j.b. schneewind - macintyre on the indispensability of tradition

8/20/2019 J.B. Schneewind - MacIntyre on the Indispensability of Tradition

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/jb-schneewind-macintyre-on-the-indispensability-of-tradition 1/5

International Phenomenological Society

MacIntyre and the Indispensability of TraditionAuthor(s): J. B. SchneewindSource: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 165-168Published by: International Phenomenological SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107831

Accessed: 11/07/2010 11:38

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless

you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you

may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed

page of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

International Phenomenological Society is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.

http://www.jstor.org

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107831?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ips

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107831?origin=JSTOR-pdf



Philosophy

ndPhenomenological

esearch

Vol. LI,No.

1, March1991

MacIntyreand the Indispensability

of

Tradition

J. B.

SCHNEE WIND

TheJohns

HopkinsUniversity

In

After

Virtue(1981)

Alasdair

MacIntyre

used the history

of thought

aboutmorality

as an aid

in

diagnosing

what he took

to be the

disastrous

condition

of modern Western society.

In

Whose Justice?

Which

Rationality?

(Notre

Dame, 1988;

abbreviatedhereafter

as

WJ; page

referencesgiven

in

text)

he claims

that we must draw

on the

historyof

ethics

for an additionalpurpose:

o findsolutions

o the moral

problems

whose insolubilityis a mark of the chaotic conditionof our present

culture.

He indicates heseproblems nly

briefly WJ,

p. 1) and offers

no

solution

to them. He

claims,

however, to have

accomplished

what

Descartes

was right in thinking

he

most difficulttask

of philosophy:

o

findout

howto

begin .

We, whoever

we are, can onlybegin enquiry

romthe

vantagepoint

afforded y our

rela-

tionship

o somespecificsocial

and intellectual

ast through

which we have

affiliated ur-

selves to someparticularradition f enquiry, xtendinghehistoryof thatenquirynto the

present.. (WJ, .

401)

The claim

is thatunless

we deliberately

easonfrom

withina

tradition-

as

Aristotelian,

as

Augustinian,

as

Thomist,

as

Humean,

as

post-

Enlightenment

iberal,or as something

else

(WJ,p. 402)-we

cannot

reason

at all.

MacIntyre'sposition,

which

I

shall label traditionalism,

as

two

components.First,we must understandhe resourcesof our traditionn

orderto use them

in

producing

our own solutions

to

particular

urrent

problems,

and

in

arguing

that

the solutionsour

traditionprovides

are

superior

o thoseprovided

by other

traditions. econd,

because

ours

is a

world

in

which

there

are

manyconflicting

outlooks,

controversy

over

particular

ssues

mustescalate o the level of

a

war of

traditions:

it is

no

MACINTYRE

YMPOSIUM

165



longer possible

to speak except out of one

particular

tradition

in a

way

which will

involve conflict with

rival

traditions.

WJ, p.

401)

Has

Macintyre supported his

traditionalism?

Has

he shown that we

must begin

within an historically

specific

and

already constituted

tradition, and that our arguments cannot be fully resolved until one

traditionmakes

its rivals

capitulate?

I think

not.

First, MacIntyre

allows that

traditions have beginnings. Aristotle and

Augustine and

Aquinas,

he holds, were founders

of

traditions. Why

then

might there not be among

us today

those

who

are

originating

new

lines

of

thought?

Their

views may some day

come to be seen

as

having

started

a

tra-

dition;

but

even

if

this

occurs,

it

will

not be

right

to describe an initiator

as

working

within the tradition

she starts.

Second, MacIntyreallows that those who, as he puts it, inhabita social

and intellectual

tradition

in

good

working

order

(WJ,

p. 7)

need

not

articulate their

presuppositions

or

think

of

themselves

as

working

within a

tradition

ratherthan as

simply

conducting

inquiry.

It is

only

later

thinkers,

consciously

theorizing about

traditions,

who

take this

view of what

the

earlier members of a tradition

were

doing.

These

later

writers,

such

as John

Henry

Newman, can

use

a sharp antithesis

between tradition and

something else

...

which

was

unavailable to

the

earlier inhabitants

of

the

tradition.

(WJ,

p. 8)

But

if

a

tradition,

ike an

epistemological crisis,

may

only be

recognized

for

what

it

is

in

retrospect

(WJ,

p.

363) then we

ourselves may be

in

the

position of

early members of what will

eventually

be

described

by some historianas a

tradition.

f

we

are,

we

are

reasoning

n

a

tradition-specific

way without

being aware

of

it. But then we are not

consciously

calling

on

ourtradition

or our

resources.

Since

in

controversy

about particular ssues we

could

be

either initiating

a traditionor using the resourcesof one withoutknowing that we are doing

so,

MacIntyre has not shown

that we

are now forced to

begin

discussing

particular

moral

issues by

deliberate use

of

the

resources of some

already

identified, historically

constituted

tradition.Why might

he think

that he

has

shown this?

MacIntyre

holds that all rational

discussion

is situated within a

shared

frameworkof

beliefs and standards,

which

cannot be

transcended n favor

of

some eternal or

absolute

standpoint

untouched by change. I am in

considerable

sympathy with this

anti-foundationalist or

pragmatist

outlook, but

I

do not

see that it has any

force to

move us

toward

traditionalism.

