ideological polarization in baltic...

88
A CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEY REPORT IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIES Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa

Upload: others

Post on 06-Jun-2020

11 views

Category:

Documents


3 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 0

A CROSS-NATIONAL

SURVEY REPORT

IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIES

Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa

Page 2: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 1

IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIES

A CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEY REPORT

Mārtiņš Kaprāns

Inta Mieriņa

Institute of Philosophy and Sociology

University of Latvia

May, 2019

Page 3: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION 7

METHODOLOGY 9

THE CONTEXTS OF IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION 10

WESTERN ORIENTATION 10

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FAILED STATE CLAIMS 24

ATTITUDE TOWARD IMMIGRANTS 35

ATTITUDES TOWARD PROTECTIONISM 45

IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION: A BIRD’S EYE VIEW 54

THE WESTERN ORIENTATION INDEX 54

THE FAILED STATE INDEX 56

THE XENOPHOBIA INDEX 58

THE PROTECTIONISM INDEX 60

OPINION GROUPS 62

CLUSTERS OF SOCIETY 67

CONCLUSIONS 76

APPENDIX A. THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE 2019 SURVEY 79

APPENDIX B. SURVEY WAVES AND SOURCES 83

APPENDIX C. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT (P<.05) SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN

SURVEY ITEMS 84

Page 4: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 3

INDEX OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Attitudes toward Western countries as important allies ............................................................................. 11

Figure 2. The dynamics of public opinion toward Western countries as important allies (2016-2019) ..................... 12

Figure 3. Attitudes toward Russia as a balancing power ............................................................................................. 13

Figure 4. The dynamics of public opinion toward Russia as a balancing power (2016-2019) ..................................... 13

Figure 5. Identification with Western values ............................................................................................................... 14

Figure 6. The dynamics of identification with Western values (2016-2019) ............................................................... 15

Figure 7. Future of the European Union ...................................................................................................................... 16

Figure 8. The Dynamics of the public opinion toward the future of the European Union (2016-2019) ..................... 17

Figure 9. NATO as a threat to Russia............................................................................................................................ 18

Figure 10. EU sanctions against Russia ........................................................................................................................ 19

Figure 11. The dynamics of public opinion toward the EU sanctions against Russia (2016-2019) ............................. 20

Figure 12. Support for the statements that challenge Western orientation............................................................... 21

Figure 13. Support to anti-Western statements .......................................................................................................... 22

Figure 14. Evaluation of the state's sovereignty .......................................................................................................... 25

Figure 15. The dynamics of evaluation of the state's sovereignty .............................................................................. 25

Figure 16. Demography as a threat for the state’s existence ...................................................................................... 26

Figure 17. Opinions on economic sustainability .......................................................................................................... 27

Figure 18. Dependence on the EU's financial assistance ............................................................................................. 28

Figure 19. Evaluation of social inequality .................................................................................................................... 29

Figure 20. Emigration as an issue ................................................................................................................................. 30

Figure 21. Anti-elite sentiments in the Baltic countries .............................................................................................. 31

Figure 22. Opinions on the failed state claims ............................................................................................................. 32

Figure 23. Approval of the failed state claims ............................................................................................................. 32

Figure 24. The dynamics toward the satisfaction with life (1999-2019) ..................................................................... 34

Figure 25. Approval of the failed state claims by the life satisfaction evaluation ....................................................... 34

Figure 26. General perception of immigrants .............................................................................................................. 36

Page 5: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

4

Figure 27. The dynamics of public opinion toward foreigners (2013-2019) ............................................................... 37

Figure 28. Immigrants as a source for crime................................................................................................................ 38

Figure 29. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as source of crime (2013-2019) ............................... 38

Figure 30. Immigrants as a threat to job market ......................................................................................................... 39

Figure 31. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as a threat to job markets (2013-2019) ................... 39

Figure 32. Immigrants as a threat to local culture ....................................................................................................... 40

Figure 33. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as a threat to local culture (2013-2019) .................. 41

Figure 34. Approval of the anti-immigrant statements ............................................................................................... 42

Figure 35. Support to anti-immigrant statements ....................................................................................................... 43

Figure 36. Economic nationalism in the Baltic countries ............................................................................................. 45

Figure 37. The dynamics of economic nationalism in the Baltic countries (2013-2019) ............................................. 46

Figure 38. Attitudes toward international companies ................................................................................................. 47

Figure 39. The dynamics of public opinion toward large international companies .................................................... 47

Figure 40. Opinions on foreigners’ right to purchase land .......................................................................................... 48

Figure 41. The dynamics of public opinion toward foreigners’ right to purchase land (2013-2019) .......................... 49

Figure 42. Assessment of the international organizations .......................................................................................... 50

Figure 43. The dynamics of public opinion toward the assessment of the international organizations .................... 50

Figure 44. Approval of protectionist statements ......................................................................................................... 51

Figure 45. Support for protectionism in the Baltic countries ...................................................................................... 52

Figure 46. Distribution of attitudes toward the West (2019) ...................................................................................... 54

Figure 47. Distribution of attitudes toward the West in three Baltic countries (2019) .............................................. 55

Figure 48. The Western orientation index in the Baltic countries in 2016 and 2019 .................................................. 56

Figure 49. Distribution in the perception of the country............................................................................................. 57

Figure 50. The perception of the state in the Baltics ................................................................................................... 57

Figure 51. Distribution of attitudes toward immigrants .............................................................................................. 58

Figure 52. Distribution of attitudes toward immigrants in three Baltic countries ...................................................... 59

Figure 53. The xenophobia index ................................................................................................................................. 59

Page 6: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 5

Figure 54. Distribution of openness to free trade ....................................................................................................... 60

Figure 55. Distribution of openness toward competition in three Baltic countries .................................................... 61

Figure 56. The dynamics of public opinion toward the openness to free trade (2013-2019) ..................................... 61

Figure 57. Distribution of the opinion groups in the society of the Baltic states ........................................................ 62

Figure 58. Opinion groups in the Baltic countries........................................................................................................ 63

Figure 59. Opinion clusters .......................................................................................................................................... 67

Page 7: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

6

INDEX OF TABLES

Table 1. Following news and discussing political matters among opinion groups ...................................................... 63

Table 2. The opinion groups’ profiles........................................................................................................................... 64

Table 3. The opinion groups’ attitudes ........................................................................................................................ 66

Table 4. The profile of opinion clusters ....................................................................................................................... 68

Table 5. Differences between pro-Western and anti-Western groups in all Baltic countries..................................... 70

Table 6. Clusters in Estonia .......................................................................................................................................... 71

Table 7. Clusters in Latvia ............................................................................................................................................. 74

Table 8. Polarization of opinions - decile ratio ............................................................................................................ 75

Page 8: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 7

INTRODUCTION

Ideological tensions have become a sensitive issue in Western societies over the past

decade. The slogans such as “Make America great again” and “Take back control” have epitomized

recent ideological unrest. The values that these slogans represent have urged political scientists

to think about the end of the democratic century.1 These discourses have also resonated in the

Baltic states where, along with ever present geopolitical matters, political actors and the members

of civil society have problematized the understanding of Western values. Specifically, the public

polemics after the European refugee crisis in 2015, the voicing of isolationist ideas, and the

criticism of liberal order as well as a general sense of existential anxiety about the future of one’s

country have nurtured ideological polarization in the Baltic states. This report explores the level

and potential of such polarization in Baltic societies.

Ideological polarization is a litmus test for democracies. This can seriously effect on

democratic culture, as societies learn to elaborate controversial issues and develop coping

strategies, but this can also undermine rational social discourse and cohesion. Ideological

polarization can take different forms. Normally, this entails a conflict between competing

worldviews and practices. If such a conflict develops into antagonistic relations between two

equally strong and coherent opinion groups, it may harm democratic culture. Exacerbating

antagonism via political discourse may also pose a threat to democratic regimes. If antagonism is

restrained and moderated through legitimate institutions, the polarized opinion groups can be

seen as crucial elements of a democratic society and policy making. Conversely, conflicting

relations where more than two opinion groups intend to impose their worldviews on the larger

public can yield to a pluralistic polarization. Thus, three different analytical types of polarization

can be distinguished: radical, moderate and pluralistic.

One of the central questions that can be asked regarding the Baltic states and other

countries concerns the role of radical ideological polarization. Namely, is there an increasing

salience of this pattern in public opinion? This question intertwines with our report.

Acknowledging the local impact of the so-called populist parties as well as of the Kremlin’s

strategic narratives, it should be noted that we do not intend to explore the discursive sources of

polarization in every Baltic society. Instead this study looks at possible structural similarities or

differences between competing opinion groups. This shall help us to understand the level and

1 See Wike, R., Silver, L., Castillo, A. ‘Many across the globe are dissatisfied with how democracy is working’. April 29, 2019. Pew Research Centre, available at https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/04/29/many-across-the-globe-are-dissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working/

Page 9: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

8

potential of ideological polarization. Simultaneously, we do not intend to conflate the polarization

in Baltic countries with the situation in Western Europe where formally similar ideological

cleavages are rooted in different structural conditions.

The report consists of two parts. The first part focuses on the descriptive analysis of survey

data, outlining the country-level intricacies with respect to each survey item. This analysis is

organized around four thematic contexts (Western orientation, failed state, immigration, and

protectionism) that, as previous research has suggested, might be relevant for ideological

polarization. The second part provides a more aggregated and deeper statistical analysis of opinion

groups in the Baltic states.

Page 10: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 9

METHODOLOGY

This study is based on the analysis of survey data. The survey questionnaire was designed to

measure the dynamics of public opinion as well as to provide original knowledge about the

possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey data that are explored

in this report have cross-sectional background, i.e. they are comparable with the data that have

been collected in previous years, using the same survey items (see the questionnaire and the

sources of cross-sectional questions in the Appendix A and B). The survey questions were selected

or specially constructed taking into account secondary sources that provide relevant and reliable

empirical information about polarizing topics. These topics are at times cultivated in the Baltic

states by pro-Kremlin media or populist parties.2

The 2019 survey contained 10 thematic survey questions; among them were three batteries

of questions that used the same response items to measure an attitude toward different

statements related to a particular issue. Survey questions address the issues of Western

orientation, the failed state, anti-immigrant sentiment, and protectionism. Likewise, several

control questions are used to provide additional information about the sociological profile of

specific opinion groups. These control questions focus on the attitude toward Russia, the

respondents’ satisfaction with life, national pride, and exposure to political discourse in everyday

life. The questionnaire also contains a set of socio-demographic questions (sex, age, education

etc.). However, it should be taken into account that the number of socio-demographic questions

varies across countries and not always did similar questions include identical response items. Thus,

a comparative analysis on the basis of socio-demographic data is limited and is often replaced by

country-level analysis.

The 2019 survey is a nationally representative opinion poll. The fieldwork (face-to-face

interviews) in the Baltic states was conducted in January by three research agencies: SKDS (Latvia),

Baltic Surveys (Lithuania), and Turu-uuringute (Estonia). The total sample that was reached in this

survey is 3031 respondents: 1014 in Estonia, 1008 in Lithuania, and 1007 in Latvia.

2 See, for example, Berzina, I. et al. (2018) Russia's Footprint in the Nordic-Baltic Information Environment. Riga: Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Available at https://www.stratcomcoe.org/russias-footprint-nordic-baltic-information-environment-0; Winnerstig, M. (ed.) (2014) Tools of Destabilization Russian Soft Power and Non-military Influence in the Baltic States. Försvarsdepartementet, available at https://www.stratcomcoe.org/mike-winnerstig-ed-tools-destabilization-russian-soft-power-and-non-military-influence-baltic-states; Jakobson, M-L. et al. (2012) Populism in the Baltic States. Tallinn: Tallinn University Institute of Political Science and Governance, available at https://oef.org.ee/fileadmin/media/valjaanded/uuringud/Populism_research_report.pdf; Open Estonia Foundation; EU vs. Disninfo, available at https://euvsdisinfo.eu/; CEPA Stratcom Program, available at http://infowar.cepa.org/index/; Disinfo Portal, available at https://disinfoportal.org/

Page 11: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

10

THE CONTEXTS OF IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION

WESTERN ORIENTATION

Identification with the Western world has been a crucial topic in the Baltic states since the

restoration of independence. Belonging to the West is sometimes challenged by particular political

parties and local economic actors. This is also contested by pro-Kremlin media that insist that the

Baltic states are rather a bridge between the West and Russia or they are peripheral and irrelevant

countries for the great Western powers. If such narratives are accepted in larger opinion groups,

one should expect that the identification with the imagined Western world and its institutions may

evoke the polarization of public opinion. A Western orientation in this report is operationalized as

a positive attitude toward Western values, geopolitical interests and institutions that are

associated with the West. The 2019 survey used six items to explore the intensity and dynamics

of the Western orientation in Baltic societies. These items focus on the willingness to cooperate

with other western countries, relations between traditional values and Western values, the

attitude toward the EU and NATO and relations between Russia and the West.

The 2019 aggregate survey data reveal that the majority of Baltic respondents (70%) believe

that it is in their country’s interest to work closely with the US and other western powers (Fig. 1).

This indicates a rather strong consensus about Western countries as important allies. However,

only a small portion of (22%) express strong support toward working closely with Western

countries while the majority (47%) instead demonstrate moderate support. Such results, among

other things, allude to the conditional character of Baltic public opinion regarding support to close

cooperation with Western countries. To be sure, the willingness to foster closer cooperation with

other Western countries is much higher in Baltic societies than the weakening of such cooperation.

The country-level analysis of the 2019 data shows that Lithuanians and Estonians are more

likely to strongly support cooperation with Western powers than Latvians who are more likely to

resist close cooperation.3 Latvians are also more likely to demonstrate uncertainty with respect to

such cooperation. Thus, working closely with Western countries has a higher potential to trigger

polarization in Latvia than in other Baltic states.

3 In this report, the statistical significance of differences between groups is tested by using dispersion analysis (ANOVA), chi-square tests, and T-tests. Only differences that are significant at the <0.05 level are described in the analysis.

Page 12: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 11

Figure 1. Attitudes toward Western countries as important allies

The cross-sectional data from the 2019 and 2016 surveys show on an aggregate level that

support toward working closely with Western countries has not significantly changed in the Baltic

states (Fig. 2). A country-level analysis, however, reveals more specific dynamics. Estonia’s public

opinion indicates the most significant changes were a considerable drop in moderate support for

close cooperation with the US and other Western countries and an increase of uncertainty by 7pp.

