locgov disciplinary actions cases

8/13/2019 Locgov Disciplinary Actions Cases

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G.R. No. 93252 August 5, 1991

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, respondents.

G.R. No. 93746 August 5,1991

MARY ANN RIVERA ARTIEDA, petitioner, vs. HON. LUISSANTOS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department ofLocal Government, NICANOR M. PATRICIO, in his capacity asChief, Legal Service of the Department of Local Governmentand SALVADOR CABALUNA JR., respondents.

G.R. No. 95245 August 5,1991

RODOLFO T. GANZON, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS and LUIS T. SANTOS, in his capacity asthe Secretary of the Department of Local Government,respondents.

Nicolas P. Sonalan for petitioner in 93252.

Romeo A. Gerochi for petitioner in 93746.

Eugenio Original for petitioner in 95245.

SARMIENTO, J.:p

The petitioners take common issue on the power of the President(acting through the Secretary of Local Government), to suspendand/or remove local officials.

The petitioners are the Mayor of Iloilo City (G.R. Nos. 93252 and95245) and a member of the Sangguniang Panglunsod thereof(G.R. No. 93746), respectively.

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series ofadministrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him byvarious city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, amongthem, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgracefuland immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of theConstitution, and arbitrary detention. 1 The personalities involvedare Joceleehn Cabaluna, a clerk at the city health office; SalvadorCabaluna, her husband; Dr. Felicidad Ortigoza, Assistant CityHealth Officer; Mansueto Malabor, Vice-Mayor; Rolando Dabao,Dan Dalido, German Gonzales, Larry Ong, and Eduardo PefiaRedondo members of the Sangguniang Panglunsod; and PanchoErbite, a barangay tanod. The complaints against the Mayor are setforth in the opinion of the respondent Court of Appeals. 2We quote:

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In her verified complaint (Annex A), Mrs. Cabaluna, a clerkassigned to the City Health, Office of Iloilo City charged that due topolitical reasons, having supported the rival candidate, Mrs. Rosa 0.

Caram, the petitioner City Mayor, using as an excuse the exigencyof the service and the interest of the public, pulled her out fromrightful office where her qualifications are best suited and assignedher to a work that should be the function of a non-career serviceemployee. To make matters worse, a utility worker in the office of


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the Public Services, whose duties are alien to the complainant'sduties and functions, has been detailed to take her place. Thepetitioner's act are pure harassments aimed at luring her away fromher permanent position or force her to resign.

In the case of Dra. Felicidad Ortigoza, she claims that the petitionerhandpicked her to perform task not befitting her position as

Assistant City Health Officer of Iloilo City; that her office waspadlocked without any explanation or justification; that her salarywas withheld without cause since April 1, 1988; that when she filedher vacation leave, she was given the run-around treatment in theapproval of her leave in connivance with Dr. Rodolfo Villegas andthat she was the object of a well-engineered trumped-up charge inan administrative complaint filed by Dr. Rodolfo Villegas (Annex B).

On the other hand, Mansuelo Malabor is the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Iloilo City and complainants Rolando Dabao, Dan Dalido,German Gonzales, Larry Ong and Eduardo Pefia Pedondo aremembers of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the City of Iloilo. Theircomplaint arose out from the case where Councilor Larry Ong,whose key to his office was unceremoniously and without previousnotice, taken by petitioner. Without an office, Councilor Ong had tohold office at Plaza Libertad, The Vice-Mayor and the othercomplainants sympathized with him and decided to do the same.However, the petitioner, together with its fully-armed security men,forcefully drove them away from Plaza Libertad. Councilor Ongdenounced the petitioner's actuations the following day in the radio

station and decided to hold office at the Freedom Grandstand atIloilo City and there were so many people who gathered to witnessthe incident. However, before the group could reach the area, thepetitioner, together with his security men, led the firemen using afiretruck in dozing water to the people and the bystanders.

Another administrative case was filed by Pancho Erbite, a barangaytanod, appointed by former mayor Rosa O. Caram. On March 13,1988, without the benefit of charges filed against him and nowarrant of arrest was issued, Erbite was arrested and detained at

the City Jail of Iloilo City upon orders of petitioner. In jail, he wasallegedly mauled by other detainees thereby causing injuries Hewas released only the following day. 3

The Mayor thereafter answered 4and the cases were shortly set forhearing. The opinion of the Court of Appeals also set forth thesucceeding events:

xxx xxx xxx

The initial hearing in the Cabaluna and Ortigoza cases were set for

hearing on June 20-21, 1988 at the Regional Office of theDepartment of Local Government in Iloilo City. Notices, throughtelegrams, were sent to the parties (Annex L) and the partiesreceived them, including the petitioner. The petitioner asked for apostponement before the scheduled date of hearing and wasrepresented by counsel, Atty. Samuel Castro. The hearing officers,

Atty. Salvador Quebral and Atty. Marino Bermudez had to come allthe way from Manila for the two-day hearings but was actually heldonly on June 20,1988 in view of the inability and unpreparedness ofpetitioner's counsel.

The next hearings were re-set to July 25, 26, 27,1988 in the same

venue-Iloilo City. Again, the petitioner attempted to delay theproceedings and moved for a postponement under the excuse thathe had just hired his counsel. Nonetheless, the hearing officersdenied the motion to postpone, in view of the fact that the partieswere notified by telegrams of the scheduled hearings (Annex M).


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In the said hearings, petitioner's counsel cross-examined thecomplainants and their witnesses.

Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent issued a

preventive suspension order on August 11, 1988 to last untilOctober 11,1988 for a period of sixty (60) days.

Then the next investigation was set on September 21, 1988 and thepetitioner again asked for a postponement to September 26,1988.On September 26, 1988, the complainants and petitioner werepresent, together with their respective counsel. The petitionersought for a postponement which was denied. In these hearingswhich were held in Mala the petitioner testified in Adm. Case No. C-10298 and 10299.

The investigation was continued regarding the Malabor case andthe complainants testified including their witnesses.

On October 10, 1988, petitioner's counsel, Atty. Original moved fora postponement of the October 24, 1988 hearing to November 7 to11, 1988 which was granted. However, the motion for change ofvenue as denied due to lack of funds. At the hearing on November7, 1988, the parties and counsel were present. Petitioner reiteratedhis motion to change venue and moved for postponement anew.The counsel discussed a proposal to take the deposition ofwitnesses in Iloilo City so the hearing was indefinitely postponed.However, the parties failed to come to terms and after the parties

were notified of the hearing, the investigation was set to December13 to 15, 1988.

The petitioner sought for another postponement on the ground thathis witnesses were sick or cannot attend the investigation due to

lack of transportation. The motion was denied and the petitionerwas given up to December 14, 1988 to present his evidence.

On December 14,1988, petitioner's counsel insisted on his motion

for postponement and the hearing officers gave petitioner up toDecember 15, 1988 to present his evidence. On December 15,1988, the petitioner failed to present evidence and the cases wereconsidered submitted for resolution.

In the meantime, a prima facie evidence was found to exist in thearbitrary detention case filed by Pancho Erbite so the respondentordered the petitioner's second preventive suspension datedOctober 11, 1988 for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner wasable to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunctionin the Regional Trial Court, Branch 33 of Iloilo City. The secondpreventive suspension was not enforced. 5

Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon institutedan action for prohibition against the respondent Secretary of LocalGovernment (now, Interior) in the Regional Trial Court, Iloilo City,where he succeeded in obtaining a writ of preliminary injunction.Presently, he instituted CA-G.R. SP No. 16417, an action forprohibition, in the respondent Court of Appeals.

Meanwhile, on May 3, 1990, the respondent Secretary issuedanother order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for anothersixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating

meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor.Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced CA-G.R. SP No. 20736 ofthe Court of Appeals, a petition for prohibition, 6(Malabor it is to benoted, is one of the complainants, and hence, he is interested inseeing Mayor Ganzon ousted.)


