louisville train derailment case study

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LOUISVILLE TRAIN DERAILMENT CASE STUDY Michael J. Magda Livonia Fire & Recue Western Wayne County HMRT

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Louisville Train Derailment Case Study. Michael J. Magda Livonia Fire & Recue Western Wayne County HMRT. Monday Oct. 29, 2012. Derailed at 0630 72 cars, 5 engines. Monday Morning B riefing . Approach and Position. Approach and Position. Approach U phill/upwind - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

LOUISVILLE TRAIN DERAILMENT CASE STUDY

Michael J. MagdaLivonia Fire & Recue

Western Wayne County HMRT

Page 2: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Monday Oct. 29, 2012Derailed at 0630

72 cars, 5 engines

Page 3: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study
Page 4: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study
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Page 7: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Monday Morning Briefing

Page 8: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Approach and Position

Page 9: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Approach and Position Approach

Uphill/upwind Conditions found

through observation Visible clues

Occupancy in the area Heavy or light

industrial Residential

Incident type Spill Leak Release Container

Page 10: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Site Management Establish Command

Fill Command positions

Isolate immediate area

Request resources Establish Staging

Area

Page 11: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study
Page 12: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Request Resources Hazmat

EPA MDEQ PEAS (State Assists) NRC USCG Environmental

companies Additional Hazmat

Teams Tech Rescue?

Additional Fire companies

Salvation Army American Red cross County Roads MDOT Police

Local State

Page 13: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Request Resources Railroad

Environmental companies

Contractors Customer

Contractors Environmental

contractors Chemical Specialist

Local EOC Full activation

County EOC State EOC Regional Assists

IMT Medical unit Etc.

Page 14: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Request Resources

NTSB MIOSHA OSHA

Page 15: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Identify the Problem Survey the Incident Surrounding

conditions Hazard behavior

Page 16: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Monday Afternoon Briefing

Page 17: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hazard Assessment Identify the

Hazards Physical Chemical Environmental

condition Survey the incident

Identify defining criteria? Identify the

chemical hazards

Hazard Identificatio

n

Exposure Assessment

Risk Assessment

Hazard/RiskManagemen

t

Page 18: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hazard Assessment Defining Criteria

Occupancy & location

Container shapes & sizes

Marking & colors Labels & Placards Shipping papers Monitoring &

detection Observational

clues

Hazard Identificatio

n

Exposure Assessment

Risk Assessment

Hazard/RiskManagemen

t

Page 19: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hazard Assessment Behavioral event

(Stress Events) Breach Release Engulf Impingement Types of Harm

Damage Assessment

Hazard Identificatio

n

Exposure Assessment

Risk Assessment

Hazard/RiskManagemen

t

Page 20: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hazard Assessment Reference Materials

SDS’s/MSDS’s Shipping papers Internet

Passive Analysis Observation Referencing

defining criteria

Hazard Identificatio

n

Exposure Assessment

Risk Assessment

Hazard/RiskManagemen

t

Page 21: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study
Page 22: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Abbreviations used in NIOSH

MW—Molecular weight. BP—Boiling point at 1

atm Sol—Solubility in water Fl.P—Flash point in °F IP—Ionization potential VP—Vapor pressure at

68 °F MLT—Melting point for

solids FRZ—Freezing point.

UEL—Upper Explosive Level

LEL—Lower Explosive Level

MEC—Minimum explosive concentration, in g/m3

Sp.Gr—Specific gravity at 68 °F

RGasD—Relative density of gases referenced to air = 1

Page 23: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

STYRENEUN 2055

Page 24: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Styrene

Styrene CAS 100-42-5

C6H5CH=CH2 RTECS WL3675000

Synonyms & Trade Names Ethenyl benzene, Phenylethylene, Styrene monomer, Styrol, Vinyl benzene

DOT ID & Guide 2055 128P (inhibited)

Exposure Limits

NIOSH REL: TWA 50 ppm (215 mg/m3) ST 100 ppm (425 mg/m3)

OSHA PEL†: TWA 100 ppm C 200 ppm 600 ppm (5-minute maximum peak in any 3 hours)

IDLH 700 ppm See: 100425 Conversion 1 ppm = 4.26 mg/m3

Physical Description Colorless to yellow, oily liquid with a sweet, floral odor.

