In-House Counsel Antitrust UpdateAmerican Bar AssociationSection of Antitrust LawCorporate Counseling CommitteeApril 25, 2006

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Agenda

• Recent Developments (February – April 2006):• Supreme Court• Department of Justice• Federal Trade Commission• Private Litigation• European Union

• Hot Topic: Information Exchanges/Benchmarking

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The Supreme Court: Texaco v. Dagher

• Background:

• Gas station owners alleged Equilon (JV of Texaco and Shell) had engaged in unlawful price fixing by setting single price for different brands of gasoline marketed by JV.

• Ninth Circuit found this to be per se price fixing.

• Supreme Court reversed, 8-0 (Justice Alito not participating).

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Texaco v. Dagher (2)

• Once legitimate joint venture formed, joint decisions regarding pricing were not per se unlawful:

– “[T]he pricing policy challenged here amounts to little more than price setting by a single entity—albeit within the context of a joint venture—and not a pricing agreement between competing entities with respect to their competing products.”

• Court thus concluded “it would be inconsistent with this Court’s antitrust precedents to condemn the internal pricing decisions of a legitimate joint venture as per se unlawful.”

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Texaco v. Dagher (3)

• Under Ancillary Restraints Doctrine, antitrust laws examine whether a particular restriction is a naked restraint on trade, and thus unlawful, or ancillary to the legitimate and competitive purposes of JV, and thus valid.

• S. Ct. found pricing policies to be clearly ancillary to sale of JV products (“what could be more integral to the running of a business than setting a price for its goods and services?”); thus, ancillary restraints analysis unnecessary.

• Hoped for guidance on joint venture analysis not forthcoming.

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The Supreme Court:Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink

• As expected, Court reversed Federal Circuit.

• Court held that in light of extensive scholarly commentary, congressional amendments addressing patent misuse, and changes in position of federal enforcement agencies, no longer appropriate to apply judicial presumption of market power to tying arrangements involving patents (or copyrights?).

• Substantial dicta explaining evolution of Court’s views on tying from hostility to receptiveness.

• But Court stopped short of eliminating per se rule in cases involving monopoly power in tying market.

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Illinois Tool Works v. Independent Ink (2)

• Significance of decision:

• Keeps general trend in antitrust/IP law headed in the right direction – away from knee-jerk hostility to possession and exercise of IP rights.

• Keeps tying law headed in the right direction – away from per se illegality.

• But does not take additional step of clarifying tying law even further (e.g., permitting justifications or requiring evidence of anticompetitive effect in tied product markets even when defendant has monopoly power).

• Broader legal context: Supreme Court abandoning presumptions throughout antitrust law.

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DOJ: Civil Enforcement

• U.S. v. Watchmakers (Rolex):

• Good news: DOJ supported termination of 1960 consent decree restricting Rolex’s conduct.

• Bad news: Rolex paid $750,000 penalty for violating consent decree provisions since 1996.

– Rolex has policy not to sell watch parts to independent watchmakers unless they agree not to use parts in any watch that has non-Rolex parts or accessories. This policy and other conduct violated a 1960 consent decree.

• Lesson: Consent decrees represent a separate source of potential liability unless and until it is terminated.

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DOJ: Civil Enforcement (2)

• Whirlpool/Maytag: Cleared by DOJ, even though combined firm has 75%+ share of top-load washers.

• Reflects that market shares are only the starting point of antitrust analysis.

• Implications:

– Efficiencies count?

– Absence of customer complaints counsels against a merger challenge?

– Imports accorded greater significance?

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DOJ: Civil Enforcement (3)• Qualcomm/Flarion:

• $1.8 million penalty for gun-jumping; DOJ alleged Clayton Act Section 7A violation (but not Sherman Act Section 1).

• Merger agreement required Flarion to obtain Qualcomm’s consent for:

– IP licensing agreements; acquiring or disposing of IP rights.

– Agreements involving obligation to pay or receive > $75,000 in a year or > $200,000 in the aggregate.

– Proposals to customers or prospective customers.

– Expanding scope of pre-existing technology deployments or committing to deliver new equipment in support of those deployments after December 31, 2005.

