islamic banking baselii challenges opportunities
TRANSCRIPT
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Islamic Banking and Basel II: Challenges and
Opportunities
Dr. Nabil Hashad *
Introduction
Before the year 1999, Basel Committee for Banking Supervision exerted great
efforts for issuing Basel II Accord relating to Banks capital adequacy standard in a way that
reflects the changes in the structure and practice of financial markets and banks.
Before issuing Basel II Accord, the Committee discussed the causes of banking
crisis in many countries. It discovered that the most significant causes that lead to those crisis
is that the banks did not manage the banking risks facing them, in addition to the weakness of
external and internal supervision (national supervisory authorities). Thus, the new Accord
focuses on handling these problems for ensuring banks strength.
During the period between the year 1999, and June 2004, the Committee made
several amendments on the first edition issued in the year 1999, until the final edition, which
was issued in June 2004.
The new Accord (Basel II) focused on strengthening regulatory or legal capital
framework through minimum capital requirements in a way that it can be more sensitive to
the risks facing the banks. At the same time, these requirements provide incentives to the
banks, which manage their risks appropriately.
Basel II Accord is considered more complex than Basel I Accord for several
reasons. One of which is that the assessment of risks in a developed environment that
witnesses an increase in the new financial tools and their strategies, seems to be a complex
matter.
Another reason is that the development and amendment efforts resulted from Basel
II Accord have many objectives, a summary of which is described below:
(1) Developing ways of measuring and managing banking risks.(2) Achieving consistency between the required amount of capital and the amount
of risks that the bank faces.
* Director of Arab Center for Financial and Banking Studies and Consulting.
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(3) Developing discussions between banks officials and national supervisoryauthorities concerning measuring and managing risks and the relationship
between the amount of capital and the amount of risks.
(4)
Increasing transparency for risks facing the banks, and the sufficientinformation should be available for banks stakeholders in a timely manner as
they share the risks facing the banks.
Basel II requirements are considered the most important challenges that face banks
generally and banks in the developing countries specifically, as many banks in the developing
countries do not have effective risk management systems in place. In addition, market
discipline, which means disclosure and which represents the third pillar of the Accord is, not
fully applied.
Basel II implementation represents the most important challenges for conventional
banks; it also represents the most important challenges for Islamic banks, because they have
their own characteristics that distinguish them from conventional banks. Thus, not all what
was mentioned in Basel II Accord, which is issued by Basel Committee for Banking
Supervision, is applicable in Islamic banks. Therefore, to be able to implement Basel II,
Islamic banks should take from Basel II what is consistent with the nature of their work, and
if there is something inconsistent, then they should comply with what was issued by IFSB
concerning capital adequacy.
Regulating Islamic Banking
Islamic finance is developing at a remarkable pace. Since its inception three decades
ago, the number of Islamic financial institutions worldwide has risen from one in 1975 to
over 300 today in more than 75 countries. They are concentrated in the Middle East and
Southeast Asia (with Bahrain and Malaysia the biggest hubs), but are also appearing in
Europe and the United States. Total assets worldwide are estimated to exceed $250 billion,
and are growing at an estimated 15 percent a year (although cross-border data remainscarce).1
Islamic financial products are aimed at investors who want to comply with the Islamic
laws (Sharia) that govern a Muslim's daily life. These laws forbid giving or receiving interest
(because earning profit from an exchange of money for money is considered immoral);
mandate that all financial transactions be based on real economic activity; and prohibit
investment in sectors such as tobacco, alcohol, gambling, and armaments. Islamic financial
1
El Qorchi, M., Islamic Finance Gears Up, Finance and Development,. IMF. Volume 42, No. 4 December2005.
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institutions are providing an increasingly broad range of many financial services, such as
fund mobilization, asset allocation, payment and exchange settlement services, and risk
transformation and mitigation. But these specialized financial intermediaries perform
transactions using financial instruments compliant with Sharia principles.
The growth opportunity as well as the challenges facing the development of the
Islamic financial industry in the global market have raised public policy issues in the
jurisdictions in which they operate and internationally. These have led international
organizations, international standard setters, national regulatory authorities, policy makers
and academia to examine various aspects of Islamic financial intermediation each from their
own perspective. Focus has been directed notably on Islamic financial institutions (IFIs)
risk management practices, the broad institutional environment in which they operate, and the
regulatory framework that governs them. A number of institutions have been established to
become focal points on major issues, in particular the Accounting & Auditing Organization
for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI), the International Islamic Rating Agency (IIRA),
the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB) and the Liquidity Management Center (LMC).2
Equally important for the operation of Islamic as well as conventional banks is the
presence of a conducive institutional environment and an efficient regulatory framework.
