intellectual property rights and preferential trade ... trade agreements: data, concepts and ......

Working Paper No. 2016/2 | April 2016

Intellectual Property Rights and Preferential Trade Agreements: Data, Concepts and Research Avenues

Manfred Elsig / Jenny Surbeck University of Bern [email protected] / [email protected]

Today, more than half of international trade is regulated through preferential trade agreements (PTAs). While in the past, these agreements served as tools to eliminate further tariffs between the parties, today we witness the increasing inclusion of trade-related provisions such as Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) protection, competition clauses or behind-the-border regulation. This paper maps the variation of IPR provisions using three different concepts: the degree of IPR protection, IPR enforcement and multilateral coherence. In addition, it explores who are the main advocates of IPR protection and how successful are their approaches to embed IPR protection in PTAs?

This paper presents novel fine grained data which captures the variation in the design of IPRs in 661 PTAs building on the DESTA database (www.designoftradeagreements.org). We review the literature and provide a descriptive look at.the new dataset and outline future research avenues.

Research for this paper was funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation under a grant to the National Centre of Competence in Research on Trade Regulation, based at the World Trade Institute of the University of Bern, Switzerland.

NCCR TRADE WORKING PAPERS are preliminary documents posted on the NCCR Trade Regulation website (<www.nccr-trade.org>)and widely circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. These papers have not been formally edited. Citations should refer to an “NCCR Trade Working Paper”, with appropriate reference made to the author(s).

IntellectualPropertyRightsandPreferentialTradeAgreements:

Data,ConceptsandResearchAvenues

ManfredElsig(UniversityofBern)

JennySurbeck(UniversityofBern)

PaperpreparedforpresentationattheInternationalStudiesAssociation57thAnnualConvention,

March16th-19th,2016,Atlanta,Georgia

1. Introduction

Intellectualproperty rights (IPRs)andtradeagreementsgoa longwayback.But itwasnotbeforetheconclusion of the multilateral negotiations that created theWorld Trade Organization (WTO) and itscovered agreements, when IPRs made the news. The WTO devoted a specific agreement on IPRsembeddedinalargermarketaccessphilosophyandbackbyadisputesettlementsystemwithteeth:TheAgreementonTrade-RelatedAspectsofIntellectualPropertyRights(TRIPS).TradeexpertssawtheTRIPSagreement as one of themain outcomes and pillars of the new organization. The protection of IPRs,however,washeavilycontestedbothduringthenegotiationsandintheaftermathoftheWTOcreation.Inthisparticularregulatoryarea,least-developedcountries(LDCs)havebeengrantedatransitionalopt-out from the treaty obligations, a flexibility provision which has been prolonged to at least 2021.Criticism,however,wasalsovoicedbyanumberofemergingeconomiesthatlamentedanovertlystrictIPRregime.In2001theDohaDeclarationtolaunchanewtraderound(theDohaDevelopmentAgenda)couldonlybeadoptedbyconsensusafterheateddebatesanddifficultnegotiationstoallowtheTRIPSagreementtobederogatedfornationalpublichealthobjectives.

TheprotectionofIPRshasremainedacontestedmatterinrecentyears.Civilsocietygroups,inparticularin Europe, have been campaigning against too stringent protection. They pushed for the EuropeanParliament to block the ratification of theAnti-Counterfeiting TradeAgreement (ACTA) in 2012 by anoverwhelming majority (478 to 39 with 165 abstentions). This ended (for now) the project of aplurilateral agreement among some of the leading exporters of patent and trademark protectedproducts.Themostrecentmega-regionaltradeagreementssuchastheTrans-PacificPartnership(TPP)which has been strongly advocated by the US, move toward higher levels of protection granted fortrademarks,copyrightsandotherareasofIPR,buildingheavilyonACTAandUSIPRlaw.

