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Independent Muslimrepublics in Central Asia:legacy of the past, shape ofthe futureGregory Gleason aa Professor in the Department of PoliticalSciences , University of Mexico , Alberqurque,New Mexico, USAPublished online: 20 Mar 2007.

To cite this article: Gregory Gleason (1991) Independent Muslim republics inCentral Asia: legacy of the past, shape of the future, Institute of Muslim MinorityAffairs. Journal, 12:2, 355-375, DOI: 10.1080/02666959108716212

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Independent Muslim Republics in Central Asia:Legacy of the Past, Shape of the FutureGregory Gleason

IntroductionAbout ninety-five percent of life is continuity. No doubt this is the most importantpart of life. The past flows naturally and smoothly into the future. Life has meaningand structure because life is as it has been and is, therefore, as it should be. But thereare also moments - the other five percent - when the past becomes disconnectedfrom the future. These are moments when individuals and whole societies findthemselves at a branching of the paths to the future. Naturalness, routine andregularity are overcome by the choice, redefinition and uncertainty. Individuals andwhole societies are forced to look into their past to redefine their most basic valuesand to determine how those values will shape their future. They are compelled toplan their future rather than merely live it.

The Central Asian societies of the former Soviet Union have entered such aphase of life. The accumulated difficulties of the USSR during the 1980s led to aseries of political reforms toward the end of the decade. By the beginning of the1990s, the decline in economic production and the capacities of governmentreached unprecedented proportions. Deteriorating economic circumstances fueledthe arguments of those who saw the central Soviet government as economicallyinefficient and politically corrupt. Nationalist movements in the outlying borderlandrepublics pressed insistently for greater self-determination. By the spring of 1991,the Soviet government in Moscow turned to desperate but unsuccessful measuresto halt the economic decline and placate centrifugal nationalist pressures. Theattempted coup of August 1991 sent a sudden shock wave through the entirepolitical structure of the USSR. In the span of just a few days following the coup,the political centre of gravity fragmented, shifting from the capital in Moscow to thecapitals of the fifteen constituent republics. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,at least in the form in which it had existed for the previous seven decades, ceasedto exist.

The collapse of the USSR took place with a speed and completeness that fewobservers - whether within the USSR or outside of it - had reason to anticipate. Thecollapse initiated what may prove to be one of the most sweeping politicalreconfigurations of this century. The old "rules of the game" suddenly ceased toapply. Political realignment became the consuming issue in all the borderlandregions. The Baltic states quickly assumed a European orientation. Ukraine set

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upon a course of political independence. The far eastern territories began reorientingtoward the communities of the Pacific rim and the societies of Central Asia rapidlyrediscovered the force of the religious, historical and cultural ties with thecommunities to the south.

The collapse of the USSR and the resulting emergence of political independenceof the republics of Central Asia fundamentally transformed the political agenda forthese communities. The societies of Central Asia must now actively choose theirfuture rather than simply live in the shadow of the Great Powers. This is a time ofdecision. It raises crucial questions regarding the legacy of the past. What politicaland economic structures of the Soviet past are likely to prove enduring? Which willexert the greatest influence on the new structures of the future? What politicalfactors inherited from the past will likely influence relations between the independentCentral Asian republics and the countries of the Middle East? What factors willinfluence the new political relationships between the post-Soviet republics to theNorth and the newly independent Central Asian republics? These are the questionsthis paper seeks to answer. The conclusions we reach will lead us to the much morespeculative but also more intriguing question looming on the horizon, namely, whatis the likely shape of the future political community of the Muslim societies ofCentral Asia?

Soviet Federal Reform and the Central Asian RepublicsAccording to formal definitions, the USSR was a "federal system."1 The originallegislation creating the USSR and all the subsequent Soviet constitutions describedthe USSR as a "federal union." Despite these official descriptions, however, theUSSR functioned throughout the years of Soviet power as a centralised, unitarygovernment. To a large extent, the USSR's federal form was a result of historicalaccident. Vladimir Lenin, the architect of the Soviet state, was staunchly opposedto federalism on theoretical grounds. He argued that federal structures had afragmenting effect on the feelings of class solidarity that he saw as critical toadvancement of the international workers movement. But, faced with the prospectof political disintegration in the chaos following the Russian Revolution, Leninaccepted a "tactical compromise."2 In order to win the support of political groupsin the borderland areas, the Bolshevik leaders granted the regional groups recognitionin the form of "national-statehood." They were also offered promises of self-government.

The original federal compromise was formalised in the Union Treaty of 1922that bound the republics together. The Union Treaty was incorporated into the newConstitution when the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was officially formed in1924. The trappings of the federal form of government were retained in both the1936 and 1977 Soviet Constitutions. But few serious observers took the formaldescriptions of republican rights seriously. For instance, the right of each republicto freely secede from the Union, a right guaranteed in all the successive versions of

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the Soviet Constitution (Article 72 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution) was oftenrepeated but never seriously tested.

From the point of view of functional analysis, then, the Soviet system was nota federal system. Functional analysis emphasises five key criteria of a federalsystem. In order for a system to be classified as federal, it must posses: 1) separate,hierarchically arranged political jurisdictions (units), consisting of at least two tiers;2) the responsibility and authority of the particular constituent units must beseparated such that each has final authority for some defined spheres of decisionmaking; 3) the political structures of the separate tiers much possess some degreeof internal complementarity with the social structures of that tier, that is, some claimto representativeness of the society; 4) mechanisms for dispute resolution (typicallya judiciary); and 5) some "residuary rule" which prescribes that undelegatedquestions automatically become the province of one of the tiers. Judged by thesestandards, the USSR was not federal system. However, as a legacy of the original"Leninist tactical compromise," federal tiers having separate administrativejurisdictions were defined.* These are the official dates of entrance into the Union of the republics of CentralAsia. The shape and status of these units changed considerably over the years.Tadzhikistan and Kirgizia were first admitted as autonomous republics.

The Constituent Soviet Muslim Republics of the

Azerbaidzhan

Kazakhstan

Kyrgyzstan

Tadzhikistan

Turmenistan

Uzbekistan

USSR(Prior to Independence)Populationin thousands

16,538

4291

5112

3534

19906

Territory(1000 squarekilometres)

2717

198

143

488

447

Date of

formation*

Dec. 1936

Oct. 1924

Oct. 1924

Oct. 1924

Oct. 1924

Source: NarodnoekhoziaistvoSSSR vl985, pp. 12-17. the 1989populationfigures arefrom Trud (April 30,1989).

