jj bosman supreme court of appeals

7/31/2019 JJ Bosman Supreme Court of Appeals

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NOTICE OF MOTION

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA

Case Number: ..

Court a quo case number: 22113/2011

In the matter between:-

JACOBUS JOHANNESS JOUBERT BOSMAN Applicant

~and~

THE STANDARD BANK OF SOUTH AFRICA LIMITED Respondent

SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT

I,

JACOBUS JOHANNESS JOUBERT BOSMAN

do hereby state under oath as follows;

i. I am the Applicant in this matter and duly authorised to depose to this affidavit and tobring this application.

ii. The facts herein contained are, save where the contrary appears from the context, withinmy personal knowledge, to the best of my belief both true and correct, and I can and do


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swear positively thereto. Where I make legal submissions, I rely on advice that I have

received from my legal representatives.

iii. I have acted in my personal capacity throughout proceeding before this application andindent doing so with the leave of the Honourable Court.

iv. I am current residing at 328 Grus street Waterkloof Ridge PRETORIA, Postal Address,P. O. Box 95709 Waterkloof 0145 with contact details as follows, telephone number: 082

4414652, fax number: 0865147368 and email address: [email protected].

OVERVIEW:

1. The Applicant herein had unsuccessfully lodged an application for leave to appeal beforethis Honourable Court which was heard by the Honourable Judge C P Rabie on the 15th of

March 2012, the grounds of appeal which are annexed hereto as JJJ 1.

2. On the date of the hearing of the Appeal, the Applicant herein prepared and handed to theHonourable Judge a copy of its presentation, annexed hereto as JJJ 2.

3. In relation to the above, the Applicant had contended, and in these premises persist tocontend that the Respondent had failed to show proper cause that it has properly dispensed

with its obligation in terms of Rule 18 of the Uniform Rules of Court and where the


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Respondent was obliged and required to produce documents to prove or disprove

allegations made by the Applicant against the Respondent, had failed to produce same.

4. The reasoning and contention held by the Respondent was that it was not obliged norrequired to produce any such documents as the agreement of loan and covering

mortgage bond was sufficient and suffice to properly dispose of the Respondents burden

of proof.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT:

5. The Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 32(2) make provision for , together with an affidavitmade by himself or by any other person who can swear positively to the facts verifying the

cause of action and the amount, if any, claimed and stating that in his opinion there is no

bona fide defence to the action and that notice of intention to defend has been

delivered solely for the purpose of delay. and further If the claim is founded on a

liquid document a copy of the document shall be annexed to such affidavit

5.1 In the matter of FirstRand Bank Ltd v Beyer 2011 (1) SA 196 (GNP) after an

analysis of Rule 32(2) of the Uniform Rules of Court clearly shows that the court,

before it can grant summary judgment, must from the facts set out in the verifying

affidavit itself, be able to make a factual finding that [a] the person who deposed


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to the affidavit was able to swear positively to the facts alleged in the summons

and annexures thereto and [b] be able to verify the cause of action and [c] the

amount claimed, if any, and be able to [d] form the opinion that there was no

bona fide defence available to the defendant, and that the [e] notice of intention to

defend was given solely for the purpose of delay.

5.2 Juristic entities, like that of the Respondent, whom authorise employees to

dispense and swear to the correctness of averments in an affidavit are to state how

it obtained such authority. It follows that such authority must also be annexed to

such affidavit. In this instance the Respondent had failed, neglected and/ or

refused to address this requirement, therefore the application for summary

judgment should have failed.

In the alternative;

5.3 Paragraph 6 of the Respondents loan agreement inter alia provides as follows:

The nature and amount of any indebtedness of the Mortgagor to the Bank shall

at any time be determined and proved by a written certificate purporting to have

been signed by a manager or accountant for the time being of any branch or the

head office of the bank . . .


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Insofar as the loan agreement alleges the Certificate of Balance purports to be a

liquid document, there is no indication that the signatory, one Kervin Govender, is

a manager of a branch or head of the Respondent, since he is merely indicated as

Home Loans Legal Manager.

I submit that Legal Recoveries/ Legal Manager is not a branch of the bank as

contemplated in paragraph 6 of the Respondent loan agreement and therefore

the application for summary judgment should have failed.

6. The Respondent had caused the registration of a Covering Bond, which includes anAcknowledgement of Debt. In accordance with the findings ofThienhaus v Metje

and Ziegler Ltd, 1965 (3) SA 25 (A) the court pointed out that, in practice, mortgage

bonds serve three purposes, viz, [a] to create a security interest, [b] to record the

details of the obligation secured, and to [c] create a contractual debt. Williamson JA

explained (at 31):~ clearly a mortgage bond can be utilised both as an instrument of

hypothecation and as a record of the terms and conditions of the obligation in respect

of which the hypothecation is to create a security; in addition it is a matter of

common and usual custom in the drafting of bonds to incorporate therein an

unqualified admission of liability by the mortgagor. The reason therefor is, however,

certainly not that such an acknowledgment is required for the validity of the bond as

a means of creating a real right by hypothecation in favour of the creditor. The origin


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and the prime purpose of the custom is the facilitation of the obtaining of a quick and

easy remedy, such as provisional sentence, against the mortgagor in case of his

default;

6.1 In contrast, Section 90 of the National Credit Act, 2005, prohibits any contract tocontain an acknowledgement of debt;- Section 90(1) read with (2)(a)(i), (ii)

(b)(i) and (c)(i);

6.2 Furthermore the inclusion of an acknowledgement of debt in the mortgagebonds, signed and authorised by an agent of the Respondent, on behalf the

Applicants power of attorney defeats the ends of justice and is a direct

contravention of the Consumer Affairs (Unfair Business Practice) Act, 1988;

6.3 Having regard to the above, such actions are contra bona mores, prejudicial andremoves all common law defences the Applicant could raise. This is evident in the

proceedings before this application. Therefore the Respondents application for

summary judgment had to fail.

7. The standard terms and condition of the Respondent declares the renouncement of allbenefits from the exceptions which might or could have been pleaded insofar it places a

bar to any claim the Respondent has under the mortgage bond. These presences are in


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contravention of Section 90 of the National Credit Act, 2005, Section 90(1) read with

(2)(a)(i), (ii) (b)(i) and (c)(i). Therefore, the Applicant was barred from raising and

entering its plea.

8. Contrary to the provisions of Rule 14(2)(b), Respondent has failed and/ or neglected toannex the liquid documents, including the accompanying Powers of Attorney, as an

annexure to the Deponents purported Affidavit. Therefore, the summary judgment had to

fail.

