Implementing Bus Reform

Christopher Zegras Manuel Tironi

Onesimo Flores Dewey Matías Fernandez

Institutional Dimensions

Research Objectives

• Understand, from the planning, policy and sociological perspectives, the political hurdles facing bus system reform in Latin America – With potential implications beyond (e.g., Africa)

• Document and analyze how reform proponents

navigate tensions with, and address the concerns, of: a) Existing transport operators, and b) Civil society, more generally.

• “Soft” tech transfer

Research questions 1. How and why do reform projects change in response

to pressure from social groups?

2. What institutional devices and negotiation strategies best cope with conflict and integration?

3. How do similar bus reform projects in different cities compare?

4. What consequences does the participation (or lack of thereof) of stakeholders in the design and operation of the new system have on the effectiveness and legitimacy of the resulting system?

Methods • Two research units:

– MIT: Focusing on negotiations with transport operators

– PUC: Focusing on “public engagement”

• Collaborative framework:

– Jointly developed case selection framework and research method.

– Ongoing dialogue and feedback • Online meetings, research workshops, public seminar

Methods • Structured, focused comparison of case studies. • Fieldwork:

– MIT and PUC fieldwork in the two case cities. • ~140 in-depth semi-structured interviews with key

stakeholders (March-August, 2012) – Experts – Politicians involved in design and implementation processes. – Community leaders. – Scholars

• Reviewed official documents, technical studies, financial reports, operating contracts, newspapers, other written material, websites

Case selection

1) Implementation strategies in transitioning incumbent bus industry into BRT • “force-foster continuum”

2) Reform approaches • Piecemeal: “evolution” • System-wide: “revolution”

(Big Bang)

Foster change

Force change

Evolution Revolution

Type A: e.g. Mexico City

Incorporate incumbents, no competition

Incremental expansion, different conditions agreed at each stage

Non-integrated, Feeder, other services continue operations without change

Type B: e.g. Leon

Incorporate incumbents, no competition

“Big Bang”: All (or most) services simultaneously transformed

Integrated, corridors, feeders, etc. all subject to new rules

Type C: e.g. Quito

Introduce new actors, maintaining incumbents operators not priority

Incremental expansion, different conditions agreed at each stage

Non-integrated, Feeder, other services continue operations without change

Type D: e.g. Santiago

Introduce new actors, maintaining

incumbents operators not priority

“Big Bang” All (or most) services

simultaneously transformed.

Integrated, corridors, feeders, etc. all subject to new rules

The case of Mexico City (2002)

106 organizations (“rutas”), formed by owners of individual bus concessions operating 22,850 minibuses, 2,271 buses and 3,094 vans.

Most linked around a few informal groups, known as “cúpulas”.

Fostering BRT in Mexico City

“Replacing (incumbent operators) was never a

possibility for us, because it represented a social, a

political and a legal problem. What, are you

going to displace all these people from night to

morning without offering them an alternative?”

Claudia Sheimbaum

Fostering BRT in Mexico City

“We deal with 2 fundamental premises: First, negotiate with pre-existing operators terms that will get them to participate in the system. Second, relocate those that choose not to participate to a viable feeder route, and compensate their income loss by giving them taxi medallions”

Officer at SETRAVI

250,900 passengers/day

352 vehicles 2 organizations LINE 1 (2005) 80 buses, 2

firms

53,500 passengers/day

336 vehicles 4 organizations LINE 1-Sur

(2008) 17 buses, 2

firms

142,847 passengers/day

650 vehicles 6 organizations LINE 2 (2008) 71 buses, 5

firms

153,870 passengers/day

702 vehicles 3 organizations,

no RTP LINE 3 (2011)

54 buses, 1 firm (51% ADO)

The case of Santiago, Chile (2001)

119 organizations (“asociaciones gremiales”), formed by owners of individual bus concessions operating 8,179 vehicles.

Most linked around a few Federations, notably the Asociación Gremial Metropolitana de Transporte Público (AGMPT).

Forcing bus reform in Santiago

“We had a tiger roaming the streets of the city and we needed to place it in a cage. This unregulated tiger was destroying, killing, causing most of the accidents… our task was to put it in the cage of a State that regulates”

German Correa

Strategic adjustments: Forcing-Fostering-Forcing

1995 2002 2010

Forced

Fostered

Dissolution of Ruta 100, informal buses “tolerated”

Initial BRT plans, political mandate to continue only with incumbents’ support

Public costs (and operator’s expectations) rise

Mexico

2007-8

Forced

Fostered

1991 2001

Route-based tenders, Cartel rigging bids and influencing terms

PTUS planning advances, operators protest, tender terms softened for AGMPT

Contract terms tightened, several incumbent-formed companies exit system

Santiago

Mexico City Santiago

Successes Scrapped ~ 900 small,

underutilized minibuses

Substituted with 284 BRT

buses

Transformed numerous

quasi-informal rutas into 7 professional, accountable firms.

Opened industry to external

competition

Broke cartel

Transformed several quasi-

informal asociaciones gremiales into professional, accountable firms

Challenges & Observations

Sustainability of reform

• Negotiations increasingly complex

• Subsidies increasing

Integration elusive

“Partially” Open: space

reserved for incumbents (3/5 trunks & 9/10 feeders)

Transition phase reduced

operator costs

History can help Prior decade

(90s) prepared some operators for reform

Subsidies increasing?

Industry Reform: Main Findings

Public Engagement: Main Findings

Mexico City Santiago How the project was justified?

Progressive discourse: social sustainability.

Modernizing discourse: to be a first-world city.

Which restrictions are recognized?

Sociopolitical restrictions: how to satisfy all incumbent outside and within the government.

Economic restrictions: excessively low budget, suspicion against subsidies.

Where to intervene? “Donde se pueda”: routes determined by political feasibility.

“En la red completa”: routes defined by computing programs.

How the ‘citizen’ is defined?

As a “militant”: a priori opponent.

As a “user”: accommodate-able, behavior can be modeled.

Who participates in decision-making?

“Everything is negotiable”: everyone with a stake participates.

Decision-making limited to experts (transport engineers) and high-ranking authorities.

How powerful is the government?

Weak government; strong clientelistic networks.

Extremely strong government; technocratic culture.

“Extension” Opportunities

• Lessons for other cities in Chile and Mexico

– Negotiation “stance” and public engagement approach

• Applications in rest of region and beyond (e.g, Africa, Asia) with similar industry structures and reform intentions (BRT revolution)

• Propagate lessons through BRT ALC

– Which has co-financed the research

Conclusions Negotiation stance with operators • Both approaches opened a window for reform • Bus organization leaders prioritize role as entrepreneurs

over role as trade-union representatives. • Convergence of “forcing” and “fostering” transitions

– “Forcing" strategies relaxed to minimize political conflict and investment costs

– “Fostering" strategies tightened to avoid legitimizing rent-seeking behavior and limit spiraling public subsidy

Public Engagement • Larger economic philosophy and technocracy influences

approach and perspectives • How different is ultimate outcome?

Tentative “meta” conclusions

• Politics matters

• Force-fostering process is pendelum

– Ongoing calibration process

– Fostering cost (initial political buy-in) eventually leads to forcing correction

– Forcing cost requires eventual accomodation

• Specific politico-cultural conditions seem to propel (or hamper) ‘fostering’ or ‘forcing’ strategies

– Technocratic versus clientelistic powers

Thank you.

Transantiago Trunk Contracts Tenders (2003)

Black arrow – successful bid Red arrow – unsuccessful bid

Bids by new entrants

Bids by incumbent operators

Why did Transantiago move from “forced” to “fostered” change?