Over the years numerous proposals for change in the federal system were advanced.Some proposals sought the inclusion of the states of East Central Europe into theUSSR as constituent republics. Other proposals called for the elimination of the

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republican borders which were said to be "losing significance." 3 Throughout thefirst four years of perestroika, Gorbachev repeatedly urged retaining the federalstructure of the USSR in its existing form, but delegating greater power to theconstituent republics. In an effort to form political constituencies for many of hisdecentralising reforms, however, Gorbachev announced a major political reform atthe 19th conference of the CPSU in June-July, 1988.

After the 19th party conference, the accelerating pace of perestroika encouragedmany supporters of independence movements that the time had come for testing theformal guarantees of the Soviet constitution. On November 16,1988, the legislatureof the Estonian republic adopted changes in the republics's constitution whichreserved for the republic the right to veto all-union legislation passed in Moscow.The new Estonian legislation declared the land, natural resources, industrial plant,banks, and general capital located on the territory of the Estonian republic to beproperty belonging solely to the Estonian republic.4 The executive chamber of theUSSR legislature quickly acted to invalidate the "Estonian Clause."5 But the transitionhad already begun.

The central government offered a succession of plans to satisfy localist sentimentwhile keeping the general idea of the union intact. A "Nationality Platform" of theparty was adopted in September, 1989.6 To mollify local complaints that the economywas excessively centralised, the government offered a plan called the "GeneralPrinciples for Restructuring the Management of the Economy and Social Sphere inthe Union Republics." 7 On April 3, 1990, the "Law on the Order of QuestionsConnected to the Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR" was passed.8 A"Law on the General Principles of Local Self-government and Local Economy inthe USSR" was passed on April 9,1990.9On April 10,1990, the "Law on the BasicEconomic Relations of the Union SSR, Union Republics and Autonomous Republics"was passed.10 But these laws had no discernible effect on the growing economicdeterioration. If anything, the laws provoked public resentment as people began tosee them as little more than bureaucratic maneuvering in the face of an impendingcrisis.

Two events in particular contributed to the centrifugal pressures. One waspopular elections. Elections for the all-union Congress of Peoples Deputies wereheld in March, 1989. Elections to the republican legislatures were held at differentdates, beginning late in 1989 and staggered throughout 1990. u During 1989, thenew popularly elected legislative assemblies of the republics passed new legislationon a language, migration, economic sovereignty, citizenship, and, in a few cases,independence.

A second important event was the split in the Lithuanian Communist Partywhich precipitated the Lithuanian party organisation to formally withdraw from theCPSU in December, 1989. Secessionist movements surged ahead following thedecision of the Lithuanian Party. The withdrawal symbolised the end of partyhegemony in the USSR. Gorbachev's position on the republics changed substantiallyafter the Lithuanian party's withdrawal. Gorbachev adopted the view that the Union

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must be further decentralised but, at the same time, measures had to be taken toprevent secession. He accepted the idea of a new Union Treaty as the chiefinstrument for accomplishing this goal. Reversing his earlier opposition to the ideaof a new union treaty, Gorbachev announced at the February 1990 CPSU Plenumthat it had become necessary to negotiate a new union treaty. n At the same time,Gorbachev countered the Lithuanian attempt to "go it alone" with an economicblockade. But, following the election of Boris Yeltsin to the post of President of theRussian republic - and Yeltsin's suggestion that he was prepared to negotiateindependently with the Lithuanians - the power and authority of the "centre" toexecute the blockade of Lithuania was broken.

In the spring of 1990 a committee was established to draft the new UnionTreaty.13 Anticipating a renegotiation of the basic contract, the republics quicklyformulated their negotiating positions in the form of declarations of sovereignty. Bythe end of 1990, each of the republics had passed legislation on sovereignty. Theprovisions of the declarations varied widely. For instance, the resolution of theRussian republic, adopted on June 11,1990, allowed the centre to retain control ofdefence, state security, aviation, communication, transportation, energy, and space.Other areas of policy belonged to the republic. In contrast, the Ukrainian declaration,adopted on July 15, 1990, went further in asserting the right to establish anindependent Ukrainian militia and security force.

Gorbachev's goal for the Union Treaty was to combine the self-sufficiency,independence and sovereignty of the republics with an effective centre. Hemaintained that the union should be held together by "mutually advantageouseconomic relations in an all-union market." Gorbachev wanted to maintain eightkey policy spheres under the control of the central government: 1) defence and statesecurity; 2) foreign policy, trade, and customs; 3) human rights; 4) a unifiedmonetary policy, prices and standards; 5) energy supplies; 6) transportation; 7)environmental regulation; and 8) scientific and technical progress.14 He underscoredthe importance of maintaining some key all-union economic institutions, inparticular the concept of a "single economic field." 15

The draft of the Union Treaty was approved by the USSR parliament upperhouse, the USSR Supreme Soviet, on December 3,1990, and was introduced intothe lower house, the Congress of People's Deputies, at the December 17, 1990,opening session. Many were not satisfied with the provisions of the Treaty. Latvia'sdelegation refused to attend the Congress. Estonia's delegation attended, butmarched out in protest on the first day. In the face of this opposition, Gorbachevcountered by promoting a new treaty which gave even more responsibility to therepublics. The draft of the treaty was negotiated in the spring of 1991. Ninerepublics agreed to sign the treaty. Since the "centre" - that is, the Moscowgovernment - was also a key player, the agreement was referred to as the "Nine-plus-One" agreement. The treaty itself was dubbed the "Novo-Ogarev" treaty, bearingthe name of Gorbachev's private residence in the outskirts of Moscow.

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The Novo-Ogarev treaty had a number of new and revolutionary provisions. Itmaintained that the concept of "Union property" did not exist. It limited all-unionfunctions to: the Ministry of Defence; the KGB; the Ministry of Internal Affairs;Defence-related industrial sectors; a single energy system; a single system ofcommunication; a single system of transportation; a single cosmic-exploration andresearch system. All other functions, including metallurgy, machine building,industrial equipment production, and agriculture, were to be returned to therepublics. The Novo-Ogarev document was scheduled to be signed on August 20,1991 in Moscow. The August Putsch in Moscow, however, took place on the daybefore the planned signing ceremony. The political situation changed overnightafter the Putsch. The republics became the key actors in the system.