9. The State President has, in terms of section 10 of the Justice of the Peace andCommissioners of Oaths Act, 1963 (Act 16 of 1963), made the following regulation

referred to in the jurat of the deponents Affidavit, i.e. Government Notice No. R.1258

dated 21 July 1972, as amended by Government Notice No. R.1648 dated 19 August 1977,

and as further amended by Government Notice No. R.1428 dated 11 July 1980 and by

Government Notice No. R.774 dated 23 April 1982 (the Regulations).

9.1 Regulation 1-1 provides as follows:

An oath is administered by causing the deponent to utter the following words: I

swear that the contents of this declaration are true, so help me God.


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9.2 I have good reason to believe that the Commissioner never administered the oath

by causing the Deponent to utter the following words: I swear that the contents

of this declaration are true, so help me God.

9.3 That wording does not appear from the jurat. If in truth and in fact the Deponent

uttered the words I swear that the contents of this declaration are true, so help

me God, therefore the Respondent has not complied with the requirements so set

forth aforesaid. Having failed to do so, therefore Regulation 1-1;-

9.3.1 is peremptory;

9.3.2 the non-compliance thereof renders the deponents attestation void; and

9.3.3 the non-compliance thereof deprives the deponents purported Affidavit of

its validity as an Affidavit.

10. The Respondent s Affidavit does not comply with the provisions of Rule 14(2)(a) of theRules of Court, in that the Deponent cannot swear positively to the facts, verifying the

cause of action and the amount claimed, in that the Deponent has no personal knowledge

of the registration of the First and Second Bonds nor the Certificate of Balance, Annexure

JJJ 3 attached to the Respondents application for Summary Judgment;


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10.1 In order to attend to comply with the provisions of Rule 32(2) of the Rules of

Court, the Plaintiff is obliged to file a Supporting Affidavit of personal

knowledge deposed to by the Deponent;

10.2 The Applicant denies that the Deponent has personal knowledge and is able and

capable to verify the cause of action and the facts required by Rule 32(2) of the

Rules of Court.

10.3 The Applicant denies that Anthony Lorcan Kennedy is duly authorised to depose

to the Affidavit and bring an application for summary judgment;

10.4 Anthony Lorcan Kennedy has failed and/ or neglected to attach a Resolution from

the Board of Directors of the Respondent authorising him to depose to this

Affidavit and to bring an application for summary judgement.

10.5 The Applicant therefore denies that Anthony Lorcan Kennedy, in the absence of a

Resolution by the Board of Directors of the Respondent, is authorised to depose to

the purported Affidavit.

10.6 The Applicant denies that the facts referred to in Respondents Particulars of

Claim dated 6 April 2011 are within the personal knowledge of Anthony Lorcan


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Kennedy. The Applicant repeats that the employees of Respondent mentioned

above have failed to file Confirmatory Affidavits in support of the Application for

Summary Judgment. I reiterate my third point supra.

10.7 In this regard, the matter of Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South

Africa t/a The Land Bank v The Master and Others 2005 (5) SA 235 (c) in

terms of s 33 of the Land and Agricultural 952 Development Bank Act 15 of 2002

for recovery of moneys owing to a Bank not constituting management of 'the day

to day affairs of the Bank' as contemplated in s 18 of the Act - Board or chief

executive officer should therefore provide court with authority to institute such

litigation by properly authorised resolution in terms of s 16 of Act In

comparison see the definition of The business of a bank as defined in the Bank

Act, 94 of 1990, as amended.

10.8 For these reasons the Respondents application for summary judgment had to fail.

11. The Applicant signed a Power of Attorney on behalf of the Respondent to register the bondover the property as security, but the Respondent failed to annex same to their application,

despite same being requested. The Respondent failed to produce same therefore a copy of

the Power of Attorney cannot be annexed to this application, however, the following

averments could have been made if the said Power of Attorney was presented;-


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11.1 Ex facie the Power of Attorneyit is clear that the name of the Conveyancer and/or alleged Appeared, person appearing had been added by rubber stamp/ deleted

by drawing a line through the name of the original appearing person and

replaced with another person to the Power of Attorney subsequent to the

registration of the bond;

11.2 At the time of signature the Power of Attorney did not contain the name ofanother person. The name of another person was clearly rubber stamped/

deleted by drawing a line through the name of original person onto the Power of

Attorney after signature thereof by the Applicant, without knowledge or consent.

The Applicant did not authorise another person to register the Bond. The Bond

is therefore invalid.

11.3 In the event of it being contended by the Respondent that another person wassubstituted by the power of substitution vested in the Conveyancers mentioned in

the Power of Attorney and that the Bond is therefore valid, the Applicant avers as

follows:

11.3.1 Section 2(1) of the Alienation of Land Act, Act No. 68 of 1981 (theAOL Act) provides as follows:


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No alienation of land (after the commencement of this section) shall,

subject to the provisions of section 28, be of any force or effect unless it

is contained in a deed of alienation signed by the parties thereto or by

their agents acting on their written authority.

In section 1(b) of the AOL Act, the definition of land includes

any interest in land . . . .

11.3.2 A Deed of Substitution for the purpose of registration of a MortgageBond over the property is an interest in land and must therefore be in

writing.

11.3.3 another person clearly never received a written Deed of Substitutionby any one of the Conveyancers mentioned in the Power of Attorney

because such Deed of Substitution must be filed with the original Power

of Attorney in the Deeds Office, Pretoria, which it is not.

11.3.4 In the absence of such a written Deed of Substitution, the Bond istherefore invalid.

12. It is clear that strict compliance with the provisions of Rule 32(2) is required for asummary judgment to become a final judgment, unless reversed on appeal. A summary

judgment is an extremely extraordinary and drastic remedy, often referred to as a


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draconian measure. It shuts the mouth of the defendant finally. A party who seeks to

avail himself of this drastic remedy must comply strictly with the requirements of the rule.

(Paragraph [11] at 200D - E.)

12.1 It is so that the court has the power to condone mere technical non-compliance

with the provisions of Rule 32(2), but cannot condone non-compliance with the

safeguards built into Rule 32(2) for the benefit of defendants, for instance

regarding hearsay evidence and the doing away with, or the relaxation of the test

to be applied by every court, considering an application for summary judgment to

be able, on the evidence adduced in the affidavit, to make a factual finding that

the deponent was a qualified deponent, otherwise it would make a mockery of the

said safeguards. See Paragraph [17] at 202E938 G.

