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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION INSITUATIONS OF CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICTANDREA LARI a & ROB KEVLIHAN ba Refugees International , a Washington based organization which generateslifesaving humanitarian assistance and protection for displaced peopleb School of International Service of American University , Washington, DCand iscurrently serving at the Faculty on Special Appointment of the Bang School ofBusiness, of the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and StrategicResearch in AlmatyPublished online: 21 Jul 2010.

To cite this article: ANDREA LARI & ROB KEVLIHAN (2004) INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONIN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT AND POST-CONFLICT, African Security Review, 13:4, 29-41, DOI:10.1080/10246029.2004.9627316

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‘In October 2001, one morning, when mywife was pregnant, they arrived and she couldnot flee quickly enough. I was able to flee withthe four children, but she was caught by thesoldiers and they shot her to death’

Testimony from internally displaced person inAngola included in an MSF report on Angola2

Introduction

Angola’s long war finally came to an end on 4 April 2002 with the signature of a memo-randum of understanding between the ForcasArmadas Angolanas (FAA – the Angolan mili-tary) and the União Nacional para aIndependência Total de Angola (UNITA). Thishistoric agreement was greatly facilitated by

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONIN SITUATIONS OF CONFLICT AND

POST-CONFLICTA case study of Angola1

ANDREA LARI AND ROB KEVLIHAN

This paper considers the effectiveness of Angolan government and United Nations (UN) andnon-governmental attempts to protect human rights in Angola from early 1998 to date, duringand in the immediate aftermath of the recent conflict. Angola has suffered from one of thelongest-running conflicts in Africa. The country was originally a battleground for a proxy warbetween the Cold War superpowers, but the conflict developed its own self-sustaining dynamicin the 1990s, fuelled by revenue from oil and diamonds. The impact of the war on the Angolanpeople was severe – at its height in early 2002 over four million were internally displaced andaround 450 000 lived in refugee camps in neighbouring countries. Increasing violence causedby rebel attacks and government counter-insurgency activities fuelled forced displacement andcreated one of the largest humanitarian crises of the 1990s. The international communityresponded with UN Security Council-mandated sanctions against UNITA, extensive humani-tarian activities, and attempts at promotion and protection of human rights. However, the effec-tiveness of human rights activities was impeded by weak political support from donor nations,the nature of the governing regime, and humanitarian imperatives. Despite some minorsuccesses, with respect to human rights Angola is a case study of failure: the failure of the inter-national community and the Angolan government to adequately protect its citizens from grossand systematic human rights abuses during a brutal civil war.

ANDREA LARI is an Advocate with Refugees International, a Washington based organization which generates lifesavinghumanitarian assistance and protection for displaced people. ROBERT KEVLIHAN is a Doctoral candidate in International Relations at the School of International Service of AmericanUniversity, Washington DC, and is currently serving at the Faculty on Special Appointment of the Bang School of Business,of the Kazakhstan Institute of Management, Economics and Strategic Research in Almaty.

FEATURE

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the death of UNITA’s leader, Jonas Savimbi,in February 2002.

That a conflict which had lasted for so long(since Angolan independence in 1975) couldsuddenly end with the death of one of its majorprotagonists is startling. However, other factors,including military advances, the government’scounter-insurgency strategy, a changing geopo-litical context (in particular the end of ColdWar support to both sides and pressure of inter-national sanctions against Unita) undoubtedlyset the scene for this dramatic denouement.3

The history of the Angolan civil war in the1990s is one of failed opportunities for peace.Initially it seemed that the end of the Cold Waroffered the hope of a new beginning forAngola, with international agreements leadingto the independence of Namibia from SouthAfrica and the withdrawal of Cuban troopsfrom Angola. However, elections organisedunder the Bicesse Accord (1991) for 1992resulted in a defeat in the first round of thepresidential election for UNITA leader JonasSavimbi, in an electoral process deemed byinternational observers to have been essentiallyfree and fair.4 As a result of UNITA’s refusal toaccept this result, the UN Security Councilimposed the first set of sanctions in September1993 (under Resolution 864 of the UN SecurityCouncil).

UNITA’s return to war allowed it to takelarge swathes of the countryside, including thediamond-rich Cuango Basin, in early 1993 vir-tually unopposed. Two years of heavy fightingensued, which lasted until a new ceasefire cameinto place with the signing of the LusakaProtocol by both parties in November 1994.The Lusaka Protocol ended the fighting andobliged UNITA to accept the results of the1992 election, demobilise, disarm and handover occupied territory to state administration.In return UNITA agreed to participate in a gov-ernment of national unity and reconciliation(known by its Portuguese acronym, GURN).

The process of implementation of theLusaka Accord proceeded post-1994, but witha number of major flaws, in particular a lack oftrust between the two parties. The consequencewas a spiralling deterioration in the political sit-uation with UNITA largely being blamed by

the international community. UNITA stage-managed demobilisation and disarmamentthat left it with considerable hidden militarycapacity in place. By mid-1997, further UNsanctions were imposed on UNITA(Resolution 1127, August 1997, and Resolution1135, November 1997) because of continueddelays in the full implementation of the LusakaAccord, including demobilisation and handingover of UNITA-controlled areas to state admin-istration. In June 1998 the UN imposed a fur-ther set of largely financial sanctions(Resolution 1173) on UNITA when it becameclear that the Lusaka process had broken downand UNITA continued to delay the handingover of territories. In the following monthsUNITA went further and began to occupy anumber of districts that had previously beenhanded over to the government. TheGovernment of Angola (GoA) responded withan offensive in December 1998 that was strong-ly countered by UNITA. UNITA’s capacity tofield a well-equipped conventional force at thistime highlighted the obvious failure of the UN-imposed sanctions. The Angolan governmentreacted by asking the UN to withdraw theMONUA observer mission in place. Renewedgovernment offensives in 1999 and 2000 final-ly deprived UNITA of control of most ofAngola’s large towns, many key bases and theircapacity to wage conventional warfare. Theseoffensives coincided with a tougher stance bythe international community on the imposi-tioning of sanctions, led by the Canadian gov-ernment, who chaired the UN UNITAsanctions committee at this time.5