ThispapertakesasystematicapproachtoIPRsintradeagreementsandaimstotakestockofIPR-relatedprovisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs). For this purpose, we first discuss the literature

IntellectualPropertyRightsandPreferentialTradeAgreements:Data,ConceptsandResearchAvenuesManfredElsig/JennySurbeck

WorkingPaperNo.2016/2|April2016 2

regarding the role of IPRs before providing new descriptive statistics on their inclusion in tradeagreements. Basedon theDESTAdatabase (Dür et al. 2014),wepresent our conceptualizationof IPRcontentinPTAsandprovidethemostsystematicmappingdonesofar.Thedatashowsinparticularthatagreementswith participation of theUS andNorth-South agreement are themost ambitious, featurespecificenforcementmechanisms,butarealsostronglytiedtothemultilateralIPregime.Thisconfirmslargelyconventionalwisdom.Thepaperendswithoutliningthenextstepsofthisresearchproject.

2. DebatesonIPRsandTradeAgreements

TheeconomicliteratureontheroleofstringentIPRsinattractingtrade,investmentandtechnologyisfarfromconclusive(FinkandMaskus2005;Maskus2005).Asaconsequence,theneedforincludingIPRsintrade agreements is also contested (seeMaskus 2000).Nevertheless, international treaties to protectIPRs in foreignmarketshavebeenaround fora long time.The19th centurywitnessed theelaborationand conclusion of a set of specific bilateral and plurilateral agreements to protect copyright, artisticwork, etc. These agreements later in the 20th centurywere bundled and administrated by theWorldIntellectualPropertyRightsOrganization(WIPO)throughamultilateralsetting(seeCottieretal.2015).Theadherentstothesetreatiesweremainlyindustrializedcountriesatthetime.

The debate increasingly politicized when IPR protection became a prominent feature in tradeagreementsinthelate1980s,illustratedbysignificantIPRobligationsintheNorthAmericanFreeTradeAgreement (NAFTA) treaty. Butmore importantly, IPRsmoved center stage in themultilateral tradingsysteminthecontextoftheUruguayRoundleadingtotheTRIPSagreement.Thedebateontheoptimalbalanceprotecting legitimateconcernsbytheholderof IPRrightsandallowingforongoing innovationwasoutstrippedbydevelopingcountriescontestingtheconceptofIPR,whiledevelopedcountriesseeingIPRs as a necessary condition for foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transfer. DevelopedcountriesfinallyacceptedtheinclusionofIPRsaspartofagrandbargainwhichprovidedopportunitiesforbettermarketaccessintextilesandagriculturalgoods(Ostry2002).

OneoftheeffectsofthecreationoftheWTOanditsstrongdisputesettlementsystemwasthegrowingimportanceofWIPOagreementsbybothtransplantinglegallanguageofIPRagreementsintotheTRIPSagreementandbymaking theaccession toanumberofWIPO treatiesquasimandatory.This led toahardening of WIPO’s soft law regime (see Shaffer and Pollack 2010) and a shifting of regulatoryboundaries across international organizations (Dupont and Elsig, forthcoming). However, the originalfears that the TRIPS agreementwould lead to a floodofWTOdisputes did notmaterialize (Pauwelyn2010) and beyond the demands to clarify the relationship between public health and TRIPS, thepoliticizationwaslessacutethananticipatedduringthelate1990s.

Today, IPRs have become an important feature of modern PTAs while the dialectical relationshipbetweenPTAsandthemultilateralsystemremainsstrong.AuniqueelementoftheTRIPSagreementistheobligationforWTOmemberstograntconcessionsagreed inPTAstoallWTOmembersnot just tothose that participate in a given PTA. This so-calledMFN clause ensures that non-PTAmembers canbenefit from WTO+ types of protection for existing areas or new types of concessions. This clauseprovidestheopportunityforanindirectmultilateralizationofpreferentialdealsintheareaofIPRs.



3. ExistingWorkonIPRsandTradeAgreements

Given the importance of IPRs and the growing reliance on trade deals through preferentialarrangements, it is surprising how little systematic research has been conducted in this area. WhilenumerousstudiesexistthatlookatIPRsintradeagreements,fewofthesetakeasystematicapproach;most follow a legal descriptive approach. Some studies have zoomed in on one particular tradeagreementandhaveeithercompareditsdesigntoTRIPS(seeMaskus1997;KangandStone2003;Price2003; Roffe 2004) or focused on a specific IPR issue such as public health within a PTA (see Correa2004a). Other contributions have compared IPRs across multiple PTAs selecting one country or oneregion(seeAbbott2006;HeathandKampermanSanders2007;Lindstrom2010;Fink2011).StillothersexamineaspecificissueareasuchastechnicalassistanceinPTAs(seeRoffeetal.2007)oranalyzeIPRsinBilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) without accounting for corresponding commitments in PTAs (seeDrahos2001;Correa2004b;Bernieri2006;Boie2010).