12.2 a Court cannot condone non-compliance with safeguards built into a Rule 32(2)

established for the benefit of Defendants. This was, with respect, an oversight of

the Court, a quo, analysis of the facts.


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THE APPLICANTS FUNDAMENTAL CONTENTION

THE BUSINESS OF THE BANK:

13. The Bank Act, Act 94 of 1990 specifically excludes the bank from engaging insecuritisation where it is the holder of such security or has a vested interest in such

security. The latter averment was emphasised by notice in the Government Gazette [No.

30628, Volume 511, January 2008] which amends the Bank Act by changing the business

of a bank ~ [Section 1, definition] to exclude securitisation from the business of the

bank.

14. Furthermore a Bank is precluded from using its clients deposits for loans and arefurthermore restricted in how it utilises its allocated capital and reserve funds and other

funds in terms of Sections 70(2), 70(2A) and 70(2B). These prescriptions follow through

and are further defended in the South African Reserve Bank Act, Act 90 of 1989.

15. Commercial banks, like the Respondent, invest their money with the South AfricanReserve Bank and the interest received on such investments is called seigniorage.


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15.1 Ordinarily seigniorage is an interest-free loan (historically of gold) to the issuer of

the coin or paper money. When the currency is worn out, the issuer buys it back at

face value, thereby balancing exactly the revenue received when it was put into

circulation, without any additional amount for the interest value of what the issuer

received.

15.2 The solvency constraint of the South African Reserve Bank only requires that the

present discounted value of its net non-monetary liabilities (separate from its

monetary liabilities accrued through seigniorage attempts) be zero or negative in

the long run. Its monetary liabilities are liabilities only in name, as they are

irredeemable: the holder of base money cannot insist at any time on the

redemption of a given amount of base money into anything else other than the

same amount of itself (base money); unless, of course, the holder of said base

money is another Reserve Bank/ Federal Reserve Bank reclaiming the value of its

original interest-free loan.

15.3 Currently over half the revenue of Zimbabwe is in seigniorage. Zimbabwe has

experienced hyperinflation, with the annual rate at about 24,000% in July 2008,

indicating that prices doubled every 46 days.


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15.4 Currently notes and coins represent 6 to 5 persent in the market place, the

remainder 94 to 95% are generated by banks, whom loan against their share

capital and reserves which the banks has invested in property, short term assets

and so on.

15.5 Until 1980 the South African Reserve Bank would issue directives as to the

amount of reserves relative to the duration of the loan, the volume of credit

advanced and the maximum growth rate at which credit extension could increase.

16. Within the framework of co-operation between the South African Reserve Bank andBanks, a bank can loan what it has put into circulation, without any additional amount for

the interest value of what the issuer received.

17. Thus, a loan from the South African Reserve bank by a bank is interest free, less the costof the manufacturing (print) of the note. This equates to a 95% interest free loan.

18. From the aforementioned two particular legal questions are raised:-

18.1 In the first instance, the bank, in this instance the Respondent was not the

institution that loaned, in first instance, the money to the Applicant. In other

words, the Respondent only obtained the required funding once the Applicant had


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completed and signed the necessary contracts. Therefore, the lack of the

Respondent disclosing to this fact in their contract failed the very basic

requirement in contract law, that is, it lacked capacity to act. It therefore can also

be said that there could have never been a true consensus between the parties. In

conjunction to the aforementioned, the Respondent did not have the necessary

capacity to act in the first instance, as it only became the holder of money after

the conclusion of an agreement between the Respondent and the Applicant. The

Respondents application therefore had to fail for the following reasons;-

18.1.1 The Respondent/ Applicant could never had consensus to concluded

the agreement, in term of the general requirements of Contract Law;

18.1.2 The Respondent lacked the capacity to act, because it only became the

holder of what was borrowed after the conclusion of the contract. It,

the Respondent, therefore was never in possession of what was

presented as being in their possession prior to the contract being

concluded, in other words, the transaction was subjected to them

obtaining the funds from another, the South African Reserve Bank.


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18.1.3 For the Respondent to have the appropriate and correct status, the

contract should have clearly stated that it is acting as intermediary,

subjected to the Respondent obtaining a loan from the South African

Reserve Bank. This fact is not disclosed in the Respondents contract.

18.1.4 In addition, the Respondent does not disclose this fact in its

advertisements.

18.1.5 The fact stated above remains intact, irrespective if the Respondent had

utilised their security to obtain the loan on behalf of the Applicant, as it

had undesirably deceived their truthful role, that is, acting as

intermediary. The Applicant reiterates, its irrespective if the

Respondent obtains what was required in due course, as the fact

remains that the Respondent acted as intermediary.

18.1.6 The Respondent in this regard will argue, as they have done before, that

the relationship between themselves and that of the South African

Reserve Bank is one conjured in terms of legislation, thus the

Respondent, like other banks, are exclusively and uniquely, authorised

to utilise this future of advancement of loans. This argument, with due


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respect, has nothing to do with the fact that the Respondent still acts as

intermediary, irrespective of their special relationship and/ or security.

18.1.7 It is the Respondent is required in law, including The National Credit

Act and Consumer Protection Act, of which the latter derives its

legislative inauguration from the South African Constitution, 1996, to

disclose all material facts to a consumer and to inform a consumer of all

material facts so that an informed decision may be formulated.

18.1.8 The requirements to disclose, which contention was in particular raised

in these proceedings forgoing this application, was pertinent and

important as the lack of disclosure raises questions as to the true intent

of the Respondent, its reasons and in retrospect its hidden reasons for

non-disclosure, as will be prevailed hereinafter.

18.2 When the Respondent obtained a loan from the South African Reserve Bank, it

did so against its own security at no cost and close to 5% or less interest. Further,

this loan was not executed with liquid money being borrowed, but rather by South

African Reserve Bank bonds, in close resemblance to promissory notes. This

equates no liquid money being passed from one to another, but rather a debit and

credit entry taking place in each partys accounting records. The latter entries are


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then followed through to the Applicants account created by and at the

Respondent.

18.2.1 This averment was placed before the Court, of first instance and its

appeal, and summarily dismissed by the Honourable Judges presiding

over this matter. Their reasoning being that, inter alia, society has

moved from traditional cash transactions to electronic payment systems

and that to retain traditional values holds no place in an ever changing

society. The Applicant makes no objection against these findings,

however, and more so, the Honourable Judges have displaced the

Applicants contention, that is; Due to the Respondents use of

electronic methods it has become so more efficient to debit and credit

accounts with nothing more than nothing; whereas when liquid

money is required to be withdrawn, the Respondent would simply

place such funds into the possession of the drawer from reserved funds.