From 2000 onwards the Angolan govern-ment (which retained the title of GURN andcontinued to include elements of UNITA thathad not gone back to war) began to implementa counter-insurgency strategy aimed at depriv-ing UNITA of any possible sources of supportin rural areas. This was primarily achievedthrough so-called limpeza (cleaning) activitiesby the FAA. Limpeza campaigns were used bythe FAA to clear areas of the countryside con-sidered to harbour UNITA elements. Typicallypopulations were forcibly moved from theirlands to the nearest urban centre and cropswere destroyed to ensure that UNITA had no

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essentially a highly centralised authoritarianregime, despite the veneer of democratic legit-imacy provided by the victory of Dos Santosin the first round of the presidential election.This is not to imply that the regime exhibiteda highly organised structure at all times. TheGoA were successful in maintaining a strongmilitary and coercive capacity, but in othersectors rule by confusion or neglect was fre-quently the apparent modus operandi. This lackof capacity or apparent interest of key govern-ment ministries such as the Ministries ofHealth, Education and MINARS (Ministry ofAssistance and Social Reintegration) frequent-ly made for frustrating and ineffectiveencounters between international actors, localcivil society and the state.

This centralisation of power was a relativelystraightforward task. The dismissal of theprime minister and lack of a new appointeeby Angolan President Dos Santos between1998 and 2002 are indicative of the weaknessof the Angolan legislature. The third pillar ofgovernance – consisting of the constitution(approved in September 1992) and the judi-cial system - has been even weaker. TheAngolan constitution, while rhetoricallyquite a progressive document, in practice hashad little impact on how the country is gov-erned. The Angolan judicial system has beenin a state of collapse throughout the 1990s,with limited personnel and only 13 of 164municipal courts functioning.8 Minimalsums have been set aside for judicial institu-tions by the GoA throughout the decade, aclear indication of just how little priority itaccorded to this area.9

In the same period an increasing number ofinternally displaced steadily crowded the cap-ital, Luanda, provincial towns, and formal set-tlements. At the peak of the humanitariancrises in early 2002, there were some 300camps, hosting a confirmed number of 1,2million people.10 The government rarely pro-vided humanitarian assistance to these camps,relying instead on the services of humanitari-an actors that progressively became over-stretched and unable to assist this highnumber of people. Internally displaced per-sons (IDPs) also suffered frequent abuses at

access to food. This movement was accompa-nied by the use or threat of force and some-times resulted in the deaths of innocentcivilians. It also put these civilians at a higherrisk of death because of starvation and infec-tious diseases in the short to medium term,since the FAA failed to provide them with basicfood and health assistance in areas under mili-tary control. Simultaneously, UNITA steppedup its efforts to control civilian populationsthrough inflicting protracted violence and tar-geting alleged government supporters orinformers. UNITA also prevented civiliansfrom leaving areas under their control. Entirevillages were forced to follow UNITA troopsand provide support services.6

These were the principal motives for peopleleaving their homes from 2000 to early 2002.They contributed to the dreadful humanitariansituation in the country, and were entirely theresult of the manner in which the Angolan gov-ernment and UNITA decided to conduct thewar.7

Domestic political/legal system andprotection

The first point of reference in a review of sys-tems of protection for vulnerable peopleinvariably must be the domestic systems ofthe state in which these people find them-selves at risk. In the aftermath of the failedelection, the ruling Movimento Popular paraaLibertação de Angola (MPLA) maintainedcontrol, despite the retention of elements ofUNITA in GURN. However, while MPLAmembers occupied key positions within thegovernment, power increasingly became con-centrated under the presidency, with PresidentJosé Eduardo Dos Santos maintaining tightcontrol. Named after the location of his resi-dence, Futungo, Dos Santos’ regime cen-tralised control of key elements of the state,including control of the armed forces andparamilitary police, and of oil revenues fromthe state oil company and foreign investors.Key political appointments, particularlyprovincial governors, continued to be underthe control of the president. As a result,Angola continued to be ruled by what was

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the hands of government forces, includingharassment, extortion, property disposses-sion and rape.11 As a result of the almostnon-existent judicial system, victims had lit-tle recourse to legal protection from theirown government. The only major legislativeinitiative by the Angolan government wasdesigned to provide some protection forIDPs during resettlement or return processes– not during initial displacement, or whilethey resided in displaced camps. Thesenorms were required because of instances offorced return or resettlement of IDPs to sitesthat were either vulnerable to UNITA attacks(during the war), in mine-infested areas, orwithout proper access to basic resources andamenities (including adequate arable land,potable water and other essential services).

