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Husserl Studies 17: 207–216, 2001.© 2001 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.

Intersubjectivity and Naturalism – Husserl’s FifthCartesian Meditation Revisited

PETER REYNAERTDepartment of Philosophy, University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, B-2000 Antwerp,Belgium

Abstract

As Husserl argues in the fifth Cartesian Meditation, the similarity of my Body (Leib) withthe body (Körper) of another person is the founding moment of the experience of the other.This similarity is based on the previous objectivation of my Body. Husserl continuouslyworried to explicate this similarity-premise and by doing so, it appeared that this objectivationalready presupposes intersubjectivity. By running into this problem, the Meditation actuallyfulfils its program by showing that the other is co-constitutive of the world and more pre-cisely of my existence as a worldly human being. At the same time he developed an alterna-tive approach by identifying the original experience of the other as an expressive unity(Ausdruckseinheit) as the condition of possibility of intersubjective experience. By drawingon the relevant Forschungsmanuskripte in the volumes on Intersubjectivity and on Ideas II,it appears that the Meditation offers a naturalistic theory of intersubjectivity that results fromthe introduction of the reduction to primordiality. When one takes into account Husserl’s analy-sis of the experience of an expressive unity, that is a defining characteristic of the personalisticattitude, one can clarify the derivative nature of this naturalistic approach.

Key words: attitude, expressive unity, fifth Cartesian meditation, intersub-jectivity, naturalism

To overcome the apparent yet illusory solipsism of his transcendental phenom-enology, in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation Husserl needs to clarify the ontologi-cal difference between the ego and another world-constituting transcendentalego.1 Not only this difference, but also and primarily the intersubjectivenature of transcendental constitutive consciousness is at stake here. His analy-sis elucidates the subjective conditions of possibility of the experience of theother that permit one to apprehend the other as another transcendental ego.The argument says I can experience other persons because their bodies looklike mine. This similarity requires me to perceive my organism or Body (Leib)as a physical object or body (Körper).2 Together with the objectivation of myBody, Husserl identifies this similarity as the founding moment of the expe-

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rience of the other. (Hua XIII, pp. 264–266; Hua XIV, pp. 473 and 527) Al-though he never published a revision of the Meditation, Husserl was aware ofits problematic nature. Four points are of interest here. By drawing on therelevant research-texts, one can explain that the similarity-premise cannot bethe basis of the experience of the other, since the objectivation of my Bodypresupposes intersubjectivity.3 The Meditation thereby implies that the otheris indeed co-constitutive of the world and more precisely of my existence asa worldly human being. From the perspective of Ideas II, I further want toargue that the Meditation offers a naturalistic theory of intersubjectivity, as aresult of the introduction of the reduction to primordiality. I also want toshow that this theory is insidiously undermined by an alternative accountof intersubjectivity that Husserl develops while trying to explicate the simi-larity-premise. This other approach founds intersubjective experience on theoriginal experience of the other as an expressive unity (Ausdruckseinheit).4

This latter notion refers to a key-entity of the spiritual world (geistige Welt).Since this approach implies the priority of personalism over naturalism, itallows one to clarify the derivative nature of the naturalism of the fifth Medi-tation.

1. Reduction to Primordiality and the Naturalistic Attitude

If the other is another world-constituting transcendental ego, it must be ac-cepted – and should subsequently be possible to show – that the other is co-constitutive of my transcendental experience of the world and thus of mytranscendental self-experience as a worldly human being. In other words,my experienced world, that includes my personal worldly existence, isintersubjective in nature. So the analysis cannot take the normal phenomenonworld as its point of departure. In order to make the argument proceed in alogically correct manner by avoiding a petitio principii, it is thus necessaryto abstract from the ego’s intentionality that is directed towards the other. Thisis the motivation for the reduction to primordiality, which thematically ex-cludes this intentionality from the analysis. Husserl neglects the transcendentalexperience of the other, noetically as well as noematically. He not only putsin parenthesis the validity of the noemata of this intentionality, which resultsfrom normal phenomenological reduction, he simply does not want to con-sider this intentionality at all. Of course, the experience of the other is therebynot eliminated from the ego’s conscious life. (Hua I, pp. 124–126 and 134)As Husserl remarks in a critical note, the neglected “other” has a complexmeaning. (Hua I, p. 244, remark concerning p. 125, line 25) Since I originallyencounter the other as another human being, other means another person, butalso myself as normal worldly human being, because the other is co-constitu-tive of my world. This first move, the reduction to primordiality, already in-