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DOJ: Civil Enforcement (4)• Qualcomm/Flarion (con’t.):

• Parties’ documents unhelpful and provided evidence that Qualcomm assumed control of operational decisions:

– "Bascially [sic] before we sign any new contracts we seek Q consent." – Flarion

– Flarion was "being very careful seeking our approval on even very small operational level agreements." - Qualcomm

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DOJ: Criminal Enforcement• Industrial Rapid Prototyping (IRP):

• Japanese firm CMET pays $100,000 fine and pleads guilty to conspiracy to obstruct justice in connection with consent decree proceedings in IRP industry.

• CMET applied to acquire technology license offered pursuant to decree.

• Charged with carrying out its conspiracy by altering translations of documents to DOJ and making misrepresentations to DOJ regarding its intent to vigorously compete if offered license.

• Hydrogen Peroxide and Sodium Perborates: • Belgian and Dutch firms Solvay S.A. and Akzo Nobel agree to plead

guilty to price-fixing and pay $40.8 million and $32 million fines, respectively.

• Glyphosate/Anthraquinone:• Former manager of Georgia chemical manufacturer Chemical

Products Technologies LLC will plead guilty to filing false tax returns and conspiracy to commit fraud in connection with kickback scheme

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DOJ: Criminal Enforcement (2)• E-Rate Program

• Former South Carolina school district official charged with mail and wire fraud.• Premio Inc. guilty plea and $1.7 million fine and restitution

• Military Household Goods• Allied Freight Forwarding bid-rigging guilty plea and $1.043 million fine.• Executive Relocation International bid-rigging guilty plea and $72,600 fine.

• DRAM• 7 Korean executives from Samsung and Hynix pled guilty

– $250,000 fines, 5-8 months jail time.

• Ready Mixed Concrete• MA-RI-IL Corp., d/b/a Beaver Materials, and 3 executives charged with price-

fixing.– Execs also charged with making false statements to law enforcement

officials.• Guilty pleas from Builder’s Concrete & Supply and its president.

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DOJ: Patriot Act and Antitrust

• March 9, 2006 amendments to the Patriot Act add criminal antitrust investigations to list that permits non-consensual bugging and wiretapping.

• Powerful new tool for DOJ investigators.

• DOJ may seek court order when there is probable cause of Sherman Act violation.

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DOJ: Bugs and Wiretaps

• Impact may include expansion of criminal prosecutions into areas previously seen as civil violations.

• Sherman Act does not differentiate between civil and criminal violations.

• Traditionally, DOJ has saved criminal enforcement for “hard core” offenses such as price-fixing, bid-rigging and market allocation.

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DOJ: Bugs and Wiretaps (2)

• Direct evidence, e.g., of monopolization, gained through electronic measures may encourage DOJ to pursue criminal charges for offenses that are usually addressed in civil proceedings.

• When put on notice of an antitrust investigation, potential targets should assume electronic eavesdropping.

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Stolt-Nielsen Sent Back

• Stolt-Nielsen is the very public airing of the DOJ’s decision to revoke S-N’s conditional amnesty that had been provided in exchange for the company’s disclosure of price-fixing activity in the container shipping industry.

• DOJ contends that S-N failed to cease its activity promptly upon learning of it, which was 8 months prior to approaching DOJ.

• S-N contended that the amnesty letter was not specific on when the conduct had to have ended and that it had satisfied its conditions by ceasing the conduct as of the date of the letter.

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• S-N obtained an order from the District Court, permanently enjoining an indictment because the letter was not specific on the termination date and the DOJ had gotten the benefit of its bargain, i.e., the information needed to pursue co-conspirators.

• DOJ appealed, arguing that the court has no jurisdiction to interfere in the indictment process and that the lower court was wrong in assessing the amnesty letter.

• The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, agreeing with DOJ that the court’s cannot interfere with the executive branch’s right to pursue indictments.

Stolt-Nielsen Sent Back (2)

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• Post-indictment, however, S-N can again attempt to raise the letter as a bar to trial.

• The 3d Circuit declined to address the merits of whether the letter provided amnesty under the circumstances.

• In footnote 7 to the decision, the court directed the lower court to “consider the Agreement anew” if the indictments are brought again.

• The court must determine the date the activity was discovered and any subsequent anti-competitive conduct, and whether S-N had thus taken prompt and effective action.

