Livelihoods and Chronic Poverty in

Semi-Arid Zimbabwe

KATE BIRD and ANDREW SHEPHERD *Overseas Development Institute, London, UK

Summary. — Remoteness and geographic (natural, physical, human and social) capital arecontrasted with social and political exclusion in explaining persistent rural poverty. We found thatpersistent poverty was strongly associated with the structural poverty of Zimbabwe�s semi-aridcommunal areas. Relative urban proximity assisted income diversification and improvement in avery poor, socially and politically excluded area. Less excluded but remote areas remained poor butnot as poor as the excluded population. Livelihoods changed and diversified more in the nonremotearea, speeding poverty reduction as measured by an index of perceived change. We conclude withwhat policy options and sequence might support the inclusion of chronically poor people.� 2003 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.

Key words — chronic poverty, livelihoods, remoteness, Zimbabwe, semi-arid, social protection

1. INTRODUCTION

(a) Remoteness 1 and poverty

This paper seeks to explain why people livingin remote rural areas experience high levelsof chronic poverty (Bird, Hulme, Moore, &Shepherd, 2002a; de Haan & Lipton, 1998;IFAD, 2001; Jalan & Ravallion, 1998, 2000). Itfocuses on three semi-arid rural areas in Zim-babwe. Two of are remote, and the third isaffected by social and political exclusion fol-lowing civil conflict. Policy implications of re-search findings are then drawn out.In this paper the chronically poor are re-

garded as those who have lived below the in-come poverty line for five years and/or haveexperienced severe and multidimensional de-privations for several years (see Hulme, Moore,& Shepherd, 2001; Hulme and Shepherd in thisissue). It appears likely that a large proportionof chronically poor people live in remote,largely rural regions and remote rural areas(RRAs) in nonremote regions in poor coun-tries. Remote areas are physically or friction-ally distant 2 (McCall, 1985; Smith, 1992) fromlocations of strong economic activity, urbanagglomerations, coasts, communication linksand political centers. They may lie behindecological barriers such as mountains or waterbodies. Commonly they are characterized by adifficult climate or by high levels of disease

prevalence (e.g., tsetse-infected regions) (Birdet al., 2002a). The effects of remoteness may becompounded by some of its consequences: so-cial and political exclusion from mainstreamsociety (de Haan & Maxwell, 1998; de Haan,1999) and politics around socio-political iden-tities such as ethnicity or religious conviction;perceived illegitimacy of the central state forthe remote population, and the prevalence ofviolent conflict especially (but not only) inborder regions.There are strong theoretical and empirical

reasons for the prevalence of chronic poverty inRRAs. Food security is erratic in many RRAs,leading to undernutrition damaging children�smental and physical development. Governmentprovision of education and health services ispoor and private sector providers are difficultto attract due to low levels of effective demand(Bird et al., 2002a). Inaccessibility due to poorinfrastructure and high transport costs affectshealth and education outcomes (Thapa,

World Development Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 591–610, 2003� 2003 Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.

Printed in Great Britain0305-750X/03/$ - see front matter

doi:10.1016/S0305-750X(02)00220-6www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

* This paper is based on joint work by Bird, K, Hulme,

D, Moore, K and Shepherd, A (see Butcher, 2002) for

the DFID funded (R7847 and R8005) Chronic Poverty

Research Centre. It also uses a dataset generated by

ITDG in 1998 for the DFID funded project ‘‘Economic

Reform and Smallholder Communal Agricultural De-

velopment in Zimbabwe’’ (see Chipika & Chisvo, 1997;

Chipika, Chisvo, & Chipika, 1999).

591

Chongsuvivatwong, Geater, Ulstein, & Bechtel,2000) makes access to services difficult andexpensive, inflates the food costs of net con-sumers 3 (Krings, 1993), reduces the likelihoodof producers engaging with national and in-ternational markets (Rayner, 1980) and re-duces organizational development (McCall,1985).Spatial poverty traps result from low en-

dowments of ‘‘geographic capital’’ (the natural,physical, social and human capital of an area),with one household�s poverty reinforcing an-other�s (Jalan & Ravallion, 1997; Ravallion &Wodon, 1999). High transactions costs, loweconomies of scale, low savings rates and levelsof effective demand, and thin imperfect marketscombine with the impact of low provision ofgovernment services and infrastructure to lowerlikely returns on investment. Thus the time andexpense invested in educating your childrenmay fail to generate expected returns as theyare undermined by poor health service deliveryand inactive local labor markets (Bird, Shep-herd, Scott, & Butaumocho, 2002b). Poor re-turns to investments in these areas may also bedue to adverse incorporation into the nationaland international political economy (Wood,2000) and historical incorporation into thestate. We believe the notion of geographiccapital usefully highlights the importance of thespatial patterning of disadvantage.The disadvantages of these areas are com-

pounded by outmigration which, though pro-viding remittances to some, leaves behindinsecure asset-depleted ‘‘residual’’ populations(Kothari, 2002). These populations face multi-ple disadvantages and experience high depen-dency ratios, stigma 4 (Bigman & Fofack, 2000,p. 135), low reserves of social capital andundermined social security systems.High levels of risk characterize many RRAs

(Bester, Belete, & Kelembe, 1998; Dercon,1999; Ellis, 2000; Kinsey, Burger, & Gunning,1998), and contribute to the difficulties ofemerging from poverty as well as the likelihoodof destitution. This is true for ill-health andinjury, natural disaster, harvest failure, terms-of-trade deterioration and reduced access towork (Sinha & Lipton, 1999). It may also betrue of violence and conflict (Goodhand, 2001).By definition, RRAs are the other side of thecoin: while major conurbations are located infavorable areas, RRAs are distant from these.Risk and responses to risk degrade assets, im-poverish the most vulnerable, and, where thedensity of poor and risk-prone households is

high, prevent neighboring households climbingout of poverty (Corcoran, 1995).Concepts of social and political exclusion

offer other perspectives on remoteness. Whileaccess to natural resources may be an issue onlyfor some in some RRAs, management ofcommon property resources commonly is aproblem 5 (Jodha, 1986; Ostrom, 1990; Pender& Hazell, 2001; Singh, 1994). Poor access toinformation, opportunities, social and politicalconnections and patronage may go a long wayto explain persistent poverty. Exclusion isstrongly linked to both state and market fail-ures (de Haan, 1999), and its sources include:physical isolation (Chambers, 1983), ethnicity,gender and religious discrimination, bureau-cratic barriers, institutionalized (tarmac) roadbias (Chambers, 1983), corruption, intimida-tion and physical violence, and the nature ofthe local and national political �eelite. But whileexclusion may be the cause of chronic povertyfor some, it is the form of their inclusion that isproblematic for others. Adverse incorporation(Wood, 2000) may be more likely in areasremote from dynamic social change wheremarkets are relatively uncompetitive and thedevelopment of an active civil society to chal-lenge historic power holders is slow.We hypothesize that RRAs are often insecure

and conflict-prone. Local or national �eelites canuse the disaffection stemming from exclusionand deprivation to mobilize disgruntled youth.RRAs are sometimes deliberately left with poorgovernance to enable �eelites to cash in on illegaland crossborder trading opportunities (Col-lier, 2000; Collier & Hoeffler, 2001; Goodhand,2001).Democratic party political competition seems

at first sight to have little to offer the poor ofRRAs. An exception to this is the greater em-phasis on the prevention of destitution indemocracies compared to nondemocratic re-gimes 6 (Moore & Putzel, 2000). Well-institu-tionalized democratic politics can bring benefitsto the poor as a whole (Moore & Putzel, 2000;Wickrama & Mulford, 1996) but dealing con-vincingly with the problems of the chronicallypoor in RRAs is expensive (Airey, 1985), diffi-cult (Narayan, 2000, pp. 6, 190) especially intight electoral timeframes, and depends onsignificant improvements to governance (Birdet al., 2002a). The chronically poor may there-fore be a less attractive constituent for institu-tional party politics. They are distant frompolitical decision-making and the cost of par-ticipation and their wide range of priorities and