Immediately after the coup attempt, Boris Yeltsin began pressing for aneconomic union on the assumption that the political union was too difficult and toocontentious to negotiate. The announcement of the "High Leaders" of September2, 1991, outlined the following objectives of the new agreement:16

1. To prepare a Treaty of Union of Sovereign States (Dogovorosoiuze suverennykhgosudarstv) in which each state freely determines its participation in union;

2. To appeal to all the republics regardless of their political status to conclude aneconomic union as quickly as possible in the form of a single free economicspace;

3. In the transitional period to:

3a. Create a Soviet of representatives of peoples deputies on the principle of equalrepresentation from the union republics of 20 deputies chosen from the electedpeoples' deputies of the USSR and the republics;

3b Create a Government Co\mcil-Gossovet-(Gosudarstvennyi sovet) to include thePresident of the SSR and high officials of the union republics;

3c. Empower the Gossovet to coordinate the relations among republics;

3d. Create an interrepublic economic committee, with representatives from eachrepublic, for the purpose of economic coordination;

4. To adopt an agreement to retain for collective security a single, unified armedforce and to conduct reforms in the military, KGB, Ministry of Internal Affairs,and the Procuracy,

5. Insist on rigid following of USSR's external treaties;

6. Adopt a declaration affirming the rights of all citizens regardless of ethnicityand nationality;

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7. Ask the UN to accept the republics as members.

The "Announcement" was signed by: the President of USSR (M. Gorbachev); theHighLeaders of the RSFSR (Yeltsin); of Ukraine; of the Belorusskoi SSR; of theRepublic of Uzbekistan; of the Kazakhskoi SSR; of the Azerbaidzhanskoi Republic;of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan; of the Republic of Tadzhikistan; of the Republic ofArmenia; of the Turkmen SSR. But according to reports, no such "Gossovet"appeared to be functioning during the last weeks of September and the early part ofOctober.

Emphasis shifted quickly away from the idea of political union, to the conceptof a minimal economic community. On October 2, 1991, negotiations began inAlma-Ata, at the invitation of the President of Kazakhstan, for the creation of an"Economic Association." The key issues of negotiation were: 1) the currency andbanking system; 2) the management of the existing, centralised economicinfrastructures; 3) the restoration of trade and commercial connections betweenenterprises; 4) improving public attitudes and encouraging work habits and labourdiscipline; and 5) establishing unified external customs arrangements. A series ofserious questions remained in the background. These included: 1) the graduatedintroduction of market prices; 2) the commercialisation of economic relations forenterprises on different republics' territory; 3) the deficits of the republicanbudgets; 4) the social welfare systems; 5) the inadmissibility of interrupting orpreventing transshipment of goods through republican territory; and 6) the republics'share of the USSR foreign debt. The new "Treaty of Economic Association" wassigned in October 18,1991." With the single exception of Azerbaidzhan, all of theCentral Asian Muslim republics singed the agreement.l8 Ukraine later signed thedocument.

With the abandonment of serious prospects for forming a political union, theformer Soviet "constituent" republics assumed the status of "independent" republics.The internal arrangements, consequently, came less to resemble federal arrangementsthan inter-state arrangements. The succeeding three sections of this paper discussthe principal structures, the principal problems, and the likely outcomes, of theCentral Asian community in terms of: 1) the adoption of the independent status ofeach of the republics; 2) relations between the republics and Moscow; 3) relationsamong the newly emergent Muslim republics, and 4) the shape of the new politicalconfiguration in Central Asia.

Political Independence in the Muslim RepublicsWhereas the Baltic States had been pressing insistently for independence for overtwo years, the Central Asian states had been conservatively arguing for continuityand gradual change. Independence came to the Central Asian republics, therefore,from without. Yet once the idea of political independence was thrust upon them, itfound great popularity. For instance, a referendum on independence in Turkmenistanresulted in a vote of 94.1 percent in favour of the declaration of independence." But

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despite this popularity, the difference in the Central Asian declarations ofindependence suggest that separate republics quickly assumed very differentpolitical trajectories. No doubt these differing responses have their roots in the factthat domestic situations of the various republics were quite different. A few factorsstand out as salient in describing those differences. One important issue is the roleof the President in each of the republics. A second issue is the ability of the republicto conduct trade under the circumstances of the decline in Moscow's coordinatingrole. A third issue concerns the institutions of property ownership. A fourth issueis the question of employment in the republic. A fifth issue concerns the republicanmilitia. Finally, a key issue is the way in which the local republic has responded tothe sharp rise of interest in Islam.

Declaration of Sovereignty and Independence of the MuslimRepublics of Central Asia

Sovereignty Independence

Azerbaidzhan September 23,1989 August 30,1991

Kazakhstan December 17,1990

Kyrgyzstan December 15, 1990

Tadzhikistan August 25,1990 October 9,1991

Turkmenistan August 22,1990 October 27, 1991

Uzbekistan June 20,1990 September 1,1991

Following the example set in Moscow, each of the Central Asian republics hadswitched by 1991 from leadership primarily through the party to a "presidentialsystem." The argument in favour of this transition was that it not only empoweredthe leader (President) to deal more effectively with policy challenges, it also madethe leader more responsive to popular will. The Central Asian Presidents haveproved, with one exception, to be extraordinarily popular in re-elections. Theexception is Tadzhikistan's Kakhar Makhkamov who was forced to resign underpressure on August 31,1991, just days after the August coup in Moscow. The otherPresidents have enjoyed favourable public support. In the most recent election, forinstance, Kyrgyzstan's Askar Akaev was elected (on a single slate) with 94 percentof the vote.

The Central Asian republics have long played the role of primary commoditysuppliers. The collapse of the economic network, therefore, has left them in aprecarious position. Several of the republics anticipated the importance of findingnew foreign suppliers and markets. As early as June, 1990, for instance, the Uzbekrepublic passed a law "On the formation of a Government Committee of the UzbekSSR on foreign trade and external contacts." 20The law gave the republic's institutions

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Presidential Elections in the Muslim Republics

(most recent elections)

Azerbaidzhan September 8,1991 Aiaz Mutalibov

Kazakhstan Nursultan Nazarbaev

Kyrgzstan October 12,1991 AskarAkaev

Tadzhikistan November 24, 1991 Rakhman Nabiev

Turkmenistan October 27,1991 Saparmurad Niiazov

Uzbekistan May 24,1990 Islom Karimov

the right to conduct a single foreign economic policy, coordinate work on theeconomic, commercial and scientific-technical and cultural connections withforeign countries, to control the activity of all units having foreign ties, fulfillgovernment plans and tasks of the government of the republic, and to develop newforms of cooperation with foreign partners. The law was essentially designed tocreate an export-led "para-statal" organisation to promote trade. However, theCentral Asian republics have not been very successful in promoting the developmentstrategies, largely because of a lack of expertise and difficulty having shippingaccess to large Middle Eastern, European, and Pacific Rim markets. In the fall of1991, Uzbekistan took the lead in the market-oriented economic association withthe creation of a number of semi-private commodity exchanges.

