japan’s peace building diplomacy in sri lanka

Japan's Peace Building Diplomacy in S ri Lanka

Peng-Er Lam

In May 2002, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro declared: Japan will "strengthen cooperation for the consolidation of peace and nation building in countries suffering from conflicts. This policy has become a new pillar of Japan's international cooperation. ''1 The targets of Japan's peace building diplomacy include: Afghanistan, East Timor, Mindanao, Aceh, and Sri Lanka. Underpinning Tokyo's peace building diplomacy is the desire to play an active political role commensurate with its status as the second largest economy in the world. Since the 1991 Gulf War (when Japan was roundly criticized domestically and internationally for passively engaging only in checkbook diplomacy), it has sought to play a larger political role in Asia.

A persistent image of Japan's foreign policy behavior is its passive and reactive nature, and a focus on mercantilism and economics. 2 Explanations for Tokyo punching below its economic weight in international affairs include: the legacy of militarism and defeat in World War II; an allergy among its East Asian neighbors toward a more assertive Japan in the military sphere; constitutional restrictions (Article 9) on Japan exercising the use of force to settle international disputes; a pacifistic political culture among the Japanese; resistance within the ruling coalition and opposition parties to Japan playing a more active military role abroad; and the idea that Japan, being a junior part- ner to the US superpower, should follow the lead of Washington in foreign relations.

My central argument is that Japan has been seeking a more active political role in international affairs since the 1991 Gulf War. While the urge to play a larger political role is not new, the attempts to specifically consolidate peace in countries suffering from severe ethnic conflict and violence mark a new development in Japanese foreign policy. Tokyo is now committed to play a political role even in civil war-torn countries where thousands have perished and peace yet to be fully restored. The commitment to engage in peace building is evidenced by Japan's diplomacy in Sri Lanka.

This political initiative is also reflected in Japan's reformulated Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy: there is a shift away from an empha-

EASTASIA, Summer 2004, Vot. 21, No. 2, pp. 3-17,

4 Eas t Asia / S u m m e r 2004

sis on economic development during peace time in recipient countries to peace building or consolidation of peace in conflict-prone regions. According to Akashi Yasushi (the Japanese Government's Special Representative to the Peace Process in Sri Lanka), peace building occupies the "twilight zone" between the cessation of conflict and the establishment of "solid" peace, 3 To consolidate peace, Japan would utilize ODA incentives including humanitarian and reconstruction aid to facilitate peace through political mediation and host international peace conferences in Tokyo.

Significance: Sri Lanka as Case Study

Contrary to the stereotype that Japan is merely a reactive state, this article highlights Japan's desire to exercise diplomatic initiatives and address regional problems in a post-Cold War world bedeviled by ethnic conflict, civil wars and terrorism. It also examines whether Tokyo has latitude and credibility in pursuing an autonomous diplomatic agenda while remaining a close ally of the US superpower. Moreover, Japanese peace building, if successful, will not only save thousands of lives but also deliver a peace-dividend that will enhance political stability and improve the lives of human beings in tar- get states.

While Tokyo has sought to play an active mediatory role in various domestic and regional disputes in Southeast Asia, its quest for a political role in Sri Lanka is probably the first attempt to seriously do so in South Asia, an area where India is the great regional power. Japan's peace building efforts in Sri Lanka and other parts of Asia also reveal that the image of Japan being a political pigmy despite being an economic superpower is simplistic if not ob- solete. The article also highlights the importance of informal policy networks in the formulation of Japanese foreign policy. The role of informal policy networks is an under explored area in the study of Japan's foreign relations. This article seeks to elucidate how informal networks have facilitated Japan's political activism in Sri Lanka.

This article examines Tokyo's role in Sri Lanka as a case study of Japan's peace building in Asia. 4 In the Sri Lankan case, Tokyo ventures into an ethnic conflict which erupted in 1983 between the Sinhalese-dominated national government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). This conflict has already cost around 65,000 deaths and displaced more than 800,000 internal refugees. 5 Although Japan had expressed concern about the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict in October 2000, it did not seek to play an active role in addressing the conflict until the advent of the Koizumi administration. 6

This article will first ask: why has Japan adopted peace building diplomacy? Next, it explains why Japan has picked Sri Lanka as a litmus test for its peace building agenda. Following that is an examination of Japan's peace building process in Sri Lanka including the key actors involved. Finally, the article will examine the problems and prospects to the consolidation of peace in Sri Lanka and their larger ramifications for Japan's political role in Asia.

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Why Peace Building?

Japan's desire to engage in peace building is a reflection and an extension of its desire to play a more active role in international affairs after the 1991 Gulf War. Since the early 1990s, Tokyo has embarked on United Nations Peace Keeping Operations (UNPKO) in places including Cambodia and East Timor, sought a mediatory role in inter-state conflict (for example, the Spratlys dispute between China and the Philippines) and also intra-state conflict in Burma and Cambodia. In the former, Japan tried to act as a bridge between the military junta and Nobel Peace Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi; in the latter, Ja- pan successfully brokered peace between two major Cambodian factions after armed conflict erupted between Co-Prime Ministers Hun Sen and Prince Ranariddh. 7

Tokyo's peace building diplomacy is marked by both continuity and change: continuity because the pursuit of peace building is driven by the impulse to play a more active role in international affairs since the Gulf War fiasco; change because, hitherto, Japan has not been seriously involved in promoting peace in Asian countries which have suffered from ethnic violence and civil wars.

Other reasons also underpin Tokyo's quest for peace building. Since Japan has been mired in economic difficulties for more than a decade, it has been forced to cut back on its ODA, a key pillar and instrument of Japanese foreign policy. Tokyo's emphasis on ODA incentives is important, especially when it cannot resort to military power to exercise political influence due to its consti tut ional constraints and residual pacif ism among Japanese public opinion. Tokyo recently focused on peace building to gain the most political mileage out of its ODA. Supported by a domestic political consensus on peace building, MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) seeks to justify and protect its ODA budget from sharper cuts as a necessary tool for Japanese foreign policy. 8

The Japanese media, public opinion and Japan's East Asian neighbors (especially China and the two Koreas) are sensitive to the dispatch of Japanese troops abroad due to Japan's imperial record including World War II. Peace building diplomacy in Asia, unlike the dispatch of Japanese troops to places like Cambodia and Iraq, stirs neither controversy in domestic politics nor arouses the suspicions of Japan's neighbors. Moreover, the MOFA can also use peace building to burnish its image after being marred by a series of financial scandals.

An analyst notes: "Scandals involving bribes and kickbacks for ODA projects have made it difficult for the government to persuade voters of the importance in using ODA as a tool of national advancement, at a time the Japanese would rather see money spent at home on the sluggish economy". 9 Faced with revelations of corruption in various ODA projects, MOFA can cite peace building as a noble cause which requires an adequate budget. ~~

Besides viewing peace building as relatively "risk-free" foreign policy activism, it can also be interpreted as a quest by Japan to seek balance and autonomy in its foreign policy. In order to avoid a one-dimensional depen- dence on the US-Japan Alliance, Tokyo has sought to supplement (not sup-

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plant) the alliance with multilateral approaches such as involvement in APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation), ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), and ASEAN Plus Three; supporting UNPKO; seeking free trade agreements; and more recently, peace building in Asia. Japan's role as a peacemaker also bal- ances domestic and regional perceptions that the country is embarking on a larger military role as a supporter of the US-led war in Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, Tokyo's diplomatic successes in Asia including Sri Lanka would counterbalance the view that China has stolen a march on Japan when it offered a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area proposal to the Southeast Asian countries in 2001. If its efforts at consolidating peace in Asia are successful, Japan can even strengthen its case of earning a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council. H

Why Sri Lanka?

Sri Lanka is the litmus test in Japan's peace building diplomacy. Indeed, it is the most likely case for this new approach to succeed. While seeking peace in Sri Lanka is a difficult challenge for Japan, the prospects of a Japanese role in other cases identified earlier by Prime Minister Koizumi are even bleaker. The politico-military situation in Afghanistan appears to have deteriorated; the Philippine government does not welcome a Japanese political role in deal- ing with the Muslim separatists in Mindanao; likewise, the Indonesian government believes it can militarily crush the separatists in Aceh rather than rely on Japan as a peacemaker. However, if Tokyo were to succeed in promoting and consolidating peace in Sri Lanka, it will be encouraged to extend this approach to other conflict areas in Asia.

There are a number of reasons why Japan finds Sri Lanka attractive for peace building. First, the Japanese harbor goodwill toward Sri Lanka because the latter renounced its reparations from Tokyo at the 1951 San Francisco Conference. Second, there is a perceived commonality of culture: both the Sinhalese and Japanese are profoundly influenced by Buddhism; there is also a scholarly thesis that the Tamil and Japanese languages share a common ancestry.12

Third, Japan has no imperial past in Sri Lanka. Unlike the United States and India, Japan is viewed as an honest broker by both the Sri Lankan government and LTTE. ~3 The Tamil Tigers are suspicious of the United States and India who have branded it a terrorist organization. ~4 Besides providing limited military assistance to the Sri Lankan government, the United States also banned the LTTE from attending the Washington Seminar on Sri Lanka on April 14, 2003 (chaired by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage) and is apply- ing political and financial pressure on the Tigers to abandon violence and terrorism. India has aroused the suspicions of both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE because of its abortive peacekeeping mission in Sri Lanka during the late 1980s. The LTTE resisted the Indian military's attempts to disarm it while India blames the LTTE for assassinating Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.15 Simply put, Japan can play a diplomatic role in Sri Lanka because it does not carry any historical baggage in South Asia. ~6 In contrast,

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Japan's history of colonialism and militarism hinders an active political role in Northeast Asia due to suspicions from China and the two Koreas.

Fourth, Tokyo's role as peacemaker came at an opportune time when both combatants have been exhausted by a protracted military stalemate. The LTTE has also been exercising greater political flexibility in the wake of a hostile international climate against terrorism after September 11, 2001 for fear that the United States will upgrade its military assistance to the Sri Lankan government. 17 Simply put, elite and mass sentiments in Sri Lanka have increasingly become more receptive to foreign mediation in its peace process.

Fifth, Japan is able to offer substantial ODA incentives to parties seeking a political solution and enjoying a peace dividend of economic reconstruction. Thanks to its ODA to Sri Lanka, post-war Japan has acquired a non-ideologi- cal, pacifist and friendly image in that country. Japan is the largest foreign aid donor to Sri Lanka for the past two decades and can tap on local goodwill to play a diplomatic role in that country (Figure 1). Japan was Sri Lanka's number one donor disbursing US$174 million in 1996; Norway was a distant number two at US$32 million; Germany was third at US$16 million. Cumulative through 1997, Japan had disbursed a total of US$2.6 billion to Sri Lanka. 18

Figure 1 Japan's ODA to top ten Countries in 2001

(US$ million)

Recipients Amount Share (%)

1. Indonesia 860 11.5

2. China 686 9.2

3. India 529 7.1

4. Vietnam 460 6.2

5. Philippines 298 4.0

6. Tanzania 260 3.5

7. Pakistan 211 2.8

8. Thailand 210 2.8

9. Sri Lanka 185 2.5

10. Peru 157 2.1

Rest of the World 3,606 48.3

Total 7,462 100%

Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Summary of 2002 White Paper on Official Devel- opment Assistance.