WORLD DEVELOPMENT592

identities combine to hamper the developmentof an effective lobby. While democracy is likelyto facilitate the development of greater politicalcapabilities of poor people, an increase in socialsolidarity at national and local levels is neces-sary if political inclusion and democracy are tobenefit the marginalized in RRAs.This article argues that there has been a

widespread ‘‘policy failure’’ in RRAs. There aregood grounds for believing that contemporarydevelopment processes will ensure that suchconcentrations of human deprivation will per-sist and deepen in coming decades (de Haan &Lipton, 1998; IFAD, 2001; Jalan & Ravallion,1997; World Bank, 2000, p. 124). The focuson livelihoods development, 7 based on suc-cesses in nonremote areas has not taken ac-count of the special characteristics of risk,exclusion and marginalization in RRAs. At-tacking these causes of persistent povertywould involve a greater emphasis on humancapital and security, particularly the protectionof existing assets as well as whatever assets canbe acquired by poor households in the course ofdevelopment. 8 Livelihood diversification––anacknowledged key to poverty reduction (Ellis,1998)––would then become more of a possi-bility. Policy sequencing is therefore critical.The neoliberal policy discourse turned to

human capital development in the 1990s andthe World Development Report for 2000/1announced a renewed and welcome focus onsecurity, which is, however, yet to be mains-treamed and operationalized in poverty reduc-tion policies (World Bank, 2000).There is now ample evidence from many

poor countries for the persistence of poverty inRRAs. The Zimbabwe case study will illustratethat other factors, in this case the socioeco-nomic marginality derived from a regional andethnic identity, can be as powerful in generatingchronic poverty as remoteness. It may be evenbe more powerful in producing a large popu-lation of severely poor people.

(b) Scale of the problem

We do not know the exact numbers ofchronically poor people in remote rural areas.But a recent study by the CGIAR 9 found thatnearly two-thirds of the rural population ofdeveloping countries (almost 1.8 billion people)live in ‘‘less-favored areas’’ (Pender & Hazell,2001) which include marginal agricultural, for-est and woodland and arid areas, 10 and thatthe rural poor are highly concentrated in these

areas. While not all these areas are remote andnot all of the poor people living in them arechronically poor, these figures help to indi-cate the upper limit of the problem. Evidencefrom the Chronic Poverty Research Centre(CPRC) 11 presented in this volume shows thatRRAs do indeed contain a substantial pro-portion of the world�s chronically poor people.Recent work (Bird & Shepherd, 2002; Bird

et al., 2002b) shows chronic poverty to bewidespread in semi-arid Zimbabwe, and weestimate at least four million of Zimbabwe�s 12million 12 people are chronically poor. 13 Whilethe population and economy of Zimbabwehave suffered as a result of poor governance,the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the repercussions ofthe 1991–92 drought and other lesser droughts,and the knock-on effects of long-term down-turn in South Africa�s economy (see section onthe vulnerability context below), it is not alonein experiencing this mix of shocks. Manycountries in sub-Saharan Africa and SouthAsia face a similar mix of macro shocks whichprovide a forbidding environment for house-holds in poverty. We would therefore expect tosee similarly high proportions of chronicallypoor people in many countries in Africa, withperhaps higher numbers in postconflict and‘‘failed state’’ environments.

2. METHODOLOGY

We illustrate the key arguments in this paperwith case study material drawn from a studyanalyzing changes in well-being, coping andlivelihood strategies in semi-arid Zimbabweduring the 1990s (Bird & Shepherd, 2002; Birdet al., 2002b). This work was based on reanal-ysis of a dataset constructed by ITDG in 1998in order to assess the impact of structural ad-justment on communal smallholder farming inZimbabwe (see Note 1).

(a) Communal areas

Land and agricultural policies during thecolonial period resulted in the majority of therural black populations being concentrated in‘‘communal areas,’’ where land is held by thestate and allocated by traditional leaders ac-cording to customary law. These communalareas, which make up 42% of Zimbabwe�s landarea, are generally in natural regions IV andV, 14 and are inadequate for intensive cropproduction. Nevertheless, they are home for

CHRONIC POVERTY IN SEMI-ARID ZIMBABWE 593

two-thirds of Zimbabwe�s population. As a re-sult the land has been divided into small land-holdings where people attempt to generate alivelihood. Some land redistribution was at-tempted in the early 1980s, which recent studies(e.g., Hoogeveen & Kinsey, 2001) have foundto be more effective than previously thought.Current land reform processes are highly con-troversial, with land reallocation not appearingto follow systematic procedures and the de-struction of the commercial farming sectorbeing partially blamed for the current foodsecurity crisis in Zimbabwe.

(b) The dataset

The sample for the ITDG dataset was drawnfrom four districts selected purposively on thebasis of agro-ecological conditions, to ensurethat the areas selected were representative ofeach of the ‘‘natural regions’’ found in Zim-babwe�s communal areas; enterprise mix; pres-ence of nongovernment organization (NGO)projects in the study area, partly to providebaseline data on the study area (Figure 1); therange of infrastructural development; and theethnic background of the residents.A ward in each district was then selected on

the basis of similar: proximity to markets; 15

access to basic socioeconomic infrastructure;agricultural production and marketing activi-ties; and interaction between farmers andpublic and private service providers (includingagricultural extension, input suppliers andoutput marketing agents). Nearly 800 house-holds (798) were randomly selected from asampling frame listing all farm households inthe selected wards (199 households, GulatiWard, Matopo; 197 households, Ward 8, Gutu;198 households, Ward 10, Chivi; and 204households, Souguru Ward, Guruve). ITDGundertook the survey 16 and PRA exercises 17

in 1998 in the same wards to allow for crossreferencing (see Chipika et al. (1999) andChipika & Shumba (1999) for further infor-mation on methodological approaches).The authors reanalyzed the dataset, focusing

on the 594 households in the sample from thethree semi-arid districts (Chivi, Gutu and Ma-topo). Guruve was excluded as it falls outsidethe semi-arid zone. We also undertook addi-tional qualitative field work in Chivi and Gutuin mid-2000 to capture thematic issues notcovered by either the survey or original PRA.One of the three districts, Matopo, is signif-

icantly less remote than the other two. It is 35km away from Bulawayo, Zimbabwe�s secondcity, and is well connected with markets. Chivi

Figure 1. Location of study sites.

WORLD DEVELOPMENT594

and Gutu are both fairly remote (>100 kmfrom a major town or city), and the study areaswere distant from all-weather roads.

(c) Poverty categories

We divided sample households into threecategories using key Zimbabwean nationalpoverty lines.In order to arrive at these categories we

divided households from the three semi-aridareas into income groups 1–5 in four stages:(i) Adult equivalent units per household (in-dividuals over 15 ¼ 1, those under 15 ¼ 0:5)were noted.(ii) Grand Total Household Income was cal-culated (total wage income; total remittanceincome) cash and kind; other nonfarm in-come; total income from livestock sales; totalincome from sold agricultural output; totalvalue of retained output). Note: this includesa value for ‘‘retained output,’’ i.e., consump-tion of home produce, which was very im-portant for the poor and even more so forthe severely poor.(iii) Grand Total Household Income was di-vided by the adult equivalent units in thehousehold.(iv) Households were placed in five incomegroups and three categories:

––the severely poor: income group 1(Z$0–500 p.a.) and income group 2(Z$501–1,180 p.a.) (below the 2000RuralFood Poverty line (FPL) of Z$1180.49per capita, which was less than two-thirds of the Total Consumption PovertyLine (TCPL) Z$1924.20 per capita);––the poor: income group 3 (Z$1,181–Z$1,925 p.a.) (below the TCPL butabove the FPL); and––the nonpoor: income group 4(Z$1,925–5,000 p.a.) and income group5 (Z$5,001þp.a.) (above the TCPL).

