justyna gotkowska, bundeswehr 3.0
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Study about german army in 2012TRANSCRIPT
This reform of the Bundeswehr, launched in 2011, is the latest of the three decisive stages in the post-war transformation of the German armed forces. The reform aims at “constructing” the armed forces anew in the political, military and social dimensions. The present paper presents the evolution of the role of the armed forces in German foreign and security policy and the ongoing process of “constructing” a new Bundeswehr. it analyses the process of redefining the objectives and principles of: the Bundeswehr’s participation in international operations, its current military transformation, and changes in its image and social identity. it also presents the implications of this broader transformation for political and military cooperation within NATO and the EU.
Justyna Gotkowska
analyst in the centre for Eastern Studies, Department for Germany and Northern Europe. her areas of expertise include Germany’s foreign and security policy and security policy in the Nordic and Baltic countries Justyna Gotkowska
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BUNDESWEHR 3.0
ThE POliTicAl, MiliTARy AND SOciAl DiMENSiONS OF ThE REFORM OF ThE GERMAN ARMED FORcES
NUMBER 28WARSAWMAY 2012
BUNDESWEHR 3.0ThE poliTicAl, MiliTARY ANd SociAl diMENSioNS of ThE REfoRM of ThE GERMAN ARMEd foRcES
Justyna Gotkowska
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Contents
Key points /5
introduction /7
I. the Bundeswehr as a political instrument of Germany /8
II. the military dimension of the reform /13
1. improving expeditionary capabilities /162. challenges for the Bundeswehr’s transformation /22
III. the social dimension of the reform /25
1. problems with legitimacy /252. the new image and identity of the Bundeswehr /27
IV. the implications for nato and the eu /30
1. the implications for political cooperation within nato and the eu /30
2. the implications for military cooperation within nato and the eu /32
appendix /361. 1993: Volker rühe’s reform /362. 1999: rudolf scharping’s reform /383. 2003/2004: peter struck’s reform /40
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Key points
• ThereformoftheBundeswehr,launchedin2011,aimsat“con-structing” the German armed forces anew in the political,militaryandsocialdimensions.
InthepoliticaldimensionGermanyisredefiningtherole,ob-jectivesandprinciplesofemployingtheBundeswehrasanin-strumentinforeign,securityand(also)economicpolicies.ThenewBundeswehrissettobeaninstrument(tobeusedasalastresort)ofsupportingandprotectingGermaninterestsintheworld.TheBundeswehrwill thusbecome thesameasotheralliedarmedforces.Germany’sengagementinNATOandEUoperationswillbesubjecttosovereigndecisionoftheGermangovernmentandnot theresultof thepoliticalcommitmentsconnectedwithmembershipinNATOandtheEU.
In themilitarydimension the reform’sobjective is to createamilitarywhich is smaller butmore effective,well-trainedandwhichusesmodernequipment.Thechangesinstructure,processes,capabilitiesandmilitaryequipmentaredesignedtooptimiseitsexpeditionaryprofile.
In thesocial sphere thereformis intended toprovidesociallegitimacy for thenewmodelof thearmed forcesand, indi-rectly,toincreasetheappealofprofessionalmilitaryserviceinGermany.
• BoththepremisesofthepresentreformandthedevelopmentsofGermansecuritypolicywillhaveanimpactonGermany’sapproachtopoliticalandmilitarycooperationwithinNATOandtheEU.ThemaincriterionfordecisionmakingabouttheparticipationinEU,NATOandUNoperationswillbeGerma-ny’s interests. The participation in international operationswill however remain the ultima ratio for Germany. Grow-ingenergyandeconomiclinksandthewishtodevelopgood
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relationswithemergingeconomieswillinfluenceGermany’sreluctancetotakepartinoperationsinregionswhichareseenas thespheresof influenceof thesecountries.Germanywillalso be cautious in engaging in operations inMuslim coun-tries,intheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,asthiscouldaffectitsimageaswellasthepoliticalandeconomicpositionintheregion.
• The premises of the Bundeswehr’s transformation and theevolutionofGermany’ssecuritypolicyfitinwiththeexistingfragmentation tendencieswithin the EU (CSDP) andNATO.Theyalsogo in linewiththetendencytousethestructuresofbothorganisationsbythelargestmemberstatestoachievetheirnationalobjectives.
• InthediscussionswithinNATOandtheEUaboutclosermil-itarycooperation,Germanywillnotbeready todevelopco-operationwhichwouldresultinapermanentdependenceonpartnersinusingcertaincapabilitiesininternationalopera-tions (this concernsaboveallunits involved in combatmis-sions).However,Germanywilltakepartin(limited)coopera-tionprojects,forexampleintheareasoflogisticsandtraining,whichdonotinvolvetoomuchdependenceforGermanyandwhichgeneratemilitaryandpoliticalgains.Germanyhasin-dicatedthepoliticalandmilitaryconstraintsofthesmartde-fence(NATO)andpoolingandsharing(theEU)conceptscur-rentlybeingdiscussed.
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introduction
Sinceitsestablishmentin1955theBundeswehrhasbeenperceivedinGermany as an important instrument for achieving goals inforeignandsecuritypolicies.However,thelegacyofWorldWarIIwasaburdenfortheGermanarmedforces, forcingthegovern-mentinBonn,andlaterinBerlin,todeviseaconceptwhichwouldjustifytheexistenceoftheBundeswehrandlegitimiseitsroleandmissionsinthemilitaryaspect,ininternalpolicyandinrelationswithGermany’sallies.
The first concept was established in the ColdWar period. ThesecondwascreatedafterthecollapseoftheSovietUnionandthereunificationofGermany.Theseeventsbroughtaboutgeopoliti-calchangesinEuropeandintransatlanticrelationswhichforceda redefinition of the goals andprinciples of deploying themili-taryafter1990.Asaresult,thepoliticalandmilitaryconceptoftheBundeswehrwastransformed.Asimilarprocessiscurrentlyunderway.Ithasbeenbroughtaboutbythestrategictransforma-tions takingplace inEurope: theEUandNATOareundergoingchangesandthepositionofGermanyinitsrelationswithitsalliesis being strengthened. The current reform of the Bundeswehr,launchedin2011,isintendedto“construct”Germanarmedforcesanewinthepolitical,militaryandsocialdimensions.
ThepresentpaperpresentstheevolutionoftheBundeswehr’sroleinGermanforeignandsecuritypolicyandtheongoingprocessof“constructing”anewmilitary.Thepaperdiscussestheobjectivesofthemilitarytransformationandthechangeintheimageandsocial identityof theGermanarmed forces. It alsoanalyses theimplicationsofthisnewconceptoftheBundeswehrforpoliticalandmilitarycooperationwithinNATOandtheEU.
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i. the Bundeswehr as a political instrument of Germany
(1)TheconsentexpressedbytheUSandtheirEuropeanalliesfortheBundeswehrtobeestablishedafter world war iiwasintend-edtoincreaseWestGermany’scontributiontoNATO’sterritorialdefenceanddeterrencedoctrine.ForthegovernmentinBonntheroleoftheBundeswehrfromtheverybeginningextendedbeyondthatofensuringthesecurityofthestateandsociety.Thearmedforces were treated as an instrument of foreign policy, whichhelped to gradually increase the degree ofWest Germany’s po-liticalautonomywithregardtotheallies1.However,thelegacyofWorldWarIIweighedheavilyontheWestGermanarmedforces.Thereforeapolitical and social conceptof theBundeswehrwasestablished in order to ensure theBundeswehr’s democratic le-gitimacyanditsacceptancebyWestGermansocietyandtheWestEuropeanstates.
Withthedivisionofroles inNATOduringtheColdWarperiod,twofactorsensuredthattheexistenceoftheWestGermanarmedforces (intended to ultimately reach nearly half a million sol-diers)wasaccepted by the allies(aboveallthosefromWesternEurope).Firstly,theBundeswehrwasdefinedintheconstitution(Grundgesetz)asamilitaryservingexclusivelytodefendtheter-ritoryofWestGermanywithinNATO.Secondly,thegovernmentin Bonn accepted military restrictions imposed on the Bun-deswehr:the lackofaGeneralStaff,theorganisational focusofthearmedforcesonterritorialself-defenceandthesubordinationoftheGermanarmyandthecombatunitsoftheairforceandthenavytotheintegratedNATOcommandstructures.the domestic
1 Inreturnforremilitarisation,foraccesstoNATOandtothe(newlyestab-lished)WesternEuropeanUnionandforfulfillingcommitmentsresultingfrommembershipinbothorganisations,WestGermanygainedtheliftingoftheoccupationstatute,therecognitionofthegovernmentinBonnastheonly legal representative of thewhole Germany and the confirmation ofsupportforthereunificationofthetwoGermanstates.
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legitimacy, i.e. theacceptanceofWestGermansociety, criticalof the remilitarisationof the country, for theBundeswehr,wasensuredbythephilosophyofthe“citizeninuniform”.Thiscon-ceptconsistedoftheprincipleofthe“leadershipdevelopmentandciviceducation”2(InnereFührung)andofconscription.Theprin-cipleofInnereFührungimpliedthatsoldierswerecitizenswithacriticalapproachtothelegalityoftheorderstheyweregiven.Mandatorymilitaryservicewasintendedtocreateasenseofre-sponsibilityforthecountryandalsotofulfilthefunctionofinte-gratingthearmedforceswithsociety.