In all other transactions it will simply pass a credit or debit as

required. This is achieved by the very same technology we have

become so accustomed to.

18.2.2 The argument will be raised, as before, that these presents have no fault

or prejudice to the Applicant. To the contrary, given the mathematic


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calculations utilised in this process, an example being that the total

exposure of Bank A is Bn1, it requires additional capital to extend and

uphold its business for the next year. Thus Bank A requires an

additional Bn1. For this, Bank A will borrow from the South African

Reserve Bank bonds or credit notes at close to 5% or less, enter this

credit into the account of client X. In other words, nothing other than an

entry onto the account of X. X is now required to effect payment, first

towards interest, cost then capital. If X pays Y, such credit and debit is

done to reflect the accounting transaction. When X makes payment

towards his account, the liquid money is received as close to 100%

profit (100% profit is recorded as transaction fees and administration

fees are recorded against the transaction).

18.2.3 From the aforementioned one can deduce that the Respondent is

profiteering on no more than accounting entries, proverbial, empty

boxes that are filled with liquid money from the Applicant.

18.2.4 In returning to the example forgoing, Bank X gathered only a paper

loan against its own security at no risk and no interest, whereupon it

will gain substantial profits, costs and fees, which in return will allow


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them to increase their investments with the South African Reserve

Bank, so it can for ever increase its profiteering.

18.2.5 These instances, inclusive of the averments in paragraph 15, supra,

places an unreasonable financial prejudice onto the Applicant, so much

so, that the Legislature has asymmetrically authorised the Banks, like

the Respondent, to print proverbial money at leisure to the expense and

factual financial prejudice of the Applicant.

18.2.6 Had the Applicant been informed in first instance of the role the

Respondent plays in procuring loans, e.g. its intermediary-ship, and the

fact that loans are based on a measure of profiteering, there could never

have been a meeting of minds in concluding the contract with the

Respondent.

18.2.7 No contract can stand where it is shown that the very nature of the

contract was to deceive, profiteer and goes against the moral fibres of

the people, thus the Respondents contract stands contested.


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18.2.7 Within these premises, the Respondents application for summary

judgment had to fail, as the Applicant had shown a defence, which in all

probable cause, would allow thorough investigation by the Courts

before, which would dispense the Applicants burden to show proper

cause why the matter should continue by way of trial.

18.3 Given the facts above, consideration must be given that the Respondents claim

would in effect be in-correct as its claim in liquid money has no basis, because the

fundamental aspect is that which was borrowed was not liquid money, but it was

no more than a promissory note, entered as a debit/ credit entry. To correct these

premises, the Respondent would need to correct their pleadings, so it correctly

reflects security granted or obtained on behalf of the Applicant, which will also

equate to an amendment to the contract of first instance and the issue of a

certificate of balance.

18.3.1 The fact that the Respondent claims liquid money (see agreement) and

lacks to abbreviate on the fact that it, the Respondent, does not say the

same about their borrowings being liquid money is clearly indicative

that the Respondent was pre-empting, had knowledge and intended to

deceived the Applicant from inception of the contract. In other words,


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why mention the payment to be made in liquid money in the first

instance, where the obvious would suffice mutatis mutandis.

18.3.2 It follows that the claim of the Respondent would be in contravention of

theIn Dup Rule, so much so, that the interest charged would in fact be

null and voidable as [a] the liquid money never received entry into the

books of the Respondent, and in the alternative [c] interest charged on

the capital is based on an illiquid transaction.

IN CONJUNCTION TO THE ABOVE (IN THE ALTERNATIVE):

SECURITISATION:

19. Securitization is the financial practice of pooling various types of contractual debt such asresidential mortgages, commercial mortgages, auto loans or credit card debt obligations

and selling said consolidated debt as bonds, pass-through securities, or collateralized

mortgage obligation [CMOs], to various investors. The principal and interest on the debt,

underlying the security, is paid back to the various investors regularly. Securities backed

by mortgage receivables are called mortgage-backed securities (MBS), while those

backed by other types of receivables are asset-backed securities (ABS).


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19.1 As stated supra, paragraph 13 hereof, it is not the business of the bank to engage

in or deal in securitization of its own contract. The Respondent is prohibited from

such activities.

19.2 The publication annexed as JJJ 4 hereto confirms this. Paragraph 1 of this

publication reads as follows: SA Home Loans (SAHL) is not a bank and does

not accept deposits from the public. As such, in order to be able to fund the home

loans which are given out to clients, SAHL (South African Home Loans) has set

up a securitisation funding platform. and at paragraph 3 The capital markets are

where long term funding (greater than one year in duration) can be obtained and

it is, as such, the place where many lenders, banks included, would obtain long

term funding for their longer term assets (such as home loans).

19.2.1 To achieve the aforementioned the process would in most instances be

one where a suitably large portfolio of assets is "pooled" and transferred

to a "special purpose vehicle" or "SPV" (the issuer), a tax-exempt

company or trust formed for the specific purpose of funding the assets.

Once the assets are transferred to the issuer, there is normally no

recourse to the originator. The issuer is "bankruptcy remote," meaning

that if the originator goes into bankruptcy, the assets of the issuer will

not be distributed to the creditors of the originator. In order to achieve


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this, the governing documents of the issuer restrict its activities to only

those necessary to complete the issuance of securities.

19.2.2 Accounting standards govern when such a transfer is a sale, a financing,

a partial sale, or a part-sale and part-financing. In a sale, the originator

is allowed to remove the transferred assets from its balance sheet: in a

financing, the assets are considered to remain the property of the

originator. Under South African accounting standards, the originator

achieves a sale by being at arm's length from the issuer, in which case

the issuer is classified as a "qualifying special purpose entity" or

"qSPE".

19.3 For a bank like the Respondent it will be required to bundle the security (a bond

registered over the title deed of the Applicant) with other agreements and assign

the rights and title over to the particular securitisation broker or company. See

annexure JJJ 5, JJJ 6, JJJ 7 and JJJ 8 hereto. Within these premises,

one will note that the Respondent (bank) loses it rights and title to the security;

therefore it cannot be the Applicant as purported in their proceeding before this

court as they would lacklocus standi.


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19.4 The originator (the Respondent) initially owns the assets engaged in the deal. This

is typically a company looking to raise capital, restructure debt or otherwise adjust

its finances. Under traditional corporate finance concepts, such a company would

have three options to raise new capital: a loan, bond issue, or issuance of stock.

