Is Jordan Doomed? YesAuthor(s): Rita E. HauserSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Jan. - Feb., 1994), pp. 178-179Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20045904 .

Accessed: 10/06/2014 03:14

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

Council on Foreign Relations is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to ForeignAffairs.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 193.104.110.123 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 03:14:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Letters to the Editor

sion that the key lesson from Chile is that "the withering away of the state" is

the necessary condition for economic

progress. I go further than he does with

respect to foreign aid. I believe along with Lord Peter Bauer and others that

foreign aid has almost invariably been

harmful to the country receiving it pre

cisely because it tends to retard or pre vent "the withering away of the state."

MILTON FRIEDMAN

Senior Research Fellow, the Hoover Insti

tution on War, Revolution, and Peace

IS JORDAN DOOMED? YES

To the Editor:

Lawrence Tal ("Is Jordan Doomed?"

September/October 1993) presents a

sober and clear analysis of the risks fac

ing Jordan should the PLO-Israeli accords eventuate in a Palestinian state.

Most observers, including Israel's cur

rent leaders, contemplate that very

prospect as the likely outcome of the

recent decisions, despite public rhetoric

to the contrary. A mini-Palestine, demil

itarized and economically integrated

with, if not dependent upon, Israel will

likely emerge and seek to confederate

with Jordan, uniting Palestinians on

both banks of the Jordan River. That the prospect of confederation is

less than appealing to Jordan's Hashem

ites has received little serious attention

outside Jordan. Tal renders a real service

by posing the question of whether such a

development would doom Jordan as we

know it. While he consistently argues that a confederation of Palestine and Jor dan will come about, with the Palestinian

component clearly the stronger, Tal pulls his punch with a sanguine conclusion

that somehow or other the Jordanian state will remain intact.

It is difficult to share this conclusion.

The likely prospect following confedera tion is a democratic, mainly secular gov ernment in which the Hashemite crown

would reign rather than rule. Palestini

ans' economic acumen, aided by billions

of dollars in international assistance and

direct Israeli involvement, will assure

their place as the dominant demographic

group. The most startling statistic Tal

cites is that, even today, Jordan's per

capita GNP is lower than that of either the

West Bank or Gaza. Moreover, substan

tial expatriate Palestinian capital and

entrepreneurship will be deployed to

assist Palestinian projects. As Tal notes, a

diversion of Palestinian funds from

Amman to West Bank financial institu

tions would send Jordan's economy into

severe crisis.

Nor does it seem likely that King Hussein can slow the forces of democra

tization in Jordan, as he now seems to

acknowledge in going ahead with sched

uled parliamentary elections. When the

Palestinian dimension emerges more

clearly after final status is reached, politi cal parties attuned to a Palestinian

agenda will likely assert themselves and

eventually dominate the Jordanian politi cal process, especially after King Hussein

passes from the scene. Jordanian nation

alism is strongly tied to the person of

King Hussein.

A democratic confederation, with full

Hashemite participation, should be

encouraged. The merger of Palestine and

Jordan offers the chance for a secular,

economically prosperous entity to flour

ish, defying the long-held view that

[178] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volume y3 No. 1

This content downloaded from 193.104.110.123 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 03:14:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Letters to the Editor

democracy cannot take root in the Arab

world. That prospect is important for

Arabs, and it is also the surest guarantee of peaceful relations with Israel.

RITA E. HAUSER

President, The H?user Foundation

INFLUENTIAL ARABISTS?

To the Editor:

William Quandt in his review of my book, TheArabists (November/Decem ber 1993), accuses me of "ignoring their

[the Arabists'] successes." Pages 207-229 of my book are

solely devoted to docu

menting the rescue of 12,000 Ethiopian

Jews carried out by two Arabic-speaking

Foreign Service officers. Pages 267 and

301 document the Arabist role in freeing an American from an Iraqi prison, sur

viving an embassy siege in Kuwait, and

carrying out the 1988 re-flagging opera tion in the Gulf "without a hitch." Page 137 covers how, without making conces

sions, Arabists preserved relations with

Saudi Arabia. Page 160 and a caption

plate mention the successful evacuation

of Americans carried out by Arabist

Talcott Seelye. Pages 232-233 cover the

Arabist role in uncovering Saudi missiles

capable of reaching Israel. This is in addition to the feats of heroism by

Arabist missionaries in the nineteenth

century that I document.

Quandt says I quote "approvingly" a

negative statement about Arabists by Francis Fukuyama. On page seven of the

book, immediately after the Fukuyama

quotation, I quote Nicholas Veliotis, who

"sharply disagrees" with Fukuyama.

Quandt says that my "prototypical

figure of the early Arabist, Loy Hender

son, was not an Arabist at all." Indeed,

on page 98 I write that Henderson "did not speak Arabic and spent only two of

his ninety-three years living in the Arab

world." My point, made absolutely clear

in the book, was that because of both his

harsh anti-Israel views and his loyalty to

the Foreign Service, Henderson, despite his not being an Arabist, ironically became a prototype.

Quandt says I "have made no effort to

interview [Ambassador April] Glaspie." From June 1991 through November 19921 made repeated attempts to convince

Glaspie to meet with me for a lengthy profile of her version of events, as well as

her diplomatic life prior to Iraq. These

attempts were made in three phone con

versations with Glaspie, in letters, faxes

and a request through the public affairs

office of the State Department Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs in autumn 1992.

Nevertheless, Glaspie did provide me with some direct information, such as

details about her honor awards and her

challenge to Saddam Hussein to remove

his sidearm in her presence. This mater

ial is in the book. ROBERT D. KAPLAN

William B. Quandt replies: I accept that Mr. Kaplan tried to

interview Ambassador Glaspie, although there was no way of knowing this from

his book. Still, I think he is too willing to

accept the thesis that Glaspie bears much

of the blame for our policy toward Iraq on the eve of the invasion of Kuwait. I

would look more carefully at policymak

ers in the White House. Indeed, my major difference with Kaplan is that he sees the "Arabists" as very influential in

the past 30 years, whereas I do not.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS January/February 1994 [179]

This content downloaded from 193.104.110.123 on Tue, 10 Jun 2014 03:14:40 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions