magic and experimental science. the achievement of lynn thorndike

Magic and Experimental Science. The Achievement of Lynn ThorndikeAuthor(s): Dana B. DurandSource: Isis, Vol. 33, No. 6 (Jun., 1942), pp. 691-712Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/330717 .

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Magic and Experimental Science The Achievement of Lynn Thorndike

By DANA B. DURAND

I

T HE completion by an American scholar of a monument in a field of European history is, even today, a rather exceptional event. It is true that American-born historians are turning out an ever-increasing flow

of articles, monographs, and books which compare favorably with the best that the Old World is producing. We have learned how to comb through archives and manuscript collections with fine professional virtuosity, and our leading scholars make no more mistakes in footnotes than most Europeans. Yet, for the most part, the achievement of the individual American historian has rarely proved sufficiently original to be hailed as "bahnbrechend," nor sufficiently exhaustive to be honored as "magistral." Both of these praises are due, I believe, to the work of LYNN THORNDIKE. The publication of the fifth and sixth volumes of A History of Magic and Experimental Science calls for at least a provisional appraisal of his massive achievement.

Even by the test of quantity THORNDIKE'S work has few competitors. According to my count, which may not be complete, he has published in book form well over 7000 pages.1 These include two excellent textbooks, one of which has passed through several editions.2 I have found references to more than 100 articles-exclusive of reviews-totalling at least 1000 pages. Some of these have been incorporated into chapters of Magic and Experimental Science, but others constitute supplements to material already published in Volumes I toIV. At least one by-product of THORNDIKE'S main activity-his Catalogue of Incipits,3 prepared in collaboration with PEARL KIBRE-itself takes rank as a monument, an indispensable tool for future research.4

1 Cf. "Bibliography of Lynn Thorndike," in A Bibliography of the Faculty of Political Science, Columbia

University, 1830-1930 (New York, 1931), pp. 285-89. 2 The History of Medieval Europe, revised edition (Boston, 1928). A Short History of Civilization,

second edition (New York, 1929); "When the world war broke out in 1914, I determined to do what little I could to keep civilization alive. This volume is a contribution in that direction" (Preface).

3 Full title, A Catalogue of Incipits of Mediaeval Scientific Writings in Latin (The Mediaeval Academy of America, Publication No. 29: Cambridge, Mass., 1937). This has been supplemented by "Additional

Incipits of Mediaeval Scientific Writings in Latin," Speculum, XIV (1939), 93-105. 4 THORNDIKE also drew up a "Prospectus for a Corpus of Medieval Scientific Literature in Latin,"

Isis, XIV (1930), 363-84, which includes as desiderata 164 items from the general field of medieval science and 85 from medicine.



Dana B. Durand

Another by-product, THORNDIKE'S seminar at Columbia University, has also

begun to yield its fruit.5 Finally, lest anyone should suppose that the happy termination of Magic and Experimental Science marks the end of scholarly activity, it should be pointed out that THORNDIKE has promised a number of attractive items for future publication.6 All of these past and future enter- prises, even without Magic and Experimental Science, would be sufficient to win a reputation for unusual productivity.

II

A History of Magic and Experimental Science originated-its author tells us-in a suggestion made by JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON in 1902-03. ROBIN-

SON proposed, as the subject for a Master's thesis, the study of magic in medieval universities. The resulting dissertation, which appeared in 1905 under the title The Place of Magic in the Intellectual History of Europe,7 might be described as a prospectus of THORNDIKE'S life work. It is noteworthy that at this stage the term "science" did not appear in the title, and indeed it scarcely figured in the book itself. Chronologically The Place of Magic was restricted almost entirely to the period of the Roman Empire. Although he was aware that antecedents of magic-in-science might be found in Greek writers (even in ARISTOTLE), THORNDIKE turned his attention immediately to Roman and Greco-Roman authors, and, to a large extent, it is the Latin tradition which has continued to monopolize his interest. Greek and Arabic works have been used in his treatment only insofar as they were known to the West in Latin translation.

After completing this preliminary survey of the classical background- which like so many dissertations had turned out to be only a long running start toward the topic originally proposed-THo RNDIKE turned to the Middle

Ages. Shortly before the outbreak of the last war, he prepared an account of magic and science during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. He decided not to publish this work, since it was based only on printed material available in this country. The next ten years, apart from the war period, marked the beginning of that series of Studienreisen which have made LYNN THORNDIKE

one of the best known American names in European manuscript rooms. During these years he published a number of articles, from which it was possible to see that a major scholarly project was taking shape.

6 Published works by THORNDIKE'S students include: CARL B. BOYER, The Concepts of the Calculus; A Critical and Historical Discussion of the Derivative and the Integral (New York, 1939); MARSHALL

CLAGETT, Giovanni Marliani and Late Medieval Physics (New York, 1941). In preparation is an edition of the TheoricaPlanetarum of CAMPANUS OF NOVARA, based on six MSS.

6 Notably an edition of the botanical writings of RUFINUS, one of THORNDIKE'S most important "finds"; cf. "Rufinus: a Forgotten Botanist of the Thirteenth Century," Isis, XVIII (1939), 63-76.

7 (Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, Columbia University, xxiv, 1: New York, 1905).

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Magic and Experimental Science

The first two volumes of Magic and Experimental Science appeared in 1923.8 About half of the first volume consists of an amplification of THORN- DIKE'S dissertation, The Place of Magic. The rest of Volume I carries the story through the Dark Ages to the end of the eleventh century. Volume II covers the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It was not indicated at the end of these volumes that a sequel might be expected, and it seems possible that THORNDIKE himself did not foresee at the time the magnitude of what lay ahead. At any rate the next installment was eleven years in the making. During this period the only major publication was a volume entitled Science and Thought in the Fifteenth Century.9 Despite the broad title, this work consisted largely of special studies, illustrating several important aspects of fifteenth-century intellectual history, but presenting only a limited vue d'ensemble.

Volumes III and IV of Magic and Experimental Science, covering the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, were published in 1934.10 The steady increase in scale, which had been apparent as the earlier volumes progressed, was enhanced by the inclusion of extensive Latin quotations in the footnotes, and of a veritable forest of Appendices-62 in all. Reflecting and continuing this increased momentum of THORNDIKE'S scholarship, the interval between volumes decreased to seven years, and at the same time the scale of treatment expanded still further. Volumes V and VI, appearing in 1941,11 devote 1287 pages (exclusive of indexes) to the period from 1500 to 1630. This compares with the 707 pages which had been devoted to the fifteenth century, 771 to the fourteenth, 663 to the thirteenth, 302 to the twelfth, and 743 to the preceding ten centuries.

Since the publication of the sixteenth-century volumes is the occasion of the present article, I shall describe them somewhat more fully than the preceding volumes. Roughly speaking Volume V treats the first half of the sixteenth century, Volume VI the second half, with occasional sallies into the first three decades of the seventeenth century. As in the earlier volumes the organization is not rigorously systematic; some chapters are devoted to individual writers, others to groups, still others to special topics. The first chapter, "Intellectual Characteristics," sets forth a number of generalizations about the background of the period. The most noteworthy of these may be given in the author's own words:

8 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1923; second printing with corrections, 1929). 9 Subtitle: Studies in the History of Medicine and Surgery, Natural and Mathematical Science. Philosophy

and Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1929). 10 (History of Science Society Publications, New Series, IV; New York: Columbia University Press,

1934). 1 Also published by the Columbia University Press with the sponsorship of the History of Science

Society: Vol. V, xxii+695 pp.; Vol. VI, xviii+766 pp.; price $10.00 per set.