However, stock offerings dilute the ownership and control of the company, while

loan or bond financing is often prohibitively expensive due to the credit rating of

the company and the associated rise in interest rates.

19.3.1 If for any reason the Respondent apportions that it has the proper locus

standi, it had in any event failed to do so properly in their surmising

proceedings;

19.3.2 Once again, the Respondent finds itself in a precarious position, as it

once again was not the original moneylender, but intermediary with

the added negative legal standing of lacking locus standi; in tallying-

19.3.2.1 The Respondent now also benefits from the transaction of

securitisation two folded: ~

19.3.2.1.1 The Respondent gains further loan capacity

as it has rid its debt and four folded its

exposure to entertain more loans to the


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public with the unknown participation of the

Applicant; and

19.3.2.1.2 Commissions or interest are earned by the

Respondent of securitisation transactions; in

other words, over and above earning in

receivables from the Applicant it now earns

income from securitisation as can be seen

from annexure JJJ 6 to JJJ 9 hereto.

Securitization makes it possible to record an

earnings bounce without any real addition to

the firm. When a securitization takes place,

there often is a "true sale" that takes place

between the Originator (the parent

company) and the SPE. This sale has to be

for the market value of the underlying assets

for the "true sale" to stick and thus this sale

is reflected on the parent company's balance

sheet, which will boost earnings for that

quarter by the amount of the sale. While not


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illegal in any respect, this does distort the

true earnings of the parent company.

20. The Applicant had signed a limitless power of attorney authorising the Respondent todispense with, inter alia, registration of a bond onto the title deed of the property, thus, the

deed will form part of security held by the Respondent against the loan. However, the

registration of the bond together with the power of attorney is utilised by the Respondent to

gain funding from processes mentioned above and below. The Respondent therefore does

not, and the power of attorney stipulates as much, require any further authority from the

Applicant in whatsoever dealing the Respondent contracts into. The result being that the

Applicant is in toto removed from any transaction the Respondent concludes with

securities given by the Applicant.

20.1 The Applicant contends that the power of attorney was given explicitly for theexclusive use to register a bond, and nothing more, therefore the use of the power

of attorney in any other formulations are without prior knowledge at the first

instance, without consent, authority and such use is in conflict with the National

Credit Act and law in general use, e.g. law of contract.

20.2 If such signature had been used, or in the alternative assigned to any other processof securitisation or in its third alternative to gain funds or loans relating to


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securitisation, or in its fourth alternative gain any benefit or in its fifth alternative

placed an obligation on the Applicant, the Respondent had done so without

explicit permission from the Applicant and the Respondent is in violation of the

fiduciary relationship as between the Applicant and Respondent (as banker) and in

terms of the Bank Act.

20.3 Had the Respondent gained from any securitisation, aforementioned, theApplicant is entitled to share in such profits, notwithstanding the fact that such

profits would effectively lessen the Applicants liability to the Respondent.

21. The process of securitization caused prejudice towards the Applicant as, unknown to the

Applicant, another becomes the holder of its security (bond) and therefore the risk arises

that such security can be called-up under any judicial process like liquidation or

administrative orders;

21.1 The opposite of the above, any income derived from securitisation is deliberatelywithheld from the Applicant, or will never be brought under the attention of the

Applicant as knowledge of such securitisation process has been withheld from the

Applicant by the Respondent, so much so, the Respondent is not prohibited from

making such entries into the accounting books of the Respondent.


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21.2 The process of securitisation deprives the Applicant of knowledge as to whom thetrue creditor is, its financial exposure which, inter alia, could include the

Respondent acting as intermediary and/ or collecting agent for a third party whom

could, once again, earn collection commission when acting as intermediary/

collecting agent.

21.3 Lastly, when the Respondent entertains processes like securitisation, why is itheld so secretively; the subject matter being protected most vigorously by the

Respondent? The only conclusion is that there is collusion between the parties

that can only equate to profiteering. If, which the Applicant contends its not

permitted in terms of how the Respondent deals therein, securitisation is allowed,

why is it not disclosed or public knowledge, particularly prior to any agreement

being concluded between the Applicant and the Respondent?

22. Thus application for summary judgment must fail and the Respondent must amend itsapplication proper. In this regard the Honourable Judge failed to realise that the defence so

offered by the Applicant is technically difficult, obstructed by generality, implied contract

law remedies and the bone of what is contended in defence is further frustrated by the

Respondents unwillingness to go beyond its contract of loan, holding same as a proverbial

shield from the seriousness of the allegations made by the Applicant.


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SEIGNORAGE:

23. This subject matter co-exists with paragraphs 13 to 18, Business of the Bank, supra,discussed separately due to its fundamentals being difficult to comprehend and/ or

appreciate.

24. Seignorage can be defined as one of the following as it relates to these proceedings;-

24.1 Historically, if a person has one ounce of gold, trades it for a government-issued

gold certificate (providing for redemption in one ounce of gold), keeps that

certificate for a year, and then redeems it in gold, that person ends up with exactly

one ounce of gold again. No seigniorage occurs.

24.2 Instead of issuing gold certificates, a government converts gold into currency at

the market rate by printing paper notes. A person exchanges one ounce of gold for

its value in currency. They keep the currency for one year, and then exchange it

all for an amount of gold at the new market value. This second exchange may

yield more or less than one ounce of gold if the value of the currency relative to


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gold has changed during the interim. (Assuming that the value or direct

purchasing power of one ounce of gold remains constant through the year.)

24.2.1 If the value of the currency relative to gold has decreased, then the

person receives less than one ounce of gold, thus seigniorage occurred.

24.2.2 If the value of the currency relative to gold has increased, the redeemer

receives more than one ounce of gold thus seigniorage did not occur.

24.2.3 Seigniorage, therefore, is the positive return on issuing notes and coins,

or "carry" on money in circulation.

24.2.4 The opposite, "cost of carry", is not regarded as a form of seigniorage.

24.3 Ordinary seigniorage can be defined as an interest-free loan, for instance, of

gold, to the issuer (South African Reserve Bank) of the coin or paper money.

When the currency is worn out, the issuer buys it back at face value, thereby

balancing exactly the revenue received when it was put into circulation, without

any additional amount for the interest value of what the issuer received.

24.4 Historically, seigniorage was the profit resulting from producing coins. Silver and

gold were mixed with base metals to make durable coins. Thus the British


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"sterling" was 92.5% pure silver; the base metal added (and thus the pure silver

retained by the government mint) was (less costs) the profit, or the seigniorage.