(2) the end of the cold warbroughtaboutfundamentalchang-es inGermany’s foreign and security policywhichwere due toGermany’s reunification and regaining of full sovereignty andchangesinthesecurityenvironment.ThustheGermangovern-mentredefinedthegoalsandprinciplesofthedeploymentoftheBundeswehr in its foreign policy. It was deemed that the Bun-deswehrshouldremaintheinstrumentusedtoincreaseGerma-ny’simportancewithinNATO,extendthecountry’sinfluenceattheUNandstrengthenitspositionwithregardtoFranceandtheUKintheWesternEuropeanUnion(WEU).Germanparticipationinpreventive,stabilisationandcrisisresponseoperationsabroadweretobethemeanstothisend.Thepolitical,militaryandsocialconceptoftheBundeswehrdatingbacktotheperiodoftheColdWardidnotfitintothenewrealities.Germanyhadto“construct”anewitsarmedforces–i.e.toacquirelegitimacyathomeandac-ceptanceabroadforamodelofanexpeditionarymilitary-andtolaunchnecessarymilitaryreforms.
the international acceptance of Germany’s military engage-ment abroad has already partly existed. Due to Germany’s fullintegration in the EU andNATO and the predictability of Ger-manpolicies,abovealltheUSbeganeventoexpectthatGermany,
2 Official German translation. Source: Innere Führung is our establishedmeansofguidance,04.12.06,www.bmvg.de
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which previously benefited from NATO’s protective umbrella,would fully participate in crisis management operations. The“multilateralism doctrine” in German security policy was alsointended to ensure international acceptance for the expansionofGermany’smilitaryinvolvementabroadinthe1990s.Thedoc-trineexcludedindependentGermandecisionsonsecurityissueswhichwouldbecontrarytothepoliciesoftheUSorFranceandimpliedpoliticalandmilitarysupportforactionstakenbytheseallieswithinNATO,theEUandtheUN.Germanyalsointendedtogradually familiarisemainlyEuropeancountrieswith theBun-deswehr’sengagementabroad.ThiswasdonebyaslowincreaseofGermany’s involvement inNATO,EUandUNoperationsanda gradual development of the expeditionary capabilities of the armed forces(seeAppendix).
Thedomestic legitimacyoftheBundeswehr’sevolutiontowardsexpeditionaryarmedforcesfocusedoninternationaloperationswasthegreatestchallengefortheGermangovernment.Legalle-gitimacywasensuredbytherulingoftheFederalConstitutionalCourtin1994.ThecourtrecognisedthatGermany’smembershipinthesystemsofcollectivesecurityandcollectivedefenceorgani-sationsandresultingtasksarecompatiblewiththeGrundgesetz.ThisrulingpavedthewayfortheBundeswehr’sengagementinUN,NATOandWEU(laterEU)operationsprovidingthatthegovern-mentobtainedtheapprovaloftheBundestag.However,thesociallegitimacyoftheBundeswehr,basedonthe“citizeninuniform”philosophywasnotadjustedtothenewgoalsandrulesoftheBun-deswehr’sdeploymentandthusgraduallybecameoutdated.NotonlydidtheprincipleofInnereFührungbecomedevalued,buttheproportionandimportanceofconscriptsinthearmedforcesalsodeclined.ThegovernmentbelievedthatagradualincreaseintheBundeswehr’s engagement abroadwouldmake German societygrowaccustomedtoit.ThegovernmentalsoexplainedthearmedforcesparticipationininternationaloperationsbythenecessityforaunitedGermanytotake“internationalresponsibility”.Thismove proved successful regarding stabilisation operations but
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metwithopposition fromsocietywhenGerman troopsbecameinvolvedincombattasksinAfghanistan.
(3) over the last decade (whosebeginningmaybemarkedbytheSeptember11thattacksinNewYork)theprocessofdisintegrationoftheAtlanticconsensusabouttheroleandthemodeofNATO’sfunctioninghasintensified,whichhasalsoaffectedtheEU’sCom-monSecurityandDefencePolicy.
ThisismanifestedbytheincreasedinstrumentalisationofbothNATOandEUstructuresbyitslargestmembercountries(theUS,France)toachievetheirnationalobjectives.Thisprocesshasalsoextended to Germany,which has gradually been shifting awayfromthe“multilateralismdoctrine”toconditionalsupportforac-tionsundertakenbyitsallieswithinNATO,theEUandtheUN.Paradoxically, the emancipation of German security policy im-pliednotagreaterautonomyandreadinesstodeploythearmedforces, but an increasingly cautious approach to participationin internationaloperations.However,unlike in the 1990swhenarguments of a historical naturewere raised, national interestisnowmorelikelytobethedeterminingfactor.Thefirstexam-pleof thisapproachwasGermany’sopposition to theAmericaninterventioninIraqin2003andnon-participationinthe“coali-tionofthewilling”.AnothercaseinquestionwaswhenGermanyrefusedtoparticipateintheEUoperationinChad,promotedbyFrance.
Thenew interpretationofGerman interests and the role of theBundeswehrwerealsodemonstratedbyGermany’sresistancetothesignificantextensionofitsinvolvementinAfghanistan.Thenewapproachwasshownbestby therecentGermanopt-outoftheinternationalandlaterNATO-ledoperationinLibyain2011,championedbyFranceandtheUK3.
3 See:JustynaGotkowska,Nomorecompulsoryengagement.Theemancipa-tionofGermansecuritypolicy,OSWCommentary,July2011.
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The process of redefining the goals and principles of the Bun-deswehr’sdeploymentabroadstartedalongsideGermany’sgrow-ingpolitical independencewithregardto itsallies.Thereform,launched in 2011, is to seal the ongoing transformations in thepoliticalandmilitaryareasandtointroduceanewsociallegiti-macyoftheBundeswehr.TheBundeswehrwillthusbecomethesameasotheralliedarmedforces. Itsdeployment inNATOandEUoperationswilldependonGermany’ssovereigndecisionandwillnot theresultof thepoliticalcommitmentsconnectedwithmembershipinNATOandtheEU.TheGermanpoliticaleliteareconvincedthatmorethan60yearsaftertheendofWorldWarIIGermanydoesnothavetobeguidedbyhistoricalreasonsinshap-ingitssecuritypolicy.Theimprovementoftheexpeditionarypro-fileof thearmed forces is thereforeunderway, accompaniedbytheestablishmentofanewsociallegitimacyoftheBundeswehr.
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ii. the military dimension of the reform
Thecurrentreform,whichtheFederalMinistryofDefencereferstoasNeuausrichtung4, in its militaryaspects ispartof awiderprocessofthetransformationoftheGermanarmedforcesiniti-atedat thebeginningofthe1990s(seeAppendix). Itconstitutesaconsecutivestageofthetransformationlaunchedin2004–theconceptdevisedintheUSandunderstoodasacontinuousprocessofadjustingthearmedforcestonewchallengesandcircumstanc-es.The2011reformwasdirectlycausedbyproblemswithregardtotheoperationruninAfghanistanandbudgetsavings.
Several years after the 2003/2004 reform authored by PeterStruck,theDefenceMinisterintheSPD/Greensgovernment(seeAppendix),itturnedoutthatthestructuresandproceduresthenintroduced in the Bundeswehr did not take fully into accountchallengesmetduringtheoperationinAfghanistan.TheinternalreportpreparedbytheFederalMinistryofDefencein2007,“TheBundeswehr’s international operations” enumerated the short-comingsintheplanning,commandandexecutionofoperationsabroad,includingtheISAFmissioninAfghanistan,inthecoordi-nationofthebranchesofthearmedforcesandofdifferentlevelsofcommand,intheduplicationofstructures,excessiveredtape,andininsufficientcombatequipmentandfinancingofthearmedforces.However,therewasnotenoughpoliticalwillintheFederalMinistryofDefenceheadedin2007byFranz-JosefJung(CSU)toimplementreformswhichwerenecessarybutcontroversialbackhome.After2008theBundeswehrhadtofaceuptomoreserious
4 TheworkonthereformwaslaunchedbyDefenceMinisterKarl-TheodorzuGuttenberg(CSU)whosupervisedthecreationofthereform’sinitialprem-isesandmadethedecisiontosuspendconscription.Thereformwascontin-uedbyDefenceMinisterThomasdeMaizière (CDU).Theministry issueda series of documents:DefencePolicyGuidelines (May2011); Plans of thenewstructureof theBundeswehr(September2011);plans forrestructur-ingtheministryofdefence,thereductioninmilitaryequipmentandarms,increasingtheappealofmilitaryserviceandanewdislocationofunitsinGermany(October2011);thereservists’concept(November2011).
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challengesduetothedeterioratingsecuritysituationinNorthernAfghanistanandtofurtherextendtherangeofthearmedforces’tasks5.ThisforcedtheCDU/CSU/FDPgovernmentinautumn2009to include in itscoalitionagreementadeclarationto implementtheconsecutivestageofthetransformation.
An important incentive to introduce a deep reformof theBun-deswehrwasprovidedbytheeconomiccrisisandthefour-yearausterityplanofthefederalgovernmentofJune2010.Underthisplan the FederalMinistry ofDefencewas set to save 8.3 billioneuros in total by 2014. Thismotivated theministry to considera number of options and their possible implications for the ca-pabilitiesoftheBundeswehr.Nevertheless,despitethefactthatthedirectincentivetoimplementthereformwasthesearchforsavings, in 2011 the government agreed that the FederalMinis-tryofDefencewouldnothavetofulfilitsobligationsmadeintheJune2010agreement6.By2014 itwillhaveabudget comparableorevenslightlyhigherthantheoneof2010(Germany’sdefencespendinginrecentyearsfluctuatedbetween1.3and1.4%ofGer-manGDP)7.Furthermore,costslinkedwiththereductionincivil-ianstaffwillberemovedfromtheministry’sbudget8.Additionalfundingfortheimplementationofthereformwillbe“obtained”
5 ThearmysetupthenthefirstcombatunitaftertheendofWorldWarII–QuickReactionForcewith300soldiers.
6 TheplansfromJune2010allowedforthefollowingbudgetoftheMinistryofDefencein2012-2014:in2012–30.9billioneuros,in2013–29.6billioneuros,in2014–27.7billioneuros.See:Bundestag,AntwortderBundesregierungaufdieKleineAnfrageBündnis90/DieGrünen:SparbeitragdesVerteidi-gungshaushaltes,Drucksache17/7293,11.10.2011.
