Karl Popper on Science: Conjectures and Refutations

Emmanuel Udoh

Karl Popper (1963). Science: Conjecture and refutations

Sir Karl Raimund Popper (1902 - 1994)

BioAustrian-British Philosopher

Brought four paradigm shifts to philosophical thought

Interests: Philosophical, Social, Political and Historical

1919: The Problem of Demarcation

When should a

theory be ranked as science?

How do you

distinguish science

from pseudo-science?

Popper’s ‘17 Theses’

1. It is easy to obtain

confirmations for nearly

every theory

2. Confirmations should count only if they

are a result of risky

predictions

3. Every ‘good’

scientific theory is a prohibition

4. A theory which is not refutable is unscientific

5. Every genuine test of a theory is an attempt to

falsify it

6. Confirmation should only

count when it is the result of a genuine test of the theory

7. Some genuinely testable theories,

when found to be false,

are still upheld by

their admirers

Popper’s ‘17 Theses’

8. There are no

ultimate sources of knowledge

9. The proper

epistemological

question is not one about

sources, but

whether it agrees

with the facts

10. The most

important source of

our knowledge is tradition

11. knowledge

cannot start from nothing -a

tabula rasa- nor yet from

observation

12. The advance of knowledge

consists, mainly, in

the modificati

on of earlier

knowledge

13. There is no

criterion of truth,

though we possess

the criteria to recognize error and

falsity

14. Neither

observation nor

reason are authorities

15. Testability

has degrees;

the theory which takes

more risks is more

testable, and

therefore, better

16. Every solution of a problem raises new unsolved problems

17. All scientific

knowledge is

hypothetical,

conjectural, and

inherently fallible

Popper’s Critique of the ‘Sciences’ of his time

Marxist Theory of History• Testable• Falsified• Conventionalist

twist• Not Scientific

Astrology• Soothsaying• Confirmationist• Not falsifiable• Not scientific

Psychoanalytic Theories (Freud & Adler)• Non-testable• Verificationist• Not scientific

Einstein’s Theory of Gravitation• Falsifiable• Refutable• Scientific

The Problem of Induction

David Hume’s dilemma: Psychological explanation of induction

Inductive reasoning leads to generalizations & infinite regress :

e.g. All swans I’ve seen are white…therefore, all swans are white

Inductive generalizations (custom, habit, repetition) lack logical justification

Popper’s verdict: Scientific conjectures are logically prior to observations

What should the method of science be?

Observation -> Theory Dogmatic attitude

Pseudo Science Myth or Pre-science

Hypothesis -> Observation Scientific attitude

Science Critical (analytic), rational

Popper’s criterion of scientificity

Falsifiability, or refutability or testability: A logical possibility to be refuted by a probable, true, observation statement

The Critical (Scientific) Method

P1 (Initial Problem)

TT (Tentative theories)

EE (error elimination, empirical

falsification, experiment, critical

argument, refutation

P (New Problems 2, 3,

4, etc.)

An epistemological process of (Darwinian) “natural selection”

How scientific knowledge grows

The best theories survive, while the inadequate ones are tossed away by scientific examination Risky conjectures ensure the survival of the fittest ideas

Qualities of a good scientific theory

Vs(a) CtT(a) CtF(a)

Probability, Knowledge and Verisimilitude

Some questions for discussion

In what ways has Popper’s thoughts influenced scientific enquiry and research today?

With a Popperian mindset, which of these is science…Clinical Psychoanalysis, Physics, Accounting, Philosophy of Science, Pharmacy, Informatics, Astronomy, logic, Metaphysics?

Do you share the view that following Popper’s theory logically, theories cannot be definitively refuted any more than they can be verified or proved?

Popper claimed to have "solved Hume's problem“. He tries to deny that the accumulation of observational evidence ever leads to the formation of hypotheses. Yet to the question of where a hypothesis comes from, Popper replies ‘from the refutation of a prior hypothesis, not from the collection of observational evidence’. Has Popper himself not fallen into induction?

Bibliography

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Bibliography

Popper’s Theory of Epistemology: A Perpetual Falsifiable Journey Towards Truth. (n.d.). Retrieved September 4, 2013, from http://redicecreations.com/article.php?id=21727

Popper, K.R. (March 2, 2001). All Life is Problem Solving, London: Routledge. Chapter 7 says "A rationalist is simply someone for whom it is more important to learn than to be proved right..."

Popper, K. R. Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. London, Routledge and Kegan Paul 1965, p. 67. http://arizona.openrepository.com/arizona/html/10150/105705/ethikskript/trita.htm

Popper, K. R. (1945, reprint 2006). (chapters 23,24). The Open Society and Its Enemies, Volume Two, Routledge

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