Perhaps

MacIntyre

supposes

that

because the framework

within

which

disagreement takes

place is

itself a result of

historical

development,

any

use of

it counts as carrying

on a

tradition. But

if

the

existence

of

any set

of

shared beliefs shows

that those

holding them

are

166

J. B. SCHNEEWI



operating

within a-tradition, the claim

that

we

must start

from

a

tradition

is extremely

weak. No historical arguments

are needed to

establish

it. One

need

only point

out that

since we must

share

some beliefs with

anyone

we

understand,

we necessarily start

from a tradition

whenever

we

engage

in

conversation. The anti-foundationalist or pragmatist who grants that

historical

processes

were involved

in shaping the framework

available to

participants

n

a

particular

discussion

is not forced

to the conclusion

that

the participants

must be appealing

to

and constrained

by some

specific

historical tradition.

This is

not only because

innovations

may

possibly provide

acceptable

solutions.

It

is also because

we share

a substantialcommon

vocabulary

and

set of assumptions

which cannot be

said to have come

from any

single,

specific historical tradition.These common assumptionsgo beyond matters

of

simple

fact and purelogic.

They enable

us

to

agree

on

many

matters

con-

cerned with

how to live peacefully

together.

It is

possible,

as

MacIntyre

says,

that

what we agree

on

is

insufficient

to resolve

our disagreements

(WJ,

p. 351),

but we cannot

know this a

priori.

We can

only

find out by

trying,

in

particular

cases,

to see

how far our agreements

will

take

us. But

this means that

in

embarking

on discussion

of

controversial

issues

it is

advisable

to start

from what

is

common. Beginning

from

what we

know

to

be

unique

to some special

tradition

would only

make a divisive

issue

harder

to resolve.

Saying

this is

not

saying

that there

is,

some set

of

startingpoints

beyond

our

historically conditioned

commonalities

which

is always

and

everywhere

sufficient

to

lead

to the rational

settlement

of

any

conceivable

issue. It is simply

leaving open the

possibility

that with respect

to

any

particular

ssue

either shared beliefs

or

new

ideas

may

enable us

to reach a

generallyaccepted resolution.To say that what serves this purpose in one

context must serve it

in

all

is to assume that

no issue

is satisfactorily

settled unless

there

is a more

or less comprehensive

principle

or

theory

backing

the settlement.

But this

is

an assumption

one need

not make.

On

practical

matters

a common understanding

may come

from different

people

for

different reasons,

and still be adequate

for the purposes

at hand.

We do

not

have to win the

kind of

dialectical victory

MacIntyre

describes

in

chapter

18-the surrender

of adherents

of one tradition to

the

superior

decisiveness,

inclusiveness,

and

explanatory power of another. In the

Rushdie

affair,

for instance,

it is not

necessary that Islam

admit

the total

superiority

of Western views. It would suffice

if

for

whatever reason

the

order to murderRushdie

were

formallyrescinded

and

the faithful

urgedto

leave

him alone. More

progress

towardresolving

important

disputes

may

MACINTYRE

YMPOSIUM

67



be achieved

if total views are

ignored

than

if disputants always insist on

making converts of their opponents.

MacIntyre would not be happy with this.

For him

particular

solutions

must add up to a coherent theory if they are to be acceptable. This assump-

tion leads him to one of his more startlingassertions-that

the rival

claims

to

truth of contending

traditions

depend

for their vindication

upon

the

ade-

quacy ... of the histories which

the

resources

of

each

of those traditions n conflict

enable their

historians

to write.

(WJ, p. 403)

The historian is MacIntyre's non-foundationalist replacement

for a

timeless criterion

of

truth

because

only

the

historian

can see

whether

particular issues

have been

resolved

in

a

way

that fits into a

coherent

general theory.But the historian'sverdict is useless. If we must wait for it

in

order to know the solution to a problem, then that knowledge

will

have

no role

in

the actual give and take of life. What solves a problem

now is

what the parties to the dispute agree solves it.

If

later concerned

parties,

including historians of traditions, think their solution inadequate, they can

reopen the dispute. But their later resolution will itself always be open

to

reiterationof the same process.

Out

of

the

piecemeal

settlement

of

substantial numbers

of

disputes

there sometimes emerges a general outlook which is articulatedin classic

writings and thus generates a tradition.It is also possible

for

relative peace

and

stability

to be

achieved without this.

In

either

case

recognized

traditionsdo

not

constitute the whole of the resources we have for starting

discussions.

MacIntyre

has

failed to show that the historical study

of those

traditions,

to

which his book is

largely devoted, has anything special

to

offer toward the resolution of the current issues whose interminability

he took as his starting point. Only the genuine use of the resources of a

given tradition, showing that it actually yields a practical solution we can

all

accept,

could

do

this. And

even then those outside the tradition would

not accept the solution because it was generated by the tradition. They

would

accept it because it struckthem as reasonable.

168 J. B.

SCIHNEEW

j.b. schneewind - macintyre on the indispensability of tradition

Documents