Lithuanians have become more moderate over a three-year period concerning close cooperation

with Western countries. Latvian abstention from close cooperation has weakened, though, but

this has also strengthened uncertainty with respect to how important it is for Latvia to work closely

with other Western powers.

28%

44%

13%

4%

11%

24%

54%

11%

2%

9%

17%

44%

19%

5%

15%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

It’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other Western powers (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 13: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

12

Figure 2. The dynamics of public opinion toward Western countries as important allies (2016-2019)

An attitude toward the statement that ‘a strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence

of the West’ also alludes to geopolitical priorities in Baltic societies. The 2019 aggregate data

illuminate a polarized attitude toward Russia as a geopolitical actor. While 41% of Baltic

respondents disagree with the balancing role of a strong Russia, 38% grants approval to this.

Arguably, a sense of being somewhere in between the West and Russia is still a popular frame of

reference for Baltic societies. A more subtle analysis reveals a moderate association and

relationship between the perception of Russia as a military threat and opinion on Russia’s

balancing role as regards the influence of the West. That is to say, there is a much higher likelihood

to agree with Russia’s balancing role in the opinion group who think that Russia does not pose a

military threat to their country. The opposite holds true for the opinion group that perceive Russia

as a military threat. Thus, the competing images of Russia are a decisive watershed in Baltic

societies for competing geopolitical identities and a profoundly different understanding of one’s

relations with the West.

The country-level data indicate (Fig. 3) that Estonians are more likely to disagree with

Russia’s balancing role (46%), whereas roughly one fifth of Latvians and Lithuanians are uncertain

about their geopolitical choice (‘Hard to say/NA’). Nevertheless, cross-sectional analysis shows

that disapproval for Russia’s balancing role has weakened in the Baltic states by 11pp since 2016

26%

49%

15%

5%

4%

28%

46%

12%

4%

9%

17%

46%

18%

8%

11%

28%

44%

13%

4%

11%

24%

54%

11%

2%

9%

17%

44%

19%

5%

15%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

It’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other Western powers

2019

2016

Page 14: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 13

(Fig. 4). This decline has primarily translated into a growing uncertainty vis-à-vis the perceived

relations between Russia and the West. The opposition to a strong Russia has most significantly

weakened in Estonian and Lithuanian public opinion by 13pp and 11pp, respectively.

Figure 3. Attitudes toward Russia as a balancing power

Figure 4. The dynamics of public opinion toward Russia as a balancing power (2016-2019)

11%

25%

21%

25%

17%

5%

33%

29%

10%

23%

13%

27%

25%

13%

22%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

11%

21%

27%

32%

9%

8%

24%

25%

25%

18%

13%

24%

25%

21%

17%

11%

25%

21%

25%

17%

5%

33%

29%

10%

23%

13%

27%

25%

13%

22%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West

2019

2016

Page 15: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

14

The survey item that measures identification with Western values gives a more nuanced

picture as regards the Western orientation of the Baltic societies. According to the 2019 aggregate

data, almost a half of the Baltic population disagrees with the statement that there is a conflict

between their country’s traditional values and Western values. Yet a sizable opinion group (33%)

approves of this statement. Public opinion has a tendency to choose moderate attitudes in terms

of the potential value of conflict that alludes to higher flexibility. Hence, although the polarization

potential between traditional and Western values is much higher than in the item that measures

support for close cooperation with Western countries, this value-based polarization has only a

moderate character in Baltic societies.

The country-level data indicate that Latvians and Lithuanians are more likely to see a conflict

between traditional and western values (Fig. 5). A comparison of moderate answers suggests that

Lithuanians are more likely to hesitate when positioning themselves vis-à-vis traditional and

Western values. Estonia’s public opinion demonstrates the strongest and firmest consensus, as

the majority (54%) believe that the country’s traditional values and Western values are not in

conflict with each other. However, Estonians are also more likely to express uncertainty.

Figure 5. Identification with Western values

5%

18%

33%

20%

23%

5%

33%

40%

8%

14%

10%

28%

34%

11%

16%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West(2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 16: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 15

The cross-sectional analysis of aggregate data reveals that the rejection of a conflict

narrative as regards the country’s traditional values and Western values has declined in the Baltics

by 6pp over the past three years (Fig. 6). Simultaneously, uncertainty regarding relations between

traditional and Western values has strengthened. The most significant changes can be observed

in Estonia where opposition to the value conflict narrative has decreased by 15pp, but society’s

uncertainty has increased by 13pp. Lithuanian public opinion indicates less salient dynamics, but

Latvian public opinion has remained invariable over the past three years. Although the level of

polarization on the basis of the conflict between traditional and Western values has increased in

Estonia, public opinion in all three Baltic states demonstrates a persistently moderate conflict

potential. Namely, only a small portion of the Baltic population is eager to take extreme stances in

approving or rejecting the value conflict narrative.

Figure 6. The dynamics of identification with Western values (2016-2019)

Opinion on the European Union provides a more specific insight into the Western

orientation of Baltic societies (Fig. 7). Aggregate data from 2019 show that Baltic societies are

generally optimistic about the future of the EU, the majority (57%) do not believe that the EU could

soon collapse. Those who support the collapse scenario form a significantly smaller opinion group

(28%) that minimizes the conflict potential with respect to this survey item. Latvians are more

4%

18%

43%

25%

10%

9%

35%

37%

9%

10%

8%

26%

35%

13%

18%

5%

18%

33%

20%

23%

5%

33%

40%

8%

14%

10%

28%

34%

11%

16%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West

2019

2016

Page 17: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

16

likely to be sceptical about the EU’s future and are more inclined to believe that it will soon

collapse (36%), while Lithuanians and Estonians hold the equally strong consensus that the EU will

not dissolve. Nevertheless, Latvian scepticism is largely expressed in moderate terms (‘tend to

agree’). The cross-sectional data indicate that, along with decreasing uncertainty, the Baltic

societies have experienced growing optimism during the last two years, i.e. the opinion group who

disagree with the statement that the EU will soon collapse has grown by 9pp (Fig. 8). This goes in

line with other data which demonstrate the growth of a positive attitude toward the EU across the

member states after the Brexit referendum.4

Figure 7. Future of the European Union

4 Taking up the challenge: From (silent) support to actual vote. (2018). Eurobarometer Survey 90.1 of the European Parliament. A Public Opinion Monitoring Study, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2018/parlemeter-2018/report/en-parlemeter-2018.pdf

5%

19%

39%

22%

15%

3%

20%

39%

24%

14%

8%

28%

36%

13%

15%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

The European Union will soon collapse (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 18: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 17

Figure 8. The Dynamics of the public opinion toward the future of the European Union (2016-2019)

The 2019 survey measured Western orientation also in terms of recent geopolitical matters

that are of particular importance in the Baltic region. In 2016, responding to the anxiety caused by

Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine, NATO member states agreed to deploy multinational battle

groups in the Baltic states and Poland. The pro-Kremlin media and opinion leaders argued that the

reinforcement of NATO positions at Russia’s Western border poses a threat to Russia. The 2019

aggregate data reveal that the majority of people (49%) in the Baltic states do not accept such an

interpretation. However, a sizeable opinion group support it (36%), suggesting that the

deployment of NATO forces under the alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence contains a rather

high polarization potential in the Baltic societies (Fig. 9). Baltic respondents who see Russia as a

threat to their countries are more likely to think that strengthening the NATO role in the Baltics

does not pose a threat to Russia (56%). In other words, the popular perception of Russia as a

military threat is more likely to be primarily associated with support for NATO’s defensive role

rather than with NATO as a threat to Russia.

7%

20%

30%

22%

21%

5%

23%

39%

15%

18%

10%

24%

29%

11%

25%

5%

19%

39%

22%

15%

3%

20%

39%

24%

14%

8%

28%

36%

13%

15%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

The European Union will soon collapse

2019

2017

Page 19: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

18

Figure 9. NATO as a threat to Russia

The country-level data indicate that Estonians hold a stronger consensus that the

reinforcement of NATO’s presence does not pose a threat to Russia (56%). Conversely, Lithuanian

support for the narrative that NATO is a threat to Russia is significantly higher (45%). This does

not necessarily mean that the Lithuanians are more susceptible to anti-NATO rhetoric as promoted

by Russia. Acknowledging that Lithuania’s survey results demonstrate a higher polarization

potential, these results perhaps also illustrate that the association of NATO with military

mightiness is more pronounced in Lithuania compared to in Latvian or Estonian public opinion.

Another specific item in terms of the Western orientation focuses on support for Western

economic and political sanctions that were imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea and

Russia’s military engagement in Eastern Ukraine. In the Baltic states, the implementation of

Western sanctions, at least during its initial phase, were often associated with possible economic

losses due to Russia’s counter-sanctions. The pro-Kremlin media also sought to target the

willingness of the Baltic societies to support Western sanctions, framing these societies as

insignificant for Russia, but as severely damaging for Western economies, particularly for the Baltic

economies.

The 2019 aggregate data indicate the rather pluralistic attitude of the Baltic societies toward

the EU sanctions on Russia (Fig. 10). While one opinion group prefer that western sanctions are

tightened (20%), another equally sizable group support the idea of softening sanctions (25%). Yet

the strongest support is to maintain Western sanctions in their current state (33%). The country-

11%

20%

22%

34%

13%

6%

39%

29%

10%

16%

8%

24%

32%

20%

16%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states poses a threat to Russia (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 20: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 19

level data reveal that Latvians are the least likely to support either the tightening of sanctions or

the maintaining of the status quo, but are more likely to support the softening of sanctions or to

express uncertainty with respect to this issue. On contrary, Estonians demonstrate significantly

higher support for the tightening of EU sanctions on Russia. Lithuanians, in turn, are more likely to

maintain the current form of sanctions, and they are also the least likely to support the idea that

sanctions should be softened. Hence, public opinion in each Baltic country takes a different stance

on the EU sanctions for Russia. On the one hand, these data suggest that sanctions have a relatively

high polarizing potential in the Baltic societies, but, on the other hand, they also reveal that

Western orientation as regards sanctions on Russia is more pronounced among Lithuanians and

Estonians than it is among Latvians.

Figure 10. EU sanctions against Russia

25%

31%

27%

17%

22%

42%

14%

21%

15%

27%

32%

26%

Tightened

Maintained in their current form

Softened

I don’t know/Hard to say

What should be done with the current EU sanctions against Russia? (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 21: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

20

Figure 11. The dynamics of public opinion toward the EU sanctions against Russia (2016-2019)

The cross-sectional analysis indicates that support for the tightening of EU sanctions has

deteriorated in all three Baltic states since 2015, particularly in Lithuania and Estonia where

support has fallen by 22pp and 20pp, respectively (Fig. 11). These changes, however, have

reinforced support to maintain the current sanctions rather than to revise and soften them.

Therefore the most significant increase in support for maintaining the status quo can be observed

in Lithuania (17pp) and Estonia (12pp). Remarkably, Latvian public opinion, unlike public opinion

in other Baltic countries demonstrates a significant decline in support for the softening of

sanctions on Russia (11pp). This shows that the sanctions have been normalized by Latvian public

opinion in particular and by the Baltic societies in general. Concurrently, the level of uncertainty

as regards sanctions has significantly increased over the past four years. Perhaps this topic has

gradually lost its sensitivity and relevance since 2014 when the sanctions were introduced. This

also suggests that sanctions on Russia pluralizes rather than antagonizes the Baltic public opinion

vis-à-vis the EU/western economic and political measures taken against Russia after the

annexation of Crimea. It should be also highlighted that the residents of the Baltic states who see

Russia as a military threat maintain the highest likelihood to support Western sanctions. Although

this relationship has weakened since 2015, it remains relatively strong, showing that insecurity,

even if today less salient than four years ago, is still a relevant motif for why the sanctions against

Russia hold rather strong support in all Baltic societies.

44%

18%

29%

9%

54%

25%

11%

9%

31%

18%

44%

8%

25%

31%

27%

17%

22%

42%

14%

21%

15%

27%

32%

26%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Tightened

Maintained in their current form

Softened

I don’t know/Hard to say

Tightened

Maintained in their current form

Softened

I don’t know/Hard to say

Tightened

Maintained in their current form

Softened

I don’t know/Hard to say

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

What should be done with the current EU sanctions against Russia?

2019

2015

Page 22: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 21

Figure 12. Support for the statements that challenge Western orientation

Note: The categories of ‘Completely agree’ or ‘Agree’ with the given statement are merged into the categories

‘Agree’.

Interestingly, the majority of those that agree within Baltic societies regarding statements

that fully or partly contradict the Western orientation simultaneously support the idea that ‘it is in

our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other Western powers’ (Fig. 12). This

outlines a syncretic form of geopolitical thinking among the Baltic respondents that are critical

toward Western policies and values. This highlights the multi-layered and conditional character of

their Western orientation. At the same time, these data also allude to the internal polarization of

an anti-Western opinion group.

The national pride variable reveals striking differences in all three Baltic societies with

respect to a Western orientation (Fig. 13). While people who express strong national pride are

more likely to align with the Western orientation of their country, this is quite the opposite among

those who do not feel proud of being citizens of their country. A socio-demographic analysis

reveals that the Western orientation in Latvia and Estonia is differentiated along ethnic and

linguistic lines (see the table in Appendix C). In both countries, the respondents that identify with

an ethnic majority are more likely to support pro-Western ideas than the members of ethnic

minorities whose native language is mostly Russian. These attitudinal differences in Latvian and

71%

67%

67%

60%

53%

Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states posesa threat to Russia

There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the Wes

A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of theWest

The EU will soon collapse

The EU sanctions against Russia should be softened

Share of Baltic respondents who simultaneously agree that "it’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other Western powers''

Page 23: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

22

Estonian public opinion are reflected by all survey items that are explored in this section.

Furthermore, ethnic differences have regional implications, as the most Russophone regions of

Latvia and Estonia (Latgale and Ida-Viru, respectively) are more likely to demonstrate a weaker

Western orientation.

