knowing how, what and that

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Knowing How, What and ThatAuthor(s): Nathan BrettSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Dec., 1974), pp. 293-300Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40230506 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Volume IV, Number 2, December 1974

Knowing How, What and That

NATHAN BRETT, University of Guelph

In an examination of Ryle's distinction between knowing how and knowing that D. G. Brown is led to the conclusion that "All knowing how is knowing that.' The distinction (in the form that Ryle drew it) is improper, and these tags should be dropped. All knowledge is propositional, after all, though there is a legitimate way of retaining the essentials of Ryle's account. Knowledge for which the primary evidence is a person's performance replaces the category of knowing how in this reformulated version of the distinction. But to have this type of knowledge is to know the answers to questions concerning the way in which it can be done. And this is knowing that

I would like to raise some doubts about these conclusions and the

arguments which led to them. I will not question the claim that the distinction between knowing how and knowing that has never been drawn with precision, or that it has been used or alluded to often without producing solutions. Nonetheless, I believe the distinction should not be abandoned, but retrieved from the obscurity which it has gained in becoming too familiar. An examination of Brown's argument may provide an initial step in this direction.

I

Brown starts by distinguishing two general types of problems with Ryle's account: (i) the difficulty of drawing the distinction, and (ii) the problem of

stating "that which is known in knowing how" (p. 215). Clearly we cannot

depend upon the occurrence of 'know how' and 'know that' in ordinary English to mark the distinction that Ryle was after. Knowing how a projectile will fall or how an alarm clock works involves having propositional knowledge.2 Less

1 D. G. Brown, "Knowing How and Knowing That, What," in Wood and Pitcher

(eds.), Ryle (London, 1971), pp. 213-248. References in parentheses are to this collection of essays.

2 Some philosophers have gotten around this by simply using the expression 'know

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clearly, a person's knowledge that he can slow his car by downshifting may be one feature of his knowledge of how to drive. There are, as Brown's examples suggest, difficulties on the borders of these concepts, at least. It's not simply that Ryle's use of these expressions is a technical one that is not perfectly reflected in ordinary language. This second type of example seems to straddle the line of philosophic division. Someone who knows how to slow down by downshifting need not be reciting precepts to this effect as he begins to

decelerate; but suppose he could not answer a simple question about this, e.g., "Would you shift up, or down, in decelerating?" Perhaps we can say that both

types of knowledge are involved here. But it's not obvious that either can be said to exist independently of the other in such cases; and, if not, then are there

really two sorts of knowledge, or just different features of one bit of knowledge? There are, then, cases which may be difficult to classify in terms of Ryle's

distinction. But this is little evidence that there is no legitimate distinction. Viruses are difficult to place in terms of the classical division between plants and

animals, but it hardly follows that there is no difference between these two, or that the concepts are of no utility. However, if it remains unclear just what makes an ability count as knowing how to do something, we cannot be sure that the division won't be upset by the discovery that this sort of knowledge involves

propositional knowledge in some way that we had not anticipated. With this

possibility in mind, Brown moves to consider the second difficulty: What is known in knowing how?

II

First, a point about the question. It seems loaded. Suppose I say of someone that he knows how to plant potatoes, and I am asked, "What is it that he knows in knowing how to do this?" It will be natural to answer the question 'Knows what?' with some assertion involving 'knows that'. Thus, I may say of the gardener that he knows one shouldn't plant before April, that potatoes must not be buried deeply, etc. If I give a list of the things that the man must know how to do in order to raise potatoes, each item on the list will still be open to the same question. The question itself invites us to see beyond the man's

performance, to see in the performance the evidence of his knowledge. Notice that we could raise a parallel question concerning knowledge that, viz.y 'What is known in knowing that . . . ?' This would typically be treated as a request to make explicit the content of the knowledge claim. Assuming that 'What is known in knowing how?' is similarly a request for explication, it should not be

surprising that the answer has a propositional form. To make this explicit is to

how to1. Cf. Shwayder, The Stratification of Behaviour (London, 1965), pp. 222ff.

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render it in propositional form. Ryle never denied that we could have theories

supporting our practices; he did deny that having them can be sufficient to

explain intelligent behaviour. Underlying Brown's question is the

question-begging presumption that an ability to do something cannot itself be entitled knowledge.