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On September 7, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment,dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 16417. On July 5, 1990, it likewisepromulgated a decision, dismissing CA-G.R. SP No. 20736. In aResolution dated January 24, 1990, it issued a Resolution certifying

the petition of Mary Ann Artieda, who had been similary charged bythe respondent Secretary, to this Court.

On June 26,1990, we issued a Temporary Restraining Order,barring the respondent Secretary from implementing thesuspension orders, and restraining the enforcement of the Court of

Appeals' two decisions.

In our Resolution of November 29, 1990, we consolidated all threecases. In our Resolutions of January 15, 1991, we gave due coursethereto.

Mayor Ganzon claims as a preliminary (GR No. 93252), that theDepartment of Local Government in hearing the ten cases againsthim, had denied him due process of law and that the respondentSecretary had been "biased, prejudicial and hostile" towards him 7arising from his (Mayor Ganzon's) alleged refusal to join the Labanng Demokratikong Pilipino party 8 and the running political rivalrythey maintained in the last congressional and local elections; 9andhis alleged refusal to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. 10 He alsoalleges that he requested the Secretary to lift his suspension sinceit had come ninety days prior to an election (the barangay electionsof November 14, 1988), 11 notwithstanding which, the latter

proceeded with the hearing and meted out two more suspensionorders of the aforementioned cases. 12He likewise contends that hesought to bring the cases to Iloilo City (they were held in Manila) inorder to reduce the costs of proceeding, but the Secretary rejectedhis request. 13He states that he asked for postponement on "valid

and justifiable" 14grounds, among them, that he was suffering froma heart ailment which required confinement; that his "vital" 15witness was also hospitalized 16but that the latter unduly denied hisrequest. 17

Mayor Ganzon's primary argument (G.R. Nos. 93252 and 95245) isthat the Secretary of Local Government is devoid, in any event, ofany authority to suspend and remove local officials, an argumentreiterated by the petitioner Mary Ann Rivera Artieda (G.R. No.93746).

As to Mayor Ganzon's charges of denial of due process, the recordsdo not show very clearly in what manner the Mayor might havebeen deprived of his rights by the respondent Secretary. His claimsthat he and Secretary Luis-Santos were (are) political rivals and thathis "persecution" was politically motivated are pure speculation andalthough the latter does not appear to have denied thesecontentions (as he, Mayor Ganzon, claims), we can not take hisword for it the way we would have under less politicalcircumstances, considering furthermore that "political feud" hasoften been a good excuse in contesting complaints.

The Mayor has failed furthermore to substantiate his say-so's thatSecretary Santos had attempted to seduce him to join theadministration party and to operate a lottery in Iloilo City. Again,although the Secretary failed to rebut his allegations, we can notaccept them, at face value, much more, as judicial admissions as

he would have us accept them18

for the same reasons above-stated and furthermore, because his say so's were nevercorroborated by independent testimonies. As a responsible publicofficial, Secretary Santos, in pursuing an official function, ispresumed to be performing his duties regularly and in the absence


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of contrary evidence, no ill motive can be ascribed to him.

As to Mayor Ganzon's contention that he had requested therespondent Secretary to defer the hearing on account of the ninety-

day ban prescribed by Section 62 of Batas Blg. 337, the Court findsthe question to be moot and academic since we have in factrestrained the Secretary from further hearing the complaints againstthe petitioners. 19

As to his request, finally, for postponements, the Court is afraid thathe has not given any compelling reason why we should overturn theCourt of Appeals, which found no convincing reason to overruleSecretary Santos in denying his requests. Besides, postponementsare a matter of discretion on the part of the hearing officer, andbased on Mayor Ganzon's above story, we are not convinced thatthe Secretary has been guilty of a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court can not say, under these circumstances, that SecretarySantos' actuations deprived Mayor Ganzon of due process of law.

We come to the core question: Whether or not the Secretary ofLocal Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspendand/or remove local officials.

It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution 20no longerallows the President, as the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, toexercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local

officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant,first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second,by deleting the phrase 21 as may be provided by law to strip thePresident of the power of control over local governments. It is aview, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the

Constitutional Commission. The provision in question reads asfollows:

Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general

supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect tocomponent cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalitieswith respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts oftheir component units are within the scope of their prescribedpowers and functions. 22

It modifies a counterpart provision appearing in the 1935Constitution, which we quote:

Sec. 10. The President shall have control of all the executivedepartments, bureaus, or offices, exercise general supervision overall Local governments as may be provided by law, and take carethat the laws be faithfully executed. 23

The petitioners submit that the deletion (of "as may be provided bylaw") is significant, as their argument goes, since: (1) the power ofthe President is "provided by law" and (2) hence, no law mayprovide for it any longer.

It is to be noted that in meting out the suspensions under question,the Secretary of Local Government acted in consonance with thespecific legal provisions of Batas Blg. 337, the Local GovernmentCode, we quote:

Sec. 62. Notice of Hearing. Within seven days after thecomplaint is filed, the Minister of local Government, or thesanggunian concerned, as the case may be, shall require therespondent to submit his verified answer within seven days from


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receipt of said complaint, and commence the hearing andinvestigation of the case within ten days after receipt of suchanswer of the respondent. No investigation shall be held withinninety days immediately prior to an election, and no preventive

suspension shall be imposed with the said period. If preventivesuspension has been imposed prior to the aforesaid period, thepreventive suspension shall be lifted. 24

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension maybe imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondentis a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if therespondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city ormunicipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at any time after theissues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe thatthe respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, whenthe evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offenseso warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondentcould influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety andintegrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventivesuspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of saidsuspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty days, the suspended official shall bedeemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation ofthe proceedings against him until its termination. However ' if the

delay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect orrequest, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing thetime of suspension. 25

The issue, as the Court understands it, consists of three questions:

(1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may beprovided by law" intend to divest the President of the power toinvestigate, suspend, discipline, and/or remove local officials? (2)Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local

Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in theconstitutional language?

It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding thechange in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend todivest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogativeas conferred by existing legislation to provide administrativesanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission(of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than tounderscore local governments' autonomy from congress and tobreak Congress' "control" over local government affairs. TheConstitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local

autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipalcorporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out oflocal government units, as in the federal governments of the UnitedStates of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is saidto have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "smallrepublics." 26Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to theguiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit thelegislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the"supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government

units from over-dependence on the central government.

It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is notinstantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, thepassage of a local government code, 27a local tax law, 28 income


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distribution legislation, 29and a national representation law, 30andmeasures 31 designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It isalso noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution placesthe local government under the general supervision of the

Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congressto include in the local government code provisions for removal oflocal officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removalpowers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done,delegate its exercise to the President. Thus:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code whichshall provide for a more responsive and accountable localgovernment structure instituted through a system of decentralizationwith effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum,allocate among the different local government units their powers,responsibilities and resources, and provide for the qualifications,

election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers andfunctions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relatingto the organization and operation of the local units. 32

As hereinabove indicated, the deletion of "as may be provided bylaw" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framersto strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control ofits affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power oflocal legislation. 33The Constitution did nothing more, however, andinsofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through theSecretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials

administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution hasleft the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedlyexcludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which

allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistakenimpression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible withdisciplinary authority as this Court has held, 34thus:

xxx xxx xxx

It is true that in the case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, 51 Off. Gaz., No.6 p. 2884, this Court had occasion to discuss the scope and extentof the power of supervision by the President over local governmentofficials in contrast to the power of control given to him overexecutive officials of our government wherein it was emphasizedthat the two terms, control and supervision, are two different thingswhich differ one from the other in meaning and extent. Thus in thatcase the Court has made the following digression: "In administrationlaw supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of anofficer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If thelatter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action orstep as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter ormodify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer had done inthe performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of theformer for that of the latter." But from this pronouncement it cannotbe reasonably inferred that the power of supervision of thePresident over local government officials does not include thepower of investigation when in his opinion the good of the publicservice so requires, as postulated in Section 64(c) of the Revised