Stolt-Nielsen Sent Back (3)

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• In light of those facts, the court should determine whether S-N had taken “prompt and effective action” to terminate the illegal activity upon its discovery.

• DOJ considers Footnote 7 to offer a complete victory because it concentrates the analysis on the period between discovery of the conduct and when the amnesty application occurred.

• Stay tuned. . . .

Stolt-Nielsen Sent Back (4)

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Stolt-Nielsen Lessons

• DOJ not afraid to revoke amnesty.

• Make an early application for amnesty.

• Cease illegal conduct immediately unless there are international ramifications; if so, seek DOJ guidance on how to coordinate amnesty applications in multiple jurisdictions.

• Avoid “whipsaw” effects.

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FTC: Civil Enforcement• Boston Scientific/Guidant Merger – Consent Order:

• Requires divestiture of all assets (including IP) related to Guidant’s vascular business (upfront buyer: Abbott).

• Markets alleged in complaint:

– drug eluding stents with RX delivery system– PTCA balloon catheters– coronary guidewires– implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICDs)

• Limits Boston Scientific’s access to potential ICD entrant Cameron Health’s information and control over Cameron’s activities.

– Boston Scientific must notify FTC before trying to exercise its option to buy Cameron.

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FTC: Civil Enforcement (2)

• Fresenius/Renal Care Group Merger – Consent Order:

• Requires divestiture of 91 dialysis clinics and Fresenius’ interest in 12 more to National Renal Institutes.

• Also restricts Fresenius from contracting with the divested clinics’ medical directors or their practice groups for 3 years.

• Fresenius must license is policies and procedures to NRI and give it option to obtain Fresenius’ medical protocols.

• Health Care Alliance of Laredo, L.C.:

• 80-physician IPA settled price-fixing charges.

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FTC: Civil Enforcement (3)

• Allergan/Inamed Merger - Consent Order:

• Allergan markets Botox, which is currently only botulinum toxin approved by FDA to treat wrinkles.

• Inamed acquired from UK manufacturer Ipsen the US rights to Reloxin, a botulinum toxin in Phase III of clinical trials and next likely entrant.

• Firms must return Reloxin development and distribution rights to Ipsen.

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FTC: Civil Enforcement (3)• In the Matter of Valassis:

• Valassis, a producer of free-standing newspaper inserts (FSIs), settled FTC charges that it used a quarterly conference call with securities analysts to attempt to collude with its only competitor:

– Valassis detailed strategy to increase FSI prices, which included abandoning its 50 percent market share goal and submitting above-market price bids for current News America customers.

– Valassis’ CEO stated that if its competitor competed for customers and market share in the future, Valassis would resume a recent price war.

• Valassis agreed to a consent order that bars the company from inviting any competitor to divide markets, allocate customers, or fix prices.

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FTC: Personnel Changes

• New deputy directors of Bureau of Competition.

• Ken Glazer – former Senior Competition Counsel, Coca-Cola– Current chair of ABA Section 2 Committee

• David Wales – Former Partner, Cadwalader– Counsel to Charles James and Hew Pate at DOJ – also

worked closely with Deborah Platt Majoras

• FTC Chief of Staff Maryanne Kane retiring after 28 years– Attorney-Advisor Brian Huseman will fill role

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FTC: Policy

• FTC Merger Process Reforms:

• Limit searches to files of 35 employees, providing the party complies with specified timing requirements;

• Reduce time period for responsive documents from three to two years;

• Require preservation of backup tapes for two days when documents have other accessible sources;

• Allow for significantly reduced information to be supplied on privilege logs.

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• Authorized Generic Drug Study:

• Goal is “to assess the likely short- and long-run effects of market entry by authorized generics on generic drug competition.” (FTC website)

• Comments accepted until June 5, 2006.

• Advisory Opinion: Suburban Health Organization• SHO, a physician-hospital organization, proposed to exclusively collectively

negotiate with insurers for 192 doctors employed by SHO’s eight member hospitals.

• Staff concluded that SHO’s proposed program – which SHO called “clinical integration” – had some potential to improve care and create efficiencies, but potential benefits significantly limited by proposed program’s limited scope and nature.

• Price agreement wasn’t reasonably necessary – “ancillary” – to potential efficiencies.