7 SIPRI,TheSIPRIMilitaryExpenditureDatabase,http://milexdata.sipri.org/8 InlinewiththeGermanGrundgesetzthereisacivilianadministrationof
the Bundeswehr (Bundeswehrverwaltung)which performs functions re-lating toprocurement, realestateandpersonalmanagement (territorialeWehrverwaltung)andthepurchaseofarms,informationandITmanage-ment(Rüstungsbereich).
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from gradual decrease in German military involvement in Af-ghanistan(theGermancontingenthadinthebeginningof2012approximately5,000troops).91011
the budget of the federal ministry of defence, 2006–2011 (billion euros)9
2006 27.8
2007 28.4
2008 29.5
2009 31.2
2010 31.1
2011 31.5
the forecasted budget of the federal ministry of defence for 2012–2015 (billion euros)10
2012 31.7(accordingtoearlieragree-ments1130.9)
2013 31.4(accordingtoearlieragree-ments29.6)
2014 30.9(accordingtoearlieragree-ments27.7)
2015 30.4
9 Data from the FederalMinistry of Defence, Bundesministerium derVer-teidigung,www.bmvg.de
10 Bundesfinanzministerium,UnterrichtungdesBundes,FinanzplandesBundes2011 bis 2015, source: http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/nn_137300/DE/Wirtschaft__und__Verwaltung/Finanz__und__Wirtschaftspolitik/Bun-deshaushalt/Bundeshaushalt__2012/20110905-Bundeshaushalt12-Finanzplan,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf
11 Seefootnote6.
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1. Improving expeditionary capabilities
In themilitary dimension, the objective is to create amilitarywhichissmallerbutmoreeffective,excellentlytrained,andpro-videdwithmodernequipment.Thechangesinthestructure,pro-cesses, capabilities andmilitary equipment are geared towardsimprovements in the expeditionary profile of the Bundeswehr.Germany still considers there to be a negligible likelihood ofaconventionalarmedattackonGermanterritoryandisfocusingaboveallonanalysingthreatswhichcanhaveanegativeimpactonthe internationaleconomicflow.Germanywishestodevelopitsmilitarycapabilitieswithregardtoitsincreasedindependencefromitsalliesandtofillinthegapsinthecapabilitiesneededinordertocompletethetasksitcouldnotundertakealone.Indevel-opingthearmedforces’capabilitiestheministrywantstofollowtheprincipleofBreite vor Tiefethatistomaintainthewidestpossi-blerangeofcapabilities.Howeverthiswillalsomeanprioritisingcertaincapabilitieswhiledecreasingtheefficiency/effectivenessinareaslesssignificantfromthepointofviewoftheministry.
By 2015 the number of Bundeswehr troops will total 185,000(170,000professionalandcontractsoldiersand5,000-15,000sol-diersinvolvedinavolunteermilitaryservicelastingfrom12to23months).Thearmedforceswillbethusreducedby25,000profes-sionalandcontractsoldiers(whichislessthantheinitiallypro-posedreductionof40,000).Thenumberofcivilianemployeeswillalsobedownsized–from75,000to55,000(areductionof20,000).Thearmyandtheairforcewillbescaleddownbyapproximatelyathird(respectivelyto57,500and22,500soldiers),thenavywillbe diminished by approximately 14% (to 13,000 soldiers)12. TheBundeswehr is to generate up to 10,000 troops to be deployed
12 The JointMedicalServicewillhave 14,600 soldiers (reducedby26%), theJointSupportServicewillhave36,700soldiers(reducedby37%)and30,000soldierswill be in training orwork in such areas as infrastructure, themaintenanceofmilitaryequipment,ITetc.
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in internationaloperationsat thesametime(currently it isap-proximately7,000).Thearmedforceswillfurtherdeveloptheca-pabilitiesneededforGermanytotakeontheroleofaframeworknationinconductingoperationsabroad13.DespitereductionstheFederalMinistryofDefenceannouncedthatGermanywillmain-tainitscontributiontotheNATOResponseForceandtheEUBat-tleGroupsatthepreviouslevel.
The reduction in the number of soldiers has been linked withthe complete professionalisation of the armed forces. In July2011conscriptionwassuspendedandasaresult55,000placesforconscriptsandconscriptswhoopted forserviceextensionwereeliminated.AtthesametimeanewBundeswehrreservists’con-ceptwasintroducedthatincreasestheirimportanceinthenewstructureofthearmedforces14.Asubstantialchangewillbemadein theareaoftraining.Theearlierdivisionof theBundeswehrintointervention,stabilisationandsupportforceswillbeelimi-nated.Thegoalistoadjustthearmedforcestotherealitiesofop-erationscurrentlyrunsincetheycombinebothelementsofsta-bilisationandcombat tasks.Soldierswillbe trained toperformabroadspectrumoftasksinbothlow-andhigh-intensityopera-tions.Furthermore,followingthestatementsmadebyThomasdeMaizière,inthefuturetheBundeswehrwillconfineitsactivitytomilitaryoperationsandwillnot,contrarytothepresentsitua-tion,undertakeactionsintheareaofdevelopmentcooperationorpolicing.Changeswillalsobeintroducedintheorganisationofthebranchesofthearmedforces,commandstructures(areduc-tioninthenumberofcommands,astrengtheningoftheposition
13 BundesministeriumderVerteidigung,DefencePolicyGuidelines,27.05.2011,www.bmvg.de
14 BundesministeriumderVerteidigung,KonzeptionderReserve,01.02.2012,www.bmvg.de.ThenewconceptintroducesthedivisionintoreservistswhosupporttheBundeswehrunitsinoperationsabroadwhentheneedarises(Truppenreserve),reservistsassignedtoterritorialdefencetasks,actionsundertakeninresponsetonaturaldisastersortheprotectionofcriticalin-frastructure(TerritorialeReserve)andfinally–reservistsnotassignedtospecifictasks(AllgemeineReserve).
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oftheGeneralInspectoroftheBundeswehr)andthestructureoftheFederalMinistryofDefencewiththeaimofincreasingitsef-ficiencyandsimplifyingdecision-makingandbureaucraticpro-cesses.
Asfarasmilitary equipmentisconcerned,thereformallowsforareduction inolderequipment inuseandequipmentcurrentlybeingplanned15/beingintroducedintoservice16.Thereasonbe-hindthereductioninpurchasesofnewequipmentisnottomakesavingsbutratherto“release”fundingfortheequipmentwhichinviewoftheministryisneededmoreinBundeswehr’sinternation-aloperations.Itisworthnotingthatthebudgetforinvestmentsinnewmilitaryequipmentwillremainthesame17.Inthepasttheallocationof95%offundswithinthisbudgetwasappropriatedtofinancingequipmentmostlyorderedinthe1990swhichwillnotbeneededinsuchquantitiesafterthearmedforceshasbeenre-ducedinsize(Eurofighter,Puma)orbecauseitdoesnotmeetthecurrent requirements of the Bundeswehr (Tigermulti-role firesupporthelicopterorNH90medium-sizedtransporthelicopter)18.
15 OnconditionthattheMinistryofDefencereachesanagreementwithde-fenceindustry.
16 Thelargestreductionsareplannedinthearmyandtheairforceandwillconcern Leopard 2 tanks (from 350 to 225), Puma infantry fighting vehi-cles (from the planned 410 to 350), Panzerhaubitze 2000 self-propelledhowitzers(from148to81),NH90mediumsizedtransporthelicopter(fromtheplanned122 to80),Tigermulti-rolefiresupporthelicopters (fromtheplanned80 to40),Tornadocombataircraft (from185 to85),probablyEu-rofightercombataircraft (currentlytheLuftwaffehas143Eurofighters, ithasnotyetmadeadecisionaboutacceptingthedeliveryof37Eurofightersfrom the 3B tranche) andmilitary transport aircraft (Transall – from80to60,A400M– fromtheplanned60to40).Theplansofpurchasingnewmilitaryequipmentbythenavywillnotbechanged;theoldestmodelsoffrigatesandsubmarineswillhoweverbephasedoutmorequicklyorhavealreadybeenwithdrawnfromuse.