24.5 Currently, under the rules governing monetary operations of major central banks

(including the central bank of the USA and in similarity the South African Reserve

Bank), seigniorage on bank notes is simply defined as the interest payments

received by central banks on the total amount of currency issued. This usually

takes the form of interest payments on treasury bonds purchased by central

banks, putting more Rands into circulation. However, if the currency is collected,

or is otherwise taken permanently out of circulation, the back end of the deal

never occurs (that is, the currency is never returned to the central bank). Thus the

issuer of the currency keeps the whole seigniorage profit, by not having to buy

worn out issued currency back at face value.

24.6 The solvency constraint of the South African Reserve Bank only requires that the

present discounted value of its net non-monetary liabilities (separate from its

monetary liabilities accrued through seigniorage attempts) be zero or negative in

the long run. Its monetary liabilities are liabilities only in name, as they are

irredeemable: the holder of base money cannot insist at any time on the

redemption of a given amount of base money into anything else other than the


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same amount of itself (base money); unless, of course, the holder of said base

money is another central bank reclaiming the value of its original interest-free

loan.

24.7 To illustrate the aforementioned points, in relation to modern day application of

seigniorage, would be to reference Slate Online comments on 29 th of July 2011,

regarding the 2011 United States of America debt ceiling crisis. The author

suggested that the United States of America Government mint a US$5 trillion

coin, deposited the said mint with the Federal Reserve and used to buy back debt

thus making funds available. The author, whom in effect suggested seigniorage

was not off-beat, as it later appeared that the United States of America caused

such a bail-out for its bankers, thus it created money out of nothing.

25. Seigniorage is a concept utilised throughout financial history over decades, the onlyindifference being that modern seigniorage does not have physical liquidity like gold as

the exchange principal; this has been replaced by axiomatic I owe you notes.

26. To further illustrate the points above and below, the Basil Reports imitating from theGlobal Regulator, USA, formulates standards on bank capital adequacy, stress testing and

market liquidity risk agreed upon by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking


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Supervision. Currently the Basil III report is the operative guideline internationally. These

reports have been excluded from this application due to its volumes being in extensive;

however copies of Basil II and III shall be made available at the hearing of this matter. A

report by Deloitte has been annexed hereto as JJJ 9 as further referencing material.

27. The Respondent having required a loan from the South African Reserve Bank in thehistorical sense of seigniorage, had occurred nothing more than the cost of the currency,

its return value to balance to books, thus the loan was zero rated in interest; in the

alternative the Respondent had acquired a loan based on bonds, zero rated in interest,

however there is no seigniorage to be earned. See paragraph 24.2.4 supra.

28. The Respondent, acting as nothing more than an intermediary with special legislativeauthority to conduct and conclude transactions of this nature, obtained a loan, free of

interest, and elected to charge X% of interest per annum, the interest to be paid first, then

the capital, had acted exuberantly, selfish, motivated by profiteering having absolute

disregard for human rights, law of general application, manipulative in a monopolised

environment, which include the Bank Act and South African Reserve Bank Act.


FRACTIONAL RESERVE SYSTEM:


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29. By definition, Fractional Reserve System, forms part of banking where banks maintainreserves (of cash and coin or deposits at the central bank) that are only a fraction of the

customer's deposits. Funds deposited into a bank are mostly lent out, and a bank keeps only

a fraction (called the reserve ratio) of the quantity of deposits as reserves. Some of the

funds lent out are subsequently deposited with another bank, increasing deposits at that

second bank and allowing further lending. As most bank deposits are treated as money in

their own right, fractional reserve banking increases the money supply, and banks are said

to create money. Due to the prevalence of fractional reserve banking, the broad money

supply of most countries is a multiple larger than the amount of base money created by the

Reserve Bank. That multiple (called the money multiplier) is determined by the reserve

requirement or other financial ratio requirements imposed by financial regulators, and by

the excess reserves kept by commercial banks like the Respondent.

30. The South African Reserve Bank generally mandates reserve requirements that requirebanks to keep a minimum fraction of their demand deposits as cash reserves. This both

limits the amount of money creation that occurs in the commercial banking system, and

ensures that banks have enough ready cash to meet normal demand for withdrawals.

30.1 Problems can arise, however, when depositors seek withdrawal of a large

proportion of deposits at the same time; this can cause a bank run or, when

problems are extreme and widespread, a systemic crisis. To mitigate this risk, the


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governments of most countries (usually through their Reserve Bank, and in South

Africa, the South African Reserve Bank) regulate and oversee commercial banks,

provide deposit insurance and act as lender of last resort to commercial banks like

the Respondent.

30.2 Fractional-reserve banking is the most common form of banking and is practiced

in almost all countries, including South Africa. Although Islamic banking

prohibits the making of profit from interest on debt, a form of fractional-reserve

banking is still evident in most Islamic countries.

30.3 The nature of modern banking is such that the cash reserves at the bank available

to repay demand deposits need only be a fraction of the demand deposits owed to

depositors. In most legal systems, a demand deposit at a bank (e.g., a checking or

savings account) is considered a loan to the bank (instead of a bailment), see

Bank Act, repayable on demand that the bank can use to finance its investments in

loans and interest bearing securities. Banks make a profit based on the difference

between the interest they charge on the loans they make, and the interest they pay

to their depositors (aggregately called the net interest margin (NIM)). Since a

bank lends out most of the money deposited, keeping only a fraction of the total as

reserves, it necessarily has less money than the account balances of its depositors.


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30.4 The main reason customers deposit funds at a bank is to store savings in the form

of a demand claim on the bank. Depositors still have a claim to full repayment of

their funds on demand even though most of the funds have already been invested

by the bank in interest bearing loans and securities. Holders of demand deposits

can withdraw all of their deposits at any time. If all the depositors of a bank did so

at the same time a bank run would occur, and the bank would likely collapse. Due

to the practice of the South African Reserve Bank, this is a rare event today, as the

South African Reserve Bank usually guarantee the deposits at commercial banks,

and act as lender of last resort when there is a run on a bank.

30.5 As an example for a very simple idea of how the fractional reserve system can

work is as follows, if there is only one bank, for a Reserve Fraction of 10%, a

bank can turn R1, 000.00 deposit M0 of money, into R18, 997.00 of "M1"

money. Ignoring interest & fees, which makes banks even more profitable, this is

how a bank can copy 90% of "M0" money to make "M1" money, where in this

example the money loaned out is simply re-deposited in the bank and loaned out

again, and so on, that is how the R18, 997.00 "M1" money comes from the R1,

000.00 of "M0" money. Banks, like the Respondent do this by accumulating loans

and deposits (effectively multiplying) the "M0" supply to make a larger "M1"

supply. Banks can collect interest on the spread of the higher loan interest from


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the lower deposit interests. Return on Investment (ROI) for a bank is theoretically

infinite considering the bank is using none of its own money, if one excludes the

cost of setting up and maintaining the accounting system.