Administrative Code. ...35

xxx xxx xxx

"Control" has been defined as "the power of an officer to alter ormodify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in


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the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of theformer for test of the latter." 36 "Supervision" on the other handmeans "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see thatsubordinate officers perform their duties. 37As we held, 38however,

"investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is alesser power than "altering". The impression is apparentlyexacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases,Lacson v. Roque, 39Hebron v. Reyes, 40and Mondano v. Silvosa, 41and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General.42In Lacson,this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers butonly supervision "as may be provided by law," 43a rule we reiteratedin Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President"may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality ortake any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from adecision of the corresponding provincial board." 44However, neitherLacson nor Hebron nor Mondano categorically banned the Chief

Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because shedid not exercise control powers, but because no law allowed her toexercise disciplinary authority. Thus, according to Lacson:

The contention that the President has inherent power to remove orsuspend municipal officers is without doubt not well taken. Removaland suspension of public officers are always controlled by theparticular law applicable and its proper construction subject toconstitutional limitations. 45

In Hebronwe stated:

Accordingly, when the procedure for the suspension of an officer isspecified by law, the same must be deemed mandatory andadhered to strictly, in the absence of express or clear provision tothe contrary-which does not et with respect to municipal officers ...

46

In Mondano, the Court held:

... The Congress has expressly and specifically lodged theprovincial supervision over municipal officials in the provincialgovernor who is authorized to "receive and investigate complaintsmade under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office,and conviction by final judgment of any crime involving moralturpitude." And if the charges are serious, "he shall submit writtencharges touching the matter to the provincial board, furnishing acopy of such charges to the accused either personally or byregistered mail, and he may in such case suspend the officer (notbeing the municipal treasurer) pending action by the board, if in hisopinion the charge by one affecting the official integrity of the officer

in question." Section 86 of the Revised Administration Code addsnothing to the power of supervision to be exercised by theDepartment Head over the administration of ... municipalities ... . If itbe construed that it does and such additional power is the sameauthority as that vested in the Department Head by section 79(c) ofthe Revised Administrative Code, then such additional power mustbe deemed to have been abrogated by Section 110(l), Article VII ofthe Constitution. 47

xxx xxx xxx

In Pelaez, we stated that the President can not impose disciplinarymeasures on local officials except on appeal from the provincialboard pursuant to the Administrative Code. 48

Thus, in those case that this Court denied the President the power


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(to suspend/remove) it was not because we did not think that thePresident can not exercise it on account of his limited power, butbecause the law lodged the power elsewhere. But in those cases iiwhich the law gave him the power, the Court, as in Ganzon v.

Kayanan, found little difficulty in sustaining him.49

The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point tothe debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat thePresident's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are bythemselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner JoseNolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, 50 Commissioner Blas Ople would not. 51

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitutionhas repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As wesaid, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and

one may stand with the other notwithstanding the strongerexpression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We haveindeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg.337 is still in force and effect. 52

As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a moreresponsive and accountable local government structure institutedthrough a system of decentralization." 53 The Constitution as weobserved, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of thenational government over the affairs of local governments and asput by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from

the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to endthe relation of partnership and inter-dependence between thecentral administration and local government units, or otherwise, touser in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such aradical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject

to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose thanprecisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self- government.

As we observed in one case, 54decentralization means devolution

of national administration but not power to the local levels. Thus:

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration ordecentralization of power. There is decentralization ofadministration when the central government delegatesadministrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broadenthe base of government power and in the process to make localgovernments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure theirfullest development as self-reliant communities and make themmore effective partners in the pursuit of national development andsocial progress." At the same time, it relieves the centralgovernment of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it

to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises"general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that localaffairs are administered according to law." He has no control overtheir acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments withhis own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdicationof political power in the favor of local governments units declared tobe autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free tochart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum interventionfrom central authorities. According to a constitutional author,

decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in thatevent, the autonomous government becomes accountable not tothe central authorities but to its constituency. 55

The successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Rodolfo


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Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and whatindeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facingten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibilityof 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield

prima facie findings. The Court is not of course toleratingmisfeasance in public office (assuming that Mayor Ganzon is guiltyof misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make himserve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend himout of office. As we held: 56

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigaodel Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986. Were it not forthis information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayanaccording to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he wouldhave been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as suchmunicipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October

26, 1983, he has been unable to. it is a basic assumption of theelectoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people areentitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. Formisfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, beproceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally.In either case, Ms culpability must be established. Moreover, ifthere be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutionalpresumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be

justified. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length oftime raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he wereacquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had beennullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice sufferedby him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewiseon the people of Lianga They were deprived of the services of theman they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, toparaphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this

preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason andresulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quitemanifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that theorder of suspension should be lifted. 57

The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease withsuspensions, for the above reasons, 58and so also, because it isout of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The soleobjective of a suspension, as we have held, 59is simply "to preventthe accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigationwith his influence and authority over possible witnesses" 60 or tokeep him off "the records and other evidence. 61

It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up acase, if any, against an erring local official. Under the LocalGovernment Code, it can not exceed sixty days, 62which is to say

that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period isotherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be liftedif prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span.

Suspension is not a penalty and is not unlike preventiveimprisonment in which the accused is held to insure his presence atthe trial. In both cases, the accused (the respondent) enjoys apresumption of innocence unless and until found guilty.

Suspension finally is temporary and as the Local Government Codeprovides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we

held,63

a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and wemight add, nothing less than tyranny.

As we observed earlier, imposing 600 days of suspension which isnot a remote possibility Mayor Ganzon is to all intents and


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purposes, to make him spend the rest of his term in inactivity. It isalso to make, to all intents and purposes, his suspensionpermanent.

It is also, in fact, to mete out punishment in spite of the fact that theMayor's guilt has not been proven. Worse, any absolution will be fornaught because needless to say, the length of his suspensionwould have, by the time he is reinstated, wiped out his tenureconsiderably.

The Court is not to be mistaken for obstructing the efforts of therespondent Secretary to see that justice is done in Iloilo City, yet itis hardly any argument to inflict on Mayor Ganzon successivesuspensions when apparently, the respondent Secretary has hadsufficient time to gather the necessary evidence to build a caseagainst the Mayor without suspending him a day longer. What is

intriguing is that the respondent Secretary has been cracking down,so to speak, on the Mayor piecemeal apparently, to pin him downten times the pain, when he, the respondent Secretary, could havepursued a consolidated effort.

We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through theSecretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of theopinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that poweroppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

The Court is aware that only the third suspension is under

questions, and that any talk of future suspensions is in factpremature. The fact remains, however, that Mayor Ganzon hasbeen made to serve a total of 120 days of suspension and thepossibility of sixty days more is arguably around the corner (whichamounts to a violation of the Local Government Code which brings

to light a pattern of suspensions intended to suspend the Mayor therest of his natural tenure. The Court is simply foreclosing whatappears to us as a concerted effort of the State to perpetuate anarbitrary act.

As we said, we can not tolerate such a state of affairs.

We are therefore allowing Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon to suffer theduration of his third suspension and lifting, for the purpose, theTemporary Restraining Order earlier issued. Insofar as the sevenremaining charges are concerned, we are urging the Department ofLocal Government, upon the finality of this Decision, to undertakesteps to expedite the same, subject to Mayor Ganzon's usualremedies of appeal, judicial or administrative, or certiorari, ifwarranted, and meanwhile, we are precluding the Secretary frommeting out further suspensions based on those remaining

complaints, notwithstanding findings ofprima facie evidence.