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New facts were appended to outworn systems, with the result for a time of more confusion than enlightenment (V, 10).

Scientific controversy seldom followed religious lines. ... Natural and occult science, medicine and mathematics, were like the classics in offering a neutral territory and in affording a common meeting ground where religious and political differences could be ignored and tem- porarily forgotten (V, 11).

As for nationalist separatism, the sixteenth century had still gone only a little way from medieval Latin unity to the idea-tight compartments of modern national languages, where linguistic barriers are even more formidable than tariff walls (V, 12).

It is a surprising and paradoxical fact that, although in the sixteenth century the persecu- tion of witches reached greater proportions than before, and the literature against witchcraft became much more vehement and voluminous, there was less objection to the word magic, and more approving use of it than in the preceding centuries (V, 13).

As the [sixteenth] century wore on, the turning away from ARISTOTLE'S natural philosophy and the rise of Paracelsanism encouraged the development of occult philosophy, and a favor- ing attitude toward natural magic. This tendency continued briskly into the seventeenth century until by its excesses it exhausted and killed itself and was replaced by the sceptical rationalism and enlightenment of the eighteenth century (V, 14).

At the end of Volume VI stands a chapter entitled "Summary and By- Products." In substance this chapter is a sort of semi-statistical autopsy performed by the author on the indexes of all six volumes. An analysis of place and person names brings out, among other points, the continuing frequency in the sixteenth century of citations from Arabic writers in medicine and astrology, despite the humanistic outcry against medieval bar- barism; the partial shift of the cultural center of gravity from southern to northern Europe (with the exception of the British Isles which lagged until the end of the century); the continuing importance of Paris as a center of printing and of learning; the wide diffusion of learned medical practice; the beginnings of scientific correspondence and exchange on an international basis; the absolute pre-eminence of Venice as a center of scientific publication.

A topical analysis of the indexes suggests to THORNDIKE that the sixteenth century, with its "close combing of classical books and sources, [was] a sort of catch-all for the previous history of thought" (VI, 585). Although the index of Volumes V and VI contains many terms which had not appeared in any of the earlier volumes, this fact would not seem to indicate that the sixteenth century surpassed the preceding periods in quantity of innovation. THORNDIKE, indeed, gives the palm for originality and richness of intellectual life to the fourteenth century-an interesting and important conclusion which I shall examine in more detail below.

Between these two summaries at the beginning and the end of the sixteenth-century volumes, THORNDIKE has strung a chain of forty-six highly variegated chapters. Nearly every page is based in some measure on new

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material. Although many familiar figures make their appearance, the reader will find that even these take on the strange aspect which is common to the scores of obscure philosophasters, occultists, doctors, poets, encyclopedists, dabblers, charlatans and honest men of science who are presented to his attention for the first time. A transcription of the chapter headings will give an impression of the wealth of material:

Volume V: 1, Intellectual Conditions and Characteristics of the Sixteenth Century; 2, LEONARDO DA VINCI: "The Magician of the Renaissance"; 3. ACHILLINI, Aristotelian and

Anatomist; 4, COCLES and Chiromancy; 5, NIFO and Demons; 6, POMPONAZZI on Incanta- tions; 7, SYMPHORIEN CHAMPIER; 8, AGRIPPA and Occult Philosophy; 9, Varied Approaches to Natural Philosophy; 10, Astrology of the Early Century; 11, The Conjunction of 1524; 12, Astrology at Bologna; 13, The Court of PAUL III (1543-1549); 14, Astronomy and Astrology at Paris; 15, Astrology Elsewhere; 16, The Aftermath of REGIOMONTANUS; 17, The Circle of MELANCHTHON; 18, The Copernican Theory; 19, German Medicine; 20, BRASAVOLA and Pharmacy; 21, Poisons, Fascination, and Hydrophobia; 22, FRACASTORO

(1478-1533); 23, Anatomy from CARPI to VESALIUS; 24, Alchemy during the First Half of the Sixteenth Century; 25, Elements and Occult Virtue; 26, CARDAN; 27, Three Tech- nologists, TAISNIER, BESSON, and PALISSY; 28, GRATOROLO; 29, The Paracelsan Revival; 30, THOMAS ERASTUS.

Volume VI: 31, Post-Copernican Astronomy; 32, The New Stars; 33, Astrology after 1550; 34, The Catholic Reaction: Index, Inquisition and Papal Bulls; 35, Adversaries of Astrology; 36, Medicine after 1550; 37, LIBAVIUS and Chemical Controversy; 38, The Sixteenth Century Naturalists; 39, The Lore of Gems; 40, CESALPINO'S View of Nature; 41, Efforts toward a Christian Philosophy of Nature; 42, For and against ARISTOTLE; 43, Natural Philosophy and Natural Magic; 44, Mystic Philosophy: Words and Numbers; 45, Divination; 46, The Literature of Magic and Witchcraft after WIER; 47, The Sceptic and the Atheist: FRANCESCO SANCHEZ and LUCILIO VANINI; 48, Summary and By-Products.

Among the general characteristics which impress the reader of these volumes easily the first is their erudition. As a compendium of biographical and bibliographical information they stand almost alone in their field. THORNDIKE threads his way through the maze of authentic and pirated editions, abridgments and translations with complete assurance. His comprehensive knowledge of earlier writers makes it easy for him to spot the repetitions of threadbare arguments, the adaptations and downright plagia- risms which sprout like weeds in the fertile sixteenth-century soil. And throughout the reader has the comfortable feeling that everything is quite accurate; there is no temptation to waste one's energies trying to catch the author on a misspelled German title or a defective Latin ending.

The formal presentation of the sixteenth, and to some extent of the fourteenth and fifteenth-century volumes, unlike their learning, is not impec- cable. It is true that THORNDIKE can, and frequently does write a clean, pre- cise expository prose. Nevertheless the general impression created by these volumes is one of a certain stylelessness, a stringing together of thousands of notes taken down rapidly and accurately, but without formal polish.

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Indeed it is sometimes difficult to determine-this was particularly true in Volumes III and 1V-what criterion was followed in assigning a given item to footnote, appendix or text. Possibly this defect has resulted solely from the magnitude of the undertaking and from the diversity of the material, rather than from any inherent lack of architectonic sense.

III

In appraising the essential, as opposed to the accidental qualities of Magic and Experimental Science-I speak now of the entire work-the natural starting point is the lengthy review of Volumes I and II, which was written by GEORGE SARTON in 1924 (Isis, VI, 74-89). Since this criticism remains the most comprehensive which has been directed against Magic and Experimental Science, it may be worth while to summarize it at some length.

