ideological polarization in baltic...
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© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 0
A CROSS-NATIONAL
SURVEY REPORT
IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIES
Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 1
IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION IN BALTIC SOCIETIES
A CROSS-NATIONAL SURVEY REPORT
Mārtiņš Kaprāns
Inta Mieriņa
Institute of Philosophy and Sociology
University of Latvia
May, 2019
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 7
METHODOLOGY 9
THE CONTEXTS OF IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION 10
WESTERN ORIENTATION 10
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FAILED STATE CLAIMS 24
ATTITUDE TOWARD IMMIGRANTS 35
ATTITUDES TOWARD PROTECTIONISM 45
IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION: A BIRD’S EYE VIEW 54
THE WESTERN ORIENTATION INDEX 54
THE FAILED STATE INDEX 56
THE XENOPHOBIA INDEX 58
THE PROTECTIONISM INDEX 60
OPINION GROUPS 62
CLUSTERS OF SOCIETY 67
CONCLUSIONS 76
APPENDIX A. THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE 2019 SURVEY 79
APPENDIX B. SURVEY WAVES AND SOURCES 83
APPENDIX C. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT (P<.05) SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN
SURVEY ITEMS 84
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INDEX OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Attitudes toward Western countries as important allies ............................................................................. 11
Figure 2. The dynamics of public opinion toward Western countries as important allies (2016-2019) ..................... 12
Figure 3. Attitudes toward Russia as a balancing power ............................................................................................. 13
Figure 4. The dynamics of public opinion toward Russia as a balancing power (2016-2019) ..................................... 13
Figure 5. Identification with Western values ............................................................................................................... 14
Figure 6. The dynamics of identification with Western values (2016-2019) ............................................................... 15
Figure 7. Future of the European Union ...................................................................................................................... 16
Figure 8. The Dynamics of the public opinion toward the future of the European Union (2016-2019) ..................... 17
Figure 9. NATO as a threat to Russia............................................................................................................................ 18
Figure 10. EU sanctions against Russia ........................................................................................................................ 19
Figure 11. The dynamics of public opinion toward the EU sanctions against Russia (2016-2019) ............................. 20
Figure 12. Support for the statements that challenge Western orientation............................................................... 21
Figure 13. Support to anti-Western statements .......................................................................................................... 22
Figure 14. Evaluation of the state's sovereignty .......................................................................................................... 25
Figure 15. The dynamics of evaluation of the state's sovereignty .............................................................................. 25
Figure 16. Demography as a threat for the state’s existence ...................................................................................... 26
Figure 17. Opinions on economic sustainability .......................................................................................................... 27
Figure 18. Dependence on the EU's financial assistance ............................................................................................. 28
Figure 19. Evaluation of social inequality .................................................................................................................... 29
Figure 20. Emigration as an issue ................................................................................................................................. 30
Figure 21. Anti-elite sentiments in the Baltic countries .............................................................................................. 31
Figure 22. Opinions on the failed state claims ............................................................................................................. 32
Figure 23. Approval of the failed state claims ............................................................................................................. 32
Figure 24. The dynamics toward the satisfaction with life (1999-2019) ..................................................................... 34
Figure 25. Approval of the failed state claims by the life satisfaction evaluation ....................................................... 34
Figure 26. General perception of immigrants .............................................................................................................. 36
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Figure 27. The dynamics of public opinion toward foreigners (2013-2019) ............................................................... 37
Figure 28. Immigrants as a source for crime................................................................................................................ 38
Figure 29. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as source of crime (2013-2019) ............................... 38
Figure 30. Immigrants as a threat to job market ......................................................................................................... 39
Figure 31. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as a threat to job markets (2013-2019) ................... 39
Figure 32. Immigrants as a threat to local culture ....................................................................................................... 40
Figure 33. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as a threat to local culture (2013-2019) .................. 41
Figure 34. Approval of the anti-immigrant statements ............................................................................................... 42
Figure 35. Support to anti-immigrant statements ....................................................................................................... 43
Figure 36. Economic nationalism in the Baltic countries ............................................................................................. 45
Figure 37. The dynamics of economic nationalism in the Baltic countries (2013-2019) ............................................. 46
Figure 38. Attitudes toward international companies ................................................................................................. 47
Figure 39. The dynamics of public opinion toward large international companies .................................................... 47
Figure 40. Opinions on foreigners’ right to purchase land .......................................................................................... 48
Figure 41. The dynamics of public opinion toward foreigners’ right to purchase land (2013-2019) .......................... 49
Figure 42. Assessment of the international organizations .......................................................................................... 50
Figure 43. The dynamics of public opinion toward the assessment of the international organizations .................... 50
Figure 44. Approval of protectionist statements ......................................................................................................... 51
Figure 45. Support for protectionism in the Baltic countries ...................................................................................... 52
Figure 46. Distribution of attitudes toward the West (2019) ...................................................................................... 54
Figure 47. Distribution of attitudes toward the West in three Baltic countries (2019) .............................................. 55
Figure 48. The Western orientation index in the Baltic countries in 2016 and 2019 .................................................. 56
Figure 49. Distribution in the perception of the country............................................................................................. 57
Figure 50. The perception of the state in the Baltics ................................................................................................... 57
Figure 51. Distribution of attitudes toward immigrants .............................................................................................. 58
Figure 52. Distribution of attitudes toward immigrants in three Baltic countries ...................................................... 59
Figure 53. The xenophobia index ................................................................................................................................. 59
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Figure 54. Distribution of openness to free trade ....................................................................................................... 60
Figure 55. Distribution of openness toward competition in three Baltic countries .................................................... 61
Figure 56. The dynamics of public opinion toward the openness to free trade (2013-2019) ..................................... 61
Figure 57. Distribution of the opinion groups in the society of the Baltic states ........................................................ 62
Figure 58. Opinion groups in the Baltic countries........................................................................................................ 63
Figure 59. Opinion clusters .......................................................................................................................................... 67
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INDEX OF TABLES
Table 1. Following news and discussing political matters among opinion groups ...................................................... 63
Table 2. The opinion groups’ profiles........................................................................................................................... 64
Table 3. The opinion groups’ attitudes ........................................................................................................................ 66
Table 4. The profile of opinion clusters ....................................................................................................................... 68
Table 5. Differences between pro-Western and anti-Western groups in all Baltic countries..................................... 70
Table 6. Clusters in Estonia .......................................................................................................................................... 71
Table 7. Clusters in Latvia ............................................................................................................................................. 74
Table 8. Polarization of opinions - decile ratio ............................................................................................................ 75
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 7
INTRODUCTION
Ideological tensions have become a sensitive issue in Western societies over the past
decade. The slogans such as “Make America great again” and “Take back control” have epitomized
recent ideological unrest. The values that these slogans represent have urged political scientists
to think about the end of the democratic century.1 These discourses have also resonated in the
Baltic states where, along with ever present geopolitical matters, political actors and the members
of civil society have problematized the understanding of Western values. Specifically, the public
polemics after the European refugee crisis in 2015, the voicing of isolationist ideas, and the
criticism of liberal order as well as a general sense of existential anxiety about the future of one’s
country have nurtured ideological polarization in the Baltic states. This report explores the level
and potential of such polarization in Baltic societies.
Ideological polarization is a litmus test for democracies. This can seriously effect on
democratic culture, as societies learn to elaborate controversial issues and develop coping
strategies, but this can also undermine rational social discourse and cohesion. Ideological
polarization can take different forms. Normally, this entails a conflict between competing
worldviews and practices. If such a conflict develops into antagonistic relations between two
equally strong and coherent opinion groups, it may harm democratic culture. Exacerbating
antagonism via political discourse may also pose a threat to democratic regimes. If antagonism is
restrained and moderated through legitimate institutions, the polarized opinion groups can be
seen as crucial elements of a democratic society and policy making. Conversely, conflicting
relations where more than two opinion groups intend to impose their worldviews on the larger
public can yield to a pluralistic polarization. Thus, three different analytical types of polarization
can be distinguished: radical, moderate and pluralistic.
One of the central questions that can be asked regarding the Baltic states and other
countries concerns the role of radical ideological polarization. Namely, is there an increasing
salience of this pattern in public opinion? This question intertwines with our report.
Acknowledging the local impact of the so-called populist parties as well as of the Kremlin’s
strategic narratives, it should be noted that we do not intend to explore the discursive sources of
polarization in every Baltic society. Instead this study looks at possible structural similarities or
differences between competing opinion groups. This shall help us to understand the level and
1 See Wike, R., Silver, L., Castillo, A. ‘Many across the globe are dissatisfied with how democracy is working’. April 29, 2019. Pew Research Centre, available at https://www.pewglobal.org/2019/04/29/many-across-the-globe-are-dissatisfied-with-how-democracy-is-working/
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potential of ideological polarization. Simultaneously, we do not intend to conflate the polarization
in Baltic countries with the situation in Western Europe where formally similar ideological
cleavages are rooted in different structural conditions.
The report consists of two parts. The first part focuses on the descriptive analysis of survey
data, outlining the country-level intricacies with respect to each survey item. This analysis is
organized around four thematic contexts (Western orientation, failed state, immigration, and
protectionism) that, as previous research has suggested, might be relevant for ideological
polarization. The second part provides a more aggregated and deeper statistical analysis of opinion
groups in the Baltic states.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 9
METHODOLOGY
This study is based on the analysis of survey data. The survey questionnaire was designed to
measure the dynamics of public opinion as well as to provide original knowledge about the
possible contexts of ideological polarization in Baltic societies. Many survey data that are explored
in this report have cross-sectional background, i.e. they are comparable with the data that have
been collected in previous years, using the same survey items (see the questionnaire and the
sources of cross-sectional questions in the Appendix A and B). The survey questions were selected
or specially constructed taking into account secondary sources that provide relevant and reliable
empirical information about polarizing topics. These topics are at times cultivated in the Baltic
states by pro-Kremlin media or populist parties.2
The 2019 survey contained 10 thematic survey questions; among them were three batteries
of questions that used the same response items to measure an attitude toward different
statements related to a particular issue. Survey questions address the issues of Western
orientation, the failed state, anti-immigrant sentiment, and protectionism. Likewise, several
control questions are used to provide additional information about the sociological profile of
specific opinion groups. These control questions focus on the attitude toward Russia, the
respondents’ satisfaction with life, national pride, and exposure to political discourse in everyday
life. The questionnaire also contains a set of socio-demographic questions (sex, age, education
etc.). However, it should be taken into account that the number of socio-demographic questions
varies across countries and not always did similar questions include identical response items. Thus,
a comparative analysis on the basis of socio-demographic data is limited and is often replaced by
country-level analysis.
The 2019 survey is a nationally representative opinion poll. The fieldwork (face-to-face
interviews) in the Baltic states was conducted in January by three research agencies: SKDS (Latvia),
Baltic Surveys (Lithuania), and Turu-uuringute (Estonia). The total sample that was reached in this
survey is 3031 respondents: 1014 in Estonia, 1008 in Lithuania, and 1007 in Latvia.
2 See, for example, Berzina, I. et al. (2018) Russia's Footprint in the Nordic-Baltic Information Environment. Riga: Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Available at https://www.stratcomcoe.org/russias-footprint-nordic-baltic-information-environment-0; Winnerstig, M. (ed.) (2014) Tools of Destabilization Russian Soft Power and Non-military Influence in the Baltic States. Försvarsdepartementet, available at https://www.stratcomcoe.org/mike-winnerstig-ed-tools-destabilization-russian-soft-power-and-non-military-influence-baltic-states; Jakobson, M-L. et al. (2012) Populism in the Baltic States. Tallinn: Tallinn University Institute of Political Science and Governance, available at https://oef.org.ee/fileadmin/media/valjaanded/uuringud/Populism_research_report.pdf; Open Estonia Foundation; EU vs. Disninfo, available at https://euvsdisinfo.eu/; CEPA Stratcom Program, available at http://infowar.cepa.org/index/; Disinfo Portal, available at https://disinfoportal.org/
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THE CONTEXTS OF IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION
WESTERN ORIENTATION
Identification with the Western world has been a crucial topic in the Baltic states since the
restoration of independence. Belonging to the West is sometimes challenged by particular political
parties and local economic actors. This is also contested by pro-Kremlin media that insist that the
Baltic states are rather a bridge between the West and Russia or they are peripheral and irrelevant
countries for the great Western powers. If such narratives are accepted in larger opinion groups,
one should expect that the identification with the imagined Western world and its institutions may
evoke the polarization of public opinion. A Western orientation in this report is operationalized as
a positive attitude toward Western values, geopolitical interests and institutions that are
associated with the West. The 2019 survey used six items to explore the intensity and dynamics
of the Western orientation in Baltic societies. These items focus on the willingness to cooperate
with other western countries, relations between traditional values and Western values, the
attitude toward the EU and NATO and relations between Russia and the West.
The 2019 aggregate survey data reveal that the majority of Baltic respondents (70%) believe
that it is in their country’s interest to work closely with the US and other western powers (Fig. 1).
This indicates a rather strong consensus about Western countries as important allies. However,
only a small portion of (22%) express strong support toward working closely with Western
countries while the majority (47%) instead demonstrate moderate support. Such results, among
other things, allude to the conditional character of Baltic public opinion regarding support to close
cooperation with Western countries. To be sure, the willingness to foster closer cooperation with
other Western countries is much higher in Baltic societies than the weakening of such cooperation.
The country-level analysis of the 2019 data shows that Lithuanians and Estonians are more
likely to strongly support cooperation with Western powers than Latvians who are more likely to
resist close cooperation.3 Latvians are also more likely to demonstrate uncertainty with respect to
such cooperation. Thus, working closely with Western countries has a higher potential to trigger
polarization in Latvia than in other Baltic states.
3 In this report, the statistical significance of differences between groups is tested by using dispersion analysis (ANOVA), chi-square tests, and T-tests. Only differences that are significant at the <0.05 level are described in the analysis.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 11
Figure 1. Attitudes toward Western countries as important allies
The cross-sectional data from the 2019 and 2016 surveys show on an aggregate level that
support toward working closely with Western countries has not significantly changed in the Baltic
states (Fig. 2). A country-level analysis, however, reveals more specific dynamics. Estonia’s public
opinion indicates the most significant changes were a considerable drop in moderate support for
close cooperation with the US and other Western countries and an increase of uncertainty by 7pp.
