india today and tomorrow
TRANSCRIPT
India Today and TomorrowAuthor(s): John CoatmanSource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Jan., 1940), pp. 314-323Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20029001 .
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INDIA TODAY AND TOMORROW
By John Coatman
THE outbreak of war caught India already moving rapidly toward a political crisis. The scheme for an All-India Fed
eration, after having been before the Indian public since
1930, had been formally embodied in a statute since 1935. By the summer of 1939, however, the prospects of Federation had all but vanished under the combined opposition of the Princes, the
Moslems and other minority communities. Then in September an even more fateful problem
? that of India's status in the British Commonwealth of Nations ? arose. For the All-India National Congress, the most powerful political movement in the
country, has declared that it can give whole-hearted support to Britain only after India has become a full-fledged democracy, taking her place in the Commonwealth on exactly the same terms as Canada, Australia, New Zealand or South Africa.
This demand is not a mere attempt to trade on Britain's present troubles. The Congress leaders of course fully appreciate the
strength of their unique bargaining position; but they are in full
sympathy with Great Britain's aims in this war as defined by Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Halifax. They would rather help than embarrass Britain and it is
noteworthy that they are not demand
ing the severance of the connection between Great Britain and India. There is no talk of fighting for independence. Put in a nut
shell, what the Congress leaders are saying is this: "You are
fighting for democracy and for all the spiritual and political liberty which that word implies. The Government of India is not yet a
fully democratic government and, although the people of India
sympathize with you in your present struggle, it is not possible for them to release their immense physical and moral power unless
they feel that they are fighting to safeguard something which they themselves possess and dearly prize."
There can be no doubt that sympathy with the British and French cause and a desire to help are very widespread in India, and that this is a factor which Congress dare not ignore. More
over, Mr. Gandhi himself is not inclined to make political capital out of Britain's present preoccupations. It is quite certain that
large numbers of Indians wish to help the British Government at this crisis, and that only a small minority wants to oppose it
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INDIA TODAY AND TOMORROW 315
actively. The Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, has been busy during the last few weeks interviewing the representative leaders of all shades of organized Indian opinion. From all that we can hear, these meetings have been cordial and frank, and there can be little doubt that Indian opinion is now more friendly towards the British Government than at any time since 1919.
What has been the British response to this demand from the All-India National Congress
? a demand, be it noted, which is not supported by any other organized political interests in India? In a White Paper published at Delhi on October 18 Lord Lin
lithgow stated that no major constitutional development could take place in India during the war. In taking this view he was
supported by Lord Zetland, Secretary of State for India. The
Viceroy did, however, promise that there would be full consulta tion with all sections of Indian opinion after the war, if this should be found necessary and desirable, and that in the mean time he was arranging for a consultative body representative of Indian opinion generally to be associated with him during the war.
This announcement has not satisfied Congress. Mr. Gandhi has described it as profoundly disappointing, while Pandit
Jawaharlal Nehru more forcibly talks about it as spurning the hand of friendship extended by Congress to the British Govern
ment. Mr. Gandhi says that the Viceroy's statement simply shows that the old policy of divide and rule is to continue. The
Working Committee of Congress followed these words by de
manding that the governments in those provinces where the Con
gress Party was in power should resign. Accordingly, the minis tries have resigned in Madras, Bombay, Bihar, Orissa, Assam, the Central Provinces, the United Provinces, and the North West
Frontier Province ? some of them, it may be said, very unwill
ingly. No attempt is being made to form alternative govern ments, and the administration is being carried on by officials, as is
provided by the Government of India Act of 1935. However, anxious efforts to reach an agreement are still being made on both
sides; already it is clear that Mr. Gandhi does not wish to exploit the situation by calling on Congress to practice civil disobedience.