After conceding that Magic and Experimental Science must be recognized as a work of major importance, SARTON proceeds directly to his principal point: the title of the book, he charges, is fundamentally misleading. This is not a history of experimental science. It was conceived originally as a history of magic, and science was added (the author himself confesses it) as an afterthought. Moreover, throughout the work, whenever THORNDIKE talks about the experiments which were actually carried out in ancient or medieval times, he fails to tell us what we most want to know: how was each experiment conceived and executed, and what did it prove? Instead of em- phasizing the really important experiments-such as PTOLEMY'S studies of refraction or PIERRE DE MARICOURT'S work on the magnet-THoRNDIKE lingers over the "experimenta" and the "secreta" of the medieval physicians, which were little more than semi-magical collections of remedies and recipes, ostensibly tried by experience. THORNDIKE is, of course, aware of this naive use of the term "experimentum" in antiquity and the Middle Ages, but he has insensibly been beguiled into accepting all references to experiment as valid in the modern sense.

Of magic, SARTON concedes, the author has given an adequate definition, but of true science he has displayed only an imperfect and uncritical notion. The main characteristics of science, SARTON asserts, are "its rationality, its scepticism, its progressiveness, its unlimitedness" (80). It is clear from his development of this contrast that, for SARTON, any work which calls itself a history of experimental science should be the record of a "cumulative, a progressive activity." The history of science is for him, as his whole work shows, identical with the chronicle of human progress. In that progress magic is not, as THORNDIKE claims, a causal influence, a creative contributor. It is rather an impediment, a weed which threatens to choke the flowers in the garden of thought. Magic is to science as vice is to virtue. The co-existence

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of magic and true science-often in the same mind-cannot be denied, but that is simply evidence of the basic duality of the human spirit. The progressive elimination of this flaw is a chronicle of emancipation, a "tale of con- quest, of hope, of joy" (88). THORNDIKE by centering his approach in magic, has given us the "depressing recital of unprogressive and hopeless activities."

SARTON justifies the severity of this indictment by the contention that Magic and Experimental Science will actually mislead many of those who read it. Scientifically trained readers without historical knowledge, finding in it nothing but a tale of human aberration, will be confirmed in their er- roneous preconception that medieval science was nothing but a waste of time. Non-scientific readers will lack both the technical knowledge to check the author's statements, and the perspective to see that he has not been talking about science at all:

After reading this elaborate parody of the history of medieval science, they will imagine that they know something of the subject-yet they will know precious little of it, and their understanding of science will be worse than ever. Truly such a prospect makes one shudder (83).

This is strong language, and in a sense I hesitate to recall it. It is well to do so, however, for the acerbity which it-and indeed the whole review-con- veys should not be allowed to persist. Even in his original review, SARTON softened the impact of his criticism by admitting that it was primarily the title which was at fault. In his review of Volumes III and IV (Isis, XXIII, 471-75) the tone is distinctly more generous, and I am sure that if SARTON were reviewing the present volumes, he would ungrudgingly acclaim the completion of the only monument of this generation in the history of science worthy to stand with his own Introduction.

Any comprehensive judgment must start with the recognition that Magic and Experimental Science is not a complete work. THORNDIKE himself says so explicitly. The magnitude of his task imposed a principle of economy, the deliberate avoidance of repeating work satisfactorily accomplished by other scholars. This is particularly true in the case of DUHEM; THORNDIKE rarely cites him except to amplify a point or to correct an error. Though this principle of economy has undoubtedly saved effort to the author, and has cut down the already considerable bulk of the work itself, it is also one of the chief reasons why Magic and Experimental Science fails to achieve a rounded synthesis.

But admitting that the avowed partiality of THORNDIKE'S aim disarms some of SARTON'S criticism, there remains the charge that the title is misleading. This charge also is tacitly admitted by the author, who states that the work might more properly have been called "a history of the relations between magic and experimental science" (III, 22). Perhaps the realization

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that this was the true subject of the book came too late, or perhaps the title was too cumbersome for the publisher. I find it hard to share SARTON'S dis- may over this matter. I can hardly believe that many persons would approach Magic and Experimental Science under a misapprehension, and come away from it badly disappointed or misled.

Both of these criticisms, then, would seem to be of minor significance. There remains the fundamental question: has THORNDIKE succeeded in demonstrating his central thesis? In his review of 1924 SARTON flatly states that THORNDIKE has failed to prove it in a single instance; he has failed

signally to demonstrate a positive, a constructive relation between the history of magic and the history of science. My own examination of the entire work leads me to believe that this judgment calls for modification.

The premises underlying SARTON'S contention may be stated as follows: THORNDIKE may understand magic, but he does not understand science. Without an understanding of science, it is eo ipso impossible to establish any conclusions as to its relations with magic.

We may agree with SARTON that Magic and Experimental Science does present a valid, and perhaps a novel concept of magic. In THORNDIKE'S earliest statement, clearly written under the influence of FRAZER'S Golden Bough, magic is characterized as primitive man's philosophy ... his attitude toward nature .... It is any change with characteristics and results which we do not expect nor usually see in changes.

In THORNDIKE'S latest statement magic is described as a systematized and ordered marvel-believing and marvel-working, a consistent body of error, attained through sense perception, introspection, reflection, and dreaming, influenced by faith, emotion, appetite, and pleasure, marked by unwarranted association of ideas, without adequate means of correcting error and without proper standards of measurement (V, 13).

In its concrete manifestations magic takes innumerable forms. THORNDIKE

is not concerned with the whole of magic, but only with those parts which touch on, or edge toward, science. But even these self-imposed limits still embrace an enormous area, extending from the crudest superstitious folk practices to those disciplines now regarded as pseudo-science, but once regarded as consistent bodies of rational natural knowledge, such as alchemy and astrology. Between these poles lie the areas of black and white magic, of divination with its innumerable weird and often revolting forms of manti- cism, of fantastic natural philosophies embodying aesthetic, occult, mystical and religious principles.

The conception of science, like that of magic, undergoes clarification as the work proceeds. In the original statement of the thesis, and in the earlier volumes of Magic and Experimental Science, science is taken for granted and is not rigorously defined. In Volume V, however, acting perhaps under the

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sting of SARTON'S criticism, THORNDIKE does set forth a positive conception of science which is contrasted, point by point, with the characterization of magic quoted above:

Science is systematized and ordered knowledge, a consistent body of truth, attained through sense perception, introspection, and reflection, aided by mechanical and mathematical instruments, independently of faith, emotion, prejudice, appetite, pleasure, and the like.... In magic the desire to attain ends and satisfy human cravings not primarily intellectual was dominant; in science the urge is to measure and know (V, 12 f.).

