jacobinism transfer
TRANSCRIPT
Freie Universität (UC Berkeley Austausch)
The Transfer of French Jacobinism to Germany: 1789-1793
Jason Fauss
Geschichte
Prof. Dr. Arnd
March 15, 2015
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Outline
I. Introduction
A. Research Question: Why was the transfer of Jacobin ideals not successful in the
Germanic states following the French revolution?
B. Thesis: By utilizing historical transfer methodology (A → B, B1 → A) the
movement of Jacobin ideals from France to Germany from 1789 to 1793 was
unsuccessful because of 1. Germany’s political conditions (A. Geography B.
Political Culture) 2. Germany’s intellectual community and 3. France’s
militarization of Germany.
II. Historical Background
A. Jacobin Ideology
B. Timeframe (1789-1793)
III. Methodology Explained
IV. Germany’s Political Conditions
A. Geography
B. Political Culture
V. Germany’s Intellectual Community
VI. Frances’ Militarization of Germany
VII. Conclusion
VIII. Bibliography
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The Transfer of French Jacobinism to Germany: 1789-1793
History has taught us that the world is strongly connected in a plethora of ways. Through
trade states are economically tied; through diplomacy and foreign affairs states are politically
joined. States are also, however, ideologically linked. The movement of ideas and institutions
from one state or society to another is what Margrit Pernau refers to as ‘Transfergeschichte’1 in
her book, “Transnationale Geschichte”. In this essay, I will focus specifically on the ideology of
the Jacobins and shed light on the question: why was the transfer of Jacobin ideals not successful
in the Germanic states following the French revolution? I will argue that by utilizing historical
transfer methodology (A → B, B1 → A) the movement of Jacobin ideals from France to
Germany from 1789 to 1793 was unsuccessful because of 1. Germany’s political conditions (A.
Geography B. Political Culture) 2. Germany’s intellectual community and 3. France’s
militarization of Germany. I will first provide historical background, then explain the
methodology and lastly flush out three arguments in support of my thesis.
Jacobinism refers to the values and ideologies of the Jacobin Club which was the most
influential political club in the French Revolution up until the death of their leader in 1794—
Maximilien de Robespierre. The Jacobin ideology that was developing in France at the time was
considerably left wing and radical, though its promotion of a, “centralized republican state and
strong central government powers”2 is what will be the focus of this essay. A centralized
republican state was a strong grassroots desire at that time because aristocracies all over Europe
were powerfully oppressive and had infringed on the natural rights of their citizens for centuries.
Jacobinism appealed to the common man because it argued that, “any institution which does not
1 Pernau, Margrit. Transnationale Geschichte. N.p.: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2011. Print. Entire Chapter 2.2 Rey, Alain. Dictionnaire historique de la langue française, Le Robert, 1992.
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suppose the people good, and the magistrate corruptible, is evil. - Robespierre”3 In short, a move
from monarchistic feudalism to a democratic republic was what the Jacobin ideology encouraged
—along with the social contract and the freedom of all men. Many German intellectuals,
politicians, and other members of the upper middle class were sympathetic to Jacobinism and
responded by trying to set up ‘Jacobin Clubs’ at home.
This paper will begin with 1789 because this year saw the start of the French Revolution
and therefore also the start of robust Jacobin promotion. 1793 is the most appropriate year to end
with because 1793 was the year in which the Mainz Republic of Germany failed and several
months later Robespierre died, consequently crushing any notions of spreading Jacobinism
throughout Germany en masse.
Before diving deep into a historical analysis of German and French Jacobinism in the late
18th century, it is imperative that I clarify Pernau’s scholarship on ‘Transfergeshichte’. A
transfer, according to Pernau, is not just a copy of an idea or institution in another a state. When
idea A is transferred to B, it is changed through B’s interpretation and can consequently no
longer be called simply B. The alteration of B through new interpretation is referred to as B1—or
what Pernau calls a ‘Mischform’, hybrid in nature. In regards to the methodology, French
Jacobinism represents A and Germany represents B. This is only logical since Jacobinism first
began with the French. The adoption of French Jacobinism in Germany is reflected in the model
as AB. Germany’s implementation of Jacobinism, is indicated through B1A. The first two
arguments refer to the adoption of Jacobinism (A → B) and the third point refers to the
implementation of the ideology (B1 → A).
3 Lejeune, Anthony. The Concise Dictionary of Foreign Quotations. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn, 2001. Print. 117.