Such poor supporting institutional infrastructure exposes Islamic banks to systemic risks
related to institutional, legal and regulatory issues. At the forefront of these is institutional
risk resulting from the lack of consensus among Fiqh scholars on contractual rules governingfinancial transactions. For instance, while some Fiqh scholars consider the terms of a
murabaha or istisna contract to be binding to the buyer, others argue that the buyer has the
option to rescind from the contract even after making an order and paying the commitment
fee.50 This raises Islamic banks exposure to counter-party risks arising from the unsettled
nature of contracts, and may lead to potential litigation problems. A related issue is the
general confusion created by the heterogeneous interpretations of the fundamental Shariah
rules resulting in differences in financial reporting, auditing and accounting treatments by
Islamic banks.
It is often argued that Islamic banks are less vulnerable to insolvency as they can
share their profits and losses with the depositors and investors according to their joint
contracts. This is sometimes raised as an argument for lower capital adequacy ratio for
Islamic banks. However, the counter argument is that Islamic banks are subject to greater
fiduciary and operational risks and therefore must provide adequate capital to reflect these.
2 El Hawary, Dahlia; et al. Regulating Islamic Financial Institutions: The Nature of the regulated, World
Bank policy research working paper 3227. March 2004.
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These special characteristics and risk features of Islamic banking have been
recognized by a number of Central Banks. Consequently, they are already developing ways to
supervise and regulate these risks. They are also aware of the need for international
collaboration and are joining hands in developing standards that can form the basis of a
strong infrastructure for Islamic banking.
On the question of adaptation of existing international norms and practices for Islamic
banks, I note there are many areas where Islamic banks are similar to conventional banks. It
is perhaps most practical, cost effective and efficient to adapt relevant standards to Islamic
banking. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has issued standards and principles
in risk areas including credit, liquidity operations, consolidation, capital adequacy etc. Many
of these standards are equally relevant and applicable to Islamic banks.
Capital Adequacy and Islamic Banks3
Under capital adequacy one initiative has been to develop a conceptual framework
which is appropriate for the risks of Islamic banks but also parallels in important respects that
of the 1988 Basel Capital Accord and Basel II. Capital adequacy regulations for non-Islamic
banks are based on the assessment of credit and market risk in relation to the capital, which
consists of shareholders' equity and other items such as retained earnings, certain categories
of reserves, and hybrid instruments combining debt and equity, and which serves as a buffer
against losses under both risk headings. As mentioned above, Islamic precepts by contrastinvolve risk sharing between the banks and holders of their liabilities, a close link between
banking transactions and real assets, and avoidance of speculative activities, all of which are
capable of affecting the level of banking risks incurred and their incidence between different
parties. The bank is also exposed to the risk of losses due to mismanagement and negligence
(fiduciary risks), which may lead to legal liability, and to the risk of transfers from
shareholders' funds for the purpose of the "smoothing" of investors' returns mentioned above
(displaced commercial risk).
A major result of this initiative is the 1999 Statement on the Purpose and Calculation
of the Capital Adequacy Ratio for Islamic Banks of the Accounting and Auditing
Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI).8 This document proposes a method
of calculating a capital adequacy ratio (CAR) for Islamic banks. The numerator of the ratio
consists of items classified as capital under the 1988 Basel Capital Accord and Basel II with
the exception of instruments included which have debt as well as equity characteristics (and
3Cornford, Andrew, Capital of Alternative Financial institutions and Basel II, presented at a workshop on
"Will Ethical Finance Survive Basel II?, Third International Meeting: Ethics, Finance&Responsibility,October 1-2, 2004, Chteau de Bossey - Geneva
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not including PSIA accounts themselves which are not considered to serve the buffer function
of capital). The denominator consists of risk-weighted assets as follows: assets financed by
the bank's own capital and non-PSIA liabilities plus 50 per cent of assets financed by PSIA
(to cover the fiduciary and displaced commercial risks of such assets). Other approaches to
the capital requirements and risk management of Islamic banks that put less emphasis than
the AAOIFI initiative on features of an Islamic analogue to the 1988 Basel Capital Accord
and Basel II have also been proposed by regulators, credit rating agencies, and other
commentators.
One approach would be to treat Islamic banks for regulatory purposes as mutualfunds, whose obligation is to repay not the original sum invested but that
remaining after taking account of gains or losses at the time of redemption.