Lithuanians have become more moderate over a three-year period concerning close cooperation
with Western countries. Latvian abstention from close cooperation has weakened, though, but
this has also strengthened uncertainty with respect to how important it is for Latvia to work closely
with other Western powers.
28%
44%
13%
4%
11%
24%
54%
11%
2%
9%
17%
44%
19%
5%
15%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
It’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other Western powers (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
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Figure 2. The dynamics of public opinion toward Western countries as important allies (2016-2019)
An attitude toward the statement that ‘a strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence
of the West’ also alludes to geopolitical priorities in Baltic societies. The 2019 aggregate data
illuminate a polarized attitude toward Russia as a geopolitical actor. While 41% of Baltic
respondents disagree with the balancing role of a strong Russia, 38% grants approval to this.
Arguably, a sense of being somewhere in between the West and Russia is still a popular frame of
reference for Baltic societies. A more subtle analysis reveals a moderate association and
relationship between the perception of Russia as a military threat and opinion on Russia’s
balancing role as regards the influence of the West. That is to say, there is a much higher likelihood
to agree with Russia’s balancing role in the opinion group who think that Russia does not pose a
military threat to their country. The opposite holds true for the opinion group that perceive Russia
as a military threat. Thus, the competing images of Russia are a decisive watershed in Baltic
societies for competing geopolitical identities and a profoundly different understanding of one’s
relations with the West.
The country-level data indicate (Fig. 3) that Estonians are more likely to disagree with
Russia’s balancing role (46%), whereas roughly one fifth of Latvians and Lithuanians are uncertain
about their geopolitical choice (‘Hard to say/NA’). Nevertheless, cross-sectional analysis shows
that disapproval for Russia’s balancing role has weakened in the Baltic states by 11pp since 2016
26%
49%
15%
5%
4%
28%
46%
12%
4%
9%
17%
46%
18%
8%
11%
28%
44%
13%
4%
11%
24%
54%
11%
2%
9%
17%
44%
19%
5%
15%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
It’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other Western powers
2019
2016
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 13
(Fig. 4). This decline has primarily translated into a growing uncertainty vis-à-vis the perceived
relations between Russia and the West. The opposition to a strong Russia has most significantly
weakened in Estonian and Lithuanian public opinion by 13pp and 11pp, respectively.
Figure 3. Attitudes toward Russia as a balancing power
Figure 4. The dynamics of public opinion toward Russia as a balancing power (2016-2019)
11%
25%
21%
25%
17%
5%
33%
29%
10%
23%
13%
27%
25%
13%
22%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
11%
21%
27%
32%
9%
8%
24%
25%
25%
18%
13%
24%
25%
21%
17%
11%
25%
21%
25%
17%
5%
33%
29%
10%
23%
13%
27%
25%
13%
22%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West
2019
2016
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The survey item that measures identification with Western values gives a more nuanced
picture as regards the Western orientation of the Baltic societies. According to the 2019 aggregate
data, almost a half of the Baltic population disagrees with the statement that there is a conflict
between their country’s traditional values and Western values. Yet a sizable opinion group (33%)
approves of this statement. Public opinion has a tendency to choose moderate attitudes in terms
of the potential value of conflict that alludes to higher flexibility. Hence, although the polarization
potential between traditional and Western values is much higher than in the item that measures
support for close cooperation with Western countries, this value-based polarization has only a
moderate character in Baltic societies.
The country-level data indicate that Latvians and Lithuanians are more likely to see a conflict
between traditional and western values (Fig. 5). A comparison of moderate answers suggests that
Lithuanians are more likely to hesitate when positioning themselves vis-à-vis traditional and
Western values. Estonia’s public opinion demonstrates the strongest and firmest consensus, as
the majority (54%) believe that the country’s traditional values and Western values are not in
conflict with each other. However, Estonians are also more likely to express uncertainty.
Figure 5. Identification with Western values
5%
18%
33%
20%
23%
5%
33%
40%
8%
14%
10%
28%
34%
11%
16%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West(2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 15
The cross-sectional analysis of aggregate data reveals that the rejection of a conflict
narrative as regards the country’s traditional values and Western values has declined in the Baltics
by 6pp over the past three years (Fig. 6). Simultaneously, uncertainty regarding relations between
traditional and Western values has strengthened. The most significant changes can be observed
in Estonia where opposition to the value conflict narrative has decreased by 15pp, but society’s
uncertainty has increased by 13pp. Lithuanian public opinion indicates less salient dynamics, but
Latvian public opinion has remained invariable over the past three years. Although the level of
polarization on the basis of the conflict between traditional and Western values has increased in
Estonia, public opinion in all three Baltic states demonstrates a persistently moderate conflict
potential. Namely, only a small portion of the Baltic population is eager to take extreme stances in
approving or rejecting the value conflict narrative.
Figure 6. The dynamics of identification with Western values (2016-2019)
Opinion on the European Union provides a more specific insight into the Western
orientation of Baltic societies (Fig. 7). Aggregate data from 2019 show that Baltic societies are
generally optimistic about the future of the EU, the majority (57%) do not believe that the EU could
soon collapse. Those who support the collapse scenario form a significantly smaller opinion group
(28%) that minimizes the conflict potential with respect to this survey item. Latvians are more
4%
18%
43%
25%
10%
9%
35%
37%
9%
10%
8%
26%
35%
13%
18%
5%
18%
33%
20%
23%
5%
33%
40%
8%
14%
10%
28%
34%
11%
16%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West
2019
2016
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likely to be sceptical about the EU’s future and are more inclined to believe that it will soon
collapse (36%), while Lithuanians and Estonians hold the equally strong consensus that the EU will
not dissolve. Nevertheless, Latvian scepticism is largely expressed in moderate terms (‘tend to
agree’). The cross-sectional data indicate that, along with decreasing uncertainty, the Baltic
societies have experienced growing optimism during the last two years, i.e. the opinion group who
disagree with the statement that the EU will soon collapse has grown by 9pp (Fig. 8). This goes in
line with other data which demonstrate the growth of a positive attitude toward the EU across the
member states after the Brexit referendum.4
Figure 7. Future of the European Union
4 Taking up the challenge: From (silent) support to actual vote. (2018). Eurobarometer Survey 90.1 of the European Parliament. A Public Opinion Monitoring Study, available at https://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/eurobarometer/2018/parlemeter-2018/report/en-parlemeter-2018.pdf
5%
19%
39%
22%
15%
3%
20%
39%
24%
14%
8%
28%
36%
13%
15%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
The European Union will soon collapse (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 17
Figure 8. The Dynamics of the public opinion toward the future of the European Union (2016-2019)
The 2019 survey measured Western orientation also in terms of recent geopolitical matters
that are of particular importance in the Baltic region. In 2016, responding to the anxiety caused by
Russia’s aggression toward Ukraine, NATO member states agreed to deploy multinational battle
groups in the Baltic states and Poland. The pro-Kremlin media and opinion leaders argued that the
reinforcement of NATO positions at Russia’s Western border poses a threat to Russia. The 2019
aggregate data reveal that the majority of people (49%) in the Baltic states do not accept such an
interpretation. However, a sizeable opinion group support it (36%), suggesting that the
deployment of NATO forces under the alliance’s Enhanced Forward Presence contains a rather
high polarization potential in the Baltic societies (Fig. 9). Baltic respondents who see Russia as a
threat to their countries are more likely to think that strengthening the NATO role in the Baltics
does not pose a threat to Russia (56%). In other words, the popular perception of Russia as a
military threat is more likely to be primarily associated with support for NATO’s defensive role
rather than with NATO as a threat to Russia.
7%
20%
30%
22%
21%
5%
23%
39%
15%
18%
10%
24%
29%
11%
25%
5%
19%
39%
22%
15%
3%
20%
39%
24%
14%
8%
28%
36%
13%
15%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
The European Union will soon collapse
2019
2017
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
18
Figure 9. NATO as a threat to Russia
The country-level data indicate that Estonians hold a stronger consensus that the
reinforcement of NATO’s presence does not pose a threat to Russia (56%). Conversely, Lithuanian
support for the narrative that NATO is a threat to Russia is significantly higher (45%). This does
not necessarily mean that the Lithuanians are more susceptible to anti-NATO rhetoric as promoted
by Russia. Acknowledging that Lithuania’s survey results demonstrate a higher polarization
potential, these results perhaps also illustrate that the association of NATO with military
mightiness is more pronounced in Lithuania compared to in Latvian or Estonian public opinion.
Another specific item in terms of the Western orientation focuses on support for Western
economic and political sanctions that were imposed on Russia after the annexation of Crimea and
Russia’s military engagement in Eastern Ukraine. In the Baltic states, the implementation of
Western sanctions, at least during its initial phase, were often associated with possible economic
losses due to Russia’s counter-sanctions. The pro-Kremlin media also sought to target the
willingness of the Baltic societies to support Western sanctions, framing these societies as
insignificant for Russia, but as severely damaging for Western economies, particularly for the Baltic
economies.
The 2019 aggregate data indicate the rather pluralistic attitude of the Baltic societies toward
the EU sanctions on Russia (Fig. 10). While one opinion group prefer that western sanctions are
tightened (20%), another equally sizable group support the idea of softening sanctions (25%). Yet
the strongest support is to maintain Western sanctions in their current state (33%). The country-
11%
20%
22%
34%
13%
6%
39%
29%
10%
16%
8%
24%
32%
20%
16%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states poses a threat to Russia (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 19
level data reveal that Latvians are the least likely to support either the tightening of sanctions or
the maintaining of the status quo, but are more likely to support the softening of sanctions or to
express uncertainty with respect to this issue. On contrary, Estonians demonstrate significantly
higher support for the tightening of EU sanctions on Russia. Lithuanians, in turn, are more likely to
maintain the current form of sanctions, and they are also the least likely to support the idea that
sanctions should be softened. Hence, public opinion in each Baltic country takes a different stance
on the EU sanctions for Russia. On the one hand, these data suggest that sanctions have a relatively
high polarizing potential in the Baltic societies, but, on the other hand, they also reveal that
Western orientation as regards sanctions on Russia is more pronounced among Lithuanians and
Estonians than it is among Latvians.
Figure 10. EU sanctions against Russia
25%
31%
27%
17%
22%
42%
14%
21%
15%
27%
32%
26%
Tightened
Maintained in their current form
Softened
I don’t know/Hard to say
What should be done with the current EU sanctions against Russia? (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
20
Figure 11. The dynamics of public opinion toward the EU sanctions against Russia (2016-2019)
The cross-sectional analysis indicates that support for the tightening of EU sanctions has
deteriorated in all three Baltic states since 2015, particularly in Lithuania and Estonia where
support has fallen by 22pp and 20pp, respectively (Fig. 11). These changes, however, have
reinforced support to maintain the current sanctions rather than to revise and soften them.
Therefore the most significant increase in support for maintaining the status quo can be observed
in Lithuania (17pp) and Estonia (12pp). Remarkably, Latvian public opinion, unlike public opinion
in other Baltic countries demonstrates a significant decline in support for the softening of
sanctions on Russia (11pp). This shows that the sanctions have been normalized by Latvian public
opinion in particular and by the Baltic societies in general. Concurrently, the level of uncertainty
as regards sanctions has significantly increased over the past four years. Perhaps this topic has
gradually lost its sensitivity and relevance since 2014 when the sanctions were introduced. This
also suggests that sanctions on Russia pluralizes rather than antagonizes the Baltic public opinion
vis-à-vis the EU/western economic and political measures taken against Russia after the
annexation of Crimea. It should be also highlighted that the residents of the Baltic states who see
Russia as a military threat maintain the highest likelihood to support Western sanctions. Although
this relationship has weakened since 2015, it remains relatively strong, showing that insecurity,
even if today less salient than four years ago, is still a relevant motif for why the sanctions against
Russia hold rather strong support in all Baltic societies.
44%
18%
29%
9%
54%
25%
11%
9%
31%
18%
44%
8%
25%
31%
27%
17%
22%
42%
14%
21%
15%
27%
32%
26%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Tightened
Maintained in their current form
Softened
I don’t know/Hard to say
Tightened
Maintained in their current form
Softened
I don’t know/Hard to say
Tightened
Maintained in their current form
Softened
I don’t know/Hard to say
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
What should be done with the current EU sanctions against Russia?
2019
2015
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 21
Figure 12. Support for the statements that challenge Western orientation
Note: The categories of ‘Completely agree’ or ‘Agree’ with the given statement are merged into the categories
‘Agree’.
Interestingly, the majority of those that agree within Baltic societies regarding statements
that fully or partly contradict the Western orientation simultaneously support the idea that ‘it is in
our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other Western powers’ (Fig. 12). This
outlines a syncretic form of geopolitical thinking among the Baltic respondents that are critical
toward Western policies and values. This highlights the multi-layered and conditional character of
their Western orientation. At the same time, these data also allude to the internal polarization of
an anti-Western opinion group.
The national pride variable reveals striking differences in all three Baltic societies with
respect to a Western orientation (Fig. 13). While people who express strong national pride are
more likely to align with the Western orientation of their country, this is quite the opposite among
those who do not feel proud of being citizens of their country. A socio-demographic analysis
reveals that the Western orientation in Latvia and Estonia is differentiated along ethnic and
linguistic lines (see the table in Appendix C). In both countries, the respondents that identify with
an ethnic majority are more likely to support pro-Western ideas than the members of ethnic
minorities whose native language is mostly Russian. These attitudinal differences in Latvian and
71%
67%
67%
60%
53%
Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states posesa threat to Russia
There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the Wes
A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of theWest
The EU will soon collapse
The EU sanctions against Russia should be softened
Share of Baltic respondents who simultaneously agree that "it’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other Western powers''
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
22
Estonian public opinion are reflected by all survey items that are explored in this section.
Furthermore, ethnic differences have regional implications, as the most Russophone regions of
Latvia and Estonia (Latgale and Ida-Viru, respectively) are more likely to demonstrate a weaker
Western orientation.
Figure 13. Support to anti-Western statements
Note: here and elsewhere in this report answers ‘Very proud’ and ‘Somewhat proud’ are merged into the category
‘Proud’ and ‘Not very proud’ and ‘Not proud at all’ is merged into the category ‘Not proud’.