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Contrary to the view that Japan's interest in the Sri Lankan peace process is driven by its economic and strategic interests, Japan's investments and trade with Sri Lanka are indeed very small. 19 Japan's exports to Sri Lanka in 2002 were only US$283 million (0.07 percent of Japan's total exports); Japan's imports from Sri Lanka were US$164 million (0.05 percent of Japan's total imports). 2~ Economics does not drive Japan's peace building efforts in Sri Lanka especially when the amount of resources and the energy it has poured into the process far outstrips any obvious economic gains.

Japan and Norway: Partners in Peace Building

Japan cooperates with Norway which earlier brokered the initial peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers. zl While Norway has been a facilitator in keeping the talks going since February 2000, Japan's active involvement came much later. 22 The ceasefire agreement between the Government of Sri Lanka and LTTE on February 22, 2002 paved the way for a Japanese peace building role. Norway's skillful and patient role in the Sri Lankan peace process is pivotal. However, Norway by itself lacks the financial resources to keep the momentum going for peace; Japan has the financial clout for peace building. In this regard, Oslo and Tokyo have forged a close diplomatic partnership and a division of labor in Sri Lanka: While the Norwe- gians have concentrated on politics, the Japanese have focused on economic and humanitarian dimensions without ignoring a political role too.

Informal Policy Networks

Japan's initial involvement in the peace process was not spearheaded by MOFA but by Japanese academics through their informal web of personal friendships and profound common interest in Sri Lanka. On March 20, 2002, B. A. B. Goonetilleke, director general of Sri Lanka's Secretariat for Coor- dinating the Peace Process, invited Professor Nakamura Hisashi of Ryukoku University in Kyoto, one of Japan's foremost experts on Sri Lanka, to visit and give his advice on enhancing peace in that country. 23 On April 2, 2002, Nakamura replied in his personal capacity and recommended Akashi Yasushi as a suitable person who can facilitate the consolidation of peace in Sri Lanka. 24

Indeed, Akashi has the track record of being an ex-Undersecretary General of the United Nations, former chief of UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) and UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Forces) in Yugoslavia. Akashi has been harshly criticized in the West for being too "soft" in his handling of the Bosnian crisis but his reputation remains sterling in Japan. In his home country, Akashi is perceived as Mr. UN and peace maker since he had been a bureaucrat in that international organization since 1957. However, a Japanese critic of Tokyo's diplomacy commented that choosing Akashi to represent the Japanese government on the Sri Lanka peace process (despite his alleged limitations in Bosnia as an effective diplomat and negotiator) reflects the lack of top quality negotiators Tokyo can muster in times of

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needy Nevertheless, the mainstream view in Japan is that Akashi is the right man for the job.

Another scholar in Japan who is deeply concerned about the situation in Sri Lanka is Professor Monte Cassim of Ritsumeikan University in Kyoto, a close friend of Nakamura. That informal policy networks facilitated Japan's role in the peace process can be seen from Monte Cassim's connections. He was a childhood friend of then Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe; they were from the same neighborhood, went to the same school and university. Monte Cassim also knew Akashi well and had earlier invited him to Ritsumeikan University as a Visiting Professor. 26

Another personal network which facilitated Japan's role in Sri Lanka was forged by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo. 27 He has an abiding interest in Sri Lanka and was a pivotal player in Japan's involvement in Sri Lanka's peace process. Fukuda was the Chairman of Japan's Parliamentary Friendship League to Sri Lanka, visited the island on a few occasions, knows many Sri Lankans and is a good friend of Sri Lanka's Ambassador Amunugama in Tokyo. Fukuda, until his resignation as Chief Cabinet Secretary in May 2004, was reputed to be the "shadow foreign minister" of Japan who was more influential than Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko in the formulation and execution of Japanese foreign policy. As the Chief Cabinet Secretary, Fukuda was also the official spokesperson for the Koizumi government.

In July 2002, Sri Lanka's Foreign Minister Tyronne Fernando wrote to Kawaguchi seeking Japan's role in Sri Lanka's peace process. However, To- kyo responded to that proposal only in October 2002. 28 Why did Tokyo take more than three months to respond to Sri Lanka's request? There are at least two plausible reasons. First, Japan's foreign policy making process is gener- ally slow and cautious especially if it were to move in a new direction or adopt new commitments. Second and more specifically, MOFA especially Ambassa- dor Otsuka Seiichiro and the Japanese embassy in Sri Lanka were initially hesitant about their country's political involvement in Sri Lanka before peace is consolidated and when the ceasefire remained fragile. Apparently, they also had reservations about a special representative from the Japanese government playing a key role in their diplomatic turf.

