indo-pakistani relations: reciprocity in long-term perspective

Indo-Pakistani Relations: Reciprocity in Long-Term PerspectiveAuthor(s): Sheen RajmairaSource: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Sep., 1997), pp. 547-560Published by: Wiley on behalf of The International Studies AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600796 .

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International Studies Quarterly (1997) 41, 547-560

Research Notes

Indo-Pakistani Relations: Reciprocity in Long-Term Perspective

SHEEN RAJMAIRA

East Carolina University

This article examines the foreign policy behavior of two rival states, India and Pakistan. Previous studies of this dyad reveal competing causal claims concerning the nature of Indian and Pakistani relations. I argue that Indian and Pakistani foreign policy behavior exhibits strong short-term relations in the context of long-term "memories" that shape future expectations of their bilateral relations. The results indicate that reciprocity in Indo-Pakistani relations is shaped by a long-term equilibrium and suggest a reconceptualization of the nature of the Indo-Pakistani relations. The findings highlight the legacy of suspicions between these two countries, providing sober insights into the possibilities for reducing conflict and promoting cooperation in South Asia.

Whether rival states respond to each other's actions represents a true "puzzle" for international relations research (Zinnes, 1980). Studies of arms races, foreign policy behavior, and the development of cooperation among adversaries all focus, to some degree, on reciprocity. Some of these studies seek to determine if reciprocity exists, while others examine the role reciprocity plays in foreign policy interactions. This research reveals mixed findings regarding reciprocity, leading some to doubt the utility of reciprocity. These doubts may be a result of the varying conceptions of "reciprocity" that have been used in the international relations literature (Goldstein, 1991), despite the fact that these studies use similar data and empirical methods to examine reciprocity across dyads. As a pattern of action that characterizes the exchange of behavior between rivals (Keohane, 1986; see also Moore, 1995), reciprocity is variable in terms of the equality and nature of that exchange. This article examines short-term interactions of two rivals, India and Pakistan, in the context of their ongoing rivalry. This rivalry is rooted in long-term "memories" and exhibits itself in the short-term interactions of the two rivals.

Author's note: This research was conducted with support from the Department of Political Science at East Carolina University and the Department of Political Science and the Institute of Behavioral Science at the University of Colorado. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. I would like to thank a number of people, many ofwhom read different versions of this article, for their helpful comments and suggestions: John Freeman, Joshua Goldstein, Sean Q Kelly, David Kinsella, Michael D. McGinnis, Will H. Moore, Maury Simon, and Michael D. Ward. I would also like to thank Robert Durr for his advice on a methodological matter, and Henrik Bjarheim for sharing his thoughts on Indo-Pakistani relations with me. Marnie Pasciuto provided excellent research assistance.

?g 1997 International Studies Association. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 350 Main Street, Maiden, MA 02148, USA, and 108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK.



548 Indo-Pakistani Relations

Previous studies of the Indo-Pakistani dyad have only focused on the short-term, tit-for-tat interactions between the countries. Most of these studies apply Richard- son's (1960) action-reaction framework only to reach contradictory conclusions about Indo-Pakistani relations. For instance, Hollist (1977) and Oren (1994) both find evidence of negative reaction coefficients in their analyses of Indian and Pakistani arms spending. Ward and Mahajan (1984) conclude that India is not responsive to changes in its rival's military expenditures. Majeski and Jones (1981) discover that Indian and Pakistani military expenditures are best represented by moving average models not Richardsonian models and find no relationship between the states' arms spending. It appears that "factors internal [i.e., technology, cost constraints, fatigue] to each nation play a comparably greater role than does the basic action-reaction factor" (Hollist, 1977:338).

Other studies have reached different conclusions. Majeski (1985) discovers that Pakistan develops expectations of India's current military expenditures and factors this into its own spending decisions. India, on the other hand, does not respond to Pakistani spending (Majeski, 1985:237). By contrast, Ferejohn (1976) concludes that India reacts positively to increases in Pakistani spending. Taking a slightly different approach, Freeman (1983) finds that past values of Indian spending influence Pakistani spending, and concludes that Indian behavior fuels the conflict between the two rivals. Freeman, Kellstadt, and Williams (1996) reanalyzed Free- man's (1983) study and found similar qualitative results. Rather than focus solely on the short-term interactions of these states, I conceptualize the short-term behavior of these rivals in the context of the long-term equilibrium that sustains their rivalry. This conception of foreign policy behavior among these rivals has implications for conflict resolution and confidence-building not only in South Asia, but in other regions as well.