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dicates that Husserl’s phenomenology is not solipsistic at all. The motivationfor the primordial reduction implies that the world, including myself as worldlyhuman being, is intersubjectively constituted. A phenomenology that wantsto elucidate intersubjectivity starting from the ego’s experience has first toabstract from this sense of the world. But this abstraction does not entail thatthe ego is thereby understood as the source of intersubjectivity. It is thus co-herent for Husserl to say that, notwithstanding the reduction to the ego, theMeditation does not give a genetic analysis of how this intersubjective char-acter of the world depends upon a previous self-experience. (Hua I, pp. 136and 150)5 On the contrary, he wants to explain how this character of the worlddepends upon my experience of the other as another transcendental ego.

The reduction to primordiality results in the sphere of my ownness. Thispeculiar structure of my transcendental constitutive life is not restricted to re-flective self-experience. (Hua I, pp. 129, 131 and 135) It also contains the expe-rience of all things that do not refer anymore to the other. The object ofprimordial experience, the so-called primordial world, is devoid of anyintersubjective characteristics, such as social and cultural meanings, that origi-nate from the action of others. (Hua I, p. 127) It thus appears as a purelynatural world, that is the physical world of partes extra partes with its spatio-temporal form, in which physical things can be understood as causal realities.(Hua I, p. 129) Referring to Ideas II, one could conclude that this world is theobject of an experience in the naturalistic attitude. Nature is the intentionalcorrelate of an experience performed in the so-called purely theoretical atti-tude. This attitude does not take into account the ethical, aesthetic or utilitarianvalue of things.6 The experience of nature depends upon a more fundamental,natural experience (natürliche Erfahrung) that has as its object the normalphenomenon world in all its richness. The object of the experience of nature(naturale Erfahrung) is thus constituted by an abstraction, and comprisesphysical nature together with animated being.7 As for animated beings, thatare understood as psycho-physical realities, only their Bodies can be consid-ered as material things, provided abstraction is made from their being expres-sive of consciousness. That is exactly what happens as a result of the reductionto primordiality. When one neglects the intentionality directed towards theother, one abstracts from another person’s psyche and thereby necessarilyreduces his Body to a body. The reduction to primordiality thus shares thisneglect of non-naturalistic predicates with the experience of nature, and thisexplains why Husserl calls the object of primordial experience primordialnature. This also explains why the other is first perceived as nothing but a body.Yet it is only partially true that the naturalistic attitude defines primordialexperience. Original self-experience is not naturalistic. My psycho-physicalself with its Body, psychism and personal identity, together with other thingsthat have so-called work- and worth-predicates because they are determinedby my personal activity, are also amongst the objects of this sphere. (Hua I,

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pp. 128–129) The naturalism of the primordial experience is thus a selectiveone, restricted to material things that are neither myself nor the object of mypersonal activity. With regard to the other, the reduction to primordiality clearlyleads to a naturalistic attitude. Moreover, it should be stressed that althoughoriginal self-experience is not naturalistic, the experience of the other requiresa naturalistic attitude with regard to one’s own Body.