MW: 104.2 BP: 293°F FRZ: -23°F Sol: 0.03%

VP: 5 mmHg IP: 8.40 eV Sp.Gr: 0.91

Fl.P: 88°F UEL: 6.8% LEL: 0.9%

Class IC Flammable Liquid: Fl.P. at or above 73°F and below 100°F.

Incompatibilities & Reactivities Oxidizers, catalysts for vinyl polymers, peroxides, strong acids, aluminum chloride [Note: May polymerize if contaminated or subjected to heat. Usually contains an inhibitor such as tert-butylcatechol.]

Measurement Methods NIOSH 1501, 3800; OSHA 9, 89 See: NMAM or OSHA Methods

Personal Protection & Sanitation (See protection) Skin: Prevent skin contact Eyes: Prevent eye contact Wash skin: When contaminated Remove: When wet (flammable) Change: No recommendation

First Aid (See procedures) Eye: Irrigate immediately Skin: Water flush Breathing: Respiratory support Swallow: Medical attention immediately

Important additional information about respirator selection Respirator Recommendations NIOSH Up to 500 ppm: (APF = 10) Any chemical cartridge respirator with organic vapor cartridge(s)* (APF = 10) Any supplied-air respirator* Up to 700 ppm: (APF = 25) Any supplied-air respirator operated in a continuous-flow mode* (APF = 50) Any chemical cartridge respirator with a full facepiece and organic vapor cartridge(s) (APF = 50) Any air-purifying, full-facepiece respirator (gas mask) with a chin-style, front- or back-mounted organic vapor canister (APF = 25) Any powered, air-purifying respirator with organic vapor cartridge(s)* (APF = 50) Any self-contained breathing apparatus with a full facepiece (APF = 50) Any supplied-air respirator with a full facepiece Emergency or planned entry into unknown concentrations or IDLH conditions: (APF = 10,000) Any self-contained breathing apparatus that has a full facepiece and is operated in a pressure-demand or other positive-pressure mode (APF = 10,000) Any supplied-air respirator that has a full facepiece and is operated in a pressure-demand or other positive-pressure mode in combination with an auxiliary self-contained positive-pressure breathing apparatus Escape: (APF = 50) Any air-purifying, full-facepiece respirator (gas mask) with a chin-style, front- or back-mounted organic vapor canister/Any appropriate escape-type, self-contained breathing apparatus

Exposure Routes inhalation, skin absorption, ingestion, skin and/or eye contact

Symptoms Irritation eyes, nose, respiratory system; headache, lassitude (weakness, exhaustion), dizziness, confusion, malaise (vague feeling of discomfort), drowsiness, unsteady gait; narcosis; defatting dermatitis; possible

Page 25: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

HYDROGEN FLUORIDE (HF)UN 1052

Page 26: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

"The Hydrogen Fluoride is the chemical that first responders are most concerned about and makes the greatest risk for the community as well as the responders themselves," says Louisville Metro Emergency Management Director Doug Hamilton.

Page 27: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hydrogen Fluoride

Hydrogen fluoride CAS 7664-39-3

HF RTECS MW7875000

Synonyms & Trade Names Anhydrous hydrogen fluoride; Aqueous hydrogen fluoride (i.e., Hydrofluoric acid); HF-A

DOT ID & Guide 1052 125 (anhydrous) 1790 157 (solution)

Exposure Limits

NIOSH REL: TWA 3 ppm (2.5 mg/m3) C 6 ppm (5 mg/m3) [15-minute]

OSHA PEL†: TWA 3 ppm

IDLH 30 ppm See: 7664393 Conversion 1 ppm = 0.82 mg/m3

Physical Description Colorless gas or fuming liquid (below 67°F) with a strong, irritating odor. [Note: Shipped in cylinders.]