The resettlement norms covered the con-ditions that were required for IDPs to beresettled either in their home areas, or inalternative areas considered secure. Thenorms were developed in two documents,the Norms for the Resettlement of DisplacedPopulations (Normas sobre o Reassentamentodas Populacões Deslocadas) and the implement-ing Regulamento (these Regulamento were pub-lished by the GoA on 6 December 2002 andserved to operationalise these norms). Thenorms are based on the UN’s GuidingPrinciples on Internal Displacement and onpaper they provided minimum standards forreturn and resettlement. However, theapproval of the Regulamento after one mil-lion12 IDPs had already returned home isindicative of lack of relevance of the legisla-tion to conditions on the ground. Despitebeing publicly acknowledged shortly after-wards by the Minister for Social Assistanceand Reintegration, João Baptista Kussumua,as an important government initiative to pro-tect Angolans during the process of return,13

government compliance with the normsremained poor. The UN’s Humanitarian Co-ordinator, Erick De Mul,14 estimated thatonly 30 % of those returning did so in com-pliance with the norms.15 De Mul presentedthis as a good result given the prevailing con-ditions in Angola.

National NGOs and networks

The emerging literature on transnational net-works and human rights in the late 1990spointed to the salience of advocacy networkstransnationally and domestically. By buildingnew links among actors in civil societies, statesand international organisations, they multiplythe channels of access to the international sys-tem and make international resources avail-able to new actors in domestic and politicalsocial struggles.16 However, in Angola, theextent of such transnational linkage was rela-tively low, with national and internationaladvocacy having little impact on the behav-iour of the government. The Angolan casewould seem to support a more realistic per-spective on the effectiveness of human rightsadvocacy in the absence of a strong domesticreaction in powerful states to advocacy activi-ties and when other interests of internationalstates are involved.

Within Angola, the lack of space for effec-tive civil society interaction with the Angolangovernment, and difficulties in civil societyorganisation and mobilisation in areas withactive MPLA party cadres, made for a difficultoperating environment. Confronted with theincreased level of violence that stranded thecivilian population during the last phase ofthe war, national groups and organisationsfocused their actions and advocacy efforts oncalling for the end to hostilities through nego-tiation and dialogue between the warringforces. Networks such as the Inter-Ecclesiastical Committee for Peace in Angola(COIEPA) and the Network for Peace (Rede daPaz) insisted that there was no military solu-tion to the Angolan crisis and that othermeans should be found. When the war sud-denly ended through what amounted to agovernment military victory, many of civilsociety’s most prominent groups and leaderswere unprepared for the changed situation.17

Other national networks, such as Fórum dasOrganisações Não-Governamentais Angolanas(FONGA), were relatively quiescent withrespect to joint public initiatives, althoughthey did raise human rights issues in privatemeetings with visiting dignitaries, particularlyUN officials.

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actor responsible for providing protection forits own citizens) being one of the main perpe-trators of serious rights abuses through the useof limpeza activities, it seems appropriate toconsider the efficacy of external actors in put-ting pressure on the Angolan government toprotect their own people and live up to theircommitments under domestic and interna-tional law.

The 1990s saw many Western governmentstaking an increasingly aggressive stanceagainst countries where serious human rightsviolations were occurring, particularly inAfrica. Political conditionality becameincreasingly prominent among donor govern-ments from the end of the Cold War. WithCold War rivalry removed from the equation,Western governments felt freer to pursue basicpolitical concerns vis-à-vis governments of thesouth. The establishment and strengtheningof Western norms and interests, in particularrelating to human rights (especially civil andpolitical rights) and governmental systems(democracy, rule of law), assumed greaterprominence in the foreign policies of Westerngovernments towards the south.20

Despite this increased international promi-nence of political conditionality, donorsmaintained a remarkably low profile in deal-ing with the Angolan government. The moststriking aspect of Angola’s situation is the lackof donor leverage. Unlike the vast majority ofcountries in sub-Saharan Africa, Angola effec-tively managed to insulate itself from pressurefrom foreign governments. While the GoAhas a reputation for being extremely defensivetowards international criticism and was unen-thusiastic about international involvementafter the failure of the Lusaka process, unilat-eralism in the absence of material power canonly go so far. In Angola its independentapproach was backed up by oil. Western statesdid impose conditionality on further interna-tional financial institution (IFI) lending, pri-marily with the objective of improvedtransparency in accounting for oil revenues.However, throughout the 1990s the Angolangovernment succeeded in expanding revenuesfrom its offshore oil reserves; either directlythrough profit sharing, or through oil-backed

Throughout the period under review sever-al isolated initiatives on human rights wereimplemented by various Angolan groups inlocal settings. The main focus of their workwas on human rights promotion, rather thanprotection activities per se, and includedhuman rights awareness activities throughtraining and sensitisation on the Angolanconstitution and international human rightsinstruments. Only a few groups managed toapply a countrywide perspective, mainly as aresult of associations with existing and widelyspread church networks. For instance, the cul-tural centre Mozaico (run by members of theDominican Order) carried out training in var-ious provinces, often in collaboration withjustice and peace commissions created withinthe Catholic dioceses. These training activitiesbrought together representatives from differ-ent sectors of the community, in particularthe police and local administration, and thosewho had suffered violations.18

More proactive national advocacy initia-tives included the ad hoc commission reporton human rights violations in Cabinda (inDecember 2002), the establishment by theCatholic Church of Movimento Pro-Pace, and anumber of outspoken pastoral letters from theCatholic Bishops Conference. These efforts,coupled with other laudable but isolated ini-tiatives, did not lead to an organised system ofmonitoring, reporting and advocacy on viola-tions of human rights. While the stated phi-losophy of many national organisations wasthat confrontation was not the way to getthings done, fear of a negative governmentresponse to public criticism played a role. Inaddition, the GoA proved itself adept at co-opting elements of civil society through directfinancial support and/or through the use ofquasi-governmental (and patrimonial) organi-sations such as the Fundação Eduardo dosSantos (FESA).19

Donor governments and internationalhuman rights protection

In the absence of any serious efforts to pro-vide protection at national level and, indeed,with the Angolan government (itself the main

