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INVESTMENT STRATEGYPRIVATE BANKING
3rd quarter 2009
Quarterly publication of the Private Banking
Investment Services of Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch
IMPORTANT INFORMATIONPlease see important information at the end of this document.
Data as of July 13, 2009
Edition 2/3
Investment conclusions
The crisis which began in 2007 is still far from
complete and we have positioned our portfolios
comparatively defensively in recent weeks to
refl ect this observation. Within the context of
a positive strategic but more cautious tactical
view of risk taking, we anticipate adding
exposure to risky assets in coming months as
the risk return trade-off becomes more attractive
against the backdrop of a clearer sense of reality
amongst market participants.
The US equity market has recovered to •
almost 11* trailing peak reported earnings and
approximately 15* trend earnings, both at the
very long-run median level and indicative of a
market which must be considered fair value
at best. In aggregate, we are strategically
positive on global developed equity markets
but tactically more cautious.
Massive liquidity injections have leaked into •
Emerging Market Equity (EME), through
hugely expanded bank lending, into infl ation
in monetary assets in China in particular. At
a near 10% premium to developed equity in
aggregate, EME may be vulnerable at current
elevated valuation and depressed risk premia
levels.
There is little or no demand for credit •
and little or no appetite to lend amongst
banks. As a consequence, banks are awash
with liquidity, at almost zero cost, and are
purchasing government bonds aggressively to
take advantage of the almost free profi t from
the spread between the cost of cash and the
yield on government bonds. We anticipate
government bond yields remaining depressed
for some considerable period of time.
Please see important information at the end of this document.
2 Lombard Odier · Investment Strategy – Private Banking · 3rd quarter 2009
The injection of large amounts of liquid-
ity, intended to stabilize the deposit
base of the banking system, alongside
the provision of ample additional capi-
tal by governments seeking to at least
preserve some sense of solvency, has
been both necessary and suffi cient to
remove the threat perceived in the mar-
ket earlier in the year of total economic
and fi nancial systemic failure. As the
system was assured of resuscitation,
if not revival, the “Armageddon” risk
premia refl ected in the pricing of risky
assets was removed and with it the po-
tential for a depression-like collapse in
economic activity. Accordingly, subse-
quent economic data have been unde-
niably weak but clearly an improvement
relative to previously dire expectations.
This spate of positive economic sur-
prises (things could have been so much
worse) was enough for asset prices to
correct from oversold levels. To this ex-
tent, Geithner is correct in suggesting
that pulling the US economy back from
the brink and normalizing conditions is
necessary for an improvement in global
economic activity.
However, whilst market participants
are actively seeking evidence of fabled
“green shoots”, it is well worth bear-
ing in mind that from one quarter to
the next or from one year to the next
there is no correlation between eco-
nomic growth and either earnings per
share growth or equity market total
returns. That is to say, if you knew ex-
actly where and when the green shoots
of economic recovery would appear, it
would be useless to you as an investor!
The chart I (page 3) illustrates our point
perfectly: periods of strong economic
activity are not indicative of great fu-
ture returns. In eff ect what determines
future asset returns is the current level
of valuation, not a hypothetical growth
rate. Similarly, it is simply not the case that faster-growing economies produce better returns than slower-growing economies (if anything, the opposite is
more consistent with observed empiri-
cal facts).
Periods of strong economic
activity are not indicative
of great future returns.
In short, investors who express their
risk-taking views on the basis of arbi-
trary forecasts for economic growth,
or the appearance of “green shoots”,
are likely to be severely disappointed!
Economies expand and contract, com-
panies expand and contract their sales,
but it is simply incorrect to believe that
this process is the driver of investment
returns (in fact, ranking S&P500 com-
panies by 5-year trailing sales growth in
the post-war period produces the coun-
terintuitive result that the slowest-
growing companies delivered the best
returns to investors). In truth, the eco-
nomic growth forecasts of economists
are of no use to investors.
