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Laying transoceanic cables on Africa’s shores: a Neo-gramscian study

Derbe, S.T.

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Citation for published version (APA):Derbe, S. T. (2010). Laying transoceanic cables on Africa’s shores: a Neo-gramscian study.

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Laying Transoceanic Cables on Africa’s shores

159

Conclusion

ICAIS and telecommunications reforms as a strategy of

capital accumulation

The transformation of the telecommunications sector since

the 1980s, from national to global, from public service to

trade, and from regulation to deregulation has enabled capital

accumulation at a planetary level. The reorganisation of

production of telecommunication services at a global level,

thus, led to a shift of market power to the new dominant

economic unit - the privately owned global telco.

Competition among the global telcos in the restructured

telecommunications sector has focussed on routing most or, if

possible, all of the Internet traffic within one‘s private

network. This in turn necessitated control of as much physical

and logical communication resources as possible. The series of

mergers and takeovers that led to the emergence of even fewer

global telcos as oligopolies and conglomerates was a result of

such necessity.

Furthermore, by expanding into the periphery through

equity purchases or contractual arrangements, these global

telcos are pushing out the few national incumbents, relics of

the old ITU-based system. In this capitalist competition for

inputs and markets, the national incumbents, who command a

narrow resource and profit base, are severely constrained by

the new global production and exchange structure. Some ISPs

have, therefore, joined the global telcos as ―strategic

investors‖ in order to tap into their global networks. Others

have resorted to cost-saving technologies to minimise their

vulnerability.


160

International Charging Arrangements for Internet Services

(ICAIS) are instruments for the exercise of bargaining power

by the global oligopolies or conglomerates against smaller

competitors. These confidential arrangements establish the

network link speed, network congestion, and price available to

ISPs and users all over the world. U.S and European regulatory

institutions have so far refrained from regulating these

arrangements between the global telcos and smaller ISPs.

The imperative of the accumulation strategy is such that

even the current imbalance in bargaining power may change to

further strengthen the global telcos. Major international

backbone providers have claimed that bandwidth, routing tables

and IP addresses are scarce resources, presently available to

users all over the world due to the huge investment made by

them. They may, therefore, shift resources to production of

services that are valued by those users who can pay for them.

The new market segment, called New Generation Networks,

targets the demand for real time services by multinational

corporations and consumers in developed countries. In short,

by introducing product differentiation and price

discrimination in the market, the global telcos can impose an

even more aggressive strategy of accumulation of capital

through ICAIS.

The contours of hegemony

The power of the global telcos to determine the

allocation of resources arises from their ownership of the

means of production. Conceptualising this class power merely

as a contractual arrangement between individual parties is

itself a form of consciousness about power relationships. In

examining inter-capital relations as those manifested in


161

ICAIS, therefore, the role of ideas and consciousness, as an

integral component of the global structure must be explicated.

The Information Society idea accords a broad political

and ideological legitimacy for the dominant class forces in

the global information structure. In the promotional and

academic literature, information society represented

progressive values such as openness, freedom and innovation.

The emphasis on the market as the arbiter of ICT development

and usage also refers to these values. Thus, private ownership

of infrastructure and willingness to pay for access are now

the worldwide organising principles of production and exchange

of network services.

In relation to Africa, the essence of hegemony has been

in establishing particular interests of global capitalist

accumulation as compatible with the aspirations of ordinary

people for development and better life. The information

society, significantly coupled with the digital divide,

equated expansion of foreign capital into the less developed

economies as a way of development, leapfrogging or catching up

with the advanced societies. At the same time, the embedment

of these ideas as the global common sense constrains the full

articulation of alternative forms of production and

distribution of ICT services such as those premised on free

and open source or public goods provision.

The hegemonic fit between the material interests of

dominant class forces and collective images of development or

human progress is achieved through an active agency. This

dissertation has extensively documented how national and

international think tanks, policy consultants and informal

organisations such as the G8 as well as formal inter-state

organisations such as the ITU were central in the process of


162

constructing a hegemonic order. Organic intellectuals played a

key role in this hegemonic exercise. Consequently, third world

political engagement is no more based on the antagonistic

division between the North and the South. Instead,

technological determinism and neo-liberal ideas pervade

current policy discourse in developing countries as well.

