If You Love Someone...Author(s): Ronald TierskySource: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2000), pp. 156-157Published by: Council on Foreign RelationsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20049955 .

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Letters to the Editor

offering, however disguised by later

retractions, policy prescriptions that

much of the rest of Europe, not to

mention the United States, finds

morally abhorrent.

The eu and the American press have

certainly simplified the story of the rise of the Freedom Party. Austria's "grand coalition" shares the responsibility for

the situation in which the country now

finds itself. But a political party that comes to share power as a result of discontent

with the political system?however

legitimate and understandable?does

not and should not automatically gain international legitimacy. Dangerous right

wing movements?and Nagorski does

not suggest that the Freedom Party has

really changed its stripes?frequently come to power because they combine

racist or xenophobic appeals with a plau

sible attack on the real deficiencies of the

system. The "excuse me" apologies that

Nagorski seeks from the Freedom Party and Chancellor Wolfgang Sch?ssel are

unconvincing: if words were enough, then

Haider's own disavowals should suffice.

Nagorski is quite right to assert that

Austria's "failure to face its past is one

reason why ... Haider gets away with

open xenophobia." The significant contrast

here is with Germany, where, despite the

near-collapse of the Christian Democratic

Union, the difficulties posed by the inte

gration of the east, and a flagging economy, there is no prospect of a right-wing

resurgence on the scale of the Freedom

Party. Why? In part because, from the

Nuremberg tribunals to the furor over

the publication of Daniel Jonah

Goldhagen's Hitlers Willing Executioners in 1996, other nations and their citizens

have repeatedly shown their unwillingness

to sanction any re-emergence of Nazi

ideology in Germany, even in an attenuated

form. This is not to belittle the distin

guished contributions of many Germans, from Theodor Heuss to Willy Brandt, to the destruction of the extreme right in

Germany. But their courage would have

been less effective if the spotlight of the world had not been trained on Germany for the past 55 years. Denazification was

imperfect and partial; so is the eu reaction

to the Freedom Party. But it is a start,

and a long-overdue one, toward making Austria acknowledge its past.

ted r. bromund

Associate Director, International Security Studies, Yale University

IF YOU LOVE SOMEONE...

To the Editor:

Philip H. Gordon's excellent commen

tary on the eu plan for a unified military

force ("Their Own Army?" July/August 2000) examines a range of unintended

and unwelcome possible consequences. Americans know well that their

European friends have long been simulta

neously pushed and pulled by ambivalent U.S. attitudes toward European integration and the self-assertion that it implies. The

U.S. Defense and State Departments open

ly or privately denigrate European efforts,

and with a very powerful, Euroskeptical, unilateralist Congress, the Europeans are

generally (and not surprisingly) intimidated

by American megapower.

Washington sees Europe's own divi

sions all too well. Paris, London, Berlin,

and other capitals have different priorities and orientations. Even those who wish

European integration well worry whether

its leaders will have the political guts to face

down American distrust and intimidation.

[156] FOREIGN AFFAIRS- Volume y 9 No. s

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Letters to the Editor

Combined with those U.S. policymakers who for geostrategic and geoeconomic reasons do not want a healthy European

competitor, the resulting American

pressure demands a new generation of

European leaders willing to take risks and

ask their peoples for uneasy tradeoffs?in

short, leaders who will push back against Washington. Establishing a unified

European defense force will not neces

sarily require another de Gaulle. But it

will require a generation of leaders willing to stand up even to allies.

European self-assertion, unfortunate

ly, will in certain respects appear to be

anti-American, as threatening to

American interests if not to American

security. Not all Americans will think

this way, but those wedded to a view of

the Europeans as troublemakers, free

riders, and shifty partners certainly will.

Thus the next phase of European American relations will require especially wise and liberal presidential leadership in

Washington. If the Europeans are success

ful at continued renaissance, which is in

the U.S. interest and which the U.S. should

want for its friends and allies, the next

administration must be prepared to explain to Americans and justify to a sincerely incredulous Congress how and why the

post-World War II American intimidation of Europe, intended or not, must be

consciously wound down. A better

transatlantic equilibrium will ensure that

the United States does not become an

overpowerful, resented leviathan, as strong and influential as it is fragile and isolated.

A unified European defense force must be constructed not only in Europe but also in Washington.

RONALD TIERSKY

Professor of Politics, Amherst College

ERRATUM

In editing our review of The Breakdown of the State in Lebanon, 1967-1976, ("Recent

Books," July/August 2000) we introduced

an error. The published text reads, "After

the Palestine Liberation Organization was ejected from Jordan in 1970-71, Lebanon was the last available staging area for actions against Israel. Although other Arab governments had banned the plo from their territories, they were

content to have it based in Lebanon."

The text should have read, "After the

Palestine Liberation Organization was

ejected from Jordan in 1970-71, Lebanon

was the last available staging area for

actions against Israel?just what Arab

governments had ruled out in their own

territories but forced Lebanon to accept." The plo had offices and a presence in

all the Arab countries.

Our apologies.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS September/October 2000 [157]

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