I experience my Body as a freely moveable organ of perception, over whichI govern (Walten). (Hua I, p. 128; Hua IV, pp. 145 and 250, note 1; Hua VI,pp. 220–221) By transferring the sense of this self-experience to another bodythat looks like mine, I can perceive it as the Body of the other. This transferrests on a pairing (Paarung). These paired data look alike, and this constitutesa specific problem, because the appearance of the other body never associ-ates itself directly with my Body (Hua I, p. 147). My Body appears to me asbeing here, since it is the subjective centre of oriented space. The other bodynecessarily appears as being there. A similarity is nevertheless possible, theargument continues, when I move to where the other body is. Since the twobodies then look alike, the manner of appearance of the other body can be un-derstood as a possible manner of appearance of my Body as a physical body.This likeness enables the pairing and motivates the apperceptive transfer ofthe sense of the perceived, namely my Body, to that which is coupled to theperceived, the body there. The other body that I now, thanks to this transfer,apprehend as another Body, appresents the other consciousness by way ofexpressing it. (Hua XIII, p. 445; Hua XIV, p. 249) At this stage in the analy-sis, the thematic exclusion that defines primordial reduction is superseded.

Two remarks should be made here. First, the subject of intersubjectiveexperience is the transcendental ego in so far as it is constituted as primordialman. (Hua I, pp. 130–131 and 140) There are several reasons for this. The ex-perience of the world and of the other, who appears in it on the basis of pair-ing and transfer, requires a mundanized transcendental subject, existing inspace and time, because the world essentially has a spatio-temporal form. Afurther reason why I have to be embodied for the experience of the others tobe possible lies in the presupposed resemblance between my Body and theirs.So I have to be embodied for this resemblance to be possible. Moreover, whenI experience the other on the basis of a resemblance between our bodies, I nec-essarily experience the other’s consciousness as incarnated.8 My experienceof the other’s embodied consciousness, that is a psycho-physical phenomenon,requires me to exist as a Bodily subject, since sense perception without a Bodyis impossible. So the experience of the other belongs to my soul, Husserl says,which is part of my worldly psycho-physical existence that is itself a phenom-enon of transcendental consciousness. (Hua I, p. 129) Secondly and more im-portantly, my Body over there can resemble the other body there when itappears as a physical body like any other. (Hua XIV, pp. 282, 338 and 473)This means that my Body has to be naturalised for this similarity to be pos-

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sible. To achieve this, it is necessary to understand “here” as an arbitrary po-sition in space, which means that “here” and “there” are interchangeable places.If it is possible for my Body to occupy such a position, it can, of course, changeplace arbitrarily. (Hua XIII, p. 281; Hua XV, pp. 264–265) Such a body existsand moves in space like any other, so my Body can be apprehended as a natu-ral body. Appearing as a spatial object like any other, it displays various ex-ternal appearances and could thus eventually resemble other spatial bodies.(Hua I, pp. 146–147)9

2. The Objectivation of my Body and Intersubjectivity

Precisely this objectivation of my Body is problematic from the subject’s pointof view. I subjectively experience my Body as a very specific spatial object.10

Its original experience precludes its objectivation. In primordial nature myBody always and necessarily appears as being here. (Hua XIII, pp. 260, 275,278, 280, 325–326 and 329) From the subject’s point of view, this central hereis not an arbitrary spatial position. Husserl calls it an absolute here. (Hua I, p.146) Being at the centre of primordial nature, the subjectively experiencedBody can never change place either, because it always stays the functionalcentre of the ego’s governing. (Hua XIII, p. 239; Hua XIV, pp. 62, 76 and 522;Hua XV, pp. 263–264, 269, 280 and 654) When I approach a thing over there,this other place becomes the new centre of oriented space. Movement is notso much an objective change of place, as a subjectively experienced tensionin the muscles. Throughout this experience, I always stay here. Although theBody alters its position in relation to the surrounding objects by approachingor distancing them, movement is a sequence of subjective here-positions,where I am rather continually at rest. (Hua XIII, p. 320) Husserl uses a com-parison to clarify this point. Related to my Body, the moving car I sit in is atrest. Its movement becomes objective when I get out of it. To experience themovement of my Body as spatial relocation, I would have to leave it, whichis of course rather absurd. (Hua XV, p. 248) Because my Body does not oc-cupy an arbitrary spatial position and hence does not move objectively, I can-not change my position with regard to it. Since I cannot approach, distance orencircle it, my Body cannot appear from different perspectives.11 One shouldconclude then that it is not a correlate of a (presumptive) unity of changingperspectives. (Hua XIV, p. 413) This means I cannot imagine how my bodywould look like if I were over there.12 Even when moving over there, my Bodynecessarily appears as the partially given central body. The presupposed per-ceptive “system constitutive of my animate organism as a body in space” (HuaI, p. 147) that consists of its multiple ways of appearing is not possible in theprimordial sphere. Therefore the unique manner of appearance of my Bodynever couples itself to the manner of appearance of the other body.