Akashi's Roles

Nevertheless, on October 25, 2002, the Koizumi government appointed Akashi as the special representative of the Japanese government for peace building in Sri Lanka. MOFA then announced: "Mr Yasushi Akashi ... will be in Sri Lanka from 3 to 9 November. During his stay, Mr Akashi will meet with Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and officials of the Government of Sri Lanka, the political parties of the country, as well as international organizations. He also plans to visit various places, including the northern and eastern parts of this island nation where civil war had been fought over the past 19 y e a r s . ''29

Akashi also became the principal advisor to the Sub-committee on Immedi- ate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs in the North and East (SIHRN)


established to offer tangible benefits to civilians living in those contested regions.3~ establishing rapport with Colombo and the LTTE, Akashi also sought international support for the Sri Lankan peace process. For that purpose, Akashi also visited the US, India, Norway and the United Nations. 31 Between November 2002 and May 2004, Akashi made seven trips to Sri Lanka including LTTE-controlled areas. Adding weight to Akashi's diplomatic efforts, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi visited Sri Lanka in January 2003, met with government leaders and toured the war-devastated northern town of Jaffna.

The Koizumi government also appointed Akashi as chairman of the Advi- sory Group on International Cooperation for Peace which also included Japan's role in peace building. 32 It issued its report on December 18, 2002 to Prime Minister Koizumi. The advisory panel comprised 16 members and reported to the chief cabinet secretary of the Prime Minister's Office and not to MOFA? a This suggests the rising influence of Fukuda and the Chief Cabinet Office in Japan's foreign policy making process vis-h-vis MOFA) 4 Nevertheless, MOFA provided expertise, information and manpower to Akashi especially when he visited Sri Lanka.

The Hakone and Tokyo Meetings

Japan hosted the sixth round of peace talks between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE between March 18 and 21, 2003 in Hakone. It organized the ministerial-level Reconstruction for Sri Lanka Conference in Tokyo on June 9 and 10, 2003 attended by 51 countries and 22 International Organiza- tions. 35 At the Tokyo conference, donors pledged US$4.5 billion (US$1 billion from Japan alone) to facilitate the peace process. Its disbursement is contingent on actual progress in the peace process made by both erstwhile combatants.

Akashi remarked: "In Hakone, I made it very clear to the parties that unless they made tangible, concrete progress in the negotiations, it would be difficult for donor countries, including Japan, to be generous towards them . . . . I told the parties in Hakone that we do not want to be just Santa Claus bringing gifts to the parties. ''36

However, the LTTE boycotted the Tokyo Conference in June 2003 because the Sri Lankan government initially refused to establish an interim administrative council in the northern and eastern parts of the island country where the LTTE will have a major say in the administration and control of reconstruction aid in these regions. 37 Subsequently, then Prime Minister Wickremesinghe re- lented and came close to meeting the LTTE demand for an interim council. 38 According to Akashi, Japan pushed for the Tokyo Conference to proceed despite the boycott of the LTTE because to do otherwise would be tantamount to giving the LTTE a veto over the peace process. 39 Being the co-chair of the Conference, Japan also helped to draft the declaration for peace building in Sri Lanka on behalf of all the delegates at the talks.

At the 2003 Tokyo Conference, the Japan Bank for International Coopera- tion (JBIC) made many recommendations about peace building and reconstruction in Sri Lanka to the delegates. 4~ Key members of the team who made

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these recommendations included two Sri Lankan experts based in Japan: Pro- fessors Nakamura Hisashi and Monte Cassim. This excellent document was also distilled from two workshops held in Colombo (December 2002) and Tokyo (January 2003) where preliminary findings and recommendations of the study were presented and discussions took place among participants from government agencies, international organizations, academics and N G O s . 41 The roles of academics like Professors Nakamura Hisashi and Monte Cassim in policy recommendations for the Tokyo Conference are indicative of the roles informal social networks play in Japanese foreign policy.

Problems and Prospects

While Japan offers substantial material incentives for a peace accord, the successful outcome of the fragile peace process ultimately depends on the Sri Lankan government and LTTE setting up an interim authority in Northern and Eastern part of Sri Lanka where the LTTE will play a major political role. However, after two decades of civil war, there is profound distrust not only between the Sri Lankan government and the Tamil Tigers but also between President Chandrika Kumaratunga and then Prime Minister Wickremesinghe who come from rival political parties.

Sri Lanka is bedeviled by confrontational party politics. The president and prime minister were forced into political cohabitation which often led to a political gridlock. In November 2003, their political feud flared up again when the president fired three ministers (who were involved in the peace process) and suspended parliament when the prime minister was in Washington. Be- sides personal antagonism with the prime minister and his party, President Kumaratunga was also fearful that Wickremesinghe was making too many concessions in peace talks with the Tamil Tigers. Sri Lanka's bitter and confrontational party politics threatens to unravel the fragile peace process. In April 2004, President Kumaratunga's party recaptured power in parliamentary elections but had to forge a coalition with smaller parties (some of whom were opposed to negotiate with the LTTE) to maintain a ruling majority.

Akashi earlier remarked: "There are so many imponderables, which only hard work, goodwill and some element of luck can help to resolve. ''42 He reiterated: "It is only obvious that in the end peace will be realized only through self-reliant efforts by each one of the Sri Lankan people. The support of the international community is in the end only supportive and supplementary. ''43 Akashi also noted that a great deal of patience and tenacity is required for peace building and it might well be the case of "two steps forward, one step backwards. ''44

US Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, at the Tokyo Conference of June 2003, was skeptical about the Tamil Tigers giving up violence. The group that he said "pioneered the practice of turning its sons and daughters into human bombs is going to have to work hard to build trust and convince the world that it is capable of playing a legitimate role in the political life of Sri Lanka. ''45

It is uncertain whether the LTTE has truly given up its goal of an independent Tamil state. Conceivably, it may tactically accept autonomy and a federal

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system of government merely to strengthen its hands for an eventual show- down with the Sri Lankan government. However, there is no certainty that Colombo will actually share power, tax revenues, and foreign aid with the LTTE and end discriminations against Tamils when they are granted "autonomy" within the state of Sri Lanka. Indeed, the peace process remains fragile especially when trust is virtually absent between the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE.