We retained the five groups for analysis, butfor ease of presentation use only the three cat-egories: the nonpoor, the poor and the severelypoor.

(d) Chronic poverty: interpreting the‘‘recovery index’’

While the 1998 survey and qualitative re-search in 1997–98 and 2000 do not provide time-series data, we have explored the relationshipbetween the severity and duration of povertyusing a ‘‘recovery index.’’ The dataset contains

detailed information on people�s perceptions ofchange in a number of relevant dimensions overthe five years prior to the date of the survey(1998). These were used to create a ‘‘recoveryindex,’’ measuring the degree of perceived im-provement or decline over 1993–98. It was la-beled a ‘‘recovery’’ index as it sought to measurehouseholds� bounce back after the widespreadimpoverishment associated with the 1991drought (see, e.g., Cavendish, 1999; Corbett,1994; Scoones et al., 1996). The index was sim-ply calculated based on responses to eightquestions about change in food security relatedvariables, 18 positive answers to which wouldbroadly indicate a degree of recovery. A positiveresponse on each question scored 1, no changescored 0, and a negative response )1. The scoreswere then aggregated (but not weighted) foreach household. The minimum possible was )8and the maximum þ8. 19The recovery index gives us a subjective as-

sessment of change in assets, which we can as-sociate with income groups and other correlatesto arrive at an analysis of chronic poverty.Hulme and Shepherd (in this issue) argued thatasset change gives a better picture of chronicpoverty than income or consumption change:this is a first (and methodologically simple)attempt to use asset change in this way.

3. VULNERABILITY CONTEXT

(a) Structural adjustment

The story of Zimbabwe�s economic perfor-mance is one of decline. At independence in1980 Zimbabwe appeared to have strong eco-nomic potential. There were, however, lowlevels of entrepreneurial activity and economicdiversification in rural areas and this may havecombined with structural distortions in theeconomy to prevent sufficient economic growthto keep pace with government spending. GNPper capita was erratic and, during a period ofincome stability, inflation rose from 7.3%(1980) to 58.5% (1999). This was fuelled by thehigh budget deficit, which ran at double figuresfrom the late 1980s. The Zimbabwean dollarplunged in value during the same period. 20

Structural adjustment became inevitable (Chip-ika et al., 1999).As liberalization and adjustment measures

were introduced the real price of fertilizerquadrupled during 1990–93 and maize pricesduring 1990–91. Many lost their formal sector

CHRONIC POVERTY IN SEMI-ARID ZIMBABWE 595

jobs. Remittances declined and many retren-chees were forced to return to their ‘‘ruralhomes.’’ But the impacts of devaluation werenot all negative; for instance, growth and em-ployment opportunities were stimulated insome export sectors, including commercialagriculture (Chipika et al., 1999).Zimbabwe is now facing economic deterio-

ration as a result of continued governmentdeficits, unscheduled payments to war veterans,the cost of military involvement in the Demo-cratic Republic of Congo and the impact ofrecent land reform processes.

(b) Droughts

The 1991–92 drought was the worst experi-enced in Zimbabwe during the 20th century,and struck just as structural adjustment wasbeginning to bite. Most areas produced nocrops and livestock populations were wipedout.Zimbabwe defines years with rainfall 100 mm

or more below the recent 30-year average forthe area as drought years (Table 1). 21

The rain failure prevalent in the 1980s and1990s was reversed in 1999–2000 when the El

Ni~nno brought Cyclone Eline and devastatingfloods to the region. This series of shocks wipedout savings and productive assets, increasedpeoples� vulnerability and reduced their pro-ductivity. The current food security crisis in theregion is having a profound effect, particularlyon those made vulnerable by previous losses.

4. GOVERNANCE CONTEXT: POLICIES,INSTITUTIONS, PROCESSES

Government spending is influenced by anarea�s political marginality, the electoral mile-age it provides, ethnic and religious politics,and whether policy-makers perceive that in-vestments in high potential areas will generategreater benefits (Bigman & Fofack, 2000,p. 135). In this section we assess the influencethat governance has had on the study areas.

(a) Market development

Subsidy and price control were removed onmaize and maize meal in 1993. By 1994–95government had liberalized most agriculturalproduce markets, although the Grain Market-ing Board (GMB) has retained a monopoly inimport and export of maize (Chipika et al.,1999). Liberalization has encouraged some todiversify into new crops, e.g., paprika, butothers have been driven further into subsistenceproduction and the barter economy by the re-moval of input subsidies and pan territorialpricing.

(b) Governance and politics

Ethnicity and historical political loyalties andrelationships with the state provides an im-portant contrast between the three semi-aridsites in this study. Matopo in Matabeleland hashad harsher experiences in the post indepen-dence era than either Chivi or Gutu (both inMasvingo).In the early 1980s, return to civilian life was

difficult for some in the aftermath of the liber-ation war. There were several assassination at-tempts on Robert Mugabe, and outbreaks ofviolence near guerrilla assembly points aroundthe country (CCJPZ, 1997), and ‘‘war veterans’’have been sporadically involved on both sidesof the ethno-political divide ever since.The Shona–Ndebele divide has domi-

nated postindependence politics in Zimbabwe(Butcher, 2002) and in the early 1980s the

Table 1. Zimbabwe�s drought years

Planting/harvest

year

Percentage deviation

from mean

Severity

1981–82 )21.6 PP1982–83 )74.6 PPP1983–84 )30.1 PPP1985–86 )19.6 PP1988–89 )10.1 P1990–91 )31.0 PPP1991–92 )72.6 PPPP1994–95 n/a P1995–96 n/a PP1996–97 n/a

1997–98 n/a PPP1998–99 n/a P1999–2000 n/a

2000–01 n/a P2001–02a n/a PPPP

Source: 1981–82 to 1995–96 (excluding 1994–95): Sco-

ones (1996, p. 165); 1994–95 and 1996–97 to 2001–02:

Blessing Butaumocho, personal correspondence.a The 2001–02 drought is ranked fifth in terms ofdrought severity, using national annual cumulativerainfall records: 1991–92; 1946–47; 1972–73; 1921–22;and 2001–02. Drought years are defined as those yearswith rainfall amounts 100 mm or more below the recent30-year average for the area.

WORLD DEVELOPMENT596

partnership between (Shona) Robert Mugabeof ZANU and his vice-president (Ndebele)Joshua Nkomo (ZAPU) crumbled. The(ZANU) government became involved in twooverlapping conflicts in Matabeleland, againstguerrillas and against unarmed civilian ZAPUsupporters. Both sets of opponents were treatedalike 22 (CCJPZ, 1997) in one of the most vio-lent ethnic struggles in recent African history(Butcher, 2002). Nkomo fled to Botswana(BBC, 2000) but returned in 1987 to sign apeace accord. The Ndebele have not, however,forgiven Mugabe and ZANU-PF for the up to20,000 deaths and disappearances of this period(Butcher, 2002). In the 2002 general electionsZANU-PF won just two of the 23 seats in theprovince, with the rest going to the oppositionMovement for Democratic Change (BBC,2000).So, as we have shown elsewhere, Matopo in

Matabeleland is the least remote, but in 1998 itwas recovering not only from drought but alsofrom the counterinsurgency and its aftermath,and although 20 years have passed, the Ndebelestill form the largest ethno-geographic locus ofopposition.

