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Lessons learnt from thecrisis in the BalkansHans‐Ulrich SeidtPublished online: 19 Oct 2007.

To cite this article: Hans‐Ulrich Seidt (1996) Lessons learnt from the crisis in theBalkans, European Security, 5:1, 65-70, DOI: 10.1080/09662839608407253

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Lessons Learnt from the Crisis in theBalkans

HANS-ULRICH SEIDT

On 1 November 1995 the 'proximity talks' on a peaceful settlement for theBosnian crisis started in Dayton, Ohio. The international negotiators werefaced by extremely difficult negotiations and highly complex problems.Success was not assured. But even after the signing ceremony in Paris andthe deployment of the Implementation Force (IFOR) no final lessons shouldbe drawn from the Bosnian crisis before the end of the implementationperiod.

However, the last four years provided us with some terrible material thathas to be included in a careful analysis of past developments. Press reportsabout the Srebrenica massacre and continuing human rights violationsthroughout the area are only a few examples of still unanswered questionsand unsolved problems.

The points raised here should, therefore, only be regarded as preliminarylessons drawn from the crisis in the Balkans. They reflect personal opinionand limited experience. But with the advent of peace they may hopefullycontribute to the urgent debate on the future of conflict management in thepost-Cold War era.

LESSON NUMBER 1: HISTORY SHAPES THE FUTURE

Bosnia is a sparsely populated and rather poorly developed area in a remotecorner of Europe. Yet developments since 1991 conform the wellestablished fact that historically and geographically Bosnia has always beenthe dangerous divide between Rome and Constantinople, betweenCatholicism, the Orthodox Church and Islam. It remains the dangerouspowder keg of Europe - at least until the end of the successfulimplementation of the peace settlement.

Events leading to the Russian-Turkish War of 1877/78 and to the BerlinCongress had their origins exactly in the very same small towns which were

Revised version of a paper presented to the 3rd annual conference of the Federal SecurityAcademy (Bundessicherheitsakademie), Bonn, and the National Defence University,Washington, 2 Nov. 1995. The views expressed aree those of the author and should not beconstrued to represent the views of German Foreign Ministry or the German Government.

European Security, Vol.5, No.l (Spring 1996), pp.65-7OPUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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widely unknown five years ago but which are household names today:Mostar, Zenica, Gorazde. The consequences of the Bosnian crisis of 1908and in particular the drama in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, which led to theFirst World War, are only too well known.

On 28 June 1989, at a huge political demonstration to mark theanniversary of the Serb defeat at Kosovo which resulted in five centuries ofOttoman rule, Slobdan Milosevic told one million of his compatriots thatthey must prepare to fight again. In the high-risk Balkan power game, thefirst cards to be played against the backdrop of Albanian unrest after the lossof autonomy in spring 1989 were the glorious past and uncertain future ofthe Serbs in the province of Kosovo.

LESSON NUMBER 2: ILLUSIONS ARE DANGEROUS

Not only has the international community underestimated the forces ofhistory. In the name of well-meaning common sense it also tried to persuadethe combatants to abandon their irrational tribal hatreds and lay down theirarms. But what Western observers and governments have often failed torealize was that despite the appearance of chaos, the Balkan War has beenfought with terrifying rationality by protagonists following long-termstrategies.

The dangerous illusion that the Yugoslav federation of six republicsseemed better placed than many other parts of the ex-communist world tomake the transition to free market democracy, to a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society, was a misperception. At the surface only, Yugoslavia wasrelatively prosperous and sophisticated but these appearances weredeceptive. Ethnic grievances had been merely suppressed, not dispelled, bythe centralized communist system.

Between 1989 and 1991, when Ante Markovic, a Croat and a successfulbusinessman, began the difficult process of transforming Titoist Yugoslavia,an optimistic Western public expected a peaceful change to a liberal politicalsystem. But many leaders of the dying Yugoslav state were already cynicallyconsidering the path to violent disintegration. The collapse of Yugoslaviahad many plotters, but the evidence of premeditation looks clearest in thecase of those leaders, who as early as 1989 instigated the nationalism andfears of their people to preserve and enlarge their own power.