17 Itnowamounts to23%of theBundeswehr’sbudget.MinisterdeMaizièrebilligtUmrüstung,21.10.2011,www.bmvg.de
18 Niemieccy eksperci krytykują NH90, 23.02.2010, http://www.altair.com.pl/start-4172, Bezużyteczne Tigery, 26.05.2010, http://www.altair.com.pl/start-4576
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in the army thestrengtheningofcombatcapabilitieswillbethemost significant criterion for the realignment. This means anincreaseincombatunits,thereinforcementofinfantryandtheshiftingofsomeunitstoanotherbranchofthearmedforces(theairdefenceandmissiledefenceunitsaswellasCH-53heavy-lifttransporthelicopterswillbemovedtotheLuftwaffe).Theinfan-trywillbecomemobileandlight,preparedtorunjointoperationsandtoperformabroadspectrumoftasks19.Theinfantrywillbestrengthenedatthecostofthereductioninarmouredandartil-leryunits,whichisvisibleinthereductionofmilitaryequipment–tanks,infantryfightingvehiclesandself-propelledhowitzers.
thenavywillimproveitscapabilitiesforparticipatingininter-nationaljointoperationsinremoteregions.Itwillalsoundertakeimprovementsinitscapabilitiesofsupportingland-basedopera-tionsfromthesea.Thenavyhasbeenundergoingatransforma-tionintothemodelofanexpeditionarynavy forseveralyears20.Germany assesses that in the future the navy will be neededmoreasregards theprotectionofGermancitizensandGermaninterests abroad and Germany’s participation in internationaljointoperations.Therearetworeasonsforthis.Theprotectionofmaritime transport routes is of strategic importance toGerma-ny21.Jointoperationswithamorerobustparticipationofthenavynotonlyoffermoremilitaryoptionsbutalsoexpandtheroomformanoeuvreforpoliticaldecisions.Domesticallyitiseasiertoac-
19 InformationenzurGrobstrukturHeer,www.bmvg.de20 KlausvonDambrowski,EinmaritimesKonzeptfürdasgesamteEinsatzs-
pektrum,MaritimeConvention1/2008,p.11–13.21 Germany is theworld’s third largest exporter. Furthermore, it is a coun-
try highly industrialised but poor in natural resources. The prerequisiteforexportsofgoodsandimportsofnaturalresourcesandthusalsoforthedevelopmentof theGermaneconomy iswell-functioningglobal trade.Asmaritime transport is one of the safest, cheapest andmost environmen-tally-friendlymeansoftransportation,itisofstrategicsignificancetotheGermaneconomy.TheGerman tradefleet consistsof 3,500ships (includ-ing600registeredinGermany)andthusoccupiesthirdplaceintheworld(firstplaceregardingthenumberofcontainerships).See:AxelSchimpf,DieDeutscheMarinederZukunft,EuropäischeSicherheit,9/2011,p.30–36.
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ceptadecisiontooperatefromtheseawithoutestablishinglandbasesandinternationallyitiseasiertoimplement.Thereforethenavywillbeaffectedto the leastextentbythereduction in thenumberofsoldiers(approximately14%comparedtoover30%inotherbranchesofthearmedforces).Reductionswillnotaffectthepurchaseofnewmilitaryequipmentwhichhasbeenonthedraw-ingboardforseveralyears22.JointSupportShips(JSS)plannedinthenewstructureofthenavyshowthedirectionofchangesbe-ingmade.JSSwillbeusedtolaunchjointoperationsfromtheseaandwillincreaseGermany’sautonomywithregardtoitsalliesinconductingashowofforceinagivenregion,inconductinglandoperationsfromthesea,evacuationoperations,specialforcesop-erationsaswellashumanitarianandsupporttasksinresponsetonaturaldisasters.Duetofinancialreasons,theorderfortheseshipswillbeprobablyplacedin2016/2018.
As for the German air force, the transformed Luftwaffe willmaintain, though to a lesser extent, capabilities for the territo-rialdefenceofGermanyandNATO.Theairforcewillretainthreewings (Geschwader) with Eurofighter combat aircraft. Therewillbeonlyonewingleft(outofthecurrentthree)withTornadofighterandfighter-bomberaircraftcapableofelectroniccombatandthedeliveryofnuclearweapons.TheBundeswehrwillthusmaintainnuclearsharingcapabilitywithinNATO.Furthermore,theGermanairforcewilldevelopitscapabilitiesforparticipationin combined joint operations. Under theLuftwaffe 2020 conceptandthecurrentreformtheairforcewillalsoprioritisecapabili-ties that increase Germany’s political and military leverage in
22 Inapproximately2016Germannavywillhave:elevenfrigates(fourstate-of-the-art F125s, three F124s, four F123s), five K130 corvettes, three taskforcesuppliers(EinsatzgruppenversorgerclassBerlinships)toprovidelo-gisticsupportformaritimeoperations,sixclass212Asubmarines,30newhelicopters,tenminesweepersandeightP-C3Orionmaritimesurveillanceaircraft.Mostlikelyin2019-2020sixsmallmulti-taskships(Mehrzweck-kampfschiff180)willbeintroducedintoserviceandinapproximately2016-2018twoshipstoprovidelogisticsupportforlandoperations(JointSupportShips)willprobablybeordered.
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NATOandGermaninfluenceonconductinginternationalopera-tions.Fourpriorityareas23arementioned:militaryuseofspace24,missiledefence25,unmannedaircraft systems26 andAirSurface
23 RalphThiele,ReconsideringtheRelevancyofAirPower–GermanAirForceDevelopment,ISPSWStrategySeriesNo.162,July2011.
24 TheBundeswehrusesdataandservicesprovidedbysatellitesystemsintheareaofcommunication,reconnaissance,navigationandgeoinforma-tion.TheBundeswehrhasitsownsatellitecommunicationsystems(SAT-ComBw2) and satellite reconnaissance systems (SAR-Lupe)whichwerelaunchedinrecentyears.Intheareaofreconnaissanceandcommunica-tionGermanyisseekingtomaintainitsautonomouscapabilitiesandwillonly supplement themwith participation in international projects. TheLuftwaffeisresponsiblefordevelopingcapabilitiesintheareaoftheuseofspace,forprotectingandmaintainingthesatellitesystemscurrentlyinuseandforoperatingtheSpaceSituationalAwarenessCentrewhichgath-ersandverifiesinformationobtained.Themainsourceoffootnotes22,24,25,26:www.bundeswehr.de
25 TheBundeswehrisbuildingmissiledefencecapabilitiesintwoareas.First-ly,with regard to protectingGermanmilitary bases in international op-erations.TheMANTISshortrangeairdefenceprotectionsystem(counter-rocket,artilleryandmortar)willbeusedinthiscontext(theBundeswehrhasorderedfourofthese).Secondly,GermanyistakingpartintheNATOALTBMD (Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence) programmewhich is aimed at protectingNATO troopsduring operations against thethreatposedbytacticalballisticmissileswithrangesupto3,000kilometresandwhichcouldbecomepartoftheNATOmissiledefencesystem.TheGer-mancontributiontotheALTBMDprogrammewillbeprobably,afterthein-troductionofthereform,14batteriesoftheshort-rangeanti-missilePatriotsystemupgraded to thePAC-3versionand theSurface toAirMissileOp-erationsCentre(SAMOC).Until2011GermanytookpartinthedevelopmentoftheMEADSprogrammetogetherwiththeUSandItaly,thisprogrammewasintendedtograduallyreplacethePatriotsystem.DuetothefactthattheUSdecided towithdraw from theMEADSprogramme,Germanyalsoabandoneditonfinancialgrounds.
26 Germanywillbedevelopingunmannedaircraftsystemswhicharealreadycompleting forand takingover tasksperformedbymultirolecombatair-craftintheareaofreconnaissanceandsupportforland-basedoperations.FortheLuftwaffethepriorityistodevelopcapabilitiesnotonlyintherangeofMALEclassUAV(theequivalentsoftheIsraeliIAIHeronUAV,theBun-deswehrisleasingthreesuchUAVsuntil2012andhasoptedfordevelopingasystemofthesameclassbyGermancompanies,possiblyincooperationwith foreign partners). It alsowants to develop its capabilities in higherclassHALEUAVs.From2015onwards theLuftwaffewillhave fourHALEclass EurohawkUAVs equippedwith signals intelligence (SIGNIT)whichwillbetheGerman“ear”intheair.AspartoftheGermancontributiontotheAllianceGroundSurveillanceCore system,which is being developednow,theBundeswehrwillalsopurchasefourUSGlobalHawkUAVs.Ger-
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Integration-theplanning,synchronisationandintegrationoftheairforce,armyandnavycapabilitiesavailablewithinanopera-tionalarea–fromtheearth’ssurfacetospaceonjointoperations.
2. Challenges for the Bundeswehr’s transformation
WilltheBundeswehrbeabletoachievetheobjectivesandcapa-bilitiessetbytheFederalMinistryofDefencewithinthepresenttransformationprocess?Theimplementationofthereform–bothinthemilitaryandpoliticalaspects–will takeseveralyears. Itwillbepossibletoevaluatetheresultswhen:thereorganisationofthearmedforcestakesplace,newproceduresareintroduced,newcommandstructuresaretestedforoperationalpurposes,thenewequipmentisintroducedandwhentheconsequencesofthesuspensionofconscriptionisdiscovered.Nevertheless,inseveralareastheimplementationofthereformwillrunintodifficulties.
(1) Despite the introduction of financial and social incentivesalongwithmeasures to increase the social recognition of serv-ing in themilitary, itmayprovedifficult to recruit a sufficientnumber of volunteers (the expectednumber ranges from 5,000to 15,000).TheBundeswehr’sfirstexperienceswithavolunteerservicedonotinspirewithoptimism–outof3,459volunteersen-rolled in July 2011 22.5% leftwithina short amountof time (re-signed frommilitaryservicevoluntarilyorweredischarged). Itremainsanopenquestionhowmanyofthevolunteerscurrentlyperformingtheirmilitaryservicewilldecidetostayinthearmedforcesascontractsoldiers.Militaryofficialsexpressdoubtsastowhetheritwillbepossibleinthefuturetomaintaintheexpectedsizeofthearmedforces(185,000soldiers,including170,000pro-fessionalandcontractsoldiers)andindicateunfavourabledemo-graphictrendsinGermany.Furthermore,thereareconcernsthat
man companies, commissioned by the Federal Ministry of Defence, arealsodevelopingprojectsregardingunmannedcombatairvehicles(UCAVs)–http://augengeradeaus.net/2012/01/zum-nachlesen-kampfdrohne-fur-die-bundeswehr/
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theBundeswehrmaybecomethe“armedforcesofthelowersocialclasses”(Unterschichtenarmee)27and/oramilitarywhosesoldierswillberecruitedinlargepartfromradicalright-wingcircles28.