5. CONCENTRATIONS OF THESEVERELY POOR IN SEMI-ARID

ZIMBABWE

In this section we explore some of the di-mensions of poverty in semi-arid Zimbabweand the relationship between income and lo-cation, asset holding, social capital, livelihoodactivities, migration, household size and edu-cation.In Zimbabwe three quarters of the rural

population was poor in 1995, 23 and severepoverty 24 was increasing, growing from 17% to37% during the 1990s in rural areas. Povertywas widespread in the three semi-arid districtsexamined in our study. Over 80% of sample

households were poor, nearly three-quarterswere extremely poor, and only 16% were non-poor (see Table 2). Mean per capita incomes ineach of the three districts were below the foodpoverty line (means: Gutu Z$1,343; Chivi,Z$1,353; and Matopo, Z$1,011). Income me-dians showed nonremote Matopo to be thepoorest of the three districts, despite its prox-imity to Bulawayo, and remote Gutu therichest, but there was substantial incomedifferentiation in all three areas, and the meanfigures masked the depth of poverty experi-enced by many households. On average, thepoorest households were more than 20 timespoorer than the least poor.The hypothesis is that such a large group of

severely poor people will almost inevitably bechronically poor. This is because they do nothave and cannot acquire through ‘‘normalchannels’’ the assets which can enable saving,accumulation and the human developmentwhich is possible with a degree of security.Opportunities to change this situation are likelyto have to be externally generated: the sur-rounding population provides little by wayof employment or market opportunities. Thedata available do not allow detailed objectiveincome or asset change measurement overtime; 25 however, the ‘‘recovery index’’ reflectshousehold�s perceived change in well-being (seeSections 2 and 7).Severe poverty was associated with signifi-

cantly lower levels and less common ownershipof a number of critical productive assets––oxen(key for agricultural field operations), scotchcarts (key for market and common propertyresource access) and even wheelbarrows (fortransporting goods, and even people, over longdistances by those without scotch carts). Onlypoultry ownership was widespread and notstrongly associated with income. Land––theresource most abundantly available to poorhouseholds––was frequently left uncultivatedbecause of deficits in terms of physical (oxen, in

Table 2. Breakdown of sample households by poverty levels

District No. of sample hhs Severely poora Poorb Nonpoor Mean

(%) Mean income Z$ (%) Mean income Z$ (%) Mean income Z$

Matopo 198 70.7 2,623 15.2 8,091 14.1 22,354 6,242

Chivi 199 66.3 3,135 15.6 7,960 18.1 18,454 6,658

Gutu 196 67.9 3,028 15.8 6,205 16.3 19,142 6,161

a Below the ‘‘food poverty line.’’b Below the ‘‘total consumption poverty line,’’ but above the ‘‘food poverty line.’’

CHRONIC POVERTY IN SEMI-ARID ZIMBABWE 597

particular), financial (cash) or social capital toaccess labor.Severe poverty was also associated with

larger families with greater numbers of chil-dren. The statistical mode for the severely poorwas three children; two for the poor; and onefor the nonpoor. Given the severely poorhouseholds� greater dependence on subsistenceand labor intensive agriculture, and the absenceof effective public safety nets to protect assets,large family size makes sense. Very few house-holds relied on the labor market to solve laborshortage problems. Enabling children to livelong enough to be healthy productive adultswas clearly critical to household well-being. Butretaining household size was a struggle, espe-cially for the poorest.What is remarkable is that households in all

three districts experienced a significant net lossof adults through migration or marriage as wellas death during the five years prior to 1998; ifanything, this loss was most pronouncedamong the very poor. Table 3 shows that whilebirths exceeded deaths, as would be expected,the average net loss of adults during the five-year period was around one per household.This inability to retain adults could be a func-tion of a high death rate; or positive sign ofrecognition that smaller households have faredbetter; or it could be a desperate exporting ofadult labor; or a combination of these things.This process is likely to have been consider-

ably exacerbated with the higher prevalence ofHIV/AIDS since the survey. Given the criticalnature of household size and the availability ofadult labor especially for the production ofretained agricultural output and the impor-tance of this for well-being, especially of thepoor, one could predict further (and dramatic)declines in well-being across the board after1998.Given the increased prevalence of HIV es-

pecially among teenagers where girls are up to

six times more likely to be HIV positive thanboys, the availability of adult labor is likely tohave become an even bigger constraint formany households since the survey was carriedout in 1998. 26

Education enabled households to engage inthe formal wage labor market and also enabledsome diversification from subsistence agricul-tural production. This meant that householdsheaded 27 by individuals with primary level ed-ucation or less were much more likely to befound among the severely poor, while the richesthouseholds were much more likely to be headedby individuals with ‘‘senior secondary’’ or col-lege-level education. There was a statisticallysignificant relationship between households witha wage component to their income and the levelof education of the household head. Regularwages were strongly associated with prosperity.In addition, more educated households appearto have had more assets. This is indicated bythese households gaining a greater share of theirincome from lending out implements.Education had facilitated diversification:

households with educated heads were less reli-ant on subsistence agricultural production, andwere more likely to contain wage earners. Loweducation was linked with being dependent ontransfers from the extended family. Remit-tance-dependent households tended to haveheads with low levels of education (none/pri-mary), and the more educated the householdhead the less significant the contribution madeby remittances. 28 But the level of income de-rived from remittances was low for thosehouseholds with low levels of education,suggesting a strong association between loweducation levels, dependence on limited remit-tances and severe poverty. Women-headedhouseholds were also likely to be in this group,as women heads of household were generallypoorly educated. The strength of these associ-ations needs to be further investigated.

Table 3. Deaths and loss of adults by poverty grouping (1993–98)

Poverty groupings Severely poor Poor Non-poor Total

IG 1 IG 2 IG 3 IG 4 IG 5

Average number of deaths in households

experiencing death

1.5 1.4 1 1.2 1 1.3

Average number of deaths in all hhs 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4

Average net loss of adults per householda 1.3 0.9 0.7 1.2 1.1 1

Source: Bird et al. (2002b, p. 109, Table 7.4).a This includes loss through death or migration.

WORLD DEVELOPMENT598

There was a significant link between the leveland frequency of remittances, the level of skillof the remitter and education. The educationand skills of household members thus contrib-uted significantly to household social capital.The proportion of households which had a re-mitter sending home amounts from whichsavings and investments could be made wassmall in all three areas, and severely poorhouseholds received particularly small amounts.This constrained even casual employment gen-eration, as financing wages for hired labor wasvery difficult or impossible for most house-holds.

6. ASSET BASE: THE OVERALL‘‘GEOGRAPHIC’’ CAPITAL OF EACH

AREA

The three districts share many of the char-acteristics of ‘‘spatial poverty traps’’ (Bird et al.,2002a, p. 25) with low ‘‘geographic capital.’’ Inthis section we comment on the three districts�geographical capital during 1992–98 and assessthe ways in which this affected the population�sability to exit poverty. We have investigated thefollowing components of geographic capital:natural capital; political capital; social capital;human capital and their consequences for theeconomic environment. 29

(a) Natural capital 30

The three semi-arid districts in this studysuffer from low and erratic rainfall with per-sistent droughts and frequent mid-season dryspells. 31

Acute environmental degradation is occur-ring in all three areas and the natural forests,common grazing and game animal populationshave become fragile throughover exploitation(ITDG, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c). Overgrazingon common land is heightened by encroach-ment for cultivation, mining, the constructionof homes and fencing for private paddocks.Deforestation has led to shortages of firewoodand thatch grass which are so severe that sacredtrees and fruit trees are now used for firewoodand to fire brick kilns. Overharvesting of mu-pane worms 32 (mostly for sale) has led toscarcity, negatively affecting households de-pending on them as a food source. Soil fertilityin the three study areas is low and declining 33

and the removal of forest cover has deepenedsoil erosion, to the extent that rivers and dams

in Gutu were reported to have silted and dried.In addition, a profound shortage of draftpower and severe land pressure had led somehouseholds to subdivide or sell their land, andled others to leave up to half their land fallow(ITDG, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).Remote Chivi is the driest of the three study

regions. Remote Gutu is less dry but has arugged terrain, and in nonremote Matopo onlya small proportion of the land is cultivable(73% is designated natural forest and the re-maining land is fragmented by mountainousterrain). Population densities are lower innonremote Matopo (12/km2 compared with 45in Chivi and 28 in Gutu) with its tradition oflivestock herding, contrasting with the cropgrowing in Chivi and Gutu. But with an aver-age herd size of four animals (in 1998) few inMatopo are now able to depend on livestockfor their livelihood (Chipika et al., 1999;Chipika & Shumba, 1999).