One external aspect of the different trajectories of the republics is the questionof security. A critical determinant of real sovereignty and independence is theability of a nation to protect itself. Each of the republics is moving in this direction,although more in rhetoric than in deed. None of the republics currently has thecapability to fund anything larger than local militias. Azerbaidzhan issued a decreecreating a republican ministry of defence on September 5, 1991. Uzbekistanfollowed with a similar resolution two days later. Yet the only feasible way ofobtaining supplies for these militias is to nationalise the equipment of the SovietArmy - a highly provocative act.

The republics of Central Asia are generally agreed on a policy regarding landownership. Beginning early 1990, a series of laws were adopted. An all-union lawwas passed on February 28, 1990.21 The law gave an unprecedented amount ofauthority over land relationships to the republics. The following summer, republicanlevel laws were passed in Kyrgyzstan, Tadzhikistan, Turmenistan, Uzbekistan.22

The Central Asian republics retained ownership of the land in the hands of the state.In Azerbaidzhan, in contrast, the land law asserted that land would be redistributedand that full ownership rights would be returned (without payment) to those whowork the land.23

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One of the most politically sensitive issues in Central Asia today is the question ofthe rights of non-indigenous peoples, particularly those of Slavic descent. Largenumbers of the Russian-speaking population began leaving the Central Asianrepublics after the nationalist-inspired riots in the city of Fergana in the summer,1989, in Dushanbe in February, 1990, and in Osh in the summer, 1990. In a sensethis is ironic, since the violence in these outbursts was not directed at Russians, butat locals. However, the psychological atmosphere of uncertainty is so great thatwhen confronted with new laws on local languages, what is seen as discriminationin employment, and the withdrawal of Moscow's authority, many Russians havechosen to leave. The Central Asian Presidents have all appealed for Russians not toleave. The "Birlik" organisation and other public organisations in Uzbekistan haveappealed for people not to leave. Frequent appeals are seen in the press. 24

Nevertheless, many observers have noted that the trend continues. The Uzbekpolitical commentator Timur Pulatov has argued that, if the trend is not reversed,in two to three years the technologically advanced production sectors in CentralAsia will experience a "catastrophic shortage of technological specialists," leadingto reduced commercial activity, a growth of poverty, and ultimately, to the"Angolicisation" of the Central Asian economy.25

One of the most important areas of difference among the Central Asian republicsis the approach to Islam. Perhaps the most visible change in Central Asia over thepost two years is the renaissance of Islamic traditions. The influence of Islam tendsto be a generally conservative one, one not oriented toward political destabilisation.Kazi Zakhidzhan, the Deputy director of the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims ofCentral Asia and Kazakhstan, recently offered an explanation, for instance, whySoviet patriotism was not an inconsistent feeling for the Islamic faithful of theSoviet Union.26 Muhammad Sadiq Yusupov, the Mufti of Tashkent, was elected in1989 to the USSR Congress of Peoples Deputies. The Mufti also played a role inrestoring calm in Fergana after the riots. Moreover, during the referendum campaignthe official Islamic Directorate favoured the retention of the Soviet Union duringthe referendum campaign.271990 saw the first public Navruz celebration in CentralAsia in many years. A group of 500 pilgrims left on Hajj to Mecca in June 1990 withthe official sponsorship of the Uzbekistan government. Perhaps as many as 1,500people in all made the pilgrimage from the Uzbek republic alone. The SpiritualDirectorate of Central Asia and Kazakhstan received one million copies of theKoran as a gift from King Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz.

Those Islamic organisations which sponsor more rapid change have beenisolated by the political authorities in some of the Central Asian republics. Forinstance, the "All-union Islamic Party of Renewal" was allowed to register as aparty in Moscow, but the branches in Tadzhikistan and Uzbekistan were declaredillegal and their meetings were banned.28 The party, according to its leaders, urgedrestraint and the avoidance of violence in disputes involving national differences.29

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Relations with Moscow and the Other Post-Soviet CapitalsThose who favour decentralised federal government argue that the principle bywhich to distinguish between which responsibilities are properly federal (central)and which are properly local is to recognise that local decision makers will havemore information and more interest in their own affairs than will federal officials.Therefore, any decision that does not involve "public goods" or "collective actiondilemmas" should be made locally.30 The classic "common good" is security. Verymuch like the beam from a lighthouse, whether one pays for security or not, onebenefits from it. It is difficult if not impossible to exclude non-contributors frombenefiting from a common good. Therefore, many individuals tend to slacken theirefforts in sacrificing for these goods on the expectation that others will sacrifice intheir stead. A classic "collective action dilemma" is one in which the interests of allthe parties to a particular negotiation will be in a optimal solution but, given theirparticular information and immediate incentives, the outcome of arational negotiationprocess nevertheless tends to be sub-optimal. A good example of these kinds ofproblems are interstate water disputes. Frequently, water disputes cannot be solvedin the confines of a water basin because upstream-downstream disagreements willdefeat any reasonable outcome of a negotiation, even though both parties have aninterest in the rational use of the basin's water. Because of the problem of collectiveaction, interstate water disputes are very difficult to resolve locally.

In the USSR, federal theory was different. Federal theory did not assume thatdecision making should be at a local level unless it was forced - through commongoods problems or collective action problems - to the level of the centre. Accordingto Soviet federal theory, the central government in Moscow had the right to allocatevirtually all the goods and services of the USSR because it could achieveunprecedented economies of scale and technology. Consequently, the entireeconomic system was heavily centralised. In order to maintain this level ofcentralisation, the CPSU maintained tight political control over politicaldevelopments throughout the Union. These two centralised infrastructures - theeconomic system and the CPSU - have undergone rapid disintegration. It is thisprocess of disintegration which is now defining the real substance of post-Sovietfederal relations.

The withdrawal of republican financial allocations and the collapse of thecommercial infrastructure had two immediate results. For one, it removed themarkets for Central Asian goods. In the long run.this is to be welcomed, but in theshort ran it is highly destructive. It also cut Central Asia off from traditionalsuppliers. It is hard for the republics to substitute quickly for the wide range ofcommodities and manufactured goods that were provided by the northern republicsof the USSR. One ominous consequence of the deterioration and of commercialrelations is the move toward regional autarky in Central Asia. For instance,government instructions were reportedly circulated to Uzbekistan's cotton ginningstations in early October, 1991, to prohibit shipments of cotton fibre to Russia.31

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Kazakhstan's politically resourceful President Nursultan Nazarbaev, was one of thefirst strong supporters of Gorbachev's Union Treaty as a way of re-attaining the"horizontal connections" among the republics. Nazarbaev argued that the UnionTreaty would strengthen inter-republican economic ties without a return to the old"command" economic system. Uzbekistan's President, Islom Karimov, followedclosely behind Nazarbaev's efforts. So did Akaev in Kyrgyzstan.