Short-Term Interactions and Long-Term Memories In the analysis of foreign policy interactions as in the arms race literature, many studies examine superpower and regional power relations through reciprocity. In doing so, many scholars examine the diplomacy, bargaining, and negotiation behavior of states. Evidence of action-reaction processes is found primarily among regional rivals in the Middle East or in South Asia rather than between the U.S. and the Soviet Union (Ward, 1984:247). This highlights an important point about the nature of reciprocity in foreign policy behavior. Is reciprocity a short-term phenomenon that is best explained by daily vigilance and tit-for-tat behavior, or is it a long-term, more diffuse phenomenon that represents a norm of behavior between rival states? Most existing research examines reciprocity as a short-term phenomenon and uses Richardsonian arms race models to examine foreign policy behavior. However, there is merit in conceptualizing reciprocity in a more long-term manner. The works of Axelrod (1984, 1986), Axelrod and Keohane (1985), and Goldstein (1995) provide a framework for understanding various interactions between states in the context of iterated games such as the prisoner's dilemma. Axelrod finds that daily vigilance is important in a tit-for-tat world of international politics. Daily vigilance facilitates cooperation between self-interested actors, and has an evolutionary impact on the emergence of cooperative norms between adversaries. Reci- procity regulates conflict by establishing a norm of behavior over time, playing an important role- in the short-term, day-to-day interactions between states and in the longer-term relations between these actors (Keohane, 1986; Rajmaira and Ward, 1990; Ward and Rajmaira, 1992).

There are two factors that are likely to shape the frame of reference in which foreign policy is formulated and implemented. First, is asymmetry. India is larger in terms of both population and territory and has more military might, as measured



SHEEN RAJMAIRA 549

in manpower and technology, than Pakistan. Thus, the foreign policy behavior these rivals exhibit toward each other may not be symmetric. As the more powerful country, India may be reluctant to decrease conflict or to cooperate with a weaker Pakistan. A weaker Pakistan, however, may be willing to reduce conflict with India, but may not be willing to increase cooperation particularly in the context of their established rivalry. Second, as regional rivals, the foreign policy agendas of India and Pakistan are not as great in scope as would be superpower agendas. Indian and Pakistani leaders seldom concern themselves with the international repercussions of their bilateral foreign policies; primarily, they are concerned with the impact of their bilateral relations in the South Asian region. I Their intense rivalry and conflict has culminated in three wars since their independence from Britain in 1947. India and Pakistan are at the center of each other's foreign policies and "official relations [between India and Pakistan] are based on a permanent state of paranoia and a zero-sum mentality" (Thakur, 1992:168). This paranoia is a manifestation of the immediate danger both sides perceive from the other, and is augmented both by ideological and religious differences and by the disputed territory of Kashmir. It is this perception of an immediate threat coupled with sustained hostility that shapes the day-to-day interactions of the two rivals.

While it is evident that rival countries often respond to each other's foreign policies, it is not clear that this response is always immediate. Certain critical issues in foreign policy persist over several months or even years, as there are "many foreign policy actions that are purportedly 'reactive' and 'proportional' that occur outside of the week-to-a-month time scale preferred by many analysts" (Rajmaira and Ward, 1990:459). The Indo-Pakistani case is no exception, and the Kashmir issue is a case in point. In 1990 Pakistan carried out a military exercise dubbed Zerb-e-Momin ("the believers' counterpunch") in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. This was a direct response to India's major military exercise "Brass Tacks" which occurred in the fall of 1986, nearly four years earlier. The intent "was to deliver a clear message to India: If attacked, Pakistan still possessed the military strength to deliver a blow to India" (Burki, 1991:195). This example of the loose coupling (or linking) of actions and reactions over a long period of time suggests that the foreign policy relations of India and Pakistan are shaped by a long-term memory. This is consonant with what is known about Indo-Pakistani bilateral relations; Indian and Pakistani foreign policy behaviors are "long-memoried" and are characterized by both short and long-run dynamics.2 That is, the short-term, day-to-day policies of India and Pakistan are made within the context of the long-term norm of behavior that exists between the two rivals. For over forty years this norm, or equilibrium level of behavior, has been characterized by high levels of sustained hostility punctuated by an intense ideological, religious, and political rivalry. This underlying norm provides the context for day-to-day foreign policy behavior; the short-run adjustments of foreign policy behavior occur within this context.