• Staff concluded that price agreement and exclusivity likely would be unlawful.

FTC: Policy (2)

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Joint DOJ/FTC Policy Developments• Hearings on Single-Firm Conduct:

• Two-four hearings per month June – December 2006 (none in August). Comments due by last session of hearings.

• Goal is “to promote dialogue, learning, and consensus building among interested parties. . . .[and] to inform policy-and decision makers on vital issues affecting consumers and the economy.” (DOJ website)

• Topics include:

– Bundled loyalty discounts/market share discounts– Product tying and bundling– Exclusive dealing– Predatory pricing – Refusals to deal– MFN clauses– Product design– Misleading or deceptive statements/conduct

• Agencies plan to issue a joint report.

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Joint DOJ/FTC Policy Developments (2)

• Joint Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines:

• Designed to offer “a new level of transparency” regarding agencies’ merger enforcement decisions.

• Reports issued at ABA Spring Meeting:

• FTC Annual Report

• DOJ Antitrust Division newsletter

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Private Litigation• PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (5th Cir.,

No. 04-41243, 3/20/06):

• Fifth Circuit upholds application of the rule of per se illegality to a Sherman Act §1 vertical minimum price fixing claim.

• Court rejected defendant’s arguments that:

– Rule of reason should apply to plaintiff's antitrust claims.

– Defendant’s pricing policy did not result in competitive harm and qualified for an exception to the per se rule.

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Private Litigation (2) • City of Moundridge v. Exxon Mobil, et al. (D.D.C., Civ. Act. No. 04-940):

• On April 20, 2006 DC district court denied preliminary injunction motion to cap natural gas prices.

• Owners/operators of natural gas distribution systems alleged that natural gas firms’ fixed prices and committed other antitrust violations through their participation in the National Petroleum Council (NPC), a federal advisory committee. Plaintiffs later charged that Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were a pretext for coordinated price increases.

• Defendants (including Chevron) have argued that their participation in the Council is subject to Noerr-Pennington.

• Defendants also argue that plaintiffs lack standing as purchasers or competitors.– Indirect purchasers cannot obtain relief.– Competitors cannot prove injury where harm alleged is minimum price-fixing.

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Private Litigation (3)

• In re Application of Microsoft Corp., (D. Mass., No. 06-10061-MLW, 4/17/06):

• Granted Novell’s motion to quash subpoena from Microsoft.

• Microsoft sought documents from Novell that were not supplied to European Commission.

• Court requested input from Commission, which suggested allowing Microsoft such discovery “would contravene principles of international comity,” and “pose a serious risk that the Commission’s rules and procedures . . . would be circumvented.”

• Court concluded: “Where, as here: the foreign tribunal can obtain the documents at issue and provide them to Microsoft; that tribunal does not want the involvement of this court; and there is no showing of fundamental unfairness in the absence of intervention, considerations of comity strongly favor quashing the subpoena."

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Private Litigation (4)• Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741 (9th Cir.

2006)

• Plaintiffs appealed dismissal of their complaint alleging Visa, MasterCard and various banks fixed prices on credit- and debit-card transactions.

• District court held their claims were released by class action settlement in In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig. (Wal-Mart I and II).

• Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding:

– Issue preclusion prevents re-litigation of Wal-Mart courts’ determination that Plaintiffs’ price-fixing claims were properly released.

– Alternatively, Wal-Mart settlement extinguishes Plaintiffs’ claims because the actions share an identical factual predicate.

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EU: Headline Developments

• Commission consultations and studies:• Abuse of dominance (Article 82) review• Private antitrust actions• Amendments to Leniency Notice• Commission Sector Inquiry in Payment Cards Industry• State aid: study on national enforcement of state aid

rules and new de minimis notice• Clearing and settlement• Supervisory approval process for M&A in banking,

insurance and securities sectors

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EU: Headline Developments (2)

• Mergers: • Energy: DONG / Danish electricity generators and suppliers.• Commission on warpath against protectionism (Endesa / Eon

(Spain); Suez / Gaz de France (France); Unicredit / HVB (Poland); Mittal /Arcelor (France / Lux).

• Article 82:• Microsoft saga continues.• Euro 24m fine against Tomra for exclusionary practices.