Figure 13. Support to anti-Western statements

Note: here and elsewhere in this report answers ‘Very proud’ and ‘Somewhat proud’ are merged into the category

‘Proud’ and ‘Not very proud’ and ‘Not proud at all’ is merged into the category ‘Not proud’.

The Lithuanian public opinion rarely indicates ethnicity-based division lines as regards the

Western orientation. Such differences can be observed only in terms of the EU future and the EU

sanctions against Russia where non-Lithuanians are more inclined to support Eurosceptic and pro-

Russian positions. The lower relevance of ethnic background is not surprising, because Lithuania

is an ethnically homogenous country. Hence ethnic relations do not play as important a role as

compared to Latvia and Estonia. Nevertheless, the Western orientation in Lithuania does

significantly differ on the regional basis. Although the survey results provide a somewhat

inconsistent pattern, a weaker Western orientation can be noticed in Western Lithuania (e.g. the

Vilnius County and Marijampole County), particularly in smaller towns and villages. Likewise,

education is also a more salient socio-demographic factor in Lithuania than it is in other Baltic

countries. This suggests that Lithuanians with a university degree are more likely to demonstrate

33%

36%

42%

24%

19%

14%

46%

53%

57%

58%

31%

32%

Strengthening the NATO presence in the Balticstates poses a threat to Russia

There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the Wes

A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influenceof the West

The EU will soon collapse

The EU sanctions against Russia should be softened

It is not in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other western powers

Share of Baltic respondents who are proud/not proud to be citizens of their country

Not proud

Proud

Page 24: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 23

a stronger Western orientation. Education is a significant differentiating independent variable in

all Baltic societies with respect to the EU’s future and to the attitude toward Russia’s role in

balancing Western influence. That is, the less educated residents of Baltic countries are more likely

to be sceptical about the EU’s viability and more optimistic about Russia’s role in the region.

The income level of Baltic households may also occasionally generate significant differences

in terms of the Western orientation, meaning that the wealthiest segment of society is more likely

to support pro-Western views. This is particularly pronounced in Lithuanian public opinion. The

income factor is more consistent between Estonia and Lithuania, whereas in Latvia, it has

considerably lower differentiating power. The most consistent results between the Estonian and

Lithuanian income groups can be observed in the attitude toward the EU (future, sanctions against

Russia) and toward the conflict between traditional and Western values. In both countries well-

off people are more likely to support the EU sanctions against Russia and to be more optimistic

about the EU future and they are more likely to disagree that there is a conflict between their

country’s traditional values and Western values. Notably, the analysis of specific age groups yields

the least striking fault lines within each country. The only consistent results across all Baltic

countries can be seen in the perception of the conflict between traditional values and Western

values. The 2019 survey results show that older cohorts (51+) are more likely to accept the conflict

narrative than the youngest cohort (up to 30).

Page 25: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

24

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FAILED STATE CLAIMS

The state-building problems, including a sense that democracy does not function properly,

forms an alternative context where ideological polarization may thrive. These problems nurture

populist political rhetoric and undermine social cohesion, promoting anti-elite, anti-democratic or

anti-western feelings in society. Casting doubts on the state’s sustainability may provoke

existential anxiety and exacerbate an awareness of fragile statehood. Acknowledging the analytical

problems of the ‘failed state’ concept, this report refers to the ‘failed state’ as a set of claims used

by different political actors to highlight moral, economic and political motives that frame a

particular state as an illegitimate and incapable entity. For the purposes of this report, special

survey items were designed in order to explore to what extent the failed state claims can trigger

polarization in Baltic societies. These items largely address two areas of the dysfunctional state

that Call defines as the capacity gap and the legitimacy gap.5

In order to obtain data on the state’s viability, respondents were asked to express an attitude

toward the statement that one’s country ‘cannot exist as an independent national state’.

According to the 2019 aggregate data, 64% of Baltic respondents believe that their country is

capable of existing as an independent national state, but a significantly smaller opinion group

(28%) think the opposite (Fig. 14). The country-level analysis reveals that optimism is much

stronger in Estonia and Lithuania. In Latvia, one can observe a typical polarization where 54% are

convinced about the country’s viability to exist as an independent national state, but 40% support

the opposite opinion. It should be added though that the majority of Latvians are moderate

pessimists (29%), as they ‘tend to agree’ rather than ‘strongly agree’ with the statement. The

cross-sectional data show that the belief of the Baltic societies that their countries can exist as

independent national states has increased by 9pp since 2017 (Fig. 15). The most salient changes

are registered in Estonian and Lithuanian public opinion where optimism about the state’s national

sovereignty has increased by 14pp and 9pp, respectively. In Latvia, the proportion of optimists and

pessimists has remained the same as in 2017.

5 Call, T. C. (2010) ‘Beyond the ‘failed state’: Toward conceptual alternatives’. European Journal of International Relations, 17(2): 303–326.

Page 26: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 25

Figure 14. Evaluation of the state's sovereignty

Figure 15. The dynamics of evaluation of the state's sovereignty

7%

17%

27%

44%

5%

5%

22%

36%

30%

6%

11%

30%

31%

23%

6%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

My country cannot exist as an independent national state (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

13%

19%

28%

31%

9%

5%

29%

39%

18%

9%

13%

23%

27%

22%

15%

7%

17%

27%

44%

5%

5%

22%

36%

30%

6%

11%

30%

31%

23%

6%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

My country cannot exist as an independent national state

2019

2017

Page 27: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

26

Along with an attitude toward the state’s sovereignty, Baltic respondents were also asked to

express an opinion on the statement that ‘the people of one’s country is on the edge of extinction

and will cease to exist in 100 years’. This statement is sometimes mentioned in connection with

the demographic problems in the Baltic countries. The country-level data reveal significant

differences between Baltic societies (Fig. 16). While Estonians hold the strongest consensus that

they are not on the edge of extinction and will exist as a nation also in 100 years, Lithuanians and

Latvians demonstrate much weaker agreement. This also suggests that polarization and insecurity

on the basis of national and cultural sustainability is more salient in Latvia and Lithuania than in

Estonia. The pessimistic mood of Lithuanians and Latvians, which is more often expressed in

moderate terms (‘tend to agree’), can be partly explained by the negative demographic indicators

of Lithuania and Latvia (e.g. depopulation, emigration) that marks the last 15 years or so. In

contrast, the demographic situation in Estonia has stabilized, if not improved over the last decade.6

Figure 16. Demography as a threat for the state’s existence

6 See Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level, available at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_gind&lang=en; Emigration by age and sex, available at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_emi2&lang=en

5%

13%

32%

39%

11%

11%

32%

33%

13%

12%

13%

23%

33%

16%

14%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

The people of my country are on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years(2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 28: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 27

Several survey items outline an attitude toward the more specific claims of the failed state.

Data on the attitude toward the statement that ‘the economy of one’s country is underdeveloped

and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development’ reveal significant differences

between the Baltic societies (Fig. 17). That is, Estonians demonstrate a rather moderate consensus

(59%) that opposes such a statement and sees the country’s economy in more optimistic terms.

Lithuanians and Latvians hold a similar moderate consensus, but this is located at the opposite

side of the attitudinal scale, as the majority from each state agree upon a negative assessment of

their economy’s shape and viability. Hence, two different polarization patterns emerge: between

dominant optimists and minor pessimists (Estonia) and between dominant pessimists and minor

optimists (Latvia and Lithuania). Interpreting these differences, one should take into account that

these economic attitudes are mainly expressed in moderate terms (‘tend to agree’ or ‘tend to

disagree’) which points to a possible flexibility in public opinion as well as to the temporal nature

of polarizing views as regards the local economy.

Figure 17. Opinions on economic sustainability

An opinion about the statement that ‘the existence of one’s country depends on the EU

financial assistance’ also largely illustrates the society’s economic attitude, but it also can be read

as an indicator for how Baltic societies see the economic autonomy of their countries. The 2019

5%

27%

40%

20%

8%

14%

44%

30%

5%

6%

19%

42%

29%

6%

4%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

The economy of my country is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development of the country (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 29: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

28

data reveal that Lithuanians and Latvians hold a strong consensus that their countries existence

depends on EU financial support (Fig. 18). In Estonia, this attitude also prevails, but consensus is

much weaker, as a sizable opinion group (40%) support the belief that Estonia’s existence does

not rest on the EU’s money. At the same time, Estonian public opinion is more polarized regarding

the country’s economic autonomy. Overall, these data illustrate diverse perceptions of the

country’s economic autonomy across the Baltic societies: the economic dependency narrative is

more common in Latvian and Lithuanian public opinion, whereas the economic self-sufficiency

narrative is more pronounced in Estonia.

Figure 18. Dependence on the EU's financial assistance

Regarding social inequality as another target for the failed state claims, Baltic respondents

were asked to express their attitude toward the statement that ‘poverty and unemployment

prevails in their countries’. The survey results yielded a complex picture (Fig. 19). Estonians hold a

moderate consensus (60%) that poverty and unemployment do not dominate in their country.

Quite the opposite attitude is expressed by Lithuanians who hold strong consensus (73%) that

poverty and unemployment is endemic in their country. In comparison with other Baltic states,

Latvia’s public opinion is the most polarized in terms of the perceived poverty and unemployment,

14%

40%

27%

13%

6%

27%

54%

13%

1%

4%

26%

53%

14%

4%

3%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

My country's existence depends on the EU's financial assistance (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 30: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 29

i. e. it is divided between two equally large opinion groups or between those who support (54%)

and who do not support (43%) the poverty and unemployment claim. Nevertheless, this

polarization again can be primarily characterized as moderate opposition, as extreme answers do

not dominate the overall Latvian attitude.

Figure 19. Evaluation of social inequality

Since emigration is a shared issue between the Baltic states, it is often framed as an indicator

of an ineffective state. The 2019 survey measured the attitude of Baltic societies toward the

statement that ‘every day many residents leave one’s country and do not want to live there’. The

data demonstrate a very strong consensus among Latvians and Lithuanians toward accepting this

claim (Fig. 20). In Estonia, the situation is highly polarized between supporters and opponents of

such claims. On a more general level, the data suggest that the emigration claims, particularly

those that depict the negative consequences of emigration may have great mobilizing potential in

the Baltic states. Likewise, these results show the varying impact of emigration intensity on public

opinion in relation to the awareness of the failed state. Although recent migration statistics

8%

29%

40%

20%

3%

29%

45%

23%

2%

2%

17%

37%

36%

7%

3%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Poverty and unemployment prevails in my country (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 31: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

30

suggest that the pace of emigration has slowed down in Lithuania and Latvia, this experience most

likely continues to frame the perception that many residents are still leaving the country and do

not want to live in that particular country. Conversely, in Estonia the emigration numbers are

significantly smaller, thus giving limited space for ‘the everyone-is-leaving’ narrative.

Figure 20. Emigration as an issue

Anti-elite sentiment is one of the central elements in populist political rhetoric that intends

to undermine the legitimacy of the ruling parties and the existing democratic order. The 2019 data

indicate an extreme distrust in political elite in Latvia and Lithuania where the majority – 85% and

83%, respectively – agree that politicians of their countries are corrupt and do not care about the

interests of the people (Fig. 21). In contrast, the Estonian public opinion is again profoundly

polarized, as trust and distrust in politicians are alike. These differences between the countries

can, to some extent, be explained by differences in the Corruption Perception Index, that in 2018

placed Latvia in 41th position and Lithuania in 38th position, but Estonia took a significantly higher

position (18th), meaning that Estonians are less likely to think that their public institutions are

corrupt.7

7 See Corruption Perception Index 2018, available at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018

15%

31%

35%

39%

47% 46%

30%

18%

13%10%

1% 2%

6%3% 4%

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

Every day many residents leave my country and do not want to live here (2019)

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Page 32: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 31

Figure 21. Anti-elite sentiments in the Baltic countries

A deeper analysis reveals that a sceptical attitude toward the state’s viability is strongly

associated with a disapproval of the state’s performance in particular fields (social equality,

economy, demography, public good (Fig. 22)). On the one hand, doubts about the state’s viability

can be interpreted as issue-related discontent rather than a generic and ungrounded feeling of

decay. Namely, people are inclined to generalize their specific disappointment. On the other hand,

the equally strong discontent with the state’s performance that intertwines specific fields may

signal an opinion group that is by nature sceptical about the state.

15%

31%

32%

9%

12%

41%

42%

12%

2%

3%

43%

42%

10%

1%

4%

Completely agree

Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Politicians in my country are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the people (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 33: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

32

Figure 22. Opinions on the failed state claims

Figure 23. Approval of the failed state claims

86%

82%

81%

74%

71%

50%

My country's existence depends on the EU financial assistance

Every day many residents leave my country and do not want to livethere

Country's politicians are corrupt and do not care about the interestsof the nation

Economy of my country is underdeveloped and cannot ensure thesufficient and long-term development

Poverty and unemployment prevails in my country

The people of my country are on the edge of extinction and willcease to exist in 100 years

Share of Baltic respondents who think that their country cannot exist as an independent state (2019)

70%

68%

72%

45%

49%

27%

25%

85%

89%

89%

77%

78%

66%

52%

My country's existence depends on the EU financialassistance

Every day many residents leave my country and do notwant to live there

Country's politicians are corrupt and do not care about theinterests of the nation

Economy of my country is underdeveloped and cannotensure the sufficient and long-term development

Poverty and unemployment prevails in my country

The people of my country are on the edge of extinction andwill cease to exist in 100 years

My country cannot exist as an independent state

Share of Baltic respondents who are proud/not proud to be citizens of their country

Not proud

Proud

Page 34: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 33

The national pride variable on the aggregate level indicates a conspicuous fault line between

those who strongly feel proud to be the citizens of their country and those who express no pride

at all (a relatively smaller group). While the former disagrees with the failed state claims, the latter

accepts them (Fig. 22). One’s satisfaction with life also provides significant explanatory data as

regards to susceptibility with failed state discourse (Fig. 24). Although in Lithuanian public opinion

this factor shows a less consistent differentiating role, one can also see that generally people who

are the most satisfied with their lives in a 10-point scale (assess satisfaction between 6 and 10) are

more likely to disagree with failed state claims, whereas those who are less satisfied (between 1

and 5) are more likely to accept these claims (Fig. 25).

A socio-demographic analysis again shows the different role of ethnicity in the Baltic states.