It is expected that the foreign policy behavior of these rivals move together or trend together rather closely over time. Between these variables an equilibrium exists; this state is one "in which there is no inherent tendency to change" (Banerjee, Dolado, Galbraith, and Hendry, 1993:2) and it represents the "expected" but not constant, level of conflict (or cooperation) that each state anticipates from the other. Indian and Pakistani behavior is attracted to a long-run equilibrium to which the system converges over time (Banerjee et al., 1993:2), and it fluctuates around a

I This is not to say that these countries are never concerned with the role they play in world politics. My point here is that in their bilateral relations, India and Pakistan are seeking primarily to maximize their security vis-a-vis each other; this has resulted in relatively myopic foreign policies on both sides. See Thakur (1992).

2 Beck (1993:238) defines a process as "long-memoried" if "predictions about the distant future of the process are dependent on the current value of that process." See also Smith (1993) on this point.




"moving equilibrium" (Smith, 1993; see also Ostrom and Smith, 1993). As Indian conflict toward Pakistan changes, this alters the "environment" of Indo-Pakistani relations thus altering the appropriate level of Pakistani conflict toward India. In short, foreign policy behavior is not at rest but is a moving equilibrium that is reached whenever levels of conflict or cooperation are altered by either side. Indian and Pakistani foreign policy behavior will not drift far from each other; they are coupled (Durr, 1993a; Ostrom and Smith, 1993), interdependent, and mutually responsive.

Empirical Analysis

Data

The data utilized in this analysis are event data that measure the bilateral political, diplomatic, and military interactions of both India and Pakistan. The events were taken from the Daily Reports of the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS).3 While existing event data sets such as the World Event-Interaction Survey (WEIS) or the Conflict and Peace Databank (COPDAB) are a good source for data on Great Power interactions, the paucity of events implies that they are a less than ideal choice for the study of Indo-Pakistani relations. While FBIS has a coverage bias-it monitors mostly areas of strategic importance to the United States-these Daily Reports provide a rich yet often underutilized source for events (Schrodt, 1993:134). The events are scaled according to event type and affective content, cooperation or conflict,4 with 15 representing the most conflictual event, all-out war, and 1 representing the most cooperative event, unification into one state (Azar and Sloan, 1975).5 Next, these actions are weighted based on their intensity according to the method developed by Azar and Sloan (1975) and aggregated into monthly conflict and cooperation time series.6 A net cooperation series is created by subtracting the conflict series from the cooperation series. Thus, there are six variables (Indian conflict, Pakistani conflict, Indian cooperation, Pakistani cooperation, Indian net cooperation, and Pakistani net cooperation) and 132 cases from 1980 to 1990 (12 months for 11 years).

The graphs of the conflict, cooperation, and net cooperation data series are presented in Figures 1, 2, and 3, respectively. In these figures, Indian and Pakistani foreign policy behavior track together well, never drifting too far from each other. As they trend together, both the conflict and cooperation series do not return to a constant level of behavior, rather the series move together, attracted to each other. Conflict behavior (Figure 1) corresponds nicely to what is known about Indo-Paki- stani bilateral relations. First, Indian levels of conflict are usually higher than those

3 FBIS is a composition of texts of foreign reports, newspaper stories, broadcasts, speeches of world leaders, and the like, that are monitored by the Central Intelligence Agency.

4 Related to problems of bias is the issue of inter-coder reliability. Based upon a random sample of the data, a test of inter-coder reliability of the data used here indicates the data were highly reliable. Reliability was assessed by calculating Cronbach's oc, the most widely used measure of reliability. Cronbach's oc is based on the inter-item correlation and is bound by 0 and 1 and where, as a rule of thumb, researchers strive for an oc > .70 (see Carmines and Zeller, 1979:44-8). Calculation of the oc yielded a score of .94.

5 Categories 15 through 9 correspond to conflictual events, while categories 7 through 1 correspond to cooperative events. Events of COPDAB category 8 (no comment, neutral statements) were excluded.

6 The appropriate aggregation unit for event data is in dispute (Freeman, 1990; Goldstein, 1991; McClelland, 1983). The annual aggregations used by most studies risk overaggregation, and may cloud statistical and substantive inferences (Freeman, 1990). Nevertheless, only through theoretical guidance is it possible to determine the appropriate temporal aggregation. The monthly aggregation used here allows us to probe the long-term nature of reciprocity with little danger of the problems of overaggregation.



