Lester EMBREEDoctor ofPhilosoplly, Professor, Flofida Atlantic Ilnive6it!, Boca Rato4 Uniad States of

REFLECTION ON OTHERS

. The complex issue of the other or-better-.,others" has long beenlhcmatic in phenomenology. Alfred Schutz, for example, was especially{oncemed with how others interpreted their own.actions, themselves, ,onennolher, their actions, their groups, their producJs, and thet sitriations. Incontras! Edmund Husserl focused on how others are originally constitutedby a self through sense-transfer and appresentation in primary passivity. Ihethcme of the presont essay can be located between the coniems of tiusserlord Schutz. It will simply be assumed tbat we always already do encounterothcrs and that we can abstractivoly set aside .how oth&rs intgrpret their. o1v4rc{ions, products, etc. Instead, the concem here is with whethei, and,in ivhatrospccts, oth€rs can be reflectively observed at all, The significance of thisq[cstion should become clearer as tlre exposition proceeds.,

The word "others" is here intended to refer,not only to separatetfldividuals. but also to small goups; moreover, it refers not only to humanhut also ro nonhuman animals. ..Observation', can be straightforward orro0ective. In straightforward observation, no notice is taken U-y the t of nerown encounterings of tbings, of things-as- encountered, or of herself, Ratb,er,otrc cxclusively thematizes things. In some taditions of pbilosophy and*cicnce, it is a matter ofcourse that observation is straightforward, and this

5 l

;il"T*"llif i!fi""jf;ff '?.*0"1 Ir other traditions, including that or

ir,".uti*ti""i' Lai;;. - *,::lTl"". " r*L""oli;:l*".*0"".Jj3st-aightfdrward or .,self-oblivious,,

.observation on the one band andreflecrive observation on the other irerrur.*oy i"qoir. .lti""i*. "oMost reflection in the history ofpl;;;;;;.#i_'o.0."*utoq

y:." ry encouJ€rings and rhings-ai-enco*"*a*U"Lig.i""ih" r*"sbeam of menhl life as the refleor 'en""tion" rl#- tel;;'ifnlc:'n'them

But'this is not the onlv ry?e",.n_"",ioo;-L", no,l",#i,lT,"'.,il,[ ;:lT*il, ?:r:H';"il]::belong to the same mental sfeam as the ,.reflecting.,, Instead, what makes

:b:.ry.q9" in._ general ,,reflective,, is its thematization ef what are,:::::::!, caued noet ico_noemo,i" "ou"t

ot iinr.';;'t;";i. "lr sert_oDservatton, one can observe I

::T1"1i'"r*r,"*hr"e"""*T*"_I:#"'"x'ir:;:H:il":1":f;.11contrast, reflection on others focuses. on ho* oth"*;;;;;;i?"iigr, uno:ii:li::","'il T;:lfi ,*HiT:::l-bI'r'"' ii'"'"''i#".. #'i'.p."i".straightrorw;oii's"iffi il;;""l",'Jil, .xn'#::, :I.n:l.H';hff SJrelectlng on others_includins.

fif, ill#L*tr#.'-.'"''T'H"'Ao"f'Tlil';?ffi X"#Xi""t,flruf,.- -?i:_j:-:"1*"s ofrepresentarionalism.in modem philosophy, some mayoe reruclanr to recognize even &e feasibirity

"r,"h!"i'1"" i.'l,iii^. a*anyone who has raught classes bas,recognizei *rr"ir_ ,*i"iro"*ip"v,"g:::i ]."L ".:\"

dSydreaming. anendrng to something else in rhe room (suchls.gnorner student), etc. More subtly, tt ore wtro are itenai"r a *fr"i,""" *ryng to teach them can be observed to be (a) *a.rrf,nffi.lu; oot:*:3S:&

(c).lndergoing rhe rransition f;; ";;-;;;;;;);r" ,"ung:r::ll1i_ne, oI (d) becoming increasingJy perpr"xJi--'

..n"'iiTJ; HTf"J: JlloflT i-i-'::\ most. generanv to observeabstractivery J ;;;*;-.Li:ff:;: T":1. tff, *T'',h:,1:mterpretations---as well as aboutuntouched oy,ur, "u*"J"".ffi T: f:',:ffXil"Ji""fff ll$,.',l;:l::::.-::..:*"i"" .pTsupio1s the encggtglng or otn"o ttut^ii*. _ortcreany_ whenever living beings (especiary those witn o.g-" oi.l*uuonano movement) are perceived or rer