However, some commentators have observed that this would fall foul of account
holders' own perceptions as to their deposits and investments. Mutual funds
complying with Islamic precepts are already available to Muslims and are the
recipients of substantial sums. But there are also large sums held in PSIA, which
suggest that people distinguish between the two categories of account. However,
some commentators would accept regulatory treatment similar to that of mutual
funds under the segmentation proposal of the second approach (see below) for
entities within Islamic banks whose operations are similar to that of such funds.
A second approach would be to structure liabilities and assets in entities designedto satisfy the differing objectives and risk appetites of account holders. In the
entity intended for account holders with high risk aversion and a high requirement
for liquidity their funds would be backed by asset-backed securities with low risk
and easy marketability (i.e. in an entity similar to the "narrow bank" of the theory
of conventional banking); and funds of other account holders willing to incur
greater risks would be similarly placed in entities with assets chosen appropriately
in the light of their investment objectives. Thus ext to the entities for the most
risk-averse would be entities similar to mutual funds for investors with riskappetites similar to those of investors in conventional versions of such funds.
Regulation of these entities would follow lines similar to that of its conventional
counterpart. A third kind of entity would be directed at the requirements of
investors willing to take longer-term, riskier positions similar to investments in
private equity and venture capital, which would require another type of regulation.
This approach would appear to have the advantage over the first approach of
accommodating all the different items amongst an Islamic bank's liabilities
including non-interest-bearing deposits.
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A third approach, which has some support amongst regulators in the UnitedKingdom, would involve a structuring of liabilities according to a system of
subordination of the rights of different categories of account holder. This would
be accompanied on the asset side by an appropriate classification of risks and
eventual rules on capital adequacy, which take into account the actual risk
experience of banks following Islamic precepts.
Capital adequacy and risk management considerations for Islamic
financial institutions4
In view of the unique risks faced by Islamic financial institutions, the applicability of
Basel standards, which are designed primarily for conventional financial institutions, may not
be all that appropriate. In the past, the supervisory authorities of Islamic financial institutions
have generally applied the Basel standards. Supervisory authorities may independently vary
these standards to capture the unique risks faced by Islamic financial institutions in their own
jurisdiction. As a result, there is often no consistency in capital adequacy and risk
management standards across Islamic financial institutions in various jurisdictions.
With the tremendous growth and increasing internationalization of the Islamic
financial system, the supervisory authorities in countries that have an active Islamic financial
system realize that there is a need for more consistency in standards. With this in mind, these
supervisory authorities established the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB).
The IFSB acts as an international standard setting body of the regulatory and
supervisory agencies that have a vested interest in ensuring the soundness and stability of the
Islamic financial services industry. The establishment of the IFSB was the culmination of an
extensive two-year consultative process initiated by a group of governors and senior officials
of central banks and monetary authorities of various countries, together with the support from
the Islamic Development Bank, the International Monetary Fund as well as the Accounting
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions.
The IFSB has begun the development of two specific prudential standards for Islamic
financial institutions, namely, the Capital Adequacy Standards and the Risk Management
Standards. These two standards are expected to be issued by early 2005. The main objective
of the Capital Adequacy Standards is to address the specific structure and contents of the
Shariah compliant products and services offered by Islamic financial institutions not
specifically addressed by the Basel Committee. In particular, this includes Islamic financial
instruments that are asset-based such as Murabaha and Ijara. Such instruments are exposed to
4KPMG, Basel Briefing 8, October 2004.
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price risk in respect of the non-financial asset as well as credit risk in respect of the amount
due from the counterparty.
For profit-sharing instruments, i.e. Musharaka and Mudaraba, the exposure is like an
equity position not held for trading, and as such is similar to an equity position in the bankingbook. Hence it is dealt with under credit risk capital requirements, except in the case of
investments (normally short-term) in assets for trading purposes, which are dealt with under
market risk capital requirements.
Likewise, the Risk Management Standards are developed as a supplement to the risk
management standards already established by the Basel Committee. Their purpose is to
address the unique risks that Islamic financial institutions face (as discussed above).
IFSB issued several important documents with regard to the main issues relating toamending Basel II in a way that it can be consistent with the nature of Islamic banks
functions, these documents are as follows:
1- Capital adequacy standard for institutions (other than insurance institutions)offering only Islamic financial services.
2- Guiding principles of Risk management for institutions (other than insuranceinstitutions) offering only Islamic financial services.
3- Guiding principles of corporate governance for institutions (other thaninsurance institutions) offering only Islamic financial services.