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Pernau’s analysis of unsuccessful transfers will be most helpful in this essay. She writes,
“ein Transfer kann gelingen, er kann aber auch scheitern. Gelungen ist ein Transfer, wenn es zur
Rezeption in der Zielkultur kommt. Diese Rezeption kann wiederum ganz unterschiedliche
Formen annehmen...ein Transfer kann auch scheitern, weil das fremde Kulturgut ignoriert wird,
sich Widerstand dagegen erhebt oder es schlichtweg verboten wird.”4 I argue that Germany’s
political and intellectual climate had strong enough ‘Widerstand’ (resistance) to Jacobin ideology
that it led to an unsuccessful transfer. This ‘Widerstand’, as previously articulated in my thesis, is
seen through Jacobinism’s adoption (arguments 1 and 2) and Jacobinism’s implementation in
German society (argument 3).
Germany’s political climate from 1789-1793 was not hospitable to the transfer of Jacobin
ideology because A. Geographically the states were not unified and B. Aristocratic values were
still deeply cherished by the majority of Germanic citizens. In his book, "Literarischer
Jakobinismus in Deutschland: 1789-1806" Inge Stephan writes that, ““ein revolutionäres
Zentrum, das eine vergleichbare Funktion wie etwa Paris für eine Revoluion hätte übernehemen
können, gab es wegen der nationalen Zersplitterung nicht.”5 Nearly every developed state has a
central location or capital in which the government resides. This centralized government location
—such as Paris—made it possible for the French to revolt so directly. The French government
was not some vague, fictitious institution that ruled the land; it could literally be seen and burned
to the ground by the common man. But because the Germanic states weren’t unified, they lacked
a central government and tangible enemy. This proved damaging to the manifestation of
Jacobinism through revolution because instead of one large revolt at the capital, there were
4 Pernau, Margrit. Transnationale Geschichte. N.p.: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2011. Print. 48-49.5 Stephan, Inge. Literarischer Jakobinismus in Deutschland: 1789-1806. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1976.
Print. 24.
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multiple small revolts consolidated to their individual localities that ultimately could not hold
their own against the Prussian and Austrian troops. Walter Grab expands on this point in his
book, "Jakobinismus und Demokratie in Geschichte und Literatur: 14 Abhandlungen" when he
writes, “nur ein entschlossenes, gemeinsames und gleichzeitiges Vorgehen aller antifeudaler
Klassen in den verschiedenen Kleinstaaten hätte es vermocht, das monarchische und
aristokratische Herrschaftsprinzip zu beseitigen. Die territoriale Zersplitterung und die
ungleichmäßige ökonomische Entwicklung Deutschlands machte einene derartigen
Zusammenschluß illusorisch.”6 Because of Germany’s fragmented territory, the independent
revolts were, unfortunately, the only forms of French revolution-style protest.
In his book, “German History, 1770-1866” James J. Sheehan researches several of these
revolts writing that, “a few weeks after the fall of the Bastille, for example, peasants and
burghers gathered in Saarbrücken, where they protested against high taxes and unfair labour
services, and then presented the duke with a list of forty specific demands for reform”7. To many
historians this would seem like a quite successful uprising. In fact, it is on official record by
regionalgeschichte.net that, “die Fürsten von Saarbrücken verlieren ihre Herrschaft”8 following
their 1789 revolt. Saarbrücken effectively revolted and brought about reform through a change in
leadership. Saarbrücken’s ‘success’ cannot, however, be hailed as proof that Jacobinism was
efficaciously transferred from France to Germany. Indeed, Jacobinism is reflected very
minimally, if at all, in the revolt given that Saarbrücken merely wanted a new Fürst and trusted
him to do the reforming. Were the revolution Jacobin in nature, it would have eliminated
completely the role of a Fürst and instead have implemented the vote, a democratic process,
6 Grab, Walter. Leben Und Werke Norddeutscher Jakobiner. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 1973. Print. 22-23.7 Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. Print. 215.8 "Saarbrücken Im Saarland: Regionalgeschichte." Saarbrücken. Institut Für Geschichtliche Landeskunde
an Der Universität Mainz E.V., 31 Mar. 2014. Web. 05 Feb. 2015. <http://www.regionalgeschichte.net/saarland/staedte-doerfer/orte-s/saarbruecken.html>.