"*p".r"n""a, ll", pi","i,"il ;;;liii3.ii;H#,i*J11fi:f,:*":l:s')

immediately experienced things are apprehended as the somas or orqamsmsthat are (to a greater or lesser extent) under the sway of these other p-syches.11t ry1 b.e . .noted, ,that. HGserl's expressi on, Einfithtung, ,oni"n i,literalhtically_rendered in English as ;tmtatlry,r' i, U*in! uuoif,.a n.i". ffri,rs Decause phenomenologists have been heard who have slid,from thetechlical signification, which is essentially cognitive, to the ordinary andpredominantly affective-valuationat signification by which one empathi:zeslhrough feelings for an other's feelings.) There ii more to ,u"fr'prirrturyllcgynlerine

of others,. but only one firther point needs to be made heri,wnrcJl ts tnat such prlrnary encountering occurs automatically, In otherI_1td,j: ll?'r

I is not engaged in performing this process of applsenting_and ndeed cannot engage in it.

In conhast, the observation here called reflection on others is a t]?e ofsecondary _encountering. It is originally an operation in which an I isengaged, although it can become a habitual or iven, for specifiable groups(e.g., psychiatrists) a traditional bpe of encountering. it h* the samepresentive/ appresentive struchre as the pdmary encor.uitering; thus one candhtinguish-the other,s soma and psyche, and to some extent]'one

"un "u"otbemafize her soma as it presents itself to her, something physicianssometimes do. As a rule, however, what one focusei on in otleloLs6rvationrs the other psyche. More will be said about this .form of observationpresently.

_ First the question of the ot[er's self_interpretations must beconsidered.

--, Urd"^F**.others throngh their own interpretations of their actions,

setves, products, etc-, is actually a rather reliable approach. one that many in:t1" :"]y"l

dlryinline; regularly emptoy in thi cirurse or purti"ip*tobservation and the study ofspeeches and texts. But one can wondir whetheran other rs mendacious, self-deceived, or merely inept at self_observation anrlself-reporting. To be a polite person entails mild liing about various trivialthings, and many occupations---e.g., selling used citirequires greaier skillar- cecepuon. I bat one may deceive oneself is too elaboraie a pmblem to beaddressed on this occasion. Finally, skill at observation of,oneselfl one,sencounteiings;

-and one's things.as-encountered varies considerably lanOcven some sor-dlsazt phenomenologists do not seem to do it well).. But if. one thus questions the reliability of.self,reports and the self-inter?retations expressed in them;, how,can one settle thi questions and, be1bl:

,o T-r:4 as has iust been done, that the undersanaing of ot".. tt outh

tner selt-rnterpretations is achially raiher. ,ieliable? One basis, for thisreliability is, ofcourse,.the intemal consistency ofthe self-reports. Another is

. the confonnity of self_intemreations with common sense. The crucial way,#il:'iftlil *:"gff iil3ll ntr' vt'"l "". i#"""-i,",#."or*ivangry observably ** * norT"*,-e'g"

is somebody who says'sbe is not

:':g:rq""irla"*p:i"i';:6"Jili j:?;*"ot"t'JffiT3l,foneselt as well as with otners_and well_developed skills at self_mterpreation).

Airother consideration is relevant here The self_r€ports of others.areexpressed in one or another language. Those who read more than onetanguage already know rhat ,**lg:: are not isomor;rhic. One may welloelleve that the main things abo

13, *'l 9: ;;G;ffi"*;';;'l#::ffi: ftX*il.i:::::*:*T:I^ i.j::-lf oriinary Janguage and it is oflen a"riraUfe lo leu.lop iecruricalrermlnotogy in order to be rph"nom"n?tog-irrffi,;d:"f,ll'ry': express desuiptions tirat fellow

o"rf; ,,'it *:ffJ"L"* *i"f

-tg"'**l""bservation (Lesrer Embree,lenomenol6gia,/ Reflective oY.^,ilt"**L6."

