment)you will be

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entitled to use only under thetitle of recommendation,hypothetically, as asuggestion ofsearch, for the possibility itself will never be a guarantee of existence.Conditions ofthe possibility of experiencehave no impact onwildlife in the forest, Kant might havesaid; they do not prescribe thelimits of reality, but only those ofour perception. Inother words, ourproductive imaginationmust censor herprophetic ambitions, but give

free rein to herprospective skills.How else could the man havenostalgia for paradisewithout this ability to

anticipate what he can know onlya posteriori(post mortem)?InKantian paradise of transcendental knowledge,the thing in itselfis theforbidden

tree. Kant, as a veritablemonarch of the intelligible world, just trying to warn us aboutthis temptation: that despite all appearances, in theenchanting lands of the intellect7

we will not ever be able to see what is beyond the limits of experience, and that anytrade with objects from beyond is illicit.

... the whole Kantian critical endeavor is nothing but an attempt to distinguish betweeninternal and external affairs of a country completely surrounded by a unknown and inaccessibleland; from where permanently a lot of messengers arrive with all kinds of messages; some storiesabout the existence of all sorts of things, which, however, no one in this country can not ever see,just imagine them according to the reports of these uninvited guests and only by comparison withthings that are here, beyond the borders. The object of trade (commercium, Kant's phrase) is a curioususe of objects from beyond the borders (without taking possession)by the inhabitants of thisautarchic country. But although they are always warned by their sovereign that everything theythink handling and build on other land might be just an illusion and their act of ownership of anyobject there is only a promise without any guarantee, since nobody and nothing can transit theborder of the two worlds apart from those foreign and insecure merchants, this trade, however, isproving to be thriving, while the authority of this country seems to have fallen out of favordefinitively8

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Transcendental topic prefigures just our visible spectrum, is thehermeneutical key of our sensitivity and also the matrix of our faculty of

7Da wir es uns zur Pflicht gemacht haben, die Grenzen der reinen Vernunft im transzendentalen

Gebrauche genau und mit Gewissheit zu bestimmen, diese Art der Bestrebung aber das Besonderean sich hat, unerachtet der nachdrcklichsten und klresten Warnungen, sich noch immer durchHoffnung hinhalten zu lassen, ehe man den Anschlag gnzlich aufgibt, ber Grenzen derErfahrungen hinaus in diereizenden Gegenden des Intellektuellenzu gelangen: so ist esnotwendig, noch gleichsam den letzten Anker einer phantasiereichen Hoffnung wegzunehmen, undzu zeigen, dass die Befolgung der mathematischen Methode in dieser Art Erkenntnis nicht denmindesten Vorteil schaffen knne, es msste denn der sein, die Blssen ihrer selbst desto deutlicheraufzudecken, dass Messkunst und Philosophie zwei ganz verschiedene Dinge sein1, ob sie sich zwarin der Naturwissenschaft einander die Hand bieten, mithin das Verfahren des emen niemals vondem andern nachgeahmt werden knne. (CPR, A 726, B 754)8Excerpt from my book: Marcel Chelba,Introducere critic, Crates,2004 (not yet translated into

English). But the Content kan be foud here:https://www.scribd.com/doc/17474184/Marcel-Chelba-Kantian-tetralogy-Vol-I-Critical-Introduction-About-the-possibility-of-Metaphysics-as-Science-in-the-critical-philosophy-of-Kant

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https://www.scribd.com/doc/17474184/Marcel-Chelba-Kantian-tetralogy-Vol-I-Critical-Introduction-About-the-possibility-of-Metaphysics-as-Science-in-the-critical-philosophy-of-Kanthttps://www.scribd.com/doc/17474184/Marcel-Chelba-Kantian-tetralogy-Vol-I-Critical-Introduction-About-the-possibility-of-Metaphysics-as-Science-in-the-critical-philosophy-of-Kanthttps://www.scribd.com/doc/17474184/Marcel-Chelba-Kantian-tetralogy-Vol-I-Critical-Introduction-About-the-possibility-of-Metaphysics-as-Science-in-the-critical-philosophy-of-Kanthttps://www.scribd.com/doc/17474184/Marcel-Chelba-Kantian-tetralogy-Vol-I-Critical-Introduction-About-the-possibility-of-Metaphysics-as-Science-in-the-critical-philosophy-of-Kanthttps://www.scribd.com/doc/17474184/Marcel-Chelba-Kantian-tetralogy-Vol-I-Critical-Introduction-About-the-possibility-of-Metaphysics-as-Science-in-the-critical-philosophy-of-Kanthttps://www.scribd.com/doc/17474184/Marcel-Chelba-Kantian-tetralogy-Vol-I-Critical-Introduction-About-the-possibility-of-Metaphysics-as-Science-in-the-critical-philosophy-of-Kant


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imagination the form in which we can conceive that something (in general) mightexist.

Transcendental topic is the ontological matrix of ourintelligible world; is thecoordinate systemin which we represent the being; the synthetic a priori form ofeverything that we could ever know and, more importantly, what we can not ever

know.Transcendental topic is nothing but thecondition of knowledge; is oursystem of

receptioninto the field of experience; but not even thecondition of existence of things.In this respect Kant was fully agrees with Locke and all other empiricist followersof Aristotle.