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checks and balances, etc. Thus, the revolt in Saarbrücken was a success in that it created minimal
change locally, but a failure because it had no impact on the spread of Jacobinism, because the
movement started local and remained so affording Jacobinism no opportunity to latch onto
Saarbrücken’s revolutionary steam.
However, even if Germany was unified, a successful transfer of Jacobin ideals would
have been difficult given that the average citizen still deeply cherished aristocratic values.
Sheehan writes that, “these people were much too deeply embedded in the existing order to lead
a revolution.”9 More specifically, Sheehan is referring to the feudalistic monarchies governing
the various Germanic States at the outbreak of the French Revolution. At that time, the average
German citizen was not enthusiastically supportive of the feudal monarchy in which he/she lived,
but he certainly was not about to risk his/her life to defend alien ideas of democracy and
republicanism. In his book, “Black Bread—White Bread: German Intellectuals and the French
Revolution” Thomas P. Saine notes that, “what mattered most, in their opinion, was not the form
of government, but the extent to which the policy of the ruler was progressive and enlightened—
even if that ruler was an autocrat.”10 The Germanic Volk, though suppressed, was pleased
enough with an autocrat as long as the autocrat was promoting adequate policy. This reflects
more Machiavellian or enlightened absolutism values, because the notion of democracy is
unimportant as long as the state or region is stable and effectively governed. This philosophy is
reflected in the Saarbrücken revolution where the aim was not to implement a democracy, but to
reform the monarchy’s leadership. Saine explains this further when he writes, “the Germans who
sympathized with the French Revolution were, however, generally well enough pleased with the
solution of constitutional monarchy at which the French had arrived in September, 1791, that
9 Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. Print. 217.10 Saine, Thomas P. Black Bread--white Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution.
Columbia, SC, USA: Camden House, 1988. Print. 276.
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they had no desire to see the Revolution carried any farther”11 Here we can see that the average
citizen’s disposition towards a government reflecting Jacobin ideology—democratic republic—
was not favorable. Instead, the long-held structure of absolutism was still dominant in the
German Volk’s value system.
Second, from 1789 to 1793 Germany’s intellectual community produced enough
‘Widerstand’ to make a transfer unsuccessful. One style of ‘Widerstand’ used very effectively by
the intellectual class was their portrayal of Jacobinism as wild and barbaric—not to be supported
if one was rational. Konrad Engelbert Oelsner, for example, criticized the Jacobins when he
wrote, “‘überhaupt streben diese Leute [the Jacobins] nach einer wilden Demokratie, das
allergefährlichste Ungeheuer, so gedacht werden kann. Sie wäre ein untrügliches Mittel, die
civilisirteste Nation in die tiefste Barbarey zu stürzen‘“ – Oelsner (Saine, 292). A ‘wild
democracy’ founded by barbaric revolutionaries certainly sounded risky to the German Volk
who were trying to decide whether or not they should support the Jacobins. Because revolutions
are at their core a gamble, the Jacobins were asking the German Volk to be trusting and take a
risk. It then begs the question: how risky was the German Volk at that point in history?
Yet again, the intellectual community would be at play in shaping the Volk’s decision to
not go for the gamble as the French had. J.B. Metzler further explains this when he writes in the
preface of Walter Grab's novel, "Leben Und Werke Norddeutscher Jakobiner" that, “die Merzahl
der deutschen Intelligenz neigte den staatstheoretischen und politischen Prinzipien Immanuel
Kants zu, die in dessen moralphilosophischen Abhandlungen niedergelegt waren. Für den
Königsberger Philosophen und seine meisten Anhänger und Schüler bedeutete die Revolution
nichts anderes als eine Umwälzung im bloßen Denken.”12 Kantian ethics—which view
11 IBID., 275.12 Metzler, J.B.. Leben Und Werke Norddeutscher Jakobiner. Stuttgart, 1973. Print. XII-XIII.
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rationality as the ultimate good—would not have been huge supporters of the fledgling, untested
Jacobin ideology. For a society educated by the philosophies of Kant, Jacobi, and Fichte,
anything irrational was dangerous and foolish. Saine writes that, “…according to the political
theory most of them had learned, “democracy” was the degenerative hypostasis of the
“republican” form of government, just as “despotism” or “tyranny” was the degenerative form of
“monarchy”.”13 This means that if the German Volk were to accept Jacobinism, they would be
endorsing what was previously thought of as ‘degenerative’. Doing such could only come with
great risk.