a ia investigaci6n

*::":{":.e,":,'i"#;,'JJ'"":iil|",o; -rf,**-.iLr*,J[l$,:!ffi: ril;Lurs. Rom6n Rabanaque (Moralig1;g"i"n"*"^*m.l'liilf;J,lTi1f T;fl1rjiil""il.11#,:",Jt,rrst of all, there is need for a most general concept and expression for thatIIi.j.*fl":lty" observation is tbrcmatically concemed. Husserl,s word isrrteOnrs, which is rendered in FreDch as vecu and which is rendered in:-1j-"],f"

as vivencia. In English..rhose in, the analyticlili'ini"1."", .f."-r^".f^:r:not

act,., which is probtematical .io"" ,"o.i or",fJ.pioi.r.". t"quesuon are passive, whire in the.phenomenologi"ur "uditioi'.o;" *"*exp€ri€nce," while others use ,,tived experien*,,;

-";il"r,'r"i#,i..il".nooor wnat an un-lived experiencr..u*.n","..to-n*,iutJ^i;;:#:,.q#::,i"ddtl#ffi:,S.-ff

l;JT jconsidered his greatest misake__and n"aly p,.ti""a ,[i"?

o#1" ".

banslations and ,,intentive process,. ror nls own irvestisari^nc-

nowever, th€ general expression used here is ,,enco'uniering.,, It connotesa process and intimates that somr

"usiry,p""in"a iJ;;;"; ;;';?1":t",i-,1H:H!,"*,\t jlfk;:;,encountering, and volitional eyil3't"Jii-r,,,u""i,i,il'oAT?fr lil','lil#ij"l"J:*f ."T:f

;'tocrs on experiencins thinkine, *,i^.|ili'"u "iri" oi.l"e*,1"d'#r"heano wlrtrng). .,Encountering,,

exp,".r.rl g"o"rat .oniJpiln"a "ln

u"54

qualified for morc specific conceptS:md exirressions. Nevertheless, it iscrucial to remember that only enoounterings di-e,concrete while words like'temembering," 'killiqg," eto:uref6r to abStra€t iomponents wiUrin tlem.

It is also orucial to remember that every ;ncountering necessirilyIncludes all-of the basic components, Thus to call an eniounteriig.aperceiving, for example, emphasizes its t?e of experiencing (i.e., direcitather than indilect and of present things) and de-emphagizes the believingvaluing, and willing also inoluded in the encountering. Real things-as-cncountered are always either perceiveq remembered, expected, or,represented and----at least in some modes---€re also believed in, valued; andwilled. It is a fallacy of misplaced cotrcreteness to thinlg for oxample, thatthings-as.:pgrceived and theii correlative perceiVings are concrete rather than[bstract noematic and noetic components ofencdunters.

The most general division among components within encounterings isbetween 'lositionality" on the one hand and what can be called"cxperiencing" on the other. In facg another adliantzige of the word"cncountering" as the most general term is that it leaves .,experiencing" free|o express a narrower concept. ,,Experiencing,t can eVen be used technicallylbr encountering ideal'things such as numbers and universal essences, whichis a type of "direct experienoing" while ,,indirect experiencing,' is iritentive'to its things on the basis ofrepresentations that may be indicatiodal, pictorial,or linguistic. The original encounterin! o{ and reflection oh, others are bothindirect, although one is not always explicirly conscious ofthis. Exieiiencinghas such a wealth oftypes ahd aspects that the traditional preoccupation withit is understandable, even though i1 is unfortunate.

It is unfortunate because positionality is.,equally important and thus oughtnot_to be disregarded or underemphasized. The most cibi'ious species ofpositionality seems to. be the affective-valualional. Colloqriially, this is amatter of liking disliking, loving, hating, apathy; etc. Such exprebsidns oftenconnote _ irrationalif, and the phenomena o-nly began to be intensivelyanalyzed in Western philosophy during the 1 8t century. Henbe it se€ms wiseto adopt the artificial expression of,,valuing.:' Like believing valuing can belpositiv_e, n€gative, or neutral, and there are correlative positive, negative, andneutral values discemable in the things-as-encountered. And all thrie sorts ofpositionaligy have.various degrees of firmness in their positive arid negatiVemddes, i.€.,_ positive or hegative resoluten€ss and hesitancy irt willing,certainty and conjecfure in believing as weli as firm and shaky vatuing.