On the basis, however, that developed
country banking systems (which we
believe to be largely insolvent still
and with insuffi cient capital at risk
to withstand further inevitable asset
writedowns) are vulnerable to the
consequences of persistent economic
weakness, it is useful to ask one ques-
tion. If recovery comes, where will it come from?
The straightforward answer is: not consumption. Although representing
the largest portion of GDP in the
United States, the United Kingdom
and developed economies, its contri-
bution to the volatility or cyclicality
of economic growth is comparatively
modest. Economic cycles, recessions,
recoveries, booms and busts are not
triggered or propagated by consumers
but by the extreme cyclicality in the
far smaller component of GDP that is
investment (in inventories and capital
goods by businesses and homes by the
household sector). Given that these
components of GDP are most likely to
be fi nanced with leverage, you can see
that any view that the United States
and global economies can recover even
to sustain long-run trend-like growth
is entirely dependent on the health of
banks and the ability to intermediate
credit. Looking at the US data, in agree-
ment with Tim Geithner, the chart II
(page 3) shows the annual change in
the private sector fi nancial balance
(think of this as the budget defi cit for
the private sector) against the annual
growth in gross investment. Since the
change in the private sector defi cit
represents the leverage cycle as it in-
creases and decreases net savings, we can only see a meaningful recovery in investment spending, to drive the economy overall, if we believe that the savings rate in the private sector is go-ing to fall sharply and / or households and businesses become net borrowers again.
“The rest of the world needs
the US economy and fi nancial
system to recover in order for
it to revive. We remain at the
centre of the global economic
activity with fi nancial and
trade ties to every region of
the globe.”
US Treasury Secretary
Timothy Geithner, speech to
the Economic Club, Washington,
22nd April 2009
Investors, who express their risk taking views on the appearance of “green shoots”, are likely to be severely disappointed
Please see important information at the end of this document.
Lombard Odier · Investment Strategy – Private Banking · 3rd quarter 2009 3
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
Q1 1985 Q3 1989 Q1 1994 Q3 1998 Q1 2003 Q3 2007 Q1 2012
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
20
1900s 1910s 1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
I. Annualized change in equity index level vs annualized nominal GDP growth by decade
II. Year / year change in private sector balance as a percent of GDP vs US gross investment
Source: Crestmont Research, Lombard Odier calculation
Sources: Datastream, Lombard Odier calculation
Dow
Nom GDP
Investment (% y / y, l.h.s.)
Change in private balance (% points, r.h.s. inverted)
Our analysis on chart III, based upon the
fact that two-thirds of Adjustable Rate
Mortgage (ARM) resets remain ahead
of us, with two or three predictable
waves looming, and that existing weak-
ness in activity and rising unemploy-
ment will worsen the outlook for debt
delinquency rates, suggests that US banks alone still have almost two-thirds of all likely losses to come (total-ing in excess of an additional USD 2.0 trillion based on our estimates). To-
gether with the low prevailing level of
capacity utilization and massive wealth
destruction, this continuing pressure
on banks and the likelihood that credit
remains scarce for quite some time
as the economy deleverages renders
the possibility of a return to defi cits
and / or a reduction in savings rates in
the private sector implausible.
Whilst we have long argued that liquid-
ity and solvency measures were entire-
ly appropriate, our confi dence that the
US banking system can be resuscitated
and not simply revived has been dent-
ed by increasingly politically motivated
policy actions.
any risk is the common equity com-
ponent. Analysts who argue that the
banks are well capitalized appear not
to have recognized this consequence
of government action or are perfectly
happy to count the tax base as part
of the capital structure of the banking
system. As a bank bond debt buyer,
what disincentive do you face when
supplying capital for bad lending prac-
tices and excess when you know you
will be made good by the taxpayer?
Consolidated accounting, much lower
leverage ratios, the potential exposure
of bond holders to losses and capital
requirements proportional to total as-
set levels are preferable to more layers
of politically motivated and ultimately
unenforceable bureaucracy. Moreover,
central banks must include monetary infl ation in their target objective and not just focus on real economy infl a-tion as they currently do: the mainte-
nance of unsustainably low levels of
interest rates in response to a positive
real economy supply shock (China sup-
plying masses of cheap goods to the
world and depressing prices) fuelled as-
The US banking system has been resuscitated
but revival requires more decisive policy actions.