In resume the Court is laying down the following rules:

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a meredecentralization of administration, not of power, in which localofficials remain accountable to the central government in themanner the law may provide;

2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism;

3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to thesupervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control overlocal governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislativeregulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamentalpremise of autonomy;


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4. Since local governments remain accountable to the nationalauthority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein,impose disciplinary action against local officials;

5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms;"investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President doesnot have);

6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon. may serve thesuspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended for theoffenses he was charged originally; provided:

a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault,neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted incomputing the time of suspension. [Supra, sec. 63(3)]

b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventivesuspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes andabuses for which proper charges are filed against him by theaggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be abar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted undersubpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petitions are DISMISSED.The Temporary Restraining Order issued is LIFTED. Thesuspensions of the petitioners are AFFIRMED, provided that thepetitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may not be made to serve future

suspensions on account of any of the remaining administrativecharges pending against him for acts committed prior to August 11,1988. The Secretary of Interior is ORDERED to consolidate all suchadministrative cases pending against Mayor Ganzon.

The sixty-day suspension against the petitioner, Mary Ann RiveraArtieda, is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz,Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino,Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ concur

G.R. No. 100874 February 13, 1992

GOVERNOR BENJAMIN I. ESPIRITU, petitioner, vs. NELSONB. MELGAR and HON. JUDGE MARCIANO T. VIROLA,respondents.

Luna, Sison & Manas for petitioner.

Panganiban, Benitez, Parlade, Africa & Barinaga Law Offices forprivate respondent.

GRIO-AQUINO, J. :

The issue in this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition isthe jurisdiction of respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court ofOriental Mindoro to stop the provincial governor from placing a

municipal mayor under preventive suspension pending theinvestigation of administrative charges against the latter.

On April 11, 1991, one Ramir Garing of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro,


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filed a sworn letter-complaint with Secretary Luis Santos of theDepartment of Interior and Local Government charging MayorNelson Melgar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, with grave misconduct,oppression, abuse of authority, culpable violation of the Constitution

and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the public service.The charge against Mayor Melgar reads:

On or about 4:30 in the afternoon of March 26, 1991, in theMunicipality of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, the aforementionedperson, Nelson Melgar, being the Municipal Mayor of Naujan,Oriental Mindoro, with abuse of official function, did then and therewilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personalviolence upon the person of Ramir Garing, by then and there boxingand kicking thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries ondifferent parts of his body and not being contented ordered hisarrest and detention in the municipal jail of Naujan, Oriental

Mindoro without filing any charges until he was released thefollowing day March 27, 1991 at about 8:30 in the morning. (p. 30,Rollo.)

An identical letter-complaint was filed by Garing with the ProvincialGovernor of Oriental Mindoro (herein petitioner Governor BenjaminI. Espiritu) accusing Mayor Melgar of the same violations of law andrequesting that the mayor be placed under preventive suspensionpending investigation of the charges.

A third complaint filed by Garing with the Presidential Action Center,

Office of the President of the Philippines, was forwarded toGovernor Espiritu with a request for prompt action (Annex "C", p.36, Rollo).

On April 22, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental

Mindoro required Mayor Melgar to answer the complaint, which wasdocketed as Adm. Case No. 91-01 (Annex "D", p. 37, Rollo).

On May 22, 1991, Mayor Melgar submitted his answer in which he

recounted the events of March 26, 1991 that led to the filing ofGaring's complaint against him:

At around 6:30 in the evening of 26 March 1991, while I was in themiddle of my speech at the Naujan Public Gymnasium, thisMunicipality, where the Jose L. Basa Memorial graduationceremonies were then being held, a prolonged but nonetheless loudand intermittent clapping suddenly erupted from one of thenumerous people then in attendance. I paused. The handclappingstopped. I resumed my speech. The fellow started all over again.

The audience was visibly disturbed and I found myself unable to

proceed not because I could not collect my thoughts but because Ifelt the solemnity of the occasion had irreversibly been shattered bya rudeness so totally unexpected.

I ended my speech and instructed a policeman to investigate theculprit who turned out to be Ramir Garing. He was drunk. I did nothurt him as can be gathered from his medical certificate (Annex "B"to the complaint) which palpably contradicts his affidavit (Annex "A"to the complaint).

I was informed that said Ramir Garing was momentarily placed in

custody for his own protection because he was drunk. An openknife (balisong) was taken from him. I was likewise informed thatafter he had sobered up, he was told to go home, but he refused togo and only did so the following morning.


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Certainly under the circumstances, charges could have been filedagainst Ramir Garing under the provisions of Article 153 of theRevised Penal Code and also for possession and concealment of adeadly weapon. Still, as a local Chief Executive, who to most

people represent (sic) a sovereign government, and who, at thecost of foregoing personal vindication must avoid any appearanceof vindictiveness, I instructed my policemen not to file chargesagainst him.

Attached hereto for your further reference are the joint affidavit ofteachers of the J.L. Basa Memorial School as Annex "A", the jointaffidavit of the Municipal Jailer and the Police Investigator as Annex"B", the affidavit of Fireman 1st Class Roy Lomio as Annex "C", anda xerox copy of the pages in the Police Blotter where the incident inquestion was entered. (pp. 40-41, Rollo).

After evaluating the complaint and its supporting documents, aswell as the Mayor's answer and the affidavits of his witnesses, theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Oriental Mindoro passed ResolutionNo. 55 on May 9, 1991, recommending to the Provincial Governorthat respondent Mayor be preventively suspended for forty-five (45)days pending the investigation of the administrative complaint(Annex "H, p. 49, Rollo).

On May 23, 1991, Mayor Melgar filed a motion to dismiss theadministrative complaint (Annex "I", pp. 51-55, Rollo). It wasopposed by Garing.

On June 6, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan denied the motionto dismiss (Res. No. 72, p. 62 Rollo; Annex "L" to the Petition).

Meanwhile, pursuant to the recommendation of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan in its Resolution No. 55, Governor Espiritu placedMayor Melgar under preventive suspension on May 28, 1991 on theground that:

. . . there is reasonable ground to believe that respondent MayorNelson B. Melgar of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, has committed theacts stated in the complaint and affidavit of Ramir Garing andcorroborated by the affidavits (Exhibits A, C & D) of his witnesses,namely: Lydia V. Garing, Nelson Tabor and Javier Dagdagan, all ofPoblacion II, Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. (p. 63, Rollo)

On June 3, 1991, Mayor Melgar received the Order of Suspension(Annex "M", p. 63, Rollo). He forthwith filed a "Petition for Certiorariwith Preliminary Injunction with prayer for Restraining Order" in theRegional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro (Spl. Civil Action No. R-5003) alleging that "the order of suspension was an arrogant,

despotic and arbitrary abuse of power" by the Governor (pp. 68-69,Rollo).

On June 24, 1991, RTC Judge Virola issued a writ of preliminaryinjunction enjoining Governor Espiritu from implementing the Orderof suspension against Mayor Melgar for:

The Court is more inclined to believe the answer under oath of therespondent and the sworn statements of his witnesses attached tothe Answer in the administrative case than the complaint under oathin the administrative case which are the evidence to be considered

in determining whether or not the order of preventive suspensionwas issued in accordance with law. There is no reason to doubt thesworn statements of the numerous public school teachers andmembers of the PNP. Besides, the medical certificate issued inconnection with the treatment of the complainant in the


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administrative case tends to corroborate the theory of therespondent and contradict that of the complaint in the administrativecase. The abrasions on the right arm of the complainant in theadministrative case tend to show that said complainant was held

tightly by the hands by the PNP because he was then drunk, inpossession of abalisongknife and causing serious disturbance andnot because he was boxed and kicked by herein petitioner. (pp. 75-76, Rollo.)