(b) Political capital and governance

Spatial patterns of poverty and well-beingare partially determined by differences in gov-ernment spending, particularly on infrastruc-ture and services (Bird et al., 2002a, p. 26). Weargued above that the chronically poor inRRAs have a limited ability to influence suchexpenditure decisions. The extent to whichsemi-arid areas in Zimbabwe do indeed sufferfrom low levels of political capital is exploredbelow by using the delivery of agricultural ex-tension services and the distribution of theGovernment Grain Loan (GGL) in the studyareas as proxies for more general governmentservice provision.

(i) Government services: agricultural extensionThe supply of agricultural extension was

good in all three districts measured by input(numbers of staff) or output indicators (peopletrained). It was especially good in nonremoteMatopo. However good the extension servicewas, outcomes were poor. There was relativelylow and declining use of hybrid seed and otherpurchased inputs, except for maize and themajority of households produced primarily forhome consumption (ITDG, 1998a, 1998b,1998c, and own analysis). But disengagementfrom markets was not a result of absence ofinformation or a willingness to innovate butdue to other constraints.

CHRONIC POVERTY IN SEMI-ARID ZIMBABWE 599

(ii) Government services: social protectionThe numbers of severely poor people in semi-

arid Zimbabwe mean that even during a normalyear many people are below the food povertyline, and are not able to consume enough pro-tein or calories to sustain health. Where shocks(affecting individuals or whole areas) diminishlevels of consumption still further it is clear thatbasic social protection is necessary.Formal social protection mechanisms rarely

extend to RRAs, however, we have found thatsome programs were delivered to the study re-gions of Chivi, Gutu and Matopo. These in-cluded food for work programs during the1991–92 drought, government grain loans,pensions for widows and the disabled, a tillageservice and health fee exemptions. But by 1998tightened budgets had apparently led govern-ment support to widows and the disabled (re-garded locally as the poorest) to decline, andthe ‘‘tillage service,’’ which benefited the poor-est 34 had been discontinued. In addition, whilehealth fee exemptions were available for thepoorest, red-tape 35 meant that few of the tar-get group benefited (ITDG, 1998a, 1998b,1998c).In 1998 many poor households in our study

areas received GGLs (an average of 52%among the poor, compared with 29% amongthe nonpoor). Low repayment rates across in-come groups and districts indicate that themajority of households viewed these schemes astransfers rather than loans. Distribution wasnot even across districts, reaching only one-third of households in Matopo compared withtwo-thirds in Gutu and Chivi.Matopo�s proximity to markets appeared to

strengthen people�s ability to withstand shocksand bounce back from the 1991–92 droughtbetter than in either of the other two districts.But the nonuniform distribution of formalsafety nets (e.g., GGL) indicates that the ad-vantages of proximity to markets was possiblycounteracted by political exclusion.

(c) Social capital

The proxies for social capital in the datasetdid not indicate a strong relationship withincome distribution. They may also poorlyrepresent the critical networks and inter-connections found in the real world of socialcapital. They included membership of formalgroups, 36 traditional societies, and informalborrowing and lending relationships and soprovide us with useful information on a num-

ber of facets of social interaction. But theymissed vital functions (more likely amonghigher income households) such as those pro-vided by urban-dwelling extended familymembers, who provide remittances and a basefor trading activities and for looking for urbanemployment.Good linkages with neighbors were crucial to

poor households� survival chances. Formal so-cial protection is patchy in coverage, sohouseholds need richer relatives and commu-nity members willing to support them in time ofneed. Improved access to technical informa-tion, credit, inputs and markets are mediatedby Farmers� Groups and Women�s Clubs.Relations with kin as social capital were

measured in the survey by borrowing in kind orcash. Households with high levels of socialcapital were more able to diversify their liveli-hood activities and gain higher returns fromexisting activities. Without social networks theywould have been less able to cope with short-ages of labor and livestock. In a cash-pooreconomy, where barter is the main form ofexchange, having a good network takes on ahigh level of significance. Households short ofagricultural labor, ploughs, oxen, scotch cartsor cash for seasonal inputs needed to be able toborrow. Many households in the study areasborrowed livestock (50% of the severely poor;35% of the nonpoor) and the majority of them(60%) borrowed from kin, representing an im-portant form of social capital. When short ofhousehold labor, poor households could rarelyafford to hire it. They either had to borrowlabor, or remain short, and we found that so-cial capital was related to income. Very poorhouseholds, without surplus grain for brewingbeer or goats to slaughter and feed labor par-ties, were excluded from these arrangements.So too were those who substantially dependedon casual labor as they could ill-afford to workfor free, when paid work was on offer. Farmers�groups, women�s groups, traditional societies,ceremonial events and work parties all tookplace on traditional rest days, and those toopoor to take an unpaid day off were thereforeunable to join in these events––thus looseningtheir bonds with their community. These pat-terns were uniform between the three studysites.The social capital available to poor house-

holds in these three semi-arid areas was largelyin the form of links with other poor house-holds. These enabled survival, but not progress,and it was notable that the wealthiest house-

WORLD DEVELOPMENT600

holds had opted out of lending systems––per-haps as a strategy to protect their accumulatingassets.By contrast, social capital as measured by

membership of clubs, associations and groups,varied significantly by area. The remote areashad higher membership levels. Even the se-verely poor in remote Gutu and Chivi had highlevels of membership. Here, we may be wit-nessing the effect of the social and politicalexclusion experienced by Matopo households,while Gutu and Chivi households were betterintegrated in the mainstream of developmentalinstitutional life.

(d) Human capital

The impact of differences in human capital bywealth group has been commented on above.Here we focus on spatial differences. Our find-ings were that the more dynamic nonremoteeconomy in Matopo generated a higher de-mand for labor which could not be satisfied,despite larger and fewer women-headed house-holds; and that nonremote Matopo had littleadvantage in terms of education. This is sig-nificant as education would have enabledgreater access to better employment and self-employment in the local and the urban non-farm economy, and thus diversification of thehousehold economy, and higher returns tolabor. 37 Educational levels were, however,similar in all three districts: nonremotenessconferred no advantage.

(e) The economic implications of differencesin geographical capital

The health of an area�s economy is partly anoutcome of its geographical capital. In thesection above, we have shown that the geo-graphical capital of semi-arid Zimbabwe is low.Economic performance in the study areas

was worsening in 1998. Unemployment was onthe rise, barter trade increasing, and liberal-ization had damaged the poor. But retrencheesreturning to the communal areas had stimu-lated construction, with positive impacts for theconstruction sector but with negative impactsfor the environment (overexploitation of clayfor bricks and wood for brick kilns and con-struction). Remittance flows had declined dueto unemployment and increased urban livingcosts. Increased transport costs had led mi-grants to return with money less often, and fewfinancial institutions in remote areas meant that

personal delivery was the only way to providesuch transfers. Youths were dropping out ofschool due to the increase in school fees. Costsof artisanal goods and agricultural inputs hadrisen beyond the reach of many. Markets hadnot developed well following the removal of theGMB (Grain Marketing Board) monopoly andfarmers had taken time to adjust to the disap-pearance of a guaranteed purchaser. Althoughmarketing channels had proliferated, farmersfound themselves selling at distress prices. Theincreased cost of borrowing from Cottco andAFC reduced investment in new farm equip-ment in Chivi. In Gutu structural adjustmentand market liberalization had had a positiveimpact on small-scale manufacture (often mic-roenterprises run by retrenchees from cities andcommercial farms) as local consumers soughtalternatives to expensive imports and ‘‘urban’’manufactured goods and had grown, stimu-lated by demand. In nonremote Matopo, theproximity of Bulawayo coupled with liberal-ization encouraged farmers to produce cropsfor market, rather than maize for home con-sumption. This, combined with erratic rainfalland shortages of affordable inputs meant thatpoor ‘‘net consuming’’ households had diffi-culty ensuring household food security (Chip-ika et al., 1999; ITDG, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c).Dam construction in Matopo from the early

1980s had stimulated vegetable production, butby 1998 local markets were saturated, andwomen were traveling to Bulawayo to sellproduce to wholesalers (Chipika et al., 1999).There were examples of market interlocking(Dorward, 1998) with postliberalization marketintermediaries paying for the transport andpackaging of goods. There were more new en-terprises in Matopo than in the two remoteareas in this study, and there were more in-vestors from outside the area, suggesting thatthere were higher returns to investment (asshown in Bigman & Fofack, 2000).

7. LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES OF THEPOOR

Nonfarm and wage income were importantincome sources for a large proportion ofhouseholds, and remittances for some, but themain economic activities pursued by severelypoor households differed substantially fromthose pursued by the nonpoor, as did theirmajor sources of income (see Figure 2). Broadlyspeaking, poor and severely poor households

CHRONIC POVERTY IN SEMI-ARID ZIMBABWE 601

were much more likely to be solely engaged infarming or in a mix of NR-based enterprises, orin activities with low social status (casual la-bor), a high degree of drudgery (beer brewing,construction) or with low entry barriers andreturns to labor (‘‘services’’). They were moredependent on retained agricultural output andwere generally less likely to be strongly engagedin markets, with the exception of those inMatopo where markets worked better. Higherincome households typically received morewage and remittance income. Average percapita income, presented by poverty category

and livelihood portfolios is given below, inFigure 3.For the livelihood portfolios where signifi-

cant numbers of severely poor households wereconcentrated, the following general commentcan be made: there was a considerable range ofincomes derivable from most livelihood port-folios, suggesting that no particular livelihoodstrategies were intrinsically any better than anyothers. Figure 2 above tells us, however, thatonly some of these portfolios were commonlyaccessible to poor households. Of those whichwere, the only clearly promising routes out of

Figure 2.Main hh livelihoods, by poverty grouping, 1998. Ninety-two households in the sample (of 594) claimed to haveno income earning occupations (11 households in Gutu, 23 in Chivi and 58 [29.3% of sample households] in Matopo).These appear in Figure 1 as shown. These respondents often gave inconsistent responses, and despite claiming to have nosource of income in fact had various sources. When all sources of income (including retained output) are aggregated toproduce grant total household income (not divided by adult equivalence to produce per capita incomes) we find that thesehouseholds obtain a significant range in income. Although none of these households contained individuals earnings wageincome, they all obtained some nonfarm income. Twenty-eight households received remittances, five obtained incomefrom livestock sales, 29 sold agricultural output (23 of these in Matopo), 91 out of 92 retained agricultural output for

home consumption although the value of this ranged from Z$71/annum to Z$5,292/annum.

Figure 3. Mean annual hh income (Z$), by livelihood portfolio and poverty grouping (1998).

WORLD DEVELOPMENT602

extreme poverty were: adding enterprises to afarm, or diversifying into nonfarm or wageemployment. Adding a poultry or garden en-terprise to a farm made a big difference forthe poorest households. This was especiallythe case for women-headed households, whotended to be poorer and crowded into low-income, high-drudgery occupations, but inthese (largely NR-related) activities 38 actuallygained higher incomes (Figure 4) and had moreassets than male-headed households. This sug-gests that a wider range of livelihood optionswere open to men, allowing male-headedhouseholds to make use of their greater socialand human capital to generate better returns innon-natural resource based activities. Women-headed households, on the other hand, tendedto be crowded into a narrower range of activi-ties, but those with the asset base (includinghuman capital and entrepreneurial skills) toenable them to succeed would invest morestrongly than men in the productive assets tomake it possible for them to generate improvedreturns.

8. POVERTY AND MOBILITY INSEMI-ARID ZIMBABWE: IMPLICATIONS

FOR THE LINKS BETWEENREMOTENESS AND CHRONIC POVERTY

People in regions with no comparative ad-vantage may find that their main source ofimproved livelihood and well-being is outmi-gration (Kothari, 2002). But regions with lim-ited advantages to exploit may also benefitfrom their proximity to other sources of growthand opportunity, provided they have the ab-sorptive capacity to do so. Areas in the Zim-babwe study did not appear to have foundremunerative comparative advantages to ex-

ploit, which reflects the experiences of manyremote and semi-arid areas. But the state hadinvested in dams and irrigation in Matopo tosupport vegetable production for Bulawayomarkets, in typical near-urban fashion.Overall, the 1990s saw most households

struggling to improve their situation. Formany, life got worse. The mean ‘‘recoveryindex’’ figure was )3.98, and the median )5.Only 14% of the scores were positive values. 40%of households scored )6 or less. This suggeststhat less than less than one-fifth of the sample‘‘recovered’’ during the period of study followingthe devastating 1991–92 drought. 39 Almosthalf the households in nonremote Matopo feltthat life had improved over 1992–98 (despitebeing poorer than households in the two otherstudy areas) while only 5% in remote Gutu andChivi had seen a positive change. A substantialproportion (37%) of nonpoor households hadexperienced increased well-being. Converselyhigher proportions (half or more) of the se-verely poor and poor had very highly negativescores ()5 to )8). These figures indicate thattheir lives had got worse, and show the preva-lence of chronic poverty in the study areas, al-beit using a qualitative measure of well-being.Analysis of the recovery index showed that

strong failure to recover was associated withzero education of the household head, low-income (the poor had significantly fewernegative scores than the severely poor) andwomen-headed households.In terms of recovery, women-headed house-

holds were less likely to have positive scores(9% compared to 20% for male-headed) andmore likely to have highly negative scores (74%compared to 60%). This gender difference wasconfirmed by the results for changes in stan-dard of living, suggesting that women-headedhouseholds (one-quarter of the sample) had

Figure 4. Mean income of male- and female-headed hhs (by livelihood portfolio).

CHRONIC POVERTY IN SEMI-ARID ZIMBABWE 603

experienced significantly less recovery thanthe male-headed households. Women-headedhouseholds had to borrow more frequently:over one-quarter reported borrowing morelivestock, twice the proportion among men-headed households.Despite all the ‘‘strategizing’’ of livelihood

options which appeared to go on, it should beremembered that three-quarters of the samplereported being worse off in 1998 compared to1993. The livelihood portfolios which were bestat generating recovery were: waged, mixed(farm/NR and nonfarm), and nonfarm. Overallthere was a substantial movement into mixedand nonfarm livelihoods. Figure 5 shows thenumbers of households moving to these port-folios from their 1993 starting point.For the severely poor, who were highly de-

pendent on self-provisioning agriculture, thebest strategies were: adding a poultry ‘‘enter-prise’’ to the farm; combining wage employ-ment with farming; or combining a serviceactivity with farming (but this was rarely opento the most severely poor).For those immediately below and above the

poverty line, getting into trade 40 was a veryuseful adjunct to agriculture. This shift wasagain assisted by education. Only 4% ofhousehold heads in the ‘‘mixed’’ and 2% in thewage, and 8% in the nonfarm livelihood cate-gories did not have any education, compared to11% for NR-based livelihoods, and 40% in the‘‘remittances þ/or casual’’ category. Just overone-fifth of the nonfarm and mixed categorieshad secondary education (21% and 22%),compared to 9% for NR-based and casual/re-mittances. Households who felt that they wererecovering were better educated, but educationwas no guarantee. Seventy-five out of the 84households with heads educated to secondary