Of the authentic sciences (as against the pseudo-sciences of astrology and

alchemy) which come within THORNDIKE'S scope, the most important is medicine. The persistence of occultism and sympathetic magic in learned, as well as in empirical medicine, can easily be demonstrated throughout the

centuries, even into our own day. THORNDIKE'S volumes abound in contributions to the history of this strange but fruitful marriage, though they by no means present a complete and justly shaded picture of medical history. Botany is another true science which, through its use in the concoction of remedies is inextricably tangled up with magic. In the penumbra of medicine lie the supposedly empirical study of the properties of poisons, and the lore of amulets and gems. In the field of the physical sciences geological questions, such as the distribution of land and water masses on the earth's surface, or the origins of mountains and fossils, figure prominently in late medieval texts from AIBERTUS MAGNUS to LEONARDO DA VINCI and PALISSY. This subject,

indeed, had been opened by PIERRE DUHEM, but THORNDIKE'S explorations have extended the field. The mathematical and mechanical disciplines, on the whole, play the least important role in THORNDIKE'S discussion, partly because they are least susceptible to magical deformation, partly, again, because they have been so extensively pioneered by DUHEM. Optics, in some

respects, the experimental science par excellence of the Middle Ages, is not given the attention which it would deserve in a full synthetic account.

Although the treatment of these various fields is somewhat uneven, in

nearly every case our understanding of the medieval achievement is sensibly enriched. We see the elaboration of science and pseudo-science, inspired and directed by widely divergent motives, by paranoid megalomania or thauma-

turgic ambition, by religious utilitarianism, by curiosity or sheer playfulness, by hunches, by cupidity and lust for power. It is true that the inner process by which scientific substance is created sometimes eludes us. We see the external juxtaposition of something which is obviously magic and something which looks like, or calls itself, or actually is science, while the internal nexus remains obscure. And yet I cannot agree with SARTON when he implies that what emerges from magic is never science, but is anti-science.

On the other hand, it may well be true that, despite the accumulation of

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instances in the later volumes of Magic and Experimental Science, "experiment" itself never fully achieves that conceptual clarity which SARTON found wanting in the earlier volumes. The nature of the experimental method is indeed difficult to define, and the most modern discussions prove that it is by no means perfectly grasped, even today. It is not surprising, therefore, that the concept should remain somewhat blurred in Magic and Experimental Science. There seems to be no clear distinction between such terms as "experience" "empiricism" and "experiment." And within the concept of "experiment" THORNDIKE has not systematically distinguished the quantitative from the qualitative approach, a distinction which has been fundamental from antiquity to our own day. There is also no clear separation between unique, casual, passive noting of phenomena, and repeated, planned, active attempts to reproduce them (the experientia quaesita of FRANCIS BACON). Finally it would seem that THORNDIKE has not sufficiently dis- criminated between the practical or productive and the speculative or theoretical faculties in scientific operation.

The failure to define the term "experiment" may account for another point of uncertainty which occurs to the reader who has reached the end of Volume VI. Is there, or is there not a radical difference in kind between the experiment of antiquity and the Middle Ages, and its counterpart of the seventeenth century and the modern world? THORNDIKE cannot, of course, be expected to give the answer to this question, since he does not make a serious entry into the latter period. What he has done-and this is also true of DUHEM-has been to extend a standing invitation to the historians of seventeenth-century science to turn their steps backward, instead of restlessly pressing forward along the lines of modern "progress."

This backward march of the historians of modern science has already begun independently on a small scale, and the time may come when they will have joined ranks with the slowly advancing body of medievalists. Separate studies have already made it clear that most, if not all of the great seventeenth-century scientists retained the impress of medieval habits of thought. The tabular scheme of experimentation devised by FRANCIS BACON is qualitative and partially Aristotelian; it bears the stamp of medieval as well as Renaissance pansophistic yearnings. KEPLER was an animist; his three laws of planetary motion were the unexpected pot of gold at the end of a Pythag- orean rainbow. GALILEO was nurtured as a student on the impetus physics of the fourteenth-century Paris School.12 DESCARTES, as a result of his Jesuit training, never fully emancipated himself from the scholastic Aristotelian

12 Cf. A. KOYRE, Etudes Galileennes: I, A l'aube de la science classique (Paris, 1939). KOYRE points out that this was only the first stage of GALILEO'S development; the crucial stage was precipitated by an intensive study of ARCHIMEDES.

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yoke.13 BOYLE was an occultist.14 LEIBNIZ proposed to edit the Calculationes of that subtlest of fourteenth-century speculators, RICHARD SUISETH.

Instances of medieval survivals of this sort could be multiplied indefinitely. THORNDIKE'S method of distilling the residues of magic, applied to the great figures of the "Age of Genius," would undoubtedly yield interesting results. I can hardly believe, however, that such an effort would be fully profitable. For fundamentally the seventeenth century marks an epochal change, a full mutation15 in the intellectual germ plasm of our culture, beyond the genetic stages traversed in the preceding centuries. THORNDIKE himself seems to recognize that fact in a somewhat cryptic valedictory at the beginning of the sixteenth-century volumes: ... it appears that as the Thirty Years War and Treaty of Westphalia make a convenient terminal point for the first political period in modern history since the close of the Middle

Ages and the beginning of the Reformation, so we may carry on our account to the verge of the

days of GALILEO and KEPLER and DESCARTES, to the writings of VANINI and CAMPANELLA. Then investigations based upon telescope and microscope ushered in a new age of science, at whose portal the present volumes stop. Like MOSES we have brought the reader through the wilderness to within sight of the promised land of modern science. It remains to be seen whether we shall enter in or whether we shall content ourselves with viewing the prospect o'er from the other-magical--side of Jordan (V, 15).

The terminus of Magic and Experimental Science is well placed at the threshold of the seventeenth century. For prior to that century the history of science is history; subsequent to that century it is science.

IV Like most really great works of scholarship, Magic and Experimental Sci-

ence displays a certain "ruling passion" in the personality of its author. In the case of THORNDIKE this might be described as a deep antipathy to established but questionable generalizations. Insofar as he has ever permitted himself to generalize about the nature of the historian's task, THORNDIKE has defended the ideal of strict scientific presentation. As far back as 1910 he wrote:

The scientific historian will see not only that his theme must be developed systematically, but also that every concept which may be implicated in his investigation must be sharply

13 Instances of medieval notions in DESCARTES are adduced by THORNDIKE in "The Survival of Mediaeval Intellectual Interests into Early Modern Times," Speculum, II (1927), 147-59. Cf. two recent important studies on DESCARTES: JOHN WILD, "The Cartesian Deformation of the Structure of Change and Its Influence on Modern Thought," Philosophical Review, L (1941), 36-51; and ALAN GEWIRTZ, "Experience and the Non-mathematical in the Cartesian Method," Journal of the History of Ideas, II (1941), 183-210, which attacks the prevalent notion that DESCARTES did not resort to experience to verify deduced conclusions.

14 Cf. Louis TRENCHARD MORE, "Boyle as Alchemist," Journal of the History of Ideas, II (1940), 61-76.

15 The phrase is used by KOYRE to characterize the passage from the Parisian impetus physics of the late Middle Ages to the Archimedean physics of the seventeenth century; supra, note 12.