There are at least four other problems. First, the peace process is still punc- tuated by armed naval clashes between the Sri Lankan navy and LTTE ves- sels. 46 Second, a key question remains about neutral international monitoring to ensure that the peace accord is observed and human rights are complied with. Third, will the Tamil Tigers disarm and participate as a legitimate local party in Sri Lanka's political process and will there be adequate constitutional, political, and even international safeguards for the Tamil minorities once the LTTE has disarmed? Fourth, besides the confrontational politics between the rival parties of the president and former prime minister, there are also other extremist political parties which oppose the peace process.

Nevertheless, there are also some grounds for cautious optimism. The international climate is against terrorism and the violent tactics adopted earlier by the Tamil Tigers. Moreover, the majority of Sri Lankan public opinion appears to be "pro-peace." Besides war-weariness, Sri Lankans have also en- joyed visible improvement in their quality of life since the ceasefire was forged: most roadblocks have been removed, tourism has risen and the economy has improved. The Tamil Tigers have also, for the very first time, offered their peace proposal on paper in November 2003. Last, but not least, is the commitment and tenacity of the international community especially Norway and Ja- pan in pursuing peace building in Sri Lanka.

Conclusion

Conceivably, if peace building in Sri Lanka is eventually successful, Japan will extend this approach to other Asian conflict zones if opportunities arise and conditions are right. After all, the offering of Japan's good offices and ODA to parties seeking negotiations and peace is virtually risk-free compared to the dispatch of troops to combat areas like Iraq. The significance of Japan's diplomatic initiatives is that, despite prolonged economic stagnation, it ac- tively plays a constructive role as a peacemaker in a country torn by civil war and ethnic conflict, a role which other Asian powers like India and China cannot presently emulate. Nevertheless, Japan's peace building role ultimately hinges on development in Sri Lanka's domestic politics. It can only do so much: persuade, mediate or offer material incentives to the erstwhile combatants but cannot coerce both parties to abide by a peace agreement.

Tokyo's peace building diplomacy in Asia especially Sri Lanka reflects both desire and confidence in autonomously pursuing and resolving a conflict is- sue which is not dependent on Washington's behest and geo-political interest. However, Japan is able to do so with the tacit understanding of the United States because such aspirations to consolidate peace in Asia neither contradict

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nor jeopardize the US-Japan Alliance. If Japan were to succeed in Sri Lanka, it will be a diplomatic coup in a region quite distant from Tokyo. Neverthe- less, Japan's dogged pursuit of peace building is not assured of success in Sri Lanka. Indeed, a failure to consolidate peace due to circumstances beyond Japan's control will only highlight how difficult it is for Japan to play a pivotal role in international affairs.

Moreover, while pursuing peace building in countries torn by ethnic conflict and civil wars is a new development in Japan's foreign policy, the offer of ODA as financial incentives to recipient states is not. If Japan desires to go beyond checkbook diplomacy and hosting aid conferences in peace building diplomacy, then it should also consider offering its police or troops in cooperation with other countries to monitor the cessation of hostilities in Sri Lanka and other countries. Given Japan's residual pacifism and constitutional constraints, the dispatch of troops even for peace building will be politically con- troversial in Japanese domestic politics. But if Japan can provide troops and not just money and diplomats for peace building after armed hostilities have ceased, then that will surely enhance its role in international affairs.

Notes

I would like to thank the following who generously shared their insights with me: Akashi Yasushi (Special Representative of the Japanese Government to the Sri Lankan Peace Process and Chairman, Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace); Professor Nakamura Hisashi of Ryukoku University (one of Japan's foremost experts on Sri Lanka); Yamanaka Akiko (Visiting Professor, United Nations University in Tokyo, member, Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace and ex- Diet member), Tor A. Dahlstrcm (Minister-Counsellor, Royal Norwegian Embassy in Tokyo) and Dr Sisira Edirinppulige (a Sri Lankan scholar at Kobe Gakuin University). I am also thankful to Professor Taniguchi Hiroyuki (President of Kobe Gakuin) and Professor Katahara Eiichi (also at Kobe Gakttin) for inviting me to present a seminar at their university in October 2003 on Japan's peace building in Sri Lanka. I am also grateful to two anonymous referees for their useful critique.

1. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Summary of the 2002 White Paper on Official Develop- ment Assistance, April 2003.<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2OO2/summary.html> (Ac- cessed: June 12, 2003). See also Asahi Shimbun, Asahi.com, "More ODA to regions shattered by conflict", April 9, 2003. <http://uunet.asahi.com/english/politics/K2003040900386.html> (Accessed: June 13, 2003).

Foreign Minister Kawaguchi Yoriko elaborated: "Important are efforts to ensure that tempo- rary ceasefires and spells of stability gained through peace negotiations can be extended and made permanent, preventing the outbreak of further violence. I am positioning the concept of consolidation ofpeace at the center of Japan's diplomatic efforts--efforts that will include humanitarian and reconstruction aid in regions of conflict, along with cooperation in achieving domestic stability and public safety. This is a relatively new type of initiative for Japan...." Kawaguchi Yoriko, "A Foreign Policy to Consolidate Peace", Japan Echo 30:2 (April 2003).

2. Kent Calder argues that Japan's foreign policy is made by a reactive state incapable of sustained, innovative policy. See Kent Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation," World Poli- tics 40:4 (1988). Gerald Curtis also perceives Japan's role in the world as essentially "coping" with its external environment. See Gerald L. Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993). For an excellent article which examines the reactive state thesis of Japan, see David Potter and Sudo Sueo, "Japanese Foreign Policy: No Longer Reactive?" Political Studies Review 1 (2003): 317-332.