Dass alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anfange, daran ist gar kein Zweifel; denn

wodurch sollte das Erkenntnisvermgen sonst zur Ausbungerwecktwerden, geschhe es nicht

durch Gegenstnde, die unsere Sinne rhren und teils von selbst Vorstellungen bewirken, teils

unsere Verstandesttigkeit in Bewegung bringen, diese zu vergleichen, sie zu verknpfen oder zutrennen, und so den rohen Stoff sinnlicher Eindrcke zu einer Erkenntnis der Gegenstnde zu

verarbeiten, die Erfahrung heisst? Der Zeit nachgeht also keine Erkenntnis in uns vor der

Erfahrung vorher, und mit dieser fngt alle an. (CPR, B 1,emphasis added)

Nevertheless, in our own mind, experiences are preceded by intellect, saidLeibniz in his way. In other words, transcendental topic is a whole system ofconcepts, categories, judicative schemes and principles without which experiencewould not be for us than a flood of incomprehensible data, will try to prove Kant

throughout theCritics.There are creatures that must begin to hunt, fly or hide from the earliest

moments of life. They must have an innate system of data interpretation andorientation into the physical world.

Empiricists address the question of knowledge as if things exist and the man(another object) comes to know them. Idealists address the question of knowledgeas if our consciousness exists and things (other self-consciousness) come to us to beknown. Kant tried to find a way of reconciliation between these two perspectives ofthought, but it could not happen than limiting their scopes. In this way Kant (The

Judge) could give justice to the both.Ontologicaly, Kant will say, transcendental topic it must bea priorigiven (by

pure intuition). But, epistemologicaly, transcendental topic can not be given thanaposteriori(throughtranscendental deduction).

Practically, it was said, first we find the answers, and then the originatingquestions. Aristoteliansystem of category, note Constantin Noica inTwenty-SevenSteps of the Real(1969), was no more than asystem of fundamental questions aninventory of the ways in which, in a certain moment of history, we knew to askourselves about what weassume to exist. Therefore, Noica stands in the same place,the emergence of the category ofcausalityin Kantscategory board, was the sign of aprofound change into the worldview of modern man.

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Experience onlyawakensin our minds the concept of object, says Kant(CPR, B 1). The experience does not deliver "objects" to us, but only some signals(some disparate information, truncated and, more or less distorted) about what we

assume to be some objects (useful or useless, dangerous or beneficial etc.)9. We cannot receive on one and the same channel, says Kant, both the diversity and thelegislative unity of our sensitive world. And, our a priori synthetic concepts, willspecify Kant, are not the condition ofthe veryexistence of things, but only of theircomprehensibility.

Kant put time and space at the bottom of the phenomenal world, but only astranscendental conditions of experience, not as substances. Kant took examplesfrom Newtonian physics and Euclidean geometry, but that does not mean he putthem at the bottom of the real world. Moreover, Kant leaves room for a certainaestheticaldiversity of the sensitive worldand even for a certainevolution of ourtranscendental topic.10

Regarding the reason, Kant was convinced that no other rational being could

9In the measurement theory it is known that two measurements will never be the same and thatwhat we suppose to be thereal dimensions of objectsis actually thearithmetic average of measurementsperformed(a knowledge produced by our own head). This handicap of perception (of science, in fact)can be surpassed only by the idea ofusefulness(practical purpose) that is the whole problem ofscientific knowledge is summarized in the question:What is the degree of accuracy (tolerance or marginof error) within which we are satisfied?In other words, the criterion of truth in science is theuse valueof

its knowledge.10Also bleibt eben so hier, wie in dem vorigen Paralogism, der formule Satz der Apperzeption: Ich denke, der

ganze Grund, auf welchen die rationale Psychologie die Erweiterung ihrer Erkenntnisse wagt, welcher Satz

zwar freilich keine Erfahrung ist, sondern die Form der Apperzeption, die jeder Erfahrung anhngt und ihr

vorgeht,gleichwohl aber nur immer in Ansehung einer mglichen Erkenntnis berhaupt, als bloss

subjektive Bedingung derselben, angesehen werden muss, die wir mit Unrecht zur Bedingung der

Mglichkeit einer Erkenntnis der Gegenstnde, nmlich zu einem Begriffe vom denkenden Wesen

berhaupt machen, weil wir dieses uns nicht vorstellen knnen, ohne uns selbst mit der Formel

unseres Bewusstseins an die Stelle jedes andere intelligenten Wesens zu setzen. (A 354,emphasisadded)

Alle unsere Vorstellungen werden in der Tat durch den Verstand auf irgend ein Objekt bezogen,und, da Erscheinungen nichts als Vorstellungen sind, so bezieht sie der Verstand auf ein Etwasals denGegenstand der sinnlichen Anschauung: aber dieses Etwas ist in so fern nur das transzendentale Objekt.