PREJUDICE CAUSED TO THE APPLICANT:

30.6 If a bank run occurs, it results in crises like that of the Northern Rock crisis of

2007 in the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the collapse of Washington Mutual

bank in September 2008, the largest bank failure in history, was preceded by a

"silent run" on the bank, where depositors removed vast sums of money from the

bank through electronic transfer.

30.7 In a normal economic environment, cash is steadily being introduced into the

economy by the South African Reserve Bank. Given the facts of financial crises

across the Globe, there seems to more and more concerns that the Fractural

Banking System will fail, causing Governments to bail out more and more

bankers at the expense of the public, despite the Respondent and alike profiteering

in billions.


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30.8 If creditors are afraid that the bank is running out of cash or is insolvent, they have

an incentive to redeem their deposits as soon as possible before other depositors

access the remaining cash reserves before they do, triggering a cascading crisis

that can result in a full-scale bank run. The aforementioned scenario has had its

reality when the 20Twenty Bank was placed in liquidation; its bailouts were

stupefied, leaving the public to fend for themselves, thus the victim.

30.9 Currently, policy papers and the state of Government spell inadequate funds to

maintain roads, municipal services and basic education, the Government therefore

does not sit in any position to cause a financial bailout should any one of the

events, supra, takes place.


ARTIFICIAL MONEY CREATION:

31. Money creation, as pleaded by the Applicant in proceeding before this application has beenrejected and booted as an argument held by cults, ignorant and outburst of utter nonsense.

It would seem that history seems to be an untold story when these averments are made; as

such possibilities seem surreal in an open and democratic society, like South Africa,


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therefore some time will be spent on explaining how money creation happens at banks and

that of the Respondent.

31.1 The relending model begins when an initial R100 deposit of the South AfricanReserve Bank money is made into Bank A. Bank A takes 20 percent of it, or R20,

and sets it aside as reserves, and then loans out the remaining 80 percent, or R80.

31.2 At this point, the money supply actually totals R180, not R100, because the bankhas loaned out R80 of the South African Reserve Bank money, kept R20 of South

African Reserve Bank money in reserve (not part of the money supply), and

substituted a newly created R100 IOU (I owe you) claim for the depositor that acts

equivalently to and can be implicitly redeemed for South African Reserve Bank

money (the depositor can transfer it to another account, write a check on it,

demand his cash back, etc.). These claims by depositors on banks are termed

demand deposits or commercial bank money and are simply recorded in a bank's

accounts as a liability (specifically, an IOU to the depositor). From a depositor's

perspective, commercial bank money is equivalent to South African Reserve Bank

money it is impossible to tell the two forms of money apart unless a bank run

occurs (at which time everyone wants South African Reserve Bank money).


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31.3 At this point in the relending model, Bank A now only has R20 of South AfricanReserve Bank money on its books. The loan recipient is holding R80 in South

African Reserve Bank money, but he soon spends the R80. The receiver of that

R80 then deposits it into Bank B.

31.4 Bank B is now in the same situation as Bank A started with, except it has adeposit of R80 of South African Reserve Bank money instead of R100. Similar to

Bank A, Bank B sets aside 20 percent of that R80, or R16, as reserves and lends

out the remaining R64, increasing money supply by R64. As the process

continues, more commercial bank money is created.

31.4.1 To illustrate the above a chart representing the transactions above

follows: (as per loans between banks)

Bank Amount Deposited Lend Out Reserves

A 100 80 20

B 80 64 16

C 64 51.20 12.80

D 51.20 40.96 10.24

E 40.96 32.77 8.19

F 32.77 26.21 6.55

G 26.21 20.97 5.24

H 20.97 16.78 4.19


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I 16.78 13.42 3.36

J 13.42 10.74 2.68

K 10.74

Total 457.05 357.05 100

Total Reserves 89.26

31.5 Although no new money was physically created in addition to the initial R100

deposit, new commercial bank money is created through loans. The two boxes

marked in italics show the location of the original R100 deposit throughout the

entire process. The total reserves plus the last deposit (or last loan, whichever is

last) will always equal the original amount, which in this case is R100. As this

process continues, more commercial bank money is created. The amounts in each

step decrease towards a limit. If a graph is made showing the accumulation of

deposits, one can see that the graph is curved and approaches a limit. This limit is

the maximum amount of money that can be created with a given reserve rate.

When the reserve rate is 20%, as in the example above, the maximum amount of

total deposits that can be created is R500 and the maximum increase in the money

supply is R400.


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31.6 Considering the magnitude and scale money is created, one can simply not ignore

that the banks such as the Respondent, are directly the cause of increase and

decrease of loan rates. Fractional reserve banking allows the money supply to

expand or contract. Generally the expansion or contraction of the money supply is

dictated by the balance between the rate of new loans being created and the rate of

existing loans being repaid or defaulted on. The balance between these two rates

can be influenced to some degree by actions of the South African Reserve Bank.

32. Returning to the contention the Applicant has shown from inception of these cases, onecannot simply ignore the facts above and expect to be profiteered on and when called-upon

to make good an agreement which was designed to circumvent liability, disable defences,

condone activities that begs justification why a system of such gross infringement and

prejudice can exist in an open democratic society.

33. The Applicant persist, its not wanting any privilege or discount in these proceedings otherthan justification why the Respondent is allowed to charge exuberant fees and interest on

what in fact does not exist in tangibility format and why the Applicant must give way to its

property, a guarantee in terms of the Constitution, which should stand above the might of

the Respondent profiteering.


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34. The actions of the Respondent described supra amount to contravening of Section 1 read

with Section 78 of the Bank Act, which prescribes 1002 undesirable practice.

35. Forfeitures amounting to arbitrary deprivations of property should not occur where the

Respondent has more than doubled on its profits as would directly infringe upon the rights

to property in terms of the Constitution.

THE INFERENCE ARGUMENTS

FEDATORY:

36. The Respondent owes the Applicant a duty to be treated honestly, to be informed of allmaterial matter before and during the existence of the contract and even thereafter and

not to profit additionally from the Applicants transaction. When one person stands in

relation to another in a position of confidence involving a duty to protect the interests of

that other person, he or she is not allowed to make a secret profit at the other's expense,

or to place himself or herself in such a position that his or her interests conflict with his

or her duty. Such a claim may arise because of a breach of contract or in delict as the case

was inDaewoo Heavy Industries (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Banks [2004] 2 All SA 530 (C), 2004


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865 (4) SA 458 (C), Da Silva v CH Chemicals (Pty) Ltd [2009] 1 All SA 216 (SCA), 2008

(6) SA 866 620 (SCA).