(2) Thereductioninthenumberoftroopsby25,000professionalandcontractsoldierscoupledwiththepremisethatupto10,000troops(currently7,000)willbeinvolvedininternationalopera-tionscallsintoquestionthefeasibilityofthereform’sguidelines.AccordingtotheFederalMinistryofDefenceandmilitaryofficialsthiscanbeachievedthroughhighqualitytrainingandequipmentbutwillalsoinvolveadecreaseintheabilityoftheBundeswehrtoconductlongerandmoredemandinginternationaloperationsduetooverstretchingitsresources29.
(3) IntheyearstocometheBundeswehrwillstillstrugglewiththeproblemofashortageofmilitaryequipmentorderedseveralyearsagoandnotyetdeliveredorofmilitaryequipmentdeliveredandreturnedforadjustment,repairorupgrade.ThismaybeduetodifficultiesintheproductionprocessoftheGerman/EuropeandefenceindustryaswasthecasewithNH90mediumsizedtrans-porthelicopters,Tigermulti-rolefiresupporthelicopters,A400Mmilitarytransportaircraft,K130corvettes.Itisquitelikelythatseveral years will pass before this equipment will be commis-sionedintoservicewiththeGermanarmedforces.
(4) Even if theFederalMinistryofDefenceadopteda long termbudgetaryplan(to2015),adecreaseinfundsallocatedtothere-formcannotbe ruledout in thecomingyears.ThegovernmentmaylookforfurtherbudgetsavingsiftheeconomicandfinancialcrisisintheEUdeteriorates.Financialsetbacksaccompaniedby
27 HaraldKujat, DasEnde derWehrpflicht,w:Wehrpflicht undZivildienst,AusderPolitikundZeitgeschichte,48/2011,November2011,pp.3–7.
28 Zwischen Verrohung und Verdummung, Handelsblatt, 27.05.2011, http://www.handelsblatt.com/politik/deutschland/zwischen-verrohung-und-verdummung/4224518.html
29 HaraldKujat,DasEndederWehrpflicht,op.cit.
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possible recruitmentproblemscould lead to adecisionwhereintheBundeswehrwilldecreasefurther.Thiswouldimplyfurtherreductionsinmilitaryequipmentand/orabandoningcertainca-pabilities(whichtheministrycurrentlywishestoavoid)30.Sucha development depends on whether the German governmentevaluates maintaining an effectivemilitary with the ability toconductthefullspectrumofcapabilitiesasnecessarytakingintoaccountdevelopmentsintheinternationalsecurityenvironment.
30 StephanLöwenstein,DasunerreichteEndederFahnenstange,Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,02.01.2012,p.4.
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iii. the social dimension of the reform
Thepresent stageof the transformation isalso intended tocre-atenewsociallegitimacyforaBundeswehrthatisimprovingitsexpeditionaryprofileandis intendedtobeusedbytheGermangovernmentpreciselyasanyotheralliedarmedforceswouldbe.
1. Problems with legitimacy
acquiring social legitimacy fortheBundeswehr’sevolutionto-wardsanexpeditionarymilitaryfocusedonconductinginterna-tionaloperationshasbeenthegreatestchallengefortheGermangovernment since the beginning of the 1990s. Consecutive gov-ernmentshopedthatGermansocietywouldslowlygrowaccus-tomedtothegradualincreaseintheBundeswehr’sparticipationininternationaloperations.Furthermore,inordertowingreateracceptance for foreign deployments of the Bundeswehr, a ficti-tiousimageofitsengagementinexclusively“good”stabilisationoperationswasmaintained.Duetothelackofasufficientinfor-mationcampaignGermansociety’sapproachtotheBundeswehrbegan to evolve towards a “friendly indifference” (freundlichesDesinteresse)31.AtthesametimesocietywasscepticaloftheBun-deswehr takingovernew tasks, andGermanyused this fact inNATOwhen justifying its lack of a largermilitary involvemente.g. in the ISAFoperation inAfghanistan.However, thisfictiveimagealsohadnegativeimplicationsfortheGermangovernmentitself.InrecentyearstheimageoftheBundeswehrconveyedbythemediawherethemilitarywasportrayedasaquasi“develop-ment/policingagencyinuniforms”clashedwiththeactualtasksperformedbytheGermanarmedforcesinAfghanistan.Withinthe last twoyears theBundeswehrhashad to substantiallyex-tendthescopeofoperationsinordertomaintainthesecurityof
31 Köhler fordert mehr Aufklärung über Auslandseinsätze, Spiegel Online,27.11.2008,http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,593131,00.html
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itsowncontingentandofthenorthernprovinces.Thismovehasnotbeenaccompaniedbyanadequate informationcampaign inGermanyandthiswasthereasonforoneofthelargestscandalsconcerning theBundeswehr in the last 20years.The air strikeagainsttwotankertruckscalledbyaGermancommanderinSep-tember2009intheAfghanprovinceofKunduzclaimedthelivesof approximately 100Afghancivilianswhile targeting theTali-ban.Thenumberofciviliancasualtiesandthedeliberateelimina-tionoftheTalibanbytheBundeswehrcausedashockinGermansociety.Franz-JosefJung,theformerheadoftheFederalMinistryofDefence in theCDU/CSU/SPDcoalitionandthe labourminis-terinthenewCDU/CSU/FDPgovernment,wasoneoftheofficialswhoresignedamidstaccusationsofprovidingfalseinformation.Partlyalsodueto thisscandal, theGermangovernmentunder-stoodthatafurthertransformationoftheBundeswehralongwiththeevolutionofGermanforeignandsecuritypolicywouldhavetobeacceptedbyGermansociety.
The issue of the social legitimacy of the Bundeswehr as inter-nationallydeployablearmedforcesis indirectlylinkedwiththerecruitment of volunteers and candidates for contract and professional soldiers. Until 2011 mandatory military serviceservedasarecruitmentsystem32.Conscriptionwasalso,atleastintheory,partofthe“citizeninuniform”philosophyandthe“link”between the armed forces and societywhich co-legitimised the
32 Mandatorymilitaryservice fulfilled the functionof therecruitmentsys-temdespitethediminishingnumbersofconscripts.In1990thepercentageof conscripts in theBundeswehrstoodat45%, in2010 itwasonly 15%. Inrecentyearsonlyapproximately 17%ofallyoungmenreachingdraftableageservedinthemilitary.Themajorityperformedcivilianservice,oftenin social care institutions inGermany, thus in fact providing themwithcheapstaff.Therecruitmentroleofconscriptionstartedtogeneratecontro-versies,whilethesmallproportionofconscriptsprovokedquestionsabout“draft equality”, of ensuring the country’s security (Wehrgerechtigkeit)andabouttheconformityofthewholesituationwiththeGermanconstitu-tion.Thecourseofmandatorymilitaryserviceandthecostsgeneratedbyconscriptionwerecriticised,aswellasthepointofthemandatorymilitaryserviceinthefaceofthenewprofileoftheBundeswehr.
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existenceof theBundeswehrduring theColdWar.Thesuspen-sion of conscription in 2011meantnot only an abandonment ofthesymbolicelementof social legitimacybutalsoofaconveni-entrecruitmentsystemforthearmedforces.Thus,thisprovidedanotherimpetustocreateanewimageandidentityfortheBun-deswehrwhichwouldbeattractiveforfuturerecruits.
2. The new image and identity of the Bundeswehr
Inordertoprovidenewsociallegitimacy,theFederalMinistryofDefencehas takenmeasuresaimedatcreating the new image and identity of the Bundeswehr.Themeasuresareintendedtowinsocialacceptanceforthenewmodelofthearmedforcesandindirectly–toincreasetheattractivenessoftheprofessionalmili-taryserviceinGermany33.
Theemphasisinpoliticaldiscoursehasalwaysbeenonthedemo-cratichistoryoftheBundeswehroverthelast50years34andonitsparticipationinUN,NATOandEUoperations.Thishasbeenex-plainedastaking“internationalresponsibility”thatcorrespondstoGermany’snewpositioninEuropeandintheworld35.ThenewelementinthepoliticalrethorikisthereferencetoGerman“na-tionalinterests”andtothelinksbetweentheBundeswehr’spar-ticipationininternationaloperationsandGermany’spositionin
33 Besides the financial aspects and the possibility to receive high qual-ityeducationintheBundeswehr,animportantfactorin(not)decidingtojointhearmedforces–particularlyinGermany–isalsothesocialaspect.See:HeikoBiehl /BastianGiegerich /Alexandra Jonas,AussetzungderWehrpflicht. Erfahrungen und Lehren westlicher Partnerstaaten, in:WehrpflichtundZivildienst,AusderPolitikundZeitgeschichte,48/2011,November2011,pp.31–38.
34 The earlier traditions / events towhich theGermanarmed forcesmakesreference includeonlyPrussianmilitary reforms from 1808–1813 and theresistancetoHitlerintheWehrmacht.
35 BurkhardKöster,TraditioninderBundeswehr–TraditionderReformen?,in:Karl-HeinzLutz,MartinRink,MarcusvonSalisch(ed.),Reform,Reor-ganisation,Transformation, München2010,pp.317–330.
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globaltrade,jobsinGermanandtheincomeofGermancitizens36.Since 2010 the government has also started to inform societyabouttherealnatureoftheBundeswehr’sactivityinAfghanistan.ThebreakthroughcamewhenDefenceMinister,Karl-TheodorzuGuttenberg,usedthetabooword“war”whilereferringtothecon-ditionsofBundeswehr’soperation.