We will discuss later a summary of the first and second documents because they
represent the key requirements mentioned in Basel II Accord.
First: a summary of the first document, which discusses capital adequacy
standard.
On March 15th, 2005, IFSB issued its exposure draft no. 2, The document is
mainly directed to the IIFS (institutions other than insurance institutions offering only Islamic
financial services) with the purpose of (1) addressing the specific structure and contents of
the Shariah compliant products and services offered by the IIFS that are not specifically
addressed by the currently adopted and proposed international capital adequacy standards,
and Shariah compliant mitigation; and (2)standardizing the approach in identifying and
measuring risks in Shariah compliant products and services and in assigning risk weights
(RW) thereto, thus, creating a level playing field amongst the IIFS, in adopting and
developing risk identification and measurement practices that meet internationally acceptableprudential standards.
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The (IFSB) held its 7th meeting on December 21 st, at the Islamic Development
Bank in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, which was attended by 12 Governors of central banks and
monetary agencies, the President of the Islamic Development Bank and representatives of 3
central banks. The meeting set the aforementioned draft as the adopted final framework
recommended to be fully implemented by the end of 2007.
The document covered the calculation of the overall minimum capital requirements
for credit, market and operational risks for IIFS and constructed a Capital Adequacy Ratio
(CAR) formula.
In the stated CAR formula, the calculation of minimum capital adequacy
requirements is based on the definition of (eligible) regulatory capital and risk-weighted
assets (RWA) in conjunction with Operational Risk for Shariah compliant instruments. It
also specified the adjustments to the capital adequacy denominator.
Some IIFS may use different product names or contract titles as part of their market
differentiation or a commercial expression. While it is not the intention of the IFSB to require
IIFS to change the way they manage the business and risks, IIFS are required to use the
substance of the Shariah rules and principles governing the contracts of these instruments to
form the basis for an appropriate treatment in deriving their minimum capital adequacy
requirements.
The minimum capital adequacy requirements for IIFS shall be a CAR of
not lower than 8% for total capital.
The Shariah rules and principles whereby Investment Account Holders (IAS)
provide funds to the IIFS on the basis of profit-sharing and loss-bearingMudarabah contracts
instead of debt-based deposits, i.e. lending money to the IIFS, would mean that the IAH
would share in the profits of a successful operation, but could also lose all or part of their
investments. The liability of the IAH is exclusively limited to the provided capital and the
potential loss of the IIFS is restricted solely to the value or opportunity cost of its work (as in
getting no remuneration). However, if negligence, mismanagement or fraud can be proven,
the IIFS will be financially liable for the capital of the IAH. Therefore, credit and market
risks of the investment made by the IAH shall normally be borne by themselves, while the
operational risk is borne solely by the IIFS.
CREDIT RISKCredit risk exposures in Islamic financing arise in connection with accounts
receivable inMurabahah contracts, counterparty risk in Salam contracts, accounts receivableand counterparty risk in Istisnaa contracts, and lease payments receivable in Ijarah
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contracts. In this standard, credit risk is measured according to the Standardized
Approach of Basel II, except for certain exposures arising from investments by means of
Musharakah orMudarabah contracts in assets that are not held for trading. The latter are to
be treated as giving rise to credit risk (in the form of capital impairment risk), and risk-
weighted using the methods proposed in Basel II either for equity exposures in the banking
book or, at the supervisors discretion, the supervisory slotting criteria for specialized
financing:
Categories Strong Good Satisfactory Weak
RW 90% 110% 135% 270%
The assignment of RW shall take into consideration the followings:
(1) The credit risk rating of a debtor, counterparty or other obligor, or a security,
based on external credit assessments. The IIFS are to refer to their supervisory
authorities for eligible external credit assessment institutions (ECAI) that are to be
used in assigning credit ratings.
(2) Credit risk mitigation techniques adopted by the IIFS;
(3) Types of the underlying assets that are sold and collateralized or leased by the
IIFS; (4) Amount ofspecific provisions
made for the overdue portion of accountsreceivable or lease payments receivable.
Supervisory authorities have the discretion to reduce the RW for exposures to the
sovereigns and central banks that are denominated and funded in domestic currency.
Multilateral Development Banks and other entities may be assigned a 0% RW as
determined by the supervisory authorities.
Exposures in Investments Made Under Profit Sharing Modes
An IIFS may hold investments made under profit-sharing and loss-bearing mode
(Mudarabah) and profit and loss sharing mode (Musharakah) that are made not for trading or
liquidity purposes but for the purpose of earning investment returns from medium to long-
term financing. Such investments are exposed to credit risk in the form of capital
impairment risk.