37. To establish a breach of a fiduciary duty, the Applicant must allege facts from which theexistence of such a duty can be deduced. For instance, the Applicant can rely on the

relationship between principal and agent, of a guardian to a ward, director to a company

or an attorney to a client or in this instance, the Respondent to the Applicant.

38. It is not necessary to define the fiduciary duty and to succeed, one needs to make thenecessary allegations concerning the particular duties imposed by the duty, in other words,

the scope and ambit of the duties imposed on the Respondent in this case, in which the

duties are implied (duties that derive ex lege) and arise in the context of the contract that

defines the relationship between the parties.

39. Furthermore, the case ofSlip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Limited v Project Law Prop (Pty)Limited and Others (36018/2009) [2011] ZAGPJHC 21 (1 April 2011) has particular

reference to illustrate the Courts approach to over-profiting. At paragraph 11 on page 6

the Learned Judge sites Innes J finding in Reuter v Yates, as follows: It comes to this - in

deciding whether the defence of usury has been sustained, and whether the lender has

taken such an undue advantage of the borrower, has so practised extortion and

oppression, that his conduct, being akin to fraud, disentitles him to relief, the Court will


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examine all the circumstances of the case. It will not only look at the scale of interest

which has been stipulated for, but will have regard to the ordinary rate prevalent in

similar transactions, to the security offered and the risk run, to the length of time for which

the loan was given, the amount lent, and the relative positions of the parties. Further, at

endnote 15 of page 9 of the Learned Judge, remarks Since time immemorial, our common

law has set its face against exploitation in the levying of interest. A most illuminating

discussion on this aspect can be found in a historical survey by Grov, Die

gemeenregtelike beheer van woeker in die Suis-Afrikaanse Reg, De Jure, 1989 (22), 233

and Die gemeenregtelike beheer van woeker in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (vervolg), De

Jure, 1990 (23),118.

40. A fiduciary relationship prevents an agent, in this instance the Respondent, from enteringinto any transaction that would cause the Applicants interests to clash with the

Respondents duty. For instance, an agent employed to buy cannot sell his or her own

property; an agent employed to sell cannot buy his or her own property. In addition the

agent cannot make any profit from his or her agency other than the agreed remuneration.

As the case was inRobinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Co Ltd 1921 883 AD 168

180, Bellairs v Hodnetl1978 (1) SA 1109 (A) 1130F, Low v Shedden [2001] 2 All SA 884

171 (C) and Ganes v Telecorn Narnibia Ltd [2004] 2 All SA 609 (SCA), 2004 (3) SA 615

885 (SCA).


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41. Within these premises the Respondent was duty bound in terms of the fiduciaryrelationship that came into operation the moment the Applicant applied for a loan from the

Respondent, further to be confirmed by entering into a contract with the Respondent and

its on-going relationship is confirmed by the Applicant making payment to the

Respondent.

42. If follows that the Respondent has seriously breached the fiduciary duty by misleading theApplicant in the grounds so set-out supra and therefore its the right of the Applicant to

bring civil action against the Respondent, which it intends doing.

CONCLUSION:

43. The structures employed by the Respondent are at very least distrustful, designed forfailure as it has no tangibility or substance which can justify the exorbitant interest charged

against such undulations;

44. The Respondent acted with predefined, predetermined set of actions prior to concludingthe agreement with the Applicant because laws relating to the conduct of their industry

allows for such conduct of profiteering to take place;


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45. There exist no true competition among banks where one can take your business, as eachone of these so-called competitors are just another extension of banks whom hold the

exclusive mandate to exchange nothing for liquid demands;

46. The Applicant had not mandated the Respondent to act, as it did in these premises, whereits inception was that liquid money is borrowed against liquid repayments. There could

never exist consensus meeting of the minds between the parties given the facts aforesaid,

because what the Applicant had envision and what the Respondent versioned are two very

distinct and far apart things that one cannot connect the two minds to conclude consensus;

47. Policies and guidances designed to protect the system from manipulation has been

infringed upon, absolute disregarded to rights and obligation in terms of law, rules and

public policy has been replaced by profiteering regardless.

48. The Respondent cannot allot that it had the capacity to act, as it had no such means; TheRespondent had to use external manipulation processes, elaborated schemes and betray

trust to enable it to gain the capacity to act;

49. It is doubtful that the Respondent had acquired authority to act; that is that the Respondenthad acquired the rights and obligations prior to the loan agreement being brought into

existence, as the majority of the Respondents rights and obligations were only concluded


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once security, surety and creditworthiness was given, sold-off, load against or manipulated

from nothingness, then pretended to give physical value.

50. The Applicant contests that it has prospects of success in this appeal, if not in paragraphs 1to 12 supra, paragraphs 13 to 32 supra.

51. Furthermore, the Applicant interjects that the processes followed by the Respondent are inviolation of the Constitution as far as the Legislation, in particular The Bank Act, The

South African Reserve Bank Act and Policies concerning financial services rendered by

the Respondent, in so far the Bill of Rights, Section 25 are concerned.

__________________________DEPONENT

I hereby certify that the deponent declares that the deponent knows and understands the contents

of this affidavit and that it is to the best of the deponent's knowledge both true and correct. This

affidavit was signed and sworn to before me at Johannesburg on this 20th day of April 2006 and

that the Regulations contained in Government Notice R1258 of 21 July 1972, as amended have

been complied with.


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__________________________COMMISSIONER OF OATHS

Name & Rank : Address : Telephone No. :

DATED AT PRETORIA ON THIS THE . DAY OF APRIL 2012.

JJJ Bosman

Applicant

Suite 1

PostNet Esselen Street

Shop 29A, The Village

47 Esselen Street, Sunnyside

Pretoria

E-mail: [email protected]

TO: THE REGISTRAR OF THE ABOVE HONOURABLE COURT

PRETORIA

AND TO: FINDLAY & NIEMEYER INC

Attorneys for Respondent

1027schoeman street

Hatfield Pretoria

Docex 14, Pretoria

Tel.: 012 342 9164

Fax.: 012 342 9165

Ref.: Mr M Coetzee/mm/f3011


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Received a copy hereof on this the_____ day ofAPRIL2012

jj bosman supreme court of appeals

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