The German Volk’s lack of risk-taking is further explained by Saine when he writes
about the approach of the German Volk in regards to government reform. The German Volk was
fully aware that their government was not perfect, but did it need to be burned to the ground and
subject to the guillotine in order to be improved? Saine answers this question when he writes,
“liberals and intellectuals hoped all along that the French example would encourage German
rulers to introduce reforms and improve conditions in their states voluntarily, obviating the
necessity of revolution or dramatic change in the form of German governments, for which, as we
have seen, even politically advanced German writers such as Forster and Rebmann considered
the Germans to be as yet unready.”14 Though Germans were sympathetic to Jacobinismus, they
were not prepared to dramatically launch feet first into a revolution. Thus, the intellectual
community—after framing the Jacobin ideology as barbaric and wild—also worked to train the
German Volk to be more conservative than risky, leading them to ultimately not take the Jacobin
gamble.
13 Saine, Thomas P. Black Bread--white Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution. Columbia, SC, USA: Camden House, 1988. Print. 280.
14 IBID., 278.
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Moreover, even if the German Volk was a trusting people, the intellectual community
alienated the Jacobins so effectively that a transfer could not have been possible. Saine writes
that, “...the French Revolution had not found any admirers among German statesmen or
philosophers, only among poets, “Romanschreiber,” and “philanthropische Kosmopoliten” such
as Campe…but poets are not obligated to be real people in touch with the real world.”15 The
Jacobin ideology promoted lofty, shining values that sounded nice in a poem or song but were
perhaps unrealistic. To insult the Jacobin Club for being out of touch with the real world is a
harsh criticism. The crowd the Jacobin’s needed to appeal to most were the peasants and artisans
because only they were capable of fueling ideology into action. With such a criticism, the
intellectual community was cutting off the Jacobin’s most powerful and necessary tool. Ideology
is always important, but without the muscle of the working class, Jacobinism was dead in the
water.
Referring back to Pernau’s methodology, the transfer was arguably unsuccessful because
it lacked societal endorsement. Pernau writes, “...der Fokus der Transferforschung bislang [liegt]
auf der Seite der aufnehmenden Kultur...ein Transfer nur dann gelingen kann, wenn ein
Bedürfnis danach besteht, d,h. wenn er eine bestimmte Aufgabe innerhalb der Rezeptionskultur
erfüllt...”16 The ‘Rezeptionskultur’ in our applied model refers to the ‘aufnehmenden Kultur’ (B)
which was German culture. In this regard, the societal endorsement was missing on part of both
German intellectuals and the common German Volk. Thus, since both facets of German society
at the time of the transfer were inhospitable to Jacobinismus, a successful transfer was highly
improbable.
15 Saine, Thomas P. Black Bread--white Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution. Columbia, SC, USA: Camden House, 1988. Print. 285-286
16 Pernau, Margrit. Transnationale Geschichte. N.p.: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2011. Print. 46.
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Third, and lastly, French militarization of Germany in 1792-93 was the last straw, killing
any possibility of a successful transfer. On October 21, 1792 the French military led by General
Custine took over Mainz after a brief period of weakness on part of the Prussians and
Austrians.17 The Jacobins saw this as an opportunity to strong arm their ideology into Germany
society. With minimal support domestically, the German Jacobins turned to their only other
hope: the French military. On March 18, 1793 independence from the monarchy was declared
and The Mainz Society of the Friends of Liberty and Equality (or just The Republic of Mainz)
was established by the German Jacobin Club. From this point on, the German Jacobins were no
longer a grassroots movement; they were a puppet movement. Grab clarifies this when he writes,
“daher blieb die deutsche jakobinische Bewegung währen der ganzen Epoche der fanzösischen
Republik nicht nur ideologisch, sondern auch militärisch auf den Beistand Frankreichs
angewiesen.”18 With the French now being both the ideological and military motor, Jacobinism
was perceived as something foreign and outsourced.
This outsourcing and distancing from German culture, politics, and intellectualism made
it very difficult for the revolutionaries to gain public support. Just a year earlier, King Louis
XVI of France declared war on Prussia and Austria followed by a victory in the Battle of
Valmy.19 News of the slaughter of Germans by the French was spreading with celerity
throughout the Germanic Confederation and the marriage of German Jacobinism with the French
military looked like treason to most locals. German nationalism was moving like wildfire
throughout the confederation but not because they were embracing Jacobin ideals and promoting
a free, democratic state. Nationalism was rising because the French were an enemy and the
17 Soboul, Albert. The French Revolution, 1787-1799; from the Storming of the Bastille to Napoleon. New York: Vintage, 1975. Print.