Credit Risk Mitigation
The exposure in respect of a debtor, counterparty or other obligor can be further
adjusted or reduced by taking into account the credit risk mitigation (CRM) techniques
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employed by the IIFS. In Islamic banking CRM techniques depend totally on
collateralization. Types of collateral commonly employed by the IIFS are as follows:
(a) Hamish Jiddiyyah (HJ) (security deposit held as collateral), a refundable security deposit
taken by the IIFS prior to establishing a contract, carries a limited recourse to the extent ofdamages incurred by the IIFS when the purchase order fails to honor a binding agreement to
purchase or to lease
(b) Urbun (earnest money held as collateral)
The urbun taken from a purchaser or lessee when a contract is established can be retained by
the IIFS if the purchaser or lessee fails to perform its contractual obligations.
(c) Guarantee from a Third Party
(d) Pledge of assets as collateral
(e) Profit sharing investment account or cash on deposit4 with the IIFS which is incurring the
exposure
(f) Sukukthat are issued by a sovereign entity, an IIFS, or a conventional bank given high
credit rating; also unrated Sukuk listed on recognized exchange with supervisory approval.
Any portion of the exposure, which is not collateralized, shall be assigned the RWof the counterparty.
Placement of funds made under a Mudarabah contract may be subject to a
guarantee from a third party. Such a guarantee relates only to the Mudarabah capital, not to
the return. In such cases, the capital should be treated as subject to credit risk with a risk-
weighting equal to that of the guarantor provided that the RW of that guarantor is lower than
the RW of theMudarib as counterparty. Otherwise, the RW of theMudarib shall apply.
In Mudarabah investment in project finance, collateralization of the progresspayments made by the ultimate customers can be used to mitigate the exposures of
unsatisfactory performance by theMudarib.
MARKET RISKMarket risk is defined as the risk of losses in on- and off-balance sheet positions
arising from movements in market prices. The risks in IIFS that are subject to the market risk
capital requirement are (1) equity position risk in the trading book, and market risk on trading
positions in Sukuk; (2) foreign exchange risk; and (3) commodities/inventory risk.
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(i) Equity Position Risk and Trading Positions in Sukuk:
The capital charge for equities held for trading or available for sale comprises two
charges that are separately calculated for the following types of risk:
(a) Specific Risk
The capital charge for specific risk is 8% on the summation of all long equity
positions and of all short equity positions and must be calculated on a market by market basis
(for each national market). The capital charge can be reduced to 4% for a portfolio that is
both liquid and well diversified, subject to criteria determined by the supervisory authorities.
(b) General Market Risk
The capital charge for general market risk is 8% on the difference between the
summation of the long position and short position, i.e. the overall net position. These
positions must be calculated on a market-by-market basis.
(c) In the case ofSukukheld for trading, the provision for specific risk charge will depend on
the RW of the issuer and the term to maturity of the Sukuk.
(ii) Foreign Exchange Risk
The capital charge to cover the risk of holding or taking long positions in foreigncurrencies, and gold and silver, is calculated in two steps by:
(a) Measuring the exposure in a single currency position; and
(b) Measuring the risks inherent in an IIFSs portfolio mix of long and short positions in
different currencies.
(iii) Commodities and Inventory Risk
A commodity is defined as a physical product which is and can be traded on a
secondary market, e.g. agricultural products, minerals (including oil) and precious metals
(excluding gold & silver as they are included in the foreign currency risk section). Inventory
risk is definedas arising from holding items in inventory either for resale under aMurabahah
contract, or with a view to leasing under an Ijarah contract. The net positions in each
commodity will then be converted at current spot rates into the reporting currency and will be
given the suitable capital charges.
OPERATIONAL RISK
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Operational risk is defined as the risk of losses resulting from inadequate or failed
internal processes, people and systems or from external events, which includes but is not
limited to, legal risk and Shariah compliance risk. This definition excludes strategic and
reputational risks.
As the Lines Of Business into which IIFS are organized are different, it is proposed
that, at the present stage, the Basic Indicator Approach be used by IIFS, which requires the
setting aside of a fixed percentage of average annual gross income over the previous three
years. Subject to supervisory authority defining the applicable business lines, the supervisory
authority may allow IIFS in its jurisdiction to apply the Standardized Approach in which the
percentage (12%, 15% or 18%) of gross income is to be set aside according to the business
lines.