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defined and henceforth consistently treated from that one point of view. ... The historian who has denied the existence of 'facts' will be inclined to look askance also at periods, move- ments and institutions. He will shake himself free from unjustifiable historical conglomerates as well as from false historical units.16

At the time he wrote these lines, THORNDIKE seems to have had great confidence in the future progress of history as a scientific discipline. Perhaps that confidence reflected the youthful ardor which had been fanned by the in- spiration of JAMES HARVEY ROBINSON. THORNDIKE suggested, for instance, that "extensive past literatures teeming with human prejudices, motives and ideas are waiting for accurate measurement and estimation."17 The content of history will be made up of scientific propositions, and its form of presentation, borrowing from mathematics, will consist of "historical sym- bols, curves, charts and other graphic means of presenting briefly and accurately what prose could compass only in many pages or fail to express with requisite precision and discrimination."'8 THORNDIKE conceded regretfully that "fewer persons would study the reformed presentation than read his- tories at present." But, he added, "they would learn more truth of value, gain a deeper insight into the true nature of history and have a greater re-

spect for it." This was the young scholar's program of 1910, and one would search in

vain, I believe, for any methodological statements of comparable sweep in THORNDIKE'S later writings. I should not have thought it worth while to dwell on this profession of faith-the author himself may no longer accept it to the letter-were it not for the fact that it helps us to understand the

origins of the "ruling passion" which I mentioned above.

Originally THORNDIKE'S distrust of generalizations seems to have sprung from a rather abstract and impersonal scientific idealism. As his work progressed, however, this distrust seems to have taken on a more personal cast. A certain animus crept in which was hardly to be detected in the statement of 1910. Gradually a concern developed, not merely to avoid making unfounded generalizations, but to uproot those which were already implanted in the popular mind. This concern has expressed itself throughout THORN- DIKE'S later work in what might be called a "reverse of the medal approach," a zeal to "parcere subiectis et debellare superbos."

The first notable examples of this approach are to be found in his treatment of certain thirteenth-century figures, especially ROGER BACON, whom THORNDIKE quite properly puts in his place as a man of his age, not ahead of

16 "The Scientific Presentation of History," The Popular Science Monthly, LXXVI (1910), p. 178. 17 Ibid., p. 179; I do not know whether THORNDIKE ever attempted to carry out such a program. The

only suggestion of such an attempt is an article-which I have not been able to consult-entitled: "Measuring Euripides," in Chapter Alpha of Ohio, Phi Beta Kappa, College for Women Section (Cleve- land, 1916).

18 "Scientific Presentation," p. 181.

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it. The fifteenth century provided further opportunity for deflationary activities. In Science and Thought (1929) two chapters are devoted to a critical scrutiny of the great reputations which have attached themselves to the names of NICHOLAS OF CUSA, GEORGE PEURBACH and REGIOMONTANUS.19 THORNDIKE asserted that the fame of these men had been unduly magnified

by their contemporaries and followers, and that modern historians have been taken in by the "piffle"20 of Renaissance printers and hack encomiasts. The lines of THORNDIKE'S attack may be simply stated: most of the scientific work of these men was unoriginal; where it was original, it was either un-

satisfactory as science or unimportant. Thus the famous Latin version of PTOLEMY'S Almagest which PEURBACH began and REGIOMONTANUS com-

pleted "was not a complete and exact translation of the Greek text, but an

epitome of it, the sort of work that has commonly been held a reproach of the

early Middle Ages, but which we here find the classical Renaissance glorying in." REGIOMONTANUS' work in trigonometry, like that of PEURBACH, was far from original, and the praises which it received merely indicated that its medieval forerunners had been forgotten.21 In the case of NICHOLAS OF CUSA, the rather fantastic anticipations of COPERNICUS which have been read into his cosmological speculations originate, not in astronomical observation, but in pious scepticism and "docta ignorantia." Having effectively demolished some of the extravagant claims made on behalf of the fifteenth-century cardinal by some of his nineteenth-century admirers, THORNDIKE lets himself go for a page and a half of diatribe against that type of scholarship which selects "as the great names in the history of philosophy and science men whose time was largely occupied by other interests, and whose fame should and does depend upon something else.'. When," he asks, "are we ever

going to come out of it?"22

19 Ch. VII, "Nicholas of Cusa and the Triple Motion of the Earth"; Ch. VIII, "Peurbach and Regio- montanus: Their Great Reputation Re-Examined."

20 The word does not appear in the chapter in Science in Thought, but in chapter XVI, Vol. V of Magic and Experimental Science, p. 335. This chapter, "The Aftermath of Regiomontanus," together with chapter XXXI, "Post-Copernican Astronomy," constitute the most important recent contribution to the history of sixteenth-century astronomy.

21 THORNDIKE'S attempt to deflate Regiomontanus has met with some opposition. The definitive biography by ERNST ZINNER, Leben und Wirken des Johannes Miuller von K6nigsberg, genannt Regio- montanus (Munich, 1938), certainly forces us to agree with GEORGE SARTON that REGIOMONTANUS was an admirable man (review of Science and Thought in Isis, XIV [1930], 238). At the 'same time it is true that ZINNER'S biography provides considerable evidence to support THORNDIKE'S charge that REGIO- MONTANUS was heavily indebted to medieval predecessors.

22 My own studies in the history of fifteenth-century cartography confirm THORNDIKE'S charge that the solid achievements of obscure scientists have often been unfairly transferred to better known figures. This is particularly true in the case of the so-called Nicholas of Cusa Map which has been mistakenly regarded as the first modern map of Central Europe; cf. D. B. DURAND, The Vienna-Klosterneuburg Map Corpus of the Fifteenth Century, 2 Vols. (Leiden, 1940?), I, 252-64. (N. B. Publication of this work appears to have been interrupted in May 1940. A bound copy of the corrected proof has been deposited in the Harvard College Library where it may be consulted by those who are interested.)

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The critique of these three fifteenth-century thinkers reveals another insistent animus which has increased steadily as THORNDIKE'S work has proceeded-a profound distaste for the movement known as humanism and for the period when it flourished, the Renaissance. It might be possible to account for this antipathy as the bias of a professional medievalist. But its roots seem to lie even deeper, embedded in a personal aversion to the whole humanistic discipline and habit of thought, and indeed to any discipline or convention which places the primary emphasis on form.

Combining this distaste with his equally firm opposition to historical generalizations about Zeitgeist, THORNDIKE frequently indulges in what can only be described as "cracks" against the period "formerly known as the Renaissance" (V, 53); against " 'the spirit of the Renaissance,' that rare

gas which the historical laboratory has never yet succeeded in holding in solution." Renaissance humanism placed its "emphasis on style rather than science, and show rather than substance" (V, 5). Its "amateurish literary interest" was in large measure responsible for the lack of scientific specializa- tion in the sixteenth century, for the popularity of superficial epitomes and compendiums instead of the solid if bulky pabulum which the scholastics manfully swallowed; for the flourishing of scientific quacks and charlatans and plagiarists at the expense of a gullible public, for the prevalence of mud- slinging controversy, of "one-sided advocacy of a certain theory or point of view," of "unutterably coarse billingsgate and bluster," in contrast with the dispassionate and impersonal "poise" of the schoolmen (V, 9).

This threefold antipathy-against unfounded generalizations, over- magnification of great names, and exaggerated emphasis on Renaissance humanism-receives full expression in THORNDIKE'S treatment of the sixteenth century, and especially of its three mightiest geniuses, LEONARDO DA VINCI, COPERNICUS and VESALIUS. These giants, whom our schoolbooks have taught us to venerate as founders of modern science, emerge from the pages of Magic and Experimental Science with a notable diminution of stature.