Governor Espiritu filed a motion to dismiss and/or forreconsideration which Judge Virola denied on July 16, 1991.Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition.

Without giving due course to the petition, we required the privaterespondent to comment and we issued a Temporary RestrainingOrder commanding respondent Judge to cease and desist from

further proceeding in Special Civil Action No. R-5003 (pp. 106-107,Rollo). On August 22, 1991, Mayor Melgar filed an "Urgent Motionto Lift Temporary Restraining Order" which the petitioner opposedand the Court denied (p. 127-155, Rollo).

Petitioner submits that respondent Judge Virola acted withoutjurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing: (1) the writof preliminary injunction restraining Governor Espiritu fromimplementing the order of preventive suspension, and (2) indenying petitioner's motion to dismiss Special Civil Action No. R-5003, for:

a Petitioner, as Provincial Governor, is empowered by Section 63 ofthe Local Government Code to place an elective municipal officialunder preventive suspension pending decision of an administrativecase against the elective municipal official:

b) Petitioner did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in placingrespondent mayor under preventive suspension; if at all, his errorwas an error of judgment which is not correctible by certiorari;

c) By express provision of Section 61 of the Local GovernmentCode, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has jurisdiction overcomplaints against any elective municipal official; on the otherhand, Section 19(c) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980withdraws from regional trial courts jurisdiction over cases within theexclusive jurisdiction of any person, tribunal or body exercising

judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Thus, by practically deciding theadministrative case on the merits, the respondent court actedwithout jurisdiction; and

d) Respondent Mayor had a remedy of appeal under Section 66 ofthe Local Government Code.

Section 63, Chapter IV of the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 63. Preventive Suspension. (1) Preventive suspension maybe imposed by the Minister of Local Government if the respondentis a provincial or city official, by the provincial governor if therespondent is an elective municipal official, or by the city ormunicipal mayor if the respondent is an elective barangay official.

(2) Preventive suspension may be imposed at anytime after theissues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that

the respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, whenthe evidence of culpability is strong, when the gravity of the offenseso warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondentcould influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety andintegrity of the records and other evidence. In all cases, preventive


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suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of saidsuspension.

(3) At the expiration of sixty-days, the suspended official shall be

deemed reinstated in office without prejudice to the continuation ofthe proceedings against him until its termination. However, if thedelay in the proceedings of the case is due to his fault, neglect orrequest, the time of the delay shall not be counted in computing thetime of the suspension.

Clearly, the provincial governor of Oriental Mindoro is authorized bylaw to preventively suspend the municipal mayor of Naujan atanytime after the issues had been joined and any of the followinggrounds were shown to exist:

1. When there is reasonable ground to believe that the respondent

has committed the act or acts complained of;

2. When the evidence of culpability is strong;

3. When the gravity of the offense so warrants; or

4. When the continuance in office of the respondent could influencethe witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of therecords and other evidence.

There is nothing improper in suspending an officer before the

charges against him are heard and before he is given anopportunity to prove his innocence (Nera vs. Garcia and Elicao,106 Phil. 1031). Preventive suspension is allowed so that therespondent may not hamper the normal course of the investigationthrough the use of his influence and authority over possible

witnesses (Lacson vs. Roque, 92 Phil. 456).

Since respondent mayor believed that his preventive suspensionwas unjustified and politically motivated, he should have sought

relief first from the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, notfrom the courts. Mayor Melgar's direct recourse to the courtswithout exhausting administrative remedies was premature (Aboitiz& Co. Inc. vs. Collector of Customs, 83 SCRA 265; Garcia vs.Teehankee, 27 SCRA 937; Manuel vs. Jimenez, 17 SCRA 55;Bongcawil vs. Provincial Board of Lanao del Norte, 10 SCRA 327;The Phil Veterans Affairs Office vs. Farias, et al., AC-G.R. SP No.05937, July 5, 1985; Bonafe vs. Zurbano, 131 SCRA 9). Theregional trial court had no jurisdiction over Special Civil Action No.R-5003 and gravely abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss thecase.

There may exist honest differences of opinion with regard to theseriousness of the charges, or as to whether they warrantdisciplinary action. However, as a general rule, the office or bodythat is invested with the power of removal or suspension should bethe sole judge of the necessity and sufficiency of the cause ( 17R.C.L. Sec. 233 cited in Attorney General vs. Doherty, 13 Am. Rep.132). So, unless a flagrant abuse of the exercise of that power isshown, public policy and a becoming regard for the principle ofseparation of powers demand that the action of said officer or bodyshould be left undisturbed.

However, in this particular case, since the 60-day preventivesuspension of Mayor Melgar was maintained by the TemporaryRestraining Order which we issued on August 6, 1991, andtherefore has already been served, he is deemed reinstated inoffice without prejudice to the continuation of the administrative


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investigation of the charges against him (Sec. 63, subpar. 3, LocalGovernment Code).

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorariand prohibition is granted.

The writ of preliminary injunction dated June 24, 1991 in SpecialCivil Action No. R-5003 is hereby annulled and set aside. SaidSpecial Civil Action No. R-5003 is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romeroand Nocon, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 94115 August 21, 1992

RODOLFO E. AGUINALDO, petitioner, vs. HON. LUISSANTOS, as Secretary of the Department of Local Government,and MELVIN VARGAS, as Acting Governor of Cagayan,respondents.

Victor I. Padilla for petitioner.

Doroteo B. Laguna and Manuel T. Molina for private respondent.

NOCON, J .:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminarymandatory injunction and/or restraining order, petitioner Rodolfo E.

Aguinaldo assails the decision of respondent Secretary of LocalGovernment dated March 19,1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89dismissing him as Governor of Cagayan on the ground that thepower of the Secretary of Local Government to dismiss localgovernment official under Section 14, Article I, Chapter 3 andSections 60 to 67, Chapter 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,otherwise known as the Local Government Code, was repealed bythe effectivity of the 1987 Constitution.

The pertinent facts are as follows: Petitioner was the duly electedGovernor of the province of Cagayan, having been elected to saidposition during the local elections held on January 17, 1988, toserve a term of four (4) years therefrom. He took his oathsometimes around March 1988.

Shortly after December 1989 coup d'etat was crushed, respondent

Secretary of Local Government sent a telegram and a letter, bothdated December 4, 1989, to petitioner requiring him to show causewhy should not be suspended or remove from office for disloyalty tothe Republic, within forty-eight (48) hours from receipt thereof.

On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to theRepublic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed byVeronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba and Orlino Agatep, respectivelythe mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao and Lasam, all inCagayan, against petitioner for acts the latter committed during thecoup. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to thecomplaint.

On January 5, 1990, the Department of Local Government receiveda letter from petitioner dated December 29, 1989 in reply torespondent Secretary's December 4, 1989 letter requiring him to


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explain why should not be suspended or removed from office fordisloyalty. In his letter, petitioner denied being privy to the planningof the coup or actively participating in its execution, though headmitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers.1

Respondent Secretary considered petitioner's reply letter as hisanswer to the complaint of Mayor Veronico Agatep and others. 2Onthe basis thereof, respondent Secretary suspended petitioner fromoffice for sixty (60) days from notice, pending the outcome of theformal investigation into the charges against him.

During the hearing conducted on the charges against petitioner,complainants presented testimonial and documentary evidence toprove the charges. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor evencross-examined the complainant's witnesses, choosing instead to

move that respondent Secretary inhibit himself from deciding thecase, which motion was denied.

Thereafter, respondent Secretary rendered the questioned decisionfinding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal fromoffice. Installed as Governor of Cagayan in the process wasrespondent Melvin Vargas, who was then the Vice-Governor ofCagayan.