SHEEN RAJMAIRA 551

of its rival Pakistan. Second, there is a trend of increasing conflict for both series over the data period, culminating in late 1989-early 1990 with the beginning of a powerful, armed Muslim uprising in Indian-held Kashmir. The coupling of behavior is also evident in the cooperative relations of these two states (Figure 2). Pakistan exhibits somewhat higher levels of cooperation than does India. The very large increase in cooperation that emerges in late-1986 and early-1987 stems from the flurry of diplomatic activity that occurred as India and Pakistan sought to reduce border tensions following the rapid escalation of hostilities which occurred with Brass Tacks in late fall of 1986. During this time, the two countries also held several discussions on monitoring and curbing illegal border crossings and reducing drug trafficking and smuggling. In addition to examining conflict and cooperation as distinct types of foreign policy behavior, these variables were rescaled into a single net cooperation variable. Figure 3 displays the net cooperation series for the two countries, reinforcing the findings in Figures 1 and 2. Corresponding to Figure 1, India exhibits larger troughs in net cooperation than does Pakistan. This figure depicts a substantial decrease in the level of net cooperation for both states following flare-ups in Kashmir in 1986, 1988, and 1990.

Nonstationarity

The cointegration of two series means that the linear combination of these two integrated series produces a series that is stationary, or invariant with respect to time. If it is determined that two integrated series are cointegrated, this suggests (1) the,existence of an equilibrium between the two series, and (2) that the two series trend together over time. Deviations from this underlying equilibrium of expected behavior reveal the nature of reciprocity in foreign policy behavior. If a shock disturbs the moving equilibrium by forcing the series further apart (or closer

700

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200-

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80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

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FIG. 1. Indian and Pakistani conflict, 1980-1990.




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SHEEN RAJMARA 553

together) than what is expected, then this error is corrected over the long run as the interdependent process seeks a new level consistent with equilibrium state (Durr, 1993a: 186). This error correctzon process reveals the dynamics of short-run adjustments in the context of the long-run equilibrium (Baghestani and Mott, 1991) and reciprocity is captured in the foreign policy adjustments to deviations from the norms of expected behavior between rivals.

A series that is integrated is one in which the sum of past contributions is the source of the process that generates the series (Banerjee et al., 1993:39). Specifically, it is said that the series is integrated of order d, or I(d), meaning that it needs to be differenced d times in order to produce a stationary series.7 The Dickey-Fuller (DF) or Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests allow one to determine whether a series is I(1), which is a test for a unit root (Kennedy, 1992:253). The issue at hand is how to illustrate that the two series, X and Y, are variant with respect to time (i.e., nonstationary). Typically, this is tested by employing DF or ADF tests which test for a unit root, that is if a series is I(1). While these unit root tests do have limitations, they remain the most widely employed tests for determining the nonstationarity of time series.8

For the Indian and Pakistani foreign policy behavior series, the following ADF model was estimated.

Ayt = 0x + PIT + P2yt-1 + P3AYt-I + *-- + 15AYt-12 + et (1)

where T is the time trend.9 The test for a unit root is a test on the coefficient ofyt-i, 32. If this coefficient is significantly different from zero, the hypothesis that y contains a unit root is rejected and the hypothesis is accepted that y is stationary. Greene (1993:564-6) presents a slightly different procedure for analyzing an ADF model with a time trend. In the above model, for example, the test for a unit root is carried out by testing thejoint hypothesis that 1i = 12 = 0 through the calculation of an F-test.10 Again, if these coefficients are significantly different from zero, the hypothesis that y contains a unit root is rejected. The results of these tests are displayed in Table 1. As indicated, both the t-test on the coefficient of yt-1 and the F-test conducted on the six series allow acceptance of the null hypothesis of a unit root (p < .05) for all the series except Indian conflict to Pakistan. These results lead us to conclude that five of the six series, with the exception of Indian conflict, are nonstationary.l

Methods

The cointegration and error correction methodology consists of three regression equations that are fit with ordinary least squares beginning with equation (1), the cointegrating regression. First, one determines if there is an equilibrium level of

7 This is typically what is considered a nonstationary series, although this is different than a nonstationary series, i.e., one that has a changing mean or variance.