Furthermore,inthelasttwoyearsthegovernmenthasbeenaim-ing to acknowledge the efforts of German soldiers involved ininternational operations and to commemorate those who werekilled serving their country. In 2009 amonumentwas built inBerlinincommemorationofthesoldiersandcivilianemployeesoftheBundeswehrwhowerekilledonduty(EhrenmalderBun-deswehr). In2008theBundeswehrCrossofHonourforBravery(EhrenkreuzderBundeswehrfürTapferkeit)wasintroducedintothe catalogue of themilitarydecorations of theGerman armedforces.This is thefirstdecorationof this type sinceWorldWarII to be awarded by the FederalMinistry of Defence to honouroutstanding achievements of German soldiers in internationaloperations37.An importantsignalwasgiven inApril2010whenChancellorAngelaMerkel for the first time participated in thememorial service inhonourof three soldierskilled inAfghani-stan.Thiswas interpretedasacommemorationof theirserviceforthecountry.
36 InMay2010GermanPresidentHorstKöhlerfeltforcedtoleavehisofficeaf-terthestarkcriticismfrompublicopinioninGermany,whenhemadealinkbetween theparticipationof theBundeswehr in internationaloperationswiththeprotectionofGermany’seconomicinterests.However,inautumnof the same year theDefenceMinister, zuGuttenberg, repeatedKöhler’sarguments.See:AnnaKwiatkowska-Drożdż,The naturalresourcesdeficit: the implications for Germanpolitics,OSWCommentary,February2011.
37 Franz Josef Jung,SoldatischesDienenanerkennen,Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 09.10.2008, http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/!ut/p/c4/NY1RC4IwFIX_0aaURr0VEUVQj2UvMt11XnGb3F0Noh_fDDwHzsv3wZEvGe-vUhEYxeqd6-ZRFjbvqLSo7GWHRYWAgHK0wEOoW65ah_LMJiAE1mtG-ZsIhlAOQy3WaZ0NSQcp_OB2i66MjHfKZB1N4Bz8vgGOMaUuxJDJ64n8lI-FIlALYskPR6SNFmSfjfX03m1zvL8cjvd5WDt_gc9kCbv/
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TheFederalMinistryofDefenceisalsopromotingthecivicchar-acterofmilitaryservice:theBundeswehristocontributetomain-tainingthemodelofafreeanddemocraticGermany.Thisaspectis intended to replace the integrating role formerly assigned toconscriptionandtoestablishthe“link”betweentheprofessionalarmed forces and society. The civic duty dimension of the newidentity is emphasised particularly in the information and re-cruitmentcampaignrunbytheFederalMinistryofDefenceun-dertheslogan“Wir.Dienen.Deutschland” (We.Serve.Germany)38.
38 BundesministeriumderVerteidigung,http://www.wirdienendeutschland.de/selbstverstaendnis.html
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iV. the implications for nato and the eu
The foundations of the present reform alongwith the develop-ment of German security policywill both influence Germany’sapproachtopoliticalandmilitarycooperationwithinNATOandtheEU.
1. The implications for political cooperation within NATO and the EU
ThecurrentBundeswehrreformandtheevolutionofGermany’ssecurity policy will bring about a progressing redefinition of Germany’s membership in nato and the eu.Germany’smem-bership inNATO and its involvement in the Common SecurityandDefencePolicyareunquestionableinGermany.InfuturetheBundeswehrwill conduct operationswithinNATO, theEU andtheUNincooperationwiththearmedforcesofthepartnercoun-tries.WithpoliticalcohesionfalteringbothwithinNATOandtheEU,Germanywillintensifyitsinstrumentalapproachtothetwoorganisationsasplatformsusedtoachieveitsownobjectives,notinstitutionswhicharesettingthepoliticalorientationandopera-tionalinvolvementoftheBundeswehr39.AswasthecaseofLibya,Germanywillnotparticipateinoperationswhicharenotconver-gentwithorarecontradictorytoGermany’sinterestsandpoliti-calgoals.Ontheotherhand,Germanyisconcernedthatitsallies(theUS,FranceandtheUK)willreachfor“coalitionsofthewill-ing”moreoftenthanisnecessaryandthatsuchoperationsmayhavenegativeimpactonGermanpoliticalandeconomicinterestsintherelevantregions.InfutureGermanymaythereforebecon-frontedwiththefollowingchoice:eitheritagreestoanunwantedengagement and thus influences the operation, or it opposes itand thushasno considerable influenceon theactions takenbythecoalition.
39 JustynaGotkowska,Nomorecompulsoryengagement.TheemancipationofGermansecuritypolicy,OSWCommentary,July2011.
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Theterm“national interest”,whichuntilrecentlywastabooinGermany,hascurrentlybecomeanorminthevocabularyofGer-manpoliticians.Accordingly,itwillbeintheGermaninteresttotakepart in internationaloperations set topreventphenomenawhichmayhaveanegativeimpactontheinternationaleconomicflowandthusaffecteconomicgrowthinGermanyanditsglobalposition,intheshorterorlongerterm.TakingoverresponsibilityininternationalpoliticsismentionedasanothercriterionwhendecidingonGermanmilitaryengagementabroad.Othersinclude:takingpart inparalleloperations, thepredicteddurationof theplannedoperationandclearconditionsforitscompletionaswellasthepossibleconsequencesGermanywouldfaceifitrefusedtoparticipate40. There are few international operationswithBun-deswehrinvolvementwhichGermanyseesasservingitsinterests.OneexampleoftheseistheEU’sOperationAtalanta;thisissettosecuremaritimeroutesoffthecoastofSomaliaagainstpirateat-tacks.Othersarethestabilisationoperations(KFORandEUFOR)intheBalkans–aregionwhichGermanytreatsasits“sphereofresponsibility”intheEU’sdirectneighbourhood.ThedeploymentoftheBundeswehrinmissionsofadifferenttypethanthatmen-tionedabovewillrathernotbeinGermany’sinterest.Thegrow-ingenergyandeconomiclinksaswellasthedevelopmentofgoodrelationswithemergingeconomies(BRIC)willcontributetoGer-many’sreluctancetotakepartinNATOandEUoperationsintheregionsperceivedasthespheresofinfluenceofthesecountries.Germanywill alsobecautious inengaging inmissions inMus-limcountries,mainlyintheMiddleEastandNorthAfrica,asthiscouldaffectitspositiveimageandhaveimplicationsforitspoliti-calandeconomicpositionintheseregions.Theinstrumentsfromthe areas of diplomacy, development policy, political, economicandfinancialcooperationaswellaspoliceandmilitarycoopera-tionaresufficientandarethepreferredtoolsofprotectingGer-man interests. For these reasons, in future crises and conflicts
40 See: Thomas deMaizière, speech at the 8thHandelsblatt conference „Si-cherheitspolitikundVerteidigungsindustrie”inBerlin,25.11.2011.
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Germanywill ratheropt fordiplomatic solutionswithinNATO,theEUandtheUN.Itwillalsoseektouseandstrengthencivil-ianinstrumentsofconflictpreventionandcrisisresponse41.Ger-manydoesanalysetheconsequencesoftheincreasedeconomic,militaryandpoliticalimportanceofthe“newpowers”onitspo-sitionand interests– thecompetition forpolitical influence,di-minishingnaturalresourcesandaccesstomarkets.ButtheGer-manansweristosupporttheestablishmentofNATO’s“strategicpartnerships”withnon-NATOcountries (aboveallwithRussia,butalsowithother “newpowers”) throughconfidencebuildingmeasures,political andmilitarycontacts, consultationsandco-operationonjointprojects42.
2. The implications for military cooperation within NATO and the EU
Withanevolvingapproachtopoliticalcooperation,theGermantake on the objectives and principles ofmilitary cooperation isalsochanging,alsointhecontextofthediscussiononstrength-eningmilitarycooperationwithinNATOandtheEU.
Germany will not be ready to become involved in cooperation which could result in a permanent interdependence between partners with regard to capabilities used in international operations. Thisappliesabovealltounitsofthearmy,airforceand the navy conducting combat operations. Germany is con-cernedthatinterdependenceinsuchcapabilitiessharedwithits
41 InthetripartiteWeimar initiative(seefootnote47),put forwardtogetherwithPolandandFrance,Germanywasaboveallinterestedintheestablish-mentofpermanentcivilianandmilitaryheadquarters(EUHQ)–inordertostrengthentheciviliancomponentofEUcrisisresponseandbetterco-ordinationwithmilitary structures inperforming futureEUoperations.See:ClaudiaMajor,Einzivil-militärischesHauptquartierfürdieEU.SWP-Aktuell,October2010.
42 See:ThomasdeMaizière,speech“DiedeutscheRolleinderinternationalenSicherheitsarchitektur”madeatthe“GermanConference“atHarvardUni-versity,Boston,20.02.2012.
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mainpartners(FranceandtheUK)mayleadtopoliticalpressureforGermanytoengageinoperationssupportedbythesecountriesbutnotnecessarilyconvergentwithGermaninterests. It ispre-ciselydue to this reason thatGermany’smainpartners (FranceandtheUK)donotwanttoengageinthiskindofcooperationwithGermanyeither,sinceinthepastalackofGermanconsenteithermadejointunitsdeploymentonEUorNATOoperationsdifficultorimpossible.Germanythusputitselfinadifficultpoliticalpo-sition.ThiswasthecasewithEUBattleGroups43andtheNATOAWACSunit44.TheFranco-BritishagreementforgreatermilitarycooperationfromNovember2010andthepolicyofexcludingcol-laborationwithGermanywhichfollowedit45best illustratestheattitudeofFranceandtheUKtowardscooperationwithGermany.