Capital Charge
The extent of losses arising from non-compliance with Shariah rules and principles
cannot be ascertained owing to lack of data. Therefore, the IIFS is not required to set aside
any additional amount over and above the 15% of average annual gross income over the
preceding three years for operational risk. Gross income is defined as sum of net cash inflows
less Investment Account Holders share of income
PSIAs
Defined as the pool of investment funds placed with an IIFS on the basis of
Mudarabah. In Wakalah contracts, however, the relationship between IIFS and the investors
is a simple agency relationship with the IIFS earning a flat fee rather than a share of profit.
The IIFS has full discretionary power in making investment decisions for PSIAU,
but in the case of the PSIAR the placement of funds by IIFS is subject to investment criteria
specified by the IIFS in theMudarabah contract or agreed between the IAH and the IIFS at
the time of contracting.
The IIFS assumes the role of economic agent or Mudarib in placing such funds in
income-producing assets or economic activities, and as such is entitled to a share (the
Mudarib share) in the profits (but not losses) earned on funds managed by it on behalf of the
IAH, according to a pre-agreed ratio specified in theMudarabah contract.
(i) Adjustment to the Capital Ratio Denominator
The capital amount of PSIA is not guaranteed by the IIFS and any losses arising
from investments or assets financed by PSIA are to be borne by the IAH except under certaincircumstances previously described. In principle, therefore, the commercial risks on assets
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financed by PSIA do not represent risks for the IIFSs own capital and thus would not entail a
regulatory capital requirement for the IIFS. This implies that assets funded by either
unrestricted or restricted PSIA would be excluded from the calculation of the denominator of
the capital adequacy ratio. In practice, however, the IIFS may forgo its rights to some or all of
itsMudarib share of profits in order to offer its IAH a more competitive rate of return on their
funds, or may be treated as constructively obliged to do so by the supervisory authority as a
measure of investor protection and in order to mitigate potential systemic risk resulting from
massive withdrawals of funds by dissatisfied IAH.
(ii) Impact on Capital
The IIFS is liable for losses arising from its negligence, misconduct or breach of its
investment mandate and the risk of losses arising from such events is characterized as a
fiduciary risk. The capital requirement for this fiduciary risk is dealt with under operational
risk
(iii) Displaced Commercial Risk
The term displaced commercial risk refers to the risk arising from assets managed
on behalf of IAH which is effectively transferred to the IIFSs own capital because the IIFS
follows the practice of foregoing part or all of its Mudarib share of profit on such funds,
when it considers this necessary as a result of commercial pressure in order to increase the
return that would otherwise be payable to the IAH. This practice may also be required by the
supervisory authority as mentioned above. While in principle the IIFS has full discretion as to
whether it performs this displacement of commercial risk, in practice it may find itself
virtually obliged to do so (as a result of commercial and/or supervisory pressure), and this has
implications for its capital adequacy which needs to be considered by its supervisory
authority. It should be noted that displaced commercial risk does not relate to cover an overall
loss attributable to IAH by reallocating profit from shareholders, as Shariah rules and
principles do not permit this.
(iv)Supervisory Discretion
In jurisdictions where an IIFS has practiced the type of income smoothing for IAH
that gives rise to displaced commercial risk and has incurred a constructive or implied
obligation to continue to do so in the future, the supervisory authority should require
regulatory capital to cater for displaced commercial risk.
A supervisory authority may also consider that IIFS in its jurisdiction are virtually
obliged for competitive reasons to practice the displacement of commercial risk. Also,
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supervisory authority may be concerned that the triggering of withdrawals of PSIA funds in
the absence of income smoothing for IAH could give rise to systemic risk.
In such an environment, the supervisory authority has discretion to require the IIFS,
to which the circumstances mentioned apply, to include a specified percentage of assetsfinanced by PSIA in the denominator of the CAR. (Represented by in the Supervisory
Discretion Formula illustrated later in this paper)
(v)Reserves
The IIFS can take precautionary steps by setting up prudential reserve accounts to
minimize the adverse impact of income smoothing for PSIA on its shareholders returns a nd
to meet potential but unexpected losses (UL) that would be borne by the IAH on investments
financed by PSIA, namely:
(a) Profit equalization reserve (PER) comprises amounts appropriated out of the
gross income from the Mudarabah to be available for smoothing returns paid to the
investment account holders and the shareholders, and consists of a PSIA portion and a
shareholders portion; and/or
(b) Investment risk reserve (IRR) comprises amounts appropriated out of the income
of investment account holders after deduction of the Mudarib share of income, to meet any
future losses on the investments financed by the PSIA.