More importantly, international organisations have been

instrumental in cooption of opposition to the dominant

information society construct. The ungainly universal access

policy has diluted the urgency and intensity of the need to

address the communication demands of the disadvantaged. It

posits that universal service is not achievable in the poor

countries because of the sheer size of the have-nots and the

logic of scarcity of resources. Therefore, despite the

magnitude of the communications needs of the majority of

people in the world, the responses are in the form of isolated

projects for low cost infrastructure such as Internet radio,

telecentres, etc.56 Unfortunately, philanthropic activities and

isolated pilot projects can address only just so much of

global inequality.

Hence, while bridging the digital divide in effect

amounts to greater access by urban elites and high-income

groups to new technology; it perpetuates the exclusion of the

popular classes as long as it does not address the income

divide. In fact, to the degree that digital divide and

universal access policies do not affect the underlying

development or class divide, they mainly serve to contain

56 See the reports of the ITU-D Focus Group 7 at

http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/univ_access/ for an updated list of projects by

ITU and NGOs.

http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/univ_access/


163

potentially counterhegemonic ideas and make them consistent

with the hegemonic order.

Nevertheless, hegemony is not a static apparatus of power

but a dynamic and contested process. A hegemonic order cannot

avoid but manage tensions (intra-class) and contradictions

(inter-class). The disputes between the U.S. and EU Internet

Backbone providers and their Asia-Pacific clients and the

resistance of African monopoly telcos to telecommunication

reforms, analysed in this dissertation, are instances of such

tensions.

The ICAIS dispute is an attempt to reverse or moderate

the flow of payment from the national and regional ISPs and

telcos to the global IBPs by enlisting the support of

regulatory bodies. The basic complaint in the ICAIS

controversy is that the contractual arrangements unduly grant

a larger profit to the latter. The ICAIS dispute does not

challenge the basis of the inequitable global social order.

Emphasis must be laid on the fact that both parties i.e. the

U.S. Internet Backbone Providers and Internet service

providers from Asia pacific countries, have subscribed to the

market system in which there are bound to be losers and

winners.

Framing the ICAIS dispute as a North-South conflict also

captures only the final stage of the controversy at its best

and, at its worst, it conceals that all the contenders share

the same capital accumulation interest. Concerns about ICAIS

were initially raised by Telstra of Australia. Then, the same

concern was taken by Chinese telcos and other Asian ISPs.

Besides, sides could be switched easily, as in the case of

Australia, when the complainant acquires enough market power

to effectively play the game as it is.


164

Likewise, the tension between African monopoly telcos and

international and regional actors regarding restructuring of

the telecommunication industry is rooted in inter-capital

rivalry. The emerging ICT entrepreneurs and global telcos

insisted that African incumbent telcos should abdicate their

means of accumulation. The new information society notion

prescribed that African states should only facilitate the

accumulation of capital by private enterprises. However, the

state class was reluctant to give up its privileged position.

This remains to be the subtext of ongoing conflicts with

respect to telecommunication reform and ownership of fibre

optic cables in Africa.

It must finally be underlined that this tension between

African incumbents and global telcos was not addressed by

persuasive or diplomatic power only. Less subtle or sometimes

plain coercive state and corporate power has also been

exercised to push the changes dictated by the new model of

capital accumulation. Thus, when the accounting rate system

was overhauled unilaterally by the US, it deprived African

governments of their major source of revenue. The introduction

of ―subversive‖ technologies such as IP telephony, call back

techniques also represented sheer technological power that

adversely affected their monopoly status.

Internal articulation of hegemony

Inasmuch as Africa‘s position on ICAIS and the

information society was shaped within the structural limit set

by the global economy and governance, NEPAD explains the role

of African political agency in relation to this global

structure.


165

By its own declaration, NEPAD is a project to legitimise

accumulation of surplus by an African capitalist class. It is

an internal articulation of the hegemonic concepts of

competitiveness, free enterprise, and open economy as

strategic orientation for ―African Renaissance‖. The

―strategic partnership‖ with global corporations and donors,

which is promoted as the way to end Africa‘s

―marginalization‖, is also part of this articulation.