• Cartels:• Zinc phosphate appeals dismissed.• Industrial bags (Euro 290.7m fines)• Belgian beer appeal dismissed.• Rubber chemicals (Euro 75.86m fines)

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EU: Article 82 Review

• Public consultation ended 31 March 2006. Currently review focussed on exclusionary abuse (exploitative to follow).

• Movement from formalistic to effects based analysis.• Identification of core economic concerns and creation of

transparent and workable proxies.• Objective justification and efficiencies defenses.• Only pricing conduct excluding an “as efficient

competitor” (“AEC”) is abusive?• Individual exclusionary abuse: predation, single branding,

rebates, tying, bundling and refusal to supply.

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EU: Private Antitrust Litigation

• Commission concern that private antitrust litigation is “totally underdeveloped” in the EU.

• Three goals:

• Enforcement

• Compensation

• Deterrence

• Practical challenges:

• No common legal basis for action or procedural structure across EU.

• Achieving uniformity would involve extensive intrusion into national substantive and procedural laws.

• Justification for a separate regime for antitrust actions?

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EU: Private Antitrust Litigation (2)

• Distinguishing stand-alone and follow-on actions.

• Access to evidence:

• decisions by regulators binding on national courts?

• limited disclosure laws:

– disclosure by class?

– disclosure of regulators file?

• Passing on defense and indirect purchaser actions.

• Collective actions and costs.

• Interaction of public and private enforcement.

• Central compensation fund?

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Amendment of EU Leniency Notice

• Proposed special procedure for the protection of corporate statements made to the Commission in the context of leniency applications.

• Intended to address risk of discovery in civil damages proceedings (particularly outside of EU).

• Elements:• Commission policy statement• Corporate statements in oral form• Restricted third party access to file• No mechanical copies of corporate statements allowed• Access only after signing written commitment backed by

sanctions

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Hot Topic:Information Exchanges/Benchmarking

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Information Sharing Attracts Scrutiny

• Oil and Gas Industry Antitrust Act of 2006:

• Proposed establishment of a joint federal-state task force– “to investigate information sharing (including

through the use of exchange agreements and commercial information services)” among participants in the oil and gas industry.

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Antitrust Conundrum

• How to tell the difference between:

• Efficient, competitive results fostered by full information

• Efficient, anticompetitive results from agreements to exchange information

• Matrix of key factors

• Type of information obtained, including time frame

• How obtained

• How used

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Type of Information

• Individual prices, costs, etc.

• Aggregate prices, costs, etc.

• Sales forecasts

• Methods and procedures

• Compliance best practices

• Employee motivational tips

LEVELLEVELOF RISKOF RISK

HIGHHIGH

DANGERDANGER

SAFESAFE

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Time Frame

FutureFutureCurrentCurrent66

MonthsMonthsOldOld

AncientAncient

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How Obtained

• Directly from competitors

• From third party who obtained it from• Competitors• Employees

• From your own employees

• Publicly available information

LEVELLEVELOF RISKOF RISK

HIGHHIGH

DANGERDANGER

SAFESAFE

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How Used

• To increase prices -• Of individual product• On average

• To avoid decrease

• To decrease more than otherwise

• Ignore

LEVELLEVELOF RISKOF RISK

HIGHHIGH

DANGERDANGER

SAFESAFE

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DOJ/FTC Safe Harbor

• Survey management by third party.

• Data at least three months old.

• Data aggregated for at least five companies, with no one company representing 25% of the aggregate data

• Safe harbor only for written exchanges.

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Leslie OvertonLeslie Overton practices exclusively in the antitrust and government regulation areas. Her practice focuses on mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures, civil nonmerger investigations, and counseling. She also has litigation experience. Leslie has represented a variety of clients, including media, technology, telecommunications, and consumer products companies. From 2002 through 2004, Leslie worked at the U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division as counsel to the assistant attorney general. In that capacity she advised the AAG and deputy assistant attorneys general regarding merger and civil nonmerger investigations, competition advocacy efforts, and policy initiatives, including the hearings on health care and competition law and policy held by the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission.