The Lithuanian public opinion rarely indicates ethnicity-based division lines as regards the
Western orientation. Such differences can be observed only in terms of the EU future and the EU
sanctions against Russia where non-Lithuanians are more inclined to support Eurosceptic and pro-
Russian positions. The lower relevance of ethnic background is not surprising, because Lithuania
is an ethnically homogenous country. Hence ethnic relations do not play as important a role as
compared to Latvia and Estonia. Nevertheless, the Western orientation in Lithuania does
significantly differ on the regional basis. Although the survey results provide a somewhat
inconsistent pattern, a weaker Western orientation can be noticed in Western Lithuania (e.g. the
Vilnius County and Marijampole County), particularly in smaller towns and villages. Likewise,
education is also a more salient socio-demographic factor in Lithuania than it is in other Baltic
countries. This suggests that Lithuanians with a university degree are more likely to demonstrate
33%
36%
42%
24%
19%
14%
46%
53%
57%
58%
31%
32%
Strengthening the NATO presence in the Balticstates poses a threat to Russia
There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the Wes
A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influenceof the West
The EU will soon collapse
The EU sanctions against Russia should be softened
It is not in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other western powers
Share of Baltic respondents who are proud/not proud to be citizens of their country
Not proud
Proud
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 23
a stronger Western orientation. Education is a significant differentiating independent variable in
all Baltic societies with respect to the EU’s future and to the attitude toward Russia’s role in
balancing Western influence. That is, the less educated residents of Baltic countries are more likely
to be sceptical about the EU’s viability and more optimistic about Russia’s role in the region.
The income level of Baltic households may also occasionally generate significant differences
in terms of the Western orientation, meaning that the wealthiest segment of society is more likely
to support pro-Western views. This is particularly pronounced in Lithuanian public opinion. The
income factor is more consistent between Estonia and Lithuania, whereas in Latvia, it has
considerably lower differentiating power. The most consistent results between the Estonian and
Lithuanian income groups can be observed in the attitude toward the EU (future, sanctions against
Russia) and toward the conflict between traditional and Western values. In both countries well-
off people are more likely to support the EU sanctions against Russia and to be more optimistic
about the EU future and they are more likely to disagree that there is a conflict between their
country’s traditional values and Western values. Notably, the analysis of specific age groups yields
the least striking fault lines within each country. The only consistent results across all Baltic
countries can be seen in the perception of the conflict between traditional values and Western
values. The 2019 survey results show that older cohorts (51+) are more likely to accept the conflict
narrative than the youngest cohort (up to 30).
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
24
ATTITUDES TOWARD THE FAILED STATE CLAIMS
The state-building problems, including a sense that democracy does not function properly,
forms an alternative context where ideological polarization may thrive. These problems nurture
populist political rhetoric and undermine social cohesion, promoting anti-elite, anti-democratic or
anti-western feelings in society. Casting doubts on the state’s sustainability may provoke
existential anxiety and exacerbate an awareness of fragile statehood. Acknowledging the analytical
problems of the ‘failed state’ concept, this report refers to the ‘failed state’ as a set of claims used
by different political actors to highlight moral, economic and political motives that frame a
particular state as an illegitimate and incapable entity. For the purposes of this report, special
survey items were designed in order to explore to what extent the failed state claims can trigger
polarization in Baltic societies. These items largely address two areas of the dysfunctional state
that Call defines as the capacity gap and the legitimacy gap.5
In order to obtain data on the state’s viability, respondents were asked to express an attitude
toward the statement that one’s country ‘cannot exist as an independent national state’.
According to the 2019 aggregate data, 64% of Baltic respondents believe that their country is
capable of existing as an independent national state, but a significantly smaller opinion group
(28%) think the opposite (Fig. 14). The country-level analysis reveals that optimism is much
stronger in Estonia and Lithuania. In Latvia, one can observe a typical polarization where 54% are
convinced about the country’s viability to exist as an independent national state, but 40% support
the opposite opinion. It should be added though that the majority of Latvians are moderate
pessimists (29%), as they ‘tend to agree’ rather than ‘strongly agree’ with the statement. The
cross-sectional data show that the belief of the Baltic societies that their countries can exist as
independent national states has increased by 9pp since 2017 (Fig. 15). The most salient changes
are registered in Estonian and Lithuanian public opinion where optimism about the state’s national
sovereignty has increased by 14pp and 9pp, respectively. In Latvia, the proportion of optimists and
pessimists has remained the same as in 2017.
5 Call, T. C. (2010) ‘Beyond the ‘failed state’: Toward conceptual alternatives’. European Journal of International Relations, 17(2): 303–326.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 25
Figure 14. Evaluation of the state's sovereignty
Figure 15. The dynamics of evaluation of the state's sovereignty
7%
17%
27%
44%
5%
5%
22%
36%
30%
6%
11%
30%
31%
23%
6%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
My country cannot exist as an independent national state (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
13%
19%
28%
31%
9%
5%
29%
39%
18%
9%
13%
23%
27%
22%
15%
7%
17%
27%
44%
5%
5%
22%
36%
30%
6%
11%
30%
31%
23%
6%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
My country cannot exist as an independent national state
2019
2017
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
26
Along with an attitude toward the state’s sovereignty, Baltic respondents were also asked to
express an opinion on the statement that ‘the people of one’s country is on the edge of extinction
and will cease to exist in 100 years’. This statement is sometimes mentioned in connection with
the demographic problems in the Baltic countries. The country-level data reveal significant
differences between Baltic societies (Fig. 16). While Estonians hold the strongest consensus that
they are not on the edge of extinction and will exist as a nation also in 100 years, Lithuanians and
Latvians demonstrate much weaker agreement. This also suggests that polarization and insecurity
on the basis of national and cultural sustainability is more salient in Latvia and Lithuania than in
Estonia. The pessimistic mood of Lithuanians and Latvians, which is more often expressed in
moderate terms (‘tend to agree’), can be partly explained by the negative demographic indicators
of Lithuania and Latvia (e.g. depopulation, emigration) that marks the last 15 years or so. In
contrast, the demographic situation in Estonia has stabilized, if not improved over the last decade.6
Figure 16. Demography as a threat for the state’s existence
6 See Population change - Demographic balance and crude rates at national level, available at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=demo_gind&lang=en; Emigration by age and sex, available at http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_emi2&lang=en
5%
13%
32%
39%
11%
11%
32%
33%
13%
12%
13%
23%
33%
16%
14%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
The people of my country are on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years(2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 27
Several survey items outline an attitude toward the more specific claims of the failed state.
Data on the attitude toward the statement that ‘the economy of one’s country is underdeveloped
and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development’ reveal significant differences
between the Baltic societies (Fig. 17). That is, Estonians demonstrate a rather moderate consensus
(59%) that opposes such a statement and sees the country’s economy in more optimistic terms.
Lithuanians and Latvians hold a similar moderate consensus, but this is located at the opposite
side of the attitudinal scale, as the majority from each state agree upon a negative assessment of
their economy’s shape and viability. Hence, two different polarization patterns emerge: between
dominant optimists and minor pessimists (Estonia) and between dominant pessimists and minor
optimists (Latvia and Lithuania). Interpreting these differences, one should take into account that
these economic attitudes are mainly expressed in moderate terms (‘tend to agree’ or ‘tend to
disagree’) which points to a possible flexibility in public opinion as well as to the temporal nature
of polarizing views as regards the local economy.
Figure 17. Opinions on economic sustainability
An opinion about the statement that ‘the existence of one’s country depends on the EU
financial assistance’ also largely illustrates the society’s economic attitude, but it also can be read
as an indicator for how Baltic societies see the economic autonomy of their countries. The 2019
5%
27%
40%
20%
8%
14%
44%
30%
5%
6%
19%
42%
29%
6%
4%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
The economy of my country is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development of the country (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
28
data reveal that Lithuanians and Latvians hold a strong consensus that their countries existence
depends on EU financial support (Fig. 18). In Estonia, this attitude also prevails, but consensus is
much weaker, as a sizable opinion group (40%) support the belief that Estonia’s existence does
not rest on the EU’s money. At the same time, Estonian public opinion is more polarized regarding
the country’s economic autonomy. Overall, these data illustrate diverse perceptions of the
country’s economic autonomy across the Baltic societies: the economic dependency narrative is
more common in Latvian and Lithuanian public opinion, whereas the economic self-sufficiency
narrative is more pronounced in Estonia.
Figure 18. Dependence on the EU's financial assistance
Regarding social inequality as another target for the failed state claims, Baltic respondents
were asked to express their attitude toward the statement that ‘poverty and unemployment
prevails in their countries’. The survey results yielded a complex picture (Fig. 19). Estonians hold a
moderate consensus (60%) that poverty and unemployment do not dominate in their country.
Quite the opposite attitude is expressed by Lithuanians who hold strong consensus (73%) that
poverty and unemployment is endemic in their country. In comparison with other Baltic states,
Latvia’s public opinion is the most polarized in terms of the perceived poverty and unemployment,
14%
40%
27%
13%
6%
27%
54%
13%
1%
4%
26%
53%
14%
4%
3%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
My country's existence depends on the EU's financial assistance (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 29
i. e. it is divided between two equally large opinion groups or between those who support (54%)
and who do not support (43%) the poverty and unemployment claim. Nevertheless, this
polarization again can be primarily characterized as moderate opposition, as extreme answers do
not dominate the overall Latvian attitude.
Figure 19. Evaluation of social inequality
Since emigration is a shared issue between the Baltic states, it is often framed as an indicator
of an ineffective state. The 2019 survey measured the attitude of Baltic societies toward the
statement that ‘every day many residents leave one’s country and do not want to live there’. The
data demonstrate a very strong consensus among Latvians and Lithuanians toward accepting this
claim (Fig. 20). In Estonia, the situation is highly polarized between supporters and opponents of
such claims. On a more general level, the data suggest that the emigration claims, particularly
those that depict the negative consequences of emigration may have great mobilizing potential in
the Baltic states. Likewise, these results show the varying impact of emigration intensity on public
opinion in relation to the awareness of the failed state. Although recent migration statistics
8%
29%
40%
20%
3%
29%
45%
23%
2%
2%
17%
37%
36%
7%
3%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Poverty and unemployment prevails in my country (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
30
suggest that the pace of emigration has slowed down in Lithuania and Latvia, this experience most
likely continues to frame the perception that many residents are still leaving the country and do
not want to live in that particular country. Conversely, in Estonia the emigration numbers are
significantly smaller, thus giving limited space for ‘the everyone-is-leaving’ narrative.
Figure 20. Emigration as an issue
Anti-elite sentiment is one of the central elements in populist political rhetoric that intends
to undermine the legitimacy of the ruling parties and the existing democratic order. The 2019 data
indicate an extreme distrust in political elite in Latvia and Lithuania where the majority – 85% and
83%, respectively – agree that politicians of their countries are corrupt and do not care about the
interests of the people (Fig. 21). In contrast, the Estonian public opinion is again profoundly
polarized, as trust and distrust in politicians are alike. These differences between the countries
can, to some extent, be explained by differences in the Corruption Perception Index, that in 2018
placed Latvia in 41th position and Lithuania in 38th position, but Estonia took a significantly higher
position (18th), meaning that Estonians are less likely to think that their public institutions are
corrupt.7
7 See Corruption Perception Index 2018, available at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018
15%
31%
35%
39%
47% 46%
30%
18%
13%10%
1% 2%
6%3% 4%
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
Every day many residents leave my country and do not want to live here (2019)
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 31
Figure 21. Anti-elite sentiments in the Baltic countries
A deeper analysis reveals that a sceptical attitude toward the state’s viability is strongly
associated with a disapproval of the state’s performance in particular fields (social equality,
economy, demography, public good (Fig. 22)). On the one hand, doubts about the state’s viability
can be interpreted as issue-related discontent rather than a generic and ungrounded feeling of
decay. Namely, people are inclined to generalize their specific disappointment. On the other hand,
the equally strong discontent with the state’s performance that intertwines specific fields may
signal an opinion group that is by nature sceptical about the state.
15%
31%
32%
9%
12%
41%
42%
12%
2%
3%
43%
42%
10%
1%
4%
Completely agree
Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Politicians in my country are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the people (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
32
Figure 22. Opinions on the failed state claims
Figure 23. Approval of the failed state claims
86%
82%
81%
74%
71%
50%
My country's existence depends on the EU financial assistance
Every day many residents leave my country and do not want to livethere
Country's politicians are corrupt and do not care about the interestsof the nation
Economy of my country is underdeveloped and cannot ensure thesufficient and long-term development
Poverty and unemployment prevails in my country
The people of my country are on the edge of extinction and willcease to exist in 100 years
Share of Baltic respondents who think that their country cannot exist as an independent state (2019)
70%
68%
72%
45%
49%
27%
25%
85%
89%
89%
77%
78%
66%
52%
My country's existence depends on the EU financialassistance
Every day many residents leave my country and do notwant to live there
Country's politicians are corrupt and do not care about theinterests of the nation
Economy of my country is underdeveloped and cannotensure the sufficient and long-term development
Poverty and unemployment prevails in my country
The people of my country are on the edge of extinction andwill cease to exist in 100 years
My country cannot exist as an independent state
Share of Baltic respondents who are proud/not proud to be citizens of their country
Not proud
Proud
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 33
The national pride variable on the aggregate level indicates a conspicuous fault line between
those who strongly feel proud to be the citizens of their country and those who express no pride
at all (a relatively smaller group). While the former disagrees with the failed state claims, the latter
accepts them (Fig. 22). One’s satisfaction with life also provides significant explanatory data as
regards to susceptibility with failed state discourse (Fig. 24). Although in Lithuanian public opinion
this factor shows a less consistent differentiating role, one can also see that generally people who
are the most satisfied with their lives in a 10-point scale (assess satisfaction between 6 and 10) are
more likely to disagree with failed state claims, whereas those who are less satisfied (between 1
and 5) are more likely to accept these claims (Fig. 25).
A socio-demographic analysis again shows the different role of ethnicity in the Baltic states.