Recent reform proposals by Treasury
Secretary Geithner and Lawrence Sum-
mers assume that more regulation is
superior to better and rigorously imple-
mented regulation: we favor a return to the days when banks were forced to take “haircuts” on assets and hold capi-tal accordingly rather than rely on the
statistical “witchcraft” that passes for
modern banking supervision, changes
to securities laws that allow bank bond
holders to realize losses in accordance
with their place in the capital structure
without triggering default clauses on
all debt in the capital hierarchy, an em-
phasis on debt / equity swaps to halt
the tidal wave of mortgage delinquen-
cies that is likely to stem from two to
three years of continuous ARM resets.
Moreover, we simply cannot accept
that a leverage ratio of 30-35 times is
acceptable in an environment where
the only capital that appears to face
set infl ation in the monetary economy
and contributed to poor and excessive
lending. Positive supply shocks are a
feature of capitalism, they have hap-
pened before and will happen again,
and if the consequences are not to
be the same next time then central
bankers need to drop the excuses and
start to monitor asset price infl ation. It
should not be beyond them to measure
premia and identify bubbles.
Our analysis suggests that whilst we
have successfully avoided a systemic
collapse, measures to sustainably re-
structure the banking system are still
not evident nor is the fi nancial system
“out of the woods” yet given the waves
of losses that loom and far exceed the
capital at risk in the system.
Turning to markets, if the fi nancial
system still faces headwinds and eco-
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
11.2008 09.2009 07.2010 05.2011 03.2012 01.2013 11.2013 09.2014
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
1,200
1,400
1,600
1,800
2,000
2,200
III. United States, next reset peaks driven by option ARMs
* Option ARMs show estimated recast schedule based on current negam rate.
Sources: Credit Suisse (US Mortgage Strategy), LoanPerformance, FH / FN / GN
Agency (l.h.s.)
Alt-A (l.h.s.)
Option ARM* (l.h.s.)
Estimated cumulative amount (USD bn, r.h.s.)Subprime (l.h.s.)
Unsecuritized ARMs (estimated) (l.h.s.)Prime (l.h.s.)
Amount in USD bn Estimated cumulative reset amount in USD bn
Months to fi rst reset
Please see important information at the end of this document.
4 Lombard Odier · Investment Strategy – Private Banking · 3rd quarter 2009
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
01.1999 01.2001 01.2003 01.2005 01.2007 01.2009 01.2011 01.2013 01.2015
-10%
-5%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
01.1975 01.1980 01.1985 01.1990 01.1995 01.2000 01.2005 01.2010 01.2015
-10%
-8%-7%
-5%
-6%
-4%-3%
-2%-1%
3%
-12%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
6%
1st(Worst)
2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th(Best)
IV. Minimum annualized 10 year S&P500 holding period return ranked by implied 10 year risk premium deciles
VI. MSCI China equity index projected 10 year holding period annualized return
V. World equity index ex United States projected 10 year holding period return with trend 6% EPS growth
Sources: Datastream, Lombard Odier calculation
Sources: Datastream, Lombard Odier calculation
Sources: Datastream, Lombard Odier calculation
Trailing maximum (19 * peak earnings)
Assuming normalized 2% per annum EPS growth and reversion
to given terminal price / trailing peak earnings level
nomic growth is not the driver of equity
market returns, what is? As if investors
(as opposed to speculators, traders and
trend chasers) needed a reminder, from
a decade of rampant global growth
that delivered desperately poor equity
market returns, the only two variables that we consider important are valu-ation and the implied risk premium.
The former because it gives us an indi-
cation of the bias in the direction of re-
turns and the latter because it gives us
an indication of the potential for losses
if things go wrong: the chart IV shows
the US implied equity risk premium
ranked by decile over the last century
and the worst case annualized 10-year
return associated with each decile.