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lending on the basis of future income. Incomefrom oil was controlled by Futungo, with gov-ernment transparency in the amount and useof these revenues abysmal.21 This ability torely on private lending meant that the inter-national donor community had little leverageover the Angolan government using the clas-sic instruments of conditionality on IMF andWorld Bank loans and bilateral aid. Indeed,Angola’s astuteness in setting countries offagainst each other in oil exploration andextraction meant that throughout these yearsthe international community remained frag-mented and largely self-interested in its deal-ings with the country, giving the governmenta relatively easy ride with human rights con-cerns. The horrendous humanitarian situationin the country also meant that Angola contin-ued to receive significant amounts of human-itarian aid, despite the government’s failure toaccount for its oil revenues or invest signifi-cant resources into humanitarian aid itself. 22

Such humanitarian assistance was channelledprimarily through the UN and NGOs andeffectively replaced the Angolan government’stask of caring for its own people - a classiccatch-22 dilemma in international humanitar-ian action, given the chronic humanitarian sit-uation in-country.

UN protection initiatives

This weak donor position inevitably led to aweak UN political presence in-country and toweakened UN efforts at human rights protec-tion, particularly after the failure of UNpeacekeeping efforts. The UN human rightspresence in Angola began in 1996 as a smallunit attached to the United NationsVerification Mission in Angola (UNAVEMII). The mission expanded in 1997 under theUnited Nations Angola Verification MissionIII (UNAVEM III), in June of the same yearbecoming the United Nations ObserverMission in Angola (MONUA). At this pointthe unit was consolidated into the HumanRights Division (HRD). When, in February1999 MONUA’s mandate was not renewed onrequest of the GoA, the HRD was asked tocontinue its activities, though still confined to

building the capacity of its institutions andimplementing activities for raising humanrights awareness.

At the end of 1998 the country began toplunge into war again. The HRD, alreadyhandicapped by a limited mandate and in thehope that with time and more confidence theGoA would accept its protection function(including human rights investigation andpublic reporting), maintained a low profile.Activities included limited training of GoApolice and military officials and ad hoc pro-grammes with civil society. The HRD didscore some small successes during this time.One example was its support in the establish-ment of a human rights committee in IDPcamps in Viana (on the fringes of Luanda) thatwas successful in addressing abuses in thesecamps. However, although most egregiousviolations were happening around combatareas in the interior of the country, the HRDdid not manage to expand to the central high-lands and eastern provinces, limiting its actionto the capital and the safest provinces in thecoastal region. Even in Luanda, the remotelocation of its office at the edge of townimpeded greater communication with part-ners and provision of public informationregarding its activities.23

Only in August 2002, after the signing ofthe April 2002 ceasefire, did the UN SecurityCouncil finally provide the new UnitedNations Mission in Angola (UNMA) with asix-month mandate including ‘the protectionand promotion of human rights’.24 The realimpact of having a stronger mandate was min-imal. A planned expansion in the countrythrough regional offices did not take place,while the deployment of additional officersauthorised by the UN resolution to increasethe size of the mission was delayed for severalmonths. When the then UN Commissionerfor Human Rights, Sergio Vierra de Mello, vis-ited Angola a month before the end of thenew mandate, the INGO network in Angola(CONGA), disappointed by the delay inimplementing its mandate, produced a letterstressing how violations were still widespreadand criticising the UN response as seriouslyinadequate.25

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violations to the attention of local authorities,with varying success. The primary tasks ofOCHA field officers included co-ordinationof humanitarian activities, local liaison withgovernment and NGO counterparts, needsassessments and, frequently, security co-ordi-nation. As a result, field officers, despite their(at times) strong personal commitments tohuman rights protection, were often over-whelmed by duties other than protectionactivities. In addition, field officers typicallyhad a strong background in humanitarianrather than protection activities and, as aresult, were often technically unprepared forcarrying out protection initiatives.27

UNHCR’s operations were concentratedaround the capital and in only two northernprovinces, working both with returningrefugees and the resettlement of IDPs.Protection activities focused on the creationof human rights committees to deal withhuman rights abuses and seek redress beforelocal authorities. These had mixed results,mainly because of high staff turnover and aconsequent lack of consistency in approach.Owing primarily to weak in-country capacity,funding difficulties, and an ambiguous com-mitment to the IDP protection work country-wide, UNHCR did not play a greater role inhuman rights protection activities, despite rec-ommendations by an internal UNHCR eval-uation team that visited the country at theend of 2001 to strengthen their protectionactivities.28

Overall, UN activities in the field of pro-tection suffered from the same structuralweakness (that is, lack of leverage / bargainingpower) that led to a weak donor effort vis-à-visAngola. In the absence of strong support fromdonor nations, the UN was placed in an insti-tutionally weak position in Angola. This wasexacerbated by an Angolan government per-ception that the UN had failed Angola in theprevious peace process. As a result protectionactivities suffered from recurrent subordina-tion to UN concerns to maintain some politi-cal presence in-country, presumably in orderto maintain a dialogue with the Angolan gov-ernment and secure a possible UN role in anynew peace process.

In February 2003 the HRD was mergedinto a technical unit supervised by theResident/Humanitarian Co-ordinator and wastasked with completing the residual tasks ofUNMA, including the social reintegration ofdemobilised soldiers, de-mining, and techni-cal assistance in the preparation of elections.26

The human rights component of the unit wasrestricted once more, this time being confinedto strengthening Angolan human rights insti-tutions. The unit now reports directly to theUN High Commissioner for Human Rights.With this significant dilution of the mandate,a short window of opportunity to boost pro-tection activities at a crucial time in Angola’spost-war transition by the UN was lost.