While those who identify as ethnic Latvians and ethnic Estonians are less likely to support the
failed state claims, the attitude of Lithuanians and non-Lithuanians do not reveal significant
differences. As a matter of fact, the regional factor provides more consistent results across the
Baltic societies, but here again one should take into account the underlying ethnic differences in
Latvia and Estonia. The survey data indicate that almost all failed state claims have triggered
regionally diverse reactions. In Latvia and Estonia, the failed state claims are more often accepted
in Russophone regions or counties (the Latgale region and the Harju and Ida-Viru counties).
Nevertheless, some less Russophone areas have also contributed to generating significant
differences, such as the Zemgale region in central Latvia and Hiiu County in Estonia. This suggests
that regional attitudinal differences have not only ethno-linguistic, but perhaps also a socio-
economic explanation. Moreover, the Estonian and Latvian data show that the failed state thinking
is more often supported outside capitals or other big cities, which reinforces the argument that
the ethno-linguistically marked area should be combined with other territorial variables in order
to better understand the structural conditions that constitute this polarization context. Lithuanian
public opinion approves such asymmetry, indicating that people who live in less populated areas
(towns, villages) are more likely to accept failed state claims. In particular, the residents of Western
Lithuania (Telsai, Taurage, Marijampole counties) are more likely to agree with such claims.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
34
Figure 24. The dynamics toward the satisfaction with life (1999-2019)
Figure 25. Approval of the failed state claims by the life satisfaction evaluation
5.9
5.09 5.27
6.696.45 6.36
7.597.26
6.69
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
Mean satisfaction with life as a whole in a 10-points scale (1 dissatisfied - 10 satisfied)
1999
2008
2019
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
1-5 6 7 8-10
Quartiles of Baltic respondents who assess their satisfaction with life as a whole in a 10-points scale (1 - dissatisfied, 10 - satisfied) (2019)
My country's existence depends on theEU financial assistance
Every day many residents leave mycountry and do not want to live there
Country's politicians are corrupt and donot care about the interests of thenation
Economy of my country isunderdeveloped and cannot ensure thesufficient and long-term development
Poverty and unemployment prevails inmy country
The people of my country are on theedge of extinction and will cease to existin 100 years
My country cannot exist as anindependent state
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 35
Education is the most consistent socio-demographic indicator across the Baltic states, this
generates differences concerning all failed state categories. According to this indicator, the most
educated part of Baltic societies is less susceptible to the failed state discourse. In contrast, the
household income variable yields less consistent findings, showing that the income level has a
rather conditional character in supporting or opposing the failed state claims. The most consistent
results of income groups across the Baltic states are associated with socio-economic topics,
revealing that the wealthiest segments in Baltic societies are less likely to agree that their country’s
economy is underdeveloped and cannot ensure a sufficient and long-term development, or that
poverty and unemployment prevails in their country or that every day many residents leave their
country and do not want to live there. The differences between age groups, again show the least
significant and consistent results, which means that a generational perspective will hardly
contribute toward explaining failed state thinking and that this mindset largely intertwines with
society as a whole.
ATTITUDE TOWARD IMMIGRANTS
An anti-immigrant sentiment is currently a very prominent issue in European societies. The
2015 refugee crisis in Europe also exacerbated this feeling in the Baltic states. Simultaneously,
massive emigration over the last 15 years and aging societies evoke discussions about the
necessity for labour migrants. Hence, the immigration issue has created a relatively new context
for ideological polarization in Baltic societies.
The 2019 survey included four items that provided data concerning attitudes toward
immigrants. The first item deals with the perception of foreigners in general. Respondents were
asked to express an attitude toward the statement that ‘it is impossible for people who do not
share the customs and traditions of one’s country to become fully attached to this country’. The
aggregate data show that the majority of Baltic respondents (46%) agree with such a statement,
but a much smaller portion (22%) disagrees (Fig. 26). The country-level data reveal that Latvians
are more likely to associate the acquisition of Latvia’s customs and traditions as a profound
precondition for belonging to Latvia, whereas Lithuanians are less likely to support such a
maximalist acculturation practice. Thus Lithuanians, ethnically the most homogenous society in
the Baltic states, appear more open to cultural diversity in their country compared to Latvians,
ethnically the most diverse society.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
36
Figure 26. General perception of immigrants
Note: a compressed scale is used in all charts of this section and the next section. ‘Completely agree’ and ‘Agree’
are merged into the categories ‘Agree’, and ‘Disagree’ and ‘Completely disagree’ is merged into the category
‘Disagree’.
The cross-sectional aggregate data indicate that support for the statement about the
necessity to share the customs and traditions of one’s country has declined by 16pp over the last
six years (Fig. 27). This means that tolerance toward cultural pluralism has increased in all three
Baltic societies. Country-level analysis reveals that Estonian public opinion has experienced the
sharpest decline in the assimilationist attitude (19pp). In the Latvian case, this decline has
significantly increased (13pp) indifference toward the requirement that people should share
Latvia’s customs and traditions if they truly want to belong to Latvia. Namely, Latvians have
become less opinionated about the proper way for how foreigners can become fully attached to
Latvia, which may allude to the increasing tolerance to other cultures as well as about increasing
reluctance toward expressing an assimilation-oriented opinion about the members of other
cultures who live in Latvia.
45%
25%
26%
4%
42%
31%
24%
3%
51%
28%
18%
2%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Hard to say/ NA
It is impossible for people who do not share my country's customs and traditions to become fully attached to my country (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 37
Figure 27. The dynamics of public opinion toward foreigners (2013-2019)
In order to measure the attitude toward immigrants, three specific statements were used.
The 2019 aggregate data reveal that support for the statement that ‘immigrants increase crime
rates’ (Fig. 28 and Fig. 29) is much higher than the approval of statements that ‘immigrants take
jobs away from people who were born in one’s country’ (Fig. 30 and Fig. 31) or that ‘the culture
of one’s country is generally undermined by immigrants’ (Fig. 32 and Fig. 33). The least accepted
statement across the Baltic societies is that ‘immigrants are a threat to the country’s culture’,
which means that anti-immigrant sentiment is more likely to be rooted in the social order narrative
(crime, jobs) than in fear from intercultural encounters. Perhaps willingness to maintain the extant
social order can be more prone to triggering defensive thinking and polarization with respect to
immigrants. The 2019 aggregate data exposed a strong association between all three immigrant-
related statements, which means that people who express a negative attitude in one context
(socially deviant behaviour) are quite likely to maintain this attitude in another context (threat to
the labour market). This shows that the anti-immigrant and pro-immigrant opinion groups
represent a somewhat coherent rather than just a conditional attitudinal segment within the Baltic
societies. Moreover, as the cross-sectional data show, attitudinal coherence has even
strengthened since 2013.
64%
18%
14%
4%
56%
27%
15%
2%
67%
15%
17%
1%
45%
25%
26%
4%
42%
31%
24%
3%
51%
28%
18%
2%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
It is impossible for people who do not share my country's customs and traditions to become fully attached to my country
2019
2013
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
38
Figure 28. Immigrants as a source for crime
Figure 29. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as source of crime (2013-2019)
47%
22%
22%
9%
29%
38%
27%
6%
50%
26%
20%
4%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Immigrants increase crime rates (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
37%
29%
24%
27%
31%
28%
39%
23%
33%
47%
22%
22%
29%
38%
27%
50%
26%
20%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
Immigrants increase crime rates
2019
2013
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 39
Figure 30. Immigrants as a threat to job market
Figure 31. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as a threat to job markets (2013-2019)
34%
21%
39%
6%
36%
33%
29%
3%
35%
29%
33%
3%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Immigrants take jobs away from people that were born in my country (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
32%
32%
28%
52%
27%
17%
57%
18%
23%
34%
21%
39%
36%
33%
29%
35%
29%
33%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in my country
2019
2013
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
40
The relationship analysis between the three anti-immigrant statements indicates that the
opinion on immigrants as job stealers is more likely to be shaped (reinforced/weakened) by the
people’s opinion of immigrants as criminals or cultural invaders rather than the other way around.
Taking into account the relatively small share of new immigrants in the Baltic societies and thus a
rather limited experience, the relations between different stereotypes alludes to a possible
priming effect. That is, inter/nationally mediated negative images become a major source of one’s
anti-immigrant opinion that continues framing immigrants in less sensitive contexts, e. g.
immigrants as a workforce for the local economies. Overall, though, these data suggest that the
level of polarization as regards immigration is somewhat moderate in the Baltic states and that it
leans toward pluralistic rather than antagonistic polarization. The presence of a large group of
people who neither support nor oppose the prejudice about immigrants is a crucial factor that
reinforces a pluralistic pattern in Baltic public opinion. Moreover, this reluctant segment is
surprisingly persistent in time.
Figure 32. Immigrants as a threat to local culture
30%
20%
44%
6%
26%
32%
38%
4%
30%
29%
37%
4%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Hard to say/ NA
My country's culture is generally undermined by immigrants (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 41
Figure 33. The dynamics of public opinion toward immigrants as a threat to local culture (2013-2019)
The country-level analysis reveals that significant differences exist between the Baltic
societies only with respect to the statement that ‘immigrants increase crime rates’. Lithuanians
are less likely to agree with this statement. Thus, Latvian and Estonian public opinion might be
more susceptible to the socially deviant image of immigrants. The cross-sectional data generally
indicate that the association of immigrants with an increasing crime rate and with a threat to
country’s culture has strengthened in Baltic public opinion by 8pp and 5pp, respectively. On the
contrary, the link between immigrants and job losses has weakened by 8pp. From these results,
one may tentatively conclude that the attitude toward labour migrants from culturally familiar
countries has a higher likelihood to develop into a more migrant-friendly attitude while
refugees/immigrants from culturally and socially unfamiliar countries have a higher likelihood to
increase anti-immigrant sentiment.
The country-level analysis also reveals quite complex dynamics since 2013. In Latvia and
Estonia, support for the statement that immigrants increase crime rates has risen by 11pp and
9pp, respectively, whereas it has remained unchanged in Lithuania. Conversely, the approval of
the statement that immigrants take jobs away has declined in Latvia (23pp) and Lithuania (17pp),
but has remained unchanged in Estonian public opinion. Finally, support toward framing
immigrants as a threat to national culture has increased in Estonia (12pp) and Lithuania (6pp), but
has slightly fallen in Latvia (5pp). These dynamics hence illustrate that the Latvian attitude toward
18%
29%
40%
19%
36%
37%
34%
21%
42%
30%
20%
44%
26%
32%
38%
30%
29%
37%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
My country's culture is generally undermined by immigrants
2019
2013
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
42
immigrants has experienced the most extensive changes in relation to the strengthening of the
deviant and asocial representation of immigrants and with the weakening of other negative
representations, e.g. immigrants as job stealers or a threat to local traditions and customs.
According to these data, the smallest increase in resentment toward immigrants can be
observed in Lithuania. In contrast, Estonian public opinion demonstrates the most salient increase
in anti-immigrant sentiment since 2013. This perhaps explains why the Conservative People's Party
of Estonia (EKRE), which secured the third place in the 2019 national elections, used anti-
immigration rhetoric as one of the central issues during their election campaign. Regardless of the
different attitudinal patterns that can be detected in Baltic societies in relation to immigrants, a
common characteristic in all three countries is the presence of a somewhat steady and neutral, if
not improving, opinion on immigrants as a labour force that can contribute to local economies.
Figure 34. Approval of the anti-immigrant statements
A comparative analysis of the aggregate data reveals that the residents of the Baltic states
that can be analytically categorized as ‘cultural assimilationists’8 are divided into those agreeing
with anti-immigrant statements and those disagreeing (Fig. 34). Thus, support for the
8 They believe that it is impossible for people who do not share their country’s customs and traditions to become fully attached to their country.
55%
44%
40%
Immigrants increase crime rates
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in mycountry
My country's culture is generally undermined by immigrants
Share of Baltic respondents who believe that it is impossible for people who do not share their country’s customs and traditions to become fully attached to their country (2019)
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 43
assimilationist strategy toward foreigners does not necessarily mean higher support for to
stereotypical anti-immigrant statements. Moreover, the national pride variable indicates an
inconsistent pattern across the Baltic states. On the one hand, a strong sense of pride about
belonging to one’s country is a characteristic feature for cultural assimilationists. On the other
hand, stronger national pride is again not associated with a higher likelihood to support anti-
immigrant claims. In fact, this significantly reduces such likelihood (Fig. 35). Simultaneously, one
should take into account that Latvian public opinion vis-à-vis two out of three anti-immigrant
statements does not indicate any statistically significant differences among those that express
strong national pride and those that do not. Thus national identification, in general, is a weaker
differentiating factor in the Latvian attitude toward immigrants.
Figure 35. Support to anti-immigrant statements
The analysis of socio-demographic data reveals that the area (county or region) where
people live generates the most consistent differences across the Baltic states. Latvian public
opinion shows that the people that live in the capital of Latvia, Riga, are more likely to disagree
with anti-immigrant sentiment. In Estonia, the differences between big cities and smaller towns
53%
43%
32%
29%
41%
51%
46%
36%
People who do not share their country’s customs and traditions cannot become fully attached to their
country
Immigrants increase crime rates
Immigrants take jobs away from people who wereborn in my country
My country's culture is generally undermined byimmigrants
Share of Baltic respondents who are proud/not proud to be citizens of their country (2019)
Not proud
Proud
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
44
are even more salient than in other Baltic countries. The residents of Harju County demonstrate
the most consistent anti-immigrant attitudes within the Estonian context. In Lithuania, the
residents of medium-sized cities are more likely to accept anti-immigrant sentiment, but the most
consistent anti-immigrant attitudes can be observed in Kaunas County. Ethnic background is a less
important differentiating factor in terms of attitudes toward immigrants. The most considerable
attitudinal differences are registered in Estonia where the respondents that identify with the
ethnic Estonian majority are more likely to be reluctant toward the statement that immigrants
increase crime rates and more likely to disagree that immigrants take jobs away from people that
were born in Estonia.
The education indicator reveals significant differences only in Latvia and Estonia where
people with a university degree are more likely to disagree with anti-immigrant statements.
Respondents from this category generally demonstrate a more welcoming attitude toward
foreigners. The household income groups also indicate less significant and regular differences.