Dieses bedeutet aber ein Etwas = x, wovon wir gar nichts wissen, noch berhaupt (nach der jetzigen

Einrichtung unseres Verstandes) wissen knnen, sondern, welcher[Akad.-Ausg.: welches]nur als einCorrelatum der Einheit der Apperzeption zur Einheit des Mannigfaltigen in der sinnlichen Anschauung

dienen kann, vermittelst deren der Verstand dasselbe in den Begriff eines Gegenstandes vereinigt. (A 250,

emphasis added)Was es fr eine Bewandtnis mit den Gegenstnden an sich und abgesondert von aller

dieser Rezeptivitt unserer Sinnlichkeit haben mge, bleibt uns gnzlich unbekannt.Wir kennennichts, als unsere Art, sie wahrzunehmen, die uns eigentmlich ist, die auch nicht notwendig

jedem Wesen, ob zwar jedem Menschen, zukommen muss. (A 42, B 59,emphasis added)Denn wir knnen von den Anschauungen anderer denkenden Wesen gar nicht urteilen,

ob sie an die nmlichen Bedingungen gebunden sein, welche unsere Anschauung einschrnken

und fr uns allgemein gltig sind. (A 27, B 43,emphasis added)9


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think otherwise than under the rigors of theprinciple of systematic transcendentalunity11, but he admitted that regarding the sensitivity, there may be beings thatperceive and represent things in a different analytical matrix. In fact, thetranscendental topicis nothing more than asubjective geography of ourintelligible worldwith which we try to orient ourselves across the ocean of oursensitive world12.

Mundus sensibilisrevolve around our own subjectivity, but this is a livingsubjectivity, which is in a continuous process of rediscovering and reshaping itself,otherwise this subjectivity would have had dogmatic ambitions even overnature,not only over ourpossible experience13. Ifcategories boardwould have been nailed byKant, then even God would not have dared to contradict Newton or Euclid. Non-euclidean geometries would not have been possible. All subatomic fauna wouldhave disappeared. Ourproductive imaginationwould become superfluous, becauseeverything that would have been possible to exist into the real world would havebeen given in our sensitive intuitions since tens of thousands of years.

Andere Formen der Anschauung (als Raum und Zeit), imgleichen andere Formen desVerstandes (als die diskursive des Denkens, oder der Erkenntnis durch Begriffe), ob sie gleich

mglich wren, knnen wir uns doch auf keinerlei Weise erdenken und fasslich machen, aber,

wenn wir es auch knnten, so wrden sie doch nicht zur Erfahrung, als dem einzigen Erkenntnis

gehren, worin uns Gegenstnde gegeben werden. Ob andere Wahrnehmungen, als berhaupt

zu unserer gesamten mglichen Erfahrung gehren, und also ein ganz anderes Feld der Materie

noch stattfinden knne, kann der Verstand nicht entscheiden, er hat es nur mit der Synthesisdessen zu tun, was gegeben ist. Sonst ist die Armseligkeit unserer gewhnlichen Schlsse, wodurch

wir ein grosses Reich der Mglichkeit herausbringen, davon alles Wirkliche (aller Gegenstand derErfahrung) nur ein kleiner Teil sei sehr in die Augen fallend..(A 230-231, B 282-283, emphasisadded)11This principle is the hinge of our rational thinking and of our entire intelligible world, we mightsay in terms of Wittgenstein's jargon.12Wir haben jetztdas Land des reinen Verstandesnicht allein durchreiset, und jeden Teil davonsorgfltig in Augenschein genommen, sondern es auch durchmessen, und jedem Dinge aufdemselben seine Stelle bestimmt. Dieses Land aber ist eineInsel, und durch die Natur selbst inunvernderliche Grenzen eingeschlossen. Es ist das Land der Wahrheit (ein reizender Name), umgeben von einem weiten und strmischen Ozeane, dem eigentlichen Sitze des Scheins, wo mancheNebelbank, und manches bald wegschmelzende Eis neue Lnder lgt, und indem es den auf

Entdeckungen herumschwrmenden Seefahrer unaufhrlich nut leeren Hoffnungen tuscht, ihn inAbenteuer verflechtet, von denen er niemals ablassen und sie doch auch niemals zu Ende bringenkann. Ehe wir uns aber auf dieses Meer wagen, um es nach allen Breiten zu durchsuchen, undgewiss zu werden, ob etwas in ihnen zu hoffen sei, so wird es ntzlich sein, zuvor noch einen Blickauf die Karte des Landes zu werfen, das wir ehen verlassen wollen, und erstlich zu fragen, ob wirmit dem, was es in sich enthlt, nicht allenfalls zufrieden sein knnten, oder auch aus Not zufriedensein mssen, wenn es sonst berall keinen Boden gibt, auf dem wir uns anbauen knnten; zweitens,unter welchem Titel wir denn selbst dieses Land besitzen, und uns wider alle feindselige Ansprchegesichert halten knnen. Obschon wir diese Fragen in dem Lauf der Analytik schon hinreichendbeantwortet haben, so kann doch ein summarischer Uberschlag ihrer Auflsungen die berzeugungdadurch verstrken, dass er die Momente derselben in einem Punkt vereinigt. (A 235-236, B 294-

295, emphasis added)13So bertrieben, so widersinnisch es also auch lautet, zu sagen: der Verstand ist selbst der Quell derGesetze der Natur, und mithin der formalen Einheit der Natur, so richtig, und dem Gegenstande, nmlich der

Erfahrung angemessen ist gleichwohl eine solche Behauptung. (A 127)10


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*

The fundamental problem of Kantian critical philosophy washomogenization(formalization)andortogonalization(axiomatisation)of thesystem of metaphysics, andthis by thetranscendental isolation of the object(thematization)and itsdecomposition in

prime factorshow mathematicians do.In terms ofhomogenization, the philosophical tradition was proposing to Kant

two choices: either everything is matter, or everything is spirit. After criticalexamination, it turns out that both variants are ontologically inconsistent (sometranscendental paralogisms).