level did not produce positive ‘‘recovery index’’scores. With shrinking formal sector employ-ment, a declining macroeconomy and worsen-ing rural–urban terms of trade an education didnot necessarily generate the hoped for returns.There were also a few signs of improvement

among those who were really struggling in1993. The single most striking change in liveli-hood portfolios is the reduction in householdswith casual labor or remittances as their mainsource of income. There were 147 households inthis category in 1993; and only 13 in 1998 (seeFigure 6). These households had moved to avariety of livelihoods––predominantly naturalresource-based, and mixed farm and nonfarm,and even some to nonfarm and wage employ-ment. This reflects how uncomfortable it was tobe dependent on others or to be in low-status,low-return casual work.Even women-headed households managed to

escape the trap of depending solely on casuallabor or remittances for cash income. But theyfound entry into nonfarm based livelihoodsmore difficult than male-headed households.Diversifying into nonfarm income sources or

wage earning was another promising strategy.The severely poor, however, found difficultydiversifying into higher return, lower drudgerynonfarm enterprises due to skills and capitalshortages, and into better paying wage workfor the same reason, and because they did nothave the social capital––in this case, relatives intown to broker entry to the labor market. Theirprospects, under existing circumstances wereclearly limited. It seems that a radical approachis needed to resolve their constraints, as tech-nological research is unlikely to uncover solu-tions.Reliance on casual labor, subsistence agri-

culture and remittances from unskilled house-

Figure 5. The shift into nonfarm and mixed livelihood portfolios during 1993–98.

WORLD DEVELOPMENT604

hold members were strategies of desperationoffering few prospects of escape.

9. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Liberalization combined with modest in-vestment in irrigation infrastructure appears tohave helped the nonremote area (Matopo) re-duce poverty albeit from a high initial level.The low level of well-being, and the extremelyhigh concentration of very poor householdsin Matopo, however, reflects the historicaldiscrimination and political exclusion of themajority ethnic group in the region. Neitherliberalization nor proximity to Bulawayo hasbeen able to transform the opportunity struc-ture in Matopo, especially for local people,though there was some evidence that new en-terprises run mostly by nonlocals were devel-oping more rapidly than in the other districts.Thus the experience of Matopo indicates thatpersistent concentration of severe rural povertymay not be only linked with the degree ofphysical remoteness of a region or area but toa history of political discrimination. Never-theless, Matopo�s proximity to Bulawayo inparticular did provide poor people withopportunities which were missing in the tworemote districts. Given the direction of recentnational politics it is unlikely that this positivedynamic will have been maintained.The analysis presented above leads to some

fairly dramatic conclusions. The combinationof the natural, physical and institutional disad-vantages characterizing Zimbabwe�s semi-ariddistricts with the fact that a large proportion oftheir population has been severely and persis-tently poor is enough to suggest that poverty inthese districts will not be substantially reduced

under the existing policy regime. It is highlyunlikely that even a significant and sustainedeconomic growth rate will do much at least forthe severely poor––70% of the population ofGutu and Chivi––since they do not have theasset base to take advantage of opportuni-ties which might be presented. The asset baseof these households needs strengtheninggreatly.Key improvements to realize the potential of

existing assets lie in the fields of human, socialand financial capital. In order to develop hu-man capital, education is a key exit route tononpoverty wages (Pender & Hazell, 2001), butalso to greater cash earnings from agriculture,and opportunities for diversification into thenonfarm sector both locally (Ellis, 2000) andthrough migration (Kothari, 2002). Poor mar-ginal farmers seeking casual work commonlyhave low social capital. Their inability to par-ticipate strongly in the reciprocal labor ex-change activities limits their ability to build uptrust and a sense of obligation. Their lack offinancial capital and grain surpluses limit theirability to hire labor or purchase agriculturalinputs.Households currently rely on the assets they

have for their security in lean times, since thereis little other protection available. There wouldneed to be a strong regime of social protectionin place before people felt free to use physicalassets as investments. This could consist of:––Free and effective primary and secondaryhealth care, or effective insurance to enablepayment for health care.––Financial markets permitting small-scale saving, preferably with an insurancecomponent, which will allow the poor todiversify, hire labor and intensify produc-tion.

Figure 6. 1998 livelihood activities of those reliant on casual labor and remittance in 1993.

CHRONIC POVERTY IN SEMI-ARID ZIMBABWE 605

––Public works at critical times of the yearto put a floor on rural wages. 41

(a) A ‘‘core’’ program

Education was highly valued in the studyareas. Women––whose responsibility it is topay school fees––commonly went to greatlengths to ensure that they could make thelump cash payments required, despite the dif-ficulties of doing so in areas with minimal casheconomies and almost no cash savings oppor-tunities. Making good quality basic educationfree and accessible would lead to significantadditional opportunities for saving, use ofsaving for working capital and for investment.During the 1990s the poor spent more on

health care even when consumption of otheressentials had declined. Free health care, oreffective exemptions would seem to be a must iftheir fortunes are to improve. It has beenwidely recognized that cost recovery for basicservices has damaged access by the poor inSSA: this study simply lends support to thatargument.Savings institutions accessible to rural peo-

ple, including the poor, would require financialsector reform deliberately constructed to permitthis kind of institutional development. Supple-mentary interventions might include sensitiveand efficient approaches to public employmentschemes designed to help very poor householdsto ‘‘graduate’’ into self-employment. 42 Beyondthese basic social protection measures there is arange of other more complex possibilities, asdiscussed in the 2000 World Development Re-port, which would require greater appreciationof the problems of the severely poor by na-tional and international decision-makers thanexisted by the 1990s in Zimbabwe (Dashwood,1999).

(b) A ‘‘supplementary’’ program

There are also policy implications in theproductive domain, although our analysiswould suggest these do not carry as muchweight as the human development and socialprotection policy domains. Since severely poorhouseholds focus to a large degree on produc-tion for home consumption, this needs to betaken into account when designing researchand extension programs. A degree of priority insemi-arid districts should be given to: low cashand labor input regimes––low external inputsustainable agriculture, and affordable mecha-

nization; gardening (horticulture) for bothconsumption and sale, including water conser-vation and irrigation; assistance with identify-ing possibilities for diversification, and a focuson the possibilities for vertical integration, as arelatively secure way of accessing markets.With the good outreach to poor householdsalready achieved by Zimbabwe�s agriculturalextension service, it would be relatively easy toredesign its extension package to suit their cir-cumstances better.Land redistribution has achieved a notorious

prominence in Zimbabwean policy (Hoogeveen& Kinsey, 2001). There are undoubtedly op-portunities for land redistribution which wouldbenefit poor households from semi-arid areasby allocating them better quality land than theyhave at present. This study shows, however,that land per se is not the overwhelming con-straint for many poor households who haveland that they are unable to cultivate––themeans to cultivate are equally important, andneed to be considered in any land redistributionprocess. 43

(c) Political feasibility

The political feasibility of such policy chan-ges and innovations would have been smallduring the 1990s (Dashwood, 1999) when thepolitical �eelite had embraced ‘‘a capitalist ide-ology that place[d] faith in the market and(was) less concerned about welfare issues’’ andsocial justice than it had been during the early1980s. During this period political, businessand agrarian �eelites were united behind the needfor the economic reforms advocated by the in-ternational financial institutions (IFIs), andseizing the opportunities––through both legaland illegal means––that these reforms openedup. But the decomposition of the �eelite into itsconstituent parts in the last five years, and thedevelopment of competitive party politics mayoffer new opportunities in the medium term forthe representation of the interests of the poor inpublic policy. While the immediate future at thetime of writing (just after the 2002 election,widely considered to have been gerrymanderedand violently rigged in favor of the rulingparty) seems bleak, the reality of the politicalopposition�s success may affect governmentwillingness to work on a wider agenda thanland redistribution alone. A more regular formof interparty political competition combinedwith the new anti-poverty orientation of inter-

WORLD DEVELOPMENT606

national development agencies is likely in thelong term to raise issues of distributive justice

closer to the top of the policy agenda again inZimbabwe.