The romantic myth of LEONARDO as a transcendental genius, an intellectual Nova, was exploded more than a quarter century ago by PIERRE DUHEM.23 DUHEM proved conclusively that the great Florentine was no mysterious cosmic happening, flaring up out of nothing and dying away without influence. DUHEM'S Atudes did nothing to diminish our admiration of LEONARDO'S amazing genius, and did much to increase our understanding of his creative power. THORNDIKE, unlike DUHEM, seems rather to begrudge the praise that has been lavished on LEONARDO. Of the famous studies and sketches of animal and human anatomy, THORNDIKE notes that they are

23 Etudes sur L6onard de Vinci, 3 series (Paris, 1906-1913).

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"excellent," without further specification, and passes immediately to the residues of magical lore and false science which permeate the Notebooks. Of LEONARDO'S work in the field of technology, he notes only that it continued the tradition of preceding centuries. He fails to credit LEONARDO with his true influence on the later tradition of technology, especially on the Theatre des Instruments of JACQUES BESSON, to which a few pages are devoted elsewhere in Volume V.24 THORNDIKE praises LEONARDO'S observation of fossil

shells, and quotes without dissent DUHEM'S assertion that this fragment in the Notebooks "created Palaeontology" (V, 27). But he hastens to remind us that LEONARDO'S notions about the earth were vitiated by a curious belief that it was an organism like the human body with a system of respiration and circulation. THORNDIKE upholds the title of his chapter, "The Magician of the Renaissance," by citing LEONARDO'S cry "Voglio far miraculi" (V, 32 f.). He admits that LEONARDO was no necromancer, yet contends that his manuscripts continue the medieval tradition of "experiments" and "secrets" which aimed at the performance of natural magic.

In his chapter on the "Copernican Theory," (V, xviii) THORNDIKE'S first concern is to remind us that the De Revolutionibus Orbium Coelestium was not totally without antecedents. From the time of CAMPANUS OF NOVARA

in the thirteenth century a number of medieval cosmologists and astronomers had sought to overthrow or at least to simplify the Ptolemaic system. Most of these simplifications, however, seem to have been of a speculative rather than a mathematical order. But even aside from partial medieval anticipations, there were other circumstances which, THORNDIKE feels, should qualify our praise of De Revolutionibus. The work was announced under an astrological accompaniment.25 It reflects a "rather excessive clas- sicism" on the part of its author. It frequently drifts into lyrical, mystical and theosophical rhapsodies, inappropriate to a scientific work.26 Technically, it failed in its professed aim of eliminating defects in the Ptolemaic calculations. It introduced a new and unnecessary irregularity to account for a non- existent slowing down in the precession of the equinoxes. It was unable to do away entirely with the complex and cumbersome system of eccentrics and epicycles. Indeed, strictly speaking, the Copernican system did not

24 Magic and Experimental Science, V, 34 f.; V, 593-96. For the LEONARDO tradition of technological drawings in the later sixteenth century, see, among others, A. WOLF, History of Science, Technology, and Philosophy in the 16th and 17th Centuries (London, 1935), pp. 536-40.

25 V, 414; but elsewhere THORNDIKE admits that COPERNICUS published nothing which would support belief in astrology (V, 419).

26 COPERNICUS' well-known passage in praise of the Sun and of the symmetry and harmony in the divine arrangement of the universe is, THORNDIKE declares, "not only not scientific and seems out of place in De Revolutionibus but is shallow and fallacious, not to say a trifle insincere" (V, 424). In the next paragraph, however, THORNDIKE excuses this as a "rhapsodical lapse" and admits that the work is "for the most part solidly mathematical both in tone and content."

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postulate that full heliocentricity which is popularly associated with it today; it placed the center of reference for the planetary motions not in the sun, but in the center of the earth's orbit. It was thus, like the system of PTOLEMY itself, still fundamentally eccentric. Moreover, COPERNICUS himself made very few observations, and these were distinctly inferior to those which underlay such medieval revisions of Ptolemaic calculations as the Alphonsine Tables. Finally, the Copernican system involved, a "somewhat incongruous" modification of the traditional Aristotelian arrangement of the elementary spheres.27

In the case of VESALIUS, to whom only part of a chapter is devoted,28 the treatment is again primarily negative. THORNDIKE reminds us that for at least two centuries before the publication of De Humani Corporis Fabrica there had been active study of anatomy in the Universities, leading to a wide diffusion of skilled and learned surgical practice. Public dissection of human corpses was common in the Middle Ages. Some of VESALIUS' immediate predecessors, notably BERENGARIO DA CARPI and NICOLAUS MASSA, were sound anatomists, but VESALIUS passes over them in jealous silence. And it was VESALIUS himself who, through his caustic preface, did more than anyone else to establish the myth that all operations in the Middle Ages had been performed by barbers and vulgar uninstructed surgeons-a calumny which has been uncritically accepted by most modern writers. VESALIUS, far from being the demolisher of GALEN which he has usually been

painted, "was concerned to restore the text of GALEN to its original form" (V, 525). Although he sneers at scholastic theologians for their controversies as to the nature of the blood and water which flowed from the side of the Crucified, he himself retains many of the occult notions which were current in his age. The entire positive achievement on which his great fame is sup- posed to rest is dismissed with the following sentence: The work of VESALIUS of course contains indications, or at least assertions, of discovery of anatomical details unknown to previous writers on and students of the subject, and denials on the basis of personal dissection and observation of previous beliefs and statements which he rejects as figments (V, 525).

THORNDIKE goes so far as to imply that the only really epoch-making feature of De Humani Corporis Fabrica lay in its accompaniment of numerous and elaborate plates (V, 519 f.).

This, I think, is a fair summary of the impression which emerges from THORNDIKE'S treatment of what are ordinarily regarded as three of the great- est names in the history of scientific genius. "Debunking" may not be the

27 V, 428; but THORNDIKE ends the chapter by admitting that "it is to be put to the credit of COPER- NICUS that he suggested that the same considerations of gravity and of heavy and light applied to the other planets as spherical bodies as to the earth" (V, 429).

28 V, 522-29.

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word to apply to this treatment; perhaps "hagiographophobia" might be coined for the purpose.

But the medal has two sides. The systematic presentation of the reverse of the big names is matched by the frequent presentation of the obverse in the case of obscure men. Naturally, not every one of the hundreds of minor writers drawn in by THORNDIKE'S far-flung net turns out to be a rare or unique specimen, Yet a surprising proportion of the scientific innovations which THORNDIKE singles out for particular comment are connected with names that the casual reader would not recognize. This is especially the case in his treatment of the fourteenth century which, as we have noted, is credited with the highest degree of originality.