8 Excellent treatments of the problems associated with the DF and ADF tests can be found in Cromwell, Labys, and TeiTaza (1994:10-9), Greene (1993:549-70),Ostrom and Smith (1993:177-81), and Williams (1993). However, there seems to be a general agreement that these tests tend to be biased toward finding a unit root.

9 MacKinnon (1991) suggests including a time trend in the DF regression when there is significant drift in a series, as is the case for all series in the model. See also Ostrom and Smith (1993).

10 This F-statistic differs from the conventional F; critical values are found in Dickey and Fuller (1981) and Greene (1993).

11 A growing debate surrounds the appropriate properties of time series data that are necessary for conducting cointegration and error correction analysis. The logic of cointegration analysis maintains that two nonstationary series form a linear combination which is stationary, but whether the prerequisite of nonstationarity is a valid one is receiving much attention in the literature (see Banerjee et al., 1993; Beck, 1993; Durr, 1 993b).




foreign policy behavior (conflictual or cooperative) between India and Pakistan. Let two series Xt and Yt represent Indian conflict to Pakistan and Pakistani conflict to India, respectively. The resulting cointegrating regressions regress each series on the other plus a constant.

Xt = ?X1 + Clyt + Ut (2)

Yt = ?C2 C2Xt + Vt (3)

When ut and vt are 0, X and Y can be assumed to be in equilibrium (Durr, 1993a). In addition, ut and vt measure the deviation of Xt and Yt, respectively, from the equilibrium, and represent the errors that are corrected in the long run. Hence, ut and vt capture the long-run relationship between the two variables, X and Y. Following Engle and Yoo (1987), I employ the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to test for the cointegration of the series. The ADF methodology is represented below.

Aut = -alut-l + a2Aut-I + * + ak+lAut-k + eut (4)

Avt = -blvt-l + b2Avti1 + . + bk+lAvt-k +Jfvt (5)

Note that ut and vt are the error terms from equations (1) and (2) above and k represents the number of lags. If the t-statistics for al and b 1 are significant, the null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected. In other words, there is a long-run equilibrium that exists between the two series; over time these series will not drift far from each other.

The next step is to examine the deviations or fluctuations of foreign policy behavior from this base, equilibrium level. Short-run changes or adjustments may cause these series to drift slightly, but they are brought back in line so that foreign policy behavior continues to meet the expectations of the moving equilibrium. This occurs through an error correction mechanism12 that takes into account the errors in such a way that short-run changes are incorporated into the long-run properties of the system (Baghestani and Mott, 1991). The importance of the error correction model is that it focuses on change; short-run dynamics are included in the long-run

TABLE 1. Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests for Unit Root

India Pakistan Net Net

Conflict Cooperation Cooperation Conflict Cooperation Cooperation

yt_, a _4.07*** -2.94 -3.22* -2.71 -2.70 -2.07

Fb 8.34** 4.35 5.33 3.94 3.66 1.25

N= 119. aCritical values for the coefficient of y,_i are from MacKinnon (1991), where Ho: P2 = 0, i.e., the exist- enice of a unit root bCritical values for the F-test are from Dickey and Fuller (1981) and Greene (1993), where Ho: B1 = 82 = 0, i.e., the existence of a unit root *p < .10; **p < .05; ***p < .01

12 Given the endogeneity of Indian and Pakistani behavior, exogenous variables are not included in the model. See Kennedy (1992:259) on the issue of general specification of cointegration models.



SHEEN RAJMAIRA 555

processes. The model seeks to uncover the long-run process of change in the relationship of the series.

Axt = C3 + Alut-I + A2AxtI + + Ak+lAxt-k + Ak+2Ayt-1 + ... + A2k+lAyt-k + ext (6)

Ayt = C4 + Blvt-l + B2Ayt_I + ... + Bk+lAyt-k + Bk+2Axt-1 + + B2k+lAxt-k + eyt (7)

Of primary interest are the fluctuations, both increases and decreases, of conflictual and cooperative foreign policy behavior and the implications these fluctuations have for Indo-Pakistani relations. In each case the error correction coefficients Al and Bj (from equations (5) and (6) above) must be negative and lie in the interval (-1, 0), indicating that X and Y will respond negatively to the error introduced in the system, ut-l and vt-l, respectively, in an effort to reestablish equilibrium (Durr, 1993a: 194). Consider equation (1) above. If the shock to series Yis positive indicating a negative value for ut-i, then a negative Al implies that X will adjust upward in order to reestablish equilibrium at a new level. Similarly a positive ut-i implies that series X is already too high and a negativeAi means X should adjust downward in order to reestablish equilibrium (Durr, 1993a: 194). A positive error correction coefficient Al or Bi implies there is no equilibrium and in fact indicates "error propagation" because X and Y are unwilling to adjust behavior to correct for the errors, ut-i or vt-i, that have been introduced into the system. In short, error correction behavior requires statistically significant and negative coefficients, Ai and Bi (Durr, 1993a).