The information society initiative steered by NEPAD

claims to fight mass illiteracy, infant mortality, abject

poverty, etc. Yet, the introduction of ICT products and

services through profit driven ICT production and distribution

will respond to the interests of a few emerging ICT

entrepreneurs such as mobile providers, ISPs, franchises, etc.

For instance, the benefits expected from the controversial

transoceanic cable projects are off- shored and outsourced

jobs for technical professionals. As a Kenyan scholar pointed

out:

What will flow through the fiber optics? Already, we have a well-

educated workforce. What is missing is the infrastructure and, of

course the supply of jobs to be outsourced. We cannot assume that

jobs will just come because the cables are in place. .. If we can

leverage on this communication link, we can turn into Silicon Valley,

the same way Indians turned Bangalore into mini-silicon valley

(Iraki, 2009).

Nevertheless, much as NEPAD represents the active agency

of a new social bloc to mobilise actors around a neo-liberal

ideology in Africa, both subjective and objective factors seem

to militate against its success. Firstly, if it has to be

accepted as an ideological consensus, it must engage a wide

spectrum of social forces through various institutions. Yet,

while a few affiliated NGOs have supported its goals and


166

activities, NEPAD has not become a broad rallying force in

Africa57.

As a hegemonic exercise striving to accommodate popular

forces, NEPAD seems to be even more significantly debilitated

by the preponderant material power relations underlying the

global structure. A considerable social conflict in Africa has

been engendered by past colonial and neo-colonial policies

such as the Structural Adjustment Programme. NEPAD‘s vision

for African recovery also privileges economic efficiency and

capital accumulation at the expense of social equity and

satisfaction of basic human needs. This only aggravates the

existing social divides in the continent.

The urgent need to engineer some form of internal

political cohesion, therefore, explains the ―partnership‖

premise of NEPAD. NEPAD requires external financial aid to

offset radical opposition through material concessions. The

―innovative solutions‖ such as construction of tele-centres in

rural areas are attempts to provide such a concession without

any substantial change in the income or class structure. Yet,

even such solutions could not succeed due to ―donor fatigue‖.

Therefore, this objective reality severely constrains the

capacity of NEPAD or any other similar elitist project to co-

opt antagonistic social forces.

Paths of Counterhegemony

From a Neo-Gramscian perspective the abiding challenges

of establishing an alternative political economic structure

57 Presently, NEPAD has merged with the African Union and the NEPAD

Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee. It is accountable

to the AU assembly.


167

are: a) Raising a counterhegemonic consciousness around a

universal ideology that speaks to the situation of those

unrepresented and disadvantaged, and b) mobilising social

action to construct an alternative political economic

structure. Hence, the ―communication society‖ movement as well

as the organised popular forces which are striving to

construct an alternative vision in Africa and elsewhere have

to address these challenges.

As more and more spheres of human life such as culture

and the natural environment are subjected to capitalist

production, opposition to it straddles class, gender and

identity formations. Thus, there is a strategic necessity to

overcome the fragmentation of actors. This, in turn, has

entailed questions as to the relative relevance and primacy of

class as a defining element of the counterhegemonic

consciousness.

As Neo-Gramscian theory contains Marxist and Post-Marxist

strands, the answers to this question have also displayed wide

ideological differences. One of the responses to this question

has been that a hegemonic consciousness must transcend class

consciousness by incorporating other identity-based movements

into a vision of society based on one of the fundamental

classes (Cox, 1999).

The other response is that the relationship between race,

gender, etc based identities in a counterhegemonic bloc should

not be understood in terms of instrumental compromise. It is a

process through which all the social forces that share anti-

capitalist values are equally engaged in an educational

relationship. As a result, all subjects will be transformed

into a new type of political community or historic bloc. No

one pre-constituted social group will be permanently


168

institutionalised. Historical materialism itself is a

―situated knowledge‖, which, in a post-hegemonic era, must be

superseded by other forms of knowledge (Rupert, 2005).

