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Initiatives of the NEA in Response to theTEPCO Fukushima Daiichi NPP

Accident

Alejandro HuertaAlejandro HuertaAlejandro HuertaAlejandro Huerta

OECD Nuclear Energy AgencyOECD Nuclear Energy AgencyOECD Nuclear Energy AgencyOECD Nuclear Energy Agency

International Experts’ Meeting on Protection against Extreme International Experts’ Meeting on Protection against Extreme International Experts’ Meeting on Protection against Extreme International Experts’ Meeting on Protection against Extreme

Earthquakes and Tsunamis on the Light of the Accident at the Earthquakes and Tsunamis on the Light of the Accident at the Earthquakes and Tsunamis on the Light of the Accident at the Earthquakes and Tsunamis on the Light of the Accident at the

Fukushima Daiichi Fukushima Daiichi Fukushima Daiichi Fukushima Daiichi NPPNPPNPPNPP

IAEAIAEAIAEAIAEA, , , , 4444----7 7 7 7 SeptemberSeptemberSeptemberSeptember 2012201220122012

NEA MissionNEA MissionNEA MissionNEA Mission

The mission of the NEA is to assist its Member countries in maintaining and further developing, through international co-operation, the scientific, technological and legal bases required for the safe, environmentally friendly and economical use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

To achieve this, the NEA works as: � A forum for sharing information and experience and

promoting international co-operation; � A centre of excellence which helps Member countries to

pool and maintain their technical expertise; � A vehicle for facilitating policy analyses and developing

consensus based on its technical work.

NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident 2

OECD/NEA MembershipOECD/NEA MembershipOECD/NEA MembershipOECD/NEA Membership

• Australia• Austria• Belgium• Canada• Chile• Czech Republic• Denmark• Estonia• Finland• France• Germany• Greece• Hungary

• Iceland• Ireland• Israel• Italy• Japan• Korea• Luxembourg• Mexico• Netherlands• New Zealand• Norway• Poland• Portugal• Slovak

Republic

• Slovenia

• Spain

• Sweden

• Switzerland

• Turkey

• United Kingdom

• United States

Not member of NEA


NEA StrengthsNEA StrengthsNEA StrengthsNEA Strengths

• Small size and budget • (80 staff members; budget of 14 million

euros, + voluntary contributions and projects)

• Large representation (85% of the world’s nuclear power capacity)

• Non-political forum; climate of mutual trust • Tries to pool world’s best nuclear expertise

among developed countries • Narrow focus: in-depth scientific, technical,

legal work


1. Nuclear safety and regulation :� CNRA (Committee on Nuclear Regulatory Activities)� CSNI (Committee on the Safety of Nuclear

Installations)� OECD/NEA Joint International Research Projects (on

Safety Research)2. Radioactive waste management3. Radiation protection and public health4. Nuclear science5. Economics, resources and technology 6. Legal affairs

NEA Strategic Plan NEA Strategic Plan NEA Strategic Plan NEA Strategic Plan 2011201120112011----2016201620162016


NEA Response to the AccidentNEA Response to the AccidentNEA Response to the AccidentNEA Response to the Accident

The NEA:• Responded quickly to assist Japan after the accident and will continue

to do so.• Responded to a huge number of media requests to explain the public

the accident.• Sought immediately to encourage co-ordination among its member

countries of how to respond to the accident.• Has altered, in large measure, its programme of work to implement

activities that will identify the impacts of the accident on nuclear safety.• Will continue to support countries in introducing measures to improve

safety. • Continues to monitor the impact on energy policies and responses.• Recognises that learning lessons from the accident will continue for

many years.