3. Interview with Akashi Yasushi, November 18, 2003. Akashi mentions that he uses the terms "peace-building" and "consolidation of peace" interchangeably.


4. Writings on peace-building in Sri Lanka tend to highlight Norway's role. This is understandable because Japan is really a newcomer to this role in Sri Lanka. See, for example, Jonathan Goodhand, Conflict Assessments: Aid, conflict and peace building in Sri Lanka, The Conflict, Security & Development Group, Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, University of London, July 2001.

5. See Peter Chalk, "The Liberation Tigers ofTamil Eelam Insurgency in Sri Lanka" in Rajat Ganguly and Ian Macduff, eds., Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions (New Delhi, Thousand Oaks and London: Sage Publications, 2003).

Miriam Young writes: "Since independence, Sinhalese majority governments have attempted to reverse what they viewed as British favoritism of Tamils in education and government positions. Successive governments instituted policies that discriminated against Tamils in language and education and gave Buddhism pride of place in the constitution. The unwillingness of these governments to address Tamil grievances escalated a political conflict into a violent and multidimensional or~... The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTI'E), which emerged as the most militarily efficient and ruthless group, is locked in battle against the Sri Lankan government. The LTTE is fighting for Tamil Eelam, a separate Tamil state that comprises the north and east of the island." See Miriam Young, "Sri Lanka's Long War", Asia Pacific Center for Justice and Peace, Vol.5, No. 35, October 2000. <http://www.fpif.org/briefs/vo15/v5n35srilanka_body.html> (Accessed: June 12, 2003).

6. When Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar met Prime Minister Moil Yoshiro on October 23, 2000, they discussed the ethnic issues in the island country. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs recorded: "Prime Minister Mori pointed out that Japan was concerned about the ethnic issues facing Sri Lanka, and expressed hope for a peaceful resolution of these issues. Foreign Minister Kadirgamar expressed his appreciation for the support of the Government of Japan toward the Government of Sri Lanka's efforts for peace and responded that Sri Lanka would continue to work for a peaceful resolution to the issues." The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Minister of Foreign Affairs Lakshman Kadirgamar of Sri Lanka's Courtesy Call on Prime Minis- ter Yoshiro Mori and Meeting with Minister for Foreign Affairs Yohei Kono (Summary and Evaluation)", October 23, 2000. <http://www.infojapan.org/region/asia-paci/srilanka/ meet0010.html> (Accessed: May 21, 2003).

7. On Japan's political initiatives in Southeast Asia, see the following articles and book chapters by Lam Peng Er, "Japan's Search for a Political Role in Southeast Asia" in Southeast Asian Affairs 1996 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Studies, 1996); "Japan and the Spratlys Dispute," Asian Survey 36:10 (October 1996); "Japanese Relations with Southeast Asia in Era of Turbulence" in Inoguchi Takashi and Prnendra Jain, eds., Japanese Foreign Policy Today (New York: Palgrave, 2000); and "Japan's Diplomatic Initiatives in Southeast Asia" in S. Javed Maswood, ed., Japan and EastAsian Regionalism (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).

8. The Asahi Shimbun writes: "In addition to strengthening a fragile peace accord in Sri Lanka, the Foreign Ministry hopes to quell criticism against ODA by using Japanese funds to maintain peace in war-ravaged region such as Jaffna ... . The ODA budget has been cut for four straight years amid the fiscal crises hitting the government and widespread doubts over the effectiveness of the economic aid to developing nations". See "Early aid: The Foreign Ministry hopes to establish peace in Sri Lanka and protect its ODA program", Asahi Shimbun, January 9, 2003. <http:// www.g••g•e.c•m.sg/search?q=cacbe:9ge•sJ•drt8J:ww.asahi.c•m/eng•ish/p..>(Accessed: June 13, 2003).

9. Shamindra Ferndinando, "Lanka to benefit from Japan's new peacemaker role", The Island (Sri Lanka), December 12, 2002. <http://www.island.lk/2002/12/15/po;ot02.html> (Accessed: June 12, 2003).

10. See Purnendra Jain, "Japan's troubled foreign aid policy" in Asia Times, July 30, 2002. <http:// www.atimes.com/atimes/Japan/DG30Dh01.html> (Accessed: June 20, 2003).

11. A Japan Bank for International Cooperation report writes: "The demands of rapid responses, quick decisions and a full-time ground presence in Sri Lanka are likely to stretch the crisis management expertise currently available within Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Thus, a commitment to capacity building in Japan's foreign service to meet these demands will be critical, particularly if the engagement in Sri Lanka is seen as a precursor of Japan's foreign policy commitments in the future. Certainly, the world at large, and the Asia-Pacific region in particular, will be waiting expectantly to see how Japan performs in her new role. This is a most important step to pave the way towards a

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well-deserved (and perhaps long overdue) permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council." See Japan Bank for International Cooperation, "Development Assistance Strategy for Peace Build- ing and Reconstruction in Sri Lanka", JBICI Research Paper 24 (August 2003): 154-155.

12. According to Professor Nakamura, scholars affiliated with the Tamil Tigers have made study trips to Gakushuin University (the tertiary institution where Japan's Imperial family and the aristocracy are educated) because Emeritus Professor Ohno Susumu, a prominent linguist, has argued that the Japanese language is related to the Tamil language. Interview, Nakamura Hisashi, November 25, 2003.