At the other end of this debate, we find the view that

class is constitutive of capitalism while the other forms of

identity are not (Wood, 1990). According to Wagar (1995), no

other identity-based struggles are anti-systemic. It is

possible to imagine capitalism without racial, national or

gender oppressions, but not without class oppression.

Therefore, such progressive social movements must be regarded

as pro-systemic in the final analysis, a ―slender and wobbly

reed‖, with which a radical movement for a socialist world

system must be ―at all odds little inclined to collaborate‖.

The communication society movement displays the

potentials and challenges of a broad counterhegmonic alliance.

This movement was able to mobilise different types of groups

and identity- based actors against the encroachment of

capitalism into the sphere of communication. Yet, there are

lingering doubts as to whether human rights will be a broad

enough umbrella to bring the disparate identities under a

common vision. Another resistance attempt frequently discussed

in the Neo-Gramscian literature, the Zapatista movement,

displayed the double-edged nature of broad based

counterhegemonic movements. The movement was able to mobilise

ethnic (indigenous) groups along with trade unions, workers‘

cooperatives, and social movements. On the other hand, such

alliance was also marred by ethnic infighting among peasants

(Rupert, 2002, Morton, 2007). Hence, Wagar‘s conclusion

captures only one side of the problem.

This dissertation has elaborated the class nature of the

genesis and dynamics of the global hegemonic order. It


169

concludes that it is possible and imperative to galvanise

different identity groups around a core class force. Once the

class basis of the vision of the struggle is established, the

tactical and strategic choices as to the counterhegemonic

alliances should be left to the actors‘ appreciation of the

immediate context. Such choices will necessarily depend on the

spur of the historical moment in the course of the

counterhegemonic engagement.

Contributions to further research and practice

1. The approach adopted in this study, while avoiding the

problem of treating Africa as a country, rather than as a

continent with multiplicity of social configurations, still

retains the possibility to analyse the shared position of

African states in the current global capitalist structure.

African political-economic issues have customarily been

characterised as merely derivative of the world capitalist

system. This is succinctly summarised by Van de Walle:

African governments are highly dependent on external public finance

and cannot afford to disagree vocally with donors and their policy

prescriptions. They agree to reform programs to gain access to the

external cash needed for crisis management; they may actually

implement parts of the reform program, but often remain unconvinced

by the intellectual logic behind these programs(2001, p.57).

Applying this theoretical framework to her study of

telecommunication reform in Kenya, Kerrets-Makau (2006)

concluded that foreign prescriptions, whether structural

adjustment programme or telecommunication reform, are accepted

by the ruling elites only to gain financial and other

resources. These resources are then channelled into the

domestic patron-client relationship.

The result of this was the second claim, namely: that a co-dependency

was created between IFIs and African leaders, in which a ‗culture of

approval‘ based on a paper process, was institutionalised... [T]he

telecom sector in part does suggest that international negotiation

between the Kenyan Government and IFIs provided both entities with

the means for self-preservation, but did not accomplish the outward


170

goals of either entity. Unfortunately, the losers on the whole are

the Kenyan people who continue to suffer at the hands of Kenyan

leaders reluctant to introduce reforms. .. It is thus both ironic and

tragic that IFIs and African leaders over the years have failed to

execute their one true mandate: supporting and assisting African

societies in reforms (pp.259-261, Emphasis in the original).

By situating both the international financial

institutions and African states within a complex structure

composed of material, ideational and institutional elements,

this dissertation contributes to a more nuanced understanding

of the reciprocity between these actors. Thus, what emerges is

a complex tapestry of class alliance as well as competition

for power and profit between the international and national

actors. This relationship is partly consensual and partly

coercive.

Moreover, the hard determinism of the abovementioned

approach leaves no room for structural transformation. Thus,

by analysing the direction of the counterhegemonic resistance

to the prevalent structure, this dissertation also indicates

ways of conceptualising possibilities of change.