Another encouragement may be gained from the debate on India in the House of Commons on October 26. Mr. Wedgwood Benn, speaking for the Labour Party, asked for a clear answer to
Mr. Gandhi's questions about British war aims and India's share in the freedom for which the British Empire was fighting. Sir
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3i6 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Samuel Hoare, replying for the Government, stated unequivo
cally that full Dominion status for India was the aim of British
policy, and that the Viceroy desired to take Indian political leaders fully into his confidence. The effect of this declaration in India has been definitely good, and it may be that Lord Linlith
gow's suggestion for a consultative body, mentioned above, may after all prove to be the bridge for an understanding between
Congress and Government.
Actually, the Viceroy's declaration is an important advance towards the Indian Congress position, particularly as regards the
promise to reexamine the whole constitutional position after the war and to form a consultative body, which might develop into a coalition government for the Federation when it is set
up. These things will be perceived by Congress men when the first disappointment of their more ardent hopes has faded. Fur
thermore, the other important sections of Indian opinion ? the
Princes, the Mohammedans, the Moderates and the depressed classes ? will actively resist any attempt to give effect to the
Congress demands. The Congress Party, let it be recalled paren thetically, has no great following in any of the parts of India from
which the bulk of the Indian Army is recruited. Two problems have impeded India's progress towards full
Dominion status: (i) the position of the Indian Princes; and (2) the divergent social, religious and political interests of the Hindu and Moslem communities. The transcendent importance of these
problems presided over the labors of the Round Table Conference held between 1930 and 1932, as well as the subsequent decisions of the joint select committee of Parliament which examined the British Government's Draft Government of India Bill. And today the British Government must give them full weight in its search for a solution to the great question of All-India Federation. The
war will inevitably introduce new conditions and loose new spirit ual forces which will probably transform the basis of Indian
political life. Yet, the one inescapable condition for the creation of an autonomous nation in that vast subcontinent must remain
the attainment of political unity by means of an All-India Federa tion ? and nothing that Congress or the British Government can do or say will alter this fact.
At the outbreak of war the position regarding Federation was
briefly this. The Princes had declared (June 1939) that the terms offered to induce them to enter into the proposed Federation were
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INDIA TODAV AND TOMORROW 317
"fundamentally unsound:" the Mohammedans were in open revolt against the scheme, which they said would subject them to
Hindu domination, while other communities, including the de
pressed classes, were likewise antagonistic. The opposition of the Princes and the Mohammedans seemed particularly intractable
? and for reasons
readily understood.
The great Indian Princes at present enjoy full domestic sov
ereignty, and they naturally hesitate to surrender any material
part of this. For example, they do not want their States overrun
by federal agents, their law courts subordinated to British Indian
courts, or their resources put at the disposal of any external au
thority. Above all, they do not want to have the control over
constitutional reforms in their States taken from their hands or
their relations with their own people influenced from outside. If
they could be certain that their present privileges would always be guaranteed by the British Crown, many of their fears would vanish. But suppose the British Crown is replaced at some future date by an autonomous Indian Government. Could they then be as certain of the sanctity of their rights?
Again, as they look at British India, the Princes see the over
whelming political supremacy of the Congress Party. Of the eleven British Provinces, eight had Congress governments at the outbreak of the war. Now the antagonism between the Con
gress Party and the Indian Princes is bitter and of long standing. As long ago as 1922, Lord Reading had to use the extraordinary powers vested in him as Viceroy to protect the Princes from the flood of vilification constantly directed against them, both as an order and as individuals, from Left Wing quarters in British India. Since the inauguration of the 1935 Act, the Congress
Party has carried on a ceaseless campaign against the Princes and
has intervened directly in State politics by demanding that the Princes undertake political reforms aimed at giving public opinion in their States a decisive voice in government. Congress, of course,
wants these reforms carried out under its supervision. Mr.
Gandhi's personal intervention in the affairs of Rajkot State in March 1939, his threat to fast to death, and the subsequent inter vention of the Viceroy, were the most dramatic and publicized events in this campaign. But in many other States the interven tion of Congress agents has resulted in various forms of disorder.