It can not be made fromclayalso the object, and mirror, and image theycould not be distinguishable. On the other hand, if everything isidea(form/image),then disappears the objective reality everything becomes an illusion14.

Kant discovered then theTranscendental: therealm of representations, theisland

of pure intellect.Here tried Kant (The Judge) to withdraw for deliberation; toreflect and to seek a solution for reconciliation between these twotraditional

perspectives of thought15, just like Ulysses, between those two ferociouscliffs16. As abuilding material he had on this island neither matter nor spirit, but mere purerepresentations, some a priori synthetic intuitions, that is only thelogical placesofmatterandspirit. With this, the mathematical requirement of homogeneity andisotropy of the system of metaphysics was fulfilled. Metaphysics was no longer indanger of add, subtract, multiply or divide apples with pears as they say inarithmetics.

Now will follow to solve a problem more difficult:ortogonalizationoraxiomatisation of metaphysics, that is, in mathematical terms, finding that minimum

14Es wre meine eigene Schuld, wenn ich aus dem, was ich zur Erscheinung zhlen sollte, blossen Scheinmachte.*Dieses geschieht aber nicht nach unserem Prinzip der Idealitt aller unserer sinnlichen

Anschauungen; vielmehr,wenn man jenen Vorstellungsformen objektive Realitt beilegt, so kann

man nicht vermeiden, dass nicht alles dadurch in blossen Schein verwandelt werde.Denn, wenn

man den Raum und die Zeit als Beschafjenheiten ansieht, die ihrer Mglichkeit nach in Sachen an sich

angetroffen werden mssten, und berdenkt die Ungereimtheiten, in die man sich alsdenn verwickelt, indem

zwei unendliche Dinge, die nicht Substanzen, auch nicht etwas wirklich den Substanzen Inhrierendes,

dennoch aber Existierendes,ja die notwendige Bedingung der Existenz aller Dinge sein mssen, auch brigbleiben, wenn gleich alle existierende Dinge aufgehoben werden: so kann man es dem guten Berke ley wohl

nicht verdenken, wenn er die Krper zu blossem Schein herabsetzte, ja es msste so gar unsere eigene

Existenz, die auf solche Art von der fr sich bestehenden Realitt eines Undinges, wie die Zeit, abhngig

gemacht wre, mit dieser in lauter Schein verwandelt werden; eine Ungereimtheit, die sich bisher noch

niemand hat zu Schulden kommen lassen. (CPR, B 69-71, empfasis added.)15Critique of Pure Reason is a system of perspectives reconciliation, I was saying intoCritical Introduction(2004),.16Der erste dieser beiden berhmten Mnner [Locke] ffnete der Schwrmerei Tr und Tor, weil dieVernunft, wenn sie einmal Befugnisse auf ihrer Seite hat, sich nicht mehr durch unbestimmte Anpreisungen

der Mssigung in Schranken halten lsst; der zweite [Hume] ergab sich gnzlich dem Skeptizism, da er einmal

eine so allgemeine fr Vernunft gehaltene Tuschung unseres Erkenntnisvermgens glaubte entdeckt zuhaben. Wir sind jetzt im Begriffe, einen Versuch zu machen, ob man nicht die menschliche Vernunftzwischen diesen beidenKlippenglcklich durchbringen, ihr bestimmte Grenzen anweisen, und dennoch das

ganze Feld ihrer zweckmssigen Ttigkeit fr sie geffnet erhalten knnen. (CPR, B 128, empfasis added)11


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number of fundamental assertions, evident in themselves (that do not requiredemonstration), and by which we can deduce all other possible theorems of thesystem. In fact, Kant had to build a reference system with at least two axes (as didDescartes, in his analytical geometry).This was the necessary and sufficientcondition for a mapping of the land of pure intellect to be possible.

Well, those twoaxes of metaphysicswill be precisely those twoirreducibleperspectives of thinking(which are always in conflict); in fact, it is about the twopossible uses(equaly of sensitivity, intellect and reason): theempiricalone (analytic)and thepure transcendentalone (synthetic). Since then, the antinomic dance (thedialectic of pure reason) can start. Metaphysics could become, finally, a science, ageometry of knowledge, an ontology of truth, a hermeneutics of possibleexperience.

Kant did not try to save Metaphysics (she had not yet reached a state just sopathetic; as today). Kant's problem was saving the dignity of Metaphysics

proving her royal ancestry (comparison with Hecuba17) and reconfirming herontological legitimacy in the palace of human knowledge.