However, incomes are an important determinant in Lithuania, revealing somewhat surprising
results. That is, the second highest income quintile (an average household income 1001 – 1401
EUR) is more likely to agree with anti-immigrant statements, whereas the representatives of the
highest quintile are more likely to disagree with these statements. In comparison previous two
polarization contexts, anti-immigrant sentiment shows that age groups play a more crucial role for
generating cleavages in public opinion. This can be specifically observed in Estonia and Lithuania
where three anti-immigrant items indicate significant differences across age groups. These reveal
that the youngest generation of Lithuanians (up to 30) are more likely to disagree with anti-
immigrant discourse. Conversely, in Estonia, the oldest generation (62 and above) are more likely
to express a negative attitude toward immigrants. The only consistent findings across all Baltic
societies indicate that the oldest generation is more likely to agree that it is impossible for people
that do not share national customs and traditions to become fully attached to one’s country.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 45
ATTITUDES TOWARD PROTECTIONISM
Protectionism can also become a source of ideological polarization. As long as neo-liberal
values clash with locally embedded thinking and needs, a protectionist ethos fits well within a
populist agenda. The election of Donald Trump as the US president and the Brexit referendum are
two landmark events that have globally illustrated and legitimized protectionist discourse. To be
sure, in the Baltic states and elsewhere, the localized versions of such a discourse have been in
existence in their own right. Furthermore, the pro-Kremlin media have keen to remind that the
Baltic states are vassals of EU and US commercial interests and do not have their own national
economies. In this section, four survey items are used to measure the level and nature of
protectionism in Baltic societies.
The first item focuses on economic protectionism, stating that ‘one’s country should limit
the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy’. The 2019 results show a
fragmented sociological picture that indicates significant differences between the Baltic states.
According to the 2019 data, Latvians are more likely to agree that the import of foreign products
should be limited, whereas Estonians demonstrate the lowest support for such an idea (Fig. 36).
In other words, while Latvians hold a moderate consensus on economic protectionism, Estonians
demonstrate an equally moderate consensus on trade openness. Lithuanians, in turn, seem to be
the most pluralistic, as there is not a dominant opinion group as regards the proposal to revise
Lithuania’s import policy.
Figure 36. Economic nationalism in the Baltic countries
27%
20%
43%
9%
32%
32%
32%
3%
48%
28%
21%
3%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Hard to say/ NA
My country should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
46
Figure 37. The dynamics of economic nationalism in the Baltic countries (2013-2019)
The cross-sectional analysis reveals changes in all Baltic countries since 2013 that, on an
aggregate level, indicate decreasing support for the idea of limiting the import of foreign products
(Fig. 37). The data show that support for limiting the import of products in order to foster the
national economy has fallen by 14pp over the last six years, and this has strengthened opposition
toward such protectionist measures. Latvia’s public opinion displays the most conspicuous decline,
and this holds true even if one takes into account the results from the 1995 and 2003 surveys
(Estonia and Lithuania were not included in these survey waves). Likewise, with weakening
support for protectionist ideas, the number of reluctant respondents in Latvian public opinion or
those that approve neither sides has increased by 15pp. Similar dynamics can be observed in
Lithuania. Contrary to the previous two cases, Estonian public opinion has instead demonstrated
the strongest increase in opposition toward the revision of import policy.
The survey item that measures attitudes toward the statement that ‘large international
companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in one’s country’ also measures
the economic dimension of protectionism. The 2019 data reveal that Latvians are more likely to
take a negative perspective on international companies, whereas Estonians and Lithuanians
demonstrate equally low support and higher pluralism toward such statements (Fig. 38). Since
2013, cross-sectional analysis indicates that public opinion in the Baltic states has been rather
steady in its framing of international companies as a damaging factor for local businesses (Fig. 39).
In Lithuania and Latvia, the negative attitude toward international companies has slightly
deteriorated by 6pp and 4pp, respectively. In the Latvian case, where three survey waves are
available, one can notice that this incremental decline is a continuous trend over the last 15 years.
30%
30%
31%
43%
23%
28%
72%
14%
12%
27%
20%
43%
32%
32%
32%
48%
28%
21%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
My country should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy
2019
2013
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 47
Figure 38. Attitudes toward international companies
Figure 39. The dynamics of public opinion toward large international companies
40%
22%
23%
15%
36%
34%
24%
7%
56%
22%
14%
8%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in my country (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
40%
27%
19%
46%
24%
20%
61%
20%
15%
40%
22%
23%
36%
34%
24%
56%
22%
14%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in my country
2019
2013
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
48
The third protectionism-related item measures an attitude toward the proposal that
‘foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in one’s country’. In this statement, the economic
(land as a recourse) and symbolic (land as a part of the nation’s territory) dimensions of
protectionism overlap. The aggregate data show that support for restricting the land ownership
rights of foreigners is a somewhat popular idea in the Baltic states. Yet this topic has only a limited
possibility to trigger antagonistic polarization. This is because pluralistic public opinion dominates
in all countries. These findings do suggest that large opinion groups within Baltic societies are
susceptible to protectionism-induced discourse.
The 2019 country-level results again mark Latvia as the most protectionist-minded country
where 61% support the ban on foreigners’ rights to purchase land (Fig. 40). These results also
mean that protectionist thinking in terms of land ownership can generate a much stronger
consensus in Latvia compared to the idea of limiting the import of products. Arguably, this is
because the former consensus is triggered by a mixed motif (economic and symbolic), whereas
the latter emerges from purely economic considerations. Estonians and Lithuanians are, to a
similar extent, both less likely to accept restrictive measures with respect to land ownership.
However, the explicit disapproval of a restrictive policy is higher in Estonia than in Lithuania (26%
vs. 14%, respectively). The cross-sectional aggregate data show a rather stable public opinion
picture regarding land ownership. In particular, this applies to Latvia and Lithuania (Fig. 41).
Estonians, in turn, have become more inclined to think in protectionist terms, i. e. demonstrate
support toward restricting land ownership rights has increased by 13pp since 2013.
Figure 40. Opinions on foreigners’ right to purchase land
49%
19%
26%
6%
52%
28%
15%
5%
61%
21%
13%
5%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Hard to say/ NA
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in my country (2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 49
Figure 41. The dynamics of public opinion toward foreigners’ right to purchase land (2013-2019)
The last protectionism-related item focuses on the sovereignty issue. This measures
respondents’ attitudes toward the statement that ‘international organizations are taking away too
much power from the government of one’s country’. 2019 survey results reveal somewhat
fractured and pluralistic public opinion in the Baltic states (Fig. 42). Although Latvians are more
likely to think that international organizations eliminate their country’s sovereignty (46%), there is
a sizeable opinion group that is either reluctant or opposes such an assumption (41%). Lithuanian
public opinion is the least likely to accept and the most likely to explicitly oppose the same claim
about the influence of international organizations. Arguably, in this respect, Lithuanians have a
higher awareness of their country’s sovereignty compared to Estonians and Latvians. In Estonia,
one may observe the highest level of uncertainty vis-à-vis the influence of international
organizations; this means that Estonian public opinion may have the highest potential for change
as regards assessment of the role of international organizations.
36%
21%
33%
55%
19%
19%
66%
19%
13%
49%
19%
26%
52%
28%
15%
61%
21%
13%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in my country
2019
2013
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
50
Figure 42. Assessment of the international organizations
Figure 43. The dynamics of public opinion toward the assessment of the international organizations
43%
18%
18%
21%
37%
32%
22%
9%
46%
27%
14%
13%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Hard to say/ NA
International organizations are taking away too much power from my country's government(2019)
Latvia
Lithuania
Estonia
44%
20%
14%
37%
29%
14%
60%
21%
13%
43%
18%
18%
37%
32%
22%
46%
27%
14%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Agree
Neither agree or disagree
Disagree
Esto
nia
Lith
uan
iaLa
tvia
International organizations are taking away too much power from my country's government
2019
2013
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 51
The cross-sectional aggregate data indicate that public opinion in Baltic societies has
maintained a rather stable attitude toward the influence of international organizations (Fig. 43).
The most significant changes are registered in Latvia where a negative perception of international
organizations has decreased by 14pp since 2013. Nevertheless, such attitudinal changes have
strengthened Latvian reluctance or uncertainty as distinct from outright opposition toward the
claim that international organizations are taking away too much power from the government of
Latvia. Moreover, a critical attitude toward the influence of international organizations, as the first
wave data on Latvia demonstrated, has been even lower at the beginning of the 2000s. In other
words, the cross-sectional analysis does not suggest that Latvians’ trust in international
organizations per se has increased. Conversely, explicit opposition to the claim that international
organizations usurp too much power has risen in Estonian and Lithuanian public opinion by 4pp
and 8pp, respectively. Overall, cross-sectional analysis suggests that the image of international
organisations portrayed by protectionist claims has higher polarization potential today than this
did six years ago.
Figure 44. Approval of protectionist statements
Interestingly, around half of the Baltic respondents that believe that their country’s economy
is underdeveloped and cannot ensure sufficient and long-term development also simultaneously
support protectionist policies (Fig. 44). That is, a progressive economic policy, in their
understanding, is most likely associated with protectionism. These findings suggest that the
protectionist solutions to economic problems in the Baltic states may trigger polarization between
57%
51%
50%
42%
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in my country.
Large international companies are doing more and more damage tolocal businesses in my country.
International organizations are taking away too much power frommy country's government.
My country should limit the import of foreign products in order toprotect its national economy.
Share of those Baltic respondents that agree that their country’s economy is underdeveloped and cannot ensure sufficient and long-term development (2019)
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
52
protectionists and ‘internationalists’. The national pride variable reveals an inconsistent link with
protectionism. The data on Estonia shows the strongest association in this context, suggesting that
people that express the strongest national pride are less likely to accept protectionist claims (Fig.
45). In Latvia, such an association has a weaker character, but in Lithuania, national pride largely
does not generate significant differences between diverse opinion groups. Hence, national
identification in Baltic societies yields a somewhat limited contribution to protectionism as a
context for ideological polarization.
The socio-demographic analysis shows that regional variation within a country again creates
the most significant and consistent differences across all Baltic states. In Latvia, these differences
have an inconsistent character with respect to protectionism, as regions with the strongest
differentiating power vary in line with survey items. In contrast, no significant variations can be
observed among the capital, bigger cities, and villages. This means that protectionism is supported
by an opinion group that is embedded in nationally rather than locally specific thinking. However,
these findings show that protectionism is not exclusively supported in regions which are
dominated by ethnic Latvians or in Russophone areas. In Estonia, the residents of Tallinn are less
likely to support protectionist ideas, whereas those that live in villages are more likely to align with
the protectionist claims. According to data, the residents of the Harju County display a consistently
higher likelihood to agree with protectionist statements. In Lithuania, the residents of
Marijampole and Taurage counties, once again, differ significantly from other areas of Lithuania.
These areas demonstrate higher support for protectionism.
Figure 45. Support for protectionism in the Baltic countries
59%
47%
46%
35%
57%
55%
56%
46%
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in mycountry.
Large international companies are doing more andmore damage to local businesses in my country.
International organizations are taking away too muchpower from my country's government.
My country should limit the import of foreignproducts in order to protect its national economy.
Share of Baltic respondents who are proud/not proud to be citizens of their country (2019)
Not proud
Proud
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 53
Estonia is the only country where ethnic identification can be associated with relevant
differences concerning protectionism. Nevertheless, data reveal an inconsistent pattern in terms
of different protectionism-related items. That is, depending on the particular protectionist claim,
ethnic Estonians can be either more likely to support or to disagree or to take a reluctant position
in terms of protectionist ideas. Thus, regardless of the salience of the ethnic identification, this
analysis does not indicate that Estonia’s ethnic majority or ethnic minorities are more inclined to
support protectionism. The education indicator in this polarization context also unveils
inconsistency between the countries. The country-level results, though, show that education plays
a significant and consistent differentiating role in Estonia as people with a university degree are
more likely to disagree with protectionist ideas, whereas Estonians who have secondary or
vocational education are more likely to accept these ideas. Household income groups are able to
generate results that illustrate the Baltic states in a more consistent light. Overall, these findings
show that the wealthiest people in all countries are more likely to disagree with the protectionist
ideas. The income factor in creating attitudinal differences is particularly relevant in Estonia and
Lithuania.
The protectionism context creates the most significant and consistent differences between
age groups. These differences mostly insist that the youngest generation (up to 30) in Baltic
societies are more likely to disagree with protectionist ideas, whereas the oldest generation (62
and above) are more likely to support them. Arguably, this relationship is stronger in Latvia and
Estonia and is more pronounced in terms of the proposal to limit the import of foreign products
in order to protect their country’s national economy and to prohibit foreigners from buying the
country’s land.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
54
IDEOLOGICAL POLARIZATION: A BIRD’S EYE V IEW
THE WESTERN ORIENTATION INDEX
The attitudes of respondents can be broadly characterized as pro-Western or anti-Western.
They were captured in our questionnaire by using a battery of items from the block Q1 (see
Appendix A).
In order to reduce the complexity of data that arises from the use of many related items, a
principal component analysis (PCA, Varimax rotation) was used. The analysis reveals that all the
aforementioned questions are significantly, although moderately, correlated, and if they are
compiled into one summary factor, this explains 42% of variation in the data. Crombach’s Alpha
value of 0.65 confirms that the five questions, taken together, form a reliable scale. Accordingly,
using these five questions, the Western orientation index was calculated. It ranges from 1 to 5,
with ‘1’ meaning an extremely cold feeling toward the West, and ‘5’ – an extremely warm feeling.
Figure 46. Distribution of attitudes toward the West (2019)
Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely anti-Western) to 4 (extremely pro-
Western). For example, 59 respondents of the 2019 survey had extremely pro-Western attitudes.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 55
According to the T-test, the attitude of Baltic respondents toward the West is significantly
warmer than it is colder. The mean value is 2.8. Country-level analysis shows that a pro-Western
stance is more common in Estonia (2.93), whereas an anti-Western orientation is most
pronounced in Latvia (mean value 2.7). Notably, 16% of Latvians hold very strong anti-Western
attitudes (a score of 2 or lower), but in Estonia and Lithuania this opinion group is much lower
(7%). Overall, in Lithuania, ‘somewhat warm’ feelings often dominate (mean value 2.69).