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Although Husserl does not mention this in the Fifth Meditation, the con-stitution of my Body as a body, which is a necessary condition of possibilityof its resemblance with another body, presupposes intersubjectivity.13 Husserlrepeatedly and consistently stressed that point in several Forschungs-manuskripte. My Body is only an object occupying an arbitrary position,moving objectively and displaying external appearances for others who per-ceive it. I cannot experience it as a physical body in the primordial sphere,but only represent it as such in so far as I take into account the perception othershave of it. Yet this is excluded in the primordial sphere, as it is defined by theneglect of the intentionality directed towards the other. If the reduction toprimordiality entails a solipsistic naturalistic attitude with regard to one’s Bodyas a condition of possibility of the experience of the other, it generates a logi-cal problem, because of the intersubjective nature of this self-objectivation.Since this objectivation presupposes intersubjectivity, the similarity-premisecannot play a role in the elucidation of the ego’s experience of the other. Ofcourse, a naturalistic attitude about oneself is always possible. I then compre-hend myself as a psychophysical reality, whereby my soul as a non-materialreality is causally dependent upon my Body as a physical reality. But it shouldbe underlined that self-experience is not the basis of this understanding. Natu-ralism towards oneself is an extremely artificial attitude that presupposesintersubjectivity. (Hua XIII, pp. 419–421 and 458, note 2, p. 461, note 2; HuaXIV, pp. 55, 60, 86–87, 314, 322 and 412–414) It is artificial because I can-not abstract from the sensitivity of my Body, which is required for its appre-hension as a physical thing. Nor do I experience my Body as the cause of mysense-experience or of my psyche either. ( Hua IV, pp. 146, 150–151, 153,155, 157 and 160; Hua XIII, pp. 238–239 and 249; Hua XIV, pp. 57–66, 414,418, 444, 462, 464 and 471) I adopt the naturalistic interpretation others canhave of me. Naturalism towards oneself requires empathy. (Hua XIV, pp.86–87)

3. The Original Experience of the Other and the Foundational Role ofthe Personalistic Attitude

In my sphere of ownness I take a naturalistic attitude towards the other’s Body,because I reduce it to a physical thing by making abstraction from any refer-ence to another psyche. By introducing the reduction to primordiality, Husserlseems to create for himself a specific version of the classical problem of theother mind. Since an immediate consciousness in the sense of reflective evi-dence of the mental states of another person is impossible, inference fromperceivable physical data (behavior) founds our knowledge of such states. Butsuch an inference is always only just hypothetical and presumptive, whichmeans that it is not really rational to believe in the other mind. Induction of

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psychic phenomena from the perception of a physical body is always prob-lematic. I think Husserl agrees with this, since he introduces in his reflectionson intersubjectivity a specific non-inductive experience of the other that is freefrom the naturalistic presuppositions that seem to define the approach in thefifth Meditation.14