NEA support to Japan NEA support to Japan NEA support to Japan NEA support to Japan

Transfer of NEA Member experience in post-accident management to the Japanese government• October 2011 and February 2012 conferences on decontamination

and rehabilitation• November 2011 and February 2012 seminars on dialogue with the

stakeholders

National safety reviews and stress tests• November 2011 experts meeting, public seminar, and advisory body

meeting

Enhancements to the Regulatory Infrastructure• January 2012 experts meeting on regulatory infrastructure changes in

Japan

Other specific areas under discussion


GGGG8 8 8 8 ---- NEA Ministerial Seminar & NEA Ministerial Seminar & NEA Ministerial Seminar & NEA Ministerial Seminar &

Regulators’ ForumRegulators’ ForumRegulators’ ForumRegulators’ Forum

7-8 June 2011 – Regulators’ Forum in conjunction with G 8/G20 Ministerial Meeting

Reinforcement of Key elements for nuclear safety:• The primary responsibility for nuclear safety is with the operator. • The regulatory body must provide assurance that nuclear power stations

are operated in a safe manner and in accordance with regulation.• A strong regulatory body possesses technical ability and independence in

decision making; works transparently; strives for continuous learning and improvement; and utilises international networks.

Key improvement areas:• High standards and continuous improvement for nuclear safety.• Safety culture in both operator and regulator.• Implementation of specific lessons learned , i.e. emergency power supply,

accident management, emergency response, etc. • Stakeholder involvement, especially during crisis communication.• Reinforce international cooperation.


• CSNI, CNRA and CRPPH discussed appropriate strategies and priorities in response to Fukushima Daiichi beginning in late spring 2011

• December 2011 – Tri-bureau meeting of the CNRA, CRPPH, and CSNI to discuss coordination and integration of NEA response� Enhanced cooperation and coordination among involved

committees for efficiency� Cross-Committee activities identified and prioritized� Strategic alignment on new work scope of NEA� Agreement on approach to coordinate cross committee

activities� Cross-committee process defined

Background to NEA ActivitiesBackground to NEA ActivitiesBackground to NEA ActivitiesBackground to NEA Activities


NEA Integrated ResponseNEA Integrated ResponseNEA Integrated ResponseNEA Integrated Response

Identification of Fukushima Issues

Prioritization

New GroupExisting Group

Group Outputs:Reports

AnalysesEtc.

Continue Longterm?


AnalysesEtc.

New Multi-Committee Group


AnalysesEtc.

Continue Longterm?

Medium Duration/Medium Priority Activities

Timeframe – within two years

Long Duration/Low Priority Activities

Timeframe – beyond two years

Task allocation

STCs

STG-FUKU: Cross-cutting issue

coordination and information exchange

EPRG: Cross-cutting issues

Output reviews and recommendations

STCs: oversight of groups’ activities

STCs

STG-FUKU & EPRG - recommendationsSTCs - decisions

STG-FUKU & PRGSTCs

Working Groups and Parties

Short Duration/High Priority Activities

Timeframe – within one year


• Integrated list of 3 Committees’ ideas and proposals for new Fukushima-related work – shared with all 3 STCs

• CNRA STG-FUKU coordinates new cross-committee Fukushima related work� Supports information exchange between NEA

Members and between Working Groups, Parties, and Task Groups of the 3 STCs

� Coordinates activities between STC subgroups as needed

• CSNI PRG (expanded) reviews and makes recommendations on cross-committee Fukushima related work products

• Joint and Tri-Bureau Meetings

CrossCrossCrossCross----committee Followcommittee Followcommittee Followcommittee Follow----upupupup


NEA Main Lines of NEA Main Lines of NEA Main Lines of NEA Main Lines of

PostPostPostPost----Fukushima ActivitiesFukushima ActivitiesFukushima ActivitiesFukushima Activities

Building on an integrated approach (CNRA, CSNI and C RPPHtri-bureau meeting, December 2011), activities are being conducted or planned in at least the following area s:

• Accident management including human factors and organisational issues related to the response to the accident.

• Reassessment of Defence-in-Depth.

• Evaluating the methodologies for defining and assessing initiating internal and external events, including coupled events, as well as methodologies defining the design basis criteria.

• Evaluation of operating experience for events that may be precursors to events that could challenge the safety of nuclear power plants given the insights from the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident.