Seuba (2013) has prepared one of the most comprehensive studies and analyzed the intellectualpropertycontentof141PTAs.Hiscaseselectionwasbasedon theWTO’sRegionalTradeAgreementsInformation-System(RTA-IS)andincludeonlyPTAs,whichhavesomeformofIPRprotection.ThepaperprovidesanoverviewoftheoccurrenceofIPRsinPTAs,looksatthedevelopmentovertime,comparestreaties between the different types of pairs of countries (developed and developing countries), anddifferentiatedareasofIPRenforcementandIPRcategories.

Anotherambitiousproject,bothconceptuallyanddescriptively,hasbeentheresultofworkcarriedoutbytheWTOSecretariat(seeValdésandTavengwa2012resp.ValdésandMcCann2014).Thefirstversionof the study analyses 194 and the second version 245 trade agreements notified to the WTO, bothpapersarebasedontheRTA-ISdatabaseaswell.ItcontainsanextensivedatasetongeneralIPRcontentand scope of IPRs in PTAs understood as different forms of IPR areas such as copyrights, industrialdesignsordomainnames.ThestudyprovidesahighlydescriptiveandinformativeanalysisofIPRcontentvariables across different regions and time, and compares networks of trade agreements with IPRprovisionsovertime.

AnotherstrandofresearchthathasbeenconductedaimsatstudyingtheoriginsofIPRdesignfeatures.There is ample anecdotal evidence of negotiators engaging in copy-pasting. If we focus on TPP, forinstance,wewitnessthatmuchofthecontenthasbeendrawnfromothertreaties.TheIPRchapterofTPP incorporates the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, in which itemphasizesoncemorethatTPPPartiescantakemeasures toprotectpublichealth.Thesamechapterthen borrows heavily from the failed ACTA treaty on counterfeit goods to address the challenges oftraffickingincounterfeittrademarkgoodsandpiratedcopyrightgoods.Finally,someelementsarenew,such as the use IPR enforcement against infringement in newly regulated areas such as the digitalenvironment,includingproductsandservices.

Someworkhasbeencarriedouttostudythisphenomenonmoresystematically.Alleeetal.(2016)showin their work on how much WTO is present in PTAs that also in the area of IPRs exists significantpresence. Over 60% of IPR chapters in PTAs make references to theWTO and these references areoverwhelminglydesignedtobuildcoherencewiththeTRIPSagreement.Inaddition,onaverageforeach



PTAmore than10%of text is lifteddirectly fromtheTRIPSagreement.Also in separateworkonhowPTAsborrowfromotherPTAs,AlleeandElsig(2015a)showthatonaverage77%ofaPTA’sIPRchaptercopiesfromitsmostsimilarPTAthatwasconcludedinthepast,suggestingsubstantialcopy-pastingandcloseconnectiontotheWTOtreatysystem.

SoalthoughthetopicofIPRsinPTAshasattractedsomeattentioninthefieldofIR,therearefewstudiesthat study the phenomenon systematically. Most studies take a descriptive, legal approach andspeculate about the policy implications. Another restriction of previous research on IPRs in PTAs hasoftenbeenthelimitednumberofcasesandtimeperiodsanalyzed,orthepredominantfocusonspecificcountriesandactors(verypopularbeingtheEuropeanUnionandtheUnitedStates).Ourpapertriestofill this apparent gap andwork towards presenting themost extensive design data on IPRs and offersomepreliminaryfindingsondesignvariation.