The population of the Indian States constitutes only about one fifth of the population of India. Thus, even though their represen
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3i8 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
tation in the Federal Legislature and Government is to be
weighted in their favor, they will always be in a definite minor
ity. In the upper house of the Federal Legislature they will have 40 percent of the seats; but in the lower house, which will
inevitably be the more important, they will have only 33 percent. If, therefore, the Princes believe that the Congress Party is des tined to retain its predominant position in British India and to
maintain its antagonistic attitude towards the princely order, they will most likely continue to look askance at Federation.
The opposition of the Mohammedans to Federation is no less formidable than that of the Princes. The Mohammedans are,
of course, in a minority; but as there are nearly 90 millions of
them, their position is very different from that of an ordinary minority. Since the inauguration of provincial autonomy, Mo hammedan opposition to Federation has grown steadily stronger. Put quite simply, the Moslems' position is that Federation will
place them in a status of hopeless inferiority in the Federal Gov ernment vis-?-vis the Hindus, since the great majority of the Indian States are Hindu. Hindu-Moslem antagonism, it must be
admitted, arises primarily from political causes. Mohammedan
spokesmen say that wherever there is a Congress government,
Mohammedans are oppressed because the personnel of the Con
gress Party is almost exclusively Hindu. Their opposition to the
present proposals for Federation has not stopped at words, for there have been outbreaks of rioting during the past few
months.
In weighing the prospects for Federation we must examine the actual working of provincial autonomy
? that part of the 1935 Act which was brought into force in 1937. Under this Act the electoral basis of the provincial legislatures was immensely wid ened as
compared with the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms of
1919, which the present Constitution superseded ? the electorate
was multiplied about fivefold, so that there are now between 35 and 40 million voters in British India. The ministries in the prov inces, which are chosen on the usual parliamentary principle,
now have complete control over all subjects of provincial ad
ministration, subject only to certain special powers vested in the
provincial governors, which until the present crisis were practi cally unused. There is, in fact, a rather striking analogy between the position of a provincial ministry in India and in Canada. On the other hand, the Indian provincial ministry is more independ
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INDIA TODAY AND TOMORROW
ent of its central government than is its counterpart in South Africa. In a word, parliaments and responsible governments were
set up in the eleven provinces of British India. After the general elections in 1937, at which the Congress
Party was returned to power in eight provinces, there was at first some doubt as to whether they would accept the responsibility conferred upon them by the electorate, and a dangerous deadlock threatened for some time. However, these doubts were
eventually
dispelled and "provincial autonomy" started on its career towards the end of that year. Even so, there were still some extreme elements in the Party which announced that, although they were prepared to sit in the provincial legislature and even
join provincial cabinets, they did so only in pursuance of the old
Congress ideal of wrecking the reforms from within. It need
hardly be said that a provincial cabinet containing a sprinkling of
avowed wreckers would not constitute a particularly good ad
ministration, unless the prime minister happened to be a man of
extraordinary force and skill. There were other possible sources of trouble. Practically all the
Congress election manifestoes had contained sweeping promises of social and economic amelioration, and the Congress voters,
having put their men in power, naturally looked to them for an
early fulfillment of these pledges. Further, the Congress Party had long engaged in active, often violent, agitation against the constituted government. It was hard for the rank and file to realize that they themselves had created the new provincial gov ernments, and
they continued to organize anti-government
ac
tivities in various provinces. In some provinces the Congress governments thus had to face riots, strikes and various other outbreaks. Also, many of the Congress ministers took office sus
picious of their governors and of the great imperial services, particularly the Indian Civil Service and the Indian Police, whom hitherto they had regarded as their natural enemies. Though these doubts have not entirely died away, the loyal acceptance of the new conditions by the services has reduced the ministers' sus
picions to a point where they no longer form a serious feature in the political situation.