The primary political linkage between Moscow and the republics was throughthe communist party branches. After the coup, the party organisation in Moscowcrumbled. The branches either dropped off or quickly withered. On August 22,1991, in the midst of the coup attempt, Kazakhstan's Nazarbaev resigned his partyposts on the CPSU Politburo and Secretariat. In early September, 1991, anextraordinary congress of the Kazakh Communist Party, an organisation of some760,000 communists, resolved to separate from the CPSU and reconstitute itself asthe Socialist Party of Kazakhstan. Islom Karimov, Uzbekistan's President, resignedfrom the party on August 23, 1991. The property of the Uzbek Communist Party,for instance, was nationalised on August 30,1991, and the party itself changed itsform, becoming officially the Peoples Democratic Party in September 1991. Theproperty of the Kirgiz Communist Party was nationalised on August 24,1991. OnSeptember 9,1991, all property belonging to the Turkmen Communist Party wasnationalised. The Azerbaidzhan Communist Party was reconstituted and its propertywas turned over to the republic as of January 1, 1992. Tadzhikistan formed the"Independent Party of Tadzhikistan." The following day, on September 22,1991,the activity of the former Communist Party of Tadzhikistan was made illegal by adirective of the acting President, Zainiddin Nasriddinov. In the confusion of therepublic's political instability, a resolution of the republic's Supreme Sovietapparently outlawed the Tadzhik Communist Party.32

One important thorn in the relations between Moscow and Central Asiaconcerns the southern border of Russia and the northern border of Central Asia(Kazakhstan). No clear justification exists for the present border between Russiaand Kazakhstan. This situation was dramatically called to the attention of the publicin August 1991 following remarks by Russian President Yeltsin that border issueswould have to be renegotiated if the old union concept were completely abandoned.In response, Kazakh President Nazarbaev dispatched an urgent telegram to Yeltsinon August 28, 1991, calling on him to affirm the present borders, warning of thepossibility of the rise of social protest within Kazakhstan with "unforeseeableconsequences." " Yeltsin responded by sending a delegation to Alma-Ata topublicly reaffirm the provisions of the agreement of November 21, 1990, whichrecognised the territorial inviolability of both republics.

The possibility of redefining the border opens up historical wounds.Solzhenitsyn's provocative proposal published in the USSR in November 1990,and entitled "How Should We Reconstruct Russia?" argued for a Slavic Union thatoccupied most of Russia and much of what is today northern Kazakhstan.Solzhenitsyn's proposals was immediately criticised by many Central Asian ,

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including Nursultan Nazarbaev. Some Russians see the territory as Russia's. Butmany Central Asian view it as stolen. As Shakhimarden Kusainov asked plaintively,"Is it not time for the governments of the Soviet republics to repent for what theyhave done and return the property of those who fled starvation, violence and war?... And not only to ask for forgiveness but to return the property and everything elsethat was taken from these families?"34

Relations Among the Central Asian StatesThe most difficult aspect of the transition to local political control is the fact that afederal (central) government does not now exist. Consequently, there is no centralgovernment to play the role of impartial arbiter of local disputes. Consequently, allthe parties in all of the disputes are principals. Under these conditions, disputeswhich have a "winner versus loser" (that is, so-called "zero-sum" disputes)character unavoidably pit locality against locality and republic against republic. Inanticipation of these kinds of divisive problems, the Central Asian presidents havepushed forward a number of multilateral and bilateral agreements. 35 The mostprominent among these is the Alma-Ata Communique signed by the Presidents ofthe Central Asian republics in the summer 1990. The communique acknowledgedthat the fates of the Central Asian republics were intertwined by common values,by the close "family relationships," and by a common geographical destiny. But thecommunique also affirmed that the borders of the existing Central Asian republicswere "inviolable" and could not be changed by "anyone's will" without the consentof the republics.36

Thus the Alma-Ata document had both a unifying and divisive character to it.It held that Central Asia was one and yet many. By underscoring the essentialcommonality of interests of the Central Asian community, it brought them together.By granting legitimacy to the republics territorial borders, the communiquecomplicated the progress toward community. Moreover, the Alma-Ata communiquewas mainly rhetorical. A more successful effort may be the agreement reached atthe Tashkent meeting of the Presidents on August 14,1991, which sets in place apermanent institutional arrangement. At the meeting, the Presidents resolved toestablish a "Interrepublican Consultative Council" to be located in Tashkent. TheCouncil also was designed to include the participation of Azerbaidzhan. GasanGasanov, the Azerbaidzhan Prime Minister, stated his republic's intention at themeeting to become an integrated part of the economy of Central Asia.

All the Central Asian interrepublican agreements were at the presidential leveluntil late September, 1991, when meetings began at the ministerial level. AConference of Committees on Economic Reform was held in Alma-Ata in lateSeptember.37 Since policy implementation typically takes place at the level of linebureaucracy, this meeting too may be regarded as an important step in the politicalintegration of Central Asia. The extent to which this political integration proceeds,however, will be limited by the divisiveness of the issues. There are seriously

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divisive issues currently facing the republics. The most important concerninterrepublican border disputes and transnational issues such as water distribution.

There are numerous historical disagreement between particular sets of republicsin Central Asia over the borders. The disagreements are closely related to the factthat the republics have differing arrangements regarding land. None of the republicshas privatised land in the form, for instance, that Russia has. Yet the absence of theinstitutions of private land ownership has led to a number of unusual developments.For one, much of the land is not surveyed. Consequently, in many cases there areinnocent disputes about whether a particular valley is in one republic or another. Inthe shallow desert valleys of Central Asia, the streams and rivers tend to "wander",following first one course and then another. Those territorial jurisdictions that areassociated with water boundaries, therefore, are mobile.

In addition, there are large tracts of land where irredentist sentiment is strong forhistorical reasons. For instance, there is sentiment favouring the secession ofKarakalpakia from Uzbekistan; the separation of a part of the Mangyshlak oblastof Kazakhstan and its addition to Turkmenia; the separation of the part of theTashauz and Chardzhua oblasts on the Amu-daria from Turkmenia and theiraddition to Uzbekistan; the separation of the northern part of the Bukhara oblastfrom Uzbekistan and its addition to Karakalpakia; separation of the south-easternpart of Karakalpakia and its addition to the Khorezm oblast of Uzbekistan; theseparation of the southern part of the Chimkent oblast of Kazakhstan and itsaddition to Uzbekistan; the separation of the Zeravshan valley of Uzbekistan andits addition to Tadzhikistan; and separation of the Surkhandarin valley of Uzbekistanand its addition to Tadzhikistan.