4. ConceptualizingandMeasuringIPRProvisions

The literature on international institutions and agreements has developed different design concepts(Koremenosetal.2001,Abbottetal.2000)rangingfromtheobligationofagreementstoquestionsofdelegationandcontrol,aswellasflexibilityfeaturesandenforcement.Thisrichliteraturehasinspiredaset of studies on trade agreements on which we draw in elaborating our conceptualization andmeasurement (Kucik and Reinhardt 2008, Pelc 2009, Johns 2014, Rosendorff 2005, Baccini et al.forthcoming,AlleeandElsig2015b).

The first concept, which we call DEGREE OF IPR PROTECTION, captures the overall IPR content andobligationsthatareincludedinatreaty(seeValdesandTavengwa2012;ValdesandMcCann2014).Wecodeelvenvariables inabinaryfashion. Inordertobecodedas1,the identified IPRtypeneedsmorethanjustmentioningorreference,butspecificobligationshavetobeincluded.WedoatthisstagenotdefinethisvariableinrelationtoWTOcommitments(WTOplusorWTOminus).Currently,weproposeasimpleaggregateindexrangingfrom0to11.Table1liststhecomponentsthatgointothismeasure:

Table1:DegreeofIPRProtection-Index

# VariableName CodingQuestion1 Copyrights,RelatedRights DoestheIPRdefinition/chapterincludespecific

commitmentsoncopyrightsand/orrelatedrights?2 Trademarks DoestheIPRdefinition/chapterincludespecific

commitmentsontrademarks?3 GeographicalIndications DoestheIPRdefinition/chapterincludespecific

commitmentsongeographicalindications?4 IndustrialDesigns DoestheIPRdefinition/chapterincludespecific

commitmentsonindustrialdesign?5 Patents DoestheIPRdefinition/chapterincludespecific

commitmentsonpatents?6 UndisclosedInformation

DoestheIPRdefinition/chapterincludespecificcommitmentsonundisclosedinformation(includingknowhow)?



7 LayoutDesignsofIntegratedCircuits DoestheIPRdefinition/chapterincludespecificcommitmentsonlayout-designs(topographies)ofintegratedcircuits?

8 NewPlantVarieties DoestheIPRdefinition/chapterincludespecificcommitmentsonnewplantvarieties?

9 TraditionalKnowledge,GeneticResources DoestheIPRdefinition/chapterincludespecificcommitmentsontraditionalknowledgeand/orgeneticresources?

10 EncryptedProgram-CarryingSatelliteSignals DoestheIPRdefinition/chapterincludespecificcommitmentsonencryptedprogram-carryingsatellitesignals?

11 DomainNames DoestheIPRdefinition/chapterincludespecificcommitmentsondomainnames?

Fromthe literature,weknowthattheoverallambitionofatreatyneedstobeanalyzed inconnectionwith the availability and strength of enforcement tools (Downs et al. 1996, Allee and Elsig 2015b).Therefore,weintroduceassecondconceptofIPRENFORCEMENT.Thismeasureisacompositevariablefocusingon11 indicators that all individuallyprovidegreaterenforcementpossibilities. These refer tothe availability of dispute settlementmechanisms, direct border measures that can help combat theinfringement of rights, the existence of administrative and/or criminal procedures, special liability forserviceprovidersaswellastheinstitutionalization(e.g.throughjointCommittees)tohelpandenforceandprovidemoretransparency.Table2liststhecomponentsthatmakeupthismeasure.

Table2:IPREnforcement-Index

# VariableName CodingQuestion1 GeneralEnforcementStatement IsthereageneralstatementofIPRsenforcement?2 DisputeSettlementMechanism Is thereadisputesettlementmechanismdirectly related to

IPRs?3 ImplementationProvision IsthereageneralstatementofIPRsimplementation?4 BorderMeasures Is thereageneral statementofbordermeasures related to

IPRs?5 Special Requirements Related to Border

MeasuresAre there special requirements related to bordermeasuresfortheenforcementofIPRs?

6 Civil,AdministrativeProcedures,Remedies Are there any civil and administrative procedures andremediesdefinedfortheenforcementofIPRs?