Side by side with these potential causes of danger were other factors which encouraged a more optimistic view of the future of the new Constitution. From the moment the Congress leaders
began to talk about refusing to take up the power which they had
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320 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
won at the elections, a marked and serious cleavage of opinion arose in their ranks. Some leaders were determined, if necessary, to accept office even in defiance of the orders of Mr. Gandhi and of the Party executive. Similar cleavages took place, one in 1926,
when an influential section of the Party declared openly that it would no longer participate in the policy of wrecking the
Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms from within, and in 1924, when the late Mr. C. R. Das defeated Mr. Gandhi on the question of
entry into the Montagu-Chelmsford legislatures. In short, when ever the Congress Party has been given an opportunity for con structive work and for the exercise of effective political power, there has always been an influential section ready to undertake the work and to use the power. In provinces like Madras and
Bombay these sections were particularly strong, and in certain
other provinces they were strong enough to maintain ministries in
opposition to the governing caucus of the Congress Party. The outstanding fact about the working of the 1935 Act in the
provinces is, then, that it has worked. It had been widely feared that in the all-important field of law and order the new ministries
would come to grief. Some justification for this foreboding was found in February 1938
? almost before the new governments had got into their stride ? when the Congress ministries in Bihar and the United Provinces arranged for the release of prison ers who had been convicted of "political" offences during the
previous r?gime. This was certainly the sort of contingency en
visaged when the provincial governors were given their special
powers. Yet it can easily be seen how dangerous would have been a simple uncompromising refusal by the governors to allow their
prime ministers to have their way. The Working Committee of Congress would have exploited the situation to the full, and in the passions which would have been aroused the nascent Consti
tution might quite conceivably have perished. Happily, the crisis was handled with considerable skill by
the Viceroy. His efforts, it must be acknowledged, were sup ported by the moderation and sense of realities displayed by the
prime ministers in the two provinces and by many of their col
leagues. The two governors were directed by the Viceroy to refuse to agree to a general and indiscriminate release of all political prisoners. Naturally this led their prime ministers to tender their
resignations. But it was obvious that scope was still left for
negotiations. After a short period of anxious consultations it was
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INDIA TODAY AND TOMORROW
agreed that the governors would follow their prime ministers' advice in regard to a number of cases which had already been under examination, and that the cases of all other political prisoners should be examined individually on their merits. In Bengal, too, the ancient problem of political d?tenus, which had already caused as much trouble as any other single question in postwar Indian politics, was brought to an end during 1938 by the release of the men detained. A less severe crisis arose in May 1938 in Orissa, where the Congress Party successfully opposed the appointment of a senior civil servant to act as governor
while the regular governor was on leave. Here again an
unpleasant situation threatened for a time, but the worst was avoided by the obvious desire of all concerned to prevent a breakdown.
In the general field of maintenance of law and order, the Con
gress governments of Bombay and the United Provinces settled strikes at important industrial centers by direct intervention,
while the governments of other provinces have not hesitated to crush violent outbreaks of lawlessness by force. Also, during the two years following the inauguration of the Act every provincial
ministry was able to enact a good deal of valuable social and economic legislation. All of which is a message of good promise for the future even though it does not justify too easy an opti
mism. After all, two years is a short time in which to judge the success of an experiment of such importance and magnitude as this. The most anxious testing time lies ahead ? when the Indian
Princes, and the governments and peoples of the British Prov
inces, definitely face up to the Federation issue. The difficulties arising from the opposition of the Princes and
the antagonism between the Hindus and Moslems will certainly grow no less formidable as time goes on; nor is there at present any prospect of the rise of an effective opposition to Congress in those provinces where it now holds sway. All the elements that threatened deadlock before the war still remain, and very likely
will become even more effective. The present attitude of the
Congress leaders widens the gulf separating them from both the Princes and the majority of the Mohammedans. There are parts of India too where Communism has already made headway, for there are many places where social and economic conditions
provide good soil for the propagation of Communist ideas. As the war continues, India will inevitably be subjected to
many of the economic and social strains affecting all the bellig
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322 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
erent countries. In India some of these strains will become ex
ceptionally great, and the war will undoubtedly necessitate many sweeping changes in all aspects of Indian life. Yet these changes
will by no means be entirely disastrous. The progress of India's internal politics may well be such as to make possible some sort of accommodation between the Congress on one hand and the Princes and Mohammedans on the other. If Mr. Gandhi and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru persist in their recently proclaimed attitude, another split may quite possibly develop in the Con
gress Party. Throughout its career, and particularly during the last two decades, the All-India National Congress has been
steadily supported by important sections of the Indian business and financial world. In other words, it is not at all a proletarian party, and there are good chances that, once its claims have been
met in a way which satisfies every reasonable expectation, Con
gress will in fact become a conservative party. In any case, every development of extremism in the Left Wing
of Congress will only drive the more moderate elements further to the Right
? a process which will be intensified by the indus trial and agrarian unrest to which the war must inevitably give rise. Above all, any appreciable extension of Communist doctrines
among the Indian masses will help push the majority of Congress towards the Right. This development will obviously improve the relations of Congress with the Princes and the Mohammedans.