While the HRD prevaricated and failed totake a lead role, the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Assistance(OCHA) and the UN High Commissioner forRefugees (UNHCR) initiated a process todevise a countrywide protection strategybased on creating provincial protectiongroups and, using the UN Guiding Principleson Forced Displacement, training personnel,both from local authorities and humanitarianorganisations. This move was made in the faceof widespread human rights violations suf-fered mainly by displaced groups during thewar. A decision was taken early on to includegovernment officials in protection groups atall stages, including local level. The result wasthat too often this approach meant that non-governmental participants were immobilisedfrom effective action within these forumsbecause of fear of negative consequences andlack of confidence in the process.

OCHA took a strong lead role in thesedevelopments, attempting to fill an institu-tional vacuum within the UN system. Despitethe structural weakness of the UN in pushingprotection activities with the Angolan govern-ment, OCHA was successful in developing aninformation network that fed some informa-tion on human rights violations to the UNResident Co-ordinator and more broadlywithin the UN system, allowing the ResidentCo-ordinator some scope for mainly privateadvocacy on human rights issues. OCHA per-sonnel were also active in bringing some acute

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This weak institutional commitment to vig-orous protection activities was exacerbated bya lack of clear ownership within UN agencieson protection activities. There was no effec-tive ‘lead agency’ for protection strategies andactivities within the UN system. A chroniclack of funding by donors for protection pro-grammes, particularly mainstreamed in theUN’s Consolidated Annual Appeal’s process(which was itself based on a human rightsapproach), cannot have helped.

Advocacy groups, humanitarian agen-cies and human rights protection

The most significant action on highlighting(and denouncing the perpetrators of) the seri-ous protection problems faced by the civilianpopulation during the war in Angola wasundertaken by international humanitarianand human rights advocacy organisations,most notably at an Arria Formula29 meetingwith members of the UN Security Council inNew York in March 2002. The agencies urgedthe GoA, the UN and the international com-munity to address the humanitarian crisis andpay more attention to the protection needs ofthe internally displaced. They stressed thatlack of good governance, transparency andaccountability were impeding greater respectfor human rights.30 Three of the agencies thatparticipated in the Arria Formula, MédecinsSans Frontières (MSF), the Human RightsWatch (HRW) and Oxfam, highlighted thelack of attention to large-scale human rightsabuses during the war. However, the impact oftheir advocacy on members of the UNSecurity Council was minimal.

Outside of such ‘high politics’, internation-al humanitarian organisations sought to raisepublic awareness of the human rights situationin Angola throughout this period. The MSFtook the strongest public role. MSF sectionshad a significant presence in Angola through-out the war, being collectively located inalmost all Angolan provinces, employingaround 150 international staff. Through assist-ing recently arrived displaced in its therapeuticand feeding centres, the MSF collected hun-dreds of testimonies that documented a series

of violations suffered by those trapped in con-flict-affected areas. The MSF published a seriesof reports on the situation in Angola, usingthese testimonies to highlight human rightsabuses being perpetrated by both sides.31

These testimonies and other evidence high-lighted that the lack of access of humanitarianagencies to isolated communities because ofthe conflict - mainly to those populationsforced to remain under UNITA control - wasa major concern. This concern proved to befounded after the April 2002 ceasefire when aso-called hidden caseload of 500 000 mal-nourished and debilitated people was ‘discov-ered’. Despite urgent needs in camps wherethese populations gathered from April 2002onwards, a hiatus in humanitarian response ofalmost five weeks occurred – apparently dueto a combination of GoA resistance and UNpoliticking, which effectively impeded thetimely delivery of humanitarian assistance.32

International human rights organisationsdid not maintain a permanent presence inAngola. Consequently, their efforts werelargely confined to mobilisation of externalactors on these issues. The HRW took anactive role in highlighting the abuses that wereoccurring.33 Their most significant contribu-tion34 was a critique in July 2002 of the inad-equate protection efforts of the GoA, raisingthe issues of the complete lack of implemen-tation of approved legislative measures guid-ing return and resettlement processes and thelack of clear ownership among UN agencies inimplementing an inter-agency protectionstrategy that had been developed between2000 and 2001. The established system andstructures did not prevent, for example, casesof forced and disorganised return or settle-ment of populations to or in areas that werenot secure, leaving these populations at riskfrom UNITA attacks (during the conflict)and/or death or serious injury from landminesand unexploded ordinance.

However, the lack of clear ownership onprotection within the UN system became amoot point with the handover of protectionactivities to the HRD in August 2002. This ledto the effective discontinuation by OCHAand, to some extent, the UNHCR, of protec-

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the availability of detailed information onhuman rights abuses committed by the warringparties. The first major reports were released inlate 2001, despite the occurrence of widespreadviolations from mid-1998 onwards.