While those who identify as ethnic Latvians and ethnic Estonians are less likely to support the

failed state claims, the attitude of Lithuanians and non-Lithuanians do not reveal significant

differences. As a matter of fact, the regional factor provides more consistent results across the

Baltic societies, but here again one should take into account the underlying ethnic differences in

Latvia and Estonia. The survey data indicate that almost all failed state claims have triggered

regionally diverse reactions. In Latvia and Estonia, the failed state claims are more often accepted

in Russophone regions or counties (the Latgale region and the Harju and Ida-Viru counties).

Nevertheless, some less Russophone areas have also contributed to generating significant

differences, such as the Zemgale region in central Latvia and Hiiu County in Estonia. This suggests

that regional attitudinal differences have not only ethno-linguistic, but perhaps also a socio-

economic explanation. Moreover, the Estonian and Latvian data show that the failed state thinking

is more often supported outside capitals or other big cities, which reinforces the argument that

the ethno-linguistically marked area should be combined with other territorial variables in order

to better understand the structural conditions that constitute this polarization context. Lithuanian

public opinion approves such asymmetry, indicating that people who live in less populated areas

(towns, villages) are more likely to accept failed state claims. In particular, the residents of Western

Lithuania (Telsai, Taurage, Marijampole counties) are more likely to agree with such claims.

Page 35: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

34

Figure 24. The dynamics toward the satisfaction with life (1999-2019)

Figure 25. Approval of the failed state claims by the life satisfaction evaluation

5.9

5.09 5.27

6.696.45 6.36

7.597.26

6.69

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

Mean satisfaction with life as a whole in a 10-points scale (1 dissatisfied - 10 satisfied)

1999

2008

2019

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

1-5 6 7 8-10

Quartiles of Baltic respondents who assess their satisfaction with life as a whole in a 10-points scale (1 - dissatisfied, 10 - satisfied) (2019)

My country's existence depends on theEU financial assistance

Every day many residents leave mycountry and do not want to live there

Country's politicians are corrupt and donot care about the interests of thenation

Economy of my country isunderdeveloped and cannot ensure thesufficient and long-term development

Poverty and unemployment prevails inmy country

The people of my country are on theedge of extinction and will cease to existin 100 years

My country cannot exist as anindependent state

Page 36: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 35

Education is the most consistent socio-demographic indicator across the Baltic states, this

generates differences concerning all failed state categories. According to this indicator, the most

educated part of Baltic societies is less susceptible to the failed state discourse. In contrast, the

household income variable yields less consistent findings, showing that the income level has a

rather conditional character in supporting or opposing the failed state claims. The most consistent

results of income groups across the Baltic states are associated with socio-economic topics,

revealing that the wealthiest segments in Baltic societies are less likely to agree that their country’s

economy is underdeveloped and cannot ensure a sufficient and long-term development, or that

poverty and unemployment prevails in their country or that every day many residents leave their

country and do not want to live there. The differences between age groups, again show the least

significant and consistent results, which means that a generational perspective will hardly

contribute toward explaining failed state thinking and that this mindset largely intertwines with

society as a whole.

ATTITUDE TOWARD IMMIGRANTS

An anti-immigrant sentiment is currently a very prominent issue in European societies. The

2015 refugee crisis in Europe also exacerbated this feeling in the Baltic states. Simultaneously,

massive emigration over the last 15 years and aging societies evoke discussions about the

necessity for labour migrants. Hence, the immigration issue has created a relatively new context

for ideological polarization in Baltic societies.

The 2019 survey included four items that provided data concerning attitudes toward

immigrants. The first item deals with the perception of foreigners in general. Respondents were

asked to express an attitude toward the statement that ‘it is impossible for people who do not

share the customs and traditions of one’s country to become fully attached to this country’. The

aggregate data show that the majority of Baltic respondents (46%) agree with such a statement,

but a much smaller portion (22%) disagrees (Fig. 26). The country-level data reveal that Latvians

are more likely to associate the acquisition of Latvia’s customs and traditions as a profound

precondition for belonging to Latvia, whereas Lithuanians are less likely to support such a

maximalist acculturation practice. Thus Lithuanians, ethnically the most homogenous society in

the Baltic states, appear more open to cultural diversity in their country compared to Latvians,

ethnically the most diverse society.

Page 37: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

36

Figure 26. General perception of immigrants

Note: a compressed scale is used in all charts of this section and the next section. ‘Completely agree’ and ‘Agree’

are merged into the categories ‘Agree’, and ‘Disagree’ and ‘Completely disagree’ is merged into the category

‘Disagree’.

The cross-sectional aggregate data indicate that support for the statement about the

necessity to share the customs and traditions of one’s country has declined by 16pp over the last

six years (Fig. 27). This means that tolerance toward cultural pluralism has increased in all three

Baltic societies. Country-level analysis reveals that Estonian public opinion has experienced the

sharpest decline in the assimilationist attitude (19pp). In the Latvian case, this decline has

significantly increased (13pp) indifference toward the requirement that people should share

Latvia’s customs and traditions if they truly want to belong to Latvia. Namely, Latvians have

become less opinionated about the proper way for how foreigners can become fully attached to

Latvia, which may allude to the increasing tolerance to other cultures as well as about increasing

reluctance toward expressing an assimilation-oriented opinion about the members of other

cultures who live in Latvia.

45%

25%

26%

4%

42%

31%

24%

3%

51%

28%

18%

2%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Hard to say/ NA

It is impossible for people who do not share my country's customs and traditions to become fully attached to my country (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 38: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 37

Figure 27. The dynamics of public opinion toward foreigners (2013-2019)

In order to measure the attitude toward immigrants, three specific statements were used.

The 2019 aggregate data reveal that support for the statement that ‘immigrants increase crime

rates’ (Fig. 28 and Fig. 29) is much higher than the approval of statements that ‘immigrants take

jobs away from people who were born in one’s country’ (Fig. 30 and Fig. 31) or that ‘the culture

of one’s country is generally undermined by immigrants’ (Fig. 32 and Fig. 33). The least accepted

statement across the Baltic societies is that ‘immigrants are a threat to the country’s culture’,

which means that anti-immigrant sentiment is more likely to be rooted in the social order narrative

(crime, jobs) than in fear from intercultural encounters. Perhaps willingness to maintain the extant

social order can be more prone to triggering defensive thinking and polarization with respect to

immigrants. The 2019 aggregate data exposed a strong association between all three immigrant-

related statements, which means that people who express a negative attitude in one context

(socially deviant behaviour) are quite likely to maintain this attitude in another context (threat to

the labour market). This shows that the anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant opinion groups

represent a somewhat coherent rather than just a conditional attitudinal segment within the Baltic

societies. Moreover, as the cross-sectional data show, attitudinal coherence has even

strengthened since 2013.

64%

18%

14%

4%

56%

27%

15%

2%

67%

15%

17%

1%

45%

25%

26%

4%

42%

31%

24%

3%

51%

28%

18%

2%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

It is impossible for people who do not share my country's customs and traditions to become fully attached to my country

2019

2013

Page 39: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

38

Figure 28. Immigrants as a source for crime

Figure 29. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as source of crime (2013-2019)

47%

22%

22%

9%

29%

38%

27%

6%

50%

26%

20%

4%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Immigrants increase crime rates (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

37%

29%

24%

27%

31%

28%

39%

23%

33%

47%

22%

22%

29%

38%

27%

50%

26%

20%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

Immigrants increase crime rates

2019

2013

Page 40: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 39

Figure 30. Immigrants as a threat to job market

Figure 31. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as a threat to job markets (2013-2019)

34%

21%

39%

6%

36%

33%

29%

3%

35%

29%

33%

3%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Immigrants take jobs away from people that were born in my country (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

32%

32%

28%

52%

27%

17%

57%

18%

23%

34%

21%

39%

36%

33%

29%

35%

29%

33%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in my country

2019

2013

Page 41: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

40

The relationship analysis between the three anti-immigrant statements indicates that the

opinion on immigrants as job stealers is more likely to be shaped (reinforced/weakened) by the

people’s opinion of immigrants as criminals or cultural invaders rather than the other way around.

Taking into account the relatively small share of new immigrants in the Baltic societies and thus a

rather limited experience, the relations between different stereotypes alludes to a possible

priming effect. That is, inter/nationally mediated negative images become a major source of one’s

anti-immigrant opinion that continues framing immigrants in less sensitive contexts, e. g.

immigrants as a workforce for the local economies. Overall, though, these data suggest that the

level of polarization as regards immigration is somewhat moderate in the Baltic states and that it

leans toward pluralistic rather than antagonistic polarization. The presence of a large group of

people who neither support nor oppose the prejudice about immigrants is a crucial factor that

reinforces a pluralistic pattern in Baltic public opinion. Moreover, this reluctant segment is

surprisingly persistent in time.

Figure 32. Immigrants as a threat to local culture

30%

20%

44%

6%

26%

32%

38%

4%

30%

29%

37%

4%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Hard to say/ NA

My country's culture is generally undermined by immigrants (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 42: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 41

Figure 33. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as a threat to local culture (2013-2019)

The country-level analysis reveals that significant differences exist between the Baltic

societies only with respect to the statement that ‘immigrants increase crime rates’. Lithuanians

are less likely to agree with this statement. Thus, Latvian and Estonian public opinion might be

more susceptible to the socially deviant image of immigrants. The cross-sectional data generally

indicate that the association of immigrants with an increasing crime rate and with a threat to

country’s culture has strengthened in Baltic public opinion by 8pp and 5pp, respectively. On the

contrary, the link between immigrants and job losses has weakened by 8pp. From these results,

one may tentatively conclude that the attitude toward labour migrants from culturally familiar

countries has a higher likelihood to develop into a more migrant-friendly attitude while

refugees/immigrants from culturally and socially unfamiliar countries have a higher likelihood to

increase anti-immigrant sentiment.

The country-level analysis also reveals quite complex dynamics since 2013. In Latvia and

Estonia, support for the statement that immigrants increase crime rates has risen by 11pp and

9pp, respectively, whereas it has remained unchanged in Lithuania. Conversely, the approval of

the statement that immigrants take jobs away has declined in Latvia (23pp) and Lithuania (17pp),

but has remained unchanged in Estonian public opinion. Finally, support toward framing

immigrants as a threat to national culture has increased in Estonia (12pp) and Lithuania (6pp), but

has slightly fallen in Latvia (5pp). These dynamics hence illustrate that the Latvian attitude toward

18%

29%

40%

19%

36%

37%

34%

21%

42%

30%

20%

44%

26%

32%

38%

30%

29%

37%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

My country's culture is generally undermined by immigrants

2019

2013

Page 43: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

42

immigrants has experienced the most extensive changes in relation to the strengthening of the

deviant and asocial representation of immigrants and with the weakening of other negative

representations, e.g. immigrants as job stealers or a threat to local traditions and customs.

According to these data, the smallest increase in resentment toward immigrants can be

observed in Lithuania. In contrast, Estonian public opinion demonstrates the most salient increase

in anti-immigrant sentiment since 2013. This perhaps explains why the Conservative People's Party

of Estonia (EKRE), which secured the third place in the 2019 national elections, used anti-

immigration rhetoric as one of the central issues during their election campaign. Regardless of the

different attitudinal patterns that can be detected in Baltic societies in relation to immigrants, a

common characteristic in all three countries is the presence of a somewhat steady and neutral, if

not improving, opinion on immigrants as a labour force that can contribute to local economies.

Figure 34. Approval of the anti-immigrant statements

A comparative analysis of the aggregate data reveals that the residents of the Baltic states

that can be analytically categorized as ‘cultural assimilationists’8 are divided into those agreeing

with anti-immigrant statements and those disagreeing (Fig. 34). Thus, support for the

8 They believe that it is impossible for people who do not share their country’s customs and traditions to become fully attached to their country.

55%

44%

40%

Immigrants increase crime rates

Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in mycountry

My country's culture is generally undermined by immigrants

Share of Baltic respondents who believe that it is impossible for people who do not share their country’s customs and traditions to become fully attached to their country (2019)

Page 44: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 43

assimilationist strategy toward foreigners does not necessarily mean higher support for to

stereotypical anti-immigrant statements. Moreover, the national pride variable indicates an

inconsistent pattern across the Baltic states. On the one hand, a strong sense of pride about

belonging to one’s country is a characteristic feature for cultural assimilationists. On the other

hand, stronger national pride is again not associated with a higher likelihood to support anti-

immigrant claims. In fact, this significantly reduces such likelihood (Fig. 35). Simultaneously, one

should take into account that Latvian public opinion vis-à-vis two out of three anti-immigrant

statements does not indicate any statistically significant differences among those that express

strong national pride and those that do not. Thus national identification, in general, is a weaker

differentiating factor in the Latvian attitude toward immigrants.

Figure 35. Support to anti-immigrant statements

The analysis of socio-demographic data reveals that the area (county or region) where

people live generates the most consistent differences across the Baltic states. Latvian public

opinion shows that the people that live in the capital of Latvia, Riga, are more likely to disagree

with anti-immigrant sentiment. In Estonia, the differences between big cities and smaller towns

53%

43%

32%

29%

41%

51%

46%

36%

People who do not share their country’s customs and traditions cannot become fully attached to their

country

Immigrants increase crime rates

Immigrants take jobs away from people who wereborn in my country

My country's culture is generally undermined byimmigrants

Share of Baltic respondents who are proud/not proud to be citizens of their country (2019)

Not proud

Proud

Page 45: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

44

are even more salient than in other Baltic countries. The residents of Harju County demonstrate

the most consistent anti-immigrant attitudes within the Estonian context. In Lithuania, the

residents of medium-sized cities are more likely to accept anti-immigrant sentiment, but the most

consistent anti-immigrant attitudes can be observed in Kaunas County. Ethnic background is a less

important differentiating factor in terms of attitudes toward immigrants. The most considerable

attitudinal differences are registered in Estonia where the respondents that identify with the

ethnic Estonian majority are more likely to be reluctant toward the statement that immigrants

increase crime rates and more likely to disagree that immigrants take jobs away from people that

were born in Estonia.

The education indicator reveals significant differences only in Latvia and Estonia where

people with a university degree are more likely to disagree with anti-immigrant statements.

Respondents from this category generally demonstrate a more welcoming attitude toward

foreigners. The household income groups also indicate less significant and regular differences.