Second: the second pillar of Basel II concentrates on the comprehensive
assessment of banking risks facing banks; the economic capital is specified in the
framework of the comprehensive assessment of risks.
Although the risk facing Islamic Banks does not differ much from the risk facing
conventional banks, there are some differences because the nature of the functions of Islamic
Banks is different. Document no.2 [guiding principles of Risk Management institutions (other
than insurance institutions) offering only Islamic financial services] referred to the risksfacing Islamic banks and means of their management, and which is described as follows:
This document provides a set of guidelines for establishing and implementing
effective risk management practices in IIFS. It is intended to serve the fully-fledged banking
institutions offering Islamic financial services. These IIFS include, but are not limited to,
commercial banks, investment banks, finance houses and other fund mobilizing institutions,
as determined by the respective supervisory authorities, that offer services in accordance with
Shari`ah rules and principles. This document has been endorsed by the Shari`ah Advisory
Committee of the Islamic Development Bank and co-opted Shari`ah scholars representing
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central banks and monetary agencies, which are members of the Islamic Financial Services
Board (IFSB) on 27 February 2005.
This document sets out fifteen principles of risk management that give practical
effect to managing the risks underlying the business objectives that IIFS may adopt. The textprovides some examples of current practices, recognizing that these practices may change as
markets change and as technology, financial engineering and improved coordination between
regulatory authorities makes other strategies available. However, the document does not
detail every possible control procedure. The IFSB will keep these matters under review.
The principles contained in this document are designed to complement the current
risk management principles issued by the BCBS and other international standard-setting
bodies. Supervisory authority shall decide on which the IIFS will adopt the Guiding
Principles set out in this document.
In cases where the existing applicable international principles are hari`ah-
compliant, these principles are retained and/or expanded. In this regard, this document treats
such principles as general principles, and they are summarized under operational
considerations in each section. In such cases where these principles are not Shari`ah-
compliant, this document states an alternative Shari`ah-compliant approach.
This document provides specific guidance for each category of risk, drawn from
discussion on industry practices. It outlines a set of principles applicable to the following six
categories of risk:
Credit riskEquity investment riskMarket riskLiquidity riskRate of return riskOperational risk
The IFSB recognizes that the specific risk management practices of each IIFS will
vary in scope and content depending on its activities. In certain countries, IIFS are already
exploring advanced risk management practices. Nevertheless, all IIFS are expected to make
meaningful risk assessments based on the principles described in this document. All
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supervisory authorities are encouraged to review their current recommendations, if any, in the
light of the principles set forth in this document.
However, it is crucial for the IIFS to recognize and evaluate the overlapping nature
and transformation of risks that exist between and among the categories of the above-mentioned risks. In addition, the IIFS may face consequential business risks relating to
developments in the external marketplace. Adverse changes in IIFSs markets, counterparties,
or products as well as changes in the economic and political environments in which the IIFS
operate and the effects of different Shari`ah rulings are examples of business risk. These
changes may affect the IIFSs business plans, supporting systems and financial position. In
this regard, the IIFS are expected to view the management of these risks from a holistic
perspective. The IIFS are also exposed to reputational risk arising from failures in
governance, business strategy and process. Negative publicity about the IIFSs business
practices, particularly relating to non-Shari`ah compliance in their products and services,
could have an impact upon their market position, profitability and liquidity. Reflecting the
different nature of the business and the extent of risks faced by the IIFS, supervisory
authorities are urged to adopt a risk- based approach when assessing and evaluating IIFSs
risk management activities. The IFSB will issue a separate document in respect of key
principles of supervisory review of IIFSs risks, including reputational risk.
General Requirement
Principle 1.0: IIFS shall have in place a comprehensive risk management and reporting
process, including appropriate board and senior management oversight, to identify,
measure, monitor, report and control relevant categories of risks and, where
appropriate, to hold adequate capital against these risks. The process shall take into
account appropriate steps to comply with Shari`ah rules and principles and to ensure
the adequacy of relevant risk reporting to the supervisory authority.
Board of directors (BOD) and senior management oversight
As with any financial institution, the risk management activities of IIFS require
active oversight by the BOD and senior management. The BOD shall approve the risk
management objectives, strategies, policies and procedures that are consistent with the
IIFSs financial condition, risk profile and risk tolerance. Such approvals shall be
communicated to all levels in the IIFS involved in the implementation of risk management
policies.