Figure 47. Distribution of attitudes toward the West in three Baltic countries (2019)
Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely anti-Western) to 4 (extremely pro-
Western) in each of the Baltic states.
The cross-sectional analysis shows that the general feeling in the Baltic societies toward the
West has become somewhat colder since 2013. The independent-samples T test indicates that the
aggregate changes from 2.84 to 2.77 are not statistically significant. However, these are significant
on the country level for Estonia and Lithuania.
0%2%4%6%8%
10%12%14%16%18%
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
56
Figure 48. The Western orientation index in the Baltic countries in 2016 and 2019
Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely anti-Western) to 4 (extremely pro-
Western) in each of the Baltic states in year 2006 and 2019.
THE FAILED STATE INDEX
In order to test the concept of Latvia (Estonia/Lithuania) as a failed state, several additional
questions were included in the questionnaire (questions in the Q5 block, see Appendix A).
The analysis shows that all seven questions correlate very well, and the one factor solution
suggested by the Principal component analysis explains 53% of the variation in our data.
Moreover, Crombach’s alfa (0,85) confirms that they form a coherent scale. Therefore, on the
basis of these questions, an index from 1 to 5 was calculated where ‘1’ means that a respondent
aligns with the failed state discourse, but ‘5’ means that a respondent sees the state as a successful
and viable social system.
2.97
2.81
2.69
2.92
2.74
2.65
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
The Western orientation index
2016
2019
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 57
Figure 49. Distribution in the perception of the country
Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely negative perception, i.e., a failed
state) to 4 (extremely positive perception).
This comparison of the Baltic states reveals that Estonians perceive their country much more
positively than the inhabitants of the other two Baltic states (mean evaluation 2.76). In Lithuania,
the value of the index is 2.19, but in Latvia it is 2.17. Overall, in Estonia there are many more people
that have a positive rather than a negative view of their country, whereas in Latvia and Lithuania
a skeptical opinion predominates. A profoundly negative perception of their country (evaluation 2
or lower) is characteristic to 44% of Latvians, 41% of Lithuanians and just 13% of Estonians.
Figure 50. The perception of the state in the Baltics
Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely negative perception, i.e., a failed
state) to 4 (extremely positive perception) in each of the Baltic states.
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
Faile
d s
tate 1.1
1.3
1.4
1.6
1.7
1.9
2.0
2.1
2.3
2.4
2.6
2.7
2.9
3.0
3.1
3.3
3.4
3.6
3.7
3.9
Succ
essf
ul…
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
58
THE XENOPHOBIA INDEX
Four questions in the questionnaire aimed to capture respondents’ attitudes toward
immigrants (questions 1 to 4 in the Q8 block, see Appendix A). As the first item, “It is impossible
for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to
[COUNTRY]” did not correlate well with other items, it was excluded from the index.
Using the remaining three items, an index of xenophobia was created that ranges from 1 to
5, and where ‘1’ means an extremely negative attitude toward immigrants and ‘5’ – an extremely
positive attitude toward immigrants. According to the Principal component analysis, these three
variables explain 74% of the variation in the data, and the Crombach’s Alpha test value of 0.81
confirms that they form a reliable scale in all three Baltic countries. According to this index a very
negative attitude toward immigrants (2 or less on the xenophobia scale) is shared by 26%-27% of
Latvians and Estonians, and by 21% of Lithuanians. This suggests that, under normal
circumstances, attitudes are moderately negative, but not extremely negative in Baltic societies.
Figure 51. Distribution of attitudes toward immigrants
Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely negative attitude) to 5 (extremely
positive attitude).
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 59
Figure 52. Distribution of attitudes toward immigrants in three Baltic countries
Figure 53. The xenophobia index
Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely negative attitude) to 5 (extremely positive
attitude) in all Baltic states.
In general, as confirmed by a one-sample T test, attitudes toward immigrants in the Baltic
states are more negative than positive (mean value in the xenophobia index–2.9). Moreover, they
are rather stable over time, as the only notable changes can be observed in Latvia where an
attitude toward immigrants has become more positive since 1995. Beyond this, over recent times
in the Baltic states, there have not been any notable changes in the generally negative attitudes
held toward immigrants.
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
3.01
2.93 2.942.98
2.60
2.842.80 2.83
2.30
2.40
2.50
2.60
2.70
2.80
2.90
3.00
3.10
2013 2019 2013 2019 1995 2003 2013 2019
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
60
THE PROTECTIONISM INDEX
The last index illustrates a general attitude toward protectionism in the Baltic states
(questions 5 to 8 in the Q8 block, see Appendix A). Considering that all four protectionism-related
items are strongly correlated, and the Principal component analysis suggests a one-factor solution
(the variables explain 53% of the variation in the data and all have high factor loadings), an index
was created that ranges from 1 to 5. In this case, ‘1’ means that a person strongly supports
protectionism, whereas ‘5’ means complete openness to international competition and
cooperation. Crombach’s Alpha of 0.7 confirms that variables form an acceptable scale. The data
reveal a relatively high level of support for protectionism across the Baltic countries. The average
value on the protectionism scale is 2.63.
Figure 54. Distribution of openness to free trade
Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely protective) to 5 (fully open to
competition).
Cross-sectional analysis demonstrates that Latvians are more prone to accept protectionist
claims compared to Estonians and Lithuanians. However, the dispersion analysis (ANOVA) shows
that Baltic populations are also becoming more open to free trade.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 61
Figure 55. Distribution of openness toward competition in three Baltic countries
Figure 56. The dynamics of public opinion toward the openness to free trade (2013-2019)
Note: The figure shows the numeric distribution of answers from 1 (extremely protective) to 5 (fully open to
competition) in all Baltic states.
0%
2%
4%
6%
8%
10%
12%
14%
16%
18%
20%
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
2.69 2.782.62 2.73
2.382.19
2.48 2.39
0.00
0.50
1.00
1.50
2.00
2.50
3.00
2013 2019 2013 2019 1995 2003 2013 2019
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
62
OPINION GROUPS
This section focuses on the composition of particular opinion groups that are behind the
ideological attitudes of Baltic societies, outlined in the previous sections. The 2019 survey used
two items for the purpose of controlling the survey items related to polarization topics. These
control variables measure one’s engagement with political information, indicating the level of
exposure to political news and informal discussions about politics.9 Three opinion groups can be
distinguished on the basis of these items: opinion leaders, opinion seekers, and politically
alienated people. The logic that determined the coding of these groups is shown in Table 1. The
distribution for these groups is similar in all Baltic countries with the caveat that in Lithuania there
are slightly more opinion leaders (16%, Fig.58).
Figure 57. Distribution of the opinion groups in the society of the Baltic states
Note: The figure shows the proportional distribution of society of the Baltic states into the three defined opinion
groups.
9 ‘How often do you follow political events via television, radio, newspapers or through internet sites, including social media (Facebook, Twitter, VKontakte u. c.)?’ and ‘When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?’. The latter question is from the European Value Survey.
13%
46%
41%
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
Opinion leaders Opinion seekers Politically alienated
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 63
Table 1. Following news and discussing political matters among opinion groups
When meeting friends, how often do you
discuss political issues?
Often Sometimes Never
How frequently do
you follow political
events in the
media?
Every day 13.3% 30.2% 6.8%
Several times a week 1.5% 15.1% 3.8%
One or two times a
week .3% 8.4% 3.9%
Less often .2% 5.0% 6.1%
Never .1% 1.3% 4.0%
Note: The table shows the proportion of respondents in the Baltic states whose answers fall within a particular cell.
For example, 13.3 per cent follow political events in the media every day AND discuss political issues with friends
often. The highlighting shows to which opinion groups respondents with such self-assessment belong, e.g. the
previously mentioned 13.3% of respondents are categorized as opinion leaders (the red color area). The orange cells
mark opinion seekers, and the blue cells designate the politically alienated group.
Figure 58. Opinion groups in the Baltic countries
Note: The figure shows the percentage distribution of opinion groups in the Baltic states
11.7
45.343.0
16.3
46.2
37.5
11.2
46.8
42.0
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
Opinionleaders
Opinionseekers
Politicallyalienated
Opinionleaders
Opinionseekers
Politicallyalienated
Opinionleaders
Opinionseekers
Politicallyalienated
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
64
Looking at their respective attitudes, one can notice that Estonian and Lithuanian opinion
leaders in general tend to harbor more pro-Western attitudes and a more positive view of their
own country. Opinion leaders are less exposed to the failed state discourse, and, considering their
impact on the development of others, we can expect more positive dynamics in the future.
However, the more pro-Western orientation of opinion leaders has not stopped the rise of
skepticism against the West in Lithuania and Estonia. This could be associated with targeted
content provided by certain media channels that opinion leaders are unable to fully counteract. In
Latvia, however, opinion leaders cannot be particularly associated with pro-Western orientation
or with weaker exposure to the failed state discourse. In fact, they are even more skeptical toward
the Latvian state than opinion seekers (though less than the politically alienated group). In all Baltic
countries, opinion leaders do not express a more positive attitude toward immigrants and they
are not more open toward international trade competition. The skepticism toward immigrants
that is expressed among opinion leaders is one of the reasons for why anti-immigrant feeling tends
to persist in the Baltic states, and, judging from the data, we cannot expect significant changes to
occur in the near future.
Table 2. The opinion groups’ profiles
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
Op
inio
n le
ader
s
Op
inio
n s
eeke
rs
Polit
ical
ly a
lien
ated
Op
inio
n le
ader
s
Op
inio
n s
eeke
rs
Polit
ical
ly a
lien
ated
Op
inio
n le
ader
s
Op
inio
n s
eeke
rs
Polit
ical
ly a
lien
ated
Western
orientation 2.98 2.94 2.91 2.81 2.76 2.67 2.72 2.77 2.57
Exposure to
failed state
discourse
2.89 2.77 2.70 2.31 2.13 2.20 2.18 2.28 2.05
Attitude
toward
immigrants
2.96 2.98 2.88 2.95 2.96 3.01 2.79 2.82 2.86
Protectionis
m 2.79 2.79 2.78 2.70 2.66 2.80 2.35 2.37 2.44
Note: The table shows the mean answers of the members of various opinion groups in different Baltic states
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 65
Opinion leaders in all Baltic countries demonstrate a stronger pride in their citizenship, and
they are more often convinced that people who do not accept the traditions and habits of the
country cannot fully become a part of it, i.e., these individuals can be considered more
nationalistic.
The Latvians and Estonians that can be identified as politically alienated most often refrain
from blaming Russia in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, and think that both countries are equally
responsible for the conflict. This suggests that reluctance to support Ukraine is related to an overall
disengagement from political discourse. Nevertheless, the survey data cannot disentangle causal
relationships, i.e. it is also possible that people whose opinion differs from the majority of others
tend to become more cynical and alienated from the political process.
It is also important to note that Latvian and Estonian opinion leaders are, compared to other
opinion groups, much more often inclined to believe that Russia constitutes a military threat to
their country, and that sanctions against Russia should be strengthened. In Lithuania, however,
three opinion groups do not differ with respect to these items. Hence it is possible to argue that
the attitude of Lithuanian society toward Russia will not change in the near future, unless Russia’s
political leadership also radically changes. In Latvia and Estonia, however, opinion leaders could
further strengthen a critical attitude toward Russia in the public opinion.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
66
Table 3. The opinion groups’ attitudes
Note: The table shows the mean answers or the percentage of answers of the members of various opinion groups in
different Baltic states. For example, 30.7% of opinion leaders in Estonia have said ‘Yes’ to the question on whether
Russia presents a military threat.
Opi
nion
lead
ers
Opi
nion
see
kers
Polit
ical
ly a
liena
ted
Opi
nion
lead
ers
Opi
nion
see
kers
Polit
ical
ly a
liena
ted
Opi
nion
lead
ers
Opi
nion
see
kers
Polit
ical
ly a
liena
ted
Mostly Russia 59.4 51.9 39.0 50.4 46.6 49.7 48.3 48.2 33.4
Mostly Ukraine 16.6 18.0 20.3 7.8 6.4 8.1 21.1 17.4 21.3
Both countries equally 24.0 30.1 40.7 41.8 47.0 42.2 30.6 34.5 45.2
Tightened 35.8 30.0 27.1 28.6 26.6 30.2 29.3 22.9 12.8
Maintained in their current
form 33.7 38.7 36.7 50.1 54.2 53.9 28.3 38.3 36.1
Softened 30.5 31.4 36.2 21.2 19.2 15.8 42.4 38.8 51.1
Yes 30.7 21.0 18.9 15.3 15.2 14.9 22.6 13.2 8.4
Rather yes 22.7 29.4 27.1 38.1 33.4 37.7 33.7 30.3 26.8
Rather no 25.9 21.7 22.2 34.6 38.0 32.2 20.3 28.9 28.8
No 20.7 27.9 31.8 12.0 13.4 15.3 23.4 27.6 36.1
Completely agree 25.1 19.3 21.3 14.9 9.8 14.0 34.3 20.6 11.8
Agree 27.7 26.0 25.5 32.5 35.1 26.3 28.7 37.9 30.6
Neither agree or disagree 20.6 26.9 26.0 28.4 35.2 31.1 23.3 26.7 33.3
Disagree 17.9 20.6 18.9 17.7 16.7 22.5 10.9 11.9 19.7
Completely disagree 8.7 7.1 8.3 6.5 3.2 6.1 2.8 2.9 4.7
Very proud 48.0 41.0 33.6 53.5 35.4 32.2 45.2 35.7 22.8
Somewhat proud 42.7 45.9 47.2 27.4 43.4 41.0 29.9 37.4 33.9
Not very proud 9.3 10.4 12.4 16.2 15.0 16.5 13.8 14.1 19.4
Not proud at all 0.0 2.8 6.8 3.0 6.2 10.4 4.5 5.5 13.1
I am not a citizen of
(COUNTRY) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.6 7.4 10.7
Life satisfaction (average on a scale from 1
to 10) 6.5 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.2 6.5 5.9 6.2 6.2
It is impossible for people who do not
share [COUNTRY’S] customs and
traditions to become fully attached to
[COUNTRY].
How proud are you to be a citizen of
(COUNTRY)?
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
Who do you think bears the most
responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine
conflict which began in 2014?
Should the current sanctions against
Russia by the EU be:
Do you think that Russia presents a
military threat for [COUNTRY]?