However, incomes are an important determinant in Lithuania, revealing somewhat surprising

results. That is, the second highest income quintile (an average household income 1001 – 1401

EUR) is more likely to agree with anti-immigrant statements, whereas the representatives of the

highest quintile are more likely to disagree with these statements. In comparison previous two

polarization contexts, anti-immigrant sentiment shows that age groups play a more crucial role for

generating cleavages in public opinion. This can be specifically observed in Estonia and Lithuania

where three anti-immigrant items indicate significant differences across age groups. These reveal

that the youngest generation of Lithuanians (up to 30) are more likely to disagree with anti-

immigrant discourse. Conversely, in Estonia, the oldest generation (62 and above) are more likely

to express a negative attitude toward immigrants. The only consistent findings across all Baltic

societies indicate that the oldest generation is more likely to agree that it is impossible for people

that do not share national customs and traditions to become fully attached to one’s country.

Page 46: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 45

ATTITUDES TOWARD PROTECTIONISM

Protectionism can also become a source of ideological polarization. As long as neo-liberal

values clash with locally embedded thinking and needs, a protectionist ethos fits well within a

populist agenda. The election of Donald Trump as the US president and the Brexit referendum are

two landmark events that have globally illustrated and legitimized protectionist discourse. To be

sure, in the Baltic states and elsewhere, the localized versions of such a discourse have been in

existence in their own right. Furthermore, the pro-Kremlin media have keen to remind that the

Baltic states are vassals of EU and US commercial interests and do not have their own national

economies. In this section, four survey items are used to measure the level and nature of

protectionism in Baltic societies.

The first item focuses on economic protectionism, stating that ‘one’s country should limit

the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy’. The 2019 results show a

fragmented sociological picture that indicates significant differences between the Baltic states.

According to the 2019 data, Latvians are more likely to agree that the import of foreign products

should be limited, whereas Estonians demonstrate the lowest support for such an idea (Fig. 36).

In other words, while Latvians hold a moderate consensus on economic protectionism, Estonians

demonstrate an equally moderate consensus on trade openness. Lithuanians, in turn, seem to be

the most pluralistic, as there is not a dominant opinion group as regards the proposal to revise

Lithuania’s import policy.

Figure 36. Economic nationalism in the Baltic countries

27%

20%

43%

9%

32%

32%

32%

3%

48%

28%

21%

3%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Hard to say/ NA

My country should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 47: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

46

Figure 37. The dynamics of economic nationalism in the Baltic countries (2013-2019)

The cross-sectional analysis reveals changes in all Baltic countries since 2013 that, on an

aggregate level, indicate decreasing support for the idea of limiting the import of foreign products

(Fig. 37). The data show that support for limiting the import of products in order to foster the

national economy has fallen by 14pp over the last six years, and this has strengthened opposition

toward such protectionist measures. Latvia’s public opinion displays the most conspicuous decline,

and this holds true even if one takes into account the results from the 1995 and 2003 surveys

(Estonia and Lithuania were not included in these survey waves). Likewise, with weakening

support for protectionist ideas, the number of reluctant respondents in Latvian public opinion or

those that approve neither sides has increased by 15pp. Similar dynamics can be observed in

Lithuania. Contrary to the previous two cases, Estonian public opinion has instead demonstrated

the strongest increase in opposition toward the revision of import policy.

The survey item that measures attitudes toward the statement that ‘large international

companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in one’s country’ also measures

the economic dimension of protectionism. The 2019 data reveal that Latvians are more likely to

take a negative perspective on international companies, whereas Estonians and Lithuanians

demonstrate equally low support and higher pluralism toward such statements (Fig. 38). Since

2013, cross-sectional analysis indicates that public opinion in the Baltic states has been rather

steady in its framing of international companies as a damaging factor for local businesses (Fig. 39).

In Lithuania and Latvia, the negative attitude toward international companies has slightly

deteriorated by 6pp and 4pp, respectively. In the Latvian case, where three survey waves are

available, one can notice that this incremental decline is a continuous trend over the last 15 years.

30%

30%

31%

43%

23%

28%

72%

14%

12%

27%

20%

43%

32%

32%

32%

48%

28%

21%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

My country should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy

2019

2013

Page 48: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 47

Figure 38. Attitudes toward international companies

Figure 39. The dynamics of public opinion toward large international companies

40%

22%

23%

15%

36%

34%

24%

7%

56%

22%

14%

8%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in my country (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

40%

27%

19%

46%

24%

20%

61%

20%

15%

40%

22%

23%

36%

34%

24%

56%

22%

14%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in my country

2019

2013

Page 49: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

48

The third protectionism-related item measures an attitude toward the proposal that

‘foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in one’s country’. In this statement, the economic

(land as a recourse) and symbolic (land as a part of the nation’s territory) dimensions of

protectionism overlap. The aggregate data show that support for restricting the land ownership

rights of foreigners is a somewhat popular idea in the Baltic states. Yet this topic has only a limited

possibility to trigger antagonistic polarization. This is because pluralistic public opinion dominates

in all countries. These findings do suggest that large opinion groups within Baltic societies are

susceptible to protectionism-induced discourse.

The 2019 country-level results again mark Latvia as the most protectionist-minded country

where 61% support the ban on foreigners’ rights to purchase land (Fig. 40). These results also

mean that protectionist thinking in terms of land ownership can generate a much stronger

consensus in Latvia compared to the idea of limiting the import of products. Arguably, this is

because the former consensus is triggered by a mixed motif (economic and symbolic), whereas

the latter emerges from purely economic considerations. Estonians and Lithuanians are, to a

similar extent, both less likely to accept restrictive measures with respect to land ownership.

However, the explicit disapproval of a restrictive policy is higher in Estonia than in Lithuania (26%

vs. 14%, respectively). The cross-sectional aggregate data show a rather stable public opinion

picture regarding land ownership. In particular, this applies to Latvia and Lithuania (Fig. 41).

Estonians, in turn, have become more inclined to think in protectionist terms, i. e. demonstrate

support toward restricting land ownership rights has increased by 13pp since 2013.

Figure 40. Opinions on foreigners’ right to purchase land

49%

19%

26%

6%

52%

28%

15%

5%

61%

21%

13%

5%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Hard to say/ NA

Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in my country (2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

Page 50: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 49

Figure 41. The dynamics of public opinion toward foreigners’ right to purchase land (2013-2019)

The last protectionism-related item focuses on the sovereignty issue. This measures

respondents’ attitudes toward the statement that ‘international organizations are taking away too

much power from the government of one’s country’. 2019 survey results reveal somewhat

fractured and pluralistic public opinion in the Baltic states (Fig. 42). Although Latvians are more

likely to think that international organizations eliminate their country’s sovereignty (46%), there is

a sizeable opinion group that is either reluctant or opposes such an assumption (41%). Lithuanian

public opinion is the least likely to accept and the most likely to explicitly oppose the same claim

about the influence of international organizations. Arguably, in this respect, Lithuanians have a

higher awareness of their country’s sovereignty compared to Estonians and Latvians. In Estonia,

one may observe the highest level of uncertainty vis-à-vis the influence of international

organizations; this means that Estonian public opinion may have the highest potential for change

as regards assessment of the role of international organizations.

36%

21%

33%

55%

19%

19%

66%

19%

13%

49%

19%

26%

52%

28%

15%

61%

21%

13%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in my country

2019

2013

Page 51: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

50

Figure 42. Assessment of the international organizations

Figure 43. The dynamics of public opinion toward the assessment of the international organizations

43%

18%

18%

21%

37%

32%

22%

9%

46%

27%

14%

13%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Hard to say/ NA

International organizations are taking away too much power from my country's government(2019)

Latvia

Lithuania

Estonia

44%

20%

14%

37%

29%

14%

60%

21%

13%

43%

18%

18%

37%

32%

22%

46%

27%

14%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Agree

Neither agree or disagree

Disagree

Esto

nia

Lith

uan

iaLa

tvia

International organizations are taking away too much power from my country's government

2019

2013

Page 52: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 51

The cross-sectional aggregate data indicate that public opinion in Baltic societies has

maintained a rather stable attitude toward the influence of international organizations (Fig. 43).

The most significant changes are registered in Latvia where a negative perception of international

organizations has decreased by 14pp since 2013. Nevertheless, such attitudinal changes have

strengthened Latvian reluctance or uncertainty as distinct from outright opposition toward the

claim that international organizations are taking away too much power from the government of

Latvia. Moreover, a critical attitude toward the influence of international organizations, as the first

wave data on Latvia demonstrated, has been even lower at the beginning of the 2000s. In other

words, the cross-sectional analysis does not suggest that Latvians’ trust in international

organizations per se has increased. Conversely, explicit opposition to the claim that international

organizations usurp too much power has risen in Estonian and Lithuanian public opinion by 4pp

and 8pp, respectively. Overall, cross-sectional analysis suggests that the image of international

organisations portrayed by protectionist claims has higher polarization potential today than this

did six years ago.

Figure 44. Approval of protectionist statements

Interestingly, around half of the Baltic respondents that believe that their country’s economy

is underdeveloped and cannot ensure sufficient and long-term development also simultaneously

support protectionist policies (Fig. 44). That is, a progressive economic policy, in their

understanding, is most likely associated with protectionism. These findings suggest that the

protectionist solutions to economic problems in the Baltic states may trigger polarization between

57%

51%

50%

42%

Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in my country.

Large international companies are doing more and more damage tolocal businesses in my country.

International organizations are taking away too much power frommy country's government.

My country should limit the import of foreign products in order toprotect its national economy.

Share of those Baltic respondents that agree that their country’s economy is underdeveloped and cannot ensure sufficient and long-term development (2019)

Page 53: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

52

protectionists and ‘internationalists’. The national pride variable reveals an inconsistent link with

protectionism. The data on Estonia shows the strongest association in this context, suggesting that

people that express the strongest national pride are less likely to accept protectionist claims (Fig.

45). In Latvia, such an association has a weaker character, but in Lithuania, national pride largely

does not generate significant differences between diverse opinion groups. Hence, national

identification in Baltic societies yields a somewhat limited contribution to protectionism as a

context for ideological polarization.

The socio-demographic analysis shows that regional variation within a country again creates

the most significant and consistent differences across all Baltic states. In Latvia, these differences

have an inconsistent character with respect to protectionism, as regions with the strongest

differentiating power vary in line with survey items. In contrast, no significant variations can be

observed among the capital, bigger cities, and villages. This means that protectionism is supported

by an opinion group that is embedded in nationally rather than locally specific thinking. However,

these findings show that protectionism is not exclusively supported in regions which are

dominated by ethnic Latvians or in Russophone areas. In Estonia, the residents of Tallinn are less

likely to support protectionist ideas, whereas those that live in villages are more likely to align with

the protectionist claims. According to data, the residents of the Harju County display a consistently

higher likelihood to agree with protectionist statements. In Lithuania, the residents of

Marijampole and Taurage counties, once again, differ significantly from other areas of Lithuania.

These areas demonstrate higher support for protectionism.

Figure 45. Support for protectionism in the Baltic countries

59%

47%

46%

35%

57%

55%

56%

46%

Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in mycountry.

Large international companies are doing more andmore damage to local businesses in my country.

International organizations are taking away too muchpower from my country's government.

My country should limit the import of foreignproducts in order to protect its national economy.

Share of Baltic respondents who are proud/not proud to be citizens of their country (2019)

Not proud

Proud

Page 54: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 53

Estonia is the only country where ethnic identification can be associated with relevant

differences concerning protectionism. Nevertheless, data reveal an inconsistent pattern in terms

of different protectionism-related items. That is, depending on the particular protectionist claim,

ethnic Estonians can be either more likely to support or to disagree or to take a reluctant position

in terms of protectionist ideas. Thus, regardless of the salience of the ethnic identification, this

analysis does not indicate that Estonia’s ethnic majority or ethnic minorities are more inclined to

support protectionism. The education indicator in this polarization context also unveils

inconsistency between the countries. The country-level results, though, show that education plays

a significant and consistent differentiating role in Estonia as people with a university degree are

more likely to disagree with protectionist ideas, whereas Estonians who have secondary or

vocational education are more likely to accept these ideas. Household income groups are able to

generate results that illustrate the Baltic states in a more consistent light. Overall, these findings

show that the wealthiest people in all countries are more likely to disagree with the protectionist

ideas. The income factor in creating attitudinal differences is particularly relevant in Estonia and

Lithuania.

The protectionism context creates the most significant and consistent differences between

age groups. These differences mostly insist that the youngest generation (up to 30) in Baltic

societies are more likely to disagree with protectionist ideas, whereas the oldest generation (62

and above) are more likely to support them. Arguably, this relationship is stronger in Latvia and

Estonia and is more pronounced in terms of the proposal to limit the import of foreign products

in order to protect their country’s national economy and to prohibit foreigners from buying the

country’s land.

Page 55: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

54

IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION: A BIRD’S EYE V IEW

THE WESTERN ORIENTATION INDEX

The attitudes of respondents can be broadly characterized as pro-Western or anti-Western.

They were captured in our questionnaire by using a battery of items from the block Q1 (see

Appendix A).

In order to reduce the complexity of data that arises from the use of many related items, a

principal component analysis (PCA, Varimax rotation) was used. The analysis reveals that all the

aforementioned questions are significantly, although moderately, correlated, and if they are

compiled into one summary factor, this explains 42% of variation in the data. Crombach’s Alpha

value of 0.65 confirms that the five questions, taken together, form a reliable scale. Accordingly,

using these five questions, the Western orientation index was calculated. It ranges from 1 to 5,

with ‘1’ meaning an extremely cold feeling toward the West, and ‘5’ – an extremely warm feeling.

Figure 46. Distribution of attitudes toward the West (2019)

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely anti-Western) to 4 (extremely pro-

Western). For example, 59 respondents of the 2019 survey had extremely pro-Western attitudes.

Page 56: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 55

According to the T-test, the attitude of Baltic respondents toward the West is significantly

warmer than it is colder. The mean value is 2.8. Country-level analysis shows that a pro-Western

stance is more common in Estonia (2.93), whereas an anti-Western orientation is most

pronounced in Latvia (mean value 2.7). Notably, 16% of Latvians hold very strong anti-Western

attitudes (a score of 2 or lower), but in Estonia and Lithuania this opinion group is much lower

(7%). Overall, in Lithuania, ‘somewhat warm’ feelings often dominate (mean value 2.69).