7 ProvisionalMeasures Are there any provisional measures defined for theenforcementofIPRs?

8 CriminalProcedures,Remedies ArethereanycriminalproceduresandremediesdefinedfortheenforcementofIPRs?

9 ServiceProviderLiability Is there a service provider liability defined for theenforcementofIPRs?

10 IPRCommittee Is there an IPR Committee monitoringimplementation/enforcement/administrationofIPRs?

11 Transparency Is therea statementofTransparencydefined toensure theenforcementofIPRprotection?

Asa third conceptwesuggest lookingat ishowmuch the IPRobligationsareembedded in the largernetworkofWTOandWIPOrulesandregulations.WecallthisvariableMULTILATERALCOHERENCE.The



moreIPRobligationsinPTAsincorporatemultilateralprincipalsandnormsandadvocatetheadherenceto established IPR treaties, the less fragmentation is created which would allow forum-shoppingbetweentreatyvenues.Weproposetwodistinctmeasuresforcoherence.ThefirstmeasureCOHERENCE1workswithfourindicators:First,whethernationaltreatmentandMFN(bothcoreWTOprinciples)areexplicitlygrantedtothePTApartnersastheMFNclausefurtherstrengthenstheexistingMFNobligationforWTOparties; second,whether a re-affirmation of the TRIPS agreement is found; third,whether areaffirmationof the coreWIPOConvention is found; fourth,whetheroneormore reference toWIPOtreaties is included. The secondmeasure COHERENCE 2 captures the anchoring of IPRs in a broadernetwork of IPR-relatedmultilateral treaties inmore detail by coding 28 IPR-related treaties that havebeen open for ratification. In appendix A, we list the treaties with year of creation. This index is anaggregateindexrangingfrom0to28.

5. MappingIPRProvisions

Inthissectionwepresentanddiscussdatarelatedtoourthreeprimecategories(degreeofprotection,enforcement,multilateralcoherence).

Figure1:CoverageOverTime

Before discussing the patterns of IPR design in these areas, figure 1 above showswhen IPR contentsstartedtoappearinPTAsandwhenspecificcommitmentsstarttoincrease.Until1985wefindnoIPR-related content in PTAs. The first trade agreement including IPRwas the FTA between Israel and theUnited States thatwas signed and entered into force in 1985. It contained one Article on IPR,whichgrantednational treatment aswell asMFN treatment andmentionedpatents, copyrights, trademarksandindustrialdesigninparticularbutdidn’tincludeanyspecificobligations(degreeofprotection).Afterthis,IPRsareincreasinglyincludedinPTAs,bothgeneralstatements(from35%intheearly1990sto80%inthepastfewyears).Thepercentageofincludingspecificprovisionbeyondthemeredeclarationstarts

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DevelopmentofIPRsinPTAs

GeneralStatement(Av)

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toincreaseinparticularthepast5years(fromaround30%to75%).Thissuggeststhatespeciallyinthepast10yearsmoreandmoreIPRcontentiscoveredinPTAs.

Ifwe focuson the typesof IPRs thathavebeen subject to inclusion intoPTAs (figure2),we find thatcopyrights, trademarks, geographical indications, industrial design and patents to be the dominatingtypesof IPR rights.More recentlyand lessoftenwe find references tonewplantvarieties, traditionalknowledgeordomainnames.SothePTAsmapprettycloselyontoWTOobligationsonthefirstgroupofrights.

Figure2:TypesofIPRCoverage

Figure3:IPRProtectionandMembershipCharaceristics

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Copyrights,RelatedRightsTrademarks

GeographicalIndicaBonsIndustrialDesigns

PatentsUndisclosedInformaBon

LayoutDesignofIntegratedCurcuitsNewPlantVarieBes

TradiBonalKnowledge,GeneBcEncryptedProgram-CarryingSatellite

DomainNames

PTAsincludinggeneralIPRs(%ofTotal#319)

GeneralIPR

SpecificIPR

0.00.51.01.52.02.53.03.54.0

Europe(N=160)

Asia(N=92)

Africa(N=34)

Americas(N=160)

Oceania(N=7)

Intercon?nental(N=208)

North-North(N=53)

North-South(N=187)

South-South(N=421)

G20(N=347)

US(N=27)

EU(N=100)