*

Therefore, we must note that theportrait of Unicorn, although it is identical(formal) both in the seeker's mind (in intellect) and into discoverer's mind (insensitivity), it is the image of different objects: inMundus intelligibilisit designateonly apossible object; inMundus sensibilisit designate aphenomenon(the object of apast experience). Where isthe Unicornin-and-for-itself(Anundfrsichsein,as Hegelwould say)? Obviously, in woods, inMundus realis(if he still exists, because there isthe possibility that the discoverer to be wrong, to be seen, for instance, only aspecimen of a species of rhinoceros a little more athletic). How it is the Unicorn initself? What eats, how it multiply, what kind of organs has, how goes his social life?The discoverer (our sesitivity) is the only one who can give a credible answer tosuch questions but never acompletely one. Something will always remainmysterious into life of that exotic animal, even for those who claim to have seen it inreality, more so for those who have not seen before.

When Kant speaks of thething in itself, he refers not to theUnicorn from thewoodsthat he knows he will never reach (because it separates them aninfinite seriesof steps), but to the two othertranscendental Unicorns(which can be reachedspontaneously, by pure intuition, synthetic); namely, the Unicorn from discoverer'smind (perceived assensitive intuition) and the Unicorn from seeker's mind(perceived as ana priori synthetic intuition of an possible animal), which we usuallyequate, by a reflex act of the intellect.

Thisconfusion of plansbetween this twopure(orthogonal)uses of our faculties ofknowledge(empirical and purely transcendental, i.e. analytical and synthetic)is called byKant:Subreption des hypostasierten Bewusstseins18,Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffeor

17CRP (A IX).18Gleichwohl ist nichts natrlicher und verfhrerischer, als der Schein, die Einheit in der Synthesis der

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transzendentalen Amphibolie19.We have just onefaculty of representation, both for our external intuitions (the

empirical one) and for our internal intuitions (the pure one). There is noformaldistinction20between thecircle perceived as the form of sun, for instance, and thecirclethought as the logical place of all points of the plan equally spaced a given point. On the

beach of our faculty of representation, the circle drawn by a child is not differentfrom the circle drawn by a geometrician, as Euclid; the difference is that for thechild the circle is a symbol of anempirical intuition; and for Euclid is a symbol of a

pure intuition. From here the illusory nature of our sensibility. But this confusion isalso our salvation, for without thisformal coincidencewe couldn't make anyconnection between what we feel and what we think. We would be some purelyinstinctive beasts. Ourfaculty of representation (reflection)will soon atrophy, becauseit would lose its purpose. Man would be a divided being (schizophrenic) thatwould succumb like Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde. So, if still we can know something

about nature it is precisely because we canformalizeher, and we canconfuse itsphenomena(as representations)with our owna priori synthetic intuitions.

The disclosure and regulation of this illusion (for her destruction is not onlyimpossible but also undesirable) is the primary task ofreason, and the main goal ofthe firstCritique.

Thistranscendentaldetachmentand the referralof thisontologicalhiatusbetween theobjectandconcept(between theepistemological thing in itselfandthe

Gedanken vor eine wahrgenommene Einheit im Subjekte dieser Gedanken zu halten. Man knnte ihn die

Subreption des hypostasierten Bewusstseins (apperceptiones substantiatae) nennen. (A 402)19Denn euer Gegenstand ist bloss in eurem Gehirne, und kann ausser demselben gar nichtgegeben werden; daher ihr nur dafr zu sorgen habt, mit euch selbst einig zu werden, und dieAmphibolie zu verhten, die eure Idee zu einer vermeintlichen Vorstellung eines empirischGegebenen, und also auch nach Erfahrungsgesetzen zu erkennenden Objekts macht. (A 484, B 512)

Die Begriffe knnen logisch verglichen werden, ohne sich darum zu bekmmern, wohinihre Objekte gehren, ob als Noumena fr den Verstand, oder als Phaenomena fr die Sinnlichkeit.Wenn wir aber mit diesen Begriffen zu den Gegenstnden gehen wollen so ist zuvrdersttranszendentale berlegung ntig, fr welche Erkenntniskraft sie Gegenstnde sein sollen, ob frden reinen Verstand, oder die Sinnlichkeit. Ohne diese berlegung mache ich einen sehr unsicherenGebrauch von diesen Begriffen, und es entspringen vermeinte synthetische [B 326] Grundstze, [A

270] welche die kritische Vernunft nicht anerkennen kann, und die sich lediglich auf einertranszendentalen Amphibolie, d. i. einer Verwechselung des reinen Verstandesobjekts mit der

Erscheinung, grnden.(A 270, B 326)20Es hat zwar den Anschein, als wenn die Mglichkeit eines Triangels aus seinem Begriffe an sichselbst knne erkannt werden (von der Erfahrung ist er gewiss unabhngig); denn in der Tat knnenwir ihm gnzlich a priori einen Gegenstand geben, d. i. ihn konstruieren. Weil dieses aber nur dieForm von einem Gegenstande ist, so wrde er doch immer nur ein Produkt der Einbildung [A 224]bleiben, von dessen Gegenstand die Mglichkeit noch zweifelhaft bliebe, als wozu noch etwas mehrerfordert wird, nmlich dass eine solche Figur unter lauter Bedingungen, auf denen alleGegenstnde der Erfahrung beruhen, gedacht sei. Dass nun der Raum eine formale Bedingung apriori von usseren Erfahrungen ist,dass eben dieselbe bildende Synthesis, wodurch wir in der