Ill

In the development of his second point about Ryle's distinction (p. 218), we can observe this presumption at work, (i) We might suggest that knowing how is simply being able to do something. But, apparently Brown feels that if this were the case there would really be no justification for the use of 'knowing'. Hence, (ii) he amends this with the suggestion that the ability must be learned. This seems right, since it would unduly stretch the category of know-how if we

admitted unlearned abilities, e.g. instincts. I'm not sure that one would convey a

serious distortion if he said that instincts were things that animals knew how to

do without having to learn them, but there are reasons for excluding these from the class of abilities which qualify as knowing how in Ryle's sense. For the latter

involve an implicit reliance upon some standards, rules, criteria, or whatever is

necessary to support the recognition of success and failure. But further,

(iii) Brown claims that even allowing that the ability must be learned is

insufficient, since some learned abilities are inappropriately characterized as

knowledge. The example given is that of drawing a circle freehand. One must

learn how to do this, but, as with bicycle riding, Brown considers that one is

"merely able" to do such things; "but we star.ted here in search of some reason

to speak at all of knowing" (p. 218). It seems somewhat arbitrary to deny that it is proper to speak of someone

knowing how to draw a circle or ride a bicycle. At the same time it is clear why Brown questions them. For, if one asks what the draftsman or cyclist knows in

knowing how to do these things* he may have difficulty discerning what "bit of

knowledge" (p. 218) gives us reason to speak of knowing. The cyclist may not know that he must turn in the direction that he is leaning, or much of the other data about maintaining the balance of his bike. Apparently what leads Brown to exclude these cases- which are surely paradigms of knowing how-is that the

person does not have information about the subject in question; "mere abilities" cannot support the use of 'knowledge'. Hence, what he counts as a reason for

speaking of knowledge is just that presupposition that begs the question. What

we need is some reason to refrain from regarding these as legitimate instances of

knowing, if we are to have grounds for questioning Ryle's distinction. Hence, we

must look further.

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IV

It is by way of a distinction between senses of 'knowing how' that Brown attempts to enforce this separation between having an ability and knowing how. The two different senses are claimed to be illustrated by the following assertions:

(a) John knows how to move about in a canoe. (b) John knows how to run a projector.

These examples of 'X knows how to V differ as follows: in case (b), but not in

(a), X is unable to V unless he knows how. One cannot run the projector if he doesn't know how; he can perfectly well move about in a canoe without knowing how (though the results may be disastrous). In cases of the first sort (a) we can observe the man V-ing (moving about, etc.) in order to ascertain whether or not he knows how. In the second case, that he is V-ing (running the projector) is sufficient evidence that he knows how. Brown concludes that there are two different senses of 'knowing how' at work in these statements, and labels (a) and (b) the "standard" and "English" uses respectively. (He uses the term 'English' in the belief that this sense is indigenous to the English language, see p. 220.)

This contrast between senses of 'know how' is made relevant to the critique of Ryle's distinction through the introduction of two further claims, (i) There is a surface plausibility to the identification of knowing how to V in the English sense of the expression with the mere ability to V. And (ii) a review of Ryle's examples "would show that he had the English use of "know how" almost exclusively in mind" (p. 223). If we consider only cases in which one is unable to V unless he knows how, we are concerned with ones in which simply establishing X's ability to V is logically sufficient to support the conclusion that X knows how to V. (If not knowing how implies not being able, and X is able then X knows how.) But this is only material sufficiency, not an analysis of 'knowing how*. It is quite consistent with the possibility that propositional knowledge is a necessary condition of such abilities. If we are given good reason to suppose that such knowledge is involved where 'knowing how' is used in the "standard" sense, we would at least have grounds for entertaining this possibility. The important point about this "standard" use, I take it, is that a person's ability to engage in the activity in question does not warrant our saying that he knows how. One is able to move about in canoes or address magistrates without knowing how. And this means that such knowledge claims involve something besides the mere ability to engage in the activity.

V

Before considering Brown's argument that propositional knowledge must fill the gap discerned here, I shall stop to question what we have just been given, (i) A review of Ryle's examples has not led me to the anticipated conclusion. In

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the course of his discussions of knowing how Ryle mentions not only chess

playing, arguing, solving anagrams, tying reef knots, and swimming; but also

pruning trees, fishing, baking, joke telling, clowning, and playing musical instruments. These samples from Ryle's battery of examples seem to fall with

equal frequency on each side of the line that Brown has drawn. We might well learn from the way in which someone joked, fished, pruned trees, or played the

piano that he really didn't know how to do these things. The feature that Ryle is intent upon preserving is that there are ways in which a person could go wrong, and the possibility of his recognition that he has done so.