Results The results of the cointegration and error correction analysis are presented in Table 2.13 The null hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected when the t-test for al

TABLE 2. Long-Term Reciprocity in Foreign Policy Behavior

India Pakistan Error Error

Cointegration Correction Cointegration Correction N

Conflict -.62** -.54** -.78** -.80** 120 (-3.21) (-1.79) (-3.42) (-1.96)

Cooperation -.99** -1.47** -.89** -.51 127 (-4.98) (-2.19) (-4.96) (-.83)

Net cooperation -.56** -.61** -.69*** -.69** 124 (-3.60) (-2.12) (-3.78) (-1.98)

Values in parentheses are t-statistics. The models include 10 lags for conflict, 4 for cooperation, and 7 for net cooperation. Critical values for the ADF test for cointegration are taken from Engle and Granger (1987), whereas critical values of the standard t-distribution are used for the error correction model. Critical values are 2.84, 3.17, and 3.77 for the cointegration model and 1.66, 1.98, and 2.62 for the error correction model, for x = .10, x = .05, and x = .01, respectively. *P < .10; **P < .05; ***P < .01

13 The columns labeled "Cointegration" present the coefficients and t-statistics for al and bl from the ADF cointegration analysis (equations [3] and [4]), while the "Error Correction" columns present the coefficient and t-statistics forAi and B1 from the error correction model (equations [5] and [6]).




and bi (from equations [3] and [4] above) is greater than the value of the critical t-statistic listed at the bottom of each table; these statistics are represented in the column labeled "cointegration." The coefficients and t-statistics forAi and Bi (from equations [5] and [6] above) are presented in the column labeled "error correction" and indicate whether there is an error correction process at work. After testing for up to 12 lags for each variable, the results displayed in Table 2 present the models that performed the best, at 10, 4, and 7 lags for conflict, cooperation, and net cooperation, respectively.

For Indian and Pakistani conflict behavior, the cointegration test is significant at a 1 0-month lag indicating that both states formulate their foreign policy toward one another in the context of the previous 10 months of relations, thus suggesting a rather long-memoried process. While there are short-term actions and reactions (e.g., mobilization of troops along the line of control in Kashmir), these short-term policies are being formulated in the context of longer-term (previous 10 months) foreign policy relations. If, for example, India receives conflictual foreign policy behavior that deviates from the level of conflict behavior it expects from Pakistan, the error correction mechanism indicates whether India adjusts (cQrrects) its conflictual foreign policy behavior in response to behavior it received from Pakistan and the rate at which this adjustment occurs. Assume, for example, that Pakistan exhibits conflictual foreign policy behavior toward India that deviates from India's expecta- tion. According to the results presented in Table 2, the coefficient of .54 means that this equilibrium error is corrected by India at a rate of 54 percent per period (month) so that its behavior falls back in line with that of Pakistan and establishes a new equilibrium level of foreign policy behavior (Durr, 1993a: 186). If there is a "shock" (a sudden increase or decrease in Pakistani conflict behavior toward India) to the system in period t-10, for Indian conflict behavior, 54 percent of the initial disequilibrium remains at t-9, 29.2 percent remains at t-8, 15.8 percent at t-7, and so forth. A similar dynamic exists in the Pakistani case; an error correction coefficient of .80 means that Pakistan corrects for any disequilibrium (from a "shock" on the Indian side) in its bilateral relations with India at a rate of 80 percent per month.