2. The findings of this dissertation show that Neo-

Gramscian studies have still to engage in analysis of local

political projects in addition to their focus on hegemonic

politics in major international institutions. The analysis of

the NEPAD project in this dissertation shows that political

practices below the general level of ―World Order‖ are also

important in explaining the nature of the global structure.

More importantly, a cautious application of Neo-Gramscian

categories of hegemony or passive revolution as ideal types,

which approximate the social reality in various degrees, leads

to an empirically nuanced conclusion about Africa. Further

research in the specific form of elite and popular class


171

interaction with the global structure has to start not from an

over-determined premise but from closer observation of state-

civil society relationship below the regional- institutional

level. Passive revolution should not provide a blanket

explanation for political changes in Africa. Some national

social formations have shown more of a hegemonic politics than

others. Dominant social forces in these formations have also

been active participants in the construction of a global

structure. South Africa, Senegal and Ghana, in a descending

order, are examples. The state of play of hegemonic politics

in individual African states needs to be further studied.

3. Critical international communication studies that

historicise the global information society have developed

concepts and strategies for a transformative praxis. The idea

of Communication Society and the shift of emphasis from

intergovernmental politics to a broader involvement of civil

society are the most important contributions in this regard.

By synthesising these works with Neo-Gramscian theory, this

study contributes to analysis of current and future direction

for social movements on issues of communication.

Formation of civil society at a local, national, and

regional level has to be rethought in terms of the potential

for establishment of a global counterhegemonic resistance. In

Africa, where the existential problem is acute, some African

scholars call for an alignment of civil society with existing

government policy, while others have made a rather negative

assessment of the role of civil society altogether. For

instance, Allen, after a critical review of the budding

literature on the subject concluded:

Apart from the grant-seeking NGOs and the academic, it is proponents

of the ‗liberal project‘ who need civil society: western governments,

their associated agencies, multinationals, and IFIs [International

Financial Institutions]. Africanists can dispense with it... (Allen,

1997, p.337).


172

Instead of such summary execution of civil society, this

dissertation argues that research should focus on redefining

the concept within a different framework. I have elsewhere

indicated a possible route for such research by developing

―models‖ of Gramscian civil society in Africa58.

Current literature based on Neo-Gramscian theory locates

transformative civil society in Africa in peasant resistance

in the form of withdrawal from the ―national economy‖ and the

state structure (Cox, 1999). The research conducted by Cheru

(1989) on the history of resistance by peasant communities

against the Structural Adjustment Programme is the key

contribution to this approach. Cheru‘s finding was that the

conscious withdrawal of peasants into their own self-help

communities and informal economy has reduced the importance

and presence of the state. Hence, communal practices in the

form of a deliberate shift from export to subsistence

production and illegal use of government owned land for

grazing and irrigation are depicted as counterhegemonic

resistance appropriate to the regional context.

This formulation of civil society leaves much to be

desired. Firstly, it draws a rather stark distinction between

the state and peasant communities. In African political

systems, kinship, ethnic, and similar ties link the state

actors with such communities. Secondly, the social anatomy of

these communities has to be problematised. Are they based on

equality or hierarchy? Thirdly, the potential for formation

58 The Global-local Nexus of Civil Society Actors in Africa. Paper

presented at the 12TH Annual Conference of The Israeli Centre for Third

Sector Research, Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Dead Sea, Israel, 18th

TO 19th March 2009.


173

of a historic bloc between these community actors and other

social forces is left unaddressed.

The argument for another model of praxis in which all

types of subaltern groups organise around an ideological

platform, therefore, focuses on engagement with the state by

radical actors, not on withdrawal from it. This, which I

called the Bond-Mayekiso model, draws from the experience of

South African community based organisations in confronting the

neo-liberal policies of the post-Apartheid era. The key

strategy of this model is instilling social agency and

consciousness into the existing community based organisations

in both rural and urban settings. The common issues that bring

them together such as the diminution of public provision of

health and education could be geared towards a demand for a

more development-oriented state and for establishment of non-

profit, community based institutions.

This approach to civil society has the additional merit

of highlighting the role of ideas in shaping political

resistance. It also helps to examine the interface, if any,

between grassroots social movements and global

counterhegemonic praxis.

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