Federation will then become less difficult.
Economically, too, the effect of the war ought
? on balance ?
to be favorable. India will, of course, be put to considerable ex
pense, but there is no doubt that with the experience of the last war before them, both the British and Indian Governments will arrive at some equitable distribution of the costs between them.
For the rest, India, as an agricultural and
raw-material-producing
country, will naturally benefit enormously from the boom in such products
as wheat, cotton, oil seeds, rubber, jute, manga nese, mica, steel and iron, aluminum, lead and wool
? to name
phly the most obvious ones. The war will also inflict injury on India's economy in various ways. But the immense size of her
population, now nearly 400 millions, ensures that the fighting forces will absorb only a very small percentage of the country's
man power and that there will be no scarcity, or even disorganiza tion, of the labor market. India's war potential on the battlefield is immense: she can raise great armies from some of the finest
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INDIA TODAY AND TOMORROW 323
fighting material in Asia. A highly expert committee is now con
sidering the question of mechanizing the Indian Army, for which
purpose the British Government had set apart substantial sums even before the war. A modernized Indian Army can look after not only India, but British and Allied interests elsewhere in the
Middle and Far East. The list of several of India's leading products recited above gives
an idea of the diversity of the country's resources. A few figures will show the scale on which she can produce some of them. In the
year 1938-39, for example, she produced over i}4 million tons of
pig iron, approximately 1 million tons of steel ingots, and not
quite that amount of finished steel. She manufactured nearly \yi million tons of jute, of which she exported over 955,000 tons. In
the same year she exported over 540,000 tons of cotton and over
15,000 tons of wool. In the previous year she exported over 8,500 tons of raw rubber, over half a million tons of oil seeds, and a large amount of manganese, mica and other mineral products. These
figures, which merely exemplify the scale of India's output, are
capable of expansion ? and of course they will be expanded.
Lastly, India will prove to be an immensely valuable industrial asset to the British Empire. Her factories are already equipped to turn out many kinds of munitions, various types of machinery, railway rolling stock, finished iron and steel goods, manufactured
textiles, chemicals and other items useful in war. For twentyyears India has ranked among the eight greatest industrial countries of the world; yet her industries, mining, transport and trade employ only about 7 percent of her total population. She has thus a tremendous reserve on which she can draw to staff whatever in
dustrial expansion may be necessitated by the war. The iron and
steel industry on the Chota-Nagpur plateau is already of the
highest importance, and may within the next decade or two be come the second, if not actually the first, iron and steel producing region in the world.
To sum up, the Congress demand for full Dominion status does not make any fundamental change in the constitutional situation in India. Congress does not speak for all of India, and the deep
divisions between the various classes and religious communities which we have noted as obstacles to Federation prevent an im mediate and complete compliance with Congress demands.
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