Petitioner relies on three grounds for the allowance of the petition,namely: (1) that the power of respondent Secretary to suspend or

remove local government official under Section 60, Chapter IV ofB.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution; (2) that sincerespondent Secretary no longer has power to suspend or removepetitioner, the former could not appoint respondent Melvin Vargasas Governor of Cagayan; and (3) the alleged act of disloyalty

committed by petitioner should be proved by proof beyondreasonable doubt, and not be a mere preponderance of evidence,because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the RevisedPenal Code.

While this case was pending before this Court, petitioner filed hiscertificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan forthe May 11, 1992 elections. Three separate petitions for hisdisqualification were then filed against him, all based on the groundthat he had been removed from office by virtue of the March 19,1990 resolution of respondent Secretary. The commission onElections granted the petitions by way of a resolution dated May 9,1992. On the same day, acting upon a "Motion to Clarify" filed bypetitioner, the Commission ruled that inasmuch as the resolutions ofthe Commission becomes final and executory only after five (5)days from promulgation, petitioner may still be voted upon as a

candidate for governor pending the final outcome of thedisqualification cases with his Court.

Consequently, on May 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition forcertiorariwith this Court, G.R. Nos. 105128-30, entitled Rodolfo E.

Aguinaldo v. Commission on Elections, et al., seeking to nullify theresolution of the Commission ordering his disqualification. TheCourt, in a resolution dated May 14, 1992, issued a temporaryrestraining order against the Commission to cease and desist fromenforcing its May 9, 1992 resolution pending the outcome of thedisqualification case, thereby allowing the canvassing of the votesand returns in Cagayan to proceed. However, the Commission wasordered not to proclaim a winner until this Court has decided thecase.

On June 9, 1992, a resolution was issued in the aforementioned


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case granting petition and annulling the May 9, 1992 resolution ofthe Commission on the ground that the decision of respondentSecretary has not yet attained finality and is still pending reviewwith this Court. As petitioner won by a landslide margin in theelections, the resolution paved the way for his eventualproclamation as Governor of Cagayan.

Under the environmental circumstances of the case, We find thepetition meritorious.

Petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan hasrendered the administration case pending before Us moot andacademic. It appears that after the canvassing of votes, petitionergarnered the most number of votes among the candidates forgovernor of Cagayan province. As held by this Court inAguinaldo v.Comelec et al., supra,:

. . . [T]he certified true xerox copy of the "CERTITICATE OFVOTES OF CANDIDATES", attached to the "VERY URGENTMOTION FOR THE MODIFICATION OF THE RESOLUTIONDATED MAY 14, 1992["] filed by petitioner shows that he received170,382 votes while the other candidates for the same positionreceived the following total number of votes: (1) Patricio T. Antonio 54,412, (2) Paquito F. Castillo 2,198; and (3) Florencio L.Vargas 48,129.

xxx xxx xxx

Considering the fact narrated, the expiration of petitioner's term ofoffice during which the acts charged were allegedly committed, andhis subsequent reelection, the petitioner must be dismissed for thereason that the issue has become academic. In Pascual v.

Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, L-11959, October 31, 1959, thisCourt has ruled:

The weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the ruled

denying the right to remove from office because of misconductduring a prior term to which we fully subscribe.

Offenses committed, or acts done, during a previous term aregenerally held not to furnish cause for removal and this is especiallytrue were the Constitution provides that the penalty in proceedingfor removal shall not extend beyond the removal from office, anddisqualification from holding office for a term for which the officerwas elected or appointed. (6 C.J.S. p. 248, citing Rice v. State, 161S.W. 2nd 4011; Montgomery v. Newell, 40 S.W. 23rd 418; Peopleex rel Bashaw v. Thompson, 130 P. 2nd 237; Board of Com'rsKingfisher County v. Shutler, 281 P. 222; State v. Blake, 280 P.

388; In re Fedula, 147 A 67; State v. Wald, 43 S.W. 217)

The underlying theory is that each term is separate from otherterms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation ofthe officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right toremove him therefor. (43 Am. Jur. p. 45, citing Atty. Gen. v. Kasty,184 Ala. 121, 63 Sec. 599, 50 L.R.A. [NS] 553). As held in Comantv. Bregan [ 1887] 6 N.Y.S.R. 332, cited in 17 A.L.R. 63 Sec. 559, 50[NE] 553.

The Court should ever remove a public officer for acts done prior tohis present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive thepeople of their right to elect their officers. When a people haveelected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this withknowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded orforgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is not


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for the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practicallyoverrule the will of the people. (Lizares v. Hechanova, et al., 17SCRA 58, 59-60 [1966]) (See also Oliveros v. Villaluz, 57 SCRA163 [1974]) 3

Clear then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed foradministrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since hisre-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer'sprevious misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to removehim therefor. The foregoing rule, however, finds no application tocriminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may havecommitted during the failed coup.

The other grounds raised by petitioner deserve scant consideration.Petitioner contends that the power of respondent Secretary tosuspend or remove local government officials as alter ego of the

President, and as embodied in B.P. Blg. 337 has been repealed bythe 1987 Constitution and which is now vested in the courts.

We do not agree. The power of respondent Secretary to removelocal government officials is anchored on both the Constitution anda statutory grant from the legislative branch. The constitutionalbasis is provided by Articles VII (17) and X (4) of the 1987Constitution which vest in the President the power of control over allexecutive departments, bureaus and offices and the power ofgeneral supervision over local governments, and by the doctrinethat the acts of the department head are presumptively the acts ofthe President unless expressly rejected by him. 4 The statutorygrant found in B.P. Blg. 337 itself has constitutional roots, havingbeen enacted by the then Batasan Pambansa pursuant to Article XIof the 1973 Constitution, Section 2 of which specifically provided asfollows

Sec. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local government codewhich may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote ofall its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable localgovernment structure with an effective system of recall, allocatingamong the different local government units their powers,responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications,election and removal, term, salaries, power, functions, and duties oflocal government officials, and all other matters relating to theorganization and operation of the local units. However, any changein the existing form of local government shall not take effect untilratified by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite called for thepurpose. 5

A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987Constitution, which reads:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code whichshall provided for a more responsive and accountable localgovernment structure instituted through a system of decentralizationwith effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum,allocate among the different local government units their powers,responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications,election,appointment, and removal, term and salaries, powers andfunctions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relatingto the organization and operation of the local units. 6

Inasmuch as the power and authority of the legislature to enact alocal government code, which provides for the manner of removal oflocal government officials, is found in the 1973 Constitution as wellas in the 1987 Constitution, then it can not be said that BP Blg. 337was repealed by the effective of the present Constitution.


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Moreover, in Bagabuyo et al. vs. Davide, Jr., et al., 7this court hadthe occasion to state that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despitethe effectivity of the present Constitution, until such time as theproposed Local Government Code of 1991 is approved.

The power of respondent Secretary of the Department of LocalGovernment to remove local elective government officials is foundin Secs. 60 and 61 of B.P. Blg. 337. 8

As to petitioner's argument of the want of authority of respondentSecretary to appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor ofCagayan, We need but point to Section 48 (1) of B.P. Blg 337 toshow the fallacy of the same, to writ

In case a permanent vacancy arises when a governor . . . refuses toassume office, fails to quality, dies or is removed from office,

voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated todischarge the functions of his office, the vice-governor . . . shallassume the office for the unexpired term of the former. 9

Equally without merit is petitioner's claim that before he could besuspended or removed from office, proof beyond reasonable doubtis required inasmuch as he is charged with a penal offense ofdisloyalty to the Republic which is defined and penalized under

Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner is not beingprosecuted criminally under the provisions of the Revised PenalCode, but administratively with the end in view of removingpetitioner as the duly elected Governor of Cagayan Province foracts of disloyalty to the Republic where the quantum of proofrequired is only substantial evidence. 10

WHEREFORE, petitioner is hereby GRANTED and the decision of

public respondent Secretary of Local Government dated March 19,1990 in Adm. Case No. P-10437-89, dismissing petitioner asGovernor of Cagayan, is hereby REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Bellosillo,JJ., concur.