How can this taxonomy be lied as a guide in reflection on others?Questions can be derived from it about what might be reflectively observed

55

in the.encounterings and things-as,encountered in others, collective as welras individuat and nonhuman as well. as human. Th" ;;;fi;;"" *"yquickly to establish possibilities is ro describe "*urrrpf"..

ili. ,i"td i. onfy:j:gtr^lq.

Deeper investisation ought to b" ubl;i;;;;;" lnoi. ,"no"aqescnphons.

. .While one can abstractively discem components of the sorts iust listedwithin encounterings and thinss-as-encoun,".i,a, t l, no, * ii:",iJint".ing,are devoid of inherent differeices.. The _be" *".a ," "r"

i" ."""fii"g tlr"main differences_among encounlerings i,,.p.edo;in"r;;.;;'rirr?#"ir*an encountering is predominantlv volitionai_ and on tnut a"couni ir"p^.op".fycalled.a witling. This does not signify that theie ar.

""i.rr"".iro#"o "a3:l:::E *9 valuing in the encoLtering, *r,tn i-r,"i" _", iri"Jr" rr,"t tr,.vorrronal component predominates. Analogously, ;;.;";;;g' _"ypredominate within the experiencing. componenq but some iememUeiing anoexpecting also occur along witb it subordinately.Jeveral examples pertainins to a nonhuman animal may be useful at this

l::::lgtlc p:"onatly nowl r had a oog when i ;;;. 'i;'t *n,"11T".I"rn schoot each day, it was plain to me and to my fariritY anJ nierA.mat he was happy to see me. I can now say that we encountered theencount€nng ofme that occured in my dog,s psyche

"" rfr.

"""".i"" "frnyretum. our e^ncountering of his psyche r,io j iounoati* il;;';;;.""r,perceiving of his noises and movements. rrr" G" "i

piri,il"r,i" *"predo.minated in his encountering "r

rn" *", "ur"iil"rrii

;;1;;;; ,"",positive. lt-was also clear tiiat I ias whar was ""r""Jl-yit " "ri

ii"l , rr"apositive value for him. Then again, I can recall being sick in bed once whileI had my dog. I do not recall-what the illness *as"burl i" ,"l""ft?", tfr"house was kept quiet and the doctormy dog was,,sad. il;. ;;-.""dff"jiiij*fiJ;yi"il".;:;n?' *'Tmovements, In this case, his attitude towarO ttre situatlon c.;i;d;; *u,valuational and negative.

*^_rY:l"^1r."*O.riencing components. in the encounterings are concemed,Dorn ol^lnese. cases^were perceptual in the broad .ignin"ut"ioo'of p.."",uurg

:ir"{"Truii+,:L'}'*-i"iiffi ff :""}'"9;:ffi::"fi :}Jlt"'*:'yff111:rl3i"d by.the. positive and negative'valuing O"r"riU"iiii rniehr lr*"D:en that. my dog,s €ncountering ot me was more expectational tianperceptual when I arived home. my dog ,.tooking f"**o;;'i" i"LJs."".d,19 havrng his ears scratched, and gorng out to play. This wa.s madf€sted inhis running back and forth from m! to the door.

As for encountering my,dog rccollecting, L can recall cases when weretumed-after an absenoe to a familiaf place and.he went.on something:of atour of inspection to see, it seepe{ if anything had changed, This wouldseem to utvolve remembering:as a basis for recognition of the presence orabsence ot tlle expected and familiar, but il. is not a matter of.attending inrecollectional operations, to past evenh in the same way tnat i Oo inrecouecung my past encounterings. With humans, however, there are indeedtrmes when the other is encountered as recolleoting, which is to say active.lyremembering, as well as times when she has past;vents impose tiemselveson her attention. Iir both cases, there is a decline if not cessation of attentionto aiiects ofthe ourrent sitMtion; moreover, the attention that we encounterin thd other at such times often seems to lack the continuing purposelirlnessthat accompanies deliberation about possible actions.