18 Grab, Walter. Jakobinismus Und Demokratie in Geschichte Und Literatur: 14 Abhandlungen. Frankfurt Am Main: Lang, 1998. Print. 23.
19 Blanning, T. C. W. The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802. London: Arnold, 1996. Print.
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monarchy was promoting the classic ‘rally around the flag’ concept. Though there was no
unified German flag to rally around, the 39 independent confederate states had their own unique
coat of arms and acted nationalistic by were preparing to defend their locality against French
intervention. The German Jacobins made a fatal mistake in their transfer when they preserved a
strong relationship with the French just as the locals were becoming considerably Francophobic.
Furthermore, foreign militarization only made the transfer more impossible because it
resulted in significant backlash and hatred for anything French by the locals. In “The Oxford
Handbook of Modern German History,” Helmut Walser Smith goes into detail about this
occupation writing, "whether through newly-instituted taxes, formal requisitions, or simple
confiscation, the revolutionary troops took everything that was not nailed down."20 To the locals
suffering under this new occupation, Jacobinism didn’t look anything like the freedom,
democracy, and sovereignty. Their livelihoods had been disturbed and their privacy taken
forcibly. It should have come as no surprise to the Jacobins when the locals refused to support
and defend their newfound republic against Prussian and Austrian troops. Without public
support, the already weak republic didn’t stand a chance against the Prussian and Austrian troops
who swiftly crushed the French occupation on July 22, 1793. Reidar Maliks writes about the end
of German Jacobinism in his book, “Kant’s Politics in Context” saying, "just as French
radicalism abated after 1794, it also diminished in Germany, and in hindsight it is clear that the
German Jacobins were never a serious threat to the governments of Prussia or the other German
states."21 Thus, with only 5 months to their name, The Mainz Republic soon perished and with it
the transfer of French Jacobinism to Germany.
20 Smith, Helmut Walser. The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011.
Print. 151.
21 Maliks, Reidar. Kant's Politics in Context. Corby: Oxford UP, 2014. Print. 89-90.
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When Pernau’s methodology is applied to the transfer of French Jacobinism to Germany,
it becomes evident that given Germany’s political climate, the response of the intellectual
community and French militarization, a transfer was highly unlikely. The applied methodology
focuses primarily on Pernau’s assertion that a successful transfer requires support and
endorsement by the receiving culture...neither of which Germany had sufficient amounts of.
Bibliography
Blanning, T. C. W. The French Revolutionary Wars, 1787-1802. London: Arnold, 1996. Print.
13
Grab, Walter. Jakobinismus Und Demokratie in Geschichte Und Literatur: 14 Abhandlungen.
Frankfurt Am Main: Lang, 1998. Print.
Lejeune, Anthony. The Concise Dictionary of Foreign Quotations. Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn,
2001. Print.
Maliks, Reidar. Kant's Politics in Context. Corby: Oxford UP, 2014. Print.
Metzler, J.B. & Grab, Walter. Leben Und Werke Norddeutscher Jakobiner. Stuttgart: J.B.
Metzler, 1973. Print.
Pernau, Margrit. Transnationale Geschichte. N.p.: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2011. Print.
"Saarbrücken Im Saarland: Regionalgeschichte." Saarbrücken. Institut Für Geschichtliche
Landeskunde an Der Universität Mainz E.V., 31 Mar. 2014. Web. 05 Feb. 2015.
<http://www.regionalgeschichte.net/saarland/staedte-doerfer/orte-s/
saarbruecken.html>.
Rey, Alain. Dictionnaire historique de la langue française, Le Robert, 1992.
Saine, Thomas P. Black Bread--white Bread: German Intellectuals and the French Revolution.
Columbia, SC, USA: Camden House, 1988. Print.
Sheehan, James J. German History, 1770-1866. Oxford: Clarendon, 1989. Print.
Smith, Helmut Walser. The Oxford Handbook of Modern German History. Oxford: Oxford UP,
2011. Print.
Soboul, Albert. The French Revolution, 1787-1799; from the Storming of the Bastille to
Napoleon. New York: Vintage, 1975. Print.
Stephan, Inge. Literarischer Jakobinismus in Deutschland: 1789-1806. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler,
1976. Print.
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