Figure 47. Distribution of attitudes toward the West in three Baltic countries (2019)

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely anti-Western) to 4 (extremely pro-

Western) in each of the Baltic states.

The cross-sectional analysis shows that the general feeling in the Baltic societies toward the

West has become somewhat colder since 2013. The independent-samples T test indicates that the

aggregate changes from 2.84 to 2.77 are not statistically significant. However, these are significant

on the country level for Estonia and Lithuania.

0%2%4%6%8%

10%12%14%16%18%

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

Page 57: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

56

Figure 48. The Western orientation index in the Baltic countries in 2016 and 2019

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely anti-Western) to 4 (extremely pro-

Western) in each of the Baltic states in year 2006 and 2019.

THE FAILED STATE INDEX

In order to test the concept of Latvia (Estonia/Lithuania) as a failed state, several additional

questions were included in the questionnaire (questions in the Q5 block, see Appendix A).

The analysis shows that all seven questions correlate very well, and the one factor solution

suggested by the Principal component analysis explains 53% of the variation in our data.

Moreover, Crombach’s alfa (0,85) confirms that they form a coherent scale. Therefore, on the

basis of these questions, an index from 1 to 5 was calculated where ‘1’ means that a respondent

aligns with the failed state discourse, but ‘5’ means that a respondent sees the state as a successful

and viable social system.

2.97

2.81

2.69

2.92

2.74

2.65

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

The Western orientation index

2016

2019

Page 58: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 57

Figure 49. Distribution in the perception of the country

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely negative perception, i.e., a failed

state) to 4 (extremely positive perception).

This comparison of the Baltic states reveals that Estonians perceive their country much more

positively than the inhabitants of the other two Baltic states (mean evaluation 2.76). In Lithuania,

the value of the index is 2.19, but in Latvia it is 2.17. Overall, in Estonia there are many more people

that have a positive rather than a negative view of their country, whereas in Latvia and Lithuania

a skeptical opinion predominates. A profoundly negative perception of their country (evaluation 2

or lower) is characteristic to 44% of Latvians, 41% of Lithuanians and just 13% of Estonians.

Figure 50. The perception of the state in the Baltics

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely negative perception, i.e., a failed

state) to 4 (extremely positive perception) in each of the Baltic states.

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

Faile

d s

tate 1.1

1.3

1.4

1.6

1.7

1.9

2.0

2.1

2.3

2.4

2.6

2.7

2.9

3.0

3.1

3.3

3.4

3.6

3.7

3.9

Succ

essf

ul…

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

Page 59: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

58

THE XENOPHOBIA INDEX

Four questions in the questionnaire aimed to capture respondents’ attitudes toward

immigrants (questions 1 to 4 in the Q8 block, see Appendix A). As the first item, “It is impossible

for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to

[COUNTRY]” did not correlate well with other items, it was excluded from the index.

Using the remaining three items, an index of xenophobia was created that ranges from 1 to

5, and where ‘1’ means an extremely negative attitude toward immigrants and ‘5’ – an extremely

positive attitude toward immigrants. According to the Principal component analysis, these three

variables explain 74% of the variation in the data, and the Crombach’s Alpha test value of 0.81

confirms that they form a reliable scale in all three Baltic countries. According to this index a very

negative attitude toward immigrants (2 or less on the xenophobia scale) is shared by 26%-27% of

Latvians and Estonians, and by 21% of Lithuanians. This suggests that, under normal

circumstances, attitudes are moderately negative, but not extremely negative in Baltic societies.

Figure 51. Distribution of attitudes toward immigrants

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely negative attitude) to 5 (extremely

positive attitude).

Page 60: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 59

Figure 52. Distribution of attitudes toward immigrants in three Baltic countries

Figure 53. The xenophobia index

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely negative attitude) to 5 (extremely positive

attitude) in all Baltic states.

In general, as confirmed by a one-sample T test, attitudes toward immigrants in the Baltic

states are more negative than positive (mean value in the xenophobia index–2.9). Moreover, they

are rather stable over time, as the only notable changes can be observed in Latvia where an

attitude toward immigrants has become more positive since 1995. Beyond this, over recent times

in the Baltic states, there have not been any notable changes in the generally negative attitudes

held toward immigrants.

0.0%

5.0%

10.0%

15.0%

20.0%

25.0%

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

3.01

2.93 2.942.98

2.60

2.842.80 2.83

2.30

2.40

2.50

2.60

2.70

2.80

2.90

3.00

3.10

2013 2019 2013 2019 1995 2003 2013 2019

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

Page 61: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

60

THE PROTECTIONISM INDEX

The last index illustrates a general attitude toward protectionism in the Baltic states

(questions 5 to 8 in the Q8 block, see Appendix A). Considering that all four protectionism-related

items are strongly correlated, and the Principal component analysis suggests a one-factor solution

(the variables explain 53% of the variation in the data and all have high factor loadings), an index

was created that ranges from 1 to 5. In this case, ‘1’ means that a person strongly supports

protectionism, whereas ‘5’ means complete openness to international competition and

cooperation. Crombach’s Alpha of 0.7 confirms that variables form an acceptable scale. The data

reveal a relatively high level of support for protectionism across the Baltic countries. The average

value on the protectionism scale is 2.63.

Figure 54. Distribution of openness to free trade

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely protective) to 5 (fully open to

competition).

Cross-sectional analysis demonstrates that Latvians are more prone to accept protectionist

claims compared to Estonians and Lithuanians. However, the dispersion analysis (ANOVA) shows

that Baltic populations are also becoming more open to free trade.

Page 62: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 61

Figure 55. Distribution of openness toward competition in three Baltic countries

Figure 56. The dynamics of public opinion toward the openness to free trade (2013-2019)

Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely protective) to 5 (fully open to

competition) in all Baltic states.

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

12%

14%

16%

18%

20%

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

2.69 2.782.62 2.73

2.382.19

2.48 2.39

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

2013 2019 2013 2019 1995 2003 2013 2019

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

Page 63: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

62

OPINION GROUPS

This section focuses on the composition of particular opinion groups that are behind the

ideological attitudes of Baltic societies, outlined in the previous sections. The 2019 survey used

two items for the purpose of controlling the survey items related to polarization topics. These

control variables measure one’s engagement with political information, indicating the level of

exposure to political news and informal discussions about politics.9 Three opinion groups can be

distinguished on the basis of these items: opinion leaders, opinion seekers, and politically

alienated people. The logic that determined the coding of these groups is shown in Table 1. The

distribution for these groups is similar in all Baltic countries with the caveat that in Lithuania there

are slightly more opinion leaders (16%, Fig.58).

Figure 57. Distribution of the opinion groups in the society of the Baltic states

Note: The figure shows the proportional distribution of society of the Baltic states into the three defined opinion

groups.

9 ‘How often do you follow political events via television, radio, newspapers or through internet sites, including social media (Facebook, Twitter, VKontakte u. c.)?’ and ‘When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?’. The latter question is from the European Value Survey.

13%

46%

41%

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Opinion leaders Opinion seekers Politically alienated

Page 64: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 63

Table 1. Following news and discussing political matters among opinion groups

When meeting friends, how often do you

discuss political issues?

Often Sometimes Never

How frequently do

you follow political

events in the

media?

Every day 13.3% 30.2% 6.8%

Several times a week 1.5% 15.1% 3.8%

One or two times a

week .3% 8.4% 3.9%

Less often .2% 5.0% 6.1%

Never .1% 1.3% 4.0%

Note: The table shows the proportion of respondents in the Baltic states whose answers fall within a particular cell.

For example, 13.3 per cent follow political events in the media every day AND discuss political issues with friends

often. The highlighting shows to which opinion groups respondents with such self-assessment belong, e.g. the

previously mentioned 13.3% of respondents are categorized as opinion leaders (the red color area). The orange cells

mark opinion seekers, and the blue cells designate the politically alienated group.

Figure 58. Opinion groups in the Baltic countries

Note: The figure shows the percentage distribution of opinion groups in the Baltic states

11.7

45.343.0

16.3

46.2

37.5

11.2

46.8

42.0

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

30.0

35.0

40.0

45.0

50.0

Opinionleaders

Opinionseekers

Politicallyalienated

Opinionleaders

Opinionseekers

Politicallyalienated

Opinionleaders

Opinionseekers

Politicallyalienated

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

Page 65: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

64

Looking at their respective attitudes, one can notice that Estonian and Lithuanian opinion

leaders in general tend to harbor more pro-Western attitudes and a more positive view of their

own country. Opinion leaders are less exposed to the failed state discourse, and, considering their

impact on the development of others, we can expect more positive dynamics in the future.

However, the more pro-Western orientation of opinion leaders has not stopped the rise of

skepticism against the West in Lithuania and Estonia. This could be associated with targeted

content provided by certain media channels that opinion leaders are unable to fully counteract. In

Latvia, however, opinion leaders cannot be particularly associated with pro-Western orientation

or with weaker exposure to the failed state discourse. In fact, they are even more skeptical toward

the Latvian state than opinion seekers (though less than the politically alienated group). In all Baltic

countries, opinion leaders do not express a more positive attitude toward immigrants and they

are not more open toward international trade competition. The skepticism toward immigrants

that is expressed among opinion leaders is one of the reasons for why anti-immigrant feeling tends

to persist in the Baltic states, and, judging from the data, we cannot expect significant changes to

occur in the near future.

Table 2. The opinion groups’ profiles

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

Op

inio

n le

ader

s

Op

inio

n s

eeke

rs

Polit

ical

ly a

lien

ated

Op

inio

n le

ader

s

Op

inio

n s

eeke

rs

Polit

ical

ly a

lien

ated

Op

inio

n le

ader

s

Op

inio

n s

eeke

rs

Polit

ical

ly a

lien

ated

Western

orientation 2.98 2.94 2.91 2.81 2.76 2.67 2.72 2.77 2.57

Exposure to

failed state

discourse

2.89 2.77 2.70 2.31 2.13 2.20 2.18 2.28 2.05

Attitude

toward

immigrants

2.96 2.98 2.88 2.95 2.96 3.01 2.79 2.82 2.86

Protectionis

m 2.79 2.79 2.78 2.70 2.66 2.80 2.35 2.37 2.44

Note: The table shows the mean answers of the members of various opinion groups in different Baltic states

Page 66: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 65

Opinion leaders in all Baltic countries demonstrate a stronger pride in their citizenship, and

they are more often convinced that people who do not accept the traditions and habits of the

country cannot fully become a part of it, i.e., these individuals can be considered more

nationalistic.

The Latvians and Estonians that can be identified as politically alienated most often refrain

from blaming Russia in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and think that both countries are equally

responsible for the conflict. This suggests that reluctance to support Ukraine is related to an overall

disengagement from political discourse. Nevertheless, the survey data cannot disentangle causal

relationships, i.e. it is also possible that people whose opinion differs from the majority of others

tend to become more cynical and alienated from the political process.

It is also important to note that Latvian and Estonian opinion leaders are, compared to other

opinion groups, much more often inclined to believe that Russia constitutes a military threat to

their country, and that sanctions against Russia should be strengthened. In Lithuania, however,

three opinion groups do not differ with respect to these items. Hence it is possible to argue that

the attitude of Lithuanian society toward Russia will not change in the near future, unless Russia’s

political leadership also radically changes. In Latvia and Estonia, however, opinion leaders could

further strengthen a critical attitude toward Russia in the public opinion.

Page 67: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

66

Table 3. The opinion groups’ attitudes

Note: The table shows the mean answers or the percentage of answers of the members of various opinion groups in

different Baltic states. For example, 30.7% of opinion leaders in Estonia have said ‘Yes’ to the question on whether

Russia presents a military threat.

Opi

nion

lead

ers

Opi

nion

see

kers

Polit

ical

ly a

liena

ted

Opi

nion

lead

ers

Opi

nion

see

kers

Polit

ical

ly a

liena

ted

Opi

nion

lead

ers

Opi

nion

see

kers

Polit

ical

ly a

liena

ted

Mostly Russia 59.4 51.9 39.0 50.4 46.6 49.7 48.3 48.2 33.4

Mostly Ukraine 16.6 18.0 20.3 7.8 6.4 8.1 21.1 17.4 21.3

Both countries equally 24.0 30.1 40.7 41.8 47.0 42.2 30.6 34.5 45.2

Tightened 35.8 30.0 27.1 28.6 26.6 30.2 29.3 22.9 12.8

Maintained in their current

form 33.7 38.7 36.7 50.1 54.2 53.9 28.3 38.3 36.1

Softened 30.5 31.4 36.2 21.2 19.2 15.8 42.4 38.8 51.1

Yes 30.7 21.0 18.9 15.3 15.2 14.9 22.6 13.2 8.4

Rather yes 22.7 29.4 27.1 38.1 33.4 37.7 33.7 30.3 26.8

Rather no 25.9 21.7 22.2 34.6 38.0 32.2 20.3 28.9 28.8

No 20.7 27.9 31.8 12.0 13.4 15.3 23.4 27.6 36.1

Completely agree 25.1 19.3 21.3 14.9 9.8 14.0 34.3 20.6 11.8

Agree 27.7 26.0 25.5 32.5 35.1 26.3 28.7 37.9 30.6

Neither agree or disagree 20.6 26.9 26.0 28.4 35.2 31.1 23.3 26.7 33.3

Disagree 17.9 20.6 18.9 17.7 16.7 22.5 10.9 11.9 19.7

Completely disagree 8.7 7.1 8.3 6.5 3.2 6.1 2.8 2.9 4.7

Very proud 48.0 41.0 33.6 53.5 35.4 32.2 45.2 35.7 22.8

Somewhat proud 42.7 45.9 47.2 27.4 43.4 41.0 29.9 37.4 33.9

Not very proud 9.3 10.4 12.4 16.2 15.0 16.5 13.8 14.1 19.4

Not proud at all 0.0 2.8 6.8 3.0 6.2 10.4 4.5 5.5 13.1

I am not a citizen of

(COUNTRY) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.6 7.4 10.7

Life satisfaction (average on a scale from 1

to 10) 6.5 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.5 5.9 6.2 6.2

It is impossible for people who do not

share [COUNTRY’S] customs and

traditions to become fully attached to

[COUNTRY].