As expected, higher risk premia give
meaningfully lower downside! Given
that the gains necessary to recover
losses are exponential (a 50% loss re-
quires a 100% gain to break even and a
trades at a near 10% premium to devel-oped equity in aggregate, that markets
may be vulnerable at current elevated
valuation and depressed risk premia
levels. The chart VI shows the Chinese
market’s implied risk premium at wafer-
thin levels: investors have forgotten
that growth does not drive returns
and seem happy again to take risk
with little or no compensation (the
same applies to the market in India).
With China at the heart of all things
emerging, we would be very cautious
at these levels, especially when domes-
tic demand simply cannot grow quickly
enough to off set the lack of demand
for exports that is evident in the shrink-
age of the US defi cit as US savings rise.
Emerging market investors, many of
whom came to the asset class in recent
years, need to learn that recent growth
rates were fuelled by US leverage as the
chart VII (page 5) shows.
1st decile = smallest / worst risk premium, 10th decile = largest / best risk premium: 1874 – 2009
Trailing minimum (2.5 * peak earnings)
Trailing median (6.0 * peak earnings)
Central banks must include monetary infl ation
in their target objective and not just focus
on real economy infl ation as they currently do.
70% loss requires a 300% gain to break
even), avoiding large losses is more
important that chasing large gains.
The US equity market has recovered to almost 11* trailing peak reported earnings and approximately 15* trend
earnings, both at the very long-run
median level and indicative of a market
which must be considered fair value at
best. The global market ex the United
States has recovered to 9* trailing peak
earnings from 7* at the March 2009
low, as the chart V shows, consistent
with an attractive risk / return profi le
over the course of the next cycle (al-
though with near-term vulnerabilities
along the lines outlined earlier). In ag-gregate, we are strategically positive on global developed equity markets but tactically more cautious.
Looking at Emerging Market Equity
(EME), massive liquidity injections
which have leaked, through hugely
expanded bank lending, into infl ation
in monetary assets in China in particu-
lar suggest to us, given that EME still
Turning to bond markets, fi scal stimu-
lus measures to boost growth and the
insertion of taxpayers into the capital
structure of banks to take losses for
which they are not responsible have
resulted in signifi cantly larger budget
defi cits in many countries. As the pro-
vider of the reserve currency, concern
seems particularly focussed upon the
United States. It seems a common
view that larger budget defi cits will
drive government bond yields higher:
however, a quick look at the data in
the chart VIII (page 5) of the change in
the budget balance versus changes in
bond yields shows that over the last 60
years, spanning infl ation, disinfl ation,
the Vietnam War and Cold War periods,
there is no correlation between defi -cits and yields. It is simply not the case
that large budget defi cits will force
government yields higher. Again, like
the perceived link between economic
growth and equity returns it is a com-
monly held view that is divorced from
empirical fact. One reason for the lack
of relationship is the fact that defi cits
Trailing maximum (= 32.9*)
Trailing minimum (= 7.1*)Trailing median P / peak E
Given dividend yield and specifi ed terminal P / peak E ratio
Actual
Please see important information at the end of this document.
Lombard Odier · Investment Strategy – Private Banking · 3rd quarter 2009 5
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
22%
24%
01.1973 01.1979 01.1985 01.1991 01.1997 01.2003 01.2009
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
09.1999 09.2001 09.2003 09.2005 09.2007 03.2009
-7.0
-6.5
-6.0
-5.5
-5.0
-4.5
-4.0
-3.5
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
tend to be cyclical, they rise when activ-
ity weakens and infl ation expectations
decline: the decline in infl ation expecta-
tions and real interest rates off sets any
upward pressure on rates from a rise in
the risk premium. We are often asked
“who will buy all of these government bonds?” The answer remains “the banks”. In the United States (and the
United Kingdom), budget defi cits are
rising and current account defi cits are
shrinking, implying that the private sec-
tor is increasing its saving faster than
the government is reducing its saving.