The BOD shall ensure the existence of an effective risk management structure
for conducting the IIFSs activities, including adequate systems for measuring, monitoring,reporting and controlling risk exposures. The BOD shall have in place an appropriate body,
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independent of the BOD (for example, a Shari`ah board), to oversee that the IIFSs
products and activities comply with Shari`ah rules and principles.
The BOD shall approve limits on aggregate financing and investment exposures to
avoid concentration of risk and, where required, ensure that the IIFS hold adequate capitalagainst these exposures. The BOD shall review the effectiveness of the risk management
activities periodically and make appropriate changes as and when necessary.
Senior management shall execute the strategic direction set by the BOD on an
ongoing basis and set clear lines of authority and responsibility for managing, monitoring
and reporting risks. The senior management shall ensure that the financing and investment
activities are within the approved limits and must report any exceptions to the BOD.
Senior management shall ensure that the risk management function isindependent from the risk-taking activities and is reporting directly to the BOD or senior
management outside the risk-taking unit. Depending on the scope, size and complexity of the
IIFSs business activities, the risk management function is carried out by personnel from an
independent risk management unit or from a part of the IIFSs general operations or
compliance unit. Small IIFS without a separate risk management function shall develop other
checks and balances to make use of limited staff. This personnel shall define the policies,
establishes procedures, monitors compliance with the established limits and reports to top
management on risk matters accordingly.
Risk management process
IIFS shall have a sound process for executing all elements of risk management,
including risk identification, measurement, mitigation, monitoring, reporting and control.
This process requires the implementation of appropriate policies, limits; procedures and
effective management information systems (MIS) for internal risk reporting and decision
making that are commensurate with the scope, complexity and nature of the IIFSs activities.
IIFS shall ensure an adequate system of controls with appropriate checks and
balances are in place. The controls shall (a) comply with the Shari`ah rules and principles,
(b) comply with applicable regulatory and internal policies and procedures; and (c) take into
account the integrity of risk management processes.
IIFS shall ensure the quality and timeliness of risk reporting available to
regulatory authorities. In addition to a formal standardized reporting system, IIFS shall be
prepared to provide additional and voluntary information needed to identify emerging
problems possibly giving rise to systemic risk issues. Where appropriate, the informationcontained in the report shall remain confidential and shall not be used for public disclosure.
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IIFS shall make appropriate and timely disclosure of information to IAH so that
the investors are able to assess the potential risks and rewards of their investments and to
protect their own interests in their decision making process. Applicable international financial
reporting and auditing standards shall be used for this purpose.
Basel II: challenges, opportunities and recommendations for Islamic banks
There is no doubt that Islamic banks implementation for Basel II in a sound,
effective and integral manner represents the most important challenges facing Islamic banks.
Proper implementation of Basel II in Islamic banks requires achieving capital
adequacy, which covers credit risk, market risk and operational risk. Thus, it is expected thatthis would require banks to increase its capital to cover these risks.
I think that in the beginning of Basel II implementation in Islamic banks, it would
be difficult for Islamic banks to implement advanced approaches either for credit risk or
market risk and operational risk. So, I recommend that Islamic banks implement simplified
approaches namely, standardized approach for market risk and basic indicator approach for
operational risk.
Most Islamic banks are the same as most banks in Islamic and Arab countries do nothave integral system for risk management (definition and determination of risk
measurements, monitoring, supervising, organization, etc.)
Consequently, the inadequate and insufficient management for banking risks is not
consistent with Basel II requirements, and so, the Islamic banks should establish systems for
risk management and train their staff on them.
The implementation of Basel II in Islamic banks is considered the most important
challenge facing them because this implementation requires complete restructuring for thebank weather for organizational structure or for asset restructure, and that is for the purpose
of being consistent Basel II.
Although the implementation of Basel II in Islamic banks is the most important
challenges they face, but it represents opportunities for Islamic banks where the sound
implementation of Basel II will make Islamic banks more efficient and sound and it will
enable them to be more capable of competing and occupying bigger share in the financial
markets.
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References:
1. Cornford, Andrew, Capital of Alternative Financial institutions and Basel II, presented at a workshop on "Will Ethical Finance Survive Basel II?, Third
International Meeting: Ethics, Finance &Responsibility,October 1-2, 2004, Chteau
de Bossey - Geneva
2. ElHawary, Dahlia; et al. Regulating Islamic Financial Institutions: The Nature ofthe regulated, World Bank policy research working paper 3227. March 2004.
3. El Qorchi, M., Islamic Finance Gears Up, Finance and Development,. IMF. Volume42, No. 4 December 2005.
4. KPMG, Basel Briefing 8, October 2004.