Among the scientific contributions of that fruitful century, one of the most important is the introduction of an ideal of precision in the use and manufacture of various instruments. THORNDIKE, following the lead of DUHEM, emphasizes the fact that astronomers of the later Middle Ages used large, well-constructed instruments, surpassing in some instances those even of the sixteenth century. Thus JEAN DE MURS, while still a student at Paris in 1318, employed a solidly mounted kardaja of fifteen-foot radius as contrasted with TYCHO BRAHE'S "much vaunted" wall-quadrant of only six feet nine inches radius.29 It is not uncommon, moreover, to find in fourteenth-century manuscripts observations and calculations carried out in fractions as small as minutes and seconds of time or angle, and occasionally these fractions were fantastically extended even to fifths and sixths. It is well to remember, however, as THORNDIKE admits, that these were "paper" refinements, manifestations of an ideal of precision which far outstripped the practically possible.

Precision, in the fourteenth century, was sought in other fields besides astronomy. The design of mechanical clocks, which, as THORNDIKE has recently shown, goes back at least on paper to the third quarter of the thirteenth century,30 was translated through the painstaking craftsmanship of medieval metal workers into a manufacturing technique. And that technique was the direct ancestor of the infinite ramifications of modern precision machinery. THORNDIKE also reminds us that systematic recording of weather observations began in the fourteenth century with WILLIAM MERLE of Oxford and EVNO of Wiirzburg.31 Meteorology, for a long time to come, was to be little more than a frontier province in the great kingdom of magic, yet the introduction of a rudimentary scientific empiricism in the

29 III, 294 ff.; it seems a little strong, however, to say "apparently it was only in TYCHO BRAHE'S

day that such large instruments became a rarity." 30 "Invention of the Mechanical Clock about 1271 A.D.," Speculum, XVI (1941), 242-43. 31 Vol. III, ch; viii.

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Middle Ages cannot be denied. THORNDIKE notes other instances of quantitative specification in medicine and alchemy,32 but these are of a crude order; and usually they must be regarded as affectations or fantasies, totally without the possibility of experimental verification. Nevertheless, the evidence provided in the fourteenth-century volume of Magic and Experimental Science does support THORNDIKE'S contention that "careful measurement of the phenomena" can be credited to some late medieval scientists (IV, 614).

These innovations of an empirical order which THORNDIKE ferrets out in the murky recesses of the fourteenth century are paralleled by advances in speculative thought. Here again the pioneer was PIERRE DUHEM, but TIHORNDIKE has made important discoveries of his own. To be sure it is difficult to escape the impression that THORNDIKE, like DUHEM, has oc-

casionally strained his texts through a porcelain filter to extract a minute residue of modernity. As a rather extreme example of THORNDIKE'S method we may cite the chapter (III, xxviii) on the late fourteenth-century scholastic IHENRICUS LANGENSTEIN, known as HENRY OF HESSE. Although HENRY is described by THORNDIKE as inferior in originality to his brilliant con-

temporary, NICOLE ORESME, he nevertheless emerges from the pages of

Magic and Experimental Science as the precursor of an astounding number of modern scientific discoveries. Among these are the development of a principle of "common nature" (which, however, had been prefigured by ADELARD OF BATH in the twelfth century and ROGER BACON in the thirteenth) vaguely anticipatory of modern notions of universal force or continuity (III, 476 ff.). In common with his predecessor RICHARD SUISETH, the "Calculator", and with his colleague ORESME, HENRY is credited with "an important first step towards the development of modern mathematical method and its ap- plication to scientific questions" (III, 492). THORNDIKE speaks of his im-

provement "at least in some respects" on the theory of the rainbow, of his "fourteenth century variety of relativity" (III, 492), of his "experiments in surface tension" (IV, 614, and III, Appendix 32) and of his anticipation of DARWIN on the evolution of new species (III, 483).

Our immediate response is naturally to enquire whether all these ideas are really there in the words of the cited texts, and, if they are there, whether they constitute full and valid anticipations. As a test case I select a passage of ten lines in which THORNDIKE adduces three "specimens of HENRY OF HESSE'S scientific caliber," all of which apparently he regards as of an "advanced" character:

We have sometimes been given the impression that the conception of gaseous substances other than air, as well as the word Geist or gas, originated in VAN HELMONT'S time. But

32 Note especially the curious theory of "degrees" in proportion of the elements in mixtures, which was devised by WALTER OF ODINGTON; III, 130 ff.

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HENRY offers a good illustration of its medieval currency when he states that the exhalations from water are aqueous, those from earth are nothing but earth reduced to a state of vapor, and those from putrefying corpses are merely flesh in a gaseous condition-caro subtiliata. He also, as we have seen, was acquainted with the variation of the magnetic needle near the north pole. He observes that regions become rejuvenated or grow arid and old with climatic change (III, 501).

Fortunately, with the footnote references it is easy to trace these three points to the original text in a modern edition.33 Concerning the first point the text reads as follows:

Item non solum elevantur ex calefactione inferiorum resolutiones ex terra et aqua, sed eciam ex omnibus corporibus mixtis bone vel male complexionis. Et secundum opinionem probabiliorem exalationes sunt eiusdem speciei cum rebus, a quibus exalant, quia exalatio terre non est nisi terra subtiliata et levificata calefactione, et vapor nisi aqua levificata, et exalatio de came caro subtiliata.34

I leave it to others more expert in seventeenth-century science to determine whether the "levificated" and "subtiliated" "resolutions" of earth, water and flesh are analogous to the different kinds of "Gas" described by VAN HELMONT. It does seem apparent, however, that this interesting and curious passage, when set in its full context, must be regarded as a direct outgrowth of current scholastic discussions of "exhalations" as set forth by ARISTOTLE. THORNDIKE is doubtless right in implying a continuous linkage between this type of discussion and the notions of VAN HELMONT.

The second "advanced" point which THORNDIKE attributes to HENRY OF

HESSE is the reference to the "variation" of the magnetic needle "near the north pole." Two pages earlier what is presumably the same point is put somewhat differently: . . . the planets may act more potently when in certain ratios of proportion or musical consonance or may lose the virtue in one position which they possess in another, like the magnet in some parts of Norway ... (III, 499).

HENRY OF HESSE'S text is as follows: Ita videtur in proposito, quod planeta in uno situ influat, et in alio non. Item in partibus Norwigie magnes in uno situ trahit ferrum et in alio propinquo non.35

It is plain that this passage refers solely to the attraction of iron by the magnet, and not to the declination of the compass needle, albeit the latter was undoubtedly known at this period.

The third of the "advanced" notions-the "rejuvenation" of regions-is derived from the following passage:

Regiones enim quandoque umificantur iuvenescentes ex caliditatis et humiditatis affluencia. Dehinc ad statum veniunt sue virtutis in aquoso permanentes. Deinde autem exsiccantur et senescunt frigiditate et siccitate et inhabitabiles fiunt.36

33 HUBERT PRUCKNER, Studien zu den astrologischen Schriften des Heinrich von Langenstein (Studien der Bibliothek Warburg, XIV: Leipzig, 1933). All of the three points in question come from HENRY OF HESSE'S Tractatus contra Astrologos Coniunctionistas de Eventibus Futurorum.