AverageDegreeofIPRProtec?oninPTAs



Turningtoour firstconceptthatmeasuresthedegreeofobligation, figure3aboveshowstheaveragedegree of IPR protection acrossmembership characteristics. Ifwe focus on regions, Americas has thehighestamountofIPRprotectioncomparedtootherregions.Intra-EuropeanPTAsandintra-AsianPTAshavesubstantiallylowerprotection,whileAfricanPTAslackIPRprotection.Intercontinentalagreementsare generallymore recent andalso showhigher levelsof IPRprotection.Not surprisinglyNorth-SouthagreementsarethosemuchhigherIPRprotectionthanbothNorth-NorthandSouth-Southtreaties.Thispattern is suggestive thatNorthpartners inPTAspush forgreater legal certaintyabout IPRprotectionandmakeit(analogoustotheWTOUruguayRoundnegotiations)aconditionforgreatermarketaccess.ThedataalsoshowsthatPTAsincludingtheUShavethegreatestobligationintermsofIPRsbyfar.TheEUcomparedaswellasthegroupofleadingeconomies(theG20)havesignificantlylowerIPRcontent.

WhenwetakeacloserlookattheUS,theEUandtheG20(figure4),weobservethatinthecaseoftheUSWTOestablished IPRsmake thebulkof specific commitments (copyright, trademarks,geographicalindicationsandpatents)butalsonewerareassuchasencryptedprogram-carryingsatellitesignalsandinternetdomainnames.ForbothG20andtheEUthereislessvariationacrossissueareas.

Figure4:IPRProtection:G20,USandEUCompared

Our second concept focuses on the strength of enforcement of IPR rights in PTAs. As most disputesettlementmechanismsofPTAshavemuchless“teeth”thantheWTO’sdisputesettlementsystem,wefocusinparticularonelementsinPTAsthatprovideastrongerenforcementpushforIPRrightsandthatcanworkincombinationwiththeexistingdisputesettlementprocedures.Figure5providesanoverview.Enforcement isonaverage rathermoderate forPTAsconcluded in theAmericas,AsiaandEuropeandnearlyabsentinAfricanPTAsduetothelackofspecificcommitments.Inparticular,thatAsianattentionto enforcement is slightly higher than for other regions is surprising, butmirrors general PTA disputesettlementdesign (Allee andElsig 2015b)questioning longstandingdebates about thenon-legalAsianway to solve disputes. Similar to the level of protection, north-south agreements have significantlyhigherenforcementcapacities.Finally,PTAsincludingtheUSexhibitstrongenforcementelements.

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G20(N=347) US(N=27) EU(N=100)

AverageDegreeofIPRProtec>oninPTAs

Copyrights,RelatedRights

Trademarks

GeographicalIndicaBons

IndustrialDesigns

Patents

UndisclosedInformaBon

LayoutDesignofIntegratedCurcuits(Topographies)NewPlantVarieBes

TradiBonalKnowledge,GeneBcResourcesEncryptedProgram-CarryingSatelliteSignalsDomainNames



Figure5:IPREnforcementandMembershipCharacteristics

Figure6:IPREnforcement:G20,USandEUCompared

In termsof theelementsthatdrivethehigh levelofUSenforcement,Figure6plots thedifferentsub-partsoftheindex.PTAswiththeUSinvolvedhavehighlevelsonallthedimensionswiththeexceptionofcreatingspecificCommitteestooverseetheprocess.Thislackof“institutionalization”lookspuzzling.Inthe US case also we witness much higher levels on civil administrative procedures and criminalproceduresaswellasdirectbordermeasures.