MW: 20.0 BP: 67°F FRZ: -118°F Sol: Miscible

VP: 783 mmHg IP: 15.98 eV RGasD: 1.86 Sp.Gr: 1.00 (Liquid at 67°F)

Fl.P: NA UEL: NA LEL: NA

Nonflammable Gas

Incompatibilities & Reactivities Metals, water or steam [Note: Corrosive to metals. Will attack glass and concrete.]

Measurement Methods NIOSH 3800, 7902, 7903, 7906; OSHA ID110 See: NMAM or OSHA Methods

Personal Protection & Sanitation (See protection) Skin: Prevent skin contact (liquid) Eyes: Prevent eye contact (liquid) Wash skin: When contaminated (liquid) Remove: When wet or contaminated (liquid) Change: No recommendation Provide: Eyewash (liquid), Quick drench (liquid)

First Aid (See procedures) Eye: Irrigate immediately (solution/liquid) Skin: Water flush immediately (solution/liquid) Breathing: Respiratory support Swallow: Medical attention immediately (solution)

Important additional information about respirator selection Respirator Recommendations NIOSH/OSHA Up to 30 ppm: (APF = 10) Any chemical cartridge respirator with cartridge(s) providing protection against the compound of concern* (APF = 25) Any powered, air-purifying respirator with cartridge(s) providing protection against the compound of concern* (APF = 50) Any air-purifying, full-facepiece respirator (gas mask) with a chin-style, front- or back-mounted canister providing protection against the compound of concern (APF = 10) Any supplied-air respirator* (APF = 50) Any self-contained breathing apparatus with a full facepiece Emergency or planned entry into unknown concentrations or IDLH conditions: (APF = 10,000) Any self-contained breathing apparatus that has a full facepiece and is operated in a pressure-demand or other positive-pressure mode (APF = 10,000) Any supplied-air respirator that has a full facepiece and is operated in a pressure-demand or other positive-pressure mode in combination with an auxiliary self-contained positive-pressure breathing apparatus Escape: (APF = 50) Any air-purifying, full-facepiece respirator (gas mask) with a chin-style, front- or back-mounted canister providing protection against the compound of concern/Any appropriate escape-type, self-contained breathing apparatus

Exposure Routes inhalation, skin absorption (liquid), ingestion (solution), skin and/or eye contact

Symptoms Irritation eyes, skin, nose, throat; pulmonary edema; eye, skin burns; rhinitis; bronchitis; bone changes

Target Organs Eyes, skin, respiratory system, bones

See also: INTRODUCTION See ICSC CARD: 0283 See MEDICAL TESTS: 0118

Page 28: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

1,3 BUTADIENEUN 1010

Page 29: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Butadiene

1,3-Butadiene CAS 106-99-0

CH2=CHCH=CH2 RTECS EI9275000

Synonyms & Trade Names Biethylene, Bivinyl, Butadiene, Divinyl, Erythrene, Vinylethylene

DOT ID & Guide 1010 116P (inhibited)

Exposure Limits

NIOSH REL: Ca See Appendix A

OSHA PEL: [1910.1051] TWA 1 ppm ST 5 ppm

IDLH Ca [2000 ppm] [10%LEL] See: 106990 Conversion 1 ppm = 2.21 mg/m3

Physical Description Colorless gas with a mild aromatic or gasoline-like odor. [Note: A liquid below 24°F. Shipped as a liquefied compressed gas.]

MW: 54.1 BP: 24°F FRZ: -164°F Sol: Insoluble

VP: 2.4 atm IP: 9.07 eV RGasD: 1.88 Sp.Gr: 0.65 (Liquid at 24°F)

Fl.P: NA (Gas) -105°F (Liquid)

UEL: 12.0% LEL: 2.0%

Flammable Gas

Incompatibilities & Reactivities Phenol, chlorine dioxide, copper, crotonaldehyde [Note: May contain inhibitors (such as tributylcatechol) to prevent self-polymerization. May form explosive peroxides upon exposure to air.]