Einbildungskraft einen Triangel konstruieren, mit derjenigen gnzlich einerlei sei, welche wir in derApprehension einer Erscheinung ausben, um uns davon einen Erfahrungsbegriff zu machen, dasist es allein, was mit diesem Begriffe die Vorstellung von der Mglichkeit eines solchen Dingesverknpft. (CPR, A 223-224, B 271, empfasys added)

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noumenal thing in itself, or betweenMundussensibilisandMundus intelligibilis)istheponsasinorum21ofphilosophy, saidMihai EminescuinArchaeus(his romanticizedinterpretationoftheCritique of Pure Reason,probably writtenduringhis studiesofphilosophy atBerlin,1872-1874).

The difficulty is that both perspectives of thinking (in this critical endeavor)

aretranscendental namely, they does not concern theUnicorn from the forest, as Imentioned above, but the othertwo Unicorns, that we have in our minds when wethink to theUnicorn from the forest, when as beinggiven(retrospectively), when asbeingmerely possible(prospectively). In other words, there are twotranscendentaltopics: that of intellect, in itsempirical use, when thething in itselfis placed at theedge of the system, as a limit of oursensitive knowledge(as the limit of an infiniteseries of empirical experiences, that basically it will be never traveled to the end),and the other, itspurely transcendental use(apperceptive), in whichthing in itselfisintroduced in system with all legitimacy, as apurelogical place. In other words, only

in thispure transcendental usewe have the right to conclude in the synthetic mannertheseries of possible experienceand consider thething in itselfat the end of this seriesas being given (as being a part of series). In itsempirical use(as aGegenstand, as aphysical obstacle or as hypothetical cause of our sensitive impressions) thething initselfis completelyunknown, isexternal (transcendent), isoutside of our sensitive world.In its pure transcendental use, thething in itselfis given objectively and is known apriori as alogical placeon the map of intelligible world. In other words, we put atthe foundation of our sensitive knowledge somepurely imaginary objectsand,conversely, we give us objectively some objects that we can not conceive as beingknowable. But even so (by this antisimetrie), Kants transcendental topic isontologically complete and equilibrated. Reducing these two ontological instancesof thething in itselfto only one, as suggested Jakobi, mean, really, to throw Kantiansystem in the purest idealism, maybe even more radical than that of Berkeley.Cantor is the one who basically will obey to Jakobi's suggestion: he was convincedthat his diagonal argument is a demonstration of God's existence, ie that the limitof a infinite serie is contiguous with the elements of serie or that, in other words,there is anactual infinity(I will return to this subject in discussion onmathematical

paradigm).Transcendental logic, precisely for she must take into account its

transcendental objects(ideals of reason) is also an ontology Heidegger remarked. Intranscendental logic,negationdoes not suppress thestatement, as in Aristotle's logic,but imposes to her with necessity and stands beside as her limit and ascomplementary logical place.

Gegenstandis (etymological) whatstands against us; is what limits us, and,says Kant, what limitate [what establishes boundaries] must be different fromwhat is limited22. Thislimit of knowledgecan not be an element of the series of ourexternal (sensitive) intuitions, because in this empirical perspective there is no last

21As it was once the Pythagorean Theorem considered by scholars.

22CPR, A 515, B 54314


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(final) intuition of truth. In other words, the border of the sensible world must bean unattainable horizon. Briefly, however, thislimit of knowledgeis no longer anobject of our external intutions, but anobject of our internal intuitions(pure), ie only alogical placewhich ends necessarily and legitimately the series of intuitions,precisely for reason of completeness of the transcendental topic, as a logical system.

InMundus intelligibillis, thething in itself, the world as a whole, God and all otherideals of reason areimanent(consubstantial and contiguous with the thinkingsubject). InMundus sensibilis, thelogical placeof all these ideals of reason istranscendent. Otherwise it would mean that they can be found and experienced inthe sensitive world as any other sensitive objects.

*

In fact, regarding reality, we are always in the position of seekers. Our only

possible certaintys, Kant wants to say, are the transcendental ones so, notregarding the existence of things, but only about their ontological possibility. Inother words, we can be sure, regarding objects, only on the limits of our ownfaculties of representation and judgment. All our knowledge is relative to thesefaculties that are perhaps not the only possible ones nor the last and the bestwe've ever had, but, anyway, some without which we can not think.

Metaphysics is possible as science, but only as atranscendental logic Kantwants to say. In experience we encounterreal objects, Kant agrees, but he sayseverything that we know about them is just what we can imagine a priori. In short,we can know only what is in us beforehand possible.

If for our daily experiences always such a statement seems strange,somewhat backwards in relation to common sense; in modern physics, for instance,that finding is quite obvious. Nuclear physics, quantum mechanics and evenmodern astronomy would not have been possible without this primacy of theimagination over empirical experience.