34 Ibid., p. 198. 35 Ibid., p. 163. 36 Ibid., p. 174.

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The proper context of this passage is stated explicitly in the opening lines of the chapter in which it occurs:

Regionum eciarn varie sunt dispositiones radicales et accidentales, unde ARISTOTELES in fine

primi metheororum....37

It may not be going too far to state that the first and third of these instances of HENRY'S "scientific caliber" prove an important point which, so far as I am aware, THORNDIKE has not brought out explicitly and which, perhaps, he would not accept. A very considerable portion of the "advanced" notions of HENRY OF HESSE, and for that matter of ORESME and others of this

group, are the direct outgrowth of subtle speculative elaboration of the Aristotelian text. A detailed and systematic investigation of the way in which ARISTOTLE was creatively interpreted and transformed by these highly ingenious theorists of the later Middle Ages is one of the major historical projects whose desirability is implied by the work of both THORNDIKE and DUHEM.38

THORNDIKE has disclaimed any interest in collecting "precursorships" for their own sake. It would seem, however, that his concern for the "reverse of the medal" has frequently led him to linger with obvious satisfaction over those which have been turned up by his excavations. The problem of the "precursor" is by no means simple. One type of scholar is inclined to dismiss the "precursor" as insignificant and without explicit influence in the cumulative statistical roll of human progress; another type, to credit him with an implicit influence which cannot be traced. The soundest approach for the historian of thought is to commit himself to neither of these extremes, but to report the achievement of the "precursor" for what it actually was, an eddy of individual creativeness in the sluggish drift of tradition, which may have affected the course of the waters far below the point where its own stirring disappeared.

But the problem of the "precursor" resolves itself into the broader theory of the historical process of intellectual change. Naturally we are impelled to ask, has THORNDIKE contributed significantly to our understanding of this process? To this question, I think, we must give an affirmative answer.

We may safely say that few historians today are equipped with a sound

37 Ibid., p. 173; the passage of HENRY OF HESSE is substantially an abridgment of Meteorologica, I, 14, lines 351a, 19-351b, 4. The originality of this chapter in the Contra Astrologos seems to lie in its ap- plication of ARISTOTLE'S notion of climatological variation to the critique of astrology.

38 For a case study in the creative reinterpretation of ARISTOTLE by a fourteenth-century scientist, see my article "Nicole Oresme and the Mediaeval Origins of Modern Science," Speculum, XVI (1941), 167-85. This article also contains remarks on both THORNDIKE and DUHEM which I have avoided repeating here, together with some reflections on the problem of the "precursor" which is treated in the following paragraph. Another, and more detailed case study, is the important monograph of CLAGETT on GIOVANNI MARLIANI, cited above, note 5.

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theory of intellectual innovation.39 Whether philosophers and psychologists have achieved such a theory I do not know, but if they have, it is to be hoped that they will show how it can be applied to the study of history. THORNDIKE, sensibly enough, refrains from formulating general theories concerning the operations of the human mind. He does, however, express the hope that his volumes may have "supplied data that may prove of value to philosophers and psychologists in determining the laws of thought and our intellectual processes" (II, 982).

This hope is not extravagant. THORNDIKE'S positive achievement-it is an important one-may be stated somewhat as follows: he has accumulated a massive body of material which other writers of different temperament and insight can use for a great variety of purposes. Moreover, even apart from success or failure in demonstrating his own thesis, THORNDIKE, by the sheer

magnitude of his accumulation, and by the principle of selection which he has followed, has given inferential support to a number of major generalizations concerning historical process. The study of nature, it seems hard to deny, springs from a dual, rather than a single principle of the human spirit. This duality may be considered under a number of aspects: knowledge and power, speculation and operation, magic and science. Because of the multi- plicity of these inner dualities and of the permutations which they engender, no unitary approach to the history of human thought is feasible. Various non-converging approaches must be followed, and all must take account of the basic fact that the unit of real innovation is always small, when contrasted at any point or in any individual with the persistence of tradition. I am not sure that THORNDIKE would acknowledge all these methodological considerations as his own; some of them, however, he does state explicitly:

We have seen the same old ideas continually recurring, new ideas appearing with exceeding slowness, men of the same given period holding a common stock of notions and being for the most part in remarkable agreement. Even the most intellectual men seem to have a limited number of ideas, just as humanity has a limited number of domesticated animals. Not only is man unable by taking thought to add one cubit to his stature, he usually equally fails to add one new idea to humanity's small collection. Often men seem to be repeating ideas like parrots. And this is not merely patristic, or scholastic; it is everlastingly human. Yet it has been evident that some of our authors were more original, resourceful, ingenious, inquisitive than others. There is curiosity, occasionally a new question is asked, an old thought put in a novel way, or a new experiment tried (II, 983).

Our final judgment must be that THORNDIKE'S primary achievement is

39 Among the more thoughtful historical students of this problem, I would single out Professor A. P. USHER of Harvard University. Apart from a few general remarks in his History of Mechanical Inventions (New York, 1929), passim, Professor USHER has so far published little on this subject. I am indebted to him for suggestions which helped in formulating these reflections on the problem of the "precursor" and on the nature of historical process.



Dana B. Durand

not so much the demonstration of a thesis as the illustration of a facet of human activity. But from this vast mass of information certain positive statements and conclusions also emerge and force at least partial assent. THORNDIKE has undoubtedly shown that magic and science co-exist; that co-existence in certain stages of historical development is more than casual, though perhaps less than fully causal in the march of human progress. As a judgment on one aspect of man's complex nature, Magic and Experimental Science cannot be denied a measure of finality. That judgment will not please everyone. It may not please the scientifically trained reader, although THORNDIKE has craved his sympathetic attention.40 It certainly has not

pleased SARTON, whose humanistic positivism venerates the creator of a viable truth, the enricher of man's permanent stock of knowledge, as the only true hero. The most sympathetic reader of Magic and Experimental Science will be the pure historian, the man who wants to know "wie es eigentlich gewesen." To the historian, the reverse of the medal, even though it may be unattractive, should also be exposed in the museum. It was perhaps with the strictures of SARTON'S original review in mind that THORN- DIKE wrote the concluding paragraph of his volumes on the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries:

Frankly, it is not for this contribution towards modernity that we most prize these writings of two remote centuries which we have been at some pains to decipher and to set forth. We have taken them as we found them and we esteem them for what they are in their totality, their fourteenth and their fifteenth century complexio-a chapter in the history of human thought. Read it and smile or read it and weep, as you please. We would not credit it with the least particle of modern science that does not belong to it, nor would we deprive it of any of that magic which constitutes in no small measure its peculiar charm. Perhaps it would be well to read it and think of what the future historian may say of the mentality and scholasticism of the present era and with what sympathy or antipathy he would be justified in regarding us (IV, 615).

I see no reason why anyone who has read Magic and Experimental Science should weep over the spectacle of human error. The moral and spiritual weakness of man is far more distressing than his intellectual debility.

Mount Holyoke College

40 Cf. the paper delivered in 1922 before a joint meeting of the History of Science group from the Am. Histor. Association and of Section L, American Association for the Advancement of Science, and published as "The Historical Background of Modern Science," Scientific Monthly, XVI (1923), 488-97. THORNDIKE appeals to scientists to study their own past, both in its scientific and its magical aspects, and not to scorn early crude experimentation; pp. 496 f.

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