Melo, J., took no part.

G.R. No. 120905 March 7, 1996

RENATO U. REYES, petitioner, vs.

COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, and ROGELIO DE CASTRO, respondents.

G.R. No. 120940 March 7, 1996

JULIUS O. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, and RENATO U. REYES, respondents.

MENDOZA., J .:p

For resolution are special civil actions of certiorari. The petition inG.R. No. 120905 seeks to annul the resolution dated May 9, 1995of the Second Division of the Commission on Elections, declaringpetitioner Renato U. Reyes disqualified from running for local office


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and cancelling his certificate of candidacy, and the resolution datedJuly 3, 1995 of the Commission en banc, denying petitioner'smotion for reconsideration. On the other hand, the petition in G.R.No. 120940, filed by Julius O. Garcia, has for its purpose theannulment of the aforesaid resolution of July 3, 1995 of theCommission en banc insofar as it denies his motion to beproclaimed the elected mayor of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, inview of the disqualification of Renato U. Reyes.

On August 1, 1995, the Court issued a temporary restraining orderdirecting the Commission on Elections en bancto cease and desistfrom implementing its resolution of July 3, 1995. It also ordered thetwo cases to be consolidated, inasmuch as they involved the sameresolutions of the COMELEC.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the incumbent mayor of themunicipality of Bongabong, Oriental Mindoro, having been electedto that office on May 11, 1992. On October 26, 1994, anadministrative complaint was filed against him with theSangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr. Ernesto Manalo. It was alleged,among other things, that petitioner exacted and collectedP50,000,00 from each market stall holder in the Bongabong PublicMarket; that certain checks issued to him by the NationalReconciliation and Development Program of the Department ofInterior and Local Government were never received by theMunicipal Treasurer nor reflected in the books of accounts of the

same officer; and that he took twenty-seven (27) heads of cattlefrom beneficiaries of a cattle dispersal program after the latter hadreared and fattened the cattle for seven months.

In its decision, dated February 6, 1995, the SangguniangPanlalawigan found petitioner guilty of the charges and ordered hisremoval from office.

It appears that earlier, after learning that the Sanggunian hadterminated the proceedings in the case and was about to render

judgment, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition andinjunction with the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro, Branch42, alleging that the proceedings had been terminated withoutgiving him a chance to be heard. A temporary restraining order wasissued by the court on February 7, 1995, enjoining the SangguniangPanlalawigan from proceeding with the case. As a result, thedecision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be servedupon Reyes. But on March 3, 1995, following the expiration of thetemporary restraining order and without any injunction being issuedby the Regional Trial Court, an attempt was made to serve the

decision upon petitioner's counsel in Manila. However, the latterrefused to accept the decision. Subsequent attempts to serve thedecision upon petitioner himself also failed, as he also refused toaccept the decision.

On March 23, 1995, the Presiding Officer of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, Vice Governor Pedrito A. Reyes, issued an order forpetitioner to vacate the position of mayor and peacefully turn overthe office to the incumbent vice mayor. But service of the orderupon petitioner was also refused.

Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a certificate of

candidacy with the Office of the Election Officer of the COMELEC inBongabong.

On March 24, 1995, private respondent Rogelio de Castro, as


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elections as provided in 78 of the Omnibus Elections Code, and thatbecause it failed to do so, many votes were invalidated which couldhave been for him had the voters been told earlier who werequalified to be candidates; (2) that the decision of the SangguniangPanlalawigan was final and executory and resulted in the automatic

disqualification of petitioner, and the COMELEC did not need muchtime to decide the case for disqualification against Reyes since thelatter did not appeal the decision in the administrative case orderinghis removal; (3) that the COMELEC should have considered thevotes cast for Reyes as stray votes.

After deliberating on the petitions filed in these cases, the Courtresolved to dismiss them for lack of showing that the COMELECcommitted grave abuse of discretion in issuing the resolutions inquestion.

G.R. No. 120905

First. Petitioner Reyes claims that the decision of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, ordering him removed from office, is not yet finalbecause he has not been served a copy thereof.

It appears, however, that the failure of the SangguniangPanlalawigan to deliver a copy of its decision was due to the refusalof petitioner and his counsel to receive the decision. As thesecretary to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Mario Manzo, stated inhis certification, repeated attempts had been made to serve thedecision on Reyes personally and by registered mail, but Reyesrefused to receive the decision. Manzo's certification states:

On March 3, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay went to Manila tofurnish a copy of the decision to the Counsel for Respondent, Atty.

Rogelio V. Garcia, which said counsel refused to accept.

On March 23, 1995, Mr. Mario I. C. Manzo, Secretary to theSangguniang Panlalawigan with Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangayagain went to the office of the Mayor of Bongabong to serve thedecision. Mayor Renato U. Reyes, himself present, refused toaccept the ORDER enforcing the decision citing particularly thepending case filed in the Sala of Judge Manuel A. Roman as thebasis of his refusal.

On [sic] 4:40 p.m., of the same date, the Secretary to theSangguniang Panlalawigan, unable to serve the ORDER, mailedthe same (registered mail receipt No. 432) on the Bongabong PostOffice to forward the ORDER to the Office of Mayor Renato U.Reyes.

On March 28, 1995 said registered mail was returned to theSangguniang Panlalawigan with the following inscriptions on theback by the Postmaster:

1) 1st attempt addressee out of town 9:15 a.m., 3-23-95

2) 2nd attempt addressee cannot be contacted, out of town, 8:50a.m., 3-24-95.

3) 3rd attempt addressee not contacted out of town 8:15 a.m.,3-24-95.

4) 4th attempt addressee refused to accept 8:15 a.m., 3-27-95.

On March 24, 1995, Mr. Marcelino B. Macatangay, again went to


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Bongabong to serve the same ORDER enforcing the decision.Mayor Renato U. Reyes was not present so the copy was left onthe Mayor's Office with comments from the employees that theywould not accept the same. 3

Rule 13, 3 and 7 of the Rules of Court provide for the service offinal orders and judgments either personally or by mail. Personalservice is completed upon actual or constructive delivery, whichmay be made by delivering a copy personally to the party or hisattorney, or by leaving it in his office with a person having chargethereof, or at his residence, if his office is not known. 4 Henceservice was completed when the decision was served uponpetitioner's counsel in his office in Manila on March 3, 1995. Inaddition, as the secretary of the Sangguniang Panlalawigancertified, service by registered mail was also made on petitionerReyes. Although the mail containing the decision was not claimed

by him, service was deemed completed five days after the lastnotice to him on March 27, 1995.5

If a judgment or decision is not delivered to a party for reasonsattributable to him, service is deemed completed and the judgmentor decision will be considered validly served as long as it can beshown that the attempt to deliver it to him would be valid were it notfor his or his counsel's refusal to receive it.

Indeed that petitioner's counsel knew that a decision in theadministrative case had been rendered is evident in his effort tobargain with the counsel for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan not to

have the decision served upon him and his client while their petitionfor certiorariin the Regional Trial Court was pending.6 His refusalto receive the decision may, therefore, be construed as a waiver onhis part to have a copy of the decision.

The purpose of the rules on service is to make sure that the partybeing served with the pleading, order or judgment is duly informedof the same so that he can take steps to protect his interests,enable a party to file an appeal or apply for other appropriate reliefsbefore the decision becomes final.

In practice, service means the delivery or communication of apleading, notice or other papers in a case to the opposite party soas to charge him with receipt of it, and subject him to its legal effect. 7

In the case at bar, petitioner was given sufficient notice of thedecision. Prudence required that, rather than resist the service, heshould have received the decision and taken an appeal to the Officeof the President in accordance with R.A. No. 7160, 67. 8 Butpetitioner did not do so. Accordingly, the decision became final on

April 2, 1995, 30 days after the first service upon petitioner.