Having made the experience of wrongly assuming that peacefultransformation in former Yugoslavia could succeed without energeticbacking from outside. Those in the West who applaud the Daytonagreements should remember that prospects for regional stability in theBalkans are still in doubt. Will a solution in Bosnia-Herzegovina set off acrisis in Kosovo or Macedonia?

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LESSONS LEARNT FROM BALKAN CRISIS 67

LESSON NUMBER 3: CONCERTED ACTION IS CRUCIAL

Despite all the instruments of high-tech diplomacy and satelliteintelligence-gathering major policy makers in Western capitals weresurprised when they were facing the terrifying logic of war in 1991. Thefirst mistake was a failure to diagnose what had gone wrong. The secondfailure was that while everybody realized that the country was breakingapart, no one considered the squabbles of Balkan politicians to beinsignificant when measured against the drama of German reunification, thedangers of the 1991 Gulf War and the rapid erosion of the Soviet Union.

Certainly, Western leaders were overburdened by problems and a tightagenda in 1990/91. They had to solve first problems first. But looking backto the traditional experience gained from the volatile European powder kegon the Balkans, it seems that expert advice based on long-term analysiscould have been available.

However, the value of expert opinion and international early warningsystems depends on the functioning of institutional mechanisms allowing acoordinated response and joint action. The traditional answer to the oldquestion of how to handle the Balkan problem relied on the concert ofEurope. One lesson learnt from the initial phase of the conflict remains that,in the face of distinct national interests and priorities, there still is a need inEurope for an informal but efficient mechanism for Great Power co-operation.

LESSON NUMBER 4: DO NOT OVERBURDEN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

In November 1991 NATO heads of state and government adopted their newstrategy for the post-Cold War era. One element of the new strategy was theidea of 'interlocking institutions'. Although later modified and called theconcept of 'mutually reinforcing institutions' it became very soon known asthe 'concept of interblocking institutions.

And during the crisis it became obvious: International organizations likeNATO and the United Nations carry an 'O' in their name. 'O' stands fororganization and means an international bureaucracy and not a decision-making body. Decisions in conflict situations are not taken by anonymousorganizations. Even behind a general staff there is the brain of the army.Decisions are taken in the capitals of the major countries working togetherin international organizations. If there is no political will in the capitals, theinternational bureaucracies will not step in and solve these problems.

International organizations without political guidance from key playerswill certainly fulfill their mandate but will also try to avoid any major risk.They will try to keep a high profile and show that they are indispensable.

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However, as mere political instruments, they will not make the necessarytough decisions.

Today we are facing a situation in which UNPROFOR, the largest andmost ambitious peace-keeping mission of the United Nations, has beenreplaced by the Implementation Force (IFOR) under the leadership ofNATO. Today we are forced to admit that in Bosnia something went terriblywrong with concepts like UN 'safe areas': well-intentioned ideasformulated in air-conditioned conference rooms were tested bycommanders and forces acting like medieval warlords and barbarian tribes.

Merely reacting to dramatic events and premeditated concepts, thepolicy of the Western capitals was one of 'damage control'. Europeans andAmericans wanted to stop the killing. They tried to prevent the crisis fromundermining international organizations and cooperation. But disunity andthe reluctance to take risks at an early stage prevented these aims from beingaccomplished. Clearly, in capitals and in international organizationsleadership was a scarce resource.

LESSON NUMBER 5: NO PEACEKEEPING WITHOUT A PEACE TO KEEP

Looking back at the UNPROFOR experience, the international communitywill have to keep in mind what peacekeeping and peace-making are allabout. Peace-making, or peace-enforcement as it is increasingly called, ismilitary action, warfare, against an aggressor and the reestablishment of thepolitical status quo. Peacekeeping is the lightly armoured surveillance of aceasefire or a cessation of hostilities by a third party with the consent of theconflicting parties. If there is no cessation of hostilities, if there is noceasefire, there is no room for peacekeepers.

Remember the tragedy of Mogadishu and the Blue Helmets taken ashostages in Bosnia. Remember the most difficult situation of the Dutchbattalion in Srebrenica and limit the future deployment of Blue Helmets topeacekeeping in the strictest sense. Of course there is the 'pragmaticapproach' to peacekeeping, that is, never declaring that peacekeeping iswhat the UN-Security Council decides. This 'pragmatic approach' will leadyou between the front lines. The last UNPROFOR commander-Lieutenant-General Rupert Smith - described the outcome in July 1995 in Sarajevo:'We are standing around in somebody else's war!'