Measurement Methods NIOSH 1024; OSHA 56 See: NMAM or OSHA Methods

Personal Protection & Sanitation (See protection) Skin: Frostbite Eyes: Frostbite Wash skin: No recommendation Remove: When wet (flammable) Change: No recommendation Provide: Frostbite wash

First Aid (See procedures) Eye: Frostbite Skin: Frostbite Breathing: Respiratory support

Important additional information about respirator selection Respirator Recommendations (See Appendix E) NIOSH At concentrations above the NIOSH REL, or where there is no REL, at any detectable concentration : (APF = 10,000) Any self-contained breathing apparatus that has a full facepiece and is operated in a pressure-demand or other positive-pressure mode (APF = 10,000) Any supplied-air respirator that has a full facepiece and is operated in a pressure-demand or other positive-pressure mode in combination with an auxiliary self-contained positive-pressure breathing apparatus Escape: (APF = 50) Any air-purifying, full-facepiece respirator (gas mask) with a chin-style, front- or back-mounted canister providing protection against the compound of concern/Any appropriate escape-type, self-contained breathing apparatus

Exposure Routes inhalation, skin and/or eye contact (liquid)

Symptoms Irritation eyes, nose, throat; drowsiness, dizziness; liquid: frostbite; teratogenic, reproductive effects; [potential occupational carcinogen]

Target Organs Eyes, respiratory system, central nervous system, reproductive system Cancer Site [hematopoietic cancer]

See also: INTRODUCTION See ICSC CARD: 0017 See MEDICAL TESTS: 0254

Page 30: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

SODIUM HYDROXIDEUN 1823 or UN 1824

Page 31: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Sodium hydroxide CAS 1310-73-2

NaOH RTECS WB4900000

Synonyms & Trade Names Caustic soda, Lye, Soda lye, Sodium hydrate

DOT ID & Guide 1823 154 (dry, solid) 1824 154 (solution)

Exposure Limits

NIOSH REL: C 2 mg/m3

OSHA PEL†: TWA 2 mg/m3

IDLH 10 mg/m3 See: 1310732 Conversion

Physical Description Colorless to white, odorless solid (flakes, beads, granular form).

MW: 40.0 BP: 2534°F MLT: 605°F Sol: 111%

VP: 0 mmHg (approx) IP: NA Sp.Gr: 2.13

Fl.P: NA UEL: NA LEL: NA

Noncombustible Solid, but when in contact with water may generate sufficient heat to ignite combustible materials.

Incompatibilities & Reactivities Water; acids; flammable liquids; organic halogens; metals such as aluminum, tin & zinc; nitromethane [Note: Corrosive to metals.]

Measurement Methods NIOSH 7401 See: NMAM or OSHA Methods

Personal Protection & Sanitation (See protection) Skin: Prevent skin contact Eyes: Prevent eye contact Wash skin: When contaminated Remove: When wet or contaminated Change: Daily

First Aid (See procedures) Eye: Irrigate immediately Skin: Water flush immediately Breathing: Respiratory support Swallow: Medical attention immediately

Page 32: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hazard Assessment Active Analysis

Reconnaissance Monitoring &

Detection Corrosively

pH, F, spiffier paper Flammability

4 gas meters Oxygen potential

4 gas meters Toxicity

PID, colorimetrics

Hazard Identificatio

n

Exposure Assessment

Risk Assessment

Hazard/RiskManagemen

t

Page 33: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hazard Assessment Quantity of

material Containment

systems Correlate to

Defining Criteria Stress event Physical damage

(Potentials)