Germany will however take part in projects of (limited) cooperation which do not restrict Germany’s ability to act autonomously and flexibly and which generate military and political gains in selected areas. Germanywillcontinueitspre-sentengagementinpoolingandsharing/smartdefenceprojects46
43 GermanyblockedtheuseofEUBattleGroupswiththeparticipationoftheBundeswehrin2006(Chad)andin2008(Congo).See:ClaudiaMajor/Chris-tianMölling,EU-Battlegroups.Bilanz undOptionenzurWeiterentwicklungeuropäischerKrisenreaktionskräfte,SWP-Studie,August2010,p.22-23.
44 GermansoldiersmakeupathirdoftheNATOAWACSunit.GermanydidnotallowtheirparticipationintheAWACSunitoperationintheNATOmis-sioninLibya.Itmayhaveconsiderablyhamperedtheunit’soperationsiftheGermangovernmenthadnotallowedtheparticipationofBundeswehrsol-diersintheunit’soperationinAfghanistan.ThisdecisionwasmadeunderpressurefromthealliesandduetofiercecriticismwithinNATOoftheGer-manstanceonLibya.Earlier,duetodomesticpolicy,GermanyhadrejectedNATO’srequesttoallowtheparticipationofGermansoldiersintheAWACSunit operation inAfghanistan. See: TheGermanmission inAfghanistandependsonlocalelections,BESTOSW,19.01.2011,http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/CEWEEKLY_99.pdf
45 Tom Kington / Albrecht Müller, Italy, Germany make their own pacts.AgreementsareactiontosnubbyFrench-UKDeal, 19.12.2011,http://www.defensenews.com/article/20111219/DEFFEAT04/112190321/Italy-Germany-Make-Their-Own-Pacts
46 E.g.EuropeanAirTransportCommand (EATC),AllianceGroundSurveil-lance(AGS)orBalticAirPolicing.
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andwillbecomeinvolvedinnewonesintheEUandNATO.Nev-erthelessthiscooperationwillhavealimitedscope.Itmaycoversupportunitswhichdonottakepartininternationaloperations,strategicandtacticalairliftunits,theareaofeducationandtrain-ingaswellasmaritimepatrolling(importantforGermanywithregardtopreventinge.g.piracy),andairpolicingresultingfromNATO’sArticle5commitments.
InresponsetotheFranco-Britishagreement,GermanyalongwithSwedenintheGhentInitiativesuggestedexploringthepossibili-ties of strengthening European military cooperation throughpoolingandsharingprojects.Theyalsoprovidedexamplesofpos-sibleareasofcooperation47.ForGermany,poolingandsharingco-operationcan improvecertaincapabilitiesattheEuropeanlevel(e.g. strategicand tacticalairlift,maritimepatrolling,airpolic-ing).GermanywouldalsoliketousepossibleEuropeanprojectsinordertomaintainandreinforcethestructuresoftheGermanarmedforces(e.g.throughthecommonuseoftheBundeswehr’strainingandexercisecentres).Germany’sapproachtoEuropean
47 TheGhent Initiative. In thedocument submittedbyGermanandSwedeninNovember2010threecategoriesofcapabilitieswerespecified:(1)capa-bilities and support structures that are deemed essential for individualnationsandthereforemaintainedonastrictlynationallevel(e.g.capabili-tiesrelatingtocombat,combatsupportandcombatservicesupportforces,intelligence,fighterairplanesandwarships). Inthiscategorycooperationcan extend as far as to increasing interoperability; (2) capabilities andsupport structureswhere closer cooperation is possiblewithout creatingtoostrongdependenciese.g.intheformofpoolingcapabilities (e.g.nonde-ployablesupportforcesandoperationaltrainingforcesaswellasselectedcapabilitiessuchasstrategicandtacticalairliftandlogisticscapabilities).In the latter area theBundeswehr is currently takingpart in the follow-inginitiatives:theNATOStrategicAirliftCapabilityandtheEuropeanAirTransportFleet);(3) capabilities and support structures where mutual dependency and reliance upon european partners is acceptable in the european role– and tasksharing framework (e.g.supportstructuresre-quiredforeducation,trainingandexercisesorcapabilitiesrelatingtotaskssuchasmaritimepatrollingorairpolicing).See:GhentInitiative.EuropeanImperative.IntensifyingMilitaryCooperationinEurope,November2010,http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/sede/dv/sede260511deseinitiative_/sede260511deseinitiative_en.pdf
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cooperationisshownbestbyitsoffertobuildpermanentEUcivil-militaryoperationalheadquartersontheBundeswehrResponseForcesOperationsCommandinUlm–thisissettobedismantledaspartof thecurrent reform48.Within itsmilitarycooperationGermanywillalsoattempttosupport itsowndefenceindustry.InthecontextoftheeconomiccrisisandexpenditurecutsmadeinthedefencesectorintheEU,Germany’sobjectiveistomaintainproductioncapacitiesandtoguaranteethetechnologicaldevelop-mentoftheGermandefencecompanies.
DespitethefactthatGermany(withSweden)authoredthepropos-altostrengthenEuropeanmilitarycooperation,Germanyisnowseekingtodiminishexpectationsregardingthiskindofcoopera-tionwithintheEUandNATO.Itindicatesthatsuchcooperationwillnotprovidealifelineformaintainingthecapabilitiesofthearmedforcesanddevelopingnewonesinatimeofsavingsinthearea of defence.Germany is rather recommending several newprojectsbefocusedupon.TheGermanDefenceMinister,ThomasdeMaizière,inFebruary2012evencalledforasoberandrealisticoutlookon smartdefenceandpoolingandsharingprojectsandstressedtheimportanceofthepoliticalandmilitarylimitationsofthistypeofcooperation49.
Justyna GotKowsKaText completed February 2012
48 Julian Hale, Germany to press maritime patrol aircraft pool, 29.07.2011,http://www.defensenews.com/article/20110729/DEFSECT05/107290307/Germany-to-Press-Maritime-Patrol-Aircraft-Pool
49 Thomas deMaizière, the speechmade at the 48thMunich Security Conference,03.02.2012,http://www.securityconference.de/Dr-Thomas-de-Maiziere.809.0.html
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appendix
the most important reforms of the Bundeswehr and their context (1990–2004)
1. 1993: Volker Rühe’s reform
After Germany’s reunification the Bundeswehr started to par-ticipate inUN,NATO andWEU (Western EuropeanUnion) op-erations. As early as in 1991 Germany supported themilitarilyoperationsof theanti-Iraqcoalition,despite the fact thatChan-cellorHelmutKohlrefusedtoinvolvetheBundeswehrdirectlyintheGulfWar.In1992theBundeswehrtookpartintheUNopera-tioninCambodia(UNTAC,medicalunits)andin1993–intheUNoperation in Somalia (UNOSOM, logistics units).Next,GermanmilitaryengagementabroadwasextendedtotheparticipationofGermannavyunits inNATOand theWEUSharpGuard opera-tionontheAdriatictoimplementtheUNeconomicsanctionsandarmsembargoagainsttheformerYugoslavia.
GermanpoliticiansandmilitaryofficialswereawareofthesecurityenvironmenttransformationandofitsconsequencesforNATOandGermanyandthusforthestructureoftheBundeswehr.However,duetothedomesticsituation,theyattemptedtomaintaindomesti-callythattheBundeswehr’sinternationaloperationsareonlycom-plementarytothemaintaskoftheGermanarmedforces,i.e.defend-ingthecountryanditsNATOallies.This“duality”wasreflectedintheDefencePolicyGuidelines(VPR)publishedbyDefenceMinisterVolkerRühein1992.Accordingtothedocumentthethreatofacon-ventionalattackonGermanandNATOterritorywashighlyunlike-ly;howeverthethreatofconflictsinGermany’sfurthergeographicalsurroundingswasincreasing.Tasksrelatedtocrisisresponseopera-tionswerethusinthefuturetoreplacetasksrelatedtoterritorialde-fence.NeverthelesstheGuidelinesstilldefinedtheterritorialdefenceofGermanyandNATOastheBundeswehr’smaintask,definingtheparticipationofalimitednumberofunitsininternationalpeaceand
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stabilisationoperationsonlyascomplementary.ThereforeadivisionwasmadeinthenewstructureoftheBundeswehr,splittingitinto:main defence forces (Hauptverteidigungskräfte), crisis responseforces (Krisenreaktionskräfte, approx. 50,000 soldiers) and basicmilitaryorganisation(GrundorganisationderStreitkräfte)50.Theto-talnumberoftroopswastoreach370,000in1995.TheBundeswehrthus began to have a certain double structure. Themain body ofthearmywasmadeupofmaindefenceforces,basedonmandatorymilitary service (54.5% of soldierswere conscripts).Main defenceforcesweretaskedwithterritorialdefenceandcomposedmainlyofarmouredunits.Crisisresponseforceswereacomplementaryandsmallercomponent.However,theywereundergoingtheprocessofthe equipmentmodernisation andprofessionalisation - theyweremadeupofcontractandprofessionalsoldiersaswellaslongerserv-ingconscripts51.AspartofthisreorganisationtheBundeswehrCom-mandCentrewasalsocreatedasaplanningandcommandandcon-trolheadquartersforinternationaloperations.Untilthen,duetofullintegrationinNATOcommandstructuresduringtheColdWar,theGermanarmedforcesintheearly1990swereunabletodeployunitsunder national command in international operations52. AlongsidethebeliefthatchangestoGermany’sdefencepolicymustbeintro-ducedslowlyandgradually,alackofdeeperreformsinthestructure,organisation,equipmentandtrainingoftheBundeswehrwasduetothehighcostoftheGermany’sreunification.TheintegrationoftheNational People’s Army (Nationale Volksarmee) into Bundeswehrstructures,thereductioninnumberoftheall-Germanarmedforc-es53conductedinparallelwiththeevolutionfromanarmedforces
50 BundesministeriumderVerteidigung,VerteidigungspolitischeRichtlinien1992,Bonn,26.11.1992.
51 Heiko Biehl, Die neue Bundeswehr, SOWI-Arbeitspapier, Nr. 112, August1998,pp.23.
52 Sven Bernhard Gareis, Militärische Beiträge zur Sicherheit, in: StephanBöckenförde/SvenBernhardGareis(publishinghouse),DeutscheSicher-heitspolitik,Opladen2009,pp.116-117.