Nonetheless, public initiatives did serve tohighlight the tragic situation confrontingordinary Angolans and bring some pressureto bear on the Angolan government and theinternational community to do more. Thelimits of the strength of the Angolan govern-ment are evident in its relations with NGOsinvolved in public advocacy. Despite issuinga number of strong reports, the MSF did notface significant sustained criticism from theAngolan government and was allowed to con-tinue its humanitarian operations – perhapsindicating the relative importance of the MSFhumanitarian operation to the country andalso its strong standing internationally, partic-ularly in the wake of receiving a Nobel peaceprize. Given this apparent strength, the lackof broader joint public initiatives by humani-tarian NGOs working in Angola (throughnetworks such as CONGA) is perhaps moreindicative of weak inter–NGO co-ordinationmechanisms (both in-country and outside), atleast with respect to human rights initiatives,and a failure of these agencies to mobilisethemselves for this type of collective action.It should also be noted that the one NGOtaking a lead in this area – the MSF - did solargely by adopting a ‘go it alone’ policy withrespect to the development and release ofthese reports. The reluctance of some human-itarian NGOs to engage in human rights pro-tection activities because of mandate issuesand/or service delivery imperatives alsoplayed a role in inhibiting co-operation inthis area. On-going uncertainty regardingNGO registration in-country may have con-ditioned relatively passive behaviour amonginternational NGOs with regard to humanrights. However, it should be noted that thehumanitarian presence in government-con-trolled areas – with some 100 internationalNGOs working in government garrisontowns and secure areas throughout the coun-try - also acted as a form of de facto accom-paniment of the civilian population,

tion activities, in the wake of the (brief)expansion in the HRD’s mandate to includeprotection activities. Years of painstakingwork, particularly on the part of OCHA, wereeffectively lost in this ‘handover’. The HRWreport was criticised by some within the UNsystem for having contributed to this loss,though lack of capacity and/or willingnesswithin the UN system to collaborate in ensur-ing a successful handover that built on exist-ing achievements was a critical factor in thisloss and subsequent failure to take advantageof the opening offered by the new mandate.In effect, the HRD proved unwilling to orincapable of accepting the responsibility thathad been assigned to it to take on this burden.

In addition to participation in UN-ledhuman rights initiatives, humanitarian NGOsperiodically organised other ad hoc initiativeswith respect to Angola. Most of these initia-tives were not public – typically they targetedhigh-ranking UN officials visiting Angola, orsometimes representatives of donor govern-ments. In 2001, for example, Oxfam took alead role in organising a joint NGO letter toUN Ambassador Gambari, highlighting thehuman rights situation – particularly viola-tions of human rights – in Angola. The letterwas signed by 12 members of the steeringcommittee of the international NGO net-work, CONGA.35 CONGA representativesfrequently made joint verbal representationsto visiting delegations.

Other, more public, forms of human rightsadvocacy included a report by Trócaire (in co-operation with the Windhoek-based Group ofIndigenous Minorities in Southern Africa(WIMSA) and Angolan NGO OrganizaçãoCristã de Apoio ao Desenvolvimento Comunitario)on the plight of the minority San people36 anda statement condemning government tactics ineastern Moxico province by GOAL, anotherIrish NGO.37 This statement coincided withfinal government offensives against UNITAprior to the death of Savimbi that resulted invery high rates of displacement.

In general, NGO protection efforts did notmeet with any greater success than other pro-tection efforts in Angola. Public advocacy alsooccurred very late in the conflict cycle - despite

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providing some measure of protection inaddition to material support.

Analysis of protection activities

Synthesising this analysis of the various levelsof protection activities presents a disappoint-ing picture of its efficacy in Angola in theperiod under review. While the Angolan gov-ernment cannot be blamed for rights viola-tions carried out by UNITA, it can be heldresponsible for its failure to protect its ownpeople from the negative impact of its ownlimpeza activities and for violations that wereperpetrated by its armed forces.

Donor governments’ response to these vio-lations was muted in the extreme, with littleconcerted effort on the part of Western gov-ernments to put serious pressure on Futungo.Given the documented trend towards themore robust human rights protection byWestern governments in the south during thisperiod, the relative lack of economic leveragethese governments enjoyed over the Angolangovernment and economic interests – in par-ticular oil - must have played a decisive role inthis weak response.

It is a cliché often repeated by UN officialsthat the UN is only as strong as the memberstates will allow it to be. This is certainly trueof many of the UN’s human rights activitiesin Angola. A weak mandate after the pull-outof MONUA left the HRD isolated and hang-ing on by a shoestring as the only quasi-polit-ical UN presence in-country. However, thefailure of the HRD to capitalise on its expand-ed mandate from 2002 onwards, even mod-estly, is indicative of a lack of boldness on thepart of the one UN unit specifically taskedwith human rights activities in Angola. Thetruth is that the HRD rarely set foot outsideLuanda, was politically hamstrung from thebeginning, and when it finally had the man-date to do something meaningful, failed toaccept the challenge. In many respects, theHRD represented a face-saving device for theperceived failure of the UN political presencein Angola’s first peace process, and as such,was there primarily to maintain the fig leaf ofa UN political presence.

On the humanitarian side, UN agencies,principally through OCHA and the activitiesof the Humanitarian Co-ordinator, Erik deMul, integrated some degree of protectionactivities - restricted primarily to collection ofinformation and analysis of patterns of viola-tions - into their operations, with some success,albeit limited. However, limited political lever-age and intermittent donor commitment tobringing pressure to bear meant that their activ-ities could never match the scale of violationsoccurring throughout the country. UN protec-tion activities were principally guided by themedium-term objective of strengthening GoAinstitutional capacity for protection and gener-ally (with one or two exceptions) avoided morepublicly confrontational approaches.

In addition, too often OCHA field stafftasked with protection responsibilities lackedsufficient training, capacity and support totruly take on these tasks in a comprehensiveway – the day-to-day imperatives of humani-tarian activities frequently took precedenceover protection activities.

Equally, international NGOs working inthe humanitarian sector failed to present aconsistent public message about what wasoccurring in Angola. While the quality ofNGO co-ordination was inconsistent through-out the period, some private CONGA advoca-cy did take place. However, at no point didCONGA publicly draw attention to thehuman rights situation in Angola. Individualhumanitarian NGOs – most notably the MSF– did publicise some aspects of the humanrights situation, though to little effect. In thesame vein, international human rights organi-sations, most notably the HRW, provided amore comprehensive analysis of the humanrights situation, but again to little effect interms of changing the behaviour of theAngolan government. Angola’s low interna-tional profile, despite its oil resources andchronic humanitarian crisis, cannot havehelped in mobilising interest. Nationalhuman rights organisations remained weakthroughout the war, with some limited advo-cacy activities again having little effect, andare indicative of the generally weak and mar-ginal status of civil society actors in Angola.