Perhaps even more divisive than these land disputes are the water disputes ofCentral Asia.38 Central Asia is in the first stage of water crisis. Over the past threedecades the expansion of arid land agriculture in the northern territories of theCentral Asian republics and Kazakhstan has forced water demand far abovesustainable levels. In this same period, the area's population has more than doubled.The aggregate consumptive use of water in industry and municipalities has tripled.Even as consumptive use has increased, the quality of available water has deteriorated.Human waste, industrial effluent, agricultural runoff, pesticides, herbicides, andchemical defoliants (used in cotton cultivation) have entered the water supply. Theworld's highest infant mortality and morbidity rates among the population of thelower reaches of Amu-Darya serve as a grim testimony to the rapidly deterioratingquality of life in the region. Even as the water crisis grows in proportions, the abilityof local governments to address the problems is diminishing rapidly, the incentivesthat the Central Asian republics have acquired during the process of decentralisation(razqosudarstylenie), have pitted the republics against one another in key policyareas.

Local authorities find themselves vying for power in an escalating competitionfor control of the area's most precious resource, water. Earlier intergovernmentalagreements referred to the water problem, but offered little in the way of concrete

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proposals. A major step forward was taken on October 11,1991, when the Ministersof Water Economy of the Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan signed an agreement designed toestablish mechanism for resolving issues of interrepublican conflict. The agreementrecognised the waters of the Aral Sea Basin as common property of the republicsand established in interrepublican working group to develop a single program ofwater use.39

Toward New Political Structures in Central AsiaThe problems of collective action suggest that the solution to Central Asia'sproblems will only be found in some sort of collective agreement. But what formwill that agreement take? This is currently the question of the hour for the entireregion. A variety of different proposals for the future have been discussed in CentralAsia. We list five different proposed structures. These are not the only possiblesolutions to political reconfiguration, they are merely the ones that are being mostseriously discussed.

1. Eurasian Confederation (Union of Sovereign States)The first idea is to link all of the states of the former USSR in a loosely boundconfederation. The advocates of this formula say that it would include all of theadvantages of the old union without any of the drawbacks. It is essentially the ideapromoted in the earlier versions of the Union Treaty of Gorbachev. The basicopposition to this idea comes from the northern states, particularly the Baltics. Butthere is also opposition from within Central Asia from those who were alwayssuspicious that the Union Treaty was just another attempt to reimpose the centre.Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akaev, for instance, even after signing the UnionTreaty, objected in a formal presentation at the United Nations that the treaty "stillpresupposed the intention to revive a centre that would issue directives. We havealways objected to this"."°

2. Eurasian Commonwealth (Political Association)This is the idea of a broad community linking the Central Asian States with Russiaand other states of the former USSR. This community would be less closelyconnected than the Union Treaty concept, but would still retain a close associationbased on common affinities and interests. The idea is closest to the concept of theBritish Commonwealth or the merging European Community. This idea has haddistinguished advocates. The late Andrei Sakharov urged such the adoption of sucha structure in 1989. At the time the concept was rejected by Moscow politicians asirresponsible. More recently, leading Central Asians have promoted the concept.The Kazakh writer Olzhas Suleimenov has publicly supported this concept as hasKyrgyzstan President Askar Akaev.41

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3. A United TurkestanThe near-mythical concept of "A United Turkestan" lies deep in the hearts of manyCentral Asians. This is the idea of uniting all of the lands of the Turkophonepopulations of Central Asia into one overarching Turkic community. One of thefounders of the "Birlik" movement in Tashkent, Muhammad Salih, expressed theyearnings for the idea of Turkestan unity, saying that for a decade he had argued forthe unification of Turkestan. In part as a result of his political activities, Salihgradually came to the position that a politically unified Turkestan was not a practicalgoal. But Salih argued that it would nevertheless still be feasible to create aTurkestani federation or confederation based on economic ties. According to Salih,"Without Kazakhstan we can't live - that much is certain. Kazakhstan also cannotlive without us, and the same can be said of all the Central Asian republics."42 GogaA. Khidoiatov, a historian at Tashkent State University recently observed that "Thecountry we call the Soviet Union is gone. I dream to live in a time that we will formthe United States of Asia."43

Such a vision of unity is unlikely to be realised without a common ideationalguide to the future. Many Central Asian have suggested that a renewed commonIslamic faith in Central Asia is the most likely institution to bridge the currentinstitutional boundaries of the Central Asian republics. As such, it is the one forcewhich could bring about a renaissance of values that would precede a spiritual if notpolitical unification of Central Asia.

4. Independent RepublicsOne solution is to simply maintain the current political boundaries. The argumentin favour of this formula is that an existing state of affairs is easier to defend thanan ideal state of affairs is to reach. But there are many opponents of the currentborders. It is often pointed out that historically Moscow's policy was one of "divideand conquer." In the 1920s a plan for the political districting of Central Asia wasworked out by the "Turkcommission." Lenin reviewed the Turkcommission'sreport and concluded that the "political map" of Turkestan needed to be redrawn tocontain three primary units, "Uzbekia, Kirgizia and Turkmenia." ** Lenin thoughtit necessary, as well, to "specify in a detailed fashion how these three would becombined into one group" at a later time.45 It is very possible that Lenin's schememay have been just as fully motivated by an intention to "divide and pacify" as"divide and conquer." Yet the fact remains that the current borders are the legacymore of historical accident than any long-standing development of nationalcommunities. As such, these are highly artificial political units.

5. Fragmentation into Subnational GroupsFinally, a last possibility is the fragmentation of the Central Asian republics intosmaller republics. This formula is promoted by some who regard the possibility ofa unified Turkestan as simply legitimising regional Great Power ambitions of theUzbek majority. Others insist that, since the present borders are basically artificial,

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it is important to return to the principle of national self-determination on a locallevel.

This formula, however, has probably the weakest popular support of the five.Many opponents of this trajectory emphasise the potential for internecine strifealong the lines of Nagorno-Karabakh and draw ominous parallels with the situationin Yugoslavia.

The Shape of the Future.The great irony of public policy is that the future is never ours to know but we mustnevertheless plan for it. Whether the Central Asian communities of the year 2000are part of a commonwealth of Eurasian nations, unified Turkestan, or an assemblageof smaller communities depends on many factors. This article has surveyed a list ofthe most important internal factors. The list includes the skill and resourcefulnessof the leaders. It includes the capacities of the institutional frameworks that theleaders engineer. In particular, it includes the capacity of those institutions to solvethe dilemmas of collective action in reaching coordinated and mutually advantageouspolicies to solve transboundary conflicts over territory, water and resources.