How proud are you to be a citizen of

(COUNTRY)?

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

Who do you think bears the most

responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine

conflict which began in 2014?

Should the current sanctions against

Russia by the EU be:

Do you think that Russia presents a

military threat for [COUNTRY]?

Page 68: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 67

CLUSTERS OF SOCIETY

Populations in the Baltic states tend to have a complex set of attitudes. In order to obtain an

informative overview of this complexity and how a set of different opinions form more or less

cohesive opinion groups, a hierarchical cluster analysis (Between-groups linkage method, Squared

Euclidean distance) is used in this report. The grouping is conducted on the basis of the

aforementioned opinion items, including those on Ukraine and Russia, but excluding the national

pride item. To summarize these findings, two distinct opinion clusters can be outlined for the Baltic

states. The first cluster is characterized by pro-Western stances, but the second cluster is marked

by anti-Western orientations (Table 4). Pro-Western respondents tend to be less exposed to the

failed state discourse, this category holds a more positive attitude toward immigrants and people

with different traditions and customs; it is a social category that is also more open to globalist and

anti-protectionist ideas. A clear majority of pro-Western respondents (88%) believe that Russia is

mostly responsible for the Russia-Ukraine conflict, whereas only 4% of the anti-Western cluster

does. Likewise, the majority believe that sanctions against Russia should be tightened (48%

support with only 6% opposing). Overall, pro-Western respondents tend to see Russia as a military

threat, whereas the anti-Western cluster mostly does not (Table 7).

The country-level analysis reveals large differences between the Baltic states (Figure 14). In

Estonia almost two-thirds (63%) of society have a pro-Western orientation, whereas in Latvia only

46% report having the same.

Figure 59. Opinion clusters

Note: The figure shows the proportional distribution of pro- and anti-Western groups in different Baltic states.

36.6 41.853.5

63.4 58.246.5

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

Anti-Western Pro-Western

Page 69: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

68

These clusters also differ from each other demographically. Pro-Western respondents are

younger than anti-Western respondents. They more often hold higher education (40% vs.28%);

whereas the anti-Western cluster more often encompasses those with professional education

(42% vs. 31%). Similarly, pro-Western respondents have a higher personal and household income

and are happier with their life in general. Large differences can be observed in terms of ethnicity

and citizenship. Anti-Western respondents are more often representatives of ethnic minorities

and are more likely to be found among those that are not the citizens of the country. Fewer of

them tend to follow political events on a daily basis (50% among anti-Westerners vs. 60% among

pro-Westerners respondents). Pro-Western respondents hold greater pride in being a citizen of

their country. One can conclude that various factors are responsible for anti-Western views, such

as education, ethnicity, personal income and life satisfaction. However, among these socio-

demographic factors, either citizenship or ethnicity is the main determinant of ideological

polarization in the Baltic countries.

Table 4. The profile of opinion clusters

Anti-

Western

Pro-

Western

Attitude toward immigrants

Openness toward competition

Western orientation

Perception of the state

(index from 1 to 5)

(index from 1 to 5)

(index from 1 to 4)

(index from 1 to 4)

2.7 3.1

2.4 2.9

2.5 3.1

2.2 2.6

It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S]

customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].

Completely agree 16.7% 23.7%

Agree 37.6% 26.2%

Neither agree or disagree 21.8% 26.1%

Disagree 18.2% 19.8%

Completely disagree 5.6% 4.2%

Who do you think bears the most responsibility for the Russia-

Ukraine conflict which began in 2014?

Mostly Russia 4.3% 87.9%

Mostly Ukraine 29.5% 3.5%

Both countries equally 66.2% 8.6%

Should the current sanctions against Russia by the EU be: Tightened 5.6% 47.1%

Maintained in their current

form 37.6% 47.6%

Softened 56.8% 5.3%

Do you think that Russia presents a military threat for

[COUNTRY]?

Yes 5.6% 31.4%

Rather yes 21.0% 44.4%

Rather no 35.1% 21.8%

No 38.3% 2.4%

Page 70: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 69

Age (mean) 48 44

Gender A man 51.2% 51.9%

A woman 48.8% 48.1%

Citizenship Citizens of the country 78.6% 95.0%

Not citizens of the country 21.4% 5.0%

Education No education 0.0% 1.2%

Primary education 10.8% 8.1%

Secondary education 19.0% 19.5%

Professional secondary

education 42.5% 31.1%

Higher education 27.7% 40.2%

How frequently follows political events in the media Every day 50.3% 60.4%

Several times a week 24.0% 16.9%

One or two times a week 12.0% 10.5%

Less often 9.2% 8.4%

Never 4.4% 3.8%

How frequently discusses political events with friends Frequently 21.3% 20.1%

Sometimes 57.9% 63.5%

Never 20.8% 16.4%

Respondent's income Low 34.6% 27.2%

Medium low 27.8% 25.8%

Medium high 22.0% 24.8%

High 15.6% 22.3%

Household income Low 12.6% 20.4%

Medium low 30.2% 30.8%

Medium high 30.3% 14.0%

High 26.9% 34.8%

Ethnicity (Lithuania) Lithuanian 85.2% 93.2%

Russian 7.1% 2.1%

Polish 6.2% 2.0%

Other 1.5% 2.8%

How proud are you to be a citizen of (COUNTRY)? Very proud 27.7% 47.3%

Somewhat proud 38.7% 39.2%

Not very proud 20.2% 9.8%

Not proud at all 7.5% 3.0%

I am not a citizen of

(COUNTRY) 6.0% .7%

Life satisfaction (average) (scale from 1 to 10) 6.7 7.3

Note: The table shows the proportional distribution of pro- and anti-Western groups’ answers or their mean answers.

Page 71: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

70

As Table 5 demonstrates, pro- and anti-Western groups across the Baltic states are more

similar in some opinions and less similar in others. For example, the pro-Western and anti-Western

groups in Latvia are equally xenophobic and protectionist, but they differ very strongly in their

perception of Russia as a military threat and in their willingness to soften Western sanctions. A

pro-Kremlin versus an anti-Kremlin attitude is ultimately the main point of contention between

these groups in Latvia. In Lithuania, the opinion of different groups is generally less diverging than

in Latvia or Estonia, except that Lithuania’s anti-Westerners overwhelmingly believe that both

Russia and Ukraine are to blame for the conflict, whereas pro-Westerners mostly blame Russia.

Thus, a pro-Kremlin attitude within the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict again plays a decisive

polarizing role. In Estonia, these groups contrast more than in other Baltic countries in terms of

how strongly pro-Western or anti-Western they are, and also in terms of their attitudes toward

immigrants.

Table 5. Differences between pro-Western and anti-Western groups in all Baltic countries

Note: The table shows the proportional distribution of answers among pro- and anti-Western groups, or the mean

of their answers in different Baltic states.

1 2 Diff. 1 2 Diff. 1 2 Diff.

Western orientation 2.60 3.24 0.64 2.50 2.92 0.41 2.43 2.99 0.56

Perception of the

state 2.53 2.95 0.41 2.02 2.35 0.33 2.03 2.47 0.44

Attitude towards

immigrants2.58 3.18 0.60 2.68 3.21 0.53 2.77 2.91 0.13

Openness towards

competition2.44 3.07 0.63 2.37 3.02 0.64 2.31 2.45 0.14

Completely agree 15.0% 23.7% 0.09 18.3% 17.2% -0.01 17.9% 33.5% 0.16

Agree 38.8% 20.8% -0.18 40.6% 29.6% -0.11 33.2% 30.6% -0.03

Neither agree or

disagree16.3% 30.7% 0.14 25.1% 22.3% -0.03 23.2% 24.1% 0.01

Disagree 21.1% 20.8% 0.00 13.7% 24.9% 0.11 20.0% 11.2% -0.09

Completely disagree 8.8% 4.0% -0.05 2.3% 6.0% 0.04 5.8% .6% -0.05

Mostly Russia 4.1% 87.6% 0.84 3.4% 86.7% 0.83 4.7% 91.8% 0.87

Mostly Ukraine 32.7% 1.8% -0.31 15.4% 3.9% -0.12 37.4% 5.3% -0.32

Both countries equally 63.3% 10.6% -0.53 81.1% 9.4% -0.72 57.9% 2.9% -0.55

Tightened 8.2% 50.0% 0.42 6.3% 51.1% 0.45 4.2% 42.4% 0.38

Maintained in their

current form34.0% 46.0% 0.12 46.9% 46.4% -0.01 27.4% 47.6% 0.20

Softened 57.8% 4.0% -0.54 46.9% 2.6% -0.44 68.4% 10.0% -0.58

Yes 10.2% 32.1% 0.22 3.4% 32.2% 0.29 4.2% 28.2% 0.24

Rather yes 20.4% 44.2% 0.24 24.6% 42.9% 0.18 17.4% 48.2% 0.31

Rather no 27.2% 22.3% -0.05 50.3% 21.9% -0.28 25.8% 21.2% -0.05

No 42.2% 1.5% -0.41 21.7% 3.0% -0.19 52.6% 2.4% -0.50

It is impossible for

people who do not

share [COUNTRY’S]

customs and

traditions to become

fully attached to

[COUNTRY].

Who do you think

bears the most

responsibility for the

Russia-Ukraine

conflict which began

in 2014?

Should the current

sanctions against

Russia by the EU be:

Do you think that

Russia presents a

military threat for

[COUNTRY]?

Estonia Lithuania Latvia

Page 72: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 71

Finally, considering that we found stronger differences between pro- and anti-Western

groups in some countries (Latvia, Estonia), and weaker differences in others (Lithuania), we also

ran the analysis separately for each of these countries to see if the same pro-Western and anti-

Western clusters emerge in each case. If we use such analysis to look deeper, we can find that in

Estonia the attitudes and opinions fall into three broad groups. The largest group (51%) can be

labeled as the “liberals”. They are open to free trade and international cooperation, they are not

xenophobic, see their country as successful and have a pro-Western orientation. The vast majority

within this group hold Russia responsible for the conflict with Ukraine; see Russia as somewhat of

a threat; and believe that sanctions should either be increased or kept at the current level. The

second largest group (40%) can be labeled as “nationalists”. They differ by their xenophobic,

nationalist, and protectionist attitudes. They usually see Russia as a military threat, hold either

Russia or both Ukraine and Russia responsible for the conflict ongoing since 2014, and have diverse

attitudes toward Western sanctions. The third group (8%) – “pro-Russians” – tend to see Estonia

as a failed state, have anti-Western attitudes, usually hold Ukraine solely responsible for the

conflict with Russia, do not see Russia as a threat and think that Western sanctions should be

weakened. They also disagree that people that do not accept the traditions of Estonia cannot fully

belong to Estonia.

Table 6. Clusters in Estonia

Clusters

1 2 3

Western orientation 2.50 3.04 3.07

Perception of the state 2.17 2.42 2.69

Attitude toward immigrants 2.69 1.97 3.51

Openness toward competition 2.36 1.95 3.22

It is impossible for people who do not share

[COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to

become fully attached to [COUNTRY].

Completely

agree 17.0% 68.0% 8.9%

Agree 37.4% 31.4% 24.6%

Neither agree

or disagree 21.9% .6% 34.9%

Disagree 18.2% 0.0% 26.5%

Page 73: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

72

Completely

disagree 5.5% 0.0% 5.1%

Who do you think bears the most

responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine conflict

which began in 2014?

Mostly Russia 4.1% 99.4% 84.6%

Mostly Ukraine 28.6% .6% 4.4%

Both countries

equally 67.3% 0.0% 11.1%

Should the current sanctions against Russia

by the EU be:

Tightened 6.1% 59.9% 44.6%

Maintained in

their current

form

36.0% 34.3% 50.7%

Softened 57.9% 5.8% 4.8%

Do you think that Russia presents a military

threat for [COUNTRY]?

Yes 5.7% 45.9% 26.1%

Rather yes 20.7% 43.6% 45.1%

Rather no 34.4% 8.1% 26.5%

No 39.1% 2.3% 2.2%

How proud are you to be a citizen of

(COUNTRY)?

Very proud 28.7% 47.4% 48.9%

Somewhat

proud 38.0% 32.2% 41.1%

Not very proud 20.0% 15.8% 7.3%

Not proud at all 7.6% 3.5% 2.2%

I am not a

citizen of

(COUNTRY)

5.7% 1.2% .4%

Note: The table shows the proportional distribution of the three groups’ answers, or their mean answers in Estonia.

In Latvia, opinion categories fall into two major groups – very similarly to those described in earlier

analysis where all three countries were taken together. The largest can be labeled “anti-

Westerners” (55%). They largely see Latvia as a failed state; have an anti-Western orientation; and

support protectionism and xenophobic claims. They usually hold both Russia and Ukraine, or

sometimes only Ukraine, responsible for the conflict ongoing since 2014, they think that Russia

does not possess a military threat to their country and most within this group believe that the

Western sanctions against Russia should be weakened. The “anti-Russia nationalists” (44%) are

Page 74: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 73

also xenophobic and protectionist, but not as skeptical about the state of affairs in Latvia and the

West as the “anti-Westerners”. Unlike the anti-Westerners, almost all within the anti-Russian

nationalist cohort blame Russia for the conflict with Ukraine, and are generally more nationalist.

Likewise, most of them think that Russia is a threat and that the Western sanctions should be

either increased or at least kept at the same level. There is also a very small group (just 2%) of

“liberals” that express profoundly liberal views in terms of immigration and globalization,

demonstrate highly pro-Western views, do not think that it is necessary to accept Latvia’s

traditions to become fully attached to Latvia, and see the viability of Latvia’s statehood more

positively than others.

Lithuanians seem to be, more or less, one uniform opinion group, as only one cluster is

suggested by our statistical analysis. The analysis suggests that Lithuanians are the most

ideologically cohesive society among the Baltic states, with the lowest potential for ideological

fragmentation.

A simple yet efficient way to explore the polarization of opinions is to calculate the ratio

between the top and bottom deciles of the distribution – similarly to how it is done in some of the

widely used inequality measures. The calculation is done by taking the top 10% of individuals and

dividing their average by the average of the bottom 10% of individuals. The resulting measure

provides a mathematical expression of the polarization in answers to the particular question

between the top and bottom 10%. Moreover, besides the 90/10 ratio it is common to calculate

the 90/50 or 10/50 ratio to see how far removed from the ‘average’ or how extreme - the top or

bottom 10% are.