While the cointegration analysis indicates that Indian and Pakistani cooperative behavior shares a common trend, the error correction results from cooperative behavior suggest a growing disequilibrium results from shocks to the system. For instance, at t-4, the error correction coefficient for India is 1.47, suggesting that any disequilibrium is adjusted at the rate of 147 percent per month. This implies that for a shock that occurred at t-4, 147 percent of the initial disequilibrium remains at t-3, 216 percent at t-2, 317.6 percent at t-1, etc. Thus while India does respond to shocks (increases or decreases) in Pakistani cooperative behavior by adjusting its behavior, it does not endeavor to bring Pakistani behavior back in line with the expected equilibrium. Instead, India amplifies the disequilibrium in cooperative foreign policy; India is not willing to alter its cooperative foreign policy to maintain equilibrium with the long-run dynamics of Pakistani cooperative foreign policy. Similarly for Pakistan, no error correction coefficients are significant; Pakistani behavior is not shaped by changes in Indian cooperative behavior since Pakistan does not respond to Indian cooperation at all.

The net cooperation results may link the disparate results of conflictual and cooperative foreign policy behavior.14 For both rivals, the cointegration analysis

14 States may condition future cooperation on the attenuation of conflict, and perhaps it is the case that examining coniflict and cooperation separately misses the relationship between these types of foreign policy behavior. However, simple correlational analysis of the Indo-Pakistani foreign policy behavior series does not support this notion. Indian conflict and cooperation have a correlation of-.05 (p = .58) while Pakistani conflict and cooperation have a correlation



SHEEN RAJMAJRA 557

indicates that Indian and Pakistani net cooperation share a common trend and that both states formulate policy toward each other in the context of the previous seven months of relations. In addition to this long-term trending of Indo-Pakistan net cooperation, each country adjusts its behavior in response to the behavior it receives from the other. These error correction coefficients are also significant at seven months for both India and Pakistan. Interpretations about the rate at which the disequilibrium in conflictual behavior is corrected are as follows: the rate at which Pakistan corrects for any shocks related to net cooperative behavior is higher than the rate at which India corrects for shocks to net cooperative behavior. In short, these results indicate that India and Pakistan do correct for errors in each other's net cooperative behavior.

Let us consider the substantive implications of these results. The rate at which Pakistan corrects for any shock related to conflict behavior is generally higher than the rate at which India corrects for Pakistani shocks to conflict behavior. Pakistan is more willing to alter the equilibrium and reestablish a new level of expected behavior by moving more quickly to alter its conflict behavior, while India appears to take things slower in terms of recalibrating conflictual foreign policy behavior. As the more powerful nation, India is not motivated to move too quickly to reestablish a new equilibrium in its conflictual relations with Pakistan. As the less powerful nation, Pakistan is quicker to respond seeking to reduce the disequilibrium at a faster rate. In the case of cooperative behavior, India adjusts its behavior in response to changes in Pakistani cooperation after four months, seeking not to reestablish equilibrium but rather to augment the disequilibrium. Pakistan, however, does not respond to changes in Indian cooperative behavior at all. The conflict and cooperation results in Table 2 indicate that the error correction model is applicable only to bilateral conflictual foreign policy behavior between India and Pakistan but not for cooperative relations. It appears that India and Pakistan treat conflict and cooperation as relatively distinct types of foreign policy behavior.

Summary and Conclusions This paper examined the bilateral relations of two important regional rivals, India and Pakistan, by analyzing short-term foreign policy interactions in the context of a long-run relationship that is shaped by the ongoing rivalry between the two states. Much of the extant research on foreign policy behavior has focused on (1) superpower relations and (2) the short-term, tit-for-tat relations between rivals. This analysis of the Indo-Pakistani case provides a more nuanced understanding of the foreign policy interactions of two increasingly important actors in the post-Cold War world. It provides a new approach with which to conceptualize reciprocity in Indo-Pakistani foreign policy relations. In particular, the results shed some light on the longer-term relationship between Indian and Pakistani conflict and cooperation suggesting that short-term, tit-for-tat reciprocity occurs within the context of a more diffuse, longer-term framework.

The results have important implications. First, these results lend support to the utility of analyzing reciprocity in terms of its long-term properties as suggested by Axelrod (1984, 1986) and put forth by Rajmaira and Ward (1990) and Ward and Rajmaira (1992). As researchers shift their focus to regional rivalries in the post-Cold War world, this approach to the study of reciprocity is strengthened by

of -.01 (p = .95). In addition, Indian net cooperation is coi-related strongly with Indian conflict (-.93, p = .00) while it is correlated moderately but significantly with Indian cooperation (.42, p = .00). Similarly, Pakistani net cooperation is colTelated with Pakistani conflict and cooperation with values of -.83 (p = .00) and .56 (p = .00), respectively. Thus, net cooperation variables are not captu ring anything different than the conflictual relations between the two states.