This article has not sought to analyse the effects of the actions of the surroundingstates on the emergence of new political forms in Central Asia. There are a numberof examples of empires disintegrating. One thinks in particular of the collapse of theOttoman and Hapsburg empires. There are also numerous examples of Colonialempires disintegrating. One thinks, for instance, of the withdrawal of British andFrench influence from the Middle East, from Africa and from South East Asia. Inall of these cases, two general tendencies are clear. First, the political reconfigurationswhich followed in these cases depended as much on foreign influence as on internalfactors. And, second, the cultural and commercial influence of the former empireor metropole continued to be strongly felt long after the political control waswithdrawn or repulsed. Even today, the primary trading patterns of the Francophoneareas of Africa continue to favour France over Britain, just as the primary tradingpatterns of Anglophone Africa continue to favour Britain over France.

One may raise doubts about whether past patterns of imperial collapse have anyrelevance for the modern world. The more all-encompassing concerns of internationalsecurity, the speed of modern communications, and the increased role of internationalorganisations, and the reconfiguration of Central Asia will not be guided by thesame forces that applied in the past. But, as many political realists will argue, theearlier cases of imperial decay and colonial dissolution may simply express someuniversal tendencies of the behaviour of nation-states.

To be sure, Central Asiais increasingly a matter of concern for both humanitarianand political reasons to many countries around the world. Japan has providedsubstantial amounts of humanitarian aid, a great deal of it concentrated specificallyon the far-eastern regions of the USSR, particularly Sakhalin province. Theunresolved question of the "Northern territories" (the four Kurile islands) is nodoubt a partial motivation of Japan's generosity. The governments of the European

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countries, particularly Germany, have provided substantial aid to the USSR, butvirtually all of it has gone through the government in Moscow; Central Asians haveasserted that little actually has been directed toward the Central Asian states. TheUnited States has offered substantial food aid, mainly in the form of loans foragricultural purchases from American farmers. But the US Congress has haddifficulty reaching a consensus on direct assistance to the USSR. Given theeconomic recession the US and the approach of the 1992 presidential elections, theidea of extending assistance to the US' s former principal rival became increasinglyawkward in the autumn of 1991. Moreover, until mid-November, 1991, when USpolicy underwent a subtle shift, all US assistance was directed at Moscow ratherthan the republics. Consequently, the Central Asian republics virtually escaped theattention of Washington.

At the same time, the government of Saudi Arabia embarked upon a majorassistance program to the region. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ArabianAmbassador to the United States, announced that Saudi Arabia was providingCentral Asia with one billion dollars in emergency aid.46 The government of Iran,according to one source, has assigned 130 million dollars of assistance, directedprincipally to Azerbaidzhan. 47 The government of Turkey has not promisedsignificant assistance, but was quick to offer political recognition of the independenceof Azerbaidzhan.48 The Turkish government ranks Central Asia among its mostimportant foreign policy concerns. Kamran Inan, Turkish Minister of State,recently summarised Turkey's foreign affairs in noting "We are entering a politicalcrisis. We are faced with enormous problems. We must assume a leadership role inthe Middle East, the Balkans, Central Asia and beyond."49 Pakistan has announcedits intention to establish direct economic links with the Central Asian republics andopen consulates in the region.50 Some of the Central Asian states are also trying todevelop an increased profile in international organisations. For instance,Azerbaidzhan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan have announced an intention to jointhe Organisation of Islamic Conferences."51

The contemporary reconfiguration of Central Asia involves a complex calculusof issues and forces. As this survey has suggested, most of these forces could beaccurately characterised as divisive ratherthan unifying. Solutions to disagreementsand the creation of new regional political institutions is therefore certain to be adifficult task. But Central Asian history spans millennia. There have been goldentimes and dark times. As Central Asia looks forward, perhaps the most difficult taskin shaping the future will be to avoid the tendency to withdraw. The economic andideational isolation of Central Asia would certainly only increase the internaltensions. Central Asia now confronts the end of Soviet influence, and very probablythe end of the period of Russian overlordship. To rediscover its ancient gloriesagain, Central Asia must look forward.

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Notes

* Research for this article was made possible with the support of the United States Institute of Peace, theHoover Institution of Stanford University and Sandia National Laboratories. The author gratefullyacknowledges this assistance.

1. On Soviet federalism, see Gail W. Lapidus, "Gorbachev and the 'National Question': Restructuringthe Soviet Federation." Soviet Economy Vol. 5, No. 3 (1989), pp. 201-250; Stephen Kux, "SovietFederalism," Problems of Communism Vol. 39 (March-April), pp. 1-20.

2. Gregory Gleason, Federalism and Nationalism: The Struggle for Republican Rights in the USSR(Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 65-68.

4. See Sovetskaia Estonia November 17,18 and 19,1988.

5. Pravda November, 18,1988.

6. "Natsional'naia politka partii v sovremennykh usloviiakh. (Platforma KPSS)," Pravda September24,1989.

7. A draft version of this document prepared by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidum, was publishedin all the Soviet central newspapers on March 14,1989. It was announced that a draft law on thesubject would follow.

8. See "O poriadke resheniia voprosov, sviazannykh s vykhodom soiuznoi respubliki iz SSSR,Izvestiia April 6,1990, p. 1.

9. See "Ob obshchikh nachalakh mestnogo samoupravleniia i mestnogo khoziaistva v SSSR, IzvestiiaApril 14,1990, p. 1.

10. See "Ob osnovakh ekonomicheskikh otnosshenii Union SSR, soiuznykh i avtonomnykh respublik,"Pravda April 17,1990, p. 1.

11. The East-West Centre of Duke University sponsored a major comparative study of the electionprocedures and outcomes. See Darrell Slider, The Soviet Elections and Political Development(forthcoming).

12. Pravda February 6,1990, p. 4.

13. Although provisions of the treaty had been under public discussion for months, the final draft formof the new treaty was not published until late in 1991. For a text, see Izvestiia November 24,1990,p . l .

14. Grigorii Revenko summarised these goals in an interview. A summary of Revenko's commentsappeared in Report on the USSR August 3,1990, p. 28.

15. These remarks were made by Gorbachev at the televised press conference of August 31,1990 onMoscow TV, channel 1. Transcribed in "USSR Today: Soviet Media News and Features Digest,"compiled by Radio Liberty Monitoring, 706.01, August 31,1990.

16. "Announcement of the President of the USSR and the High Leaders of the Union Republics"(Izvestiia September 2,1991).

17. Formally known as Dogovor ob ekonomicheskom soobshchestve suvernnykh gosudarstv.

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18. The republics which signed the agreement were: 1) The Republic of Armenia; 2) Belarus'; 3)Kazakhstan; 4) Kyrgyzstan; 5) Russia; (Rossiia); 6) Republic of Tadzhikistan; 7) Republic ofTurkmenistan; and 8) Republic of Uzbekistan. The states that did not sign the Treaty of EconomyCommunity agreement were: 1) the Baltic States (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania); 2) Azerbaidzhan; 3)Georgia; 4) Moldova; 5) Ukraine. Note that several of the republics changed their formal titles atthis point, no longer regarding themselves as constituent republics but as separate states.