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to bear. Leadership involves duties in additionto benefits of prestige.

Lessons learned and future challenges

What lessons can be drawn from this casestudy? When a repressive government hasfinancial autonomy from international finan-cial institutions controlled by Western gov-ernments, is not overly reliant on externalbilateral aid, and is clever enough to play offWestern countries against each other in theallocation of natural resources (in this caseoil), it can apparently effectively isolate itselffrom significant pressure to reform.

That said, the Angolan government stillborrowed from somewhere to finance its war– but no serious attempt appears to have beenmade to focus attention on these privatesources of funds or to use other means ofleverage on the government. In the same way,foreign governments with oil interests haveapparently not tried to present a united fronton Angola. A troika of the US, Russia andPortugal had taken a lead role in the Angolapeace process, but did not act as a lead groupin engaging with the Angolan government onissues related to human rights.

Beyond this glaring inability or unwilling-ness of the international community to exer-cise influence, lessons at micro level mayinclude the following:• The need for continued development of

Angola’s own judicial system and strength-ening of the rule of law, setting up thenecessary mechanisms for achieving theredressing of human rights violations.

• The need for support for genuine nascentcivil society institutions, combined withan analysis of the hegemonic activities ofthe Angolan government with respect tocivil society organisations, and the devel-opment of strategies to cope with this.Such an approach must include an empha-sis on state/society interaction andstrengthening the rule of law.

• The need to allow greater discussion aroundthe issue of impunity regarding the mostegregious violations and crimes of warcommitted during the civil war. The sub-

The new post-war situation

The ending of the armed conflict betweenUNITA and the GoA in April 2002, and thesubsequent change towards a more stable situ-ation throughout most of the country, hasfundamentally changed the human rights land-scape of Angola. With the exception of thecontinued low-intensity conflict in Cabinda,the absence of war means that many of theissues of recent years, in particular violations ofinternational humanitarian law, will becomeless significant in the medium term. Theabsence of war also removes one of the majorexcuses for whole-scale diversion of resourcesand tolerance of endemic corruption. GivenAngola’s vast natural wealth and the expandedpotential for exploitation of this wealth in thecontext of peace, access to economic and socialrights will become even more pertinent.Nevertheless, where large-scale rights violationscontinue to occur in Angola – such as in therecent forced expulsions of non-nationals fromdiamond areas in north-east Angola, or contin-ued violations in the oil-rich Cabinda enclave -the international community continues to facethe same weaknesses in pressuring the Angolangovernment.

However, the increased levels of debt whichAngola accepted in order to win the war, andits current efforts to access IMF funds, mayprovide one notable leverage point –withrespect to both human rights violations inplaces such as Cabinda and further reform ofits administrative, financial control and budg-eting systems in order to ensure greater trans-parency in the use of government revenues(particularly oil).

Equally, there is Angola’s own desire to beperceived as a leading southern African country– as evidenced by its recent tenure as a non-per-manent member of the UN Security Council(ending at the end of 2004) and its equallyrecent chairmanship of the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community (SADC). Whilethese appointments represent major foreignpolicy successes for the Angolan governmentand can be construed as external recognition,and indeed legitimation, at regional and inter-national levels, such leadership positions mayprovide some scope for pressure to be brought

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stantial participation in this discussion ofgroups from the civil society including thechurches may serve to ensure a proper rec-onciliation process. When and how such asensitive process could take place shouldclearly be in the hands of the Angolansthemselves, particularly Angolan civil soci-ety and those most affected by the war.

• The need for a clearer delineation ofresponsibilities within the UN humanitari-an system for human rights protectionactivities and for these activities to be prop-erly resourced and supported, including theimplementation of effective models for theUN system,

• The need for greater coherency amonghumanitarian NGOs on possible jointmechanisms for protection activities. Jointframeworks developed outside a particularcountry context may provide the necessary‘cover’ to allow humanitarian NGOs toengage in public initiatives on humanrights violations in a coherent manner.

Conclusion

Angola is at a crossroads. The country nowhas an opportunity for broad-based develop-ment that could benefit the whole popula-tion. However, continued appropriation ofcommunity resources by elite groups for per-sonal gain remains a major obstacle to nation-al development. The war has ended, but issuesof structural inequality, ethnicity and lack ofaccountability of the governing class are everpresent. Unresolved, these issues may providethe basis for an upsurge in a new phase of con-tentious politics in the medium term. Thecountry is currently going through a processof normalisation in the post-war period. Keyhuman rights interventions should target theway in which this normalisation process takesplace in order to protect human rights, includ-ing access to economic and social rights suchas education and health, and should seek toinfluence this process so that the ultimate out-come of normalisation is a more equitablesociety that benefits all Angolan citizensequally. One can only hope that Angola maysoon realise the promise of its early idealism

to the benefit of the Angolan people. Amanhãentoaremos hinos à liberdadequando comemorarmosa data da abolição desta escravatura

Nós vamos em busca de luzos teus filhos Mãe (...)Vão em busca de vida.38

Notes

1 This paper was developed from an earlier draftprepared for delivery at the 2004 annual confer-ence of the Peace and Justice Association in SanFrancisco, 14-17 October 2004.