LESSON NUMBER 6: NO DEPLOYMENT WITHOUT A WORKING CHAIN OF

COMMAND

Military forces beyond traditional peacekeeping should only be deployedwith a clear-cut mission and a working chain of command. During the

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LESSONS LEARNT FROM BALKAN CRISIS 69

Bosnian crisis 'dual key systems' did not work although key decisionmakers in the UNPROFOR hierarchy were all from NATO membercountries.

'Interlocking' of different international organizations can sometimes bepart of the political game, in particular when conflicts among major powerscannot be resolved or public consensus for an active policy is not assured.Nevertheless, it should have no impact on the operational and tactical level,where quick decisions have to be taken in the theatre. The NATO-led peaceimplementation force in Bosnia will have to acknowledge earlier mistakesif it is to avoid previous inadequacies.

LESSON NUMBER 7: MOBILIZE AND PRESERVE PUBLIC SUPPORT

If you finally deploy armed forces as an instrument of conflict management,mobilize your domestic political resources to fully support the national andinternational effort. This does not only mean active administrative andlogistical backing by the various ministries and agencies. The nationalconsensus should be reflected by an overwhelming political support.Immediate, regular and full information of the relevant committees inparliament is a precondition.

Positive response by parliament and full public support can only beachieved on the basis of a realistic and informed opinion shaping process.Above all, stay in regular touch with relevant people in the media who arethere to ask you critical questions. Without convincing answers you will notbe able to get your message across to domestic and international audiences.Without confidence and public support you will not be able to mobilize yourresources fully and participate successfully in sustained conflictmanagement with military instruments.

At the same time keep in mind the role of the media as reporter oradvocate of specific interests and policies during the Balkan crisis and otherconflicts. In Somalia, US-media first encouraged mission creep and whenthat turned into disaster were quick to demand complete disengagement.Media support can be very fleeting and perhaps one day you will have todefend the Dayton agreements and their implementation in an open politicaldebate.

LESSON NUMBER 8: BE MODEST

Realize that not only in the Balkans there are limits to every external attemptto manage or solve a conflict. These limits are defined not only by politics.In the future, these limits will increasingly be set by financial constraints. Beready to deal with crises that emerge out of agreements and guard against

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each crisis leading to more commitments and greater risks. Identify the keytasks that contribute to long-term stability and stick to them.

Modesty should also have an impact on your choice of internationalorganizations for specific tasks in conflict management. In the past, themost important criterion in targeting an international organization was thefactor of 'power multiplying': you had a natural preference for theinternational organization in which your political influence was supposed tobe the strongest. With regard to the heavy financial burden linked to thepolitical settlement of the Bosnian crisis you will in future probablyapproach those political organizations where your financial contributionsare the lowest.

LESSON NUMBER 9: LEARN FROM POSITIVE EXAMPLES

Since the end of the Cold War there were, fortunately, also positiveexamples for conflict management outside the Balkans. Unfortunately, theyare less well known than the Bosnian tragedy because the bloodshed wasover soon and the international media lost interest.

Take the case of Moldova as an example: Since April 1993 a small teamof eight dedicated international negotiators was sent by the OSCE toChisinau and Tiraspol. They were not travelling around in a global mobileoffice. They remained in the conflict area with the parties, negotiating,mediating and in the end submitting a constitutional proposal for the futurestatus of Transnistria.

Probably less spectacular and successful, but nonetheless respectable arethe achievements of the 18 members of the OSCE mission in Georgia. Theyare concentrating their mediation and monitoring activities mostly onSouthern Ossetia. They improved the political atmosphere for negotiationsand initiated direct, informal talks and helped draft a new constitution forGeorgia.

Future conflict management should use the following elements of theseexamples:- Identify a small international team of dedicated professional negotiators

who know the conflict area, the people and their mentality.- Convince the conflicting parties to accept a mediating role by the

negotiating team.- Deploy this mission not in international conference centres but in the

conflict area itself. Let the mediators work on the ground over a longperiod: peace needs time.

- Give the negotiators a broad mandate and far-reaching responsibilities.- Put the weight of the international community behind them.- Be patient, listen to their advice and be realistic in your expectations.

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