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 67
CLUSTERS OF SOCIETY
Populations in the Baltic states tend to have a complex set of attitudes. In order to obtain an
informative overview of this complexity and how a set of different opinions form more or less
cohesive opinion groups, a hierarchical cluster analysis (Between-groups linkage method, Squared
Euclidean distance) is used in this report. The grouping is conducted on the basis of the
aforementioned opinion items, including those on Ukraine and Russia, but excluding the national
pride item. To summarize these findings, two distinct opinion clusters can be outlined for the Baltic
states. The first cluster is characterized by pro-Western stances, but the second cluster is marked
by anti-Western orientations (Table 4). Pro-Western respondents tend to be less exposed to the
failed state discourse, this category holds a more positive attitude toward immigrants and people
with different traditions and customs; it is a social category that is also more open to globalist and
anti-protectionist ideas. A clear majority of pro-Western respondents (88%) believe that Russia is
mostly responsible for the Russia-Ukraine conflict, whereas only 4% of the anti-Western cluster
does. Likewise, the majority believe that sanctions against Russia should be tightened (48%
support with only 6% opposing). Overall, pro-Western respondents tend to see Russia as a military
threat, whereas the anti-Western cluster mostly does not (Table 7).
The country-level analysis reveals large differences between the Baltic states (Figure 14). In
Estonia almost two-thirds (63%) of society have a pro-Western orientation, whereas in Latvia only
46% report having the same.
Figure 59. Opinion clusters
Note: The figure shows the proportional distribution of pro- and anti-Western groups in different Baltic states.
36.6 41.853.5
63.4 58.246.5
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
Anti-Western Pro-Western
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
68
These clusters also differ from each other demographically. Pro-Western respondents are
younger than anti-Western respondents. They more often hold higher education (40% vs.28%);
whereas the anti-Western cluster more often encompasses those with professional education
(42% vs. 31%). Similarly, pro-Western respondents have a higher personal and household income
and are happier with their life in general. Large differences can be observed in terms of ethnicity
and citizenship. Anti-Western respondents are more often representatives of ethnic minorities
and are more likely to be found among those that are not the citizens of the country. Fewer of
them tend to follow political events on a daily basis (50% among anti-Westerners vs. 60% among
pro-Westerners respondents). Pro-Western respondents hold greater pride in being a citizen of
their country. One can conclude that various factors are responsible for anti-Western views, such
as education, ethnicity, personal income and life satisfaction. However, among these socio-
demographic factors, either citizenship or ethnicity is the main determinant of ideological
polarization in the Baltic countries.
Table 4. The profile of opinion clusters
Anti-
Western
Pro-
Western
Attitude toward immigrants
Openness toward competition
Western orientation
Perception of the state
(index from 1 to 5)
(index from 1 to 5)
(index from 1 to 4)
(index from 1 to 4)
2.7 3.1
2.4 2.9
2.5 3.1
2.2 2.6
It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S]
customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].
Completely agree 16.7% 23.7%
Agree 37.6% 26.2%
Neither agree or disagree 21.8% 26.1%
Disagree 18.2% 19.8%
Completely disagree 5.6% 4.2%
Who do you think bears the most responsibility for the Russia-
Ukraine conflict which began in 2014?
Mostly Russia 4.3% 87.9%
Mostly Ukraine 29.5% 3.5%
Both countries equally 66.2% 8.6%
Should the current sanctions against Russia by the EU be: Tightened 5.6% 47.1%
Maintained in their current
form 37.6% 47.6%
Softened 56.8% 5.3%
Do you think that Russia presents a military threat for
[COUNTRY]?
Yes 5.6% 31.4%
Rather yes 21.0% 44.4%
Rather no 35.1% 21.8%
No 38.3% 2.4%
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 69
Age (mean) 48 44
Gender A man 51.2% 51.9%
A woman 48.8% 48.1%
Citizenship Citizens of the country 78.6% 95.0%
Not citizens of the country 21.4% 5.0%
Education No education 0.0% 1.2%
Primary education 10.8% 8.1%
Secondary education 19.0% 19.5%
Professional secondary
education 42.5% 31.1%
Higher education 27.7% 40.2%
How frequently follows political events in the media Every day 50.3% 60.4%
Several times a week 24.0% 16.9%
One or two times a week 12.0% 10.5%
Less often 9.2% 8.4%
Never 4.4% 3.8%
How frequently discusses political events with friends Frequently 21.3% 20.1%
Sometimes 57.9% 63.5%
Never 20.8% 16.4%
Respondent's income Low 34.6% 27.2%
Medium low 27.8% 25.8%
Medium high 22.0% 24.8%
High 15.6% 22.3%
Household income Low 12.6% 20.4%
Medium low 30.2% 30.8%
Medium high 30.3% 14.0%
High 26.9% 34.8%
Ethnicity (Lithuania) Lithuanian 85.2% 93.2%
Russian 7.1% 2.1%
Polish 6.2% 2.0%
Other 1.5% 2.8%
How proud are you to be a citizen of (COUNTRY)? Very proud 27.7% 47.3%
Somewhat proud 38.7% 39.2%
Not very proud 20.2% 9.8%
Not proud at all 7.5% 3.0%
I am not a citizen of
(COUNTRY) 6.0% .7%
Life satisfaction (average) (scale from 1 to 10) 6.7 7.3
Note: The table shows the proportional distribution of pro- and anti-Western groups’ answers or their mean answers.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019
70
As Table 5 demonstrates, pro- and anti-Western groups across the Baltic states are more
similar in some opinions and less similar in others. For example, the pro-Western and anti-Western
groups in Latvia are equally xenophobic and protectionist, but they differ very strongly in their
perception of Russia as a military threat and in their willingness to soften Western sanctions. A
pro-Kremlin versus an anti-Kremlin attitude is ultimately the main point of contention between
these groups in Latvia. In Lithuania, the opinion of different groups is generally less diverging than
in Latvia or Estonia, except that Lithuania’s anti-Westerners overwhelmingly believe that both
Russia and Ukraine are to blame for the conflict, whereas pro-Westerners mostly blame Russia.
Thus, a pro-Kremlin attitude within the context of the Russia-Ukraine conflict again plays a decisive
polarizing role. In Estonia, these groups contrast more than in other Baltic countries in terms of
how strongly pro-Western or anti-Western they are, and also in terms of their attitudes toward
immigrants.
Table 5. Differences between pro-Western and anti-Western groups in all Baltic countries
Note: The table shows the proportional distribution of answers among pro- and anti-Western groups, or the mean
of their answers in different Baltic states.
1 2 Diff. 1 2 Diff. 1 2 Diff.
Western orientation 2.60 3.24 0.64 2.50 2.92 0.41 2.43 2.99 0.56
Perception of the
state 2.53 2.95 0.41 2.02 2.35 0.33 2.03 2.47 0.44
Attitude towards
immigrants2.58 3.18 0.60 2.68 3.21 0.53 2.77 2.91 0.13
Openness towards
competition2.44 3.07 0.63 2.37 3.02 0.64 2.31 2.45 0.14
Completely agree 15.0% 23.7% 0.09 18.3% 17.2% -0.01 17.9% 33.5% 0.16
Agree 38.8% 20.8% -0.18 40.6% 29.6% -0.11 33.2% 30.6% -0.03
Neither agree or
disagree16.3% 30.7% 0.14 25.1% 22.3% -0.03 23.2% 24.1% 0.01
Disagree 21.1% 20.8% 0.00 13.7% 24.9% 0.11 20.0% 11.2% -0.09
Completely disagree 8.8% 4.0% -0.05 2.3% 6.0% 0.04 5.8% .6% -0.05
Mostly Russia 4.1% 87.6% 0.84 3.4% 86.7% 0.83 4.7% 91.8% 0.87
Mostly Ukraine 32.7% 1.8% -0.31 15.4% 3.9% -0.12 37.4% 5.3% -0.32
Both countries equally 63.3% 10.6% -0.53 81.1% 9.4% -0.72 57.9% 2.9% -0.55
Tightened 8.2% 50.0% 0.42 6.3% 51.1% 0.45 4.2% 42.4% 0.38
Maintained in their
current form34.0% 46.0% 0.12 46.9% 46.4% -0.01 27.4% 47.6% 0.20
Softened 57.8% 4.0% -0.54 46.9% 2.6% -0.44 68.4% 10.0% -0.58
Yes 10.2% 32.1% 0.22 3.4% 32.2% 0.29 4.2% 28.2% 0.24
Rather yes 20.4% 44.2% 0.24 24.6% 42.9% 0.18 17.4% 48.2% 0.31
Rather no 27.2% 22.3% -0.05 50.3% 21.9% -0.28 25.8% 21.2% -0.05
No 42.2% 1.5% -0.41 21.7% 3.0% -0.19 52.6% 2.4% -0.50
It is impossible for
people who do not
share [COUNTRY’S]
customs and
traditions to become
fully attached to
[COUNTRY].
Who do you think
bears the most
responsibility for the
Russia-Ukraine
conflict which began
in 2014?
Should the current
sanctions against
Russia by the EU be:
Do you think that
Russia presents a
military threat for
[COUNTRY]?
Estonia Lithuania Latvia
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 71
Finally, considering that we found stronger differences between pro- and anti-Western
groups in some countries (Latvia, Estonia), and weaker differences in others (Lithuania), we also
ran the analysis separately for each of these countries to see if the same pro-Western and anti-
Western clusters emerge in each case. If we use such analysis to look deeper, we can find that in
Estonia the attitudes and opinions fall into three broad groups. The largest group (51%) can be
labeled as the “liberals”. They are open to free trade and international cooperation, they are not
xenophobic, see their country as successful and have a pro-Western orientation. The vast majority
within this group hold Russia responsible for the conflict with Ukraine; see Russia as somewhat of
a threat; and believe that sanctions should either be increased or kept at the current level. The
second largest group (40%) can be labeled as “nationalists”. They differ by their xenophobic,
nationalist, and protectionist attitudes. They usually see Russia as a military threat, hold either
Russia or both Ukraine and Russia responsible for the conflict ongoing since 2014, and have diverse
attitudes toward Western sanctions. The third group (8%) – “pro-Russians” – tend to see Estonia
as a failed state, have anti-Western attitudes, usually hold Ukraine solely responsible for the
conflict with Russia, do not see Russia as a threat and think that Western sanctions should be
weakened. They also disagree that people that do not accept the traditions of Estonia cannot fully
belong to Estonia.
Table 6. Clusters in Estonia
Clusters
1 2 3
Western orientation 2.50 3.04 3.07
Perception of the state 2.17 2.42 2.69
Attitude toward immigrants 2.69 1.97 3.51
Openness toward competition 2.36 1.95 3.22
It is impossible for people who do not share
[COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to
become fully attached to [COUNTRY].
Completely
agree 17.0% 68.0% 8.9%
Agree 37.4% 31.4% 24.6%
Neither agree
or disagree 21.9% .6% 34.9%
Disagree 18.2% 0.0% 26.5%
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72
Completely
disagree 5.5% 0.0% 5.1%
Who do you think bears the most
responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine conflict
which began in 2014?
Mostly Russia 4.1% 99.4% 84.6%
Mostly Ukraine 28.6% .6% 4.4%
Both countries
equally 67.3% 0.0% 11.1%
Should the current sanctions against Russia
by the EU be:
Tightened 6.1% 59.9% 44.6%
Maintained in
their current
form
36.0% 34.3% 50.7%
Softened 57.9% 5.8% 4.8%
Do you think that Russia presents a military
threat for [COUNTRY]?
Yes 5.7% 45.9% 26.1%
Rather yes 20.7% 43.6% 45.1%
Rather no 34.4% 8.1% 26.5%
No 39.1% 2.3% 2.2%
How proud are you to be a citizen of
(COUNTRY)?
Very proud 28.7% 47.4% 48.9%
Somewhat
proud 38.0% 32.2% 41.1%
Not very proud 20.0% 15.8% 7.3%
Not proud at all 7.6% 3.5% 2.2%
I am not a
citizen of
(COUNTRY)
5.7% 1.2% .4%
Note: The table shows the proportional distribution of the three groups’ answers, or their mean answers in Estonia.
In Latvia, opinion categories fall into two major groups – very similarly to those described in earlier
analysis where all three countries were taken together. The largest can be labeled “anti-
Westerners” (55%). They largely see Latvia as a failed state; have an anti-Western orientation; and
support protectionism and xenophobic claims. They usually hold both Russia and Ukraine, or
sometimes only Ukraine, responsible for the conflict ongoing since 2014, they think that Russia
does not possess a military threat to their country and most within this group believe that the
Western sanctions against Russia should be weakened. The “anti-Russia nationalists” (44%) are
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 73
also xenophobic and protectionist, but not as skeptical about the state of affairs in Latvia and the
West as the “anti-Westerners”. Unlike the anti-Westerners, almost all within the anti-Russian
nationalist cohort blame Russia for the conflict with Ukraine, and are generally more nationalist.
Likewise, most of them think that Russia is a threat and that the Western sanctions should be
either increased or at least kept at the same level. There is also a very small group (just 2%) of
“liberals” that express profoundly liberal views in terms of immigration and globalization,
demonstrate highly pro-Western views, do not think that it is necessary to accept Latvia’s
traditions to become fully attached to Latvia, and see the viability of Latvia’s statehood more
positively than others.
Lithuanians seem to be, more or less, one uniform opinion group, as only one cluster is
suggested by our statistical analysis. The analysis suggests that Lithuanians are the most
ideologically cohesive society among the Baltic states, with the lowest potential for ideological
fragmentation.
A simple yet efficient way to explore the polarization of opinions is to calculate the ratio
between the top and bottom deciles of the distribution – similarly to how it is done in some of the
widely used inequality measures. The calculation is done by taking the top 10% of individuals and
dividing their average by the average of the bottom 10% of individuals. The resulting measure
provides a mathematical expression of the polarization in answers to the particular question
between the top and bottom 10%. Moreover, besides the 90/10 ratio it is common to calculate
the 90/50 or 10/50 ratio to see how far removed from the ‘average’ or how extreme - the top or
bottom 10% are.