NOTES

1. See Bird and Shepherd (2002) for a lengthy expo-

sition of this theme.

2. Frictional distance is an idea drawn from geography

which captures time–distance traveled. It has been used

in studying the location decisions of enterprises and can

be applied to capture the remoteness caused by inade-

quate or seasonally unpassable roads or deficient trans-

port networks slowing travel time over relatively short

physical distances.

3. Households having to purchase more from the

market than they were able to produce for sale.

4. Bigman and Fofack (2000) show that the stigma of

those in RRAs by ‘‘mainstream society’’ can reduce

inflows of investment. Stigma can compound the low

self-esteem of ‘‘residual populations’’ can have the same

outcomes as low aspirations.

5. Pender and Hazell (2001) suggest that improved

management institutions for common property re-

sources such as community grazing lands or woodlots

are critical in many ‘‘less-favored areas,’’ particularly

low-potential areas with limited opportunity to increase

crop productivity.

6. The view that democracy is good at preventing

famine, forwarded mainly by Dreze and Sen (1989) has

been challenged over recent years. de Waal (1996) argues

that democracy is not the only or even the main factor

involved here. For example, anti-famine measures in

India formed a key dimension of the rhetoric and policy

program of the anti-colonial nationalist struggle, and

was an important aspect of its popularity. de Waal

(1996) contrasts this with democratic and nondemo-

cratic regimes in Africa. Anti-famine policies are thus as

closely related to the political traditions and trajectory

of particular states, and social contract between rulers

and ruled therein, rather than their current level of

democracy per se.

7. See Carney (1998), Chambers (1987, 1995), Ellis

(1998, 2000) and Moser (1998) for references which

show the development of the livelihoods framework, as

used by DFID, and Davies (1993, 1996), Swift (1989)

and Corbett (1994) for discussions which moved the

debate on coping strategies forward.

8. See Hulme and Matin in this issue.

9. The Consultative Group on International Agricul-

tural Research.

10. These areas include most of the semi-arid and arid

tropics of Africa and South Asia, mountain areas in

South America and Asia, much of the highlands of East

and Central Africa, hillside areas in Central America

and Southeast Asia, and large portions of the humid

tropics of Africa and Latin America.

11. See www.chronicpoverty.org.

12. The population was 11.4 m in 1998 and is expected

to reach 13.6 by 2015 (UNDP, 2000).

13. This is based on 70% of the population of Natural

Regions IV and V being in chronic poverty.

14. Zimbabwe is divided into five agro-ecological

zones. Natural Region (NR) I receives the highest

rainfall of over 1000 mm/year and NR V the least with

<450 mm/year.

15. Each of the wards selected were approximately

10km from the nearest ‘‘growth point’’ or marketing

center.

16. The survey included two questionnaires, the first

on household characteristics, asset ownership, agricul-

tural enterprise mix and income sources, and the second

on agricultural services management.

17. These including key informant interviews (e.g.,

with local government officials) and semi-structured

focus group discussions, with groups constructed to

represent age, gender, rich and poor farm households,

informal traders and, households involved in ‘‘special

enterprises,’’ e.g., dairy production.

18. The indicators were: access to farmland, total crop

output, household food security, livestock holdings,

draught power availability, children�s education affor-dability, and health services affordability.

19. It is not completely clear that the respondent was

being asked to comment on improvement/decline/standstill

CHRONIC POVERTY IN SEMI-ARID ZIMBABWE 607

with respect to his/her own household: however, this is

the supposition in the analysis presented here.

20. In 1993 (December 30, 1993, no January dates

available) the US dollar was worth 6.88 Zimbabwe

dollars (£1¼Z$10.18). In 1998 (January 1, 1998) the ratehad fallen to Z$18.30 (£1 ¼ 30:15). By the start of 2002(January 1, 2002) the value had declined dramatically to

Z$53.26 (£1¼Z$77.50). The income values referred to inthis paper were reported in 1998 and may be converted

using the 1998 figures above [exchange rate source:

Owanda.com (currency converter) http://www.oanda.-

com/convert/classic].

21. Chivi and Gutu suffered drought in the same years

1991–92; 1994–95; 1997–98; and 2001–02. Matopo

suffered drought in 1990–91; 1991–92; 1993–94; 1997–

98; 1998–99; 2000–01; and 2001–02. Blessing Butaumo-

cho, personal correspondence.

22. Suppression of the guerrillas was largely under-

taken by Government defence units, which included 4

Brigade, 6 Brigade, the Paratroopers, the CIO and the

Police Support Unit. While attacks on civilians were

carried out mainly by 5 Brigade, the CIO, PISI and the

ZANU-PF Youth Brigades.

23. Below the Total Consumption Poverty Line.

24. As measured by the Food Poverty Line (FPL).

25. A follow-up survey and accompanying qualitative

fieldwork are planned for 2003.

26. Each week, there were an estimated 2,400 AIDS

deaths in 2000 (Garbus & Kh _uumalo-Sakuhkwa, 2002).

AIDS is now resulting in considerable proportion of the

deaths among the productive age-group (15–64 years) in

Zimbabwe. A phenomenal 73% of the deaths each year

were predicted to be due to AIDS and AIDS related

diseases during the coming years.

27. Education of the household head has been used as

a proxy for household educational level––this is likely to

be somewhat inaccurate, however, as there was very

substantial investment in primary and secondary in

Zimbabwe during the 1980s and 1990s which would not

be reflected in many household heads in 1997.

28. The Chi square value is 80.83 with 4 df.

29. The local economy and low returns on investment.

30. The information in this section is drawn, unless

otherwise stated, from Bird et al. (2002b).

31. Chivi is drier than Gutu. Zimbabwe divides its

agricultural land into five agro-ecological zones. NR I

being the best, NR V being the poorest. Chivi (Masvingo

Province) 66% NR V, 33% NR IV. Gutu (Masvingo

Province) 17% NR III, 70% NR IV, 13% NR V. Matopo

(Matebeleland South Province) A mix of NR IV and V.

32. Edible caterpillars.

33. Although Matopo has pockets of better soils, soil

fertility there has also declined and gully erosion is a

serious problem.

34. According to participatory work undertaken in the

area by ITDG in 1998.

35. They could only be accessed by those with a letter

District Administrator, District Councillor or Ward

Councillor.

36. Zimbabwe Farmer�s Union, farmers�, women�s andgardening clubs.

37. A further test of the significance of education will

be possible upon resurvey, as the increased educational

levels of some households� older children in 1998,

compared to their parents� achieved level, can be

expected to promote household economic diversifica-

tion.

38. Women-headed households did better than male-

headed households in the following categories: farming

and poultry; farming and gardening; farming, gardening

and poultry; agriculture and remittances; agriculture and

trade; remittances and casual labor; beer brewing; and

knitting and trading.

39. This was one of a series of droughts and other

shocks (macroeconomic instability, civil conflict, HIV/

AIDS) which devastated households asset levels, reduc-

ing their buffers and ability to cope.

40. This category covered a wide range including

microtrading, ‘‘shuttle’’ crossborder trade, and various

scales of agro-trading.

41. Scoones reports that during the 1991–92 drought

80% of households in Chivi were involved in FFW

programs (Scoones et al., 1996, p. 178).

42. See Hulme and Matin in this issue, and Bird�scontribution to DFID (Bird et al., 2002b).

43. As they have been in the past in Zimbabwe with

generally good results in the medium to long term.

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