The original experience of an expressive unity (Ausdruckseinheit) is oneof a meaningful entity. (Hua XIII, p. 472; Hua XIV, pp. 63, 66, 70, 308, 326–330 and 339) This experience is a defining characteristic of the personalisticattitude. (See Hua IV, section III) The meaning is expressed in the physical,that thereby appears as meaningfully structured. (Sinnesartikulation, Hua IV,p. 241) The meaning appears in spatio-temporal reality as a peculiar propertyof a material object (Bedeutungsprädikat). Although it is possible to differ-entiate between the empirical bearer and the ideal meaning, the bearer itselfdisplays the meaning by virtue of its own physical structure. Cultural objectsas well as other persons are such unities, characterized by a material and anideal moment. (Hua IV, pp. 236–247)15 Closely joined as these two momentsare, only a single object appears, which means that there are not two distinctperceptions. One can only experience the meaning by virtue of the percep-tion of the material bearer, provided the latter is not thematized as only aphysical reality. The abstraction constitutive of physical experience is thusabsent where an expressive unity appears. Experiencing such a unity meansinterpreting it, which enables one to understand the expressed meaning. Thisis not possible within the naturalistic attitude, where the sensuous bearer isthematized as a physical object by virtue of the neglect of its meaningfulness.

Animated being originally appears as an expressive unity. When we encoun-ter such a being, we have the same intricate relation between empirical ap-pearance and expressed meaning. Body and soul are not distinctively given,since psychic life is expressed in Bodily behavior. This actually means that Ido not apprehend the other person’s Body as a physical thing, (Hua XIV, pp.331, 417, 423 and 479–480) but understand (verstehen) or interpret it asmeaningful. (Hua XIII, pp. 250–251, 336 and 478) I understand its movement,speech, mimicry etc, as meaningful behavior. Because the body’s appearancedoes not lead to the abstraction constitutive of physical experience, the prob-lem of psycho-physical relations, where one needs to induce psychical phe-nomena from the perception of the physical body, does not arise. When Iexperience the physical appearance as the expression of a mental state, the otherperson’s consciousness is thus not inductively but expressively appresented byBodily behavior. I know, for instance, that a certain appearance of the facemeans happiness or sadness. If I could not experience this, I would not be ableto interpret what I perceive as the expression of a consciousness, since con-sciousness cannot appear stricto sensu in physical reality. This means that thepersonalistic attitude, in which consciousness is expressively given throughBodily behavior, is prior to the naturalistic one. (Hua IV, pp. 281–302) The

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naturalistic interpretation of animated being depends upon this more originalexperience of an expressive unity, and has to be understood as a re-interpre-tation of it. As Husserl explains, naturalism with regard to animated being firstinvolves an abstraction from psychic life, which leads to the apprehension ofthe Body as a physical reality. This body is then causally linked to the psychethat is given by a counter-abstraction, to form a doubly layered psycho-physicalreality.

It is further important to remark that the experience of the other as an ex-pressive unity is original. The experience of meaningful behavior is not de-rived from self-experience, (Hua XIII, p. 76; Hua XIV, pp. 110, 418 and 425;Hua XV, p. 651) since I never experience my Body as the expression of myconsciousness. (Hua XIII, pp. 238 and 339; Hua XIV, pp. 243, 18 and 491)My conscious states are immediately given in reflection and I experience myBody as a freely moveable organ of perception, over which I govern. There isno similarity between this self-experience and the experience of the other.16

This again invalidates the similarity-premise. (Hua XIII, pp. 336–339 and 417;Hua XIV, pp. 143, 488 and 494) Moreover, I don’t have to objectivate my Bodyfirst – which is actually impossible in the primordial sphere – in order to expe-rience the other as an expressive unity. Finally, it appears that my personalisticself-comprehension as a human being in the sense of an expressive unityequally presupposes empathy the way the naturalistic objectivation of my Bodydoes, in that I adopt the other person’s experience of myself as such a unity.(Hua IV, p. 242) The ego’s self-comprehension as worldly human being, be itin the naturalistic sense as a psycho-physical reality or in the personalistic oneas an expressive unity, is thus dependent upon intersubjectivity.