Page 75: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

74

Table 7. Clusters in Latvia

Clusters

1 2 3

Western orientation 2.98 2.44 3.53

Perception of the state 2.49 2.02 2.81

Attitude toward immigrants 2.79 2.84 4.17

Openness toward competition 2.32 2.37 4.04

It is impossible for people

who do not share

[COUNTRY’S] customs and

traditions to become fully

attached to [COUNTRY].

Completely agree 36.9% 16.8% 0.0%

Agree 36.9% 28.9% 0.0%

Neither agree or

disagree 21.0% 26.4% 0.0%

Disagree 4.5% 22.3% 100.0%

Completely

disagree .6% 5.6% 0.0%

Who do you think bears the

most responsibility for the

Russia-Ukraine conflict

which began in 2014?

Mostly Russia 98.7% 2.0% 100.0%

Mostly Ukraine 1.3% 39.6% 0.0%

Both countries

equally 0.0% 58.4% 0.0%

Should the current

sanctions against Russia by

the EU be:

Tightened 42.7% 5.1% 50.0%

Maintained in their

current form 47.1% 29.4% 16.7%

Softened 10.2% 65.5% 33.3%

Do you think that Russia

presents a military threat

for [COUNTRY]?

Yes 29.9% 4.6% 0.0%

Rather yes 51.0% 17.8% 0.0%

Rather no 17.8% 25.9% 100.0%

No 1.3% 51.8% 0.0%

Note: The table shows the proportional distribution of the three groups’ answers, or their mean answers, in Latvia.

Page 76: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 75

Table 8. Polarization of opinions - decile ratio

Western orientation

Perception of the state

Attitude toward immigrants

Openness toward competition

Estonia 90/10 1.73 1.79 2.60 2.67

Lithuania 90/10 1.55 2.00 2.00 2.14

Latvia 90/10 1.89 2.33 2.40 2.70

Western orientation

Perception of the state

Attitude toward immigrants

Openness toward competition

Estonia 50/10 1.36 1.36 1.80 1.83

Lithuania 50/10 1.27 1.60 1.50 1.57

Latvia 50/10 1.44 1.67 1.80 1.80

Our analysis suggests that overall Lithuanians hold the most homogenous public opinion.

Opinions on openness to competition and protectionism form the most polarizing context in all

Baltic countries, i.e. people strongly believe in one or in other side of the same issue. Data about

Latvia reveal the biggest polarization in regards to Western orientation and the perception of the

state, as the decile ratio is higher than in other countries (Table 8). The 50/10 distribution confirms

that there is a group that has quite extreme opinions in terms of seeing Latvia as a failed state and

holding anti-Western views. In Estonia, the polarization of public opinion on immigrants is more

pronounced than in other countries, i.e. some part of the society would gladly welcome them

while others are strongly against. In Latvia and Lithuania, the views on immigrants are more

homogeneously negative.

Page 77: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

76

CONCLUSIONS

This report unveils the varying level and potential of ideological polarization in Baltic

societies. It has been insisted that it is essential to separate country-specific trends from the

regional polarization patterns that have been molded in particular contexts. Rarely can a country-

level ideological polarization be characterized as antagonistic. In other words, moderate or

pluralistic polarization patterns prevail in Baltic public opinion. This does not necessarily create

healthy conditions for democracy. Neither can a strong consensus that demoralizes the

democratic order and opposes to democratic values create favorable conditions. Simultaneously,

the differences between the Baltic societies should also be taken into account, as these might limit

the generalizability of the explanations and strategies for coping with the trends of antagonistic

polarization.

The Western orientation context indicates that Baltic societies are inclined to support pro-

Western views and institutions. It also suggests that anti-Westerners are less coherent as an

opinion group than pro-Westerners. Nevertheless, the pro-Western consensus significantly varies

across the three Baltic states. Latvian public opinion demonstrates the highest level of ideological

polarization, whereas Estonian and Lithuanian public opinion holds a stronger consensus toward

the Western orientation. Estonian public opinion is however more consistent by comparison, as

polarization within Lithuanian public opinion increases when Western influence is juxtaposed to

Russian influence or when Lithuanian traditional values are confronted with Western values.

Moreover, the Western orientation index suggests that the pro-Western consensus in both

Lithuania and Estonia has weakened over the last three years, thus increasing the potential for

polarization.

The failed state context also highlights profound differences between Baltic societies. While

Estonians hold a moderately positive consensus about the Estonian state, their public opinion is

highly polarized, particularly on emigration; the country’s financial autonomy; and the perception

of the political elite. In contrast, Latvians and Lithuanians are extremely pessimistic about their

country’s viability and performance. Hence, two different polarization patterns can be observed:

one between dominant optimists and minor pessimists (Estonia) and another between dominant

pessimists and minor optimists (Latvia and Lithuania).

The xenophobia context that is largely limited in this report to the attitude toward

immigrants also exhibits a rather inconsistent pattern. Despite the fact that slightly negative

opinion toward immigrants prevails in the Baltic states, and that Latvians and Estonians hold a

Page 78: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 77

relatively stronger consensus about the positive or negative characteristics of immigration, the

2019 data reveal a rather polarized public opinion in all Baltic societies. A moderate polarization is

particularly salient in Lithuania. This analysis suggests that inward labor migration and labor

migrants, particularly from familiar cultures, might trigger the highest polarization risk in society.

In contrast, other migrant groups from more unfamiliar cultures would likely provoke a more

dominant anti-immigrant attitude in Baltic societies. Nevertheless, the attitude toward immigrants

has not changed over the past decade. This perhaps means that the recent refugee crisis in Europe

has not significantly increased the level of anti-immigration sentiment in the Baltic states.

The economic protectionism context indicates a considerable level of support for

protectionist ideas in all Baltic societies. However, this attitudinal pattern is again not consistent.

While Latvians express a strong consensus toward support for protectionist ideas and Estonians

demonstrate a somewhat moderate support by comparison, Lithuanian public opinion reveals the

highest level of polarization. Acknowledging that support for free trade and international

cooperation has increased slightly in the Baltic states over the last six years; this analysis also

suggests that polarization as regards protectionism might nevertheless strengthen in the next

years. This is especially likely should this trend be systematically cultivated by incumbent political

parties and if the economic situation was to considerably deteriorate.

This report has also sought to outline the various dimensions and features of the major

opinion groups that generate polarization in the Baltic societies. On the most aggregate level, two

large clusters of pro-Western and anti-Western opinion groups can be identified. According to our

data, the major ideological fault line appears to be the attitude toward Russia and the Kremlin’s

strategic narratives. Nevertheless, the size and sociological portrayal of these clusters may

ideologically vary on the country level. While Estonians and Latvians display strong differences

between nationally-minded and pro-Kremlin opinion groups, the potential of ideological

antagonism is less pronounced in Lithuanian public opinion. Hence a pluralistic ideological

polarization is more characteristic in Lithuania than in Estonia or Latvia.

Various socio-demographic factors are responsible for separating opinion groups, such as:

education; ethnicity; household income; and satisfaction with life. However, among these factors,

ethnicity and country-level regional differences are the most consistent determinants of

ideological polarization. In Estonia and Latvia, ethnic identification and country-level regional

differences occasionally overlap. This highlights significant ideological polarization between the

ethnic majority and the Russophone minority. While these differences are more significant in

terms of the Western orientation indicator, their importance declines in other polarization

contexts where geopolitical self-positioning is less relevant. In Lithuania, ethnicity does not play

an important differentiating role at all. Instead, internal regional and socio-economic differences

Page 79: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

78

(income, education) become more significant socio-demographic factors with the ability to predict

differences between pro-Westerners and anti-Westerners.

In order to highlight the potential sources of social attitudes, this report has sought to

extrapolate more specific opinion groups. This has taken the relations between political

socialization and exposure to political discourse into consideration. Our findings show that the

most politically socialized opinion group in the Baltic states (‘opinion leaders’) are more Western-

oriented compared to the groups that are less exposed to an everyday political discourse. ‘Opinion

leaders’ also express stronger national pride and are more optimistic about their country when it

comes to the failed state claims. At the same time, their Western orientation does not translate

into a more positive attitude toward immigration. Such relations between political socialization

and ideological attitudes is more noticeable in Estonia and Lithuania, whereas Latvian ‘opinion

leaders’ are inclined to align with the attitudes that characterize groups that are less socialized

politically.

Page 80: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 79

APPENDIX A. THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE 2019 SURVEY

Q1 Please tell me if you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the

following statements?

Q2 Who do you think bears the most responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine conflict which began in 2014?

Mostly Russia 1

Mostly Ukraine 2

Both countries equally 3

I don’t know/Hard to say 8

Q3 Following the Russian annexation of Crimea and the military engagement in Eastern Ukraine, the US and EU have imposed economic and political sanctions on Russia. Should the current sanctions against Russia by the EU be:

Tightened 1

Maintained in their current form 2

Softened 3

I don’t know/Hard to say 8

Completely

agree Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

The EU will soon collapse 1 2 3 4 8

A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West

1 2 3 4 8

It’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other western powers

1 2 3 4 8

There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West

1 2 3 4 8

Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states poses a threat to Russia

1 2 3 4 8

Page 81: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

80

Q4 Do you think that Russia presents a military threat for [COUNTRY]?

Yes 1

Rather yes 2

Rather no 3

No 4

I don’t know/Hard to say 8

Q5 I am going to read a list of popular statements. Some people completely agree, some tend to agree or tend to disagree. Others completely disagree. What do you think?

Q6 All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?

Dissatisfied Satisfied

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Completely

agree Tend to agree

Tend to disagree

Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

[COUNTRY] cannot exist as an independent state

1 2 3 4 8

Poverty and unemployment prevails in [COUNTRY]

1 2 3 4 8

Economy of [COUNTRY] is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development of the country

1 2 3 4 8

[COUNTRY’S] existence depends on the EU financial assistance 1 2 3 4 8

Every day many residents leave [COUNTRY] and do not want to live here

1 2 3 4 8

The people of [COUNTRY] is on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years

1 2 3 4 8

[COUNTRY’S] politicians are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the nation

1 2 3 4 8

Page 82: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 81

Q7 How proud are you to be a citizen of (COUNTRY)?

Very proud 1

Somewhat proud 2

Not very proud 3

Not proud at all 4

I am not a citizen of (COUNTRY) (DO

NOT READ)

7

Don’t know (DO NOT READ) 8

Refused (DO NOT READ) 9

Q8 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?

Completely

agree Agree Neither

agree or disagree

Disagree Completely disagree

Hard to say/ NA

It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].

1 2 3 4

5 8

Immigrants increase crime rates.

1 2 3 4

5 8

Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [COUNTRY].

1 2 3 4

5 8

[COUNTRY’S] culture is generally undermined by immigrants.

1 2 3 4

5 8

[COUNTRY] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.

1 2 3 4

5 8

Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [COUNTRY].

1 2 3 4

5 8

Page 83: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

82

Q9

How often do you follow politics in the news on television, radio, in the press or on the Internet sites and social

media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, VKontakte etc.)?

Every day 1

Several times a week 2

Once or twice a week 3

Less often 4

Never 5

Don’t know (spontaneous) 8

No answer (spontaneous) 9

Q10 When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently,

occasionally or never?

Frequently 1

Occasionally 2

Never 3

Don’t know (spontaneous) 8

No answer (spontaneous) 9

Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [COUNTRY].

1 2 3 4

5 8

International organizations are taking away too much power from the [COUNTRY’S] government.

1 2 3 4

5 8

Page 84: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 83

APPENDIX B. SURVEY WAVES AND SOURCES

Survey items Previous waves Source

Q1.1 2017 Latvian Institute of International Affairs, research “Euroscepticism in the Baltic States” Q5.1 2017

Q1.2 – Q1.4 2016 Pew Research Center, survey “Religion and social life” Q7

Q2 2015 Institute of Public Affairs, Poland; research “Baltic Group: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In search of common interests”

Q3 Q4

Q6 1999, 2008 European Value Survey Q10

Q8 1995*, 2003*, 2013, 2019

The National identity module of International Social Survey Program

*Data are available only for Latvia

Page 85: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

84

APPENDIX C. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT (P<.05) SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN SURVEY ITEMS

EE LT LV EE LT LV EE LT LV EE LT LV EE LT LV

Ethnic identification Region/county Education Income Age

Q1.1 EU will soon collapse x x x x x x x x x x x x

Q1.2 A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West

x x x x x x x x x x

Q1.3 It’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other western powers

x x x x x x x

Q1.4 There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West

x x x x x x x x x x x x

Q1.5 Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states poses a threat to Russia

x x x x x x x

Q3 Attitude toward the EU sanctions against Russia

x x x x x x x x x

Q5.1 [COUNTRY] cannot exist as an independent state

x x x x x x x x x x

Q5.2 Poverty and unemployment prevails in [COUNTRY]

x x x x x x x x x x x x

Q5.3 Economy of [COUNTRY] is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development of the country

x x x x x x x x x x x x x

Page 86: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 85

Q5.4 [COUNTRY’S] existence depends on the EU financial assistance

x x x x x x x x x x

Q5.5 Every day many residents leave [COUNTRY] and do not want to live here

x x x x x x x x x x

Q5.6 The people of [COUNTRY] is on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years

x x x x x x x x x x

Q5.7 [COUNTRY’S] politicians are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the nation

x x x x x x x x x

Q8.1 It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].

x x x x x x x x x x x x

Q8.2 Immigrants increase crime rates.

x x x x x x x x x x

Q8.3 Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [COUNTRY].

x x x x x x x x x x x

Q8.4 [COUNTRY’S] culture is generally undermined by immigrants.

x x x x x x

Q8.5 [COUNTRY] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.

x x x x x x x x x x x

Q8.6 Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [COUNTRY].

x x x x x x x x x x x x

Q8.7 Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [COUNTRY].

x x x x x x x x x x x

Page 87: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019

86

Q8.8 International organizations are taking away too much power from the [COUNTRY’S] government.

x x x x x x x x x x x

Page 88: IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIESfsi.lu.lv/userfiles/file/2019_ideological_polarization...possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey

© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 87