53 Duetoprovisionsofthe2+4TreatyGermanyagreedtoreducethenumberoftroopsofthereunifiedGermanyto370,000soldiersbytheendof1994.
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chargedwiththetaskofterritorialdefenceintoamobileandworld-widedeployablemilitarywouldhavebeendifficulttoachieve–bothinpoliticalandfinancialterms.Firstly,Germansocietyfeltincreas-inglysecureandwantedtotakeadvantageofthe“peacedividend”.Secondly,theintegrationofEastGermanyincurredincreasedsocialandinfrastructuralexpenditurefortheGermangovernment54.Yetalreadyinthe1990sdecisionshadbeenmadeonthedevelopmentofnewtechnologies,futurepurchasesandthemodernisationofmili-taryequipmentwithregardtoconductinginternationaloperations55.
2. 1999: Rudolf Scharping’s reform
CivilwarintheformerYugoslaviaacceleratedchangesinGerma-ny’ssecuritypolicy,bringingaboutachangeinthedoctrineofus-ingthearmedforces.TheWesternBalkansweretooclosearegiongeographically for Germany not to engage in their stabilisation,bothpoliticallyandmilitarily.TheBundeswehr’sparticipationinoperations in the former Yugoslavia was to become a milestonefortheGermanmilitaryout-of-areaengagementandcontributedto breakingmany taboos. In 1995 theGermanunits participatedinNATO’s IFORoperation andwere stationed inCroatia. “Kohl’sdoctrine”wasbindingandaccordingtoitGermansoldiersshouldnot takepart inoperations incountrieswhichwereoccupiedbythe Third Reich duringWorldWar II. However, already in 1996theGermancontingentwasmovedfromCroatiatoBosniaaspartofNATO’sSFORoperationwhichreplacedIFOR.Emphasisingthepeace and stabilising character of the SFOR operation, inwhichGermansoldierswereassignedmainlylogisticandmedicaltasks,
54 „The development of the eastern German federal states is a priority for the Ger-man government and will consume significant funds in the immediate future. The politico-economic concept of Germany’s security must take into account not only future challenges, but also the difficult financial situation of the federal budget”. See: BundesministeriumderVerteidigung,Verteidigungspolitische Rich-tlinien 1992,Bonn,26.11.1992.
55 Theyincluded: A400Mstrategictransportaircraft,Pumainfantryfightingvehicle,Tigerhelicopter(changeofspecificationfromtheoriginalantitankhelicopterintothecombatversion).
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wasmeantthentosecuredomesticlegitimacy.Thegreatestbreak-through camehoweverwhenGermany decided to participate inNATO’sAlliedForceairoperationin1999,whoseobjectivewastoputanendtoethniccleansinginKosovo.ForthefirsttimesincetheendofWorldWarIIGermanarmedforces (theair force)partici-patedinacombatoperationwhichmoreoverwasnot legitimisedbytheUN.Additionally,GermanywasengagedinthestabilisationofKosovo-notonlydiditsendalargemilitarycontingent(8,500soldiers)aspartoftheinternationalKFORforcesledbyNATO-italso,forthefirsttime,tookcommandoveroneofthesectorsduringdeploymentabroad(inKosovo).Theslogan“No more Auschwitz” be-camethejustificationfortheBundeswehr’soperationsinKosovo–Germanystartedtosupportthedoctrinetopreventethniccleans-ingandhumanitariandisasters,includingbymilitarymeans.
ThegrowingGermanmilitaryinvolvementinformerYugoslavialaidbaretheproblemswithmaintainingtheBundeswehr’sstruc-ture. Organisationally the Bundeswehr was not well preparedfor theplanneddevelopmentofmilitarycapabilitieswithin theEU’sEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicycreatedattheendofthe 1990s. In 1999 theSPD/Greensgovernmentdecided tocarryout anew reform.The assumptions ofDefenceMinisterRudolfScharping were accepted. Territorial defence and maintainingtheappropriateBundeswehrstructurewasstillthemainpointofreferencealongwithafurtherstrengtheningoftheexpedition-arycomponent.TheBundeswehrwastobereducedto282,000sol-diers(200,000professionalandcontractsoldiers,approximately77,000conscriptsand5,000reservists).Adivisionwasintroducedinto thebasicmilitaryorganisation (MilitärischeGrundorgani-sation, 105,000 soldiers) and operational forces (Einsatzkräfte,150,000soldiers)whichwerebothtoserveforterritorialdefenceand to be deployed in international operations56. Furthermore,
56 Hans-Dieter Lemke, Bundeswehrreform. SchwachpunktKrisenfähigkeit,SWP-aktuell,No. 66,November 2000, http://www.swp-berlin.org/filead-min/contents/products/aktuell/aktu_66_sicher.pdf
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the Central Medical Service (Sanitätsdienst) and Joint SupportService (Streitkräftebasis) were created, as well as the ArmedForces Operational Command (Einsatzführungskommando) torunoperationsabroad.
3. 2003/2004: Peter Struck’s reform
Quitesoonhowever,theSPD/Greensgovernmentmadeadecisiononafurtherreformwhich,duetopoliticalandmilitaryreasons,provedtobeabreakthroughreform.ThegovernmentredefinedthemissionandtasksoftheBundeswehranddecidedonacom-pletetransformationfromamilitarypreparedandtrainedforcon-ventionaldefencetasksintoamobileandworldwidedeployablemilitary.In2003DefenceMinisterPeterStruck(SPD)publisheda new Defence Policy Guidelines (VPR) and in 2004 issued thenewConceptoftheBundeswehrbasedontheGuidelines.Inbothdocuments the FederalMinistry ofDefence proclaimed aradical change of priorities, tasksandcapabilitiesdevelopmentoftheBundeswehr.AdefinitivechangeofthesecurityenvironmentandthelackofforeseeableconventionalthreatstoGermanywerestated.Thenotionof“defence”wasextendedtoincludethefightagainst unconventional threats such as international terrorismaswell as conflict prevention and crisismanagement.A quota-tionfromStruck’sprefacetothenewConceptoftheBundeswehr2004encapsulatesthenewapproach:“Wehavetoreacttothreatswheretheyappear,forifwedonottakeanystepstheymayhaveanegativeinfluenceonoursecurity,eveniftheyariseinremoteregions”57.Thedecisionabout thereformwas influencedby theSeptember 11th terrorist attacks as they createdanewpoliticalandsecuritysituationfortheWest;itwasalsoinfluencedbytheBundeswehr’sproblemsinconductingtheOEF-AandISAFopera-tionsinAfghanistan.TheproblemshighlightedthefactthattheBundeswehrmust introducegreaterchanges instructure,mili-
57 BundesministeriumderVerteidigung,GrundzügederKonzeptionderBun-deswehr,Berlin2004,pp.2–3.
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taryequipmentandtrainingandintheconductingofjointopera-tionsinordertobeabletoperformtasksincompletelydifferentconditionsthanhadpreviouslybeenthenorm.
Inordertodescribethereform,theFederalMinistryofDefenceadoptedtheUSconceptofmilitarytransformationunderstoodasaconstantprocessofadjustingtheBundeswehrtotheworld’schangingpolitical,social,economicandtechnologicalchallenges.“Transformation”wasnotonlytoleadtoadefinedgoal,buttobeagoalitself.ThusreformsintheGermanarmedforceswerein-troducedthatwereadequatetothechangesinGermansecuritypolicy. The capabilities, structure and the number of troops oftheBundeswehrwere todependabove all on the requirementsandconditionsofperforming jointandcombinedoperations (ofthebranchesof theBundeswehrand incooperationwithalliedandpartnerarmedforces)andnotonitspreparednessforterri-torialdefence.Thereductioninthenumberoftroopsto250,000soldierswasmade (up to 195,000professional and contract sol-diers, 30,000 conscripts and 25,000 voluntarily longer servingconscripts).Theprocessofswitchingtoamodelofanexpedition-arymilitarydidnot,however,includedtheabolitionofconscrip-tion; thenumberofconscriptswasonly limitedandmandatorymilitary service was reduced from ten to ninemonths. A newcategorisationofthearmedforceswasintroduced.Thenewcat-egorieswererelatedexclusivelytotheabilityofperformingtasksin international operations. A division was made into: the re-sponse forces (Eingreifskräfte, 35,000 soldiers) toperformhighintensitytasksandtorunrescueandevacuationoperations;thestabilisationforces(Stabilisierungskräfte,70,000troops)tocon-duct lowandmediumintensityoperationsaimedatpeacekeep-ing, the support forces (Unterstützungskräfte, approx. 147,000soldiers) for logistic, organisational and technical support, forcommandandcontrolininternationaloperationsandformain-tainingBundeswehr infrastructure inGermany. Emphasiswasplacedonthedevelopmentofthecapabilitiesrequiredtoconductjoint international operations: a network-centric command and
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controlsystem,reconnaissance,tacticalandstrategictransport,operationaleffectiveness,supportandsupplyandtheprotectionofsoldiersduringoperations.Atthecommandlevel thecompe-tencesoftheGeneralInspectoroftheBundeswehrwerestrength-ened.Furthermore,newstructureswerecreated;apartfromtheArmedForcesOperationalCommand,whichhadexistedsincetheScharping/Kujat reform, the Response Forces Operations Com-mandand theSpecial ForcesOperationsCommandwere estab-lished.