13. The LTTE's chief negotiator Anton Balasingham remarked: "The peace process is enhanced by Japan's involvement". See "Japan deepens Sri Lanka peace role", TamilNet, March 19, 2003. <http://news.tami.net.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=8569> (Accessed: June 10, 2003).

14. For a critique of US policy towards Sri Lanka, see Miriam Young, "Sri Lanka's Long War." 15. Chalk writes: "Although the Indian Government was instrumental in supporting the Tamil insur-

gency during the early 1980s, by 1987 New Delhi was beginning to fear the creation of an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka could spark secessionist demands in its own state of Tamil Nadu." See Chalk, "Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Insurgency in Sri Lanka," 132-133.

16. S. Chandrasekharan, "Sri Lanka: Japan and Peace Talks", South Asia Analysis Group, No.44, March 20, 2003. <http://www.saag.org/notes2/note179.html> (Accessed: June 10, 2003).

17. The Sri Lankan media reported: "Sources close to the Sri Lankan peace process said that the LTTE was worded about the increased US involvement in Sri Lanka and the military support to the Colombo government in the wake of September 11 attacks in the US." See Areal Hayasinghe, "US pressure to end conflict", The Island (Sri Lanka), September 19, 2002. <http:l/origin.island.lk/ 2002/09/221newsO8.html> (Accessed: June 12, 2003).

18. Embassy of Japan in the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, "The Current Situation of Sri Lanka in Development". <http://www.lk.emb-japan.go.jp/assistance/develop.html> (Accessed: May 21, 2003).

19. K. Ratnayake, "Japan's involvement in the Sri Lankan peace process", World Socialist Web Site, February 26, 2003. <http:llwww.wswg.org/artMes12003/feb2003/sri-f26.shtml> (Accessed: June 9, 2003).

20. Statistics were from Japan External Trade Organization, Japan's International Trade in Goods, December 2002.

21. On Norway's role, see Mahesh Uniyal, "India, Norway begin peace bid in Sri Lanka", Asia Times, May 13, 2000. <http://www.asiatimes.com/ind-pak/BE13Df01.html> (Accessed: May 21, 2003). Interview with Tor A. DahlstrCm (Minister-Councilor, Royal Norwegian Embassy, Tokyo), Octo- ber 16, 2003.

22. "N. Ram interviews Yasushi Akashi: Japan and Sri Lanka', Frontline, April 26-May 9, 2003. <http://www.frontlineonnet.com/f12009/stories/20030509002404400.htm> (Accessed: June 10, 2003).

23. Interview with Professor Nakamura Hisashi, November 25, 2003. Nakamura went to Sri Lanka to study Sinhalese in the early 1960s. He subsequently graduated from the University of Colombo. Nakamura intimated that a number of his Sri Lankan classmates are now cabinet ministers.

Goonnetilleke wrote to Professor Ueyama Daisyun, President of Ryukoku University on March 20, 2002: "You may be aware that the Government of Sri Lanka concluded a Ceasefire Agreement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam on 22 February 2002 ... . To assist the peace process, the Hon Prime Minister has established a Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process (SCOPP) under his direct supervision, supported by two Cabinet Ministers. In carrying out the mandate given to the SCOPE I have the responsibility to co-ordinate all aspects of work relating to the peace process, including engaging the service of foreign experts to formulate policies related to the peace process ... In this context, I would like to extend an invitation to Prof. Nakamura Hisashi to visit Sri Lanka with a view to formulating a plan of action to assist the SCOPE particularly in the reconstruction and rehabilitation work in the Northern and Eastern Provinces."

A copy of this letter was sent to K. Amunugama, ambassador for Sri Lanka in Japan and a good personal friend of then Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo. This letter is reproduced in Nakamura Hisashi, "Suri ranka naisen no heiwateki kaiketsu" (The Peaceful Resolution of Sri Lanka's Civil War) in Ryugoku daigaku keizaigaku ronshu 42:5 (March 2003): 128.


24. Nakamtara replied to Goonetilleke: "I am writing this letter strictly in my personal capacity as a concerned scholar in Japan who has been associated with Sri Lankan people and society for the past 37 years .... Dr Akashi Yasushi is highly respected in Japan since he played a vital role as a Peace facilitator in Cambodia and Bosnia while being the Under Secretary General of United Nations in 1990s. If Government of Sri Lanka requests the service of an experienced Japanese diplomat like him in preparation of the peace process in the near future, he will be able to give useful advice to Sri Lanka from his rich knowledge of conflict resolutions." This letter is reproduced in Nakamura, "Suri ranka naisen no heiwateki kaiketsu," 129.

According to Nakamura, he earlier had two persons in mind: Ogata Sadako and Akashi Yasushi. However, Ogata was already committed as the Japanese Government's Special Represen- tative to peace building in Afghanistan. Interview with Nakamura Hisashi, November 25, 2003. Akashi earlier intimated that he was approached by Nakamura about a diplomatic role in Sri Lanka. Interview with Akashi Yasushi, November 18, 2003.

25. Comment by a Japanese scholar who does not wish to be identified. March 2004. 26. Interview with Nakamura Hisashi, November 25, 2003. 27. Both Akashi and Nakamura confirmed the important role and deep interest of Fukuda Yasuo in Sri

Lanka. Interviews with Akashi Yasushi, November 18, 2003 and Nakamura Hisashi, November 25, 2003.