4. Conclusion

My interpretation does not invalidate the argument of the Meditation, providedone understands Husserl’s text as a kind of reductio ad absurdum argument,although Husserl clearly did not intend it as such.17 Let me try, by way of con-clusion, to explain what I mean by this. The approach of the Meditations iscertainly Cartesian. To ensure apodictic certainty, Husserl starts from the ego’s(self-)experience. The epistemological problem regarding the possibility ofobjective knowledge then forces him to cope with the threat of solipsism. Inorder to solve this problem, he needs to explicate the subjective conditions ofpossibility of the experience of the other. He first introduces the reduction toprimordiality as a device to avoid a petitio principii. This reduction necessar-ily demands a solipsistic naturalistic attitude with regard to one’s Body as acondition of possibility of the experience of the other. But this is actuallycontradictory, because of the intersubjective nature of this self-comprehen-sion. So the reduction seems to generate precisely the logical flaw it was meant

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to prevent. The Cartesian way apparently runs into logical problems here.Nevertheless, when one identifies this difficulty and tries to understand it inthe light of these other texts I referred to, the Meditation serves indeed to foundtranscendental monadology, because it implies the non-solipsistic characterof Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. When the problem is spelled out,it appears that the Meditation insidiously shows that the other as another tran-scendental ego is already co-constitutive of my self-constitution as a worldlyhuman being.

The Cartesian and at the same time naturalistic approach to intersubjectivityof the fifth Meditation represents only one strand in Husserl’s thought.18 It ischallenged by, but also founded on the analysis of the experience of an ex-pressive unity, which is a defining characteristic of the personalistic attitude.Husserl thematizes this attitude when asking for the foundation of the culturalsciences (Geisteswissenschaften). Their methodological autonomy against thenatural sciences is dependent upon the identification of a proper region ofbeing. The task here is to formulate a material ontology of the spiritual world(geistige Welt). This demands for an analysis of the intentionality constitu-tive of this world. Because the expressive unity is a fundamental entity of thespiritual world, Husserl considered the elucidation of the original experienceof an expressive unity as an important element of this analysis. He started towork on this problem in section III of Ideas II. Solipsism is not an issue hereat all, because the spiritual world is social. So this personalistic mode of ex-perience of the other should be understood as an element of the intentionalitythat constitutes the social world, but it is also the more fundamental mode ofthe experience of the other, that is implicitly presupposed by the naturalisticapproach of the fifth Cartesian Meditation.

Notes

1. As Husserl remarks in a critical note with regard to Hua I, p. 124, lines 27–33, the ques-tion is how the transcendental ego constitutes in itself the difference between I and otherI. (Hua I, p. 244) So the other is not another worldly person. (Hua I, p. 124, lines 24–25)

2. The translators of Ideas II render Leib as Body and Körper as body. Husserl, E., Ideaspertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, secondBook. Trans. by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer, Collected Works III (Dordrecht, Boston,London): Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. References to and citations of Husserl’swork will be identified by the page number(s) following the German Husserliana vol-ume number.

3. These texts were published in Husserliana XIII, XIV and XV. Others before have criti-cized the similarity-premise. See J. Ortega y Gasset, “El hombre y la Gente,” in: Obrascompletas, vol. 7 (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1983), pp. 160–166. A. Schütz, “Das Problemder transzendentalen Intersubjektivität bei Husserl,” in: Philosophische Rundschau, 5,1957, pp. 81–107. I want to show Husserl was the first to be dissatisfied with the ap-proach presented in the fifth Meditation.

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4. This theory has been analysed in the excellent book of G. Römpp, Husserls Phänome-nologie der Intersubjektivität, Phaenomenologica 123 (Dordrecht, Boston, London: KluwerAcademic Publishers, 1992).