But (ii) I am not even convinced that 'knowing how' must be assigned two senses in order to comprehend the observed difference. We could say instead that the class of action verbs (V) is dichotomous in a way that affects the sense of the whole expression 'X knows how to V. This seems to be assumed anyway, and to be sufficient to explain the difference between (a) and (b) without the

assumption that 'knowing how' changes meaning. I would suggest that the class

of action verbs is in fact divisible in the following way: there is a class (Va) of

activities in which one can engage without the question of success arising. This is

not to say that these questions cannot be raised, for of course they can be. The

point is simply that a condition or criterion of success is not a logical feature of

these concepts, i.e., a condition of the identity of the actions. The second class

(Vb) is of actions defined by reference to some such conditions, where

performing or engaging in the activity at all will involve meeting the

success-condition. Thrashing about in the water is not swimming, unless the

person manages to stay more than momentarily afloat; keeping propped up by

continually putting one's feet down is not ridipg a bicycle; nor will making just

any tangle count as tying a reef knot. Thrashing, propping, and tangling are

things people can do, but they don't constitute swimming, bicycling or tying reef knots. Similarly one is not running a projector simply in virtue of the fact

that he has flipped switches; to run the projector is to succeed in showing the

film. It should hardly be a matter of surprise that one gets a different result

when he employs verbs of these contrasting types to complete the expression 'X

knows how to V*. If succeeding in some respect is a condition of doing Vb, then

there is no prospect of our discovering from some agent's V^-ing that he doesn't know how; for the evidence that he doesn't must be a failure on his part. (Of course, a projectionist may not be able to change reels quickly and we might on

this basis say that he doesn't know how to run the projector, or that he doesn't

know how to do it very well. This shows both that the criteria of success can be

varied, and that there is room for judgments of degree beyond the point where

3 The Concept of Mind (New York, 1949), Chapter \\, passim; and "Knowing How and Knowing That," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, XLVI (1945-46),

pp. 1-16.

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success-condition is met.) This then accounts for the difference between examples (a) and (b) in a way that permits us to regard 'knowing how' as univocal. We might suppose, moreover, that the ability to succeed is a sufficient condition for knowing how in each case. Accordingly, the applicability of an action concept of sort Vb would guarantee the agent's know-how, whereas the applicability of a concept not defined in terms of some success condition leaves this an open question. Thus, the man who knows how to move about in a canoe (as opposed to merely being able) can change his position successfully, e.g., without capsizing.

VI

Brown wants to establish that 'knowing how to' has a syntactical kinship with a number of other expressions, viz., those which would be formed by replacing 'know' by 'asks', 'tells', 'hears', 'considers', 'learns', etc. and/or by replacing 'how' by 'when', 'where', 'which', 'who', or 'what' (p. 225). All of these latter terms have, he argues, the primary function of introducing questions. This role is not completely lost when they occur within sentences that are not in the interrogative mood and used in conjunction with verbs of the above sort. Rather, they serve to indicate the presence of a question embedded within the structure of the sentence in which they have this adverbial occurrence. Thus, for example, 'John knows how to mix mortar,' and 'Jim knows where to find the police,' have the questions 'How does one mix mortar?' and 'Where does one find the police?' underlying their indicative statement. What these statements assert about John and Jim respectively is, in effect, that they have the answers to these questions. Now, these underlying questions, it turns out, are ones which can be answered by an indicative statement that something is the case, e.g., that mortar can be mixed by ... or that the place at which the police can be found is .... But this is not to say that either of these men must be adept at giving the relevant answers. For the evidence that they have this knowledge lies primarily in their performances. If the one can get the mortar mixed and the other can get to the police station, then they have the knowledge which the propositional answers convey. Hence, the argument concludes, if what is known in knowing how can be presented as knowledge that, the supposed contrast between these categories collapses; "all knowing how is knowing that" (p. 242).