2 Médecins Sans Frontières, Angola, sacrifice of apeople, MSF, 2002, p 15.

3 Rob Kevlihan, ‘Sanctions and humanitarian con-cerns: Ireland and Angola, 2001-2’ in Irish Studiesin International Relations, 14 2003, p 95.

4 Tony Hodges, Angola from Afro-Stalinism topetro-diamond capitalism (Oxford, 2001), p 14.

5 This account is based on an unpublished docu-ment by Allan Cain, Country Director ofDevelopment Workshop, provided to one of theauthors during his time in Angola from 2000 to2002. Mr.Cain has been resident in Angola sincethe 1970s and was present when these events tookplace. Any opinions, errors or omissions arethose of the authors and not of Mr Cain.

6 Andrea Lari, Returning home to a normal life? Theplight of displaced Angolans, ISS Paper 85, Pretoria,February 2004, p 2.

7 The existence of such activities and their impacton ordinary people are documented in muchmore detailed MSF reports, including Angola:behind the façade of ‘normalisation’ – manipulation,violence and abandoned populations, Médecins SansFrontières, Luanda, 2000.

8 Comissão dos Direitos Umanos da Orden dosAdvogados de Angola, Diagnóstico preliminarsobre o sistema da administração da justiça emAngola – Perspectiva Estático-Estrutural, Luanda,Março 2001, p 71.

9 Personal correspondence by the author with ahuman rights specialist who frequently visited thecountry in those years and produced two reports,in March 1998 and April 2001.

10 Office for the Coordination of HumanitarianAffairs in Angola (OCHA), Humanitarian situa-tion in Angola – monthly analysis, Luanda, January2002.

11 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2003, 2003, p15.

12 Lari, op cit, p 6.13 Per speech given by Kussumua at the launch of

the UN’s Consolidated Annual Appeal in

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country in those years and produced two reports,in March 1998 and April 2001.

24 UN Security Council Resolution 1433 (2002). 25 Open letter from the CONGA NGO network,

Angola, to the United Nations HighCommissioner for Human Rights, Sergio Vierade Mello (draft), Luanda, February 2003, p 2.

26 For details on the unit’s main activities, visit<www.ohchr.org/english/countries/field/ango-la.htm>

27 Human Rights Watch, The war is over: the crises ofAngola’s internally displaced continues, July 2002, p 8.

28 Ibid, p 9.29 This is a mechanism that allows members of the

Security Council to consult with non-state actors.30 Human Right Watch, World Report 2003, 2003,

p 16.31 Including Angola: behind the façade of ‘normalisa-

tion’ – manipulation, violence and abandoned popula-tions, Médecins Sans Frontières, Luanda, 2000,and Angola, sacrifice of a people, MSF, 2002.

32 Fabrice Weissman (ed), In the shadow of ’just wars’,violence, politics and humanitarian action, CornellUniversity Press, Ithaca, New York, 2004, p 109.

33 Andrea Lari was a researcher with the HRW atthis time and was involved in writing this report.

34 Lari, op cit.35 Known as the CONGA Liaison Group.36 Trócaire, 2004, Where the first are last: San commu-

nities fighting for survival in southern Angola.37 GOAL Press Release, 11 February 2002; ‘Angolan

fears raised’ available at <www.goal.ie/html/newsroom/angolian_fears_raised10202.htm> [26 Sept02] [Query: Angolan_fears?]. Rob Kevlihan wascountry director with GOAL in Angola when thisstatement was released.

38 From the poem ‘Adeus à hora da largada’xxxix ofAgostinho Neto (1922-1979), first president ofthe Popular Republic of Angola. Approximatetranslation is as follows: Tomorrow / We’ll singsons of liberty / When we’ll celebrate / The dateof the abolition of this slavery / We are lookingfor the light / Your sons, Mother / Are lookingfor the life.

Luanda on 26 November 2002.14 De Mul is also the UN Resident Co-ordinator,

Deputy Special Representative of the UNSecretary-General, and as such, acting officer incharge of the United Nations Mission in Angola(UNMA).

15 IRIN, 2002, ‘Interview with Erick De Mul, UNHumanitarian Co-ordinator, 13 Nov 2002’ avail-able at <www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/ByCountryByMonth/0003b86e61b3b6e085256b1f0075614c?OpenDocument&Start=6.22.37&Count=30&Expand=6.22> [28 August2004].

16 Margaret E Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, Activistsbeyond borders: advocacy networks in international poli-tics, Cornell University Press, 1996, p 1.

17 For an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses ofcivil society actors see N Howen, Peace building andcivil society in Angola: a role for the international com-munity, London, October 2001.

18 Other groups, such as the Action for Rural andDevelopment and Environment (ADRA), provid-ed training to community representatives in vari-ous provinces. More localised interventionsworth mentioning include Education forCitizenship in Huila province by Fr PioWakussanga and the Human Rights Programmeled by Development Workshop in Huamboprovince.

19 For more information about FESA, see CMessiant, La Fondation Eduardo dos Santos(FESA), in Politique Africaine 73, March 1999, p 83.

20 Olav Stokke, ‘Aid and political conditionality:core issues and state of the art’, in Olav Stokke(ed), Aid and political conditionality, London, FrankCass, 1995, p 68.

21 For further information on this aspect, seeHuman Rights Watch, Some transparency, noaccountability: the use of oil revenue in Angola and itsimpact on human rights, January 2004, GlobalWitness, A crude awakening, December 1999,and All president men, March 2002.

22 Common Country Assessment 2002, Angola. Thepost-war challenges, Luanda, 2002, chapter 4, pp84-94.

23 Personal correspondence by the author with ahuman rights specialist who frequently visited the

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