19. Trud October 29,1991, p. 1.97.4 percent of the eligible voters participated in the referendum.

20. The law was passed on June 12,1990.SeeAnvarKhamidovichRasulev,"Proryvnovneshniirynok"Zhizn' i ekonomika No. 10 (1990), pp. 54-57.

21. "Osnovy Zakonodatel'stva soiuza SSR i soiuznykh respublik o zemle." Izvestiia March 6, 1990.

22. For the full texts of the laws, see respectively: Sovetskaia Kirghizia June 30, 1990; KommunistTadzhikistana January 23,1991, Turkmenskaia Iskra November 2,1990; Pravda Vostoka July 4,1990.

23. 7>Krf November 13, 1991, p. 1.24. For instance, "My ne smozhem zhit" drug bez druga," Pravda Vostoka November 6,1991, p. 1.

25. Timur Pulatov, "Dogonim i peragonim Angolu!" Moskovskie novosti No. 14 (October 1990), p.7.

26. S. Bagdasarov, "My—za armiiu. Byli i budem!" Krasnaia zvezda April 10,1991, p. 3.

27. A conference of the representatives of the Spiritual Directorate of the Republics of Central Asia andKazakhstan issued a communique calling for citizens to support the preservation of a single renewedunion of sovereign republics. Reported on Moscow television. USSR Today: Soviet Media Newsand Information Digest (Compiled by Radio Liberty Monitoring) February 26,1991 (106/35).

28. See "Zaiavlenie." Komsolets Tadzhikistana December 2,1990, p. 3.

29. Vladimir Kazakov, "Gotovy k dialogu," Literaturnaia Rossiia March 8, 1991, p. 10. Also seeMoskovskie novosti No. 10, March 10,1991, p. 2.

30. These distinctions are key to contemporary federal theory. A good introduction may be found inElinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

31. As reported by the "News Program" of 'TV Russia." Transcribed in USSR Today: Soviet MediaNews and Features Digest October 3, 1991 (880/61).

32. V. Vyzhutovich, "Krasnoe znamia kommunizma ili zelenoe znamia Islama?" Izvestiia October 5,1991, p. 2.

33. USSR Today: Soviet Media News and Features Digest (RFE/RL Research Institute) August 29,1991 (729/53).

34. See Shakhimarden Kusainov, "Eta zemlia nam Bogom dana, "Munosabat No. 1 (January 1990), pp.7-8.

35. A few examples are the "Agreement on Economic, Scientific-Technical, and Cultural Cooperationamong the Uzbek SSR, the Kazakh SSR, the Kirgiz SSR, the Tadzhik SSR, and the Turkmen SSR."(Soglashonie ob ekonomichookom, nauchno-tekhnicheskom i kul'turnom sotrudnichestve UzbekskoiSSR Kazakhskoi SSR, Krigzskoi SSR, Tadzhikskoi SSR i Turkmenskoi SSR) of June 23,1990. InSov Kir June 26,1990. "The Treaty of Friendship Between the Turkmen SSR and the Uzbek SSR"(Dogovor o druzhbe mezhdu Turmenskoi Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki i Uzbekskoi

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Sovetskoi Sotsialisticheskoi Respubliki) Turkmenskaia Iskra April 23, 1991. Or the Agreementbetween the Governments of the Turkmen SSR and Uzbek SSR on Economic and CulturalCooperation during the period 1992-1995" (Soglashenie mezhdu Pravitel'stvom UzSSR iPravitel'stvom USSR ob okonomicheskom i kul'turnom sotrudnichestve na 1992-1995 gody)Turkmenskaia Iskra April 23,1991.

36. "Zaiavlenie," Pravda Vostoka June 24, 1990, p. 1.

37. Moscow news as reported in USSR Today: Soviet Media News and Features Digest (Compiled byRFE/RL Research Institute) September 27,1991 (852/33).

38. See Gregory Gleason, "The Struggle for Control over Water in Central Asia: Republican Sovereigntyand Collective Action," Report on the USSR Vol. 3, No. 25 (June 21,1991), pp. 11-19.

39. USSR Today: Soviet Media News and Features Digest (RFE/RL Research Institute) October 1991(910/21).

40. Moscow TASS broadcast of October 23,1991. Transcribed in Daily Report: Soviet Union ForeignBroadcast Information Services, (FBIS-SOV-91-205), p. 71.

41. It is interesting to note that at one point Lenin supported the idea of a "Union of Soviet Republicsof Europe and Asia." Viacheslav Mikhailov and Eduard Tadevosian, "Soiuznyi dogovor i natsional'noipolitika," Kommunist No. 7 (May 1991), pp. 68-80, at p. 73.

42. Annette Bohr, "Inside the Uzbek Parliamentary Opposition: An Interview with Muhammad Salih,"Report on the USSR Vol. 2, No. 46 (November 16,1990), pp. 18-22 at 20.

43. Edward A. Gargan, "In Central Asia, Many Dream of Union Under Islam's Flag," The New YorkTimes October 11,1991, p. 1.

44. V.I. Lenin, Polnoe, Vol. 41, p. 436. A suggestion that Lenin attached a great deal of importance, ifonly unconsciously, to the unifying aspect of the common Turkic language, was the notableomission of the Persian speaking group, the Tadzhiks. Lenin, it should be noted, had never been inCentral Asia and thus had to rely upon his lieutenant's accounts for descriptions of the politicalsituation there.

45. V.I. Lenin, Polnoe, Vol. 41, p. 436.

46. Patrick E. Tyler, "Saudis Promise Soviet Union $1 billion in Emergency Aid," The New YorkTimes October 9,1991, p. A4.

47. "Idei lamakogo Fundamentalisma na sovetskie respubliki," ("Ideas of Islamic Fundamentalism inthe Soviet Republics"). TASS radio report by Mikhail Kochetkov, October 3,1991. Transcribed inSoviet Media News and Features Digest, compiled by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty ResearchInstitute, October 3,1991 (878/50).

48. The announcement that Turkey had extended diplomatic recognition of Azerbaidzhani independenceindependence during a session of the Azerbaidzhani parliament was accompanied by applause. TrudNovember 13,1991, p. 1.

49. Chris Hedges, "Results of Turkey' s Election may Mean Basic Policy Shifts," The New York TimesNovember 18,1991, p. A4.

50. USSR Today: Soviet Media News and Features Digest (RFE/RL Research Institute) October 20,1991 (946/47).

51. Al-Akhbar (Cairo) October 25,1991.

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