• Communication with the public, media and other stakeholders.(See www.oecd-nea.org/nsd/fukushima )


CrossCrossCrossCross----committee Topical Areascommittee Topical Areascommittee Topical Areascommittee Topical Areas

CNRA CRPPH CSNI

1. Accident Management and Progression

a. TRANSITION: Review of on-site accident management programmes and procedures to address the transitional conduct of operations from normal to accident conditions to severe accident conditions, and to the implementation of protective measures under the emergency preparedness plans. This includes onsite and offsite decision-making processes.

L S S

b. ACCIDENT PROGRESSION: Enhanced understanding of accident progression analyses methods and techniques. S S L

c. HUMAN PERFORMANCE: Human and organisational performance issues under accident response conditions. S S L

d. OFFSITE: Improvement of off-site emergency preparedness by sharing knowledge on core melt accident progression and source term quantification to improve off-site emergency procedures and technical tools. S L S

2. Crisis or Emergency Communications (primary information exchange between CNRA and CRPPH)

a. PUBLIC: Communication with the public, media and other stakeholders including Japanese organisations. L S

b. REGULATORS: Communication with the regulators in other countries and with international organisations, such as the InternationalAtomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Inter-Agency Committee on Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies (IACRNE). L L

c. ONSITE OFFSITE: Crisis communications between onsite and offsite emergency response organisations. L L

3. Reassessment of Defence-in-Depth S L

4. Evaluating the methodologies for defining and asses sing initiating internal and external events, inclu ding coupled, as well as methodologies defining the desi gn basis criteria

S L

5. Reassessment of Operating Experience and prior oppo rtunities to identify or address conditions that could challenge nuclear safety.

a. OP E: Evaluation of operating experience for events that may be precursors to future events that could challenge the safety of nuclear power plants given the insights from Fukushima.

L S

b. RESEARCH: Review and gap analysis of safety research relevant to the analysis of the accident. S L

6. Balancing deterministic and probabilistic approache s to regulatory decision making L S

7. Regulatory Infrastructure L

8. Radiological Protection and Health Physics L

9. Decontamination and recovery (onsite and offsite) L


Ongoing Activities within NEAOngoing Activities within NEAOngoing Activities within NEAOngoing Activities within NEA

CSNI�Working Group on Accident Management and

Analysis (WGAMA )�F-CAPS (2012)1 – Position paper on filtered containm ent

venting �F-CAPS (2012)2 - International benchmarking project on

fast-running software tools used to model fission p roduct releases during accidents at nuclear power plants

�Working Group on Human and OrganisationalFactors (WGHOF)�F-CAPS (2012)3 – Human performance and intervention

under extreme conditions



CSNI Cont’d �Working Group on Integrity of

Components and Structures (WGIAGE)�F-CAPS (2012)4 – Metallic

component margins under high seismic loads (MECOS)

�Task group to develop a proposal for a task to study the impacts of extreme natural hazards

�Working Group on Risk Assessment (WGRISK )�F-CAPS (2012)5 – Workshop on

PSA of natural external events including earthquakes



CSNI Cont’d

�Other ongoing work within CSNI includes:�Development of a discussion paper on Defence-in-Dep th

for the purposes of identifying future technical to pics (joint effort with CNRA)

�Re-constitution of DiDELSYS TG to investigate the is sue of electrical system robustness in light of the Fukush ima Daiichi accident

�Joint international research project being establis hed: Benchmark Study of the Accident at the Fukushima Da iichi NPS


Safety Research/Joint Projects

• The importance of future safety research has been highlighted

• New safety research will be identified using a phased approach within NEA:

�Comprehensive review of past safety research - done

�Gap analysis based on research issues from Fukushima - ongoing� Discuss possible expansion of existing

projects and/or

� New R&D project proposals

�CSNI review of research direction –ongoing



Safety Research/Joint ProjectsSafety Research/Joint ProjectsSafety Research/Joint ProjectsSafety Research/Joint Projects