With the exception of Copernicus, the science of his time does not stillprovide some fairly convincing examples. If Kant would have lived in our time,surely he would have done himself much better understood.

*

If, in sciences, as Aristotle imagined them, the object is always outside andthere is no doubt about their "logical tools"; in metaphysics, the object is alwaysinside. Metaphysics must produce for himself both the object and tools (themethod) and, in addition, she must refine both of them on the go.

Metaphysics is the science of its own possibilities I was saying in "CriticalIntroduction" (2004). Therefore, I would now add, history of metaphysics is acontinuous self-referential dance (pas des trois) between thethinking subject,objectandmeans ie between individual, general and determinations; as could Hegel say.

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1.3. Criticism: a ceremonious step back (a strategic withdrawal in the

transcendental)

Criticism, as it was founded by Kant, is actually self-criticism.

Critique of Pure Reason is, for Kant, his reverential step back (a strategicwithdrawal in the transcendental), in the prelude of his harsh polemic withphilosophical tradition.

If the interest is the truth, then criticism (der Tadel) is not impertinence, but aform of respectKant wants to say, since theIntroductionto his inaugural book23.

In Kant's view, the philosophy is the kind of man to free himself from undertutelage of his own ontological prejudices and to assume the truth of his destiny,whatever the consequences.

So, forhuman reason(die Vernunft; our faculty of judgment, par excellence),

self criticism, iedetermination of the boundaries of her own jurisdiction(Gerichtsbarkeit),is the guarantee of her ownprocedural (methodological) honestyand more, theevidence of her ownmoral competence. That is why for Kant it was essential that thehuman reasonbe able to ask questions which she can not answer, because that is heronly way to deny her old and unjust reputation oftyrant, and finally to legitimatesherself in the public position ofwise judge.

2. The Juridical Paradigm

And hardly tempering his own youthful rationalist enthusiasm, just usingthe ideas of those he criticized, to be able to finally establish a lasting peacebetween the two camps, Kant was forced finally to recognize a certain limitregarding the use of reason, ie, only in the narrow context of possible experiencebut not in the existence of things. From this pacifying interest was born thecritical

23Ich glaube, ich habe Ursache, von dem Urteile der Welt, dem ich diese Bltter berliefere, eine sogute Meinung zu fassen,dass diejenige Freiheit, die ich mir herausnehme,grossen Mnnern zuwidersprechen, mir vor kein Verbrechen werde ausgelegt werden. Es war eine Zeit, da man bei

einem solchen Unterfangen viel zu befrchten hatte, allein ich bilde mir ein, diese Zeit seinunmehro vorbei, und der menschliche Verstand habe sich schon der Fesseln glcklich entschlagen,die ihm Unwissenheit und Bewunderung ehemals angelegt hatten. Nunmehro kann man eskhnlich wagen, das Ansehen derer Newtons und Leibnize vor nichts zu achten,wenn es sich derEntdeckung der Wahrheit entgegen setzen sollte, und keinen andern berredungen als dem Zugedes Verstandes zu gehorchen. (...)

Wenn ich es unternehme, die Gedanken eines Herrn von Leibniz, Wolffen, Hermanns,Bernoulli, Blfingers und anderer zu verwerfen, und denen meinigen den Vorzug einzurumen: sowollte ich auch nicht gerne schlechtere Richter als dieselbe haben, denn ich weiss, ihr Urteil, wennes meine Meinungen verwrfe, wrde die Absicht derselben doch nicht verdammen.Man kanndiesen Mnnern kein vortrefflicher Lob geben, als dass man alle Meinungen, ohne ihre eigene

davon auszunehmen, vor ihnen ungescheut tadeln drfe.Gedanken von der wahren Schtzung derlebendigen Krfte und Beurtheilung der Beweise derer sich Herr von Leibnitz und andere Mechaniker in

dieser Streitsache bedienet haben, nebst einigen vorhergehenden Betrachtungen welche die Kraft der Krper

berhaupt betreffen(A V-VI, empfasis added)16


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solution.Here's what Kant said about the two camps, that of empiricism24, on the one

hand, and that of problematic25,dogmatic26and rationalist27idealism, on the other in this case, about the limits and contradictions of Locke and Leibniz:

"Anstatt im Verstande und der Sinnlichkeit zwei ganz verschiedene Quellen vonVorstellungen zu suchen, die aber nur in Verknpfung objektivgltig von Dingen urteilen knnten,hielt sich ein jeder dieser grossen Mnner nur an eine von beiden, die sich ihrer Meinung nachunmittelbar auf Dinge an sich selbst bezge, indessen dass die andere nichts tat, als die

Vorstellungen der ersteren zu verwirren oder zu ordnen.28

In other words, in Kant's view, the two traditional ways of thinking werepracticing some paralogisms; but instead everyone to supplement their knowledgewith what was authentic and valuable in the thinking of the other side, they do not

cease to blame each other.Kant would have liked to reconcile them all: Maupertuis and Crusius withWolff; Mendelssohn with Jacobi; Leibniz with Descartes, on the one hand, or withLocke and Hume, on the other. Reason: this general scholastic scramble leadnowhere. It was the time for a compromise, for a middle way, because the losseswere ruinous for all.