558 IJdo-Pakistani Relations

the insights it provides into the Indo-Pakistani case, a case that is vastly different in cultural, historical, and geographical context than the U.S.-Soviet case. Second, this long-term manifestation of reciprocity necessitates a reconceptualization of the foreign policy dynamics between regional rivals such as India and Pakistan. Indian and Pakistani treatinent of conflict and cooperation as distinct types of foreign policy behavior suggests that efforts to link cooperative initiatives with conflict reduction may be unsuccessful. This is underscored by the unwillingness of Pakistan to respond to the changes in cooperative foreign policy behavior it receives from India while India responds by worsening the disequilibrium in cooperative relations.

On the other hand, this separation of conflict and cooperation implies that India and Pakistan can begin to cooperate on issues of less consequence than Kashmir. Agreements on cultural exchange of music or movies may spill over into further talks on water rights, drug trafficking, or smuggling, for instance, all occurring, however, in the context of continued conflict over enduring issues such as Kashmir. Although there will be short-term shocks that alter day-to-day relations, these day-to-day policies of India and Pakistan will be made within the context of the longer-term conflict equilibrium that exists between the two rivals. This underlying level of behavior continues to be characterized by high levels of enduring hostility, an ongoing rivalry, and limited cooperation. While there is short-term cooperation between the two rivals (i.e., meetings of government officials, official cultural exchanges, limited agreements on technological and economic matters, etc.), as of yet, there is no evidence of sustained, long-term cooperation between India and Pakistan. Both countries conceive of cooperative behavior primarily in the short term; cooperation is viewed as a short-term phenomenon which has little long-term, evolutionary impact. This suggests a potentially dangerous dynamic in Indo-Paki- stani bilateral foreign policy relations; a dynamic in which the memory of conflict is long-term, while the memory of cooperation is short. This focus on conflict coupled with the legacy of suspicions between the two rivals makes the region appear ripe for future confrontation. An extreme sensitivity to conflict coupled with the relative inattentiveness to cooperation might fuel a rapid and unpredictable escalation of conflict between the two rivals.

There are two factors which may be important in the future of Indo-Pakistani relations. The first of these is China and its relations with both India and Pakistan. Sino-Indian relations have been historically tense. Sino-Pakistani relations, on the other hand, have been friendly as exemplified by reports of the Chinese sale of nuclear materials and technology to Pakistan in recent years. In considering security in the region, therefore, it is important to consider the role China plays in Indo-Pakistani relations (Rajmaira, 1997). Second, efforts to expand confidence- building measures (CBMs) may also play an important role in South Asian security and stability. Whlile CBMs have not been absent in Indo-Pakistani relations, they have been few and far between.

The development of CBMs is likely to be affected by several factors. First is the stability of democracy in Pakistan. The rapid regime changes that have plagued Pakistan since its inception in 1947 continue to influence the Indo-Pakistani relations. Existing Indian threat perceptions are exacerbated by fears of another military regime coming into power in Pakistan. However, it is also possible that the consolidation of democracy in Pakistan will establish the conditions for continued conflict with India. In an effort to maintain his political support, Nawaz Sharif may be compelled to continue to pursue hard-line policies in Pakistan's bilateral relationship with India, thus reducing possibilities for the development of long-term cooperation. Second, the ethnic and separatist movements within both countries augment the paranoia of both sides, as each struggles to shore up its military defenses to protect against internal and external threats to security. Third, and most important, is Kashmir. A resolution of the Indo-Pakistani conflict is impossible



SHEEN RAJMAIRA 559

without addressing the outstanding issue of Kashmir. The problem has grown more intractable over the years as both sides have become entrenched in their positions fueled in large part by the increase of religious fundamentalism in both countries and the end of the Cold War. Nevertheless, CBMs may work to develop a long-term memory for cooperative behavior between these two rivals, in which case long-term conflict resolution could take root. Given the volatility of the region and the predisposition to conflict, it appears that hopes for reduced conflict and sustained cooperation, however limited, are linked to the development of sustained CBMs between the two rivals and the role China chooses to play in the ongoing rivalry between India and Pakistan.

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indo-pakistani relations: reciprocity in long-term perspective

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