5. Since my contribution is not meant as a criticism of Husserlian transcendental idealism,I don’t want to discuss Husserl’s alleged solipsism. Husserl-scholars have convincinglyshown that this charge is misguided. See e.g. G. Römpp, cited above, and D. Zahavi,Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität, Phaenomenologica 135 (Dordrecht:Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1996), which refer to older studies like the one by P.Ricoeur, “Etudes sur les Méditations Cartésiennes de Husserl,” in: Revue philosophiquede Louvain, 52, 1954, pp. 75–109.

6. See the first section of Ideas II: The Constitution of Material Nature. This experience iscalled “naturale Erfahrung”, Hua IV, pp. 2 and 125. Also Hua VIII, p. 315. I propose tocall it experience of nature or physical experience.

7. Hua IV, p. 183 on the naturalness of this more fundamental experience and the abstract-iveness of the naturalistic attitude.

8. See Hua I, § 43, also pp. 140 and 244, remark conc. p. 124.9. The objectivation of my Body centers on these three elements, for which Husserl repeat-

edly tried to argue: (a) arbitrary position: Hua XIII, pp. 281, 294 and 330; Hua XV, pp.264–265; (b) objective movement: Hua XIII, pp. 262–264, 278, 280–281 and 330; HuaXIV, pp. 76, 240 and 543; Hua XV, pp. 248, 265, 270 and 281; (c) external appearances:Hua XIII, pp. 255–256, 264–268, 271, 276, 333 and 344; Hua XIV, pp. 376, 416–417and 515, note 1.

10. About this appearance qua spatial object or so-called “Phantom”, see Hua IV, pp. 158–159; Hua XIII, pp. 239–240 and 249; Hua XIV, p. 57.

11. I only have a Nullerscheinung and no external appearances (äussere Erscheinungen) of myBody. Hua XIII, pp. 344 and 416; Hua XIV, pp. 483 and 511–512; Hua XV, pp. 268–270.

12. Even when fancying myself being somewhere else, I, i.e. my fancied self, am here, i.e. atthe centre of this fantasy-world. Hua XIII, pp. 275, 290–293 and 299.

13. The intersubjective nature of (a) my Body as a body: Hua XIV, pp. 64, 237–238, 414 and508; Hua XV, pp. 246, 272, 310 and 655, note 1; (b) the Body’s movement as objective:Hua XIII, pp. 261–262; Hua XIV, p. 514; (c) its external appearances: Hua XIII, p. 420;Hua XIV, p. 510. Although I can to some extent objectivate parts of my Body, this is notpossible with regard to my Body as a whole.

14. Although he repeatedly understood Ausdruck in a naturalistic fashion as induction (HuaIX, pp. 136–137; Hua XIV, pp. 377, 421, 455 and 483), Husserl finally rejected this. (HuaXIII, p. 467, note 2 where he says induction is a dangerous and dubious expression) Natu-ralism with regard to the other is secondary to a more fundamental mode of empathy.

15. See also Erfahrung und Urteil (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1985), p. 55.16. So it is not correct that the expressive nature of the other person’s Body is dependent upon

an association with mine, as says Dodd, J., Idealism and Corporeity, Phaenomenologica140, (Boston, Dordrecht, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997), p. 29.

17. In this sense my interpretation differs from the many very critical ones, like for examplethose of T. Adorno, Zur Metakritik der Erkenntnistheorie, Studien über Husserl unddie Phänomenologischen Antinomien, in: Ges. Schriften, Bd 5 (Frankfurt am Main:Suhrkamp, 1970), of M. Theunissen, Der Andere (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1965), and of K.Held, “Das Problem der Intersubjektivität und die Idee einer phänomenologischenTranszendentalphilosophie,” in: Claesges, U. und Held, K., Perspektiven transzen-dentalphänomenologischer Forschung, Phaenomenologica 49 (Den Haag, MartinusNijhoff, 1972), pp. 3–60.

18. The fundamental text Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie of 1911 opened this Carte-sian line. (Hua XIII, pp. 111–193