While in Leibniz's perspective, for instance, the objectivity of knowledgehave a transcendental origin (a priori, purely rational, being patronized by asovereignego); in Hume's view, conversely, the primacy of empirical experience on

rational thinking put the very existence and sovereignty ofegoin doubt. If Leibniz,in the monad, was losing the content of a well-defined and necessary world; Hume,indeed, in theconcept ofexperiencerecover thecertainty of an outer presencebut waslosing theidea ofnecessity.

In his approach Kant did just toassemble29the two perspectives of thought,putting experience to provide a content and certainty to some transcendentalforms, and vice versa, on legitimate reason to confer necessity (meaning) where theexperience could show only contingency, relativism and random.

Kant invented, after all, nothing. Kant has arranged better (more correctly)

the sprockets in the gearbox of our rational thinking.Later, in his famous Antithetic, to the very beginning, where it will analyzethe conflict of reason with itself within cosmological ideas, Kant will reaffirm quiteexplicit his position ofarbitratororwise judge, one that seeks to instruct himself intothe conflicts he judge to really find the right solution:

Denn die skeptische Methode geht auf Gewissheit, dadurch, dass sie, in einem solchen, auf

24Bacon, Locke and Hume.25Descartes.26Berkeley.27Leibniz.28CPR, A 271, B 32729To see R. Scruton,Kant, Ed. Humanitas, 1998

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beiden Seiten redlichgemeinten und mit Verstande [B 452] gefhrten Streite, den Punkt desMissverstndnisses zu entdecken sucht, um, wie weise Gesetzgeber tun, aus der Verlegenheit derRichter bei Rechtshandeln fr sich selbst Belehrung, von dem Mangelhaften und nicht genau

Bestimmten in ihren Gesetzen, zu ziehen.30

Kantian critical system is a system of perspectives (say Allison, Bird, Pippin,Prauss and Palmquist). In fact,Critique of Pure Reasonis a reconciliation system ofall possible pleadings on truth. Accepting the legitimacy of both contrary opinionsbut requiring them certain areas of validity, Kant assimilated thecontradictionin thehypostasis ofcomplementarityand this allowed him to find a conceptual consistencywhere philosophical tradition see onlycontradictions.

So, in relation to the philosophical tradition, always divided into two camps,Kant proposed a third way, that of thecritical skepticism, which, as a discipline ofpure reason, there will be nothing but asystem of circumspection (System der Vorsicht)

meant to protect us from errors and delusions.Pointing out that, in fact, realism-idealism dispute (or empiricism-rationalism) is nothing but a conflict of reason with itself at the level ofcosmological ideas, no other choice remained for Kant but to withdraw the reason'scompetences in matter of empirical reality and, of course, to convince both sides(the conflicting perspectives of thought) that it would be wise for them to be morereserved and cautious with their results, despite the fact that both has the solemnlook of some categorical inferences.

Ist aber dieses, so ist es, weil die Klarheit auf beiden Seiten gleich ist, doch unmglich,jemals auszumitteln, auf welcher Seite das Recht sei, und der Streit dauert nach wie vor, wenn dieParteien gleich bei dem Gerichtshofe der Vernunft zur Ruhe verwiesen worden. Es bleibt also keinMittel brig, den Streit grndlich und zur Zufriedenheit beider Teile zu endigen, als dass, da sieeinander doch so schon widerlegen knnen,sieendlich berfhrt werden, dass sie um nichtsstreiten, und ein gewisser transzendentaler Schein ihnen da eine Wirklichkeit vorgemalt habe, wokeine anzutreffen ist. Diesen Weg der Beilegung eines nicht abzuurteilenden Streits wollen wir ietzteinschlagen.31

.................................................................................................................................................

In this paper I would like to identify all the instances of thisjuridicalparadigminto the Critique of Pure Reason and the way it marked the main joints ofKantian critical philosophy. The same I would like to achieve with themathematical

paradigm; no less important.The advantage of thisparabolic methodis that it casts a revealing light on

critical philosophy as a whole, trying to capture the first philosophical visionbehind Critics and then try to answer some specific questions (like that of the thing

in itself). If the analytical method, the scholastic tradition, trying to get up from the

30CPR, A 424, B 451-45231CPR, A 501-502, B 529-530

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particular to the general, parabolic method (synthetic) tries to descend from thegeneral to the particular.

This doctoral thesis aims to be a continuation and a culmination of myprevious research on Kant's philosophy, the past two decades, mainly concretizedin these two publications:

Critical introduction. About the possibility of Metaphysics asScience, in the critical philosophy of Kant(Introducere critic.

Despre posibilitatea metafizicii ca tiin n perspectiva filosofiei critice

kantiene, Editura Crates, Reia, 2004) The Antinomy of Pure Reason and Logical Paradoxes(Antinomia

raiunii pure i paradoxele logice(n volumul de studiiLogic iontologie, Editura Trei, Bucureti, 1999)

marcel chelba: the paradigms of kant’s critical philosophy and the place of the thing in itself...

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