The net result is that when the elections were held on May 8, 1995,the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan had already becomefinal and executory. The filing of a petition for certiorari with theRegional Trial Court did not prevent the administrative decisionfrom attaining finality. An original action of certiorari is anindependent action and does not interrupt the course of theprincipal action nor the running of the reglementary period involvedin the proceeding.9

Consequently, to arrest the course of the principal action during thependency of the certiorariproceedings, there must be a restrainingorder or a writ of preliminary injunction from the appellate courtdirected to the lower court. 10


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In the case at bar, although a temporary restraining order wasissued by the Regional Trial Court, no preliminary injunction wassubsequently issued. The temporary restraining order issuedexpired after 20 days. From that moment on, there was no morelegal barrier to the service of the decision upon petitioner.

Petitioner claims that the decision cannot be served upon himbecause at the hearing held on February 15, 1995 of the casewhich he filed in the RTC, the counsel of the SangguniangPanlalawigan, Atty. Nestor Atienza, agreed not to effect service ofthe decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan pending finalresolution of the petition for certiorari.

The alleged agreement between the counsels of Reyes and theSangguniang Panlalawigan cannot bind the SangguniangPanlalawigan. It was illegal . And it would have been no less illegal

for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to have carried it out becauseR.A. No. 7160, 66 (a) makes it mandatory that "[c]opies of thedecision [of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan] shall immediately befurnished to respondent and/or interested parties." It was theSangguniang Panlalawigan's duty to serve it upon the partieswithout unnecessary delay. To have delayed the service of thedecision would have resulted in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan'sfailure to perform a legal duty. It, therefore, properly acted in havingits decision served upon petitioner Reyes.

Second. The next question is whether there election of petitionerrendered the administrative charges against him moot and

academic. Petitioner invokes the ruling inAguinaldo v. COMELEC,11in which it was held that a public official could not be removed formisconduct committed during a prior term and that his reelectionoperated as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to

the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. But thatwas because in that case, before the petition questioning thevalidity of the administrative decision removing petitioner could bedecided, the term of office during which the alleged misconduct wascommitted expired. 12 Removal cannot extend beyond the term

during which the alleged misconduct was committed. If a publicofficial is not removed before his term of office expires, he can nolonger be removed if he is thereafter reelected for another term.This is the rationale for the ruling in the twoAguinaldocases.

The case at bar is the very opposite of those cases. Here, althoughpetitioner Reyes brought an action to question the decision in theadministrative case, the temporary restraining order issued in theaction he brought lapsed, with the result that the decision wasserved on petitioner and it thereafter became final on April 3, 1995,because petitioner failed to appeal to the Office of the President. He

was thus validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40(b) of theLocal Government Code, he was disqualified from running forreelection.

It is noteworthy that at the time the Aguinaldo cases were decidedthere was no provision similar to 40(b) which disqualifies anyperson from running for any elective position on the ground that hehas been removed as a result of an administrative case. The LocalGovernment Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) could not be givenretroactive effect. Said the Court in the first Aguinaldo case: 13The COMELEC applied Section 40(b) of the Local Government

Code Republic Act 7160) which provides:

Sec. 40. The following persons are disqualified from running for anyelective local position:


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. . . . .

(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case.

Republic Act 7160 took effect only on January 1, 1992. . . . There isno provision in the statute which would clearly indicate that thesame operates retroactively.

It, therefore, follows that 40(b) of the Local Government Code is notapplicable to the present case.

Furthermore, the decision has not yet attained finality. As indicatedearlier, the decision of the then Secretary of Local Government wasquestioned by the petitioner in this Court and that to date, thepetition remains unresolved.

At any rate, petitioner's claim that he was not given time to presenthis evidence in the administrative case has no basis, as thefollowing portion of the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawiganmakes clear:

On November 28, 1994 the Sanggunian received from respondent'scounsel a motion for extension of time to file a verified answerwithin 15 days from November 23, 1994. In the interest of justiceanother fifteen (15) day period was granted the respondent.

On December 5, 1994 which is the last day for filing his answer,

respondent instead filed a motion to dismiss and set the same forhearing on December 22, 1994.

. . . .

On January 4, 1995, the motion to dismiss was denied for lack ofmerit and the order of denial was received by respondent onJanuary 7, 1995. Considering the fact that the last day within whichto file his answer fell on December 5, 1994, respondent is obliged tofile the verified answer on January 7, 1995 when he received the

order denying his motion to dismiss.

In the hearing of the instant case on January 26, 1995, the counselfor the complainant manifested that he be allowed to present hisevidence for failure of the respondent to file his answer albeit thelapse of 19 days from January 7, 1995.

The manifestation of complainant's counsel was granted over theobjection of the respondent, and the Sanggunian in open session,in the presence of the counsel for the respondent, issued an orderdated January 26, 1995 quoted as follows:

"As shown from the record of this case, Mayor Renato U. Reyes ofBongabong failed to file his answer within the time prescribed bylaw, after the motion to dismiss was denied by this Sanggunian.The Sanggunian declares that respondent Mayor Renato U. Reyesfailed to file his answer to the complaint filed against him within thereglementary period of fifteen (15) days. Counsel for respondentrequested for reconsideration twice, which oral motions forreconsideration were denied for lack of merit.

Art. 126 (a) (1) provides that failure of respondent to file his verifiedanswer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the complaint shall

be considered a waiver of his rights to present evidence in hisbehalf.

It is important to note that this case should be heard in accordance


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with what is provided for in the constitution that all parties areentitled to speedy disposition of their cases. It is pivotal to state thatthe Sanggunian Panlalawigan will lose its authority to investigatethis case come February 8, 1995 and therefore, in the interest of

justice and truth the Sanggunian must exercise that authority by

pursuing the hearing of this case.

Accordingly, the counsel for complainant Dr. Ernesto L. Manalo, etal., will present his evidence on February 2, 3, and 6, 1995, and thecounsel for respondent will be given a chance to cross-examine thewitnesses that may be presented thereat."

. . . .

On February 2, 1995, the respondent through counsel despite duenotice in open session, and by registered mail (registry receipt no.

1495) dated January 27, 1995, failed to appear. No telegram wasreceived by this body to the effect that he will appear on any of thedates stated in the Order of January 26, 1995. Indeed, such inaction is a waiver of the respondent to whatever rights he may haveunder our laws.

All in all, herein respondent Mayor Reyes was given by thisSanggunian a period of sixty one (61) days to file his verifiedanswer however, he resorted to dilatory motions which in the endproved fatal to his cause. Veritably, he neither filed nor furnishedthe complainant a copy of his answer. Failure of the respondent tofile his verified answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the

complaint shall be considered a waiver of his rights to presentevidence in his behalf ((1). Art. 126 of Rules and Regulationsimplementing the Local Government Code of 1991). All personsshall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all

judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies (Sec. 16, Art. III ofthe Constitution).

Indeed, it appears that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity tofile his answer. He failed to do so. Nonetheless, he was told that the

complainant would be presenting his evidence and that he(petitioner) would then have the opportunity to cross-examine thewitnesses. But on the date set, he failed to appear. He would saylater that this was because he had filed a motion for postponementand was awaiting a ruling thereon. This only betrays the pattern ofdelay he employed to render the case against him moot by hiselection.

G.R. No. 120940

We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the

COMELEC in denying petitioner Julius O. Garcia's petition to beproclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U.Reyes.

That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votesmay not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate isdisqualified is now settled. 14 The doctrinal instability caused bysee-sawing rulings 15has since been removed. In the latest ruling 16on the question, this Court said:

To simplistically assume that the second placer would havereceived the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for themind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer.He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority orp

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