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74
Table 7. Clusters in Latvia
Clusters
1 2 3
Western orientation 2.98 2.44 3.53
Perception of the state 2.49 2.02 2.81
Attitude toward immigrants 2.79 2.84 4.17
Openness toward competition 2.32 2.37 4.04
It is impossible for people
who do not share
[COUNTRY’S] customs and
traditions to become fully
attached to [COUNTRY].
Completely agree 36.9% 16.8% 0.0%
Agree 36.9% 28.9% 0.0%
Neither agree or
disagree 21.0% 26.4% 0.0%
Disagree 4.5% 22.3% 100.0%
Completely
disagree .6% 5.6% 0.0%
Who do you think bears the
most responsibility for the
Russia-Ukraine conflict
which began in 2014?
Mostly Russia 98.7% 2.0% 100.0%
Mostly Ukraine 1.3% 39.6% 0.0%
Both countries
equally 0.0% 58.4% 0.0%
Should the current
sanctions against Russia by
the EU be:
Tightened 42.7% 5.1% 50.0%
Maintained in their
current form 47.1% 29.4% 16.7%
Softened 10.2% 65.5% 33.3%
Do you think that Russia
presents a military threat
for [COUNTRY]?
Yes 29.9% 4.6% 0.0%
Rather yes 51.0% 17.8% 0.0%
Rather no 17.8% 25.9% 100.0%
No 1.3% 51.8% 0.0%
Note: The table shows the proportional distribution of the three groups’ answers, or their mean answers, in Latvia.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 75
Table 8. Polarization of opinions - decile ratio
Western orientation
Perception of the state
Attitude toward immigrants
Openness toward competition
Estonia 90/10 1.73 1.79 2.60 2.67
Lithuania 90/10 1.55 2.00 2.00 2.14
Latvia 90/10 1.89 2.33 2.40 2.70
Western orientation
Perception of the state
Attitude toward immigrants
Openness toward competition
Estonia 50/10 1.36 1.36 1.80 1.83
Lithuania 50/10 1.27 1.60 1.50 1.57
Latvia 50/10 1.44 1.67 1.80 1.80
Our analysis suggests that overall Lithuanians hold the most homogenous public opinion.
Opinions on openness to competition and protectionism form the most polarizing context in all
Baltic countries, i.e. people strongly believe in one or in other side of the same issue. Data about
Latvia reveal the biggest polarization in regards to Western orientation and the perception of the
state, as the decile ratio is higher than in other countries (Table 8). The 50/10 distribution confirms
that there is a group that has quite extreme opinions in terms of seeing Latvia as a failed state and
holding anti-Western views. In Estonia, the polarization of public opinion on immigrants is more
pronounced than in other countries, i.e. some part of the society would gladly welcome them
while others are strongly against. In Latvia and Lithuania, the views on immigrants are more
homogeneously negative.
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76
CONCLUSIONS
This report unveils the varying level and potential of ideological polarization in Baltic
societies. It has been insisted that it is essential to separate country-specific trends from the
regional polarization patterns that have been molded in particular contexts. Rarely can a country-
level ideological polarization be characterized as antagonistic. In other words, moderate or
pluralistic polarization patterns prevail in Baltic public opinion. This does not necessarily create
healthy conditions for democracy. Neither can a strong consensus that demoralizes the
democratic order and opposes to democratic values create favorable conditions. Simultaneously,
the differences between the Baltic societies should also be taken into account, as these might limit
the generalizability of the explanations and strategies for coping with the trends of antagonistic
polarization.
The Western orientation context indicates that Baltic societies are inclined to support pro-
Western views and institutions. It also suggests that anti-Westerners are less coherent as an
opinion group than pro-Westerners. Nevertheless, the pro-Western consensus significantly varies
across the three Baltic states. Latvian public opinion demonstrates the highest level of ideological
polarization, whereas Estonian and Lithuanian public opinion holds a stronger consensus toward
the Western orientation. Estonian public opinion is however more consistent by comparison, as
polarization within Lithuanian public opinion increases when Western influence is juxtaposed to
Russian influence or when Lithuanian traditional values are confronted with Western values.
Moreover, the Western orientation index suggests that the pro-Western consensus in both
Lithuania and Estonia has weakened over the last three years, thus increasing the potential for
polarization.
The failed state context also highlights profound differences between Baltic societies. While
Estonians hold a moderately positive consensus about the Estonian state, their public opinion is
highly polarized, particularly on emigration; the country’s financial autonomy; and the perception
of the political elite. In contrast, Latvians and Lithuanians are extremely pessimistic about their
country’s viability and performance. Hence, two different polarization patterns can be observed:
one between dominant optimists and minor pessimists (Estonia) and another between dominant
pessimists and minor optimists (Latvia and Lithuania).
The xenophobia context that is largely limited in this report to the attitude toward
immigrants also exhibits a rather inconsistent pattern. Despite the fact that slightly negative
opinion toward immigrants prevails in the Baltic states, and that Latvians and Estonians hold a
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 77
relatively stronger consensus about the positive or negative characteristics of immigration, the
2019 data reveal a rather polarized public opinion in all Baltic societies. A moderate polarization is
particularly salient in Lithuania. This analysis suggests that inward labor migration and labor
migrants, particularly from familiar cultures, might trigger the highest polarization risk in society.
In contrast, other migrant groups from more unfamiliar cultures would likely provoke a more
dominant anti-immigrant attitude in Baltic societies. Nevertheless, the attitude toward immigrants
has not changed over the past decade. This perhaps means that the recent refugee crisis in Europe
has not significantly increased the level of anti-immigration sentiment in the Baltic states.
The economic protectionism context indicates a considerable level of support for
protectionist ideas in all Baltic societies. However, this attitudinal pattern is again not consistent.
While Latvians express a strong consensus toward support for protectionist ideas and Estonians
demonstrate a somewhat moderate support by comparison, Lithuanian public opinion reveals the
highest level of polarization. Acknowledging that support for free trade and international
cooperation has increased slightly in the Baltic states over the last six years; this analysis also
suggests that polarization as regards protectionism might nevertheless strengthen in the next
years. This is especially likely should this trend be systematically cultivated by incumbent political
parties and if the economic situation was to considerably deteriorate.
This report has also sought to outline the various dimensions and features of the major
opinion groups that generate polarization in the Baltic societies. On the most aggregate level, two
large clusters of pro-Western and anti-Western opinion groups can be identified. According to our
data, the major ideological fault line appears to be the attitude toward Russia and the Kremlin’s
strategic narratives. Nevertheless, the size and sociological portrayal of these clusters may
ideologically vary on the country level. While Estonians and Latvians display strong differences
between nationally-minded and pro-Kremlin opinion groups, the potential of ideological
antagonism is less pronounced in Lithuanian public opinion. Hence a pluralistic ideological
polarization is more characteristic in Lithuania than in Estonia or Latvia.
Various socio-demographic factors are responsible for separating opinion groups, such as:
education; ethnicity; household income; and satisfaction with life. However, among these factors,
ethnicity and country-level regional differences are the most consistent determinants of
ideological polarization. In Estonia and Latvia, ethnic identification and country-level regional
differences occasionally overlap. This highlights significant ideological polarization between the
ethnic majority and the Russophone minority. While these differences are more significant in
terms of the Western orientation indicator, their importance declines in other polarization
contexts where geopolitical self-positioning is less relevant. In Lithuania, ethnicity does not play
an important differentiating role at all. Instead, internal regional and socio-economic differences
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78
(income, education) become more significant socio-demographic factors with the ability to predict
differences between pro-Westerners and anti-Westerners.
In order to highlight the potential sources of social attitudes, this report has sought to
extrapolate more specific opinion groups. This has taken the relations between political
socialization and exposure to political discourse into consideration. Our findings show that the
most politically socialized opinion group in the Baltic states (‘opinion leaders’) are more Western-
oriented compared to the groups that are less exposed to an everyday political discourse. ‘Opinion
leaders’ also express stronger national pride and are more optimistic about their country when it
comes to the failed state claims. At the same time, their Western orientation does not translate
into a more positive attitude toward immigration. Such relations between political socialization
and ideological attitudes is more noticeable in Estonia and Lithuania, whereas Latvian ‘opinion
leaders’ are inclined to align with the attitudes that characterize groups that are less socialized
politically.
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 79
APPENDIX A. THE QUESTIONNAIRE OF THE 2019 SURVEY
Q1 Please tell me if you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the
following statements?
Q2 Who do you think bears the most responsibility for the Russia-Ukraine conflict which began in 2014?
Mostly Russia 1
Mostly Ukraine 2
Both countries equally 3
I don’t know/Hard to say 8
Q3 Following the Russian annexation of Crimea and the military engagement in Eastern Ukraine, the US and EU have imposed economic and political sanctions on Russia. Should the current sanctions against Russia by the EU be:
Tightened 1
Maintained in their current form 2
Softened 3
I don’t know/Hard to say 8
Completely
agree Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
The EU will soon collapse 1 2 3 4 8
A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West
1 2 3 4 8
It’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other western powers
1 2 3 4 8
There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West
1 2 3 4 8
Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states poses a threat to Russia
1 2 3 4 8
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80
Q4 Do you think that Russia presents a military threat for [COUNTRY]?
Yes 1
Rather yes 2
Rather no 3
No 4
I don’t know/Hard to say 8
Q5 I am going to read a list of popular statements. Some people completely agree, some tend to agree or tend to disagree. Others completely disagree. What do you think?
Q6 All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?
Dissatisfied Satisfied
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Completely
agree Tend to agree
Tend to disagree
Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
[COUNTRY] cannot exist as an independent state
1 2 3 4 8
Poverty and unemployment prevails in [COUNTRY]
1 2 3 4 8
Economy of [COUNTRY] is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development of the country
1 2 3 4 8
[COUNTRY’S] existence depends on the EU financial assistance 1 2 3 4 8
Every day many residents leave [COUNTRY] and do not want to live here
1 2 3 4 8
The people of [COUNTRY] is on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years
1 2 3 4 8
[COUNTRY’S] politicians are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the nation
1 2 3 4 8
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 81
Q7 How proud are you to be a citizen of (COUNTRY)?
Very proud 1
Somewhat proud 2
Not very proud 3
Not proud at all 4
I am not a citizen of (COUNTRY) (DO
NOT READ)
7
Don’t know (DO NOT READ) 8
Refused (DO NOT READ) 9
Q8 How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
Completely
agree Agree Neither
agree or disagree
Disagree Completely disagree
Hard to say/ NA
It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].
1 2 3 4
5 8
Immigrants increase crime rates.
1 2 3 4
5 8
Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [COUNTRY].
1 2 3 4
5 8
[COUNTRY’S] culture is generally undermined by immigrants.
1 2 3 4
5 8
[COUNTRY] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.
1 2 3 4
5 8
Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [COUNTRY].
1 2 3 4
5 8
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82
Q9
How often do you follow politics in the news on television, radio, in the press or on the Internet sites and social
media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, VKontakte etc.)?
Every day 1
Several times a week 2
Once or twice a week 3
Less often 4
Never 5
Don’t know (spontaneous) 8
No answer (spontaneous) 9
Q10 When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently,
occasionally or never?
Frequently 1
Occasionally 2
Never 3
Don’t know (spontaneous) 8
No answer (spontaneous) 9
Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [COUNTRY].
1 2 3 4
5 8
International organizations are taking away too much power from the [COUNTRY’S] government.
1 2 3 4
5 8
© Mārtiņš Kaprāns, Inta Mieriņa, 2019 83
APPENDIX B. SURVEY WAVES AND SOURCES
Survey items Previous waves Source
Q1.1 2017 Latvian Institute of International Affairs, research “Euroscepticism in the Baltic States” Q5.1 2017
Q1.2 – Q1.4 2016 Pew Research Center, survey “Religion and social life” Q7
Q2 2015 Institute of Public Affairs, Poland; research “Baltic Group: Poland, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. In search of common interests”
Q3 Q4
Q6 1999, 2008 European Value Survey Q10
Q8 1995*, 2003*, 2013, 2019
The National identity module of International Social Survey Program
*Data are available only for Latvia
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84
APPENDIX C. STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT (P<.05) SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICAL DIFFERENCES WITHIN SURVEY ITEMS
EE LT LV EE LT LV EE LT LV EE LT LV EE LT LV
Ethnic identification Region/county Education Income Age
Q1.1 EU will soon collapse x x x x x x x x x x x x
Q1.2 A strong Russia is necessary to balance the influence of the West
x x x x x x x x x x
Q1.3 It’s in our country’s interest to work closely with the US and other western powers
x x x x x x x
Q1.4 There is a conflict between our country’s traditional values and those of the West
x x x x x x x x x x x x
Q1.5 Strengthening the NATO presence in the Baltic states poses a threat to Russia
x x x x x x x
Q3 Attitude toward the EU sanctions against Russia
x x x x x x x x x
Q5.1 [COUNTRY] cannot exist as an independent state
x x x x x x x x x x
Q5.2 Poverty and unemployment prevails in [COUNTRY]
x x x x x x x x x x x x
Q5.3 Economy of [COUNTRY] is underdeveloped and cannot ensure the sufficient and long-term development of the country
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
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Q5.4 [COUNTRY’S] existence depends on the EU financial assistance
x x x x x x x x x x
Q5.5 Every day many residents leave [COUNTRY] and do not want to live here
x x x x x x x x x x
Q5.6 The people of [COUNTRY] is on the edge of extinction and will cease to exist in 100 years
x x x x x x x x x x
Q5.7 [COUNTRY’S] politicians are corrupt and do not care about the interests of the nation
x x x x x x x x x
Q8.1 It is impossible for people who do not share [COUNTRY’S] customs and traditions to become fully attached to [COUNTRY].
x x x x x x x x x x x x
Q8.2 Immigrants increase crime rates.
x x x x x x x x x x
Q8.3 Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [COUNTRY].
x x x x x x x x x x x
Q8.4 [COUNTRY’S] culture is generally undermined by immigrants.
x x x x x x
Q8.5 [COUNTRY] should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy.
x x x x x x x x x x x
Q8.6 Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in [COUNTRY].
x x x x x x x x x x x x
Q8.7 Large international companies are doing more and more damage to local businesses in [COUNTRY].
x x x x x x x x x x x
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Q8.8 International organizations are taking away too much power from the [COUNTRY’S] government.
x x x x x x x x x x x
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