28. Interview with Akashi Yasushi, November 18, 2003. 29. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Press Conference, October 29, 2002. <http!//

www.infojapan.orglannouncelpress1200211011029.html> (Accessed: May 21, 2003). 30. The other sub-committees are: sub-committee on de-escalation and normalization, sub-committee

on gender issues and sub-committee on political matters. 31. "Japan ups Sri Lanka peace role", BBC News, January 18, 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/

south_asia/2672427.stm> (Accessed: June 9, 2003). Akashi intimated that because India is a pivotal player in South Asia, he strives to keep India in the loop concerning peace-building in Sri Lanka. Interview with Akashi Yasushi, November 18, 2003.

32. After Koizumi's speech in May 2002 which touched on peace building, a 16-member team was convened as the Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace. After six months of discussion from June to December 2002, the Advisory Group released its report. See Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace, Executive Summary of the Report of the Advisory Group on International Cooperation for Peace, December 18, 2002.

33. See also Akiko Yamanaka, "Peacekeeping to Peace Building: What Can We Do?", May 30, 2003, Mimeo.

34. Foreign Minister Kawaguchi has at least two disadvantages. She is not a Diet member and therefore lacks domestic political clout, and was a bureaucrat from the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MITI), the traditional rival to MOFA. Apparently, many MOFA bureaucrats were not enamored of their minister who hailed from MITI. Another reason why Kawaguchi and MOFA have less clout is due to the poor image of MOFA after it was mired in a series of scandals. While Ministries like MOFA and the Defense Agency do dispatch their staff to work in the Cabinet Office, these transferred bureaucrats cannot merely act as the voice pieces of their home ministries and agencies; the assessment of their job performances in the Cabinet Office is also dependent on their ability to balance and even transcend the parochial interests of specific ministries.

35. Kanako Takahara, "Nations pledge $4.5 billion to advance Sri Lanka peace talks", The Japan Times, June 11, 2003. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.p15?nn20030611al.htn~ (Accessed: June t 1, 2003). See also "Japan opens Sri Lanka meeting, ties $1 billion to peace progress", The Asahi Shimbun, asahi.com, June 10, 2003. <http://www.asahi.com/english/politics/K2003061000360.html> (Accessed: June 10, 2003).

36. "N. Ram interviews Yasushi Akashi: Japan and Sri Lanka", Frontline, April 26-May 9, 2003. <http://www.frontlineonnet.com/f12009/stories/20030509002404400.htm> (Accessed: June 10, 2003). The BBC also reported: "Yasushi Akashi warned that Sri Lanka risked losing huge amounts of international aid if the talks failed to progress". BBC News, "No breakthrough in Sri Lanka Talks", 13:13 GMT, March 20, 2003. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2867979.stm> (Ac- cessed: June 10, 2003).

37. Kanako Takahara, "Rebel boycott will not diminish aid talks: Akashi", The Japan Times, June 8, 2003. <http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn2OO30608a4.htm> (Accessed: June

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9, 2003). See also "Tamils shun Tokyo talks on aid offers", International Herald Tribune, June 10, 2003. According to Akashi, the LTTE boycotted the Tokyo conference to avoid Western criticisms of its terrorist acts and induction of Tamil children into its army. Interview with Akashi Yasushi, November 18, 2003.

38. Prime Minister Wickremeshinghe said: "In Oslo both the government and the LTTE jointly agreed on a significant statement and I quote: 'the parties agreed to explore a solution founded on the principle of internal self-determination in areas of historical habitation of the Tamil-speaking peoples, based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka. The parties acknowledged that the solution has to be acceptable to all communities'.... In this context, we would need to set up an innovative provisional administrative structure . . . . We will introduce constitutional reforms when we have negotiated a final political solution which we are fully committed to take to the people ofSri Lanka through a referendum for the ultimate decision." The official website of the Sri Lankan Government's Secretariat for Coordinating the Peace Process, "Prime Minister's Speech at the Tokyo Donor Conference", June 9, 2003. <http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/insidepages/stories/ PMSpeech090603.asp> (Accessed: June 10, 2003). See also Kanako Takahara, "Sri Lanka envoy offers leadership role to rebels", The Japan Times, June 10, 2003. <http: www.japantimes.co.jp/ cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5 ?nn20030610a4.htm> (Accessed: June 13, 2003).

39. Interview with Akashi Yasushi, November 18, 2003. 40. See Japan Bank for Intemational Cooperation, "Development Assistance Strategy for Peace Build-

ing and Reconstruction in Sri Lanka", JBIC1Research Paper 24 (August 2003): 1-170. 41. Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Development Assistance Strategy for Peace Building

and Reconstruction in Sri Lanka, foreword, i. 42. "N. Ram interviews Yasushi Akashi: Japan and Sri Lanka", Fronttine, April 26-May 9, 2003.

<http://www.frontlineonnet.corn/f12009/stories/20030509002404400.htm> (Accessed: June 10, 2003).

43. "Opening Statement by Mr Yasushi Akashi Representative of the Government of Japan on Peace- Building and Rehabilitation in Sri Lanka", Oslo Meeting, Norway, November 2002.

<http://www.peaceinsrilanka.org/in sidepages/Intemationalsuppoer/OsloMeeting?Ja...> (Ac- cessed: June 10, 2003).

44. Interview with Akashi Yasushi, November 18, 2003. However, in the author's view, another conceivable outcome might well be "one step forward, two steps backwards."

45. "Tamils shun Tokyo talks on aid offers", International Herald Tribune, June 10, 2003. 46. The Sri Lankan government claims that the Tamil Tigers are engaged in gun-running while the

LTTE would counterclaim that they were attacked in international waters while ferrying diesel.

japan’s peace building diplomacy in sri lanka

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