Subsequently,wefocusonourthirdindexwhichmeasuresthedegreetowhichPTAsmakereferencestoboth the WTO and the WIPO IPR regimes. We see these strong signals as an attempt to avoidfragmentation and incoherence. Figure 7 shows that intercontinental and European agreements are

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North-North(N=53)

North-South(N=187)

South-South(N=421)

G20(N=347)

US(N=27)

EU(N=100)

AverageEnforcementofIPRinPTAs

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ImplementaAonProvision

BorderMeasures

SpecialRequirementsRelatedtoBorderMeasuresCivilAdministraAveProcedures/RemediesProvisionalMeasures

CriminalProcedures/Remedies

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Transparency



those with the highest inclusion of WTO principles and re-affirmations of WTO and WIPO regimes(generalmultilateral coherencemeasure). In terms of the direct inclusion of IP-related treaties to beaccededitisnoteworthythatintra-EuropeanPTAsaremorelikelytoincludethesethanAmerican,Asianand African treaties. Very significant again are the differences when we focus on North-Southagreementsinrelationtotheothercategories.Finally,PTAsinvolvingtheUSinvolvemorecommitmentbothforgeneralandspecificcoherencewiththemultilateralsystemthanPTAsinvolvingtheEUorG20countries.

Figure7:MultilateralCoherenceandMembershipCharacteristics

Finally,welookatthedevelopmentofthedifferentindexesovertime.Asshowninfigure8allindexesshowaclear increaseovertime.For thedegreeofprotectionwecanseethatbeginning intheperiod2005-2009 on average at least one specific IPR obligation (1.2) was included per PTA. The IPRenforcement index shows thatalready5yearsearlier (2000-2004)anaveragePTAalready includedatleastoneprovisiononenforcement(1.4).Lookingatthemultilateralcoherenceweseethatbeginningin2000-2004averagePTAsincludedatleastsomeformofgeneralcoherenceprovisions(Coherence1,1.3)and included already in 1990-1994 reaffirmation or accession provisions to at least one IPR-relatedmultilateralagreement(Coherence2,1.0).1

1Thethreeindexesarenotdirectlycomparableasthenumberandtypesofcomponentsdiffer,wewillstandardizethisinthenextiterationofthepaper.

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Coherence1

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Figure8:CoverageOverTime-Indexes

6. DiscussionandNextSteps

ThispapermapsselectedIPRprovisionsinPTAs,presentsthreeconceptsanddiscussessomedescriptivestatisticswith respect toPTAmembership characteristics. It shows that treaties involving theUShavehigher protection of IPRs, stronger enforcement tools but at the same are also closely aligned to themultilateral IP regime. Similarly, North-South agreements score higher on these three indexes,confirmingthegeneralargumentonthepotentialfunctionofIPRsinattemptingtoattractinvestmentsandtechnologywhileprotectinginnovationmostlycreatedinthemoredevelopedpartnerstoaPTA.

In the next iteration of the paper,wewill engage in amultivariate analysis to better account for thepresentedpatternsandvariationinthispaper.WewillestimatemodelsforeachofthreeIPRdimensionsaccountingforthefactthatinstitutionaldesignfeaturesinteract.Wewillanalyzethevariationofdesignby focusingon a set of explanatory variablesprevalent in the literature.Weposit that thehigher theexportstotheothermarket,thecombinedmarketpowerandtheIP-contentofexports,thegreaterthelevelofprotectionsoughtinPTAs.Similarly,weexpectenforcementtobefollowingsimilarpatterns.Inrespect to the question ofmultilateral embeddedness,wewill testwhether this is a function of howsatisfiedPTApartnersarewiththemultilateralsystemandwhetherPTApartnersbelongtothecreatorsof both key WIPO and WTO treaties in this field. In addition, we expect a causal link between theexperiencewiththeWTOdisputesettlementsystemandthedegreetowhichembeddednessispushed.

Anotheravenueofresearchconsistsofgainingmoreinsightsintohowdesignfeaturestravelfrompastagreements,bilateral,plurilateralandmultilateralones.AlsodomesticlawinIPprotectionhasinspiredinternational law-making, sowewill focus on how the dominating national legal practices have been

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DevelopmentofDegreeofProtec0on,EnforcementandMul0lateralCoherence

DegreeofProtec;on(Av)

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transplanted.Thediffusionliteratureprovidesuswiththeoreticalguidanceandwilllocatecausaldriversofexportsandimportsofdesign.

Finally, with these data at hand, we might be able to better address some questions related to theimpactofPTAobligations;mostof thework in thepasthasuseddummyvariableson IPRpresence inPTAstoestimatetradeandinvestmenteffects.Givenmorenuanceddata,wemightinformthisdebatefurtherandaddressbotheconomicandpolitical-institutionaleffects.