The_sketched facts were prirdary encounterings of otbers in tbe past.andthen reflections on them in recollection. For G purposes of establishingpossibilitieb, it is sufficient if hearers or readers of tiis essay caa feim casesof these soils, -which signifies that they pretend to ,im.roU..-haviogcncountered such things or even lhat they pretend currently to encounlerthem. Also, the descriptions are quite general; they involve the encountersnpperceived in others, their frrndamental types and nibdes'of positionality,and the concuitent gpes ofexperiencing. Nuinced detaii iS. not needecl whenre questton ras to do merely with the possibility rif l6fldctibn pn,others

(w_hrch ls not to say that greater specificity canriot be dtfained ,wlth, morectlon and under suitable circumstances).

If enough has now been.said to establish tlat one.can encounter_and onthat basis observe-valuing and experiencing in others, nonhuman as well ashuman, what ofthe other species of positionality? Can one observe others asrcsolute in their striving, observe (at.least to some extent) what they areinmediately stdving toward, and lhen'observe not only the immediate endsfor them but also somd'of their means? This appeag so plainty tne

"as" tat

rn example is not necesbary, butjust to be sure, let iibe suggert"d thut sp^ortscan provide many examples..

For analysis tharit are the modalities already mentioned, e.gi, somewilling is positive, which includes being supportivi of what others io, someis undermining and there can be deshuctive as well as creative willing.Pcrhaps the most interesting mode of predominantly volifional enbounterin-gthat we cajr .refl€ctively observc in others is volitional neutrality, e.g., th;other is resolved not to take sides or, as it is sai4 not. to get:invoivedl mis.rccms usually combined with,apathy in the ualuational

"om!on"nt. t'-:

, ,. s'l

. What about believing? Once one is in a theoretical attitude of selFobservatioq it may seem that believing along with the experiencing tnat it isas a rule founded upon and motivated by urJth" rrort

"oo.pi"uour-tfriog, inencount€ring. But this may be a product of intellectuatism, irnot naturatism.

lr one reststs the tendency among many educated people in the practical aswell. as ueorencal disciplines today to disregard (or underemphasize)v_aluing and values, but also willing and the cJnelative or". oi-i*"u"ur_11T:,_1TI":

._tnerh,ings-as-encountered, if, in other words, on" uliCr. Uyy\g: ::

ne cu.uu.rat ,hrn8r rhey origina y are, then believing is merely oneot ft€ three main types ofpositionality in a concrete culhual

"n"o*t".ing.And as. for believing as encountered in other,humans, t again'c;;iaer it. something obvious that these others are at times encountered- as certain andat other times as doubtfirl, and that these degrees of assurano"- o""* in.negative as,well as positive forms. Certainty is firm believing. ,Doubg,,however, is ambiguous in ordinary and even philosophicil elgtistr..D."l!lTg

.ii .rigi&. "disbelieving," but it can also signify Ao*i. n*t urity."sceptlcism" in.English is ambiguous in the same way. Tire neutral mode isotten accompanied by valuational neutrality or apathy.. Another question concems imagination, or bitter, feigning. Though self:

observation, one can confnm that all the components of;erio;, "o"ofnt".inghave quasi-, as-if, or pietend versions. One can pretend to rememUer. pretena

to perceive, pretend to value, pretend to will, and so on. f.eiiniog orpretending is often manifested as play and puppies, for exarnpt", ""rlinly

aoDlav.

. - O:_ *_"udt indicate4 ..others,, ur this essay covers groups as well asindividuals. And at least small groups can readily be reneciiveiy ofservea topursue shared purposes by shared means, perceiving expecting, and valuing,togeth€r what are the same things for the goup memberJ'This can beconsprcuous_rn team sports and for packs ofhunting dogs.

- It should be made explicit that reflection on ottr.r, has a cognitive orepistemic function. While we always,already encounter others in*everydaylifa, reflection on others comes in addition to this and it not only has thebelieving. component predominating, but also, where experielcing isconcemed can be perceptual and memorial in fictive as will as seriousways. More srgnjfiggtly, perhaps, the perceiving or recollecting of thegn-c9ur-tterings and things-as-encountered in the others are what cai justi$believing not only in present and past actual cases, i.e., facts, but also"i eiddor universal, essences: Although not elaborated methodologically; the casesadduced above were meanl ro clarify eidetic sp€oies aid ttre-genus ofreflection on others.