Leslie is a member of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law, where she serves on the Council and as liaison to the ABA Commission on Racial and Ethnic Diversity in the Profession. She frequently lectures on competition issues, particularly those relating to antitrust and intellectual property. Leslie is a member of the editorial board for the sixth edition of Antitrust Law Developments, the Antitrust Section's flagship publication, and a contributing author to the third edition of The Merger Review Process: A Step-By-Step Guide to Federal Merger Review.

Leslie can be reached by phone at (202) 879-4688 or by email at lcoverton@jonesday.com.

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John MajorasJohn M. Majoras is a partner in Jones Day’s Antitrust and Competition Law Practice and is resident in the firm’s Washington, D.C. office. He has a wide variety of experience in general business litigation, with a focus on antitrust matters. John has been lead counsel for defendants involved in some of the largest cartel cases over the last 10 years. He has represented Aventis S.A. (formerly Rhône-Poulenc) in the vitamins litigation, including the Empagran case in the Supreme Court, and in the methionine antitrust litigation. He is currently principal counsel for parties in multi-district antitrust cases involving the carbon black, labelstock, publication paper, credit card, pharmaceutical, and funeral products industries. In addition to civil litigation, John counsels clients facing criminal and regulatory investigations, and he regularly advises clients on coordinating and responding to multinational investigations and litigation.

John’s other litigation experience includes product liability, hostile corporate takeovers, copyright, tax, entertainment, and other commercial disputes. He has tried cases throughout the country in both federal and state courts as well as arbitration proceedings.

John can be reached by phone at (202) 879-7652 or by emailat jmmajoras@jonesday.com.

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Greg OlsenGreg Olsen leads the competition practice in the London Office. He has extensive experience advising companies and financial institutions on EU and U.K. antitrust/competition law in a diverse range of businesses. A significant portion of his practice involves advising on antitrust investigations and litigation before the United Kingdom Competition Appeal Tribunal as well as obtaining merger clearances in the EU, the U.K., and elsewhere.

During 2000, Greg was on special assignment to General Electric as European antitrust counsel. He has written a number of articles and is author of the competition law section of the PLC International Acquisitions Practice Manual. He is recognized as a leading practitioner in The International Who's Who of Competition Lawyers, Chambers Global, Legal Experts, and the PLC Cross-Border Handbook. Representative clients in recent public matters include MasterCard, Apple, Harsco Corporation, SES Global, R.J. Reynolds, Timken, and Johnson Wax Professional.

Greg can be reached +(44) 20 7039 5222 or by email at golsen@jonesday.com.

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Kathryn FentonKathy Fenton has practiced antitrust law for more than 25 years and has represented clients such as American Greetings, Airlines Reporting Corporation, AOL, DIRECTV, Liberty Media, Procter & Gamble, R.J. Reynolds, and CBS/Viacom in mergers and acquisitions and on competitive issues before various federal agencies, including the Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Transportation, and the Federal Communications Commission.

Kathy is listed in The Best Lawyers in America, 2005 Chambers USA: America's Leading Business Lawyers, and Who's Who in American Law. She is vice chair of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law and will become chair of the Section in August 2007. She previously served the Antitrust Section as committee officer (2003-2005), secretary, publications officer, council member, and editorial chair of the Antitrust Law Journal. Kathy is a frequent lecturer and author on antitrust and competition issues.

Kathy can be reached by phone at (202) 879-3746 or by e-mail at kmfenton@jonesday.com.

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Margaret WardPeggy Ward's practice focuses exclusively on antitrust matters. Her practice includes mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, counseling, compliance programs, and nonmerger government investigations. She has represented clients in a variety of industries, including broadcast, consumer products, energy, health care, industrial chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and telecommunications. From 2001 through 2003, Peggy worked on antitrust matters at the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice. While serving as counsel to Assistant Attorneys General Charles A. James and R. Hewitt Pate, Peggy worked on numerous merger and nonmerger antitrust investigations and advised the AAGs on various policy initiatives, appellate and international matters, and competition advocacy efforts.

Peggy is currently a Vice Chair of the Fuel and Energy Industry Committee of the American Bar Association’s Section of Antitrust Law and has previously served as a senior editor of the Antitrust Law Journal and a vice chair of the Section’s Membership and Equal Opportunity Committee.

Peggy can be reached by phone at (202) 879-3488 or by email at maward@jonesday.com.