Hazard Identificatio

n

Exposure Assessment

Risk Assessment

Hazard/RiskManagemen

t

Page 34: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hazard Assessment Probability or

likelihood to harm Physical damage

(Potentials) Stress

Breach Release Engulf Impingement Harm

Hazard Identificatio

n

Exposure Assessment

Risk Assessment

Hazard/RiskManagemen

t

Page 35: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hazard Assessment Damage potentials

of containers Crack Score Gouge Wheel burn Dent Rail burn Street burn

Hazard Identificatio

n

Exposure Assessment

Risk Assessment

Hazard/RiskManagemen

t

Page 36: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hazard Assessment Implementing

Response Objectives Rescue Public Protective

Actions Spill Control Leak Control Fire Control Recovery

Hazard Identificatio

n

Exposure Assessment

Risk Assessment

Hazard/RiskManagemen

t

Page 37: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Monday Night Briefing

Page 38: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Monday Night

Page 39: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Tuesday Morning Briefing

Page 40: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

So, What happen?

Lack of Control• Inadequate: • Program• Standards• Compliance

Basic Causes• Personal

Factors• Job/System

Factors

Immediate Causes• Substandard

Act/ Practices:• Substandard

Conditions

Incident

• Event

Loss

• People• Property• Equipment• Environment

Page 41: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Lack of Control Who was in

control? Fire Dept. Hazmat Railroad

Compliant? IAP Site Safety Plan

Page 42: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Basics Causes Personal Factor Education &

Training Inadequate

equipment

Page 43: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Immediate Causes Substandard Act/

Practices: Reconnaissance Hazard

Assessment Damage

Assessment Risk Assessment PPE Selection

Page 44: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Incident/Event Contractor using a

torch

Page 45: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Loss 5 Members injured

3 critical 2nd & 3rd burns

2 treated and released

Delays Clean-up Commerce Infrastructure

Page 46: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Why a Torch? Couplings Debris Hot Tap

Page 47: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hot Tap Technique

Gain access Liquefied gasses or

liquids Flaring vapors or

liquids Venting gases or

vapors

Involves Threaded nozzle Welder Specially designed

drill Valve

Page 48: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hot Tap

Page 49: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hot Tap SOG Note: This Guideline is one of many methods that

could be utilized for the removal of products in the field. An evaluation of all methods shall be performed

before choosing the method that suits the situation.  

Note: This Guideline shall be used in conjunction with other Guidelines found in this manual i.e. Sit Safety Plan, Grounding and Bounding, Incident

Action Plan etc.

Page 50: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Hot Tap SOGBecause of the possibility of burn-through or explosive decompression, a hot tap should not be used under any circumstances on tank car tanks containing the following products: Bromine; Chlorine; Cryogenic liquids; Elemental sulfur; Ethylene; Ethylene oxide; Hydrocarbons in stainless steel tanks; Hydrochloric acid; Nitric acid; Propylene oxide; Sulfuric acid.

Page 51: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Preferred Conditions Not exposed to fire; Free of flammable vapors; Contents must be able to withstand the heating that occurs when a nozzle is

welded to the tank without undergoing chemical reactions that could rupture the tank,

An undamaged portion of the tank that is in contact with the liquid phase of the product is in a position where the response personnel can perform a hot tap;

Certified welder by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME),

Note: As a minimum, the welder should be certified in the 6G position. Suitable hot tap equipment is available Personnel experienced in hot tap procedures are available; and Suitable precautions can be taken to protect people and property in the

event of an accidental release during the transfer.

Page 52: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Potential Risk Failure of the installed valve or nozzle (including the

weld) could expose people, property, and the environment to the contents of the damaged tank car;

A chemical reaction initiated by the welding process could cause the tank to release of its contents;

The tensile strength of the tank metal could be reduced by mistakenly performing the hot tap in the vapor space of the tank (due to an inadequate heat sink)

Contents of the tank car could be lost when the drilling machine is removed due to metal shavings from the tapping operation being lodged in the control valve.

Page 53: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study
Page 54: Louisville Train Derailment  Case Study

Questions?