At the same time, there is little or no
demand for credit and little or no appe-
tite to lend amongst banks. As a conse-
quence, banks are awash with liquidity,
at almost zero cost, and are purchasing
government bonds aggressively to take
advantage of the almost free profi t
from the spread between the cost
of cash and the yield on government
bonds. Lower-risk government bonds
are replacing higher-risk private sector
loans on the balance sheet of banks.
The chart IX shows the increase in US
bank holdings of Treasury debt in the
last year or more, with ample room for
further expansion there and elsewhere.
We anticipate government bond yields remaining depressed for some consid-erable period of time.
In conclusion, we will continue to focus
upon valuations of assets measured
on a normalized basis and risk premia
to measure our shortfall risk, taking
risk when it is well rewarded (typi-
cally when valuations are attractive
and most investors are compelled to
want to sell). The crisis which began in 2007 is still far from complete and we have positioned our portfolios com-paratively defensively in recent weeks to refl ect this observation. Within the
context of a positive strategic but more
cautious tactical view of risk-taking, we
anticipate adding exposure to risky as-
sets in the coming months as the risk
return trade-off becomes more attrac-
tive against the backdrop of a clearer
sense of reality amongst market par-
ticipants.
Paul Marson, CIO
VII. Chinese real GDP growth vs US current account as a percent of US real GDP
VIII. Annual change in US government bond yield (vert. axis) vs annnual change in US federal budget defi cit (as a % of GDP, horiz. axis): 1953 – 2009
IX. US government securities / total assets (%): US domestic commercial banks
Sources: Datastream, Lombard Odier calculation
Sources: Datastream, Lombard Odier calculation
Sources: Datastream, Lombard Odier calculation
Chinese GDP (% y / y, l.h.s.)
US current account (r.h.s. inverted)
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
IMPORTANT INFORMATIONThis document refl ects the opinion of Lombard Odier Darier Hentsch & Cie or an entity of the Group (hereinafter “Lombard Odier”) as of the date of issue. This document is not intended for distribution, publication, or use in any jurisdiction where such distribution,
publication, or use would be unlawful, nor it is directed to any person or entity to which it would be unlawful to direct such a document.
This document is furnished for information purposes only and does not constitute an off er or a recommendation to purchase or sell any security. The opinions herein do not take into account individual clients’ circumstances, objectives, or needs. Each client must
make his own independent decisions regarding any securities or fi nancial instruments mentioned herein. Before entering into any transaction, each client is urged to consider the suitability of the transaction to his particular circumstances and to independently
review, with professional advisors as necessary, the specifi c risks incurred, in particular at the fi nancial, regulatory, and tax levels.
The information and analysis contained herein have been based on sources believed to be reliable. However, Lombard Odier does not guarantee their timeliness, accuracy, or completeness, nor does it accept any liability for any loss or damage resulting from their
use. All information and opinions as well as the prices indicated are subject to change without notice. Past performance is no guarantee of current or future returns and the client may consequently get back less than he invested. Performance data of mutual funds
do not take into account the commissions and fees charged on the issue and redemption of the units or shares.
The investments mentioned herein may be subject to risks that are diffi cult to quantify and to integrate into the valuation of investments. Generally speaking, products with a high degree of risk, such as derivatives, structured products, or alternative / non-traditional
investments (Hedge Funds, private equity, real estate funds, etc.) are suitable only for sophisticated investors who are capable of understanding and assuming the risks involved. Upon request, Lombard Odier is available to provide more information to clients on
risks associated with specifi c investments.
If opinions from fi nancial analysts are contained herein, such analysts attest that all of the opinions expressed accurately refl ect their personal views about any and all of the subject securities or issuers. In order to ensure their independence, fi nancial analysts are
expressly prohibited from owning any securities that belong to the research universe they cover. The description of the rating system used by Lombard Odier for its fi nancial research is available on www.lombardodier.com.
This document may not be reproduced (in whole or in part), transmitted, modifi ed, or used for any public or commercial purpose without the prior written permission of Lombard Odier.
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