VII

The account we are given here is of particular interest because Brown explicitly attempts to provide a solution to the problem which led Ryle to postulate two sorts of knowing. He argues that what we really have is two types of criteria for the ascription of a single, propositional type of knowledge. The sort of cases which Ryle characterized in terms of knowing how are the ones in which the primary reasons for saying a person knows-/.e., knows that-are

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certain criteria of performance. Hence, the gap between propositional knowledge and action, which generated Ryle's infinite regresses, is never allowed to arise. And we are able to maintain a unified conception of knowledge without the

grim prospect of having to bridge this gap. Unfortunately, however, there are reasons for questioning whether it is correct to regard knowledge as unified in this way.

(i) The reconstructed version of Ryle's distinction seems to leave us unable to make certain contrasts that we do in fact make. We cannot, consistently with the proposed analysis, distinguish different senses in which someone knows

something, but are instead constrained to contrast the sorts of criteria that someone knows, as being either dependent upon his statements or upon his

non-linguistic behaviour. But, consider the sort of cases usually associated with

complaints about educated fools, in which the person can describe how to do

something, but is unsuccessful in his attempts to do it. Now, we are to regard the "content" of his knowledge as some one thing, statable as, e.g., 'that the way to V is . Apparently this is the type of knowledge for which the relevant criteria concern the man's performance. Let's suppose, then, that someone

actually makes the statement which formulates the content of this knowledge. We should regard his statement as only "weak evidence" (p. 247) that he has this

knowledge. Thus, we should say on the basis of his inept performance that he

doesn't know that the way to V is But we wouldn't say this. We would

regard his statement as confirming that he has that knowledge, and his

performance as showing that, in spite of this, he doesn't know how. We cannot

say this without contradicting ourselves, if Brown's analysis is correct. For, when

we apply his analysis to 'X does not know how', we end up with 'X does not

know that the way to V is ' As long as we treat this as a question of

different types of evidence for the one claim 'X knows that P', there is no way of making this contrast between knowing how and knowing that.

(ii) Secondly, perhaps the most salient feature of our ascriptions of

know-how is that they are subject to qualifications of degree. One can know

how barely or perfectly, or in any degree in between these two. But how are we

to capture this in Brown's reductive analysis? Are we to say that barely knowing how to do something is knowing only a partial answer to the question about

how to do it? Clearly it won't do to say that the propositional content of his

knowledge is itself subject to these qualifications of degree. Following Brown's

reconstruction seems to lead us to translate 'X barely knows how to V in terms

of our having only meagre evidence that he knows that the way to V is such and

such. For we are to treat X's performance as the primary evidence for his having this propositional knowledge. But this would be a distortion, not a translation.

(iii) Finally, even assuming that these obstacles can be met, there is room

to question the way in which Brown construes the conclusion of his argument.

Strictly speaking the conclusion is that knowing how to do things "is formulable

in 'that' clauses" (p. 242). But he takes this to be equivalent to saying that "all

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knowing how is knowing that." I have already indicated (Section II) that

important questions may be begged in the move from the claim that someone knows how to the explicit formulation of his know-how. In the process of

formulating what someone knows in knowing how, it might well be necessary to

give answers to a question embedded in 'X knows how to V. What we will thus end up with will no doubt be propositional in form. But to conclude that X's

knowledge was itself propositional, we would need some argument ruling out the

possibility that this feature is superimposed by our formulation of his

knowledge- a possibility that does not seem far-fetched. What leads Brown to suppose that he has ruled out this contingency, I

suspect, is that he has in various places committed himself to a thesis that is far

stronger than the view that knowing how can be formulated propositionally. The

stronger thesis is that the agent who knows how must actually have the answers to the embedded question. Thus, he says concerning the embedded question 'How does one V?' that "knowing how means merely knowing one from a list of correct answers" (p. 241). Now, if knowing how actually consists of having such

answers, where the answer is propositional in form, then it does follow that all

knowing how is knowing that. But this stronger thesis would really be hard to maintain. If we demand that the person who knows how be capable of giving these answers- our usual grounds for saying that someone knows answers- we rule out just those cases in which we are primarily interested, where X knows, but cannot say, how to V. To avoid this we must rely upon the man's

performance alone to back the claim that he has the relevant answer. But there is little evidence here that anything beyond the man's ability must be involved. The man has answers he cannot give, to questions he has not raised; and these are propositions he cannot state. What work is left to be done by the modifier

'propositional* in the claim that his knowledge is propositional?

June 7973

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