RASPLAV

MASCA

TMI-VIP

OLHF

LOFT

H2SETH/PKL

PKL - PKL-2

ROSA - ROSA-2

PKL-3

SERENAMCCI

MCCI-2

SETH -SETH-2

HYMERES

THAI – THAI2

BIP – BIP-2

STEM

Halden

SCIP - SCIP2

CIP – SFP

PRISME

PRISME-2

HEAF

LOFC


CNRA� CNRA Senior Task Group on Impacts of Fukushima

Daiichi Accident (STG -FUKU) – established to coordinate CNRA and ultimately cross-committee response to Fukushima Daiichi accident

� New Task Group on Accident Management established� Enhancements of on-site accident management

procedures� Decision-making and guiding principles in emergency

situations � Guidance for instrumentation, equipment and supplies

for addressing long-term aspects of accident management

� Guidance when taking extreme measures for AM




CNRA Cont’d� Working Group on Operating

Experience (WGOE)� Task on pre-cursor events -

evaluation of various initiators and situations for new lessons in light of the Fukushima Daiichi accident and improvements in implementing lessons learnt. WGRISK to cooperate in a risk analysis of precursor events exercise



CNRA Cont’d� Working Group on Regulation of

New Reactors – completed a report of site selection and preparation (NEA/CNRA/R(2010)3)� Supplemental report is underway to:

• Multi- unit sites• Site layout considerations • Consideration of external events or

combinations of hazards a the siting stage• Land use/population density• Emergency preparedness

arrangements/feasibility• Social acceptability• NPP design parameters are enveloped or

suitable for a given site



CNRA Cont’d� Working Group on Public

Communication (WGPC ) – completed workshop on Crisis Communication (Madrid, May 2012)

� Safety of Research Reactors Task Group (SORRTG)� Task on peer review

workshop of country comprehensive safety assessments (stress tests) of high risk RR facilities.


CRPPH� Established Expert Group on Radiological Protection

Aspects of the Fukushima NPP Accident (EG -RPF)� Working Party on Nuclear Emergency Matters

(WPNEM)– INEX 4 evaluation report and workshop planning – EGIRES report on optimization in emergency

preparedness and response with special focus on reference levels

– Update of report on Short-term Countermeasures in Case of a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency (2003)

– Survey on emergency management lessons learned



CRPPH Cont’d� Information System on Occupational Exposure (ISOE)

Expert Group on Severe Accident Management (EG -SAM)� Lesson learned in management of occupational exposure in high

radiation areas

� Other CRPPH Activities� Support to Japanese government workshops on

decontamination and recovery and other



ConclusionsConclusionsConclusionsConclusions

• The Fukushima Daiichi accident is very important and it is going to influence the future of nuclear power.

• It was caused by highly unexpected external natural events, and not as TMI or Chernobyl by failure of equipment or maloperation.

• The accident caused the evacuation of more than 80,000 people and contaminated a large area; there has been no radiation-related fatalities, while the earthquake and the tsunami caused 20,000 deaths.

• All plants in operation are being reviewed by independent safety regulators.– NPPs are safe to operate according to the very demanding standards

in place today– Enhancements to further improve safety continue to be identified and

implemented


Conclusions (Conclusions (Conclusions (Conclusions (contdcontdcontdcontd) ) ) )

• For many countries, the Fukushima Daiichi NPP accident does not question nuclear power as such, but it does question the choice of specific locations and designs at these locations.

– Better understanding of external hazards and their consequences– Broader application of defence-in-depth– A more balanced use of deterministic and probabilistic approaches

• Policies may evolve in radiological protection, emergency and post-accident management in areas such as:– Societal impacts beyond radiation hazards– Enhancements to crisis (emergency) communications– Enhanced offsite capabilities to respond to severe accidents

• Continued emphasis on strong international coordination and cooperation to enhance safety

26NEA Initiatives following Fukushima Daiichi NPP Accident

27

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