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AppendixA

# CodingQuestion TreatyDescription Classification1 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)

totheRomeConvention?International Convention for the ProtectionofPerformers,ProducersofPhonogramsandBroadcastingOrganizations(1961)

WIPO IP ProtectionAgreements

2 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheParisConvention?

Paris Convention for the Protection ofIndustrial Property (as amended onSeptember28,1979)


3 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheBernConvention?

Berne Convention for the Protection ofLiterary and ArtisticWorks (as amended onSeptember28,1979)


4 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheWCT?

WIPOCopyrightTreaty(WCT)(1996) WIPO IP ProtectionAgreements

5 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheWPPT?

WIPOPerformancesandPhonogramsTreaty(WPPT)(1996)


6 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)to the Convention for theProtection of Producers ofPhonograms AgainstUnauthorizedDuplicationofTheirPhonograms?

Convention for the Protection of Producersof Phonograms Against UnauthorizedDuplication of Their Phonograms (1971),Geneva


7 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheBeijingTreaty?

Beijing Treaty on Audiovisual Performances(2012)


8 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheSingaporeTreaty?

Singapore Treaty on the Law of Trademarks(2006)


9 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheTLT?

TrademarkLawTreaty(TLT)(1994) WIPO IP ProtectionAgreements

10 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)tothePLT?

PatentLawTreaty(2000) WIPO IP ProtectionAgreements

11 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheBrusselsConvention?

Brussels Convention Relating to theDistribution of Programme-Carrying SignalsTransmittedbySatellite(1974)


12 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheNairobiTreaty?

Nairobi Treaty on the Protection of theOlympicSymbol(1981)


13 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheBudapestTreaty?

Budapest Treaty on the InternationalRecognition of the Deposit of Micro-organisms for the Purposes of PatentProcedure (as amended on September 26,1980)

WIPOGlobalProtectionSystem

14 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheHagueAgreement?

Hague Agreement Concerning theInternational Registration of IndustrialDesigns(1925)


15 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheLisbonAgreement?

Lisbon Agreement for the Protection ofAppellationsofOriginandtheirInternationalRegistration (as amended on September 28,1979)


16 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheMadridAgreement?

Madrid Agreement Concerning theInternational Registration of Marks (asamendedonSeptember28,1979)


17 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)to the Protocol of the MadridAgreement?

Protocol Relating to the Madrid AgreementConcerning the International Registration ofMarks(asamendedonNovember12,2007)




18 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)tothePCT?

PatentCooperationTreaty(PCT)(asmodifiedonOctober3,2001)


19 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheNiceAgreement?

NiceAgreementConcerningtheInternationalClassification of Goods and Services for thePurposes of the Registration of Marks (asamendedonSeptember28,1979)

WIPOClassification

20 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheStrasbourgAgreement?

Strasbourg Agreement Concerning theInternational Patent Classification (asamendedonSeptember28,1979)

WIPOClassification

21 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheViennaAgreement?

Vienna Agreement Establishing anInternational Classification of the FigurativeElementsofMarks (as amendedonOctober1,1985)

WIPOClassification

22 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheLocarnoAgreement?

Locarno Agreement Establishing anInternational Classification for IndustrialDesigns (as amended on September 28,1979)

WIPOClassification

23 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheUPOV?

International Convention for the ProtectionofNewVarietiesofPlants(UPOV)

MultilateralAgreements

24 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheIPPC?

International Plant Protection Convention(1951)


25 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheCBD?

Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)(1992)


26 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheUCC(Geneva,1952)?

Universal Copyright Convention of 6September 1952,with Appendix Declarationrelating to Article XVII and ResolutionconcerningArticleXI,Geneva


27 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheUCC(Paris,1971)?

UniversalCopyrightConventionasrevisedon24 July 1971, with Appendix Declarationrelating to Article XVII and ResolutionconcerningArticleXI,Paris


28 Doesthetreatyaffirm(accession)totheUDRP?

